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RIFLE f
AleEVALUATION /
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DISTR!f-UIO!'A
App .-.~~
Approved !,c.r 7'-, . NOV S0o9~

UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND T
Inventoried & Retention Justifie•&

Scopy of 50 Copieg
N B ri~-- ~Custdian USACDC Contfol Noý. S62-486
S A I eries A 6"

"• LA" ,DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTE•,•,Uyl

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 •S "
DOD DIR 5200.10

(>3 " )&rr-

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- - - - - - - - - --..
20 Dec 1962

RIFLE EVALUATION STUDY (U)

t1
1. (S) Objective. ATo evaluate the employment of small arms
to determine the 'desired military characteristics of a rifle; to
assess the 1414, M14 (USAIB), AR-15, AK-47, and SPIW to determine
the preferable weapon in meeting the desired military characteris-
tics; to make recommendations on retention of the M14, adoption of
the ARo15, and development of the AK-47 type and SPIW.,,ý---

2. (U) References.

a. Letter, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of

the Army, 26 October 1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluation (U)."

b. Letter, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, 9 November

1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluations (U)."
c. Message, DA, DCSOPS, CDDC, 921911(S), 21 November 1962.

d, Letter, CDCRE-E, Hq USA Combat Developments Command,

14 December 1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluation (U)," with one
inclosure.

3. (S) Employment.

a. The principal user of the rifle in combat is the rifle

squad infantryman; the desired rifle characteristics depend primarily
on his needs. The mission of the rifle squad is to close by foot
movement to within visual observation of enemy personnel and to
render them ineffective by killing, wounding, or capturing them or
by restricting their movement. Foot movement permits dispersion
concealment, and freedom of movement not possible in any type of
vehicle. However, a variety of air and ground vehicles are employed
to transport the rifle squad as close as possible to the enemy in
order to minimize the distance to be traversed on foot.

b. The targets which must be engaged by the rifle squad

are those which, because of their proximity, protection, or fleet-
ing nature, cannot be engaged by other weapons such as machine guns,
mortars, and artillery. To engage these targets, both area and
point, the infantryman usually must close to within 400 meters. This .
is the maximum distance that the rifleman usually can detect suitable ,3
point targets on which rifle fire can be adjusted effectively. How-
ever, the rifle squad can, at times, identify and engage lucrative
targets at greater ranges.

Ay vc
;l,*
%"myvIi*ive,the rife squad

c. In rendering the enemif

must be capable of delivering a large volume of aimed fire in a
relatively siort time with minimum casualties to itself. This
large volume is to kill, wound, and demoralize the enemy, force
him to seek cover, and reduce his ability to return fire effec-
tively. R-fle squad targets at times also include large masses
of enemy attacking at close proximity ("human sea" attacks).
Therefore, ideally all rifles should be capable of automatic fire
even though not [Link] employed in this mode.

d. Tiia [Link] guuprovides a capability for rapid re-

action in de'livering point or area sustained fires principally
at ranges up to about 1100 meters, the maximum range at which
its fires can be observed and adjusted effectively. Unlike
indirect fire weapons, mchine gun fire can be adjusted from the
weapon and shifted almost instantaneously to engage targets of
opportunity or to furnish continuous close support to advancing
rifle squads. It also can deliver sustained prearranged fires
under all conditions of visibility, and can deliver overhead fire
with aa acceptable degree cf troop safety. Thenachine gun assists
the rifle squad to close witih the enemy by delivering large
volumes of suppressive fires beyond the range capability of the
individual hand-held weapon. The machine gun also reduces the
effectiveness of attacking enemy infantry before they come within
effective range of the rifleman. Because of its weight and
ammunition consumption themaehilne gln requires a crew to serve it.
Its rapid reaction, its prearranged fire capability, and its
ability to cover ranges from 400 to 1100 meters complement but
do not supplant any of the rifles of the rifle squad, regardless
of whether all or some of these rifles are capable of automatic
fire.

e. The irregularity of terrain dictates the requirement

for a weapon to deny the enemy the protection of close-in (400
meters or less) areas that are defiladed from the relatively flat
trajectory of rifles and rmchine guns. Such targets very frequently
cannot be taken under fire by supporting units becautse of safety
considerations, minimum range capabilities, and the need for rapid
reaction. The lack of visibility over such areas further dictates
a weapon that produces a relatively large lethal area such as that
obtained by high explosive ffagmentation grenades. Additionally,
the lethal area of high explosive fragmentation fires permits
efficient attack of massed area targets. To fill the gap between
the range of the hand grenade and 400 meters, there is need for a
grenade launcher. Until each man in a rifle squad has an effective

iI
grenade launching capabiie necessary to include
individuals armed with the M79 grenade launcher in the squad
organization. Ideally, each rifle should be capable of launching
grenades without degrading the ability of the rifle to deliver
quickly either automatic or semiautomatic fire. The weight
penalty for the grenade capability should be minimLzed. In addi-
tion to its requirement for an antipersonnel grenade the squad
also has a requirement for a grenade capable of destroying enemy
armor.

f. When infantry employs armored personnel carriers

(APC's), it generally employs them for movement,not fighting.
The APC is not designed to be a fighting vehicle, but rather a
means for transporting infantry with some protection from shell
fragments and small arms fire to the point where the tactical
situation requires dismounting. Basipally, the APC is only a
means of protected transport and in combat is usually escorted by
fighting vehicles. The need to fire rifles from the APC is
unusual and is limited to a requirement that two vien other than
the comnander be able to fire from the opened hatches.

g. As regards reducing the squad to 5 or 7 men, such

a reduction would also reduce the size of the area the squad
could control effectively., Therefore, if the size of the squad
is reduced, additional squads will be required to control a given
area. Because the principal duty of the squad leader is to control
the actions of others, increasing the number of equads results in
a higher proportion of leaders and a lesser proportion of those
whose principal duty is to engage the enemy directly. The span of
control within the present 10-man squad is within the capabilities
of one leader. Tactically, squads frequently must be transported
separately as a unit., With a 5 to 7 man squad, more carriers
will be needed and total requirements for their opecation and
maintenance will be increased.

h. There is no eviderce, except for isolated instances,

of the bayonet being used in recent combat to produce casualties.
That it is effective for psychological jpurposes in combat has not
been established factually but is widely accepted by e;•perienced
infantrymen. It 4is a valuable tool for use in control of civil
distutbances since it can be used actually or as a threat without
resort to gunfire. The rifle should be able to accept a bayonet
if this capability can be obtained without significant detriment to
other desired characteristics. Preferably the bayonet should be of
the so-called "fighting knife" type so that it economizes on weight
and serves a dual purpose,

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4. (S) Desired Rif o• racteristics. The desired

] 'rifle characteristics, based' : 1hiussion in the previous
paragraph and other obvious considerations, are:

a. Reliability. Able to function consistently and with

safety to the user.

b. Durability. Capable of withstanding prolonged use and

rough treatment without loss of reliability in all environments.

c. Lightweight. As light as possible, including ammuni-

tion and the accessories that must be carried by the rifleman.

d. Simplicity. Simple to operate and maintain; no more

complex that the present Ml rifle.
e. Accuracy. Able to engage effectively area and point
targets up to 400 meters range.

f. Flexibility. Capable of use in either automatic or

semiautxMstiC mode.,
g. Lethality. Capable of firing types of ammunition
comparable in lethality to that of the standard 7.62qm round and
the area rounds now fired by the M79 projector.

h. Human Engineering. Usable without excess dispomfort

to the user. Configured for ease of carrying and use under
adverse conditions such as dismounting from vehicles, parachute
operations, and movement in heavy underbrush.
i. Position Disclosure. Position disclosing effects
should be minimized and should be no greater than those of the
Ml rifle.

5. (S) Assessment.

a. A detailed assessment of the characteristics of the

M14, M14 (USAIB), AR-15, AK-47, and the Special Purpose Individual
Weapon (SPIW) to include their competing attributes and comparative
merits are given at Inclosures 1 and 2.
b,The AR-15 represents a marked improvement over the
M14 rif1p primarily because of lower weapon and ammunition weight.
Except for the SPIW, it comes closest to meeting the desired
characteristics listed in paragraph 4 above. However it has two
characteristics which would have to be corrected before the AR.-15

4
were considered an acceptable military rifle in any role: its
poor rifle-ammunition reliability and its poor night firing
characteristics.

c. The M14 (USAIB) is a definite improvement over the

M14(M) in the automatic rifle role and in the few tests conducted
has shown itself to be superior to the AR-15 in the automatic
rifle role at ranges beyond 400 meters.

d. The AK-47 is basically a submachine gun and is inftrior

to both the M14, W (uSAIB), and AR-15 in range effectiveness,
ammunition lethality and other desired rifle characteristics.

e. The SPIW, if and when developed to design criteria,

will come closest to meeting the desired characteristics.

6. (S) The following factors also are pertinent:

a. The round fired by the M14 family has been adopted

as NATO standard small arms ammunition. A sampling test by U. •.
Army, Europe showed interchangeability of NATO rounds of various
national makes.

b. U. S. Army Forces in Europe are completely equipped

with the M14 rifle.

c. .At the end of Fiscal Year 1962, the U. S. Army had

an inventory of about 415,000 M14 rifles. This will increase to
about 735,000 M14 rifles by the end of Fiscal Year 1963. The
production base approximates 375,000 a year and the current pro*
curement objective is about 2,500,000 M14 rifles by the end of
Fiscal Year 1969.

d. There are apparently no significant differences

between the costs of the A14 and AR-15 rifles and their aiu;%i-
tion.

e. If achieved, present predictions are that 6PIW, as

compared with the AR-15, would effect a reduction of approxivately
40% in ammunition weight, an increase in automatic rate of fire,
improved lethality at ranges over 200 meters but possibly a decrease
in lethality at lesser ranges. Flechette ammunition is still under
development with a presently predicted type classification in
FY 1966 (hence probably not available in quantity until 7Y 1968 or
1969). The proposed SPIW grenade launching capability, if developed,
appears to be adaptable Lo other riflis.

i'-- -
7. (S) Conclusions.

a. If the basic decision were to be made now, without

reference to the impact resulting from the decisions already made,
in my opinion the prefe-able rifle for world-wide usage w 1dbe
the AR-15. Even in these circumstances, however, i would, not
saindardize the AR-15 without an expedited improvement program to
correct the unraliability of the rifle-armunition comibinatior and
the poor night firing qualities. Both qppear corre.-table.

b. Under present conditions, the AR-15 should be inmproved

as noted in "a" above and then introduced into the U, S. Army as an
augmentation of the 1414 rifle.

c. For those units retaining the M14, the M14 (USAIB) or

a version thereof should be stand4rdixed for use by the automatic
riflemen in each squad.,

8. (S) Recontmendations.

a. Continue use of the M14 by U. S. Army Forces ia 'Europe

and equip all u:nits earmarked for deployment to Europe with the
M14 except airborne and Special Forces units.

b. Correct the AR-15 deficiencies in reliability and

night firing capabilities.

c. Equip the following with the AR-15 in priority shown:

(1) Aiz Assault units

(2) Airborne units

(3) Special Forces units.

d. Slow [Link] from M-1 to M-14 in other areas.

Final decision witi' respect to these units can be based on the
experience of the units listed in c,

e. in unit.-; ':tued with the M14, replace tie M14 wlth a

version of the M114 (USAIB) for 4utomatic riflemen only.

f. conintuan the SPIW program looking toward a long-range

marked improvement over all other wopons considered.

W'"W
6

Nam
9. It should be notedsthat thre ip wide disagreement at all

levels both as to the worth of the AR-15 and the wisdom of intro-
ducing it into the U. S. Army. These conclusions and recommenda-
tions are mine as Commanding General, U. S. Army Combat Developments
Command.

4 Incls JOHN P. DALEY

1. Physical Charac- Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
teristics, secret Commanding
2. Summary of Weaporns /
Comparison, secret
3. Bibliography,uncl
4. Distribution
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4)~
I. TB 381-1, Department of the Army, July 1958, "Combat Equipment
Technical Intelligence Bulletin."

2. Report of United States Army Infantty Board, Project Number 2812

(Cont), 'Evaluation of NATO 7.62mm Duplex Ammunition," R6eadquarttrs
United States Continental Army Command, 24 April 1961.

3. Personnel Research Associates Repor; 56-3, "A Study of the i-nfart-y

Squad TOE," March 1956.

4. Message AJIIS-R 12-14-A, Headquarters bnited States Army infantry

School, 16 December 1961, reference United States Army T-f!ntry
School position pertaining to degree which Infantry should Le
capable of fighting mounted from armored personnel carrier
successor to M113.

5. ORO-T-161 Pamphlet, Operations Research Office, 2 July 1962,

"The Effects of Terrain on Battlefield Visibility."

6. Operations Research Office Report by Brigadier General S. L. A.

Marshall, "Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea,
Winter 1950-51"

7. "Infantry Reference Data, ROAD," September 1962, United States

Army Infantry School.

8. Report, "Rifle Squad and Evaluation Program, 22 May - 31 Jul

1961," United States Army Infantry School.

9. Staff Paper ORO-SP-144, Operations Research Office, July 1960,

"Battle Sight Setting,"

10. Staff Paper ORO-SP-102, Operations Research Office., April 1959,

"Range Estimation for Infantry Squad Weapons."

11. Report of Project Number 3008, United States Army Infantry

Board, 2 December 1962, "Comparative Evaluation of AR-15
(Armalite) and M14 Rifles."

12. Staff Paper RAC-SP-1 (SEA), "Suitability and Effectiveness of

Weapons and Equipment Used in US-Supported Operations with thp
Royal Laos Army (U)," Sept 62.

Incl 3 (Bibliography)
13. Ordnance Technical intelligence, OIN 13042, 7 May 1956, "Firing
Test:, Soviet 7.62xmn Assault Rifle Kalashnikov (AK), MCN 9866."

14. Report, "A Test of Gun, Light Machinea, 7.62mm Mcoel RPL, Soviet
and Gun, Light Machine, ?.62mm. Mod 52, Cze,'h," [Link] Sub-
project Number 2142, February 1958.

15. Development and Proof Servicos, April 1962, Report o-i "Tlest of
Rifle, Assault, [Link], bodel 1958, Czech."

16. Ordnance Technical Intelligen:ce CI'A 3270., April 1959,'Vow-al

Ballistics Tests of the Soviet 7,62inm Ballet, MCN 8300,"

17. Industry Briefing Packet, Spezial Purpose Indiv•dual Weapon,

United States Army Weapons Comiand, 11 October 1962.

18. Final Report, United States Army Combat Developments Experi-

mentation Center, 24 June 1959. "Rifle Squad Armed with a
Lightweight High Velocity Rifle."

19. FM 7-15, January 1962, "'nfantty, Airbcrn,± infantry and M-,:h-

anized Infantry Rifle Platoons and Sq,-ats."

20. FM 7-11, January 1962, "Rifle Com0:,ay, 7c_.[Link], Airborn,-'

Infantry and Mechanized Infantryv"

21. Teabnical Memorrandum ORO-T.-161, Opesretioits RessýIrcl- OffLet

2 July 1962, 't lhe Effects of Uarraib. orl [Link] VtsiiitvY

22. Staff Paper ORO-SP-158, Op_•,a:.tions Resesarch Offa,-•: wnEv.r 1960.

"Rifle Accuracies and Hit Probabilities in Ccmbae:."

23. Technical Memorandum 0Rr-1-]60. [Link].'s Rtseaccb Offi.t,

19 June 1952, "Operational R'2q1•ir,-:[Link] for an lIf,-:trv u¾.n.
Weapon."
24. Peport, Second World--Wide Coyba: Arms Co-cferd-- h-ed ad For :.
Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1962, "Fire. Support.-"

25. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-397, Oprzations Re-searck- Cf f.-

May 1961, "SALVO I! Rifle Fielh Lxp-rim•tt."

26. Staff Paper ORO-SP-103, Operations Rzsearch Office, April 1959,

"Design of Experiment for Effe:ts of Weapon Cenfiguratior.
Weight, Sights and Recoil t Rifle Aczuracy."

*1Z
I~I.

27. Staff Paper ORO-SP-46, Operations Research Office, marzr :1958

"SALVO II Rifle Rxperiment Preliminary Results."

28. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-378, Operations Researc' Offic,

June 1959, "SALVO I Rifle Field Exparime-t."

29. Department of the Arm. Pamphlet Number 30-79, 31 March 1939.

"Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Coepany.,"

30. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-.53, 6 Detým1. •r 19A1

"Handbook on the North [Link] Axmed Forzes."

31. Department of the Army Pamphlet Nnmber 30-57, 3 Nlov-ml=r 1961

"Handbook on the East German Army line Division Organizdti.o- "

32. Department of the Army Pamphlet Numrber 30-50-2, 1 Aptil 190.

"Handbook on the Satellite Armies."

33. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-50-1, 17 .arc>- 1961

"Handbook on the Soviet Army,"

34. Department of ihe Army Pamphlet Number 30-72, April 1960.

"Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Regiment."

35. Department of the Army Pamphlet Numbetr 30-73, 17 Octo!c- 1961

"Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Divisicn."

36. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-78, 15 Octobex 19c-s

"Soviet Tactics, The Mechanized Division and the TFAJek P:xi~i.

37. Department of the Army P-amphlet Number 30-51, 7 D•.ce',bmr lUf.O

"Handbook on the ChinesO Crommunist Army."

38. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-89, Maroh 19.»",

"Chinese Communist Tactics ."

39. FM 101-10, February 1959, "Staff Officers" Field Maniiats,

Organization, Technical and Logistic D:ata."

40. Report of Board to Review Rifle and Bayor-et Problems, Hiq

USCONARC, 19 December 1958.

3
41. Letter, File AGAM-P(M)474(II Apr 61) DCSOPS, Hq Department of the
Army, Subject: "Basis of Issue for the Selector for the 7.62mm.
M-14 Rifle," dated 19 April 1961.

42. Report on Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M-14 Rifles

(Report NO DPS-799), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ded 62.

43. US Army Arctic Test Board Report of Project Nr ATB 33-001,

1 Dec 62.

44. Technical Note Nr 1482, Dec 62, USA Ballistic Research Labora-
tories, "Comparative Effectiveness Evaluation of the M-14 and
Other Rifle Concepts" (U).

45. US Army Combat Developments Command "Comparative Evaluation

AR-15 and M-14 Rifles (C)", 14 Dec 62.

46. STA9AG No. 2310, Small Arms Ammunition Used by the Armed
Forces of NATO Nations, dated 27 Feb 57.

47. Brochure, The United States Army Infantry Board Presents the
M14 (USAIB) Rifle, dated 15 Nov 62.

48. USATEC letter report on Comparative Evaluation of U. S. Army

Rifle 7.62mm, M14; Armalite Rifle Caliber..223, AR-15: Soviet
Assault Rifle AK-47; 12 Dec 62.

4
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RIFLE EVALUATION STUDY (U)

DISTRIBUTION

50 - DCSOPS

Information:

5 - USA CONARC

5 - USA MC

10 - USA CAG

5 - USA CDEC

5 -USA CSSG

5 -USA Inf CDA

) 2 - USA SDEG

1 - USA OSWD

1 - USA IAS

Within Hq USA CDC

2 - Dir C&DD

2 -Dir PP&I

2 -Dir MR

3 - Dir OR&E

Si - Dir D&OM

I D&R File

Incl 4

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UNITED STATES
FORT BENNING
ARMY INFANTRYBOD
'A APROJECT
GEORGIA
NR DATE
16 Mar 62 NEGATIVE
TOP NR4
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7h 1 UAS rifle for the automatic
rifle role. h
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butt plate (G). A odified
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bipod swivel for the automatic rifle
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