NO.

18-16
NO. 18-16 APR 2018

MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Lessons and Best Practices

APR 2018

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Maneuver Leader’s
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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Foreword
Today’s operational environment presents threats the Army has not faced
in nearly 20 years. Against peer competitors, the joint force may face air
parity or even localized enemy air overmatch, challenging the assumption
of air superiority the joint force has held since the Korean War. This will
make maneuver forces vulnerable to air attack by fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and cruise missiles. Maneuver forces
lack capacity and capability to address these threats and the Army requires a
speedy response.
The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to execute a plan to
increase short-range air defense (SHORAD) capability. The immediate
solution is to train and arm teams of Soldiers organic to select brigade
combat teams with Stinger missiles. This directive is one line of effort as the
force structure for a dedicated maneuver SHORAD capability increases.
Stinger missiles provide a key capability for maneuver forces to defend
themselves from aerial observation and attack. However, without direct
involvement from senior brigade combat team leaders and effective leader
training, these missiles will become dead weight at best or a fratricide in
waiting at worst. Units must plan effectively to utilize this capability and
ensure it ties directly to their scheme of maneuver as opposed to simply
task-organizing one Stinger team per company.
This guide is designed as a single entry point for brigade combat team and
maneuver battalion commanders and their staffs to effectively train and
fight Stinger teams as part of an integrated combined arms team. These
planning and employment techniques should prove invaluable to effectively
maximize mission effectiveness, allow maneuver forces to retain the
initiative, and provide freedom of maneuver from the air.

Randall A. McIntire
Brigadier General, USA
Commandant

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Maneuver Leader’s Guide to Stinger

Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. Air Defense Planning Principles and Guidelines 3
Chapter 2. Air and Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of
19
the Battlefield
Chapter 3. Airspace Management 33
Chapter 4. Stinger Plan Development 41
Appendix A. Stinger Characteristics and Capabilities 59
Appendix B. Stinger Team Certification and Training 67
Appendix C. Manual Short-Range Air Defense Control System 77
Appendix D. Airspace Control and Coordinating Measures 83
Appendix E. Topics for Fires and Combined Arms Rehearsals 93
Appendix F. Sample Air and Missile Defense
97
Appendix to Annex D (Fires)
Appendix G. References 105

Center For Army Lessons Learned

Director COL Michael F. Pappal
CALL Analyst Ron Pruyt
Contributing Author MAJ Kenneth Collins

Special thanks to the Fires CoE and TCM ADA BDE for their contributions.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this
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by law of the Department.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is
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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Introduction
This guide serves as a concise and consolidated tool for leaders to integrate
short-range air defense (SHORAD) into battalion and brigade plans.
The principal audience for this guide is brigade and battalion staffs who
have maneuver Soldiers equipped with Stinger man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS).
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure their decisions and
actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases,
host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels must ensure
their Soldiers operate in accordance with the Law of War and the rules of
engagement. (See Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.)
The chapters of this guide first outline general air defense principles and
planning and then focus on air defense within the maneuver brigade combat
team. The appendices focus on training and employment of Stinger teams.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Chapter 1
Air Defense Planning Principles and Guidelines
This chapter provides a general overview of Army air defense planning
principles and guidelines. It addresses the role of air defense, the Army’s
air defense operational elements, air defense employment principles
and guidelines, alert statuses and warnings, and weapon control statuses
(WCSs).

Air and Missile Defense Overview

Air and missile defense (AMD) is the direct defensive actions taken to
protect friendly forces by destroying or reducing the effectiveness of hostile
air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets in support
of the joint force commander’s objectives (Army Doctrine Reference
Publication [ADRP] 3-09, Fires). Strategic, operational, and tactical levels
all execute AMD.
Air defense artillery (ADA) is the Army element whose primary mission is
conducting AMD operations. The role of ADA is to provide fires to protect
the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack,
and surveillance (ADRP 3-09).
Short-range air defense (SHORAD) are those dedicated ADA and non-
dedicated air defense capabilities which enable movement and maneuver by
destroying, neutralizing, or deterring low-altitude air threats by defending
critical fixed- and semi-fixed assets and maneuvering forces. Units use these
SHORAD elements to counter unmanned aircraft systems, rotary-wing
threats, and other low-altitude aerial threats.

Operational Elements of Air Defense

Active Air Defense
Active air defense is direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly
forces and assets (Joint Publication [JP] 3-01, Countering Air and Missile
Threats). Active air defense includes the use of aircraft, air defense
weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. Early detection
of missiles in flight to permit cueing, acquisition, tracking, classification,
identification, and destruction as soon as possible after launch enables
active missile defense. Commanders must prepare their units to actively
engage air threats if attacked. Active air defense techniques are measures
taken in support of a commander’s intent using rules of engagement (ROE),
defended asset priorities, and airspace coordinating measures to protect the
force.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The decision to engage air threats should include consideration of the unit’s
mission and tactical situation. If the enemy aerial platforms are outside the
engagement range of the unit’s weapons, a unit’s most attractive option may
be to seek cover.

Coordinating sensor plans with air defense elements prior to and

during operations can increase a unit’s survivability, especially when
located separate from the main effort.

Although sensors cannot actively engage threats, they do provide weapon

systems cueing and early warning functions needed by combined arms
commanders to make an informed decision. These systems are normally
tied into an established early warning network where tactical commanders
can integrate their units through the deployment of air defense airspace
management cells or AMD elements at the brigade combat team (BCT)
or division levels. Based on the information given on a potential threat,
a commander can make a decision on active defense or employ passive
defense measures. The commander may also have time available to take
force protection measures against a threat such as an inbound ballistic
missile if there are no available air defense systems that can defend against
it. Coordinating sensor plans with air defense elements prior to and during
operations can increase a unit’s survivability, especially when located
separate from the main effort. Implementing sensor plans using varying
routines will also reduce an adversary’s targeting and counter-target
effectiveness.
Passive Air Defense
Passive air defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken
to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against
friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01). Passive air defense measures include
camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy,
detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction.
There are two types of passive defense measures: attack avoidance and
damage limiting.
Commanders employ passive AMD measures to improve their units’
survivability by increasing the likelihood of not being detected and targeted
(attack avoidance) from the air and by mitigating the potential effects
(damage limiting) of an air attack. Air defense units perform passive air
defense techniques, which include the tasks of detecting air and missile
launches, predicting impact points, providing threat identification, and
alerting forces of possible chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) events through disseminating early warning.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Attack Operations
Attack operations are offensive actions that destroy and disrupt enemy air
and missile capabilities before, during, and after launch. Attack operations
consist of the destruction, disruption, or neutralization of enemy airfields;
aerial airframes; tactical ballistic missile (TBM) launch platforms; logistical
support trains; electronic warfare platforms; reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition platforms; and any other potential targets that can
be destroyed before having the opportunity to be utilized against friendly
forces. Sensors may be able to identify launch points for attack operations.
Mission Command
Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the
commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct
of unified land operations (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 6-0, Mission
Command).
Mission command is the baseline that links active air and missile defense,
passive defense, and attack operations to provide timely assessment of the
threat, and rapid dissemination of tactical warning, mission assignment,
targeting data, and post-strike assessment.

Components of SHORAD
The Stinger missile system is a man-portable air defense system
(MANPADS). It is a shoulder-fired, infrared radiation-homing, heat-
seeking, negative ultraviolet-guided missile system which requires no
control from the gunner after firing. Stinger has an identification, friend-
or-foe (IFF) subsystem that aids the gunner and team chief in identifying
friendly aircraft. Stinger provides SHORAD for units and select critical
assets. The Stinger weapon system is designed to counter low-level, fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft (unmanned aircraft system
groups 3-4). (See Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 3-01.18, Stinger
Team Techniques [CAC login required for access.])

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The Avenger weapon system is a lightweight, day or night, limited adverse-

weather fire unit employed to counter enemy reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target-acquisition efforts and low-level, fixed- and rotary-wing threats.
The Avenger fire unit has eight ready-to-fire Stinger missiles in two turret-
mounted standard vehicle missile launchers, an M3P .50-caliber machine
gun, a sensor package with forward-looking infrared receiver, laser range
finder, and IFF capability. It has the capability to shoot on the move or
emplace with the crew operating a remote control unit outward 50 meters
from the fire unit. Avenger units are currently organized as battalions
and separate batteries, deployed generally as a battalion or battery, and
employed as batteries or platoons. (See ATP 3-01.64, Avenger Battalion and
Battery Techniques.)
Sentinel is an X-band, medium-range, pulse-Doppler radar that provides
accurate three-dimensional cueing and near real-time target identification
information to a range of 40 kilometers (threat dependent). It can acquire,
track, and classify cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, and fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft. The Sentinel provides track data to the air defense
airspace management (ADAM) element via the Air and Missile Defense
Workstation to provide early warning. The Sentinel system is normally
deployed as a platoon with the Indirect Fire Protection Capability/Avenger
battalion and Avenger battalion. Sentinel sections can also be found in
the counter rocket, artillery, and mortar battery; division artillery; and
target acquisition platoon in fires battalions. (See ATP 3-01.48, Sentinel
Techniques [CAC required for access].)
Combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) are small arms techniques used in
air defense that incorporate the use of volume fire and proper aiming points
according to the targets direction. Small arms are limited to the range and
destructive capability of the weapon and should only be used on low-flying
aircraft. (See ATP 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense.)
The ADAM/brigade aviation element (BAE) cell is an organic element of
the corps, divisions, BCTs, and select support brigades. The ADAM/BAE
cell plans, coordinates, and establishes connectivity for unified actions with
communications systems, command and control, intelligence/controller
networks, and airspace users. It also provides situational awareness and
early warning. The ADAM/BAE cell conducts continuous planning and
execution of airspace management requirements for the supported unit/
echelon and conducts AMD and aviation planning and coordination to
determine AMD and aviation requirements across the spectrum of conflict.
(See ATP 3-01.50, Air Defense and Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell
Operation.)

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Air Defense Employment Principles

AMD employment principles enable ADA forces to successfully perform
combat missions and support overall force objectives. The following are the
four air defense employment principles:
Mass
Mass is the concentration of air defense combat power. It is achieved by
assigning enough firepower to successfully defend the force or the asset
against aerial attack or surveillance. To mass air defense combat power
in one area, commanders may have to accept risks in other areas of the
battlefield. Mass may also be interpreted to include the launching of more
than one interceptor against a target.
Mix
Mix is the employment of a combination of weapon and sensor systems to
protect the force and assets from the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of
one system with the capabilities of another and complicates the situation
for the attacker. Consider joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational ADA capabilities when applying this principle. Proper mix
causes enemies to adjust their tactics. Enemy tactics designed to defeat one
system may make the enemy vulnerable to another friendly system.
Mobility
Mobility is the quality or capability of military forces which permits
them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their
primary role. Some ADA units will have mobility that matches that of their
supported unit. Others will be less mobile. However, they retain sufficient
mobility to move from position to position to continuously protect the
supported force on the move.
Integration
Integration is the addition and fitting together of the forces, systems,
functions, processes, and information acquisition and distribution required
to efficiently and effectively perform or support Army AMD tasks.
Integration combines separate systems, capabilities, or functions in such a
way that they can operate singly or in concert without adversely affecting
other elements.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Employment Guidelines
Planning during defense design and positioning ADA units involves
applying six employment guidelines. Defense planners apply these
guidelines vertically and horizontally to account for the variety of altitudes
and ingress routes from which the enemy can attack or conduct intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.
Mutual Support
Position weapons so the fires of one weapon can engage targets within
the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun systems, this dead
zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large and
mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-
operational units or units at lower states of readiness.
Overlapping Fires
Position weapons so their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the
many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance
operations, defense planners must apply mutual, supporting, and
overlapping fires vertically and horizontally. Overlapping fires should be
achieved at a minimum during defense design.
Balanced Fires
Position weapons to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This
is necessary for AMD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the
threat or when the avenues of approach are unpredictable. It is a desired
characteristic of defense design.
Weighted Coverage
Concentrate weapons coverage toward the most likely threat air avenues
of approach or direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a
commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly
protected to weight coverage toward another direction.
Early Engagement
Sensors and weapons are positioned so they can engage the threat before
ordnance release or friendly target acquisition. Early engagements enable
destruction of enemy platforms over enemy forces and unoccupied areas,
thereby reducing the possibility of friendly collateral damage and fratricide.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Defense-In-Depth
Position the sensors and weapons in depth to expose the threat to a
continuously increasing volume of fire as it approaches the friendly
protected asset or force. Defense-in-depth decreases the probability that
attacking missiles, aircraft, rockets, artillery, and mortars will reach the
defended asset or force.

Figure 1-1. Air defense employment guidelines

(Avenger systems are depicted; however, the same concept and
terminology apply for Stinger systems.)

Air and Missile Defense Engagement Operations Control

An air defense engagement is an attack either by guns or by launch of
an air defense missile by ADA or maneuver units equipped with Stinger
MANPADS and the missile’s subsequent travel to intercept (DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Engagement operations
within the joint counter air mission represent the collective and integrated
effort by all services to physically defeat enemy air threats. Army ADA
commanders, through the application of mission command, direct the
force operations of their units. However, the decision to conduct AMD
engagements are done under the tactical control directives established by
the designated joint area air defense commander.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Positive Control
AMD fires are controlled through positive or procedural ROE. Positive
control is a method that relies on positive identification and tracking of
airborne objects and control of fires within an airspace conducted by
an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. A common
operational picture that synthesizes data from multi-Service intelligence and
air defense sensors can correlate air tracks and identify them based on an
integrated airspace control plan and established identification criteria that
enables positive control. Positive control is exercised through fire control
orders.
Procedural Control
Procedural control is a method that relies on a combination of previously
agreed upon and promulgated orders and procedures. Procedural controls
include air defense warnings (ADWs), ROE, airspace control orders,
published identification criteria, and WCS.
Air Defense Warnings
ADWs state the probability of an air raid based on the threat assessment
and current intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The area air defense
commander (AADC) establishes the baseline ADW during the planning
phase for the joint force. The ADW may be different for an air breathing
threat and a missile threat. Subordinate air defense commanders may
issue higher, but not lower, ADW for their region or sector. ADWs are
disseminated though mission command channels to air and missile defense
elements and fire units.

Air Defense Warnings

Red: An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is imminent or in progress.
Yellow: An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is probable.
White: An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable.

Local air defense warnings (LADWs) are designated as dynamite, lookout,

and snowman:
Dynamite. Aircraft or missiles are inbound or attacking now.
Response is immediate. As a general rule, a dynamite status should
be assumed when an air threat is within 15 kilometers of the division
or BCT area of operations.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Lookout. Aircraft or missiles are in the area of interest but are not
yet threatening or are inbound but there is time to react. As a general
rule, a lookout status should be assumed when an air threat is within
30 kilometers of the division or BCT area of operations.
Snowman. No aircraft or missiles pose a threat at this time. Aircraft
and missiles are monitored but not broadcast over the early warning
net.
LADWs are used to alert the force to impending attack at the local level.
They should be incorporated into the local tactical standard operating
procedure (TSOP), explaining what response the supported force desires
when a LADW is broadcast. For example, in the TSOP, when dynamite
precedes an early warning message, the forces stop to increase passive air
defense measures and predesignated elements prepare to engage with a
combined arms response. The response desired by the supported force is
unique to the mission; dependent on mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available-time available and civil considerations
(METT-TC); and should be included in the supported force’s TSOP. LADW
dissemination must be rehearsed with the supported force.

Rules of Engagement
ROE are positive and procedural management directives that specify the
circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate or continue
combat engagement with enemy forces. (See Unified Command Policy
2011, Executive Office of the President [04/08/2011].) The joint force
commander approves the theater ROE. These established rules enable the
AADC to retain control of the air battle by prescribing the exact conditions
under which engagements may take place. ROE apply to all warfare
participants in theater and are disseminated to all echelons of air, land, and
sea forces. There are seven ROE categories:
•• Right of self-defense
•• Identification criteria
•• Fire control orders
•• WCS
•• Levels of control
•• Modes of control
•• Autonomous operations

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Right of Self-Defense
Commanders at all echelons must take the action necessary to protect their
forces and equipment against air or missile attack. When under attack, the
right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapon control procedures
(JP 3-01). When applied to air defense, the right of self-defense includes the
defense of the defended assets.
Identification Criteria
The employment of Army AMD weapon systems requires early
identification of friendly, neutral, or hostile aircraft and missiles to
maximize beyond-visual-range engagement and avoid fratricide. This
requires a clear understanding of the ROE. The problem of distinguishing
friendly, neutral, and enemy aerial objects, while employing various weapon
systems against the enemy, is a highly complex task for some threats. The
AADC and the airspace control authority establish procedures within the
airspace control system to positively identify all airborne assets and permit
AMD. AMD measures reduce delays in operations and prevent fratricide.
Positive identification of tracks is normally the preferred method of
operation. In the absence of positive identification, procedural identification
is used. Procedural identification employs previously established and
promulgated airspace coordinating measures and rules. Procedural
identification separates airspace users by geography, altitude, heading,
time, and/or maneuver. Generally, a combination of positive and procedural
identification is used.
Hostile criteria are basic rules that assist in the identification of friendly
or hostile air platforms, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles,
and unmanned aircraft systems. These rules are disseminated by the
commanders of unified commands and by other appropriate commanders
when authorized.
Echelons having identification authority use hostile criteria to determine
the identification of detected air targets. The highest echelon capable of
managing engagement operations normally retains identification authority.
Upon target detection, fire units with near real-time data transmission
capability assist the controlling authority by forwarding target information.
The controlling authority makes final targeting decisions based on
identification (e.g., classification and kinematic evaluation) and delegates
engagement authority. Delegation of controlling and identifying authority
to lower echelons is normal for ADA units and as such, units have both
identification and engagement authority.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Maneuver units with Stinger teams should have identification and

engagement authority at the Stinger team-chief level due to the lack of near
real-time data transmission capability. Short reaction times due to the speed
of threat airframes make authority at a higher level impractical.
Fire Control Orders
Fire control orders are commands used to control engagements on a case-
by-case basis and can be transmitted electronically or verbally. However,
not all the following fire control orders can or will be used by every type of
ADA unit:
Engage is an order issued by the engagement authority to fire on a specified
target with the intent to destroy it.
Hold fire is an emergency fire control order to stop engagement of a specific
target. Missiles already in flight must be prevented from intercepting by
diversion or destruction, if technically possible.
Cease fire is a fire control order instructing ADA units to refrain from
firing on, but to continue to track an airborne object. Missiles in flight are
allowed to continue to intercept. This fire control order is normally issued to
preclude engagement of the same track by two or more weapon systems.
Cease engagement is a fire control order used to direct units to stop the
firing sequence against a designated target. Missiles already in flight will
continue to intercept.
Engage hold is an order applicable to Patriot and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) only. When operating in the automatic mode,
engage hold prevents automatic engagement of the specified target by the
system. Missiles in flight are allowed to continue to intercept.
Cover is used to order a fire unit to assume a posture that will allow
engagement of a target if directed. This order can be used for targets that are
presently being engaged by another fire unit or for targets that have yet to
become a significant threat. When receiving this command, report tracking
and ready to fire to higher echelons.

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Weapon Control Status

A WCS prescribes the relative degree of control of AMD fires. WCSs —
weapons free, weapons tight, weapons hold — may be applied to weapon
systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. The degree or extent
of control varies depending on the tactical situation.
Weapons hold. Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a
formal order. This is the most restrictive status. If a time limit is placed
on the weapons hold restriction, the team maintains weapons hold for this
time limit only and then reverts to weapons tight after the time limit has
passed. If communication is lost and no time limit was established, the team
maintains weapons hold for 30 minutes and then reverts to weapons tight.
Weapons tight. Fire only at aircraft positively identified as hostile
according to prevailing hostile criteria. If communication is lost, the team
remains in weapons tight condition.
Weapons free. Fire at any aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
If a time limit is established, the same rule applies as in weapons hold.
If communication is lost and no time limit is established, the team will
immediately revert to weapons tight.
ADA units will normally be governed by a mix of positive and procedural
controls that will vary by weapon system. For example, Patriot aircraft
engagements are typically positively controlled by engagement orders
passed through voice and data links from the controlling authority, while
Stinger or Avenger aircraft engagements may be positively controlled or,
more commonly, initiated at the fire unit based on established identification
criteria (visual identification), and WCS.
Level of Control
Level of control describes the ADA echelon at which positive management
of the air battle is conducted. This can be the AADC, regional air defense
commanders, sector air defense commanders, ADA battalion, or individual
fire unit. This level has engagement authority. Different levels of control
may be established for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft
systems, and ballistic missiles. The AADC will specify the level of control
in the area air defense plan The level of control may likely change over the
course of an operation.

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Modes of Control
There are three modes of control: centralized, decentralized, and
autonomous. The mode of control selected depends on the capabilities of
the communications system, the weapon systems employed, and the friendly
and enemy air situations. The AADC’s area air defense plan specifies the
modes of control, trigger events, when they should be changed, and who has
the authority to change them.
Centralized control mode. In this mode, a higher echelon authority assigns
target engagements to fire units. In some circumstances, fire units seek
permission to engage targets by requesting authorization from that higher air
defense echelon. Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of
engaging friendly aircraft while permitting engagements of hostile aircraft
and missiles only when specific orders are issued to initiate the engagement.
This mode would not be appropriate for a Stinger in maneuver units due
to lack of digital communications down to the Stinger team level and the
likelihood the ADAM will not know the exact location of the Stinger teams
to direct which team to shoot which target.
Decentralized control mode. In this mode, the higher echelon monitors
unit actions to make direct target assignments on a management-by-
exception basis to prevent engagement of friendly air platforms and to
prevent simultaneous engagements of hostile air targets. Decentralized
control is used to increase the likelihood that a hostile aircraft or missile
will be engaged as soon as it comes within range of an ADA weapon
system. During operations that are more static, it may be possible for the
ADAM to execute some level of decentralized control over Stinger teams if
their locations are known and direct communication is possible.
Autonomous operations. Autonomous operations occur when a firing unit
has lost all communications (i.e., voice, data link, and tactical chat) to their
higher headquarters. The firing unit commander assumes full responsibility
for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets in accordance with
existing ROE, WCS, and previously received directives. The team must
take immediate action to reestablish communications. Specific actions taken
will be listed in the unit TSOP or the operation order for the operation.
Normally, the ROE and supplemental fire control measures in effect at the
time of communications loss remain in effect until communications are
regained. Most Stinger teams will operate this way during more dynamic
phases of the battle, as communications with the ADAM and BCT tactical
operations center are likely to be interrupted during this time. The ADAM
cell will not have real-time updates to the positions of the Stinger teams
and therefore would be unable to select a team to conduct an engagement
or decide which team would have line of sight of the threat within the time
frame to engage a fast-moving target.

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Vignette 1
An aircraft approached my company position fast and low. The
battalion staff announced a WCS of weapons tight. My gunner acquired
the aircraft, but cannot visually identify it at this time. I direct the
gunner to interrogate. The gunner challenges and receives an unknown
IFF response: beep, beep, beep, beep ...
Action taken: I cannot tell the gunner to engage the aircraft because I
cannot positively identify it as hostile. I do not ignore it, but direct my
gunner to continue tracking the aircraft.
Reason: Weapons tight requires that we make positive hostile
identification before engaging. As the aircraft comes closer, we
positively identify it as an SU-25. It bears enemy national insignia.
Action taken: I order my gunner to engage.
Reason: By visually identifying the aircraft as hostile, I have met the
criteria for engagement under weapons tight.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Vignette 2
At 1230, I received a message from my battalion commander. He
stated, “weapons hold on all jet aircraft flying westbound between 1300
and 1330, weapons tight for all other aircraft.” At 1315, a jet aircraft I
recognize as hostile approaches westbound. It is coming within range
of my gunner’s weapon.
Action taken: I do not direct my gunner to engage but continue to
observe. My gunner tracks the aircraft and waits for my command to
engage. I report the incident to the battalion tactical operations center.
If the aircraft changes its heading so that it is no longer westbound, I
will order my gunner to engage.
Reason: Under weapons hold, I cannot engage except in self-defense.
If the aircraft changes headings, I am then under weapons tight. Since
I have already visually identified the aircraft as hostile, I can then
engage. The aircraft continues on the same heading and fires air-to-
surface missiles at my unit.
Action taken: I order my gunner to engage.
Reason: I have the right to engage any aircraft in self-defense. This
rule applies not only to an attack on my position, but to the unit I am
supporting as well.

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Vignette 3
I receive a message from my battalion commander changing the
WCS to weapons free. A jet aircraft approaches my position at a low
altitude and high speed. I direct the gunner to challenge the aircraft on
detection. He receives an unknown audible signal from the IFF.
Action taken: I continue my attempts to visually identify the aircraft
while the gunner goes through the engagement sequence. I cannot
identify the aircraft as friendly, so I order him to engage and then
shoulder my own Stinger.
Reason: I was authorized to order the engagement because weapons
free means I should engage aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
This, coupled with the fact that an unknown audible signal to an IFF
challenge was received and I was unable positively identify the aircraft
as friendly, provided sufficient grounds to launch under weapons free.
(Stinger gunners may not be allowed to engage an unknown target
in weapons free based solely on an IFF decision if constrained by
headquarters, commands directives, or standard operating procedures.)
Had there been other aircraft in the area, the engagement sequence on
the first aircraft would have continued while I directed my attention at
another aircraft. If I had identified the aircraft as friendly after the order
to engage was given but prior to launch, I would have called hold fire.

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Chapter 2
Air and Missile Defense
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Air and missile defense (AMD) intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) is a four-step systematic continuous process of analyzing the
adversary’s aerial forces and environment in a specific geographic area and
the battlefield around it. By determining the likely adversary courses of
action (COAs) and their associated branches and sequels, and by describing
the environment where AMD forces are operating, the AMD IPB process
helps the commander and staff selectively apply and maximize available
AMD forces at critical points in time and space on the battlefield (Army
Techniques Publication [ATP] 3-01.16, Air and Missile Defense Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield). The air defense airspace management
(ADAM) cell in the brigade combat team (BCT) and the AMD cell at
division should work closely with the G-2 or S-2 to develop the AMD IPB.

Figure 2-1. Continuous four-step AMD IPB process

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Step 1. Define the Operational Environment (Focus)

This step focuses the initial intelligence collection efforts and the remaining
steps of the AMD IPB process. It analyzes the command’s mission and
utilizes this analysis to define the limits of the AMD area of operations
(AO) and area of interest (AOI). The AMD AO focuses on the effect that
adversary aerial threats and AMD assets have on the battlespace well
beyond a commander’s traditional AO. The AMD AO is a composite of
the geographic areas where adversary aerial forces will be conducting
operations, where friendly AMD forces will be conducting operations, and
where these forces can affect the battlespace with their assigned sensors
and weapon systems. The AOI is that area of concern to the commander,
including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into
enemy territory. This area also includes the areas occupied by enemy
forces and any areas outside enemy territory that provide enemy capability,
which could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Defining the
significant characteristics of the operational environment aids in providing
awareness of the entire AMD battlespace and in identifying and filling
current intelligence information gaps. ATP 3-01.16 contains more detailed
information on this process.

IPB Step 1 Substeps

•• Analyze the commander’s mission and intent in relation to AMD.
•• Identify the AMD AO.
•• Identify the AMD area of interest.
•• Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps.
•• Initiate collection of information required to complete IPB.

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Step 2. Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

(Influence)
This step evaluates the environment’s effect on adversary aerial and
friendly AMD force operations. This assessment examines terrain (to
include observations and fields of fire, air avenues of approach, key
terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment), weather, and other
battlefield characteristics with a focus on how these characteristics affect
the employment of adversary aerial threats and friendly AMD assets. The
objective is to integrate the environmental effects with the operational
environment to create a holistic understanding of the battlefield, which will
be crucial to the development of enemy threat COAs and the employment of
friendly AMD assets.
Observation and Fields of Fire
These aspects relate to the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target
acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic
line of sight. Many battlefield systems require line of sight to effectively
operate or acquire and engage targets. These systems include radios, radar,
jamming systems, direct-fire weapons, airborne and ground sensors, and
friendly ADA systems. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon
systems. Airspace must be analyzed with regard to routes that provide the
best protection for air threats entering the target area and those routes that
provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.
Air Avenues of Approach
Evaluate air avenues of approach using the same criteria as for ground.
An effective air avenue of approach will permit maneuver while providing
terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems and early warning
radars. Some common air avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from
the threat point of origin, and riverbeds.
Determine entry and exit air avenues of approach using the following
factors:
•• Type of air threat, attack profile, and ordnance
•• Air threat point of origin and ground control radar positions
•• Probable threat objective
•• Potential to support maneuver forces
•• Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue
•• Protection afforded to the air system and pilot
•• Air threat and pilot capabilities
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Type of air threat. Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are elusive.

Although they usually fly at low altitudes, their altitude can vary. Once in
the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of engagement
range of ADA. Most surfaced-launched cruise missiles are terrain following
and use terrain masking. Due to their range, they may take indirect approach
routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain dependent (not a target for short-
range air defense [SHORAD]). They fly a straight ground track from
the launch point to the objective. Their flight is not restricted by terrain.
Air-to-surface missiles usually fly direct routes from launch platform to
the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct terrain-following flights.
They follow ridge lines and military crests using the terrain to mask their
approach to the target area. Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain
or manmade features. Depending on range, fixed-wing aircraft may fly a
straight line to the target. Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude
of the air system and thus influence the selection of avenues of approach.
Point of origin. The staff looks at the commander’s entire area of interest
when determining air avenues. Analysis begins at the enemy airfield, UAS,
or missile launch site and works toward the probable enemy objective. This
method allows a look at the big picture in which the staff considers the
range of the air systems, location of navigation aids, and ground control
sites.
Probable threat objective. Each avenue of approach must end at a
target; drop zone; landing zone; or within reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance; or target acquisition range. War gaming is used to identify
enemy COAs, which may be used to determine critical maneuver force
assets that require AMD protection.
Obstacles. Obstacles are broken down into the following three primary
types:
•• Those that prevent the effective employment of ADA systems
•• Those that restrict terrain-following flights
•• Those that force air threats to employ a particular surveillance or
attack profile, route, or to gain excessive altitude
Obstacles and terrain, which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of
approach, are of particular interest. This will canalize movement or restrict
evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the employment of certain
air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system’s maximum operating
ceiling. Obstacles should be plotted on a modified combined obstacles
overlay.

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Key terrain. Key terrain is any locality or area in which the seizure,
retention, or control of it will afford a marked advantage to either
combatant. In the aerial dimension, these consist of terrain features that
canalize or constrain air threat systems and terrain with an elevation higher
than the maximum ceiling of air threat systems. Additionally, areas that
can be used for airfields, landing and drop zones, or forward arming and
refueling points also need to be considered as key terrain.
Cover and concealment. Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles,
and possibly even UASs will use terrain flying, masking, and ground clutter
to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will also
use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by
using ground clutter and vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.
Weather analysis. Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of
weather. Weather analysis for air and missile defense operations is designed
to predict the most likely time over target and other considerations based on
weather effects and light data.
The G-2 or S-2 consider many of the following factors for ground
operations:
•• Visibility has the same effects on visually directed ADA systems and
sensors.
•• High winds adversely affect performance and accuracy of missiles and
UASs.
•• Precipitation affects aircraft, missile, and UAS performance and
reduces the effectiveness of sensors. Cloud cover and ceilings may
restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings, affecting early
warning and restricting visibility and target engagement.
•• Low ceilings, overcast, and cloudy conditions may restrict visually
directed ADA weapons’ detection and acquisition ranges.
•• Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and
UASs by decreasing combat range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing
aircraft), and ordnance loads.

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Step 3. Evaluate the Threat (Operational Model)

This step examines in detail the capabilities and limitations of every threat
aerial platform the enemy is assessed to possess and how the adversary will
organize for combat and conduct operations with these platforms under
normal conditions. The results of the threat evaluation are portrayed in
appropriate threat models and graphic representations of the adversary’s
aerial force capabilities and limitations. They include doctrinal templates
depicting how the adversary operates under normal conditions. (See the
Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) Volume 2: Airspace and Air Defense
Systems for specific enemy weapon systems and platforms for planners.)

Opposing forces’ equipment is broken into four tiers in order to

portray systems for adversaries with different levels of capabilities
and modernity:
Tier 1: New or upgraded state-of-the-art systems with at least limited
fielding
Tier 2: Modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for
the last 10 to 20 years
Tier 3: Generally date back 30 to 40 years and have limitations in
mobility, survivability, and lethality
Tier 4: 40- to 50-year-old systems which have been upgraded
numerous times, usually found in Third World or less-developed
countries

Collect and Analyze Doctrinal Threat Data

The following are typical questions to answer when collecting and
analyzing threat data:
•• What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the
enemy’s air operations?
•• Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression?
•• Where are previously reported missile launch positions? What are
the likely targets? What are the range, endurance, and profile of these
systems?
•• What is the size of the ballistic missile brigade, battalion, and battery?
Does it fire as a unit? Does the enemy have mobile, fixed, or both
types of launchers?

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•• Where do friendly air and missile defense assets fit into the enemy’s
objectives? Do they need to be destroyed or suppressed for the
enemy plan to work? (Answers to these two questions may result in
modification to air avenues of approach.)
•• What are the enemy’s threat characteristics? How are the assets
organized? (Knowledge of enemy organization and who has
operational control will indicate the importance of the AO. For
example, if the enemy’s bombers are at theater level and in the AO,
then that area is probably receiving the theater’s main attack.)
•• Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack?
•• How will UASs be used: attack, reconnaissance, or surveillance? What
are the associated profiles?
•• How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne,
air assault, or special operations forces in conjunction with an air or
ground attack? What sizes are these forces and to what depth are they
used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the enemy
have the capability to coordinate an air attack (possibly with varied air
threat platforms that can overmatch friendly air and missile defense
capability)?
•• What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds?
•• What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling
points? If the enemy’s maximum range falls short of the area of
operations, where is the enemy likely to stop and refuel or be aerial
refueled?
•• How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction?
•• At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions,
and exit the target area?
•• What is the release authority of certain types of ordnance? (This
is particularly important when dealing with chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] threats.)
•• How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets?
•• How has the enemy historically fought?
•• Was asymmetrical threat operations considered?

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Analyze Enemy Air Capabilities

ADA units evaluate a broad range of order-of-battle data and enemy
capabilities to include the ground force and electronic warfare threat to
ADA units. They evaluate and answer the following concerning threat
systems:
•• Ballistic missiles. The following should be considered concerning the
capabilities of threat ballistic missile systems:
○○○ Performances (missile flight time, speed, trajectory, and launch
restrictions)
○○○ Location of surveyed launch sites
○○○ Maximum and minimum ranges
○○○ Circular error probable
○○○ How is a particular ballistic missile targeted? This may indicate
sector of fire or aerial reconnaissance in the area.
○○○ Reload and fire time? What is the number of ballistic missiles
available per transporter erector launcher?
○○○ Warhead type and size
○○○ Guidance modes. Precision-guided munition may indicate enemy
spotters.
•• Cruise missiles. The following should be considered concerning the
capabilities of threat cruise missiles:
○○○ Performances (duration of flight, speed, altitude, and launch
restrictions)
○○○ Maximum and minimum ranges
○○○ Circular error probable
○○○ Targeting capabilities and type
○○○ Contour flying capability
○○○ Vulnerability to countermeasures
○○○ Guidance modes
○○○ Warhead type and size
○○○ Radar cross section

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•• Aircraft. The following should be considered concerning the

capabilities of air systems:
○○○ Coordination of air-to-ground attacks
○○○ Coordination of air and artillery operations. Are ground forward
air controllers used?
○○○ Suppression of friendly air and missile defense
○○○ Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop and
weapon load capacity)
○○○ Endurance and range (ingress and egress altitudes and speeds)
○○○ Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate
○○○ Ability to conduct pop-up maneuvers. What is the standoff range?
○○○ Target acquisition capability, night and adverse-weather capability,
and identification ranges
○○○ The standoff ranges for cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles
○○○ Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of
sophistication)
○○○ Navigational capability. Type of radar: Can it fly at night or in
adverse conditions?
○○○ Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, and
location of staging bases)
○○○ Loiter time. How long will it have on station over the target area?
○○○ Countermeasures environment. For example, will standoff
jammers, ground-based jammers, reconnaissance or chaff-laying
UASs, or aircraft degrade friendly ADA systems?
○○○ How much do they conform to doctrine?
○○○ If the nation is known to vary from prescriptive flight routes or
have restrictive command and control of sorties
○○○ Ability of pilots to fly at night or perform contour flying

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○○○ Types and capabilities of threat ordnance. Each type of ordnance

should be evaluated for the following:

*•• Range to determine the ordnance release line (assume

engagement at maximum range and two-thirds maximum
range)

*•• Accuracy
*•• Release altitude. How high or low must the aircraft fly?
*•• Reload and fire time. What is the number of missiles
available?

*•• Warhead type (for example, mass casualty, conventional, and

sub-munitions)

*•• Guidance modes. How does the pilot acquire and engage?
•• UAS. The following should be considered concerning the capabilities
of threat UASs:
○○○ Performances (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)
○○○ Endurance and range
○○○ Terrain flying or terrain limiting factors
○○○ Target acquisition and standoff range
○○○ Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load
mixture)
○○○ Loiter time. How long can the UAS stay on station?
○○○ Visibility effects on acquisition
○○○ Modes of recovery and turnaround time
○○○ Real-time, data-link capability
○○○ Guidance modes (ground controlled and preprogrammed)

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Table 2-1. UAS group categories

UAS Group 1-5

Group 1: Weigh 20 pounds or less and These systems are generally hand
Micro/Mini normally operate below 1,200 launched (including the hobby-type
feet above ground level at speeds UASs), offer real-time video and
less than 100 knots control, and have small payload
capabilities. They are operated
within the line of sight of the user.

Group 2: Weigh 25-55 pounds and These systems have a small

Small normally operate below 3,500 airframe, low radar cross-sections,
Tactical feet above ground level at speeds and provide medium range and
less than 25 knots endurance. They require operation
within line of sight to the ground
control station.

Group 3: Weigh more than 55 pounds, These systems’ range and

Tactical but less than 1,320 pounds, and endurance varies significantly
normally operate below 18,000 among platforms. They require
feet mean sea level at speeds less a larger logistics footprint than
than 250 knots Groups 1 and 2.

Group 4: Weigh more than 1,320 pounds These relatively large systems
Persistence and normally operate below operate at medium to high
18,000 feet mean sea level at altitudes. This group has extended
any speed range and endurance capabilities
(may require runway for launch
and recovery).

Group 5: Weigh more than 1,320 pounds These systems operate at medium
Penetrating and normally operate below to high altitudes having the greatest
18,000 feet mean sea level at range, endurance, and airspeed.
any speed They require large logistical
footprint similar to that of manned
aircraft.

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•• Threat anti-radiation missiles. The following should be considered

concerning the capabilities of threat anti-radiation missiles:

*•• Performances (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)

*•• Lock on before launch (LOBL)-capable systems
*•• Airframe capable of launching anti-radiation missiles
*•• Frequencies targeted by anti-radiation missiles
*•• Circular error probability (CEP)
Step 4. Determine Threat Courses of Action (Integrate)
This step integrates the results of the previous steps into meaningful
conclusions. At a minimum, this step will conclude with one enemy most
dangerous course of action (MDCOA) and one enemy most likely course of
action (MLCOA). The MDCOA is derived from the threat evaluation in the
previous step and how the enemy could conduct operations if unrestrained
by the operational environment, the environmental effects, or even
enemy intent and national policy. The MLCOA is derived from the threat
evaluation in the previous step and how the enemy will most likely conduct
operations when restrained by the operational environment, environmental
effects, enemy intent, and national policy. These COAs are developed by
creating event templates and matrices focused on intelligence collection
aimed at identifying the COA the enemy forces could execute and the COA
the enemy forces will most likely execute.
Situation Template
A situation template is a graphic depiction of expected enemy dispositions
should they adopt a particular COA. They usually depict the most critical
point in the operation as agreed on by the S-2 and S-3. However, the S-2
might prepare several templates representing different snapshots in time
starting with the initial threat array. The situation template integrates air
attack and surveillance profiles with terrain. It focuses on specific air
avenues of approach and mobility corridors to determine which avenues are
the most capable of supporting specific attack techniques, profiles, and the
most direct routes to landing and drop zones.

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Event Template
An event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and
surveillance planning. It depicts named areas of interest (NAIs) where the
commander expects to see certain activities of tactical significance and
is used to confirm or deny an enemy COA. These NAIs are based on the
terrain constraints on air approach routes to potential targets and analysis of
the enemy’s attack. The G-2 or S-2 develops an event matrix to support the
event template by providing details on the type of activity expected in each
NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other
events on the battlefield.
Decision Support Template
A decision support template is based on the situation and event templates,
event matrix, and the wargaming of friendly COA results to include the
following:
•• Air avenues of approach
•• Airborne and air assault objectives
•• Landing and drop zones and the largest-sized enemy element that
could be employed at the zone
•• Range of threat systems
•• Range of friendly air and missile defense systems
•• Target areas of interest
•• Decision points
Air target area of interest and decision points are determined in the same
manner as for ground operations. However, due to the high speeds of air
systems, decision points must be placed significantly farther in advance of
the target area of interest.

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Chapter 3
Airspace Management
Joint military operations require effective airspace control. The proliferation
of unmanned aircraft systems and fielding of indirect fire platforms capable
of higher altitudes and greater ranges than legacy systems create new
demands on and complicate the airspace control process. Integration and
synchronization of all airspace users are required to establish unity of effort
for effective combat operations.

Airspace Management
Airspace management is the coordination, integration, and regulation of the
use of airspace of defined dimensions (Joint Publication [JP] 3-52, Joint
Airspace Control). Airspace management supports airspace control through
the coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace users by airspace
control elements within an airspace of defined dimensions. (See JP 3-52 for
more discussion on airspace management.)

Airspace Control Principles

Effective airspace control enables commanders to respond effectively
to changing operational environments with appropriate, flexible, and
timely actions. Army forces use the principles of airspace control, which
complement joint airspace control principles, to integrate all airspace users.
The following are the five principles of Army airspace control:
•• Airspace control is action executed through combined arms
formations.
•• Airspace control is a commander’s responsibility based on the
commander’s intent, priorities, and risk guidance.
•• Airspace control is continually planned for and coordinated throughout
the operations process.
•• Airspace control is an integral part of risk management.
•• Near real-time airspace control requires continuous assessment.

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Fundamental Considerations of Airspace Control

•• The need for each component within the joint force to operate a
variety of aircraft and weapon systems, both high and low speed,
rotary- and fixed-wing (manned and unmanned)
•• The need for each component to use the airspace with maximum
freedom consistent with the degree of risk operationally acceptable to
the joint force commander
•• The need to discriminate quickly and effectively between friendly,
neutral, and enemy air operations, vehicles, and personnel
•• The need for the airspace control system to be responsive to the
requirements of the joint force. The airspace control system needs to
be capable of supporting high-density traffic and surge operations as
required by the joint force commander.
•• The need for close coordination and integration of surface force
operations, supporting fires, air operations, air defense operations,
special operations, and airspace control activities
•• The need to accommodate U.S., host-nation, and multinational
airspace control activities.

Airspace Control Documents

Airspace Control Plan
The airspace control authority develops this plan to provide general overall
guidance on airspace control. Key elements of the airspace control plan
(ACP) include:
•• Description of the area of responsibility/joint operations area to which
the airspace applies
•• Appointment and location of the airspace control authority
headquarters
•• List of current existing capabilities within the area of responsibility/
joint operations area to provide airspace control.
•• Description and duties of the airspace control authority to include
each airspace user and liaisons, and coordination with airspace control
authority and elements used in the airspace control system
•• Description of the interface between the tactical air ground station and
air traffic control

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•• Description of the interface between airspace control authority, area air

defense commander (AADC), fire support coordination elements, and
the procedures to deconflict air defense and operational requirements
•• Description of interface with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), host-nation Air Traffic Control System and/or International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
•• Description of the interface between U.S. and multinational forces to
coordinate and deconflict airspace requirements
•• Plans to provide continuity of airspace control operations under
degraded conditions
•• Description of the positive airspace control procedures for the joint
force
•• Description of the procedural airspace control procedures available
including requesting, approving, modifying, and promulgating
procedures
•• Description of identification, friend or foe/selective identification
feature procedures
•• Description of orbit procedures
•• Description of special procedures
•• Description of procedures and systems to compile and promulgate the
airspace control order (ACO)
Air Tasking Order
The air tasking order (ATO) is the operation order or mission assignment for
all joint aircraft missions flown in theater. The daily ATO document shows
all missions operating in theatre. Aircrews must ensure they are on this daily
mission tasking prior to flight.
Airspace Control Order
The ACO is developed after component commanders consolidate,
deconflict, and forward their airspace requests to the airspace control
authority for further consolidation with other theater-wide inputs. The
airspace control authority then integrates all input, resolves any conflicts
among the components, and prepares the ACO for distribution. The ACO
implements specific airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) for specific
time periods. The ACO activates and deactivates procedural control
measures, and updates positive control procedures. The ACO can be printed
as a stand-alone document or it can be incorporated into the ATO.

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Special Instructions
In some theaters, numerous airspace procedures and airspace usages are
published in the special instructions (SPINS). One section may contain all
the airspace procedures units can expect in an ACP. Other SPINS, such as
tanker procedures or cruise missile procedures, address airspace procedures
within those particular sections. This may include rules of engagement
and combat identification criteria for air defense along with any additional
guidance, directives, or information that weapons system operators and/
or aircrews will be held accountable for (i.e., host-nation restrictions, base
defense zone procedures, and special weapons systems control procedures
(Army Tactical Missile System [ATACMS], unmanned aircraft, Tomahawk
air-launched cruise missile (TALCM)/air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),
etc.). SPINS are published as baseline, weekly, and daily SPINS.
Combined/Joint Area Air Defense Plan
A prioritized list of friendly critical vulnerabilities is developed into a
critical asset list and incorporated into the area air defense plan (AADP).
The defended asset list is the basis of the AADP. Active air defense
operations are designated to protect these selected assets. The AADP
should:
•• Arrange a layered and/or overlapping defense to allow multiple
engagement opportunities.
•• Include information operations strategies for counterair.
•• Contain detailed weapon control and engagement procedures integral
to a joint counterair operation.
•• Specify ACMs.
•• Include all surface-to-air capabilities assigned, attached, and
supporting.
•• Provide for high-value airborne asset protection.
•• Employ electronic warfare to disrupt or destroy guidance systems.
•• Integrate air and space (aircraft), ground (Patriot, short-range air
defense [SHORAD]), and sea-based (AEGIS) capabilities.

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The integration of air defense in the ACP is critical. The location of specific
types of air defense operations and procedures for the identification of
aircraft are critical to a viable ACP. The AADP needs to be written with
detailed engagement procedures that are consistent with the ACP and
operations in the combat zone. Drafters of the AADP must be cognizant
of fielded equipment (and its possible limitations) employed by the joint/
combined forces involved. Airspace control and area air defense operations
need to be capable of functioning in a degraded mission command
environment. Detailed engagement procedures and the roles of subordinate
commanders in decentralized execution of air defense operations are keys to
success in a degraded environment.
Operational Tasking Data Link
The operational tasking data link (OPTASK LINK) lays down specifics
of the data link architecture. The interface control officer (ICO) monitors
the data link nets to ensure transfer and display of critical air defense
information. When directed, the ICO will transmit, via data link,
engagement commands and air defense warning changes to linked agencies.
The ICO coordinates the development of the OPTASK LINK message and
manages all tactical digital information link (TADIL) interfaces to create a
consolidated air picture.

Airspace Control Methods

Positive Control
Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on positive
identification, tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace,
conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and
responsibility therein (JP 3-52). Army air traffic service units train, man, and
equip to perform positive control of established airfields and tactical landing
sites.

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Procedural Control
Procedural control is a method of airspace control that relies on a
combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures
(JP 3-52). Procedural control should be uncomplicated and understood
by all aircrew members, air traffic control personnel, air defense and fires
weapon system operators, and airspace element personnel. In addition to
air traffic service personnel, the airspace elements in the Army Air Ground
System are organized, trained, and equipped to ensure Army forces can
provide near real-time procedural control and balance airspace control
system requirements with mission command. Near real-time procedural
control pertains to the timeliness of data or information, which has been
delayed by the time required for electronic communication and automatic
data processing. Furthermore, the use of near real-time implies that there are
no significant delays to the process.

Fire Support Control Measures

Fire support control measures (FSCMs) are designated restrictive or
permissive based on their purpose to either protect friendly forces or
facilitate fires as described in JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. Restrictive
FSCMs safeguard friendly forces by imposing specific coordination
requirements between the measure’s controlling authority and other users.
Permissive FSCMs facilitate target engagement with conventional means.
The fires cell is responsible for targeting coordination and synchronizing
fires delivered on surface targets by fire support means under the control
or in support of the corps or division. This cell coordinates and deconflicts
FSCMs with ACMs through close interface with air defense and airspace
management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (BAE) and airspace
elements, the air support operations center, and the tactical air control party.
The airspace element works with the fires cell to integrate FSCMs with the
unit airspace plan. (See Appendix D for a list of FSCMs and when to use
them.)

Airspace Coordinating Measures

ACMs facilitate efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. ACMs are not
designated as restrictive or permissive. They protect friendly forces by
establishing specific coordination requirements between the measure’s
controlling authority and other users, as defined in the ACP. Transit of an
ACM requires coordination with the owning airspace control element.
An airspace measures request (ACMREQ) reserves airspace for a specific
use. An originator requests airspace for an operation within their assigned
area of operations. An ACMREQ can consist of single or multiple ACMs.
(See Appendix D for a list of ACMs and when to use them.)
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Air Defense Measures

Air defense measures are planned, coordinated, and employed to facilitate
responsibilities for identification, detection, and tracking to engage enemy
air and missile threats as directed by the AADC. (See Annex D for a list of
air defense measures and when to use them.)

Collective Tasks for Airspace Control

The airspace control collective tasks apply across echelons from brigade
through theater army. At the brigade level, the ADAM/BAE or ADAM
elements execute all the collective tasks. Above the brigade level (division,
corps, and theater army), the airspace element and the air and missile
defense element collaborate to execute the tasks contained in Army
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-03, The Army Universal Task
List.
In ADRP 1-03, Army tactical task 5.4, Control Tactical Airspace, consists of
14 collective tasks that provide the basis for performance measures. These
collective tasks are separated into two groups: tasks that focus on planning
future airspace use and tasks that focus on the execution of airspace use.
The first group of collective tasks integrate airspace requirements generated
by all airspace user communities — movement and maneuver, intelligence,
fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection — both joint and
Army, while meeting commander’s guidance for mission accomplishment
and risk. The remaining collective tasks integrate airspace use during
execution of current operations using staff procedures and near real-time
procedural control. These latter tasks occur to resolve airspace use conflicts
according to the commander’s guidance for mission accomplishment and
risk.

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Chapter 4
Stinger Plan Development
This chapter describes the Stinger planning process. This chapter also
discusses the requirements of the air defense estimate and air and missile
defense (AMD) inputs for the fires annex. The estimate process assists
the force commander in decision making. The planning process results
in a description of the air defense artillery support for the concept of the
operation.

Overview
AMD planning is a distributed process occurring at all echelons. The area
air defense commander (AADC) at the theater level provides the area air
defense plan. From this plan, the defense designers extract identification
criteria, rules of engagement, airspace coordinating measures, weapon
control statuses (WCSs), air defense warnings (ADWs), self-defense
criteria, and, as applicable, direct the integration of multinational AMD.
The area air defense plan provides a baseline document for planning and is
modified routinely through the publication of air tasking orders, airspace
control orders, and special instructions. The theater area air defense
plan, with the AMD annexes from higher organizations, provides broad
guidelines to develop a Stinger air defense plan at the maneuver brigade
combat team (BCT) or battalion level.

Receive the Mission

The area air defense plan with the relevant air tasking orders, airspace
control orders, and special instructions at the combatant command, joint
task force, and/or corps level informs the division and BCT to the ADW,
WCS, rules of engagement, and joint task force critical asset list/defended
asset list. Higher headquarters orders should include relevant appendices
in the fires and protection annexes that provide additional guidance. This
information will allow divisions and brigades to begin their mission
analysis.

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Mission Analysis
The products developed by the staff during mission analysis help
commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s
visualization. Analyzing the contents of the higher headquarters products
and AMD intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) help with the
following:
•• Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.
•• Review available assets.
•• Determine constraints and limitations.
•• Identify facts and develop assumptions.
•• Begin risk assessment.
•• Develop commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and
essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).
•• Develop the initial information collection plan.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Process
The commander uses IPB to understand the operational environment and
the options it presents to friendly and enemy forces. IPB is a systematic,
continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific
area. By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information
necessary to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points
in time and space on the battlefield. Airspace — or the aerial dimension
— is the most dynamic and fast paced of the operational dimensions. The
intelligence staff must consider the aspects of air operations and be aware of
the capabilities of air threats to include unmanned aircraft systems (UASs),
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft. The S-2 has overall staff responsibility for IPB. Air
defense artillery and aviation officers must provide input to the S-2 when
integrating air aspects into the IPB process. As described in Chapter 2, the
IPB process has the following four steps:
•• Define the operational environment.
•• Describe the operational environments’ effects.
•• Evaluate the threat.
•• Determine threat courses of action.

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By the end of the IPB process, the commander expects the staff to have
formulated enemy air avenues of approach (AAA), enemy courses of action
(COAs), and have begun determining the air defense priorities (criticality,
vulnerability, threat [CVT] analysis). See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of
AMD IPB.

Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential tasks

Examining higher headquarters plans and air defense annexes two levels
higher allows the staff to identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.
Understand the mission of the adjacent units conducting air defense.

Available Assets
Air defense requirements are likely to outstrip forces available, forcing
commanders to make decisions about command and support relationships
for air defense assets. For example, attaching Stinger teams to each
maneuver company risks spreading these assets too thin and makes an
inflexible plan. It is better to keep the teams as general support to a brigade
so the air defense they provide can more easily change by phase of the
operation.

Determine Limitations and Constraints

Constraints laid out in the form of the higher unit’s WCS and rules of
engagement determines the engagement authority of Stinger teams.
Limitations for the Stinger system, especially range and capability at night,
requires careful planning to ensure teams are where they need to be and
when.

Facts and Assumptions

Monitor the tactical situation to develop facts and assumptions that support
mission analysis and COA development. More assumptions mean more risk
to the operation, unless they are confirmed and become facts.

Risk Assessment
During selection of a COA, the commander will face inherent risks (for
example, combining and concentrating weapons’ coverage [engagement
area] toward the most likely enemy AAAs or direction of attack to achieve
weighted coverage). Based on the tactical situation, a commander may
risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to
weight coverage toward another direction. Conducting a risk assessment is
recommended before this guideline is implemented.

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Develop CCIRs and EEFIs

A CCIR directly influences decision making and facilitates successful
execution of military operations. Two elements of CCIRs are friendly force
information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs). An FFIR could be a Stinger team expending all its missiles or the
loss of a Sentinel radar. PIRs could consist of how and when the enemy
utilizes its UAS capabilities.
EEFIs, the third element, is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if
known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or
limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy
detection. EEFIs, if important enough, could warrant air defense protection
in order to prevent aerial observation.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is an activity that
synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors and
assets, and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in
direct support of current and future joint operations. Air defense radars such
as the Sentinel can be used to perform aerial surveillance and to confirm
or deny enemy AAAs and aerial COAs. Including enemy air capability
in the initial collection plan is necessary. ISR should be considered to
support offensive counterair targets such as striking UAS control stations,
enemy forward arming and refuel points, or airfields before they launch
UASs or aircraft. Developing and nominating these targets as operations
unfold can help reduce the need for the active air defense provided by
Stingers, or allow them to focus more narrowly on one element of the
threat. An integrated fires cell with fire support and air defense and airspace
management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (BAE) personnel working
together makes this process much smoother.

Air Defense Priorities

Establishing the air defense priorities for the maneuver commander is a
critical step in creating the Stinger air defense plan. As part of mission
analysis, the staff should assist the commander in outlining the air defense
priorities for inclusion in the initial planning guidance at the end of mission
analysis. The most common methodology employed to establish these
priorities involves weighing the factors of criticality, vulnerability, and
threat, otherwise known as the CVT method. The CVT method allows the
BCT to avoid task-organizing a Stinger team to each maneuver company
and instead do an analysis to determine what assets by phase Stinger teams
executing short-range air defense (SHORAD) in a general support role
should protect. This is an iterative process; as COAs are developed, air
defense priorities will need to be revisited and adjusted.

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Criticality is the degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission

accomplishment. Determination of the criticality of an asset or force is
made by assessing the impact on the conduct of the operation that would
result from damage to the asset or force. The degree of criticality is based
on whether damage to the asset or force prevents, seriously interferes with,
or causes only limited interference with the execution of the plan.
Vulnerability consists of two parts: susceptibility to damage if attacked
and recuperability. Susceptibility to damage is further subdivided into two
parts: hardness and dispersion. Consideration should be given to the asset
or force’s hardness and its ability to disperse or displace to another position.
Recuperability is the degree to which an asset or force can recover from
inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and available manpower to
continue the mission.
Threat is the assessed probability of an asset or force being targeted for
surveillance or attack by enemy air and missile threats. The use of threat
information to develop AMD priorities is a reverse IPB process that
determines what enemy air to surveil and attack. Targeting information
provided by intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack
methods, and enemy doctrine are useful in evaluating AMD priorities. To
determine the relative importance of assets and forces, the commander
considers certain characteristics that make an asset or force a lucrative target
for the enemy. In effect, this is reverse target value analysis.
The CVT method provides the commander and staff with a prioritized list of
assets and matches them against the AMD resources available and the risks
of not protecting them. This is used to create a list of assets that will receive
AMD protection by phase.

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Course of Action Development

During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission
statement, commander’s intent, planning guidance, and various knowledge
products developed during mission analysis. The COA development step
generates options for subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the
commander’s intent and planning guidance.
Assess Relative Combat Power
Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and
information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply
at a given time (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 3-0,
Operations). Comparing friendly, organic, combined arms for air defense
systems (CAFADS) and Stinger numbers and capabilities against likely
threat aircraft strength and capabilities will help inform the CVT analysis.
For example, by analyzing the relative combat power, the BCT may
determine that Stinger teams should be focused on enemy rotary-wing
platforms while CAFADS is used for group one and two UASs due to
limited numbers of missiles.
Generate Options
The staff generates options based on the commander’s guidance and the
initial results of the relative combat power assessment. Air defense planners
assist the rest of the staff in determining decisive points/supporting efforts,
elimination/modification of COAs, and consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of air defense for each possible COA.
The air defense planners also advise on the integration and synchronization
of air defense with the rest of fires, maneuver, maneuver support, and other
warfighting functions. Planners should consider the air defense employment
guidelines — mutual support, overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted
coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth — before arraying forces
for each COA and phase.
Array Forces
After determining the decisive and shaping operations, related tasks and
purposes, and the air defense employment guidelines used, air defense
planners determine the relative combat power required to accomplish each
task. Planners should be cautioned against simply assigning a team or
section direct support to each subordinate maneuver formation. This rarely
results in adequate defense of the BCT commander’s priority assets.

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Assets considered critical will likely outnumber the availability of air

defense systems available. At this time, the air defense planner works with
the staff and commanders to ensure they are maximizing the planning of
passive air defense measures. It is critical to actively plan and rehearse
passive measures and CAFADS at the troop-leading level to decide on
actions to take for the local air defense warning (LADW) of dynamite.
Develop a Broad Concept
In developing the broad concept of the operation, the commander describes
how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission within the commander’s
intent. The broad concept provides the framework for the concept of
operations and summarizes the contributions of the warfighting functions.
If necessary, revisit and adjust the critical assets the commander wishes to
defend by COA and phase during this portion of planning. Developing a
draft synchronization matrix and AMD overlay two levels down will allow
the planner to coordinate air defense coverage for these priority assets in
space and time.
When selecting tentative weapon positions, planners must ensure that
weapon positions provide balance and mutual support if there is no known
direction or air attack. Planners should assign a tentative primary target line
and sector of fire for each team oriented on the AAA they are defending
against. Teams can be sited perpendicular, as well as head-on to hostile
incoming aircraft. The ADAM cell can use the Air and Missile Defense
Workstation (AMDWS) to develop detailed positioning of assets and assess
capabilities.
While developing the broad concept, planners will also need to consider
how the unit will receive and disseminate early warning notifications. Early
warning of inbound aircraft and directional cueing are essential for the early
engagement of threat aircraft of all types. Without early warning, the first
indication a Stinger team has of enemy aircraft in the area is after aircraft
release ordnance or enemy UASs call indirect fire on the defended asset
thereby losing the initiative. Creating the early warning plan may include
the placement of radars capable of detecting the enemy air threat and how
the radars will support the broader early warning network.
A Stinger force that lacks a digital method to pass early warning will be
relying purely on radio capabilities. In this case, the best practice is to have
a dedicated early warning net. This net is used to pass early warnings in
a language Soldiers can understand, such as LADWs. The early warning
net also uses the directed early warning format to send early warning to
maneuver battalions and Stinger teams. Incorporate scouts on this net to
pass information on aircraft that have been visually identified. The ADAM
cell at the BCT should be able to receive the digital air picture from its
division and nearby air defense radars in order to pass early warning to the

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force. The preferred method of passing information is to use the manual

SHORAD control system (see Appendix C). Given the time-sensitive nature
of this task, drawing the shortest route of voice communications from the
BCT tactical operations center to the individual Stinger team is paramount.
Figure 4-1 is a simplified illustration of this challenge.

Figure 4-1. Stinger team communications challenges

Planners across the staff need a unit airspace plan. This plan promotes
the permissive use of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air
fires. Flight routes and SHORAD engagement zones in particular promote
effective surface-to-air fires and minimize fratricide. Brief the unit airspace
plan during the combined arms rehearsal. Contact and correct any airspace
users who do not fly in compliance with the unit airspace plan. The BCT
does not allow adjacent units to conduct uncontrolled movement across unit
boundaries. The same rule applies to air boundaries.

Course of Action Analysis and War Gaming

COA analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties or
coordination problems and probable consequences of planned actions for
each COA. The COA analysis may uncover potential execution problems,
decisions, and contingencies. At the conclusion of this step of the MDMP,
the staff should have refined COAs, a completed synchronization matrix,
and a decision support matrix.

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Course of Action Comparison

COA comparison is an objective process for evaluating COAs
independently and against set evaluation criteria approved by the
commander and staff. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses
of COAs, enable selecting a COA with the highest probability of success,
and developing it further in an operation plan or operation order (OPORD).
The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to
key outputs.

Course of Action Approval

After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA that best
accomplishes the mission. After approving a COA, the commander issues
the final planning guidance, which includes a refined commander’s intent
(if necessary) and new CCIRs to support execution. It also includes any
additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders
preparation, rehearsal, and preparation.

Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition

The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear,
concise concept of operations. The COA statement becomes the concept of
operations for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation
overlay.

Stinger and Sentinel Radar Employment Guidelines

•• Balanced coverage: Coverage in all directions. Assets or areas such as
brigade support areas or airfields.
•• Weighted coverage: Dense coverage in areas of most likely AAAs.
Commanders assume risk in other areas.
•• Coverage in depth: Arraying Sentinels/Stingers through the depth
of battlefield. Continuous coverage of egressing and ingressing air
platforms.
•• Early detection: Position Sentinels/Stingers as far forward as the
tactical situation permits.
○○○ Radar coverage should extend beyond the Stinger positions at
least 10 kilometers in the expected direction of air attack to
provide early warning.
○○○ Position Sentinels as close as 10 kilometers from forward line of
own troops, but not in artillery range of the enemy.
○○○ Most forward radar in a secured location is no closer than
2 kilometers to the forward edge of the battle area.

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○○○ Position Stinger teams up to 3 kilometers forward of maneuver

units (may co-locate with scout teams for additional security).
Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-
time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) dependent.
•• Overlapping coverage: Adjacent Sentinels should overlap by 20
kilometers. Allows an uninterrupted band of radar coverage throughout
the area of operations.
•• Actual position is based on ground clutter that affects coverage.
•• Mutual Support: Effective search of two Sentinels extends to cover
dead space of the other Sentinel. Enhances coverage in the area of
operations, facilitates survivability.
•• Appreciate the terrain: Need a line-of-site analysis (AMDWS can do
this digitally).
•• Arranging force protection for radars is critical.
•• Provide primary target lines for Stinger teams oriented on AAAs as
well as sectors of fire.

Communications Security and Identification, Friend or Foe

Considerations
The Stinger is equipped with an identification, friend or foe (IFF)
system that aids in identification of aircraft. The IFF has two modes of
interrogation: Mode 3 and Mode 4. Mode 3 is the default mode, which is
built into the IFF interrogator system and automatically challenges aircraft.
Mode 4 requires crypto codes and requires a crew member to load the
codes into the interrogator programmer. These codes last up to four days.
The IFF programmer loads the encryption keys and the mode of operation
into the interrogator. If Mode 4 codes expire, the interrogator reverts to
challenging Mode 3. Positive Mode 4 response indicates friendly aircraft.
Local tactical directives will specify whether to consider Mode 3 returns as
a positive friend, possible friend, or unknown. Planning should incorporate
the requirement for teams requiring new IFF codes at least every four days
in order to maintain Mode 4 functionality.

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Stinger Team Operations

Outlined below are the basics of Stinger team operations. Explaining
them here gives the maneuver leader better understanding of how Stinger
teams should fight and helps commanders provide better guidance and
plan training. The team chief receives the mission orally or in writing. As
part of an integrated air defense plan, the team should be provided with a
primary target line (PTL), sector of fire oriented on the AAA it is defending
against, and a list of expected aircraft types. Upon the team’s arrival at the
designated location, the team chief selects the best firing position, field of
view, and primary target line. When selecting firing positions, pay particular
attention to positions that provide unobstructed fields of fire, no masking
of the missile launch, and adequate missile backblast area. Evaluate
terrain features that present a masking problem for employment for height,
distance, and direction from the firing position.

Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of Position

The Stinger team performs a reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of
position prior to occupying any position to ensure the survivability of the
team. The priorities of the team are selecting the mission site or position
and checking for local security. The team chief dismounts approximately
300 meters from the location and scouts the position, while the gunner
provides overwatch. The team ensures the area is clear of any hostile forces
or hazards and locates a firing position that meets operational and tactical
requirements. The following describe considerations for selecting the
primary, alternate, and supplementary positions:
Reconnaissance:
•• Receive the mission.
•• Conduct a map/aerial reconnaissance of the proposed position.
•• Team chief coordinates face-to-face with the local ground commander
prior to occupation.
•• Select a route of march and an alternate route.
•• Conduct precombat checks.
•• Initiate movement.
Selection:
•• The team stops 300 meters from the proposed primary position.
•• The team chief issues the gunner a five-point contingency plan (known
as GOTWA):

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1. Where you are Going?

2. Others you are taking?
3. Time you will return?
4. What to do if you do not return?
5. What Action to take if hit by the enemy?
•• The gunner dismounts the vehicle and:
○○○ Provides local security
○○○ Monitors radio
○○○ Awaits for team chief to return
•• The team chief moves toward the primary position and looks for:
○○○ Firing position
○○○ Booby traps and mines
○○○ Sufficient area for dispersion
○○○ Alternate exit and entrance routes
○○○ Optimal observation and fields of fire
○○○ Survivability and defendability
○○○ Cover and concealment
○○○ A position away from natural lines of drift
○○○ A position not on key terrain, if possible
○○○ Proximity to friendly troops
○○○ Alternate fighting positions
Note: Call in if you have moved more than 100 meters from your initial
grid.
Note: You have 200-400 meters of your initial grid to position yourself. If
an optimal position does not exist, find one and call higher command before
you dig in.

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Occupation of Position Priorities of Work

H-Hour:
1. The team chief coordinates face-to-face with the nearest ground
unit. Let them know you are there.
2. Establish security and clear the area of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards.
3. Ready Stinger for firing.
4. Verify location, primary target line, and sectors of fire.
5. Establish communication with higher command, report location
and “ready for action.”
6. Emplace CBRN alarm.
7. Select an alternate position (300 meters away).
8. Begin the range card.
H+1:
9. Camouflage the vehicle.
10. Dig a hasty fighting position.
11. Dig in an ammo cache point (split between the primary and
alternate position).
12. Complete the range card.
H+2:
13. Remote communications equipment from the vehicle to the
fighting position.
14. Emplace special equipment as necessary (claymore, concertina,
etc.).
15. Clear fields of fire.
H+3 to H+9:
16. Dig in the fighting position.
17. Emplace overhead cover.

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H+10 to H+24
18. Rehearse movement to an alternate position.
19. Check night vision goggles.
20. Establish sleep, security, and preventive maintenance checks and
services plan.
21. Check position camouflage.
D+1 and beyond
22. Constantly improve primary and alternate positions and construct
range cards.
Types of Positions
Primary. A position from which the fire unit intends to accomplish its
tactical mission. This is the best location available in the designated area for
the Stinger/Avenger team to accomplish the mission.
Alternate. A position to which the fire unit moves when the primary
position becomes compromised or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned
mission. The alternate position must be far enough away to prevent it
being rendered compromised by the same action that affected the primary
position. The alternate position must meet all the requirements of the
primary position.
Supplementary. A place to fight which provides the best means to
accomplish a task or cover an AAA that cannot be accomplished from the
primary or alternate positions.
Hasty. A position selected with no prior reconnaissance.
Exercise care to avoid placing positions near terrain features easily
recognized from the air. Positions are more vulnerable to enemy fires once
spotted near an identifiable object.
Stinger Position Checklist
Location:
•• Within 100 meters of the grid given in the OPORD.
•• Received permission to adjust location.
•• Within 100 meters of the grid reported to higher command.
•• Position away from terrain features that are easily recognized from the
air.

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Security:
•• Approaching vehicle halted away from position.
•• Challenge and password used correctly.
•• Local security maintained.
•• Soldiers in the proper uniform.
•• Maintain light, noise, and litter discipline.
•• Supplementary positions created.
•• Dummy positions created.
Threat:
•• Show air avenues of approach on the map.
•• Show direction of the highest air threat in relation to the position on
the ground.
•• Show on the map where the last enemy aircraft was encountered.
•• Position away from terrain features easily recognized from the air.
•• Show forward line of own troops on the map.
Sector of fire:
•• Is the primary target line the same given in the OPORD?
•• Has permission been received to adjust the primary target line?
•• Are limits designated as in the OPORD?
•• Are there major obstructions in the sector of fire?
•• Is sector of fire limited or is there 360 degrees of coverage?
Cover and concealment:
•• Is the vehicle camouflaged?
•• Is the vehicle concealed?
•• Are the vehicle tracks into position concealed?
•• Is all the equipment camouflaged and concealed?

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Access:
•• Are there adequate routes in and out of position?
•• Is there more than one route?
•• Is the vehicle combat parked?
Alternate position:
•• Is it 200-300 meters away from the primary?
•• Does it have a quick concealed access route?
•• Does it cover the same sector of fire?
•• Does it have a hasty command post position?
•• Does it have a deliberate command post position?
Deliberate fighting position:
•• Are there hasty fighting positions?
•• Is there a deliberate fighting position?
•• Are there 18 inches of overhead cover?
•• Is the range card complete?
•• Magnetic north.
•• Sector of fire limits.
•• Eight-digit grid coordinate.
•• Range rings to maximize range of Stinger nearby positions.
•• Any defensive measures or obstacles.
•• ADW/WCS.
•• Enemy threat information.
•• Is there a position:
○○○ In the defense plan?
○○○ For evacuation by vehicle?
○○○ For evacuation by foot?
•• Has an ammunition storage area been designated?

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Vehicle:
•• Is the dispatch complete and correct?
•• Is the daily preventive maintenance checks and services on vehicle,
communications, and other items complete?
Soldiers:
•• Know the task force and platoon mission.
•• What air defense fire units are adjacent to your position?
•• What other friendly units are adjacent to your position?
•• What is the ADW/WCS and at what effective time?
•• What are the rules of engagement for ground and air?
Readiness Conditions
Readiness conditions (REDCONs) describe the degree of readiness of
teams. The decision to select a REDCON is based on intelligence, early
warning, and ADW. Normally, the BCT will designate the readiness
condition used by subordinate Stinger teams. Additionally, readiness
conditions are used to ready the force in a logical way for action against
the enemy while retaining the ability to stand down teams for rest or
maintenance. This is critical with two-man crews and 24-hour capable
systems.

REDCON Levels Associated With Weapon Control Status

Red: REDCON 1 and 2
Yellow: REDCON 1 and 2
White: REDCON 1, 2, and 3

REDCON 1: A team is capable of completing its target engagement drill within

the drill standard.
REDCON 2: A team is capable of completing its target engagement drill within
5 minutes.
REDCON 3: A team is capable of completing its target engagement drill within
30 minutes.
REDCON 4: A team is moving or released from its mission.
REDCON 5: A team is non-mission capable.

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Appendix A
Stinger Characteristics
The Stinger Weapon System
The Stinger weapon system is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, infrared
homing-guided/negative ultraviolet (UV) heat-seeking missile with
modified proportional navigation. It requires no control from the gunner
after firing. The system is equipped with an identification, friend or foe
(IFF) subsystem, which aids the team in identifying friendly aircraft.
Missile Round
The missile round is composed of two major components: the fiberglass
launch tube and the missile.
Launch tube. The launch tube, which houses the missile, provides the main
support for all other parts of the weapon round. Both ends of the launch
tube are sealed with a breakable disk. The front infrared (IR) window is
transparent to IR and UV radiation. Both the front and rear disks break
when the missile is launched. The hinged sight assembly attached to the
launch tube allows the gunner to sight the weapon, determine target range,
super elevate, and hear the audible tones through the acquisition indicators.
Missile. The Stinger missile consists of three sections: guidance, warhead,
and propulsion sections.
•• The guidance assembly processes target IR and UV radiation. It
provides guidance commands for the missile during flight. The seeker
tracks the IR/negative UV source automatically after the gyro is
uncaged and during missile flight. The control assembly converts the
guidance commands into movement of control surfaces that direct the
flight of the missile.
•• The warhead section consists of a fuse assembly and a quantity of
explosives, housed within a cylindrical case. The fuse can detonate the
warhead in three ways: by means of a low-impact switch, a hard target
sensor, or by self-destructing. Should a target intercept not occur, a
self-destruct circuit detonates the warhead.
•• A separable launch motor and a dual thrust flight motor provide
propulsion for the missile. The launch motor provides initial thrust that
ejects the missile from the launch tube allowing the missile to coast to
a safe distance from the gunner. The flight motor ignites and propels
the missile to the target.

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Weapon Round
A weapon round consists of a missile round fitted with a separable
gripstock. The separable, reusable gripstock consists of operational controls,
connectors, latch mechanism, and the IFF antenna assembly. Located on
the gripstock assembly are the safety and actuator device, uncaging switch,
firing trigger, IFF challenge switch, IFF interrogator connector, and battery/
coolant unit (BCU) receptacle. When the IFF antenna assembly is unfolded
and the IFF interrogator is connected to the weapon, it is capable of
interrogating aircraft and receiving coded replies. After a missile launch, the
gripstock is removed from the launch tube.
Ready Round
A ready round consists of the weapon round and a battery coolant unit.
When the battery coolant unit is inserted into the weapon round, it becomes
a ready round. The battery coolant unit is a thermal battery that provides
prelaunch power for the system and argon gas that cools the missile seeker
for a maximum of 45 seconds (ready round). Once activated, the battery
coolant unit must be removed within three minutes of activation to avoid
damage to the gripstock due to excessive overheating. Once activated, the
battery coolant unit is expended and removed from the gripstock.
Identification Friend or Foe Subsystem
The Stinger weapon system is equipped with an IFF subsystem to aid in
the identification of aircraft. The IFF system is an electronic system that
provides an automated means to identify aircraft as friend, possible friend,
or unknown. It does not identify hostile aircraft.
Weapon and Missile Rounds
The Stinger missile is packaged as weapon round complete, weapon round
partial, or missile round. A weapon round complete includes the missile
round, gripstock, and varying numbers of BCUs packaged in a reusable
aluminum container. A weapon round partial contains the missile round and
varying numbers of BCUs packaged in a reusable aluminum container. The
missile round contains the missile round and varying numbers of BCUs
packaged in a fiberboard box within a wire-bound wooden container.

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Basic Stinger missile. The basic Stinger is no longer active in the U.S.
inventory.
FIM-92D – Stinger-Reprogrammable Microprocessor (RMP). The
RMP Stinger missile has additional improvements to the guidance system.
These improvements enable the weapon to reject complex infrared
countermeasures (IRCM), provide greater background discrimination than
the basic Stinger, and have made the missile more responsive to steering
commands. The addition of a reprogrammable module allows weapon
updates to meet future threats without the need to modify missile hardware.
FIM-92E – Block I. The Block I Stinger missile has improved guidance
system electronics, including a roll frequency sensor (ring laser gyro). This
upgrade provides the missile with the capability of determining the up
position before and during launch, allowing the missile guidance system
to bias its flight to counteract gravitational forces. The Block I upgrade
enhances missile performance when launched against targets in non-ideal
scenarios, such as minimum target elevation angles and low target aspect
angles in a clutter environment. FIM-92E Block I Stinger missiles only
fly in the Block I mode and have full continental U.S. (CONUS) IRCM
performance if they are launched with a Block I gripstock or platform
launcher.
Table A-1. Weapon round complete configurations
NSN Model No. DODIC BCU Unit Pack Boxed Dimensions
Quantity Weight

1425-01-356-6995 FIM-92D PJ12 5 95 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1425-01-325-0696 FIM-92D PJ09 3 92 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1425-01-325-0695 FIM-92D PJ12 2 91 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1425-01-440-8040 FIM-92E PJ15 3 92 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

BCU battery/coolant unit

DODIC Department of Defense Identification Number
NSN National Stock Number

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Table A-2. Weapon round partial configurations

NSN Model No. DODIC BCU Unit Pack Boxed Dimensions
Quantity Weight

1427-01-356-7048 FIM-92D PL87 5 90 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1427-01-325-3160 FIM-92D PL87 3 87 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1427-01-325-3161 FIM-92D PL88 2 85 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

1427-01-416-3184 FIM-92E PL41 3 87 66 x 13 x 13.25 inches

BCU battery/coolant unit

DODIC Department of Defense Identification Number
NSN National Stock Number

Table A-3. Missile round configurations

NSN Model No. DODIC BCU Unit Boxed Dimensions
Pack
Quantity
Weight

1427-01-325-3158 FIM-92D PL89 2 79 67.25 x 13.8 x 11.2 inches

1427-01-325-3159 FIM-92D PL86 1 77 67.25 x 13.8 x 11.2 inches

1427-01-356-7047 FIM-92D PL86 0 76 67.25 x 13.8 x 11.2 inches

1427-01-416-3186 FIM-92E PL42 1 77 67.25 x 13.8 x 11.2 inches

1427-01-416-3183 FIM-92E PL39 0 76 67.25 x 13.8 x 11.2 inches

BCU battery/coolant unit

DODIC Department of Defense Identification Number
NSN National Stock Number

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Table A-4. Equipment data

Weapon Item Length Width Height Weight

Missile Round 59.5 inches 7.25 inches 7.25 inches *36.1 lbs
(151.1 cm) (18.4 cm) (18.4 cm) (16.4 kg)

FHT 59.5 inches 7.25 inches 7.25 inches *36.1 lbs

(151.1 cm) (18.4 cm) (18.4 cm) (16.4 kg)

BCU 3.4 inches 3.75 inches 3.75 inches 2 lbs

(8.6 cm) (9.5 cm) (9.5 cm) (.9 kg)

IFF Programmer/ 23.6 inches 13.3 inches 10.7 inches 41.0 lbs (18.6 cm)
Battery Charger (59.9 cm) (33.8 cm) (27.2 cm)

Shipping and Storage 66.0 inches 13.5 inches 18.0 inches 54.1 lbs (empty)
Container (167.6 cm) (34.3 cm) (45.7cm) (24.5 kg)
100.0 lbs (full)

BCU battery/coolant unit

FHT field handling trainer
IFF identification, friend or foe
*Note: Weight includes gripstock and BCU

Capabilities
•• Supersonic, surface-to-air missile
•• Range: unclassified planning range of four kilometers
•• 2.75 inch diameter
•• 59.5 inch length
•• 36.1 pounds weight
•• Passive guidance with IR/negative UV homing and modified
proportional navigation
•• Warhead: high explosives
•• Rocket motor: solid propellant, two-stage separable launch motor and
dual-thrust flight motor
•• Extreme mobility: Goes everywhere the Soldier can go

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•• High effectiveness: High-hit probability on high speed targets

•• Head-on capability: Engage(s) target at any aspect
•• IFF capability: Aids in target identification
•• Short reaction time: Ready to fire in seconds
•• Low vulnerability: Easy to camouflage
•• High reliability: Requires little maintenance
•• Logistic simplicity: Certified round concept
•• Climatic insensitivity: Used from Arctic to tropical regions
•• Removable gripstock assembly
•• Disposable launch tube assembly
System Components
Weapon Round RMP: FIM-92D
•• (NSN 1425-01-325-0695) (End Item Code [EIC]: N/A)
•• (NSN 1425-01-356-6995) (EIC: N/A)
•• (NSN 1425-01-325-0696) (EIC: N/A)
Weapon Round Block I: FIM-92E
•• (NSN 1425-01-440-8040) (EIC: N/A)
Trainer Handling-Guided Missile Launcher M60
•• (NSN 6920-01-024-9969) (EIC: NRH)
Guided Missile Subsystem Intercept-Aerial, Training M148
•• (NSN 6920-01-246-0699) (EIC: NSC)
Interrogator Set AN/PPX-3A, AN/PPX-3B
•• (NSN 5895-01-032-4263) (EIC: IZH)
•• (NSN 5895-01-126-9263) (EIC: IZF)
Interrogator Set Programmer AN/GSX-1, AN/GSX-1A
•• (NSN 5895-01-032-4266) (EIC: IZJ)
•• (NSN 5895-01-119-1273) (EIC: IZK)

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Figure A-1. Weapon round metal container

Figure A-2. Weapon round wooden container

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Appendix B
Stinger Team Certification and Training
Managing Stinger Gunnery and Training in the
Brigade Combat Team
Brigade combat teams (BCTs) will provide Soldiers organic to their
formation to form Stinger teams, with no additional dedicated air defense
Soldiers from the Army at large. Soldiers attending the five-week Stinger
course are awarded an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) and will have the
basic tools they need to put the Stinger missile into operation. However,
they will have limited capability to conduct sustainment training or
certification on the system without centralized help from the BCT and
outside organizations. Stinger teams should be treated as low-density,
military occupational specialty holders and conduct centralized training.
The following are recommended responsibilities for a gunnery and training
program for these Soldiers:
Brigade
•• Directs consolidated Stinger team sustainment training weekly.
•• Designates the field artillery battalion commander (fire support
coordinator [FSCOORD]) as the commander in charge of the Stinger
gunnery program.
•• The BCT air defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell plans
monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual evaluations and certifications
as per Training Circular (TC) 3-01.18, Stinger Gunnery (CAC login
required for access).
•• Designates a Stinger standardization officer (recommend the
ADAM officer in charge as the air defense artillery [ADA] subject
matter expert). The following are the Stinger standardization officer
responsibilities:
○○○ Reviews and approves written tests for Tables I, III, VII, and VIII.
○○○ Works with the S-2 to create the visual aircraft recognition
(VACR) hot list for study and certification.
○○○ Establishes a centralized training program for the Stinger teams
in the BCT and manages training aids, devices, simulators, and
simulations (TADSS) for the BCT.
○○○ Maintains a list of certified trainers and evaluators.
○○○ Coordinates for outside training and evaluations as necessary.

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○○○ Serves as custodian of any commander’s gunnery waiver memos

such as for early warning equipment not fielded to BCT Stinger
teams (Pony or Crew Chief Air Situation Display [CCASD]).
○○○ Provides short-range air defense (SHORAD) leader training to
BCT and battalion leadership to facilitate proper planning and
utilization of capability.
○○○ Captures Stinger training in the BCT quarterly training guidance.
○○○ Submits Class V requirements to the brigade S-3 in accordance
with Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in
Weapons Training, Chapter 4, (CAC login required for access).
•• Includes Stinger crew and equipment reporting in the Unit Status
Report/Objective-T.
•• Consolidates TADSS (field handling trainer, tracking head trainer
[THT], and Stinger troop proficiency trainer [STPT]) at the BCT level.
Fires Battalion
•• Has training and readiness authority for the brigade’s Stinger teams.
•• Has the only authority to certify and break crew integrity.
•• Approves the brigade Stinger training and certification program.
Maneuver Battalion
•• Provides two-man teams to attend the five-week Stinger ASI-
producing course as per the BCT plan.
•• Maintains team integrity to minimize retraining and recertification.
•• Provides trained Stinger teams to BCT-consolidated Stinger training in
accordance with brigade policy.
•• Provides Stinger teams to participate in BCT-consolidated gunnery
events as required.
•• Battalion leadership participates in BCT-led SHORAD leader
development (recommend one topic per quarter).
•• Integrates Stinger training in general and Table VI training specifically
into existing field training exercises.
•• The battalion S-3 submits crew rosters and certifications to the BCT
Stinger standardization officer and BCT FSCOORD.

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Trainers and Evaluators

•• The senior evaluator should be a certified Avenger master gunner.
•• The senior evaluator selects all other evaluators to train the Stinger
teams.
•• The evaluator has the authority/responsibility to halt evaluations for
catastrophic system failures or safety violations.
Stinger Team
•• Participates in weekly brigade-consolidated Stinger sustainment
training.
•• Crew-rostered crewmembers will certify as individuals (Tables I-III)
within 30 days of assignment to a Stinger team.
•• Stinger teams will certify within 60 days of assignment and every 180
days thereafter.
•• Crew-rostered crewmembers will be Table IV certified during a section
training exercise within 90 days of being assigned as a crewmember.
•• Crew-rostered crews will be Table VI certified during a field training
exercise within 180 days of being assigned to a platoon and semi-
annually thereafter.

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Weekly Stinger Sustainment Training

Stinger crew skills are perishable if not trained on a regular basis. When
employed, Stinger teams have a narrow window to positively identify and
engage targets. Table B-1 outlines the recommended eight-hour weekly
sustainment training.
Table B-1. Eight-hour weekly sustainment training
Training Task Supported
Time Table

1 hour Stinger weapon system components/subcomponents and I

button functions

2 hours VACR II

1 hour Identification, friend or foe programming II

1 hour Tracking practice against live aircraft, Stinger troop IV

proficiency trainer, or remote aircraft

1 hour Engagement practice V

1 hour Battle drill/crew drill V

1 hour Stinger team operations VI

Stinger teams will provide the Man-Portable Air Defense System

(MANPADS) force for maneuver units. The certification requirements and
recommended training are listed in Table B-2. See TC 3-01.18 for the full
description (CAC login required for access). Tables IX and X are designed
for ADA units at the platoon level.

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Table B-2. Certification requirements and recommended training

Gunnery Event Where How Frequency
Phase
Crewmember I Stinger Weapon System UTA (C)(D)(PE) Monthly
Components/Function/ (4)(8)(12)
PMCS Platoon/Section/
Team Operations
II VACR/FACT/DAGR/ UTA (C)(D)(PE) Monthly
SKL/IFF Operations (4)(8)(9)(12)
III Crewmember UTA (E) Monthly
Certification Tables I (4)(8)(9)(12)
and II
Team IV Tracking Practice UTA (D)(PE) Quarterly
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
(10)(12)
V Battle Drill Certification UTA (D)(PE) Quarterly
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
(10)
VI Team/Section UTA (PE)(E) Quarterly
Operations Evaluation (4)(5)(7)(8)(10)
(11)(12)(13)
(14)
VII Team Pre-Certification UTA (D)(PE) Semi-
LTA (1)(2)(3)(4) Annually
(5)(8)(9)(10)
(12)
VIII Team Certification UTA (E) Semi-
LTA (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) Annually
(8)(9)(10)(12)
Collective IX Rehearsal LFX (Annual MTA (D)(E) Annually
Service Practice) UTA (3)(6)(9)(10)
LTA (11)
(12)(13)(14)
X LFX (Annual Service MTA (D)(E) Annually
Practice) UTA (3)(6)(8)(10)
LTA (11)
(12)(13)(14)
DAGR Defense Advance GPS Receiver (7) Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)
FACT forward area control terminal (8) Technical Manual 9-1425-429-12, Operator’s and Organizational
IFF identification, friend or foe Maintenance Manual for Stinger Guided Missile System (CAC login
LFX live-fire exercise required for access)
LTA local training area (9) Training Circular (TC) 3-01.80, Visual Aircraft Recognition
MTA maneuver training area (10) TC 44-117-11, Stinger Team Crew Training (CAC login required for
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services access)
SKL simple key loader (11) Unit mission essential task list (METL)
UTA unit training area (12) Anti-Tank Weapons Effect Signature SimulatorATWESS cartridge will be
VACR visual aircraft recognition used in battery level and higher level supported field training exercises.
(C) conference (13) Training readiness condition (TRC) B/C units will perform during training
(D) demonstration year.
(E) evaluation (14) One team will fire while all other available section members track with
(PE) practical exercise (hands-on) tracking head trainer (TRC A, one missile per platoon per year,
(1) Stinger troop proficiency trainer TRC B/C, one missile per platoon per training).
(2) Improved Movement Target Simulator (IMTS)
(3) tracking head trainer
(4) field handling trainer
(5) tactical aircraft when available
(6) targets one-fifth scale or its equivalent

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Crewmember Gunnery Tables

Table I (Stinger weapon system components/preventative maintenance
checks and services/functions, and platoon/section/team operations)
This table helps the individual develop a working understanding of the
Stinger weapon system and trains the individual to identify the components
of the Stinger weapon system and the Stinger 13 critical checks. This table
helps the individual understand the function of Stinger components and
preventative maintenance checks and services performed at the operator
level. This table also trains the individual on platoon, section, and team
operations.
•• Crewmembers will correctly identify and state the function of the
Stinger weapon system, the Stinger 13 critical checks, and perform
preventative maintenance checks and services per Technical Manual
9-1425-429-12, Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual
for Stinger Guided Missile System. The crewmember must achieve
a minimum score of 80 percent on the platoon, section, and team
operations.
Table II (Visual aircraft recognition (VACR)/forward area computer
terminal (FACT)/Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR)/simple key
loader (SKL)/identification, friend or foe (IFF) operations)
This table trains the crewmember on aircraft recognition. The crewmember
also receives instruction on FACT/DAGR/SKL operations, charging the IFF
programmer batteries and IFF code loading procedures.
•• The individual must receive “Go” scores in FACT linkup, DAGR/
SKL operations, successfully program the IFF to accept a code, and
receive “Go” scores in other IFF procedures and battery charging per
Soldier Training Publication 44-14S14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and
Trainer’s Guide (CAC login required for access).
•• (VACR) Each crewmember must identify 45 out of 50 aircraft by
correct nomenclature or aircraft name within five seconds, per aircraft.
Table III (Crewmember Certification Tables I and II)
This table is a critical gate used to provide an evaluation for the Stinger
crewmembers.
•• Each crewmember must receive a minimum score of 90 percent in
each evaluated task in Tables I and II. If an individual fails to certify
on Table III, retrain the Soldier until he satisfactorily completes Table
III prior to advancing to the next phase.

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Stinger Team Gunnery Tables

Tables IV through VIII train Stinger teams to engage aerial targets in a static
position using THT or STPT.
Table IV (Tracking Practice)
This table measures the Stinger teams tracking procedures of aerial targets
using the THT or the STPT. The team leader controls the tracking practice.
•• Each Stinger team will successfully track four out of five aerial targets
with the THT or STPT.
•• Each individual must achieve a score of “Go” on all drills.
Table V (Battle drill certification)
This table measures the Stinger team proficiency in engagement procedures
using STPT or THT. The Stinger team leader controls the engagement. The
Stinger team deploys to a unit training area and operates the STPT, or, when
available, the THT against live aircraft. The STPT will be used to maintain
Stinger proficiency and for Table VIII certification. The individual will
perform drill tasks required for his position as specified in Training Circular
44-117-11, Stinger Team Crew Training (CAC login required for access).
•• To successfully complete Table V, each Stinger team (team leader
and gunner) must correctly engage two out of five hostile target
presentations using the STPT and must score a “Go” on all drills.
•• Each Stinger team must achieve a score of “Go” on all drills. It is the
responsibility of the leader to ensure that the teams follow the correct
engagement procedures.
Table VI
Team operations evaluation tests the Stinger teams’ ability to employ under
day and night conditions. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant will
maintain command and control. Teams deploy to the local training area,
which may be in conjunction with a unit field training exercise and emplace
and engage aerial targets. The senior evaluator will train the team on how to
conduct a site selection and how to select firing positions.
•• Activities will be evaluated based on principles of air defense
employment contained in TC 44-117-11; Army Techniques Publication
(ATP) 3-01.18, Stinger Team Techniques (CAC login required for
access); and appropriate operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders
(OPORDs), and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

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Table VII (Team pre-certification)

This table prepares the Stinger team for certification in Table VIII. The
senior evaluator will administer a practice and/or diagnostic test on all Table
VIII elements. Stinger teams that are not proficient will receive additional
training to prepare them for certification.
•• Each crewmember must have achieved 90 percent on VACR and range
ring test; 80 percent on the platoon, section, and team test; and a “Go”
score on all crew drills, IFF programming, FACT linkup, and DAGR/
SKL operations.
•• Each Stinger team (team leader and gunner) must correctly engage
four out of five hostile target presentations using the STPT or THT.
Table VIII (Team certification)
Table VIII is a critical gate. A battalion evaluation team will evaluate
drills. The failure of any task results in an uncertified team. Teams must
successfully complete Table VIII prior to advancing to the next phase of
training.
•• Each crewmember must achieve 90 percent on VACR and range ring
test; 80 percent on the platoon, section, and team test; and a “Go”
score on all crew drills, IFF programming, FACT linkup, and DAGR/
SKL operations.
•• Each Stinger team (team leader and gunner) must correctly engage
four out of five hostile target presentations using the STPT or THT.

Platoon Gunnery Tables

Platoon gunnery tables train the team to engage targets in various modes
under various conditions. Advanced gunnery skills include Tables IX and
X. Satisfactory performance on Table VIII indicates the Stinger team is
certified to perform a live engagement of an aerial target.
Table IX (Rehearsal live-fire exercise [annual service practice])
To be satisfactorily completed, this training event may encompass more
than one training day.
•• Activities will be evaluated based on principles of air defense
employment contained in TC 44-117-11, ATP 3-01.18 (CAC login
required for access), and appropriate OPLANs, OPORDs, and SOPs.
•• Selected Stinger teams will engage an aerial target with a Stinger
missile and successfully perform drills per TC 44-117-11.

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Table X (Annual service practice)

To be satisfactorily completed, this training event may encompass more
than one training day.
•• Activities will be evaluated based on principles of air defense
employment contained in TC 44-117-11, ATP 3-01.18 (CAC login
required for access), and appropriate OPLANs, OPORDs, and SOPs.
•• Selected Stinger teams will engage an aerial target with a Stinger
missile and successfully perform drills per TC 44-117-11.

Training and Evaluation Outlines Collective Task

The collective tasks recommended to support the Stinger gunnery program
are listed in TC 44-117-11. Commanders have the option of selecting the
collective tasks they feel are required to support the gunnery program.

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Appendix C
Manual Short-Range Air Defense Control System
Accurate, timely, and reliable early warnings enable air defense artillery
(ADA) fire units to be more effective. Early warning serves two purposes:
alerting and cueing. Alerting information tells the Soldier that an aircraft
is approaching his position or defended asset. Cueing information tells the
Soldier which direction the aircraft is travelling, its positional location, and
its tentative identification in a timely manner. This enables the user to focus
attention in the right direction and detect the aircraft at a greater range. To
obtain this information, short-range air defense (SHORAD) units use a
manual control system that provides alerting, but very limited cueing. The
following are objectives of the Manual SHORAD Control System (MSCS):
•• Provide near real-time transmission of early warning information to
SHORAD and other divisional units.
•• Provide weapon control information to the SHORAD units organic to
the division.
•• Integrate ADA data into the division airspace management effort.
Early warning data is available to any unit that is capable of receiving it.
This includes ADA units, the divisional maneuver units, and combat support
units.

Manual SHORAD Control System Communications

MSCS uses various communications nets and components to provide
timely, accurate, and reliable early warning information. The early warning
broadcast net is a one-way frequency modulation (FM) net originating at the
brigade combat team (BCT) tactical operations center. The air defense and
airspace management cell in the BCT should be able to see the integrated
air picture across the area of operations. Any unit with an FM receiver and
within line of sight and operating range restrictions can obtain early warning
information simply by monitoring this net.

SHORAD Grid Matrix

MSCS uses a unique grid system (see Figure C-1). A standard grid matrix
is used with a specified reference point. The division operation order will
normally designate the map coordinates to this reference point in the air
defense annex, as well as the map sheet series number. The location of
the reference point is standard on each sheet; however, it may change
for security reasons. This can be accomplished by designating another
intersection as the reference point (for example, intersection of HEMLOCK,
INSECT, HAZEL, and INDIAN) and applying the specific map coordinates.

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Figure C-1. SHORAD grid system

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Figure C-1. SHORAD grid system (continued)

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The SHORAD grid matrix is a standardized matrix consisting of 400 grid

squares with a code name assigned to each square. Users need only use
that portion of the matrix applicable to their areas of operation. The matrix
reference point should be set to extend the matrix coverage at least 20
kilometers beyond the division boundaries.
Each grid square represents a map area of 10 by 10 kilometers. Use only the
portion of the matrix needed for the operation. SHORAD grid overlays are
locally produced in a scale compatible with standard tactical maps. Using
a larger-scale map such as 1:250,000 will allow teams to track a larger area
and provide earlier warning

Track Reporting
The track position is reported to 1 kilometer using the coded grid square
in which the aircraft is located and by further subdividing each grid square
into 1 kilometer increments (see the aircraft in Figure C-2). It is located at
SHORAD grid LEMON Three-Three.

Figure C-2

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Standard Track Report Format

Preface: Initial track (repeat twice), track update, scrub track, or mass track
ID: Friend, unknown, or hostile (friendly not normally transmitted)
Location: Lemon 3-3 (10-kilometer grid designator [LEMON] plus
1-kilometer grid increments for easting and northing, read to the
right and up)
Heading: Southwest
Raid Size: One
Aircraft Type: Fixed wing
Track Designator: A-01 (Assigned by detecting unit)

Track Report Examples

1. Initial Track. When transmitting an initial track, transmit all known
information as time or the tactical situation permits:

INITIAL TRACK, INITIAL TRACK

UNKNOWN
AT LEMON—THREE—THREE
HEADING SOUTHWEST
ONE
FIXED WING
TRACK DESIGNATOR: ALPHA-ZERO-ONE

2. Track Update. To transmit a track update, send only the preface, the
track designator, the new location, and the new heading. Using the example
shown, if the aircraft moves to grid KATIE and is located at KATIE-7-8:

TRACK UPDATE
ALPHA-ZERO-ONE
NOW AT KATIE-SEVEN-EIGHT
HEADING SOUTHWEST

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3. Track Update Identified

Track update reports must also include any changes to the information
previously reported, for instance, if, in the example below, the aircraft is
now identified as hostile and its new location is KATIE-4-3:

TRACK UPDATE
ALPHA-ZERO-ONE
NOW AT KATIE-FOUR-THREE
NOW HOSTILE
HEADING SOUTHWEST

Note: Track updates should be applied about twice a minute.

4. Scrub Track
A scrub track is reported when a track exits the area of interest, a track no
longer appears on the radar, or is identified as friendly. To report a scrub
track, only the preface and track designator must be transmitted:

SCRUB TRACK
ALPHA-ZERO-ONE

5. Mass Track
The last type of track report is a mass track. A mass track is transmitted
instead of an initial track when the raid size is “many.” When reporting
a mass track, location will normally be one or more 10-kilometer grid
designations. Track updates for a mass track are the same as any other track:

MASS TRACK, MASS TRACK

HOSTILE
AT LEMON AND MARTIN
HEADING SOUTHWEST
MANY
ROTARY WING
TRACK DESIGNATOR: ALPHA-ZERO-TWO

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Appendix D
Airspace Control and Coordinating Measures
Coordination measures are used to facilitate planning and efficient
execution of operations while providing safeguards for friendly forces and
noncombatants. See Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-52.1, Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control, for the
complete list.

Airspace Coordinating Measures

Users employ airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) to facilitate efficient
airspace use to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards
for friendly forces. The appropriate airspace control authority approves
ACMs and disseminates them via the airspace control order (ACO).
Low-level transit route (LLTR). A LLTR is a temporary corridor of
defined dimensions, established in the forward area to minimize the risk to
friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or surface forces.

Figure D-1. Low-level transit route

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Minimum risk route (MRR). An MRR is a temporary corridor of defined

dimensions recommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that
presents the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the
combat zone. The MRR graphic looks the same and has the same data as the
LLTR.
Temporary minimum risk route (TMRR). A TMRR is a temporary route
established to route air traffic between transit routes or the rear boundary
of the forward area and the operations area in direct support of ground
operations.
Transit corridor (TC). A TC is a bidirectional corridor in the rear area and
normally is not provided air traffic services.
Transit route (TR). A TR is a temporary air corridor of defined dimensions,
established in the forward area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from
friendly air defenses or surface forces.
Special corridor (SC). An SC is a corridor used to accommodate the
special routing requirements of specific missions.
Standard use Army aircraft flight route (SAAFR). SAAFRs are
established below the coordination level to facilitate Army aircraft
movement. Normally, it is located in the corps through brigade rear areas of
operation and does not require approval by the airspace control authority.
Coordinating altitude (CA). A CA uses altitude to separate users and
defines the transition between airspace control elements. A CA allows the
airspace control authority or airspace control entity to assign a volume of
airspace to another control organization.
Coordination level (CL). A CL is an ACM that uses procedural control
methods to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an
altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly. Prior to
transitioning through the CL, the aircraft should coordinate with the
appropriate command and control (C2) agency listed in the airspace control
plan or ACO. A CL allows airspace planners to deconflict low-level routes
for rotary-wing aircraft and certain unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
High-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). A HIDACZ is a complex,
designated airspace in which there is a concentrated employment of
numerous and varied airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined dimensions,
which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. The
maneuver commander normally controls HIDACZ access. The maneuver
commander can also direct a more restrictive weapons status within the
HIDACZ than the weapons status outside the HIDACZ.

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No fly area (NOFLY). A NOFLY is airspace of specific dimensions set

aside for a specific purpose in which no aircraft operations are permitted,
except as authorized by the appropriate commander and controlling agency.
Restricted operations zone (ROZ). A ROZ is an ACM with 14 specific
usages. ROZ usages are typically described by the stated mission of the
airspace user with one exception: unmanned aircraft (UA) usage. Although
a UA performs various missions, like manned aircraft, planners should use a
UA ROZ for UA missions. The 14 specific usages are:
•• Air-to-air refueling area (AAR). An AAR ROZ is airspace of defined
dimensions set aside for aerial refueling operations.
•• Airborne command and control area (ABC). An ABC ROZ is
airspace of defined dimensions established specifically for aircraft
conducting battlefield C2. A U.S. Marine Corps airborne C2 aircraft
or a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) E-8
aircraft could use an ABC ROZ.
•• Airborne early warning (AEW) area. An AEW ROZ is airspace
of defined dimensions established for airborne platforms conducting
airborne early warning missions. Generally, it is designed for aircraft
such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and
E-2C.
•• Close air support (CAS). A CAS ROZ is airspace designated for
holding orbits and used by rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft in proximity
to friendly forces.
•• Combat air patrol (CAP). A CAP ROZ is airspace for an aircraft
patrol over an objective area, protected force, critical area, or in an
air defense area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile
aircraft before they reach their targets.
•• Drop zone (DZ). A DZ ROZ is a specific area of defined dimensions
upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped.
•• Electronic combat (EC). An EC ROZ is airspace established
specifically for aircraft engaging in EC.
•• Landing zone (LZ.) An LZ ROZ is any specified zone of defined
dimensions used for landing aircraft.
•• Pick-up zone. A PZ ROZ is a specified zone used for landing aircraft
to pick-up troops, equipment, or supplies.

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•• Reconnaissance area (RECCE). A RECCE ROZ is airspace

established specifically for aircraft conducting reconnaissance.
Although UASs can perform reconnaissance, this ROZ usage is
designed for manned aircraft performing airborne reconnaissance.
•• Sector of fire (SOF) area. A SOF area ROZ is airspace of defined
dimensions, potentially covering the entire area of a joint special
operations area and created specifically for SOF missions. It can be of
any shape.
•• Surface-to-surface missile system (SSMS). An SSMS ROZ is
airspace of defined dimensions designed specifically for Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
(GMLRS), and Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) launch point,
route of flight, and impact points. Also, an SSMS ROZ is used for
Patriot firing positions.
•• Surface-to-surface munitions (SSM). An SSM ROZ is airspace of
defined dimensions established specifically for SSM route of flight and
launch and impact points.
•• Unmanned aircraft (UA). A UA ROZ is airspace of defined
dimensions created specifically for UAS operations. Generally, this
airspace defines where UAS missions are conducted and does not
include en-route airspace.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

Commanders use fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) to
facilitate engaging targets rapidly while providing safeguards for friendly
forces. They ensure fire support will not jeopardize friendly forces, will
interface with other fire support means, and will not disrupt adjacent
units’ operations. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of targets, while
restrictive FSCMs impose specific restrictions and provide safeguards for
friendly forces, facilities, or terrain.
Airspace coordination area (ACA). An ACA is a formal or informal,
three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area (established by the
appropriate commander) in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from
friendly, indirect, surface-to-surface fires. ACAs are often of short duration.
Formal and informal ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the air
liaison officer to ensure they meet the technical requirements of the using
aircraft and weapon systems. In developing situations, and as increasing
fire support and airspace control capability become available, an established
ACA can be replaced by another control measure, such as a ROZ or kill
box.

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The joint force air component commander (JFACC) can establish an ACA
within the JFACC’s assigned airspace. The JFACC cannot establish an
ACA within another component commander’s assigned airspace without
coordination because this measure could unduly restrict that commander’s
airspace users.

Figure D-2. Airspace coordination area (ACA)

Battle position (BP) and holding area (HA). BPs and HAs are not
categorized as coordination measures, but have implied airspace
components when helicopters use them.
•• A BP is a defensive position from which a unit will fight; it is oriented
on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. A unit assigned a BP
is located within the general outline of the BP, but its maneuver is not
confined to the BP.
•• For attack helicopters, a BP is a maneuvering area containing lateral
and in-depth firing points for the flight to maneuver while searching
for and engaging targets. Because a BP is not a coordination measure,
it does not appear on airspace and fires digital systems as protected
airspace. Planners should use an ACA to establish helicopter BPs. This
protects the aircraft from surface-to-surface fires and other airspace
users. Planners should coordinate size and altitude requirements
based on the mission. Alternatively, planners could use a CAS ROZ to
achieve the same effects as an ACA.

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•• HAs are generically described as areas where ground and air units
await movement instructions, targets, or missions. The area should
be well forward, but it should provide cover and concealment from
enemy observation and fires. Like the BP, HAs are two-dimensional
areas with an implied airspace component, when used by helicopters.
•• Attack helicopters occupy HAs prior to movement to BPs or
individual firing points. While in the HA, the aircraft complete final
coordination with the terminal controller, as required. Because the HA
is not a coordination measure, it does not appear on airspace and fires
digital systems as protected airspace. Planners should use an ACA
to establish helicopter HAs as necessary. This protects the aircraft
from surface-to-surface fires and other airspace users. Alternatively,
planners could use a landing zone ROZ to achieve the same effects as
an ACA.

Figure D-3. Battle position

Kill box. A kill box is a permissive measure with an associated ACM used
to facilitate integrating joint fires and coordinating the airspace within. The
kill box FSCM defines the surface area where friendly forces may employ
surface-to-surface and air-to-surface effects without further coordination.
To facilitate integrating air and surface fires, it is necessary to establish an
ACM over the kill box to protect aircraft from other aircraft and surface-to-
surface fires.

BKB044 JFLCC
ALT 9000-30000FT

160600ZMAY18-
171200ZMAY18

Figure D-4. Kill box

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Air Defense Measures

Air defense measures are employed to segregate and identify friendly
aircraft from hostile aircraft to facilitate effective air defense.
Air defense identification zone (ADIZ). An ADIZ is airspace of defined
dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control
of airborne vehicles are required. The ADIZ is normally the transition
between procedural control areas (outside) and the positive control areas
(inside). Typically, an ADIZ is used for sovereign national boundaries or, in
the case of areas of operations, for identification in the rear areas. Review
flight information publications for theater-specific ADIZ and associated
procedures and limitations.
Base defense zone (BDZ). A BDZ is an air defense zone established
around an air base and limited to the engagement envelope of short-range
air defense weapons systems defending that base. BDZs have specific
entry; exit; and identification, friend or foe procedures established. Key
components required are radar, controlling agency, and weapon systems.

Figure D-5. Base defense zone

Control zone (CONTZN). A CONTZN is controlled airspace extending

upwards from the surface of the Earth to a specified upper limit. The
graphic for a control zone looks identical to the ACA and contains the same
information, except for grid coordinates.
Coordinated air defense area (CADA). A CADA is a mutually defined
block of airspace between a land-based air commander and a naval
commander when their forces are operating in proximity to one another.

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Fighter engagement zone (FEZ). A FEZ is airspace of defined dimensions

within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally
rests with fighter aircraft. FEZs are designated airspace, usually above
and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea), short-
range air defense systems, but may extend from the surface, as required.
Normally, a FEZ is used when fighter aircraft have the clear operational
advantage over surface-based systems. These advantages could include
range, density of fire, rules of engagement (ROE), or coordination
requirements. Coordination and flexibility within the combat airspace
control system may be limiting factors.
High-altitude missile engagement zone (HIMEZ). A HIMEZ is airspace
of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement
of air threats normally rests with high-altitude, surface-to-air missiles.
Normally, HIMEZs are used when a high-altitude missile system has a
clear operational advantage over aircraft in a particular zone. Advantages
could include range, C2, ROE, or response time. Design of the HIMEZ is
contingent on specific weapon system capabilities.
Joint engagement zone (JEZ). A JEZ is airspace of defined dimensions
within which multiple air defense systems (e.g., surface-to-air missiles and
aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. JEZs depend on
correct differentiation between friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft.
Low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ). A LOMEZ is airspace
of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for air threat
engagement normally rests with low- to medium-altitude, surface-to-air
missiles.

LOMEZ
1-7 ADA BN
MIN ALT 500
MAX ALT 3000
240000ZDEC17-
291100ZDEC18

Figure D-6. LOMEZ

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Short-range air defense engagement zone (SHORADEZ). A

SHORADEZ is airspace of defined dimensions within which the
responsibility for engaging air threats normally rests with short-range air
defense weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude
missile engagement zone. A SHORADEZ is normally established for
the local air defense of high-value assets. Commanders should plan to
employ decentralized control of short-range air defense weapons within the
SHORADEZ. A SHORADEZ is similar to the LOMEZ graphic.
Weapons free zone (WFZ). A WFZ is an air defense zone established
to protect key assets or facilities, other than air bases, where air defense
weapon systems may fire at any target not positively recognized as friendly.
Normally, a WFZ is used for high-value asset defense in areas with limited
C2 authority. The area air defense commander declares weapons free with
the airspace control authority establishing the zone.

Levels and Lanes

Missile arc (MISARC). A MISARC is an area of 10-degrees centered on
the target bearing with a range extending to the maximum range of the
surface-to-air missile or as large as ordered by the tactical commander.
Safe lane (SL). An SL is a bi-directional lane connecting an airbase, landing
site, or BDZ to adjacent routes or corridors. Safe lanes may also be used to
connect adjacent, activated routes, or corridors.
Traverse level (TL). A TL is the vertical displacement above low-level air
defense systems, expressed as a height and an altitude, at which aircraft
can cross the area. Normally, TLs will be used with transit corridors, as
specified in the airspace control plan.

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Appendix E
Topics for Fires and Combined Arms Rehearsals
Brigade combat team (BCT) fires personnel may be involved in several
types of rehearsals. The most common types are combined arms rehearsals
and fires rehearsals. Multiple rehearsals ensure that maximum integration
and synchronization in supporting the scheme of maneuver with fires
is achieved. However, when time is limited, the number and scope of
rehearsals are reduced. In these cases, rehearsals may focus on fires tasks
or particular aspects of the maneuver plan, and the associated fires plan and
air and missile defense appendix. See Army Techniques Publication (ATP)
3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, for more information.

Combined Arms Rehearsals

The fires plan may be rehearsed as part of the BCT’s combined arms
rehearsal. In addition to the air defense and airspace management (ADAM)/
brigade aviation element, key fires players include the fire support
coordinator; brigade fire support officer; main command post fires cell
including the Air Force tactical air control party; BCT staff weather officer;
subordinate and supporting unit fires cells; fire support officers; mortar
platoon leaders; the Army aviation liaison officer; military intelligence
company commander; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)
officer; and the engineer coordinator. Assigned and attached combined
arms units that comprise or support the BCT will participate when possible.
Normally, the BCT S-3 directs the rehearsal using a synchronization matrix
or execution checklist. The brigade fire suppport officer should use the fire
support execution matrix. The rehearsal is normally executed by reciting or
performing the following:
•• Actions to occur
•• Possible friendly initiatives
•• Possible reactions to enemy initiatives
•• Coordinating measures
•• Significant events relative to time or phases of the operation

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At a minimum for each phase or time period of the operation, the brigade
ADAM cell officer as the senior air defense representative should verify the
following:
•• Weapon control status and air defense warning
•• Rules of engagement to include hostile criteria, friendly criteria, and
unknown response
•• Identification and engagement authority by type of target (fixed wing,
rotary wing, unmanned aircraft system, etc.)
•• Critical assets and defended assets
•• Enemy air and missile threat and capabilities
•• Sensor plan and early warning method
•• Air defense measures
•• The movement plan specifies when and where units will move.
Fires Rehearsals
The fires rehearsal should last no more than 90 minutes and should ensure
the synchronization of the fires effort with the maneuver plan. Fires
rehearsals focus on the execution of air defense tasks, fire support tasks,
the fire support execution matrix, the effectiveness of fire support control
measures, and the timing and synchronization of all fire support efforts with
each other and with the maneuver operation. Fires rehearsals serve to refine
fire support and air defense, ensure understanding by all fires personnel, and
prove the feasibility of executing fires.
A fires rehearsal may be used to prepare for a combined arms rehearsal or
it may be used after a combined arms rehearsal to refine and reinforce key
fires tasks. If the fires rehearsal is held first, changes from the combined
arms rehearsal may require a second fires rehearsal.
At a minimum for each phase or time period of the operation, the brigade
ADAM cell officer as the senior air defense representative should verify the
following:
•• Weapon control status and air defense warning
•• Rules of engagement to include hostile criteria, friendly criteria, and
unknown response
•• Identification and engagement authority by type of target (fixed wing,
rotary wing, unmanned aircraft system, etc.)

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•• Critical assets and defended assets

•• Enemy air and missile threat and capabilities
•• Sensor plan and early warning method
•• Air defense measures
•• The movement plan specifies when and where units will move.
•• Airspace clearance and integration including indirect fire trajectories
•• Ammunition status by phase (given number of enemy sorties)

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Appendix F
Sample Air and Missile Defense
Appendix to Annex D (Fires)
Annex D (Fires) contains Appendix 7 (Air and Missile Defense [AMD]).
Appendix 7 and associated tabs provide fundamental considerations, format,
and instructions for developing Appendix 7 to Annex D to the base plan or
order. This appendix follows the five-paragraph attachment format.

Sample Appendix 7
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the
classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses.
Refer to Army Regulation (AR) 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

APPENDIX 7 (AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE) TO ANNEX D (FIRES) TO

OPERATION PLAN/ORDER
[number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names
or numbers, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. Doctrinal references for this annex include Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army
Air and Missile Defense Operations; Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.18,
Avenger Battalion and Battery Techniques (CAC login required for access);
ATP 3-01.64, Avenger Battalion and Battery Techniques; ATP 3-01.81, Counter-
Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques; ATP 3-01.16, Air and Missile Defense
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; ATP 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined
Arms for Air Defense; and ATP 3-01.50, Air Defense and Airspace Management Cell
Operations.

1. Situation. Include information affecting air and missile defense that paragraph 1 of
the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) does not cover or that needs
expansion.

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a. Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest as it relates to AMD. Keep in mind
you may need to account for enemy airfields, anticipated forward arming and refuel
points, and ballistic missile operating areas that extend far beyond the area of
operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

b. Area of Operations. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(1) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact AMD. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required. Terrain will canalize low-flying aircraft but also provide
cover from early warning radars and the opportunity for pop-up attacks.

(2) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact AMD. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required. Low ceilings, precipitation, wind, and night conditions
all have large impacts on how enemy air will operate.

c. Enemy Forces. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy air
threat. List enemy maneuver, indirect fire, and electronic warfare threats that will
impact friendly AMD operations. State expected enemy air threat courses of action
and crosswalk with the map in Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase. Create
Tab B (Enemy Air Order of Battle) and Tab C (Enemy Ballistic Missile Overlay).
Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(1) Enemy Ballistic Missiles. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of enemy
ballistic missiles, refer to Tab B (Enemy Air Order of Battle) and Tab C (Enemy
Ballistic Missile Overlay).

(2) Enemy Fixed Wing. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of enemy fixed
wing, refer to Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase, and Tab B (Enemy Air
Order of Battle).

(3) Enemy Rotary Wing. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of enemy
rotary wing, refer to Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase, and Tab B
(Enemy Air Order of Battle).

(4) Enemy Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). List by group type, discuss
capabilities, limitations, and expected courses of action.

(a) Group 1-2. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of group 1 and 2 UAS,
refer to Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase, and Tab B (Enemy Air
Order of Battle).

(b) Group 3. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of group 3 UAS, refer
to Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase, and Tab B (Enemy Air Order of
Battle).

(c) Group 4-5. Discuss capabilities and courses of action of group 4 and 5 UAS,
refer to Tab A (Air Avenues of Approach) by phase, and Tab B (Enemy Air
Order of Battle).

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(5) Additional Air Threat Information. List air threat information pertinent to
operations but not covered in Annex B (Intelligence). Highlight specific air threat
considerations like sortie rates, subordination of air elements to ground units,
ordinance peculiarities, target preferences, tactics, and recent significant activities.

d. Friendly Forces. See Annex A (Task Organization). Outline the higher headquarters’
air defense plan. List critical asset list (CAL)/defended asset list (DAL) of higher
headquarters in area of interest. Outline the plan, task, and purpose of higher, adjacent,
and other short-range air defense (SHORAD) organizations and assets that support or
impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.

2. Mission. State the mission of AMD in support of the base plan or order.

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of AMD. Describe how AMD supports the commander’s intent and concept
of operations. Establish priorities of AMD to units for each phase of the operation. The
scheme of AMD must be concise but specific enough to clearly state what AMD capable
forces are to accomplish in the operation. Utilize the ADA employment guidelines.
The scheme of AMD must answer the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the
AMD to be provided, but provide enough flexibility to allow subordinate commanders
to determine the “how” to the maximum extent possible by ensuring necessary
procedural and positive control. The scheme of AMD may include a general narrative
for the entire operation that should address allocation of assets, support relationships,
task and purpose, positioning guidance and primary target lines for AMD assets. Add
subparagraphs addressing AMD tasks for each phase of the operation use the following
format: task, purpose, execution, and assessment in matrix form. Refer to the base plan
or order and Annex C (Operations) as required.

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b. Execution Matrix.

EVENTS TM 1 TM 2 TM 3 TM 4 TM 5 TM 6

Effective DS Attached

162100 HHB/3-29 TF 1-9

(Q-53)

Linkup DTG 162000 NLT

162000
begin
movement
NV
400120

Mission time NLT 170400 NLT 170400 NLT 170400 NLT 170400 NLT 170400

NV 399096 NV 430089 NV 230400 NV 444000 NV 400100

PTL 280 PTL 200 PTL 180 PTL 320 PTL 210

TF 3-8 lead NV 339080 NV 401079 NV 410125 NV 420161 NV 400100

crosses PL
MAINE PTL 285 PTL 195 PTL 182 PTL 330 PTL 210

TF 3-8 Near side Near side NV 321100

begins
breach NV 255080 NV 250120 PTL 195

PTL 285 PTL 195

NAI 1 NAI 2

TF passes Far side Far side

through
breach NV 231120 NV 238071

PTL 195 PTL 280

NAI 2 NAI 1

TF 3-8 OBJ O/O Begin O/O Begin O/O Begin O/O Begin O/O Begin
FRANKLIN reorg/ reorg/ reorg/ reorg/ reorg/
consolidation consolidation consolidation consolidation consolidation

c. Early Warning. Review method and format for passing early warning to the entire
force. Consider placement and integration of available early warning assets.

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d. Airspace Planning. Coordinate with the remainder of the Fires staff, aviation, and
other members of the airspace working group to develop the unit airspace plan to
maximize permissive fires, support procedural control of airspace, and minimize
fratricide. The full airspace control plan should be in Appendix 10 to Annex C, but
relevant information can be included here such as coordinating level, SHORAD
engagement zones, and standard Army aircraft flight routes (SAAFRs).

e. Tasks to Subordinate Units. Lists tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not
contained in the base order

f. Coordinating Instructions. Instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units.

Include references to other applicable annexes.

(1) Air Defense Warning. Include local air defense warning and the authorities for
both.

(2) Rules of Engagement (ROE)

(a) Weapon Control Status (WCS). Set by area air defense commander (AADC),
typically at joint level. A different WCS may be selected for different types of
enemy airframes (e.g., fixed wing (FW)/rotary wing (RW)-TIGHT, UAS-FREE.
Include any plans to change WCS.

(b) Hostile Criteria. The AADC will typically disseminate the ROE and hostile
criteria to all ground-based AMD forces through ROE and special instruction
(SPINS). Dropping of flares does not constitute a hostile act. Include preplanned
changes.

(c) Right of Self Defense. The right of commanders to protect their own forces.
When applied to air defense, the right of self-defense includes the defense of the
defended assets.

(d) Identification Criteria. The employment of Army AMD weapon systems

requires early identification of friendly, neutral, or hostile aircraft and missiles to
maximize engagement and avoid fratricide.

(e) Level of Control. Level of control describes the ADA echelon at which positive
management of the air battle is conducted. This can be the AADC, regional air
defense commanders, sector air defense commanders, ADA battalion, or individual
fire unit. This is the level that has engagement authority. Different levels of control
may be established for fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, UASs, and ballistic
missiles. The AADC will specify the level of control in the area air defense plan;
the level of control may likely change over the course of an operation.

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(f) Modes of Control. There are two modes of control: centralized and
decentralized. The mode of control selected will depend on the capabilities of the
communications system, the weapons systems employed, and both the friendly
and enemy air situations. The AADC’s area air defense plan specifies the modes
of control, trigger events and when they should be changed, and who has the
authority to change them. Stinger will most likely operate under decentralized.

(g) Autonomous Operations. A unit assumes autonomous operations after it

has lost all communications with the higher and adjacent echelons. The unit
commander assumes full responsibility for control of weapons and engagement
of hostile targets. Normally, ROE and supplemental fire control measures in effect
at the time of communications loss remain in effect until communications are
regained.

(3) Passive Air Defense. Specific passive air defense measures that all units should
take to protect themselves from air and missile attack or surveillance during this
operation. Should include instructions about camouflage, cover, concealment,
dispersion, and hardening. Other examples are moving units at night, noise and light
discipline, and employing obscuration techniques.

(4) Combined Arms for Air Defense. Briefly discuss specific techniques units should
use to help in defending themselves against air or missile attack or surveillance.

4. Sustainment. Identify sustainment priorities for AMD key tasks and specify additional
sustainment instructions as necessary. Describe critical or unusual sustainment actions that
might occur before, during, and after the battle to support the commander’s scheme of AMD.
Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

a. Logistics. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for AMD
logistics support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support)
as required.

(1) Supply. Identify the location of ammunition transfer holding points and
ammunition supply points. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

(2) Allocation of Ammunition. List the allocation of machine gun, and missile
ammunition for each phase of the operation based on the amount of Class V
available. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

b. Personnel. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for human
resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to
Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

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c. Health Service Support. Identify ground and air medical evacuation requirements
and the availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to Annex F
(Sustainment) as required.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

(1) Location of the Commander and Key Leaders. State the location of the
commander and key AMD leaders.

(2) Succession of Command. State the succession of command if not covered in the
unit’s standard operating procedurs (SOPs).

(3) Liaison Requirements. State the AMD liaison requirements not covered in the
base order.

b. Control

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of maneuver units and AMD-specific
command posts, including the location of each command post and its time of opening
and closing.

(2) Reports. List AMD-specific reports not covered in standard operating instructions.
Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. Consider ADA engagement and early
warning reports.

c. Signal. Address any AMD-specific communications requirements. Identify the current

standard operating instructions edition. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

[Commander’s last name]

[Commander’s rank]

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the

base order. The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy
of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the
Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters’
files.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander
signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign,
the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name
and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachment (appendixes, tabs, and exhibits).

Tab A — Air Avenues of Approach Overlay

Tab B — Enemy Air Order of Battle

Tab C — Enemy Ballistic Missile Overlay

Tab D — AMD Protection Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level
attachments.

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MANEUVER LEADER’S GUIDE TO STINGER

Appendix G
References

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.18, Stinger Team Techniques,
23 August 2017 (CAC login required for access).
ATP 3-01.64, Avenger Battalion and Battery Techniques, 10 March 2016.
Soldier Training Publication 44-14S14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and
Trainers Guide, MOS 14S, Avenger Crew Member, Skill Levels 1, 2, 3, and
4, 01 September 2004 (CAC login required for access).
Training Circular (TC) 3-01.18, Stinger Team Gunnery Program, 02
October 2017 (CAC login required for access).
TC 44-117-11, Stinger Team Crew Training, 05 August 2009 (CAC login
required for access).
TC 44-117-21, Avenger Team Crew Training, 18 September 2008.
Technical Manual (TM) 9-1425-429-12, Operator’s and Organizational
Maintenance Manual for Stinger Guided Missile System Consisting of
Weapon Round Basic, 23 October 2003.

Related Publications
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.
ATP 3-01.7, Air Defense Artillery Brigade Techniques, 16 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense, 29 July 2016.
ATP 3-01.16, Air and Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield, 31 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.48, Sentinel Techniques, 04 March 2016 (CAC login required for
access).
ATP 3-01.50, Air Defense and Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell
Operation, 05 April 2013.
ATP 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, 01 March 2016.

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ATP 3-52.1, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace

Control, 09 April 2015.
Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 02
November 2015.
FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 20 October 2016.
FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956.
Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 13 November 2014.
TC 3-01.80, Visual Aircraft Recognition, 05 May 2017.
TM 55-1425-429-14, Transportability Guidance Stinger Weapon System, 15
February 1981.

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