British strategic bombing, 1917-1918:

The Independent Force and its predecessors

Andrew Whitmarsh

After more than eighty years, the British strategic bombing campaign of 1917-
1918 may seem little more than a historical curiosity. It is generally only considered
in passing, as the precedent for the much larger bombing campaigns of the Second
World War. Yet it deserves attention for many reasons--whether at the level of the
personal bravery of those individuals involved, or that of the confused political
environment in which it came about.
This article accompanies Steve Suddaby’s groundbreaking statistical analysis
of the Independent Force’s raids. It is intended to put Steve’s article into a broader
context and to expand on some of the concepts raised in it.
During the First World War, what is today referred to as “strategic bombing”
was generally known instead as long-distance bombing.1 The concept of strategic
bombing is not to attack enemy forces on or near the battlefield--that is tactical
bombing--but to undermine the enemy war effort in other, more indirect ways, such as
by attacking his war industry, his transportation system or the morale of his citizens.
As one author put it: “The defining characteristic of strategic bombing is the objective
or purpose for which it is conducted; strategic bombing is intended to contribute
directly to the achievement of political or military strategic objectives.”2
Before the First World War, there had been little serious study of strategic
bombing. While the issue had been discussed in the British Parliament, for example,
consideration of this subject generally belonged more to the realm of fiction, such as
H.G. Wells’ book "The War in the Air".3 For the initial years of the war, British long-
distance bombing was ignored by the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), which was
preoccupied with providing support to British ground forces. The Royal Naval Air
Service (RNAS) made a number of successful raids against German airship bases.
German airship raids against the United Kingdom began in 1915, causing both
anxiety and civilian casualties, and leading to a considerable diversion of RFC and
RNAS resources to home defence. From October 1916 to April 1917, No. 3 Wing
RNAS made a limited number of long-distance raids on Germany with Sopwith 1½
Strutter aircraft, based near Nancy, on France’s eastern border. However, RFC losses
in “Bloody April” led to the withdrawal of the Wing to support its sister service.
By late 1916, British defences had gained the upper hand over the German
airships. In the following May, German heavy bombers began making bombing
attacks on the UK. These raids had a major impact on the British, both in terms of
civilian morale and casualties. In the light of these attacks, the South African soldier
and statesman General Jan Christian Smuts was asked to investigate the state of
British aviation. The first of his two reports recommended improvements to London’s
air defences, while the second considered how Britain could use aircraft as a strategic
weapon, in the manner which the Germans seemed to have demonstrated so
effectively. The latter report--the Smuts Report of 17 August 1917--famously
recommended the setting up of an independent air service. Smuts argued that “an air
fleet can conduct extensive operations far from, and independently of, both Army and
Navy... the day may not be far off when aerial operations, with their devastation of
enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale, may
become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval
1
operations may become secondary and subordinate.”4 In other words, air power (and
specifically strategic bombing operations) could be used as an independent weapon,
which would require an independent air force to wield it.
Smuts was not the only politically influential man to hold such ideas. In
November 1917, Admiral Mark Kerr of the Air Board (a forerunner of the Air
Ministry) stated that “It is a race between [the Germans] and us… If the Germans get
at us first, with several hundred machines every night, each one carrying several tons
of explosives, Woolwich, Chatham and all the factories in the London district will be
laid flat, part of London wiped out, and workshops in the south-east of England will
be destroyed, and consequently our offensive on land, sea and air will come to an
end… The country who first strikes with its big bombing squadrons of hundreds of
machines at the enemy’s vital spots, will win the war.”5
This was a vision akin to Cold War fears of a nuclear “first strike”. As will be
discussed later, contemporary concepts of strategic bombing were, however, founded
on two flawed beliefs: in the effectiveness of strategic bombing, and in the future
availability of large numbers of aircraft suitable for a bombing campaign. In fact, few
senior RFC officers supported the idea of a British bombing campaign, or indeed the
establishment of an independent air service. Yet in October 1917, the British War
Cabinet took the decision to initiate raids against German towns. The unit tasked with
carrying out these attacks was No. 41 Wing RFC. As the British bombing forces
expanded in size, in February 1918 they were renamed No. VIII Brigade RFC (from 1
April 1918, part of the Royal Air Force, or RAF). On 6 June 1918 this brigade
became the Independent Force RAF (sometimes also referred to as the Independent
Air Force). The area in which the squadrons were based was again to the south of
Nancy, France. Many enemy factories were located nearby, in an area of German
territory lying parallel to the front line and about 200 miles across, but of less depth.
The region therefore offering the attacker a wide choice of targets, while making it
difficult for the Germans to predict where an attack would fall.
Before considering the targets of the Independent Force’s raids, and the
effectiveness of its campaign, it is necessary to examine its resources and capabilities:
the squadrons, their equipment, and the difficulties faced during a mission.
From October 1917 to the following May, No. 41 Wing consisted of a mere
three squadrons. The sole day-bombing unit was No. 55 Squadron, equipped with the
de Havilland D.H.4. The night-bomber aircraft were from No. 16 Squadron RNAS
(later 216 Squadron, and originally known as “A” Naval Squadron) with the Handley
Page O/100 heavy night bomber, and No. 100 Squadron with the outdated Royal
Aircraft Factory F.E.2b. Both No. 100 and No. 216 Squadron’s aircraft were later
replaced with Handley Page O/400 type, which was an improved version of the
O/100.6
Additional squadrons became operational from May 1918 onwards--one in
that month, one in June, and two each in August and September--so that by the end of
the war, the Independent Force comprised nine bomber squadrons. This was roughly
one-tenth of the size of the main body of the RAF on the Western Front. Four of these
nine were day-bomber squadrons (Nos. 55, 99, 104 and 110), each with an
establishment of eighteen de Havilland D.H.4, D.H.9 or D.H.9A aircraft. These types
were all two-seaters, with a pilot and an observer (the main role of the latter was to act
as rear gunner). All five night-bomber squadrons (Nos. 97, 100, 115, 215 and 216)
were equipped with twelve Handley Page O/400 aircraft. The latter had three crew: a
pilot and an observer/bomb-aimer in the nose, as well as a rear gunner. Its endurance
2
was around eight hours--as opposed to between three-and-a-half to five hours for the
D.H.4, D.H.9 and D.H.9A--and its maximum bombload was roughly three times
greater than that of the day bombers.7
The D.H.9 was particularly inadequate for long-distance bombing. It was too
slow, with a low rate of climb, and most importantly, a low ceiling--only 14,000 feet
with bombs--which on operations exposed it to far greater danger from enemy anti-
aircraft fire and fighters. Some 14% of individual D.H.9 sorties had to turn back due
to engine trouble--nine aircraft out of twelve in one of the worst examples.8 Yet the
Independent Force generally received aircraft that, qualitatively if not quantitatively,
were as good as those used by the remainder of the RAF, notably the first operational
D.H.9A squadron (No. 110).9
The equipment used by these aircraft did not meet the demands of the
campaign. Navigation was always difficult, especially over heavy cloud and at night,
since most aircraft lacked reliable compasses--a significant problem during long-
distance raids in high winds. As a result, many pilots did not drop their bombs even
on the right town (indeed, this was a problem in the early years of the Second World
War as well).
Day bombers flew at around 14,000 feet and higher, altitudes at which oxygen
deprivation is a problem. Oxygen apparatus and heated clothing were used to combat
the conditions experienced at these high altitudes. Neither system was reliable, and
merely sitting in an open cockpit under these conditions for several hours was
physically exhausting. Frostbite was common, and crews also often suffered from
headaches and temporary deafness due to the cold and noise. These problems were
not unique to the Independent Force, but were exacerbated due to the great length of
many Independent Force bombing raids.
Weather conditions caused problems in other ways. Operations were cancelled
on over half the days and nights in the months from July to October 1918 due to rain,
strong winds or heavy cloud or mist. Even if bombers did manage to get airborne,
their range was often restricted by unfavourable winds.
Bombsights were also rudimentary. In addition to the technical difficulty of
devising an accurate sight, there were more basic problems. For example, floor-
mounted bombsights in D.H.9s were of little use because they got covered with oil
from the engine. Rather than using bombsights, day bombers often simply released
their bombs when the target went out of sight under the leading edge of the lower
wing of the aircraft. So-called “flock” bombing was used, whereby the whole
formation of six or so aircraft released its bombs on the leader’s signal.10
The Independent Force’s weapons were, of course, its bombs. The heaviest
bomb used weighed 1,650 lbs, and could only be carried by the Handley Page O/400,
with only eleven of these weapons being dropped by the Independent Force. Lighter
bombs were generally inadequate for the task, and sometimes telescoped on impact
rather than exploding.
The targets for a particular raid were selected by Independent Force
Headquarters, and then passed down to individual squadrons. Before the raid, pilots
and observers would visit the squadron map room or intelligence office, which
contained maps showing German defences, and photographs and plans of potential
targets.11
Day and night operations were quite different. Daytime missions were flown
at high altitude in formations of 6-12 aircraft. Each six aircraft were drawn up in a
wedge shape, with the flight leader in front, and the remaining aircraft behind him at
3
different altitudes and at separations of fifty feet or less. It was intended that the
firepower of all six aircraft could be combined to drive off enemy fighters, and the
blind spots of the formation would be minimised. This tight formation had to be held
continuously for up to three or more hours on long raids. If this could be done, it was
generally effective in repelling enemy fighter attacks. Night bombing was done by
individual aircraft, flying at lower altitudes. Night-time flights in Handley Page
O/400s lasted longer--six to eight hours or more--but generally faced less vigorous
opposition.
German anti-aircraft guns, searchlights and balloon barrages were combined
with an effective warning system (including a telephone network connecting local
authorities, defences, and potential targets such as factories and blast furnaces).
Factory buildings were camouflaged, shelters were constructed, and dummy
installations were even built. One night bomber pilot later recalled seeing all the lights
in a German town suddenly go out as his aircraft approached it. Warnings were given
out by sirens or, in towns in daytime, by firemen and policemen cycling around the
streets.12
Initially, the German home defence fighter squadrons used aircraft of lower
quality than front line units, and were generally less aggressive than German fighters
encountered further north. From mid-1918 onwards, however, the fighter opposition
increased. Independent Force bombers--in formations numbering at most 12 aircraft,
and often six or less--regularly came under continuous attack by several times their
number of enemy fighters. These onslaughts were sustained literally for several hours
at a time, so that shortages of ammunition could be a problem for the British. The
German fighters rarely risked the combined firepower of British formations, but
followed behind them, firing at long range and swarming around any aircraft that fell
out of the formation due to engine trouble or bullet damage. Attempts were made to
escort day bombers, but no aircraft of sufficiently superior performance were
available for long distance raids.
The Independent Force’s casualties were heavy: 229 personnel missing in
action (many of whom died, while others were taken prisoner), 29 killed, 66
wounded, plus 29 killed and 41 injured in accidents. Casualties were particularly
heavy in the day bombing squadrons. No. 55 Squadron, the Independent Force’s most
experienced day bombing unit, lost 167% of its normal strength in aircrew during
1918. There was one occasion in September when only one out of fourteen No. 99
Squadron pilots and observers returned safely from a raid. In contrast, with the
exception of No. 215 Squadron (120% casualties), the other night bombing squadrons
lost 13-40% casualties during their service with the Independent Force. Aircraft losses
were equally severe. For the period from June to mid-October 1918, 104 day- and 34
night-bombers were lost, as well as 320 aircraft which crashed behind the Allied
lines.13
For May-November 1918, No. 104 Squadron’s total losses numbered about
two-and-two-thirds of its normal strength--and there were several occasions when the
squadron had to cease operations while it recovered from its losses in personnel and
aircraft.14 One of the squadron’s flight commanders, Captain Ewart Garland,
recounted in his diary the impact of this high casualty rate: “Nearly the whole
squadron is now of new pilots and observers as so many were wiped out recently…
Hence we must train for quite a while before doing jobs. Today I led a few
formations, and badly the new chaps need practice too…”15

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With all these problems, it is unsurprising that there was a considerable strain
on Independent Force aircrew. The airmen knew that there was a significant
possibility that they would not return from each raid. Ewart Garland described his
preparations for a raid on 4 September 1918: “In a hushed pitying voice the adjutant
gave out to me over the phone ‘Target 36: Mannheim.’ But now for some reason I am
quite calm about it… I will trust in God and all that, but at the same time I’ll take with
me a spare pair of socks and a cheque book!”16 On this raid, two of the six aircraft in
Garland’s flight had engine failures before crossing the lines, and two more were shot
down shortly after entering enemy territory. Over Mannheim, “the air became full of
[enemy aircraft]--they just got right into us and pumped tracers till the sky was a mass
of tracer smoke.” Garland’s aircraft was dismantled upon his return, as it had suffered
so many hits.
This was the reality of Independent Force operations. The plans made for the
strategic bombing campaign bore little resemblance to reality, however. In July 1918,
the Air Ministry proposed that by September of the following year the Independent
Force would consist of 104 squadrons, including twenty squadrons of fighter escorts.
Under this plan, the allocation of squadrons would have been roughly 36% with the
Army, 32% to the Independent Force, 26% with the Navy, and 6% for Home Defence.
Even in October 1918 there were plans that by June 1919 there would be 48
Independent Force squadrons. By November 1918, however, the Independent Force
numbered only nine bomber squadrons and one fighter escort squadron (No. 45
Squadron), with the latter unable to fulfil this role until it was re-equipped with new
aircraft. Yet it is clear from these unfulfilled plans how much importance the Air
Ministry attached to the Independent Force.17
Despite these grand plans, the intended role of the Independent Force and the
type of targets it should attack were never properly established. In part, this simply
reflected the circumstances of the strategic bombing force’s creation: in late 1917, it
was more important to the British government that aircraft were bombing Germany,
and therefore responding to enemy raids on the United Kingdom, than exactly what
was being attacked. The political leaders who believed in the effectiveness of strategic
bombing did not have very clear ideas as to exactly how a bombing campaign should
be carried out.
The comparatively small size of the Independent Force made it vital that its
attacks should be made in a co-ordinated manner--otherwise, the impact of its raids
would be lost. The issue of target selection therefore involved two related questions.
The first was whether the Independent Force should concentrate solely on “strategic”
rather than “tactical” targets. In other words, should the only targets attacked be those
which would damage the German war effort in the long term? Bombing tactical
targets would deal with more immediate threats, whether they were in the form of
German defences against the Independent Force or opposition to nearby Allied
ground forces. However, attacking tactical targets would not make use of the
Independent Force’s ability (or its perceived ability, at least) to range far behind
enemy lines, and with a few well-placed bombs cause critical damage to the German
military infrastructure.
Assuming that strategic targets were chosen, the question remained as to how
best to damage something so huge and so dispersed as Germany’s war industries.
Should the Independent Force aim primarily to cause material destruction, or else
what were known at the time as “moral” effects--essentially psychological strain and
war-weariness --among the German people?18 These two kinds of objectives, physical
5
(or denial) and psychological (or coercive), have been characteristics of strategic
bombing campaigns throughout the Twentieth Century. In practice, each contains
elements of the other.19 These two objectives required conflicting methods. Aiming
for material damage, in other words the physical destruction of important factories
and so on, meant making repeated bombing attacks on a particular target until it was
destroyed. In order to have the maximum “moral” effect, bombing attacks would need
to be spread over a very large area, so that the greatest number of Germans would
experience them.20 Diverting bombers to attack targets near the front line would
detract from achieving either of these goals.
The debate about which types of targets should be attacked was in fact a
matter of public discussion. In September 1918, for example, Colonel Charles
Repington, the military correspondent of the Times newspaper, criticised the
Independent Force for attacking--as he put it--"the apple-women of Cologne", rather
than more pressing military targets.21 An airman on leave in London recalled
overhearing three young Guards subalterns referring to the Independent Force as
“baby-killers”.22
Prior to the establishment of the Independent Force and its immediate
predecessors, the declared targets of British bombing raids had varied. In April 1916,
the Director of Air Services at the Admiralty had proposed to the War Cabinet that the
RNAS bomb Germany in retaliation for airship attacks on the UK. Later that year,
however, No. 3 Wing RNAS followed French policy by attacking military-industrial
targets, specifically munitions factories in the Rhineland, or if weather conditions
restricted the range of raids, the steel works of the Saar region.23 Along with its
French counterparts, No. 3 Wing did make a single “reprisal” raid, as a direct
response to the sinking of two British hospital ships.24
In early 1917 references to the “moral” (that is, psychological) effect of No. 3
Wing’s raids began to appear in Admiralty communiqués, implying that the bombing
had a widespread effect on German civilians. Faced with criticism from the Army that
RNAS bombing was a waste of resources, it was very difficult for the Admiralty to
provide evidence of the material damage caused by its raids. Alluding to the “moral
effect” of the raids added weight to the Admiralty’s arguments, and was difficult to
refute.25
The War Cabinet’s initial reaction to the German heavy bomber raids of mid-
1917 was to propose that two RFC squadrons should make a single retaliatory raid
against Mannheim. As has already been described, however, this became a political
issue that required a larger gesture than just one raid, and as a result No. 41 Wing
RFC was tasked with carrying out a bombing campaign. The Wing generally attacked
similar targets to those chosen by French bombers in the region: in particular, coal,
iron and steel facilities in Lorraine and Luxembourg, but also railways and barracks.
The French cautioned against making what might appear to be direct attacks on
German civilians, lest the Germans make their own retaliatory bombing raids against
the local French populace.26
One of the key figures responsible for the detailed planning of British strategic
bombing was Major Lord Tiverton, later 2nd Earl of Halsbury.27 He held a variety of
posts related to British bombing operations, including serving as Armaments Officer
for No. 3 Wing RNAS. He became one of the key planners in F.O.3, the department
of the Air Ministry responsible for planning Independent Force operations. This
department worked in association with another Air Ministry department, A.I.1B,

6
which was responsible for intelligence on potential targets for Independent Force
bombing, and German counter-measures against their raids.28
In September 1917, Tiverton produced for the Air Board what one historian
has described as “the first comprehensive study by any Allied nation of the feasibility
of strategic bombardment.”29 His plan identified four potential groups of targets in
Germany: chemical factories near Mannheim, machine shops in the Dusseldorf and
Cologne areas, and the steel works of the Saar region. Tiverton envisaged
concentrated daylight raids by 100 squadrons comprising 1,000 or more D.H.9
bombers (from a dedicated strategic bombing force of 1,630 D.H.9 aircraft and 370
S.E.5 fighter escorts). Each raid would target a single German city in turn. These raids
would have psychological effects on German populace (spreading fear of attack to
other cities, and leading to pressure on the German government from its civilians to
end the war) in addition to the material damage caused to enemy industries.30
A further briefing paper produced by Tiverton in the following months listed
the strengths and weaknesses of a more extensive series of potential targets: twenty-
seven chemical works, eleven explosives factories, four aircraft engine and magneto
plants, the Krupp Works at Essen (a major arms factory), eleven iron and twenty-six
steel works, railway and wagon works, and three rubber and celluloid factories. Most
radically, Tiverton argued that three specific chemicals factories formed the weak
point in the German war industries. He included detailed calculations, again based on
“1,000-bomber raids”, with each aircraft carrying nine bombs. Using aerial
photographs, maps and intelligence gained from industrialists who had visited some
of the factories before the war, he estimated the area occupied by each target. Having
established accuracy rates in bomb-dropping tests, he made a calculation for the
number of bombs required to destroy each target. He stated that: “if sufficient
quantities [of bombs] are used any works can be obliterated… Merely to annoy a
works is foolish. If material damage is to be done against Germany, works should be
systematically obliterated” Tiverton did also take into account other factors, such as
the distance of targets behind the German lines, and each target’s vulnerability to
bombing.31
Tiverton even argued that given enough aircraft, 90% of the German
munitions industry could be destroyed within a year. This would enable the Allied
armies to make a breakthrough, which they seemed unable to gain through
conventional operations.32
This search for the enemy’s most vital points can be compared with the US
inter-war and Second World War preoccupation with bombing so-called “key nodes”,
such as ball-bearing factories or oil installations.33 In theory, such attacks exemplified
the power of strategic bombing. If one vital section of the enemy’s war industries
could be destroyed, it could have an impact out of all proportion to its size--due to the
knock-on effect on other aspects of war production, which would be denied the output
of that particular key industry. In practice, even with the more sophisticated
technologies of the Second World War, it proved very difficult to deliver crippling
attacks on “key node” targets. From the Air Ministry planners’ point of view,
however, the Independent Force’s small size made it all the more important that it
should be used as efficiently as possible.
Another obvious problem with Tiverton’s plans was the size of the bombing
force featured in them. In addition to 2,000 bomber and fighter aircraft, this force
would have required 20,000 personnel, and a supply of 30,048 bombs per week.34
Plans for using such large numbers of aircraft solely for strategic bombing had their
7
origins in unrealistic estimations of aircraft and engine production, which were made
in 1917.
Although Tiverton’s September 1917 paper did suggest that bombing raids
could have an important “moral” or psychological effect on German workers, this
mention of the psychological impact of bombing reflected Admiralty policy rather
than Tiverton’s own beliefs.35 Tiverton’s planning during the remainder of 1917 and
in the following year reflects his belief that material damage was more important than
the psychological aspect of attacks. The bombing offensive should not aim to commit
acts of retaliation, nor to dispirit German workers as a whole, but to cripple the
German industrial capacity to wage war by destroying vital components of their
industries.
Around the same time--in December 1917--Lord Rothermere, head of the Air
Board, publicly announced that “At the Air Board we are wholeheartedly in favour of
air reprisals! It is our duty to avenge the murder of innocent women and children. As
the enemy elects, so it will be the case of ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’…”36
Such announcements may have been purely for public consumption, yet this once
again simply demonstrates the extent to which strategic bombing was a political as
well as a military issue (arguably, it equally reflects confused thinking amongst the air
services’ political masters).
In mid-October 1917, the War Cabinet had set up a Committee on Air Policy
to direct the bombing campaign. The Committee consisted of Smuts, the First Lord of
the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the President of the Air Board, and
met six times between its creation and the end of January 1918.37 On 17 January, the
Committee issued a ‘Memorandum on Bombing Operations for the Supreme War
Council’, setting out its views. The Memorandum at least stated that the object of the
bombing campaign should be to attack German industry, rather than retaliation. Yet it
cited both material destruction and the morale of workers as targets of bombing. It
contained a list of one hundred German towns and cities that were potential targets,
but did not establish an effective plan for the still-small British bombing force.38
In May 1918, Tiverton complained that there was still no adequate plan for the
bombing campaign, observing to Sir Frederick Sykes, the Chief of the Air Staff, with
some sarcasm that “There are two possible objects to be gained by bombing
Germany: (a) a serious attempt to end the war. (b) merely to keep our own
unenlightened populace quiet.”39
When Trenchard took command of the Independent Force in June 1918, the
primary targets which Sykes and the Air Ministry intended his squadrons should
attack were the German “root industries”: the chemical factories that produced
explosives, propellants and poison gas. Eighty per cent of these industries were said to
be within striking distance of the Independent Force. In poor weather the steel works
of Lorraine could be a secondary target.40
Yet these targets were rarely bombed. Between June and September 1918,
only 16% of Independent Force raids were made against chemical and steel plants. In
June, only 14% of Independent Force attacks were directed against chemical factories,
while iron and steel works received a similar proportion of raids. That August, these
targets received only 8% and 7% of attacks respectively. Attacks against railways and
aerodromes, which the Air Ministry had not even identified as secondary targets, rose
from nearly 70% in June (primarily against railways), while in August both received
about 80% of attacks (with aerodromes alone being the target for about 50%).
Brigadier General P.R.C. Groves, the Air Ministry’s Director of Flying Operations,
8
protested to Sykes about this state of affairs, but to no effect.41 On 5 July, Tiverton
complained to Groves that the Independent Force was attacking “wrong and useless
objectives”.42
The difference between the plans drawn up by the Air Ministry, and the
operations ordered by Trenchard as head of the Independent Force, simply reflected
the differences between theory and practice. Trenchard himself, in his post-war
London Gazette despatch on the Independent Force, summarised the situation as
follows:

“The question I had to decide was how to use this Force in order to achieve the object,
i.e. the breakdown of the German Army in Germany, its Government, and the
crippling of its sources of supply.
The two main alternative schemes were:
1. A sustained and continuous attack on one large centre after another until each
centre was destroyed, and the industrial population largely dispersed to other towns,
or
2. To attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the
machines at my disposal.
I decided on the latter plan, for the following reasons:
(i) It was not possible with the forces at my disposal to do sufficient material damage
so as to completely destroy the industrial centres in question.
(ii) It must be remembered that, even had the Force been still larger, it would not have
been practical to carry this out unless the war had lasted for at least another four or
five years, owing to the limitations imposed by the weather.”43

As Trenchard states, the Independent Force did not have the strength to cause
critical damage to the German war industry. The problems of aircraft and engine
production, and heavy RAF losses on the rest of the Western Front, meant that the
Independent Force never received the number of squadrons envisaged in successive
Air Ministry plans. The limitations of the aircraft that it did possess meant that engine
failures or strong winds sometimes made it difficult to attack those targets which lay
furthest across the front line. The Independent Force’s casualties also restricted the
kind of attacks that could be made. Raids deep into Germany against heavy fighter
opposition only had a chance of surviving if the pilots were familiar with their
aircraft, and could hold formation. Replacement crews required two weeks training to
practice formation flying, before setting out on operations.44
Railways, which were a low priority for the Air Ministry but which absorbed a
high proportion of Independent Force attacks, were easily identifiable, even at night,
and did not lie deep inside Germany. They were therefore suitable targets for novice
crews: the important Metz-Sablon railway junction, often a target for Independent
Force bombing, was only 12 miles over the lines, for example.45 Attacks on
aerodromes were a means of destroying German aircraft (both the bombers that
sometimes raided Independent Force airfields, and the fighters that offered resistance
to the Force’s own attacks) and thus of reducing losses to both types of enemy
aircraft.
Railways were vital to the movement of industrial material, as well as troops
and supplies for the front line. By bombing railways, the Independent Force could
also offer direct support to neighbouring French and American ground troops. From
late March to mid-May 1918, the Independent Force acted in support of Allied troops
9
in the face of the German Spring Offensives. During this period, only a single
Independent Force aircraft attacked a German city. During mid-September, Marshal
Foch, the Allied Generalissimo, requested that the Independent Force assist with the
St Mihiel offensive. 46
It was important that the Independent Force maintained good relations with
the French, as they had of course provided space for the British airfields. Trenchard
also had to request for space for additional airfields, for the squadrons which would--
in theory--arrive under the Independent Force’s planned programme of expansion.
Obtaining more land was not a simple matter, and demonstrating the Independent
Force’s value in assisting ground operations was one means of placating the French.47
Unlike Tiverton, Trenchard had never been an advocate of bombing key
industries. In a memorandum to the Air Minister, Sir William Weir, shortly after
taking command, Trenchard stated that “the anxiety as to whether an attack is likely
to [take] place is probably just as demoralising to the industrial population as the
actual attack itself, provided that they have previously been given the opportunity of
experiencing aerial bombardment.”48 This view was in line with those he had
expressed while commander of the RFC on the Western Front.49
The circumstances under which Trenchard came to be in command of the
Independent Force also played a part in the disjointed approach to target selection.
Formerly commander of the RFC in France, Trenchard had been appointed as the first
Chief of the Air Staff, but had resigned shortly afterwards, being replaced in this post
by Sykes. Trenchard reported directly to the Air Minister, bypassing Sykes, with
whom Trenchard was not on speaking terms.
Sykes did not seek to change this situation, to the frustration of his planning
staff. As a result, the latter found it difficult to obtain detailed information about the
Independent Force’s operations. Trenchard’s cold-shouldering of the Air Ministry
also meant he did not receive the benefits of the intelligence and planning sections at
the Air Ministry.50 The Independent Force’s relative isolation from other British
forces perhaps also increased their commander’s independence. It is worth noting,
however, that a comparable situation occurred during the Second World War: Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff, found it difficult to persuade Harris, head of RAF Bomber
Command, to adopt targeting policies with which Harris did not agree (and Harris’
headquarters were located only a relatively short distance away from those of Portal).
Whatever decisions were taken by their superiors, it fell to both Trenchard and Harris
to chose the targets for their crews each night.
Given the accuracy of First World War bombing, the distinctions made by
planners between different target types were to some extent academic. Many German
towns that the Independent Force bombed contained a number of features that were
potential targets, such as both factories and railway lines. Whatever they had been
ordered to hit, some pilots selected their own target within the town. A post-war RAF
assessment of the Independent Force’s bombing observed that: “In the case of night
pilots it would appear, judging by results, that there was a tendency at time to drop an
odd bomb or two on objectives of their own choosing.”51
This is likely to have reflected inaccuracy as much as deliberate attempts to
choose new targets. However, some aircrew took the attitude that the Germans had
begun the use of bombing against cities, and therefore deserved to experience such
“frightfulness” themselves. Major W.R. Read, the commander of No. 216 Squadron,
described one night-time raid in his diary: “As soon as Sgt Keen dropped [the bombs]
I looked over the side for the effect. It looked terrible. I had told Sgt Keen to aim for
10
the middle of the town. Personally when I go to a German town I am all out to bomb
the town and--although it sounds awful to say so--to kill and cause as much
destruction as possible in preference to bombing railway junctions or docks… When
one thinks of all the atrocities the Huns have committed in this war one learns to hate
them and wants to kill them.”52
It is worth mentioning that not all Independent Force airmen shared these
views. Lt W.H. Greaves (an observer in No. 100 Squadron) wrote in his diary on 3
October 1918 “How different is our work from [that of German bombers]. We bomb
important military circles [sic] and they, the first thing they find” 53
It was difficult at the time for the British to assess the effects of their raids.
From reading the diaries and letters of Independent Force aviators, it is evident that
most believed that their attacks were causing serious damage. It was difficult to assess
damage from high altitude or at night. Even if aircrew witnessed bomb bursts on their
target, the bombs might not have caused significant damage. A large target like a
factory had more open spaces and non-vital buildings than vital points. The relatively
low explosive effect of most First World War bombs meant that they would only be
effective through a direct hit. A 112lb bomb landing more than 7ft from railway track,
or a 230lb bomb more than 12ft away, would not cause serious damage.54 The RAF
found after the war that of the 85-100 bombs that had hit the Burbach blast furnaces,
only about 20 had caused significant damage.55
The Independent Force did gain considerable intelligence from behind
German lines. The sources of such information included the following: reports in
German newspapers; Allied agents; repatriated Allied Prisoners of War, German
deserters or troops captured in the front line, who had witnessed bombing raids; or
letters from soldiers’ families found on captured German troops. The information
obtained from these sources was generally patchy and subjective. However, it could
provide details of casualties and damage inflicted by raids, the state of German
civilian and military morale, the locations of German aerodromes or anti-aircraft
defences, or of potential targets that had not yet been attacked.56
News of the raids given to the British public was naturally embroidered.
William Armstrong, formerly of No. 110 Squadron, later wrote "we read of our raids
in the English newspapers. The reports all looked so optimistic: sometimes we had
difficulty in recognising the raids for our own, so coloured were they."57 George
Williams argues that even the information received by the War Cabinet was
exaggerated, since as reports on raids were passed up the chain of command,
important contextual information such as casualties was omitted.58
After the end of the war, both the British and the Americans conducted
separate surveys of the effects of the Independent Force’s bombing operations. The
investigators were only able to visit towns in the areas of Germany occupied by the
Allies, but they did find considerable information about the raids in the records that
had been kept by many municipalities. These records--and their use in considering the
effectiveness of the Independent Force--are discussed further in Steve Suddaby’s
article.
In both world wars, it was in the nature of strategic bombing that there was as
little agreement on how to measure the effectiveness of bombing as there was on
target selection. The most obvious measure of effectiveness is what could be called
“direct” effects. In other words, were the intended targets hit, and how severely
damaged were they? How many German casualties were caused? How much
production time did German munitions factories lose? Even an RAF report compiled
11
after the war admitted "the consensus of opinion of our bombing by the German
[railway] officials is summed up in the word 'annoying'."59
There were also a number of “indirect” effects of the raids--in other words,
those not directly caused by the impact of bombs on German soil, but nevertheless
resulting from the Independent Force’s raids. The difficulty with assessing indirect--
and indeed direct effects--is that we do not know what would have been the result had
the bombing not taken place.
The first indirect result was that the raids had a political effect back in the
United Kingdom. The RAF was seen to be striking back against the nation that had
bombed home territory, and the newspapers were full of reports on British bombing
raids. From the point of view of some British politicians, this alone represented
effectiveness.
As well as boosting British morale, as has been discussed above, some argued
that the effect of the raids in sapping German morale was far more significant than the
physical destruction caused. As Trenchard stated in his final despatch to the Secretary
of State for Air, “at present the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the
material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1…”60 Total German casualties from the
Independent Force raids are given by the British Official History as 746 killed and
1843 wounded.61 In contrast, the nature of the strain on civilians of experiencing
regular raids cannot be measured, of course. This could be an issue even if a town was
not always actually bombed. For example, Trier was attacked 13 times by British
bombers in 1918, yet it experienced 148 air raid alarms in this period.
A number of extracts from captured letters written by German civilians
suffering under Allied bombing survive in the British archives. One, written at
Mulheim in July 1918, recounted how “last Monday we had the hostile machines over
twice in one night. At a quarter to ten I had just got into bed when I was obliged to get
up and go to the cellar until 12.30. We were just going back to bed when we had to go
back to the cellar.” In September, a German woman wrote to her brother, who was
serving in the infantry, that “it is almost as bad here as where you are; aeroplanes fly
over every night.” 62
Of course, such news cannot have improved the morale of soldiers at the front
either, but it would be unrealistic to claim that all Germans in the Independent Force’s
area of operations felt this way. There were even reports of civilians dancing in the air
raid shelters!63 There is no doubt that in 1918, life on the German home front was
very difficult. The threat of bombing was just one of a variety of psychological and
physical hardships suffered by German civilians, in addition to food shortages,
influenza and other domestic problems.
German efforts to counter British attacks (and of course, also those made by
other Allies) can also be considered an “indirect” effect. These countermeasures
ranged from active defences, such as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights and fighter
aircraft (and the personnel to man them), to passive defences. The latter included the
erection of air raid shelters, the construction of dummy factories, or the camouflaging
of potential targets using wire gauze nets strung between buildings or by planting
trees in factory grounds. The construction and operation of this defensive system
required considerable resources, which could otherwise have been more usefully
directed towards the German war effort.
Comparisons can be made with the assessment of Allied bombing during the
Second World War. During that conflict, over 14,000 heavy anti-aircraft guns and
their crews were stationed throughout Germany as a defence against the Allied
12
bomber offensive. This was a force that would have greatly reinforced German
defences on the Eastern or Western Front. Germany also used two million soldiers,
civilians and prisoners of war in ground anti-aircraft defences, as well as a further
million for reconstruction work.64
The Independent Force’s effectiveness in this respect is difficult to assess, but
George Williams argues that it was less successful in drawing enemy fighters away
from the rest of the front line than was believed at the time. The German defensive
system was not specifically created to meet the threat of the Independent Force, but
had been set up against French raids from 1915 onwards.65
Had the war continued a little longer, the Inter-Allied Independent Air Force
would have come into operational use. This was to be a strategic bombing force made
up of British, French, Italian and American squadrons. At the end of October 1918,
after considerable debate amongst the Allies, Trenchard was confirmed as the force’s
commander, under the control of Marshal Foch. Although the command structure for
the inter-Allied force was agreed upon, the war did not last long enough for it to
become operational. Had it done so, the issue of whether to attack tactical targets in
support of the battlefield, or more distant and ‘strategic’ targets, was likely to have
been a point of debate.66
Another dimension to the British strategic bombing campaign that never came
to fruition was the Handley Page V/1500, a “super-heavy” bomber that was under
development during 1918. It had over four times the bombload of the Handley Page
O/400, and possessed a fourteen-hour endurance, giving it the capability to attack
Berlin from bases in the United Kingdom. The V/1500’s troubled development
prevented its operational use. In the last months of the war, No. 27 Group--a force of
Handley Page V/1500 aircraft--was being set up at Bircham Newton in Norfolk, but
only three aircraft were available by the Armistice. Had it been available in large
numbers, it was perhaps the aircraft that could have realised some of the Air
Ministry’s objectives. Foreshadowing Bomber Command’s firestorm attacks of the
Second World War, the planners estimated that a V/1500 could drop 16,000
incendiaries over an area sixty yards wide by 2500 yards long.67
The Air Ministry planners favoured the use of these aircraft in raids against
targets in Westphalia (the Duisburg-Dortmund-Cologne region), with six steel works
being the primary target, or other cities such as Essen or Dusseldorf. Tiverton
suggested a force of 750 V/1500 aircraft! The idea of bombing Berlin appealed to the
War Cabinet, however. This would have primarily been a method of psychological
warfare: a demonstration that Allied air power could now reach even the capital of
Germany. The plan was for two of these aircraft to fly from Norfolk to Berlin, and
then back to the Independent Force bases near Nancy, a total distance of around 960
miles.68
The war finished before the Berlin raid was launched, but the aircraft
remained ready in case the Germans reneged on the Armistice. The minutes of the Air
Council for 29 November 1918 ominously state that two V/1500s “must remain
available fully equipped for carrying out special demonstrations over Berlin if
needed.”69
Another equally wild idea considered by the Independent Force at the end of
the war, also essentially as a parting gesture, was that of bombing Berlin using
Handley Page O/400 aircraft based in the Prague region, following the surrender of
Austria-Hungary. A four-man advanced party set off for Bohemia on the evening of 9
November, with the task of choosing a suitable airfield. Once this had been done,
13
supplies and ground crew would have travelled to Bohemia by rail, while the aircraft
would have flown there. On the day before the Armistice, Major Read, the
commander of No. 216 Squadron, was asked if he thought it would be possible for
one of his squadron’s O/400s, carrying maximum fuel and a minimal bombload, to fly
from France to Berlin and then to Bohemia. Read was doubtful, but to prevent the job
being offered to another squadron he agreed to do it himself. Fortunately, not least for
Read himself, the war ended the next day.70
For most of the rest of the RAF, the Independent Force must have seemed a
frustrating diversion of scarce resources. Trenchard later recalled that “I found myself
writing to Haig [Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British
Expeditionary Force] for things I wanted, and I got peevish letters from RAF HQ,
saying that they were worried by great battles on the Western Front, and could not be
bothered with my petty requests for bakeries etc.”71
Perhaps it is best to leave the last word to Trenchard, in his post-war tribute to
the men of the Independent Force: “They were imbued with the feeling that whatever
their casualties were, if they could help to shorten the war by one day and thus save
many casualties to the Army on the ground they were only doing their duty. I never
saw, even when our losses were heaviest, any wavering in their determination to get
well into Germany.”72

Bibliography
This article is based on research in a wide range of published sources, as well as
documents at the Public Record Office, Royal Air Force Museum and Imperial War
Museum (all in London, United Kingdom). For the sake of brevity, only material
referred to in the footnotes is listed here.

Ash, Eric, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912-1918, London: Frank
Cass, 1999.

Armstrong, William, Pioneer Pilot, London: Blandford Press, 1952.

Baldwin, J.E.A., ‘Experiences of Bombing with the Independent Force in 1918: A

Biddle, Tami Davis, ‘British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their
Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive’, The
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.18, No.1, March 1995, pp.91-144.

Bucknam, M., ‘Strategic bombing: What is it and is it still relevant?’, in Stuart Peach
(ed.), Perspectives on Air Power, London: The Stationery Office, 1998.

Cooper, Malcolm, The Birth of Independent Air Power, London: Allen and Unwin,
1986.

Cooper, Malcolm, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, Cross and

14
Driver, Hugh, The Birth of Military Aviation: Britain, 1903-1914, Woodbridge: Royal
Historical Society, 1997.

Jones, H.A., The War in the Air, Vol.VI, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937.

Jones, Neville, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, London: William Kimber, 1973.

Morris, Alan, First of the Many, London: Jarrolds, 1968.

Overy, Richard, Bomber Command 1939-1945, Leicester: HarperCollinsPublishers,

Paris, Michael, Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in
Britain, 1859-1917, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

Quinnell, J.C., ‘Experiences With a Day Bombing Squadron in the Independent Force
in 1918’, in A.P.1097, A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers
Attending the Second Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1923-1924, Air
Ministry, 1924.

Reece, Robert, Night Bombing with the Bedouins, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919.

Sykes, Sir Frederick Hugh, From Many Angles: An Autobiography, London: G.G.
Harrap & Co., 1942.

White, Arthur, The Hornet’s Nest: A History of 100 Squadron RAF 1917-1994,
Worcester: Square One Publications, 1994.

Williams, George K., ‘Statistics and Strategic Bombardment: Operations and Records
of the British long-range bombing force during World War I and their implications for
the development of the post-war Royal Air Force, 1917-1923’, Oxford University
D.Phil Thesis, 1987.

Williams, George K., ‘“The Shank of the Drill”: Americans and Strategical Aviation
in the Great War’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.19, No.3, September 1996,
pp.381-431.

Wise, S.F., Canadian Airmen and the First World War. The Official History of the
Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol.I, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following: Steve Suddaby, for his encouragement
and assistance in the writing of this article; the staff of the Public Record Office, the
Royal Air Force Museum (particularly Simon Moody and Katherine Boyce, for help
with photographs) and the Imperial War Museum, for their assistance with research;
the Trustees of the Royal Air Force Museum, for permission to quote from documents
held by the Museum, and to reproduce photographs from the Museum’s collections
(mainly from the Newall Papers); the Royal Aero Club, for permission to reproduce
15
the RAeC licence photograph of Major Lord Tiverton; the copyright holder of the
W.R. Read collection at the Imperial War Museum, for permission to quote from
documents in the collection (efforts to contact the copyright holder of the Ewart
Garland collection held by the Imperial War Museum were unsuccessful); Patrick
Wilson, for permission to use some of the 100 Squadron photographs of his father,
Capt. H.B. Wilson, DFC; Michael Gunton, for assistance with translation.
1
The contemporary US air services did use the term “strategical bombing”, which
was taken to mean bombing attacks made at a distance of more than 25,000 yards
from the nearest friendly troops: Williams, George K., ‘“The Shank of the Drill”:
Americans and Strategical Aviation in the Great War’, The Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol.19, No.3, September 1996, p.409.
2
Bucknam, M., ‘Strategic bombing: What is it and is it still relevant?’, in Stuart
Peach (ed.), Perspectives on Air Power, London: The Stationery Office, 1998, p.315.
3
Paris, Michael, Winged Warfare, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992,
pp.124-139, 164-169.
4
Quoted in Cooper, Malcolm, The Birth of Independent Air Power, London: Allen
and Unwin, 1986, p.103.
5
Quoted in Jones, Neville, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, London: William
Kimber, 1973, p.152.
6
These were the main aircraft equipping the squadrons, but most units had a small
number of other aircraft types.
7
By a very rough calculation the nine squadrons of the late-1918 Independent Force
could together carry a bombload equivalent to that of three Avro Lancaster aircraft or
four Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress aircraft of the Second World War.
8
Wise, S.F., Canadian Airmen and the First World War. The Official History of the
Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol.I, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, p.294;
Quinnell, J.C., ‘Experiences With a Day Bombing Squadron in the Independent Force
in 1918’, in A.P.1097, A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers
Attending the Second Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1923-1924, Air
Ministry, 1924, p.79.
9
In September 1918, the Independent Force was allocated 38 D.H.9A aircraft as
replacements, while the rest of the RAF received only 20; the following month the
allocations were 17 and 28 respectively. (Williams, George K., ‘Statistics and
Strategic Bombardment: Operations and Records of the British long-range bombing
force during World War I and their implications for the development of the post-war
Royal Air Force, 1917-1923’, Oxford University D.Phil Thesis, 1987, p.286.)
10
Armstrong, William, Pioneer Pilot, London: Blandford Press, 1952, pp.36-37;
Quinnell, ‘Experiences’, pp.78, 82-83.
11
Quinnell, ‘Experiences’, p.76; Reece, Robert, Night Bombing with the Bedouins,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919, pp.44-48.
12
Public Record Office, Kew, London (hereafter PRO): AIR 1/1986/204/273/116;
Kingsford, A.R., Night Raiders of the Air, London: Greenhill, 1988, p.139; PRO: AIR
1/1985/204/273/108.
13
Williams, ‘Statistics’, pp.276-277, p.279; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.311; Williams,
‘Statistics’, p.302; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.325.
14
Williams, ‘Statistics’, p.287; Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM): Diary of
Captain Ewart J. Garland D.F.C, P359, passim.

16
15
IWM: Ewart Garland diary, P359, 27/8/1918 (note that the British convention on
writing dates is used in this article: dd/mm/yyyy).
16
IWM: Ewart Garland diary, P359, 4/9/1918. The socks and the chequebook were
presumably in case he was shot down and taken prisoner.
17
Jones, H.A., The War in the Air, Vol.VI, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937, pp.171-
172.
18
Many Air Ministry papers specifically examine the “moral versus material”
strategies, for example, Royal Air Force Museum (hereafter RAFM): AC73/2,
Halsbury Papers, Box 3, Item 21B, ‘Notes for DFO on paper for war cabinet’,
3/6/1918. This document states that “moral” attacks should be made until sufficient
aircraft had been assembled to deliver “material” attacks.
19
Bucknam, ‘Strategic bombing’, pp.311-314.
20
However Trenchard argued that even “moral” effects required repeated attacks,
made at regular intervals--it was not simply a matter of scattering bombs over
Germany at random: Williams, ‘Shank’, p.418.
21
Reppington’s comments were discussed in the editorial of the journal Aeronautics,
Vol.15 No.257 (18 September 1918), p.263. Reppington’s criticism was that the
attacks were a waste of military resources, rather than that attacking civilians was
immoral.
22
RAFM: B1958, Cripps, S.T.P., Flt Lt, ‘The Intimate Reminiscences of a Pilot’
(unpublished), Chapter 2, p.20.
23
Williams, ‘Shank’, pp.385-6.
24
Jones, Origins, p.123.
25
Williams, ‘Shank’, pp.387-9.
26
Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.287-292; Jones, Origins, pp.148-150.
27
Major Lord Tiverton is one of the central figures in Neville Jones’ book The
Origins of Strategic Bombing, for which Jones used Tiverton’s papers (which are now
at the RAF Museum: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers). Also see Williams, ‘Shank’, pp.390-
396.
28
Williams, ‘Statistics’, pp.215-216.
29
Williams, ‘Shank’, p.394.
30
Williams, ‘Shank’, pp.391-4; Jones, Origins, pp.143-7; RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury
Papers, Box 3, Item 1, ‘Original paper on objectives’, 3/9/1917.
31
RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 3, ‘A system of bomb dropping’,
27/10/1917, p.13; Jones, Origins, pp.154-157.
32
RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 3, Item 3, Tiverton to DFO, ‘Notes on
general allocation of aeroplanes’, n.d.
33
Biddle, Tami Davis, ‘British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing:
Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive’,
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.18, No.1, March 1995, pp.114-126, passim.
34
RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 3, Item 1, ‘Original paper on objectives’,
3/9/1917.
35
Williams, ‘Shank’, pp. 392-393.
36
Morris, Alan, First of the Many, London: Jarrolds, 1968, p.20.
37
Cooper, Malcolm, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, Cross and
Cockade International, Vol.17 No.2, Summer 1986, p.55; Driver, Hugh, The Birth of
Military Aviation: Britain, 1903-1914, Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1997,
p.117.
17
38
Jones, Origins, pp.160-162.
39
RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 3, Item 17, Tiverton to CAS, 22/5/1918.
40
Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.296-297.
41
PRO: AIR 1/460/15/312/97.
42
RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 3, Item 25A, Memo to DFO, 5/7/1918.
43
Supplement to London Gazette, 1 January 1919, p.134.
44
Morris, First of the Many, p.71.
45
Williams, ‘Statistics’, p.333.
46
Cooper, ‘British Experience’, pp.56-57.
47
Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.297-298.
48
Williams, ‘Statistics’, p.256.
49
RAFM: Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/67, ‘Paper on long distance bombing’,
November 1917.
50
Williams, ‘Statistics’, pp.213-219.
51
RAFM: Newall Papers, B401, ‘Bombs etc.’ (post-war report), p.19.
52
IWM: Major W.R. Read Papers, 73/76/2, diary entry 16/9/1918.
53
Quoted in White, Arthur, The Hornet’s Nest: A History of 100 Squadron RAF 1917-
1994, Worcester: Square One Publications, 1994, p.208.
54
Baldwin, J.E.A., ‘Experiences of Bombing with the Independent Force in 1918: A
Lecture by Wing Commander J.E.A. Baldwin D.S.O., O.B.E.’, in A.P.956, Staff
College Essays, 1922-1923, p.6.
55
RAFM: Newall Papers, B396, ‘Blast furnaces’ (post-war report), p.2.
56
For examples of such reports, see PRO: AIR 1/1918/204/232/3, AIR
1/460/15/312/99, and AIR 1/1985/204/273/108.
57
Armstrong, Pioneer, p.62.
58
Williams, ‘Statistics’, pp.156-191.
59
RAFM: Newall Papers, B395 ‘Railways’ (post-war report), p.58.
60
Supplement to London Gazette, 1 January 1919, p.135.
61
Jones, War in the Air, Vol.VI, p.152. In his autobiography, Sykes give the figures
of 720 killed and 1754 wounded: Sykes, Sir Frederick Hugh, From Many Angles: An
Autobiography, London: G.G. Harrap & Co., 1942.
62
PRO: AIR 1/1918/204/232/3.
63
Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.322.
64
Overy, Richard, Bomber Command 1939-1945, Leicester: HarperCollinsPublishers,
2000, p.197; Biddle, ‘Approaches’, p.128.
65
Williams, ‘Statistics’, p.294.
66
PRO: AIR 1/1997/204/273/251; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.308.
67
Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.316 (footnote). An Air Ministry memo of August 1918
gave information on German towns which, by their construction, were suitable for
attack with incendiary bombs (RAFM: AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, Box 2, File “War
Papers 1916-18, XYZ Special”, Tiverton to SO2, 28/8/1918).
68
Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.314-319; Jones, Origins, pp.186-187; RAFM: AC73/2,
Halsbury Papers, various documents including: Box 3, Memo from Tiverton to DFO,
August 1918; Box 3, Item 12, Memo entitled ‘A Base in Norfolk’.
69
Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.320 (footnote).
70
IWM: Major W.R. Read Papers, 73/76/2, diary entries 12/10/1918, 5/11/1918 and
10/11/1918, also 72/72/2, folder about bombing Berlin from Prague.
71
Quoted in Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.296 (footnote).
18
72
Supplement to London Gazette, 1 January 1919, p.136.

19