ANNOTATION LOCUS STANDI: A MISCHIEVOUS CONCEPT IN LAW? By ROGELIO E.

SUBONG * __________________

I.INTRODUCTION, p. 183 II.LOCUS STANDI DEFINED, p. 184 a)From U.S. Jurisdiction, p. 184 b)In Philippine Jurisdiction, p. 185 III.BASIC NATURE OF LOCUS STANDI, p. 186 a)Views on locus standi, p. 186 b)Comparison of these views, p. 187 IV.A BRIEF HISTORY, p. 188 a)Specific application of locus standi, p. 188 b)Locus standi and Real Party in Interest, p. 189 V.RATIONALE OF LOCUS STANDI, p. 190 VI.CASES ON LOCUS STANDI, p. 191 a)People vs. Vera of 1937-38 to Philconsa vs. Mathay of 1960, p. 191 b)Tolentino vs. Comelec of 1971 to Placu vs. Cuneta of 1980, p. 193 c)De La Llana vs. Alba of 1982 to Kapatiran, etc. vs. Tan of 1988, p. 196 d)Association, etc. vs. Sec. of Agriculture of 1989 to Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague of 1991, p. 199 _______________

* A.B. (UP) 62 & LL.B. (UP) 66. 182

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? e)Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. to Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr. of 1994, p. 201 f)KMU Center vs. Garcia of 1994 to Bayan vs. Zamora of 2000, p. 203 g)Chavez vs. PEA of 2002 to Francisco vs. MMDA of 2006, p. 207 VII.KILOSBAYAN INC. VS. GUINGONA, JR., 232 SCRA 110 (1994) AND KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), p. 212 a)The first case of Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra, p. 212 b)The second case of Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), p. 214 c)A legal oddity?, p. 215 d)These cases witnessed justices debating, arguing or even proselytizing their respective views, p. 216 e)The spirited debates among justices still failed to yield a consensus, p. 217 VIII.TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: A MAGIC INCANTATION?, p. 219 a)No definition of the term in our jurisprudence, p. 219 b)Determinants of Transcendental Importance, p. 220 c)Attempt at definition, p. 221 IX.OBSERVATIONS, p. 222 a)Virtually everyone can be a petitioner, p. 222 b)Requisites for standing or locus standi are hard to meet, p. 223 c)Requisites tested against petitioners in previous cases, p. 224 d)The Resort to Transcendental Importance and Judicial Discretion, p. 227 e)Standing or Locus Standi: A procedural or substantive barrier?, p. 228

f)The need to reexamine this concept of standing or locus standi, p. 229 183

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 183 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? XI.CONCLUSION, p. 231 a)The quality of our lawmakers and the laws they pass, p. 231 b)The Eugenia T. San Pablo vignette, p. 232 c)The locus standi mystique lives on, p. 234 d)Death of Certainty and the need for continuing debate, p. 234 _________________

The Courts opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it. (Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court, Dissenting Opinion, Roe vs. Wade, 1973) I. INTRODUCTION In private law, the litigant or suitor must be the real party in interest to be able to pursue civil claims. And in public law, he must have the standing or locus standi to be able to pursue a suit usually assailing the constitutionality or legality of legislative enactments as well as executive issuances, actions or contracts. Like real party in interest, the absence of standing or locus standi should doom at the initial stage any legal action. Unlike real party in interest, if standing or locus standi does not obtain, the court may exercise its discretion to give due course to a suit, citing such reasons as the transcendental importance of the issues, presence of serious constitutional issues for resolution, etc. And then even if a suitor has it, the court may still refuse to entertain the suit, citing reasons like failure to observe the hierarchy of courts, lack of urgency, etc. Standing or locus standi has been so elusive and malleable that it has become a mischievous concept in law. It defies categorization and definite application and then it could be disregarded, to allow action, or harnessed, to bar it, depending upon the whims and caprice of the court. Hence, there is a need to reexamine this concept: Is it an inflexible procedural 184

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? barrier which stringently screens suitors or litigants? Or is it a porous wall that allows unrestricted suits for real or fancied reasons? Hence, there is a need also to search for a clearer and more consistent categorization and application of this concept in our jurisprudence for the guidance of all. The case of Ernesto B. Francisco vs. Hon. Bayani Fernando and the Metro Manila Development Authority, promulgated on Nov. 16, 2006 is a timely occasion to revisit, reexamine and take a hard look at this concept and those related to it. We will also try to find out whether it has advanced the cause of constitutionalism and law, or has promoted judicial ambivalence and abdication of duty. II. LOCUS STANDI DEFINED a) From U.S. Jurisdiction Locus standi isa place to stand; a standing. (Ballantine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 752). Or it is the right to litigate or to be heard. It has been called one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of public law (from Harvard Law Prof. Paul Freund, suggesting the difficulty in crafting its definition). In common law, the litigant has locus standi if a private right is interfered with; in statute law, the right is conferred by the statute (http://sixthformlaw.infor/03_dictionary/dict_l.htm). In common law, and under many statutes, standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged. In the United States, for example, a person cannot bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the plaintiff is (or will be) harmed by the law. Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the suit, and will dismiss the case without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Locusstandi). 185

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 185 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? The U.S. Supreme Court held: In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of a particular issue. (Warth v. Allen, 422 U.S. 490, 498; 1975; (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Locusstandi;).

b) In Philippine Jurisdiction In our jurisdiction, the nature and features of locus standi have been extensively discussed but they virtually repeat themselves. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, noted in Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972), that the first case that discussed locus standi (proper party, then), was People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937-38). The High Court through Justice Jose P. Laurel postulated: The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Subsequent decisions and authorities on standing or locus standi have consistently cited, elaborated upon, adopted or rephrased this delineation of Justice Laurel. Thus, in Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA 475 (2005), about seventy (70) years thereafter, the words of Justice Laurel still echoed in the High Courts definition of the term: Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing. 186

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? III. BASIC NATURE OF LOCUS STANDI a) Views on Locus Standi From the above definitions, we can deduce the following views on locus standi: 1) That it is the right to litigate or to be heard, whether the litigant is entitled to have the issue decided, or the ability to demonstrate to the court the harm to the petitioner, as per definitions from American jurisdiction; 2) That it is personal and substantial interest in the constitutional question being raised, per justice Laurel in People vs. Vera, supra, and Jumamil vs. Cafe, supra, in our jurisdiction. From the above, locus standi is viewed either as a right or interest to pursue a constitutional question. Let us analyze each view, if it would sufficiently catch the real nature of locus standi. First, as a right, this is also shared by every citizen who has an inherent stake and duty to see to it that the

Constitution is followed and the laws and executive issuances as well as government actions are consistent with it. Second, as interest or personal and material interest per Jumamil vs. Cafe, supra, or personal and substantial interest it may be also claimed by anyone as to render it too general as basis. As such right and interest, they both suffer from the bane of nebulousness. The other view of standing or locus standi as the ability to demonstrate to the court the harm to petitioner, defined in American jurisdiction is similar to the view in our jurisdiction that it is the ability to specifically prove (how, this could be done in a pleading, was not explained) that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of money or it is being able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues are of paramount importance to the public. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na Mga Manananggol ng Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., etc., 415 SCRA 44 (2003). This view may not also be reliable as will be shown hereunder. 187

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 187 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? On the other hand, the view hardly emphasized is that locus standi pertains to the possession of inherent or lawconferred attributes on the petitioner or litigant that entitles him to initiate and pursue constitutional and legal challenges. After all, locus standi basically means a place to stand which focuses on the situs or the suitor not on the issue sought to be resolved. b) Comparison of these views Let us compare these views: a) With locus standi, as interest or right to initiate and pursue proceedings, the focus or the point of reference is the case or constitutional or legal question/issue sought to be ruled upon; b) On the other hand, with locus standi, as the possession of inherent or law-conferred qualifications/attributes of petitioner or litigant, the focus or point of reference is the suitor, and not the case or constitutional question/issue challenged. Perhaps, it may result in a more accurate grasp of locus standi if the point of reference were on the suitor whether he possesses the requisite qualifications/attributes to raise a constitutional or legal question and not so much on the interest he has (which naturally flows from his attributes and which interest clothes him with personality per Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976) in the subject of the suit (the constitutional or legal issues). This distinction may probably result to a more effective winnowing only of those qualified suitors or petitioners to embark upon a constitutional or legal challenge.

c) And locus standi as the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged or being able to craft an issue of transcendental importance to the people, may not be a reliable guide. This may mislead because standing or locus standi is made to depend upon artful presentation of the issues or 188

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? facility of language in the pleadings to demonstrate entitlement to file and pursue the case. A pertinent part of the discussion in Flast vs. Cohen, 393 US 83, from the US Supreme Court was reproducedn in the Dissenting Opinion of now Chief Justice Puno, in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110 (1994): The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to be adjudicated. x x x x x x In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the above, locus standi may be defined as the standing or position of a suitor possessing such personality, qualifications or attributes, either inherent or conferred by law that entitles him to question the constitutionality or validity of legislative enactments, executive and administrative issuances, e.g., law, ordinances, executive orders, rules circulars, and the like, as well as government actions and contracts of which he has direct, personal and substantial interest and has or will sustain direct injury from the enforcement thereof. IV. A BRIEF HISTORY a) Specific application of locus standi Locus standi as possession of attributes to pursue a suit has always been in the Rules of Civil Procedure although not so denominated then. It pertained also to the proper or appropriate party who can bring a suit. Such party has been technically referred to as real party in interest in our Rules of Procedure, famously defined as the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125 *1951+). Then with the approval of the 1935 Con189

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 189 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? stitution, there were cases challenging and testing laws against this fundamental law. As stated in People vs. Vera, supra, the forerunner term for locus standi was proper party, and then in subsequent cases, personality, standing or interest was also used. It was only in Sanidad vs. Comelec, supra, when the High Court used the term locus standi for the first time, specifically referring to petitioners raising constitutional or legal challenges. b) Locus standi and Real Party in Interest Real party in interest and locus standi are both viewed as possession of direct, personal and substantial interest in the subject and outcome of the case. However, they differ in that real party in interest is applied to a litigant in private law whereas locus standi has been generally applied to a litigant in public law where there is usually a challenge to the constitutionality of a law or the constitutionality and legality of administrative and executive issuances as well as government actions and contracts. It has been recognized as a concept in constitutional law (The Anti-Graft League of the Phil., Inc. vs. San Juan, 260 SCRA 250 [1996] and Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 [1995]). Quoting from a U.S. court decision: x x x standing because of its constitutional underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards insuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas *citation omitted+ (Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Morato, supra, and reiterated in Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., and related cases, 415 SCRA 44 [2003]). This simply means that locus standi pertains to constitution and legal challenges. 190

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? V. RATIONALE OF LOCUS STANDI As pointed out earlier, locus standi is either applied as a procedural barrier or a porous wall depending upon its use by the court. Hence, locus standi when used as a barrier aims to screen indiscriminate filing

of petitions at the slightest excuse to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, government issuances and actions. If petitioners are liberally held to possess locus standi, the courts would be inundated with petitions from crackpots who may just want their names immortalized in the pages of the Philippine Reports or the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) whose interest in the case is nothing short of nothing. The High Court must be regularly swamped with nuisance petitions raising all kinds of constitutional and legal challenges, and dismissed outrightalthough they are often unreported. Justice Melo in his Dissenting Opinion in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110 (1994) was forthright: If every taxpayer, claiming to have interest in the contract, no matter how remote, could come to this Court and seek nullification of said contract, the day may come when the activities of government corporate entities will ground to a standstill on account of nuisance suits filed against them by persons whose suppose interest in the contract is as remote and as obscure as the interest of any man in the street. On the other hand, as a porous wall, locus standi aims at a policy of expanded jurisdiction by allowing the largest segment of our people the opportunity to question the constitutionality of laws and/or legality of government issuances and actions, and by encouraging them to constantly hover as a brooding omnipresence over their officials to keep them within the straight and narrow path of constitutionalism and legality. 191

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 191 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? VI. CASES ON LOCUS STANDI a) People vs. Vera of 1937-38 to Philconsa vs. Mathay of 1960 As mentioned earlier, the first case that discussed this doctrine of standing or locus standi was People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937-38) which came out with the novel holding that the People or the Government was considered as a proper party to have its own laws set aside. The accused, Mariano Cu Unjieng, who was convicted in this case applied for probation which was opposed by the prosecution. The defense questioned the personality of the private complainant bank when it challenged the constitutionality of that Probation Law. The High Court through Justice Jose P. Laurel, asserted: And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question herea point we do not have to

decidewe are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the State can challenge the validity of its laws. After the war, in Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947), petitioners, senators, congressmen, prominent citizens and taxpayers, were assumed to have the standing to question the constitutionality of the Parity Amendment Resolution (amendment to the Constitution allowing Americans equal rights to exploit our natural resources) through a petition for prohibition. The petition was dismissed because the issue was 192

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? considered a political question, but the standing of the petitioners were not questioned at all in the main decision. Then in the Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan, et al., 84 Phil. 368 (1949) petitioners, prominent lawyers, citizens and taxpayers, were found to be wanting in standing or personality to sue, but were still allowed to question the validity of Executive Orders (EOs) issued by Pres. Elpidio Quirino after the war pursuant to Com. Act No. 671 known as Emergency Powers Act. Petitioners contended that this law has ceased to have any force and effect with the convening of Congress after the war. The High Court even at the outset, opted to pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners. Then it came out with this now famous holding: Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Emphasis supplied). In Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331 (1960) petitioner, governor of Rizal province was allowed to sue as public official and taxpayer questioning the constitutionality of a law appropriating public funds for roads in a subdivision owned by a senator. The High Court argued that the rule recognizing the taxpayer to assail the constitutionality of legislation appropriating local or state public fundswhich has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court x x x has greater application in the Philippines. It concluded that petitioner was not merely a taxpayer but governor of a most populated political subdivision, and the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation.

In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., 118 Phil. 1065 (1963), petitioner, Atty. Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter and president of an association of corn and rice planters was found to have standing or locus standi in his petition assailing the legality of government importation of foreign rice since there was a law prohibiting it. The High Court dismissed the claim that petitioner lacked sufficient interest for he owned about 275 193

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 193 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? hectares of riceland and since public funds would be used to buy rice abroad. It argued that petitioner as taxpayer has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds. In Phil. Constitution Asso., Inc. (Philconsa), Jose E. Romero, et al. vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965), petitioners, Philconsa, a non-profit civic organization and some prominent individuals were recognized to have standing or locus standi in their petition directly with the High Court assailing the constitutionality of the law granting retirement and vacation benefits to members of Congress. The High Court declared the law unconstitutional after holding that: This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring the suit (Pascual vs. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]). Then in Philconsa vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966), petitioner Philconsa was again held to have standing or locus standi to question the constitutionality of a law increasing the salaries of members of Congress. As to the standing of Philconsa, with Filipino citizens and taxpayers as members, the High Court ruled that: As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, citing Philconsa vs. Gimenez, supra, and Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, supra, etc. b) Tolentino vs. Comelec of 1971 to Placu vs. Cuneta of 1980 In Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971), petitioner, a senator was allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the action of the Comelec to hold a plebiscite regarding an amendment to the Constitution reducing the minimum voting age to 18 years old. The High Court granted the petition 194

194

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? without even discussing the standing of the petitioner, then Sen. Arturo Tolentino. Thereafter in Tan vs. Macapagal,43 SCRA 677 (1972), petitioners, private individuals suing as taxpayers were held to have no standing or locus standi to question the constitutionality of the Laurel-Leido Resolution in 1971 for the adoption of a form of government other than that outlined in the fundamental law. The High Court through Justice Enrique Fernando, repeated the Laurel dictum that a party impugning the validity of a statute must possess personal and substantial interest in the case. He observed that there was a relaxation of the rule; that there were laws providing for the spending of public funds which were declared unconstitutional by courts at the instance of taxpayers; and that such expenditure amounted to misappropriation of public funds which may be enjoined by a taxpayer. He then declared: Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. It also proclaimed: x x x as far as taxpayers suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. In Aquino, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 62 SCRA 275 (1975), the petitioners, an incarcerated former senator, bishops and prominent individuals, were held to have no standing to file the petition for prohibition questioning the Presidential Decrees of Pres. Marcos calling for a referendum and appropriating funds therefor as well as his other decrees. The Court categorically concluded even at the outset that petitioners have no personality to file the suit. However, it proceeded to decide the case although it was a wrong remedy as the petition was in the nature of a quo warranto, appropriate only to be filed by the Solicitor General, for persons who assert title to the same office, but because of the farreaching implications of the herein petition, the Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised. Then in Gonzales vs. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975), the petitioner, Atty. Ramon 195

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 195 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? Gonzales again, as taxpayer was held this time, to have no personality to question the validity of an Executive Order creating the Cultural Center of the Philippineswhich he claimed had no statutory basis. The High Court found that the funds to be used for the center came from donations ,andcontributions (not) taxation, petitioner did not have the requisite pecuniary and monetary interest; and petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for taxpayers suit. It added that even if public funds were used, it still does not necessarily follow that

such kind of challenge has to be passed upon. And citing Tan vs. Macapagal, supra, it concluded that the Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. In Sanidad, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., etc., 73 SCRA 333 (1976) petitioners (father and son) were considered to possess standing in their petition for prohibition questioning the power of the President then to propose amendments to the Constitution in the absence of the Interim Batasan Pambansa. On the claim that petitioners have no standing to sue, the High Court held that they possess locus standi (the first time the term was used) to challenge the constitutional premise of certain Presidential Decress (PDs). It added that the PDs may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an office of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of such funds. x x x x x x The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothe them with the personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds (Emphasis supplied). The High Court reiterated its discretion to entertain such cases, as declared in earlier cases: Moreover, as regards 196

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? taxpayers suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into. Also, in Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (Placu), et al. vs. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 (1980), petitioner, a civic group which claimed to be dedicated to the rule of law and conscience along with a city chief of police was allowed to question the memorandums of a city mayor designed to clandestinely remove the Chief of Police of the city. It held that: Petitioner Placu, together with real party in interest, petitioner chief of police, is not disqualified to appear as petitioner in this case, because as a non-profit, civic and non-partisan organization, like Philconsa, it is merely interested in upholding the rule of law. c) De La Llana vs. Alba of 1982 to Kapatiran, etc. vs. Tan of 1988 In De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982), petitioners, a judge and several practicing lawyers were held to have standing to pursue their petition questioning the constitutionality of B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judicial Reorganization Act. The High Court through Justice Fernando declared that the judge falls within the principle in People vs. Vera, supra: that the person who impugns the validity of statute

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case. And the lawyers-petitioners, cannot be considered as devoid of any personal and substantial interest on the matter. And then he proceeded to quote from his Concurring Opinion in Aquino vs. Comelec, supra, and cited his earlier ponencia in Tan vs. Macapagal, supra. Justice Aquino in his Concurring Opinion disagreed: They have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers. And the eighth petitioner, a city judge has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from his position. 197

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 197 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? In Lozada vs. Commission on Elections, 120 SCRA 337 (1983), petitioners, a practicing lawyer and prospective candidate along with another person as taxpayer were held to be wanting in standing in their petition to compel the Comelec to conduct elections for existing vacancies in the Batasang Pambansa pursuant to the Constitution. The High Court held that petitioners did not have the standing to file and pursue the petition as there was no allegation of illegal spending of tax money. Petitioners complaint against the inaction of Comelec to call a special election, a ministerial duty, therefore, involves no expenditures of public funds. It is only when there is such illegal expenditure that the socalled taxpayer suit may be allowed. x x x Petitioners standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. No law was assailed in this case nor were there allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds (Underscoring supplied). In Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987), petitioner, a private individual was held to have standing to demand disclosure of certain records of government employees through mandamus. On the question of personality of petitioner, the High Court explained that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which by its very nature, is a public right. It further declared that when a petition for Mandamus involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore part of the general public which possess the right. In Valmonte vs. Phil. Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987 (unreported), petitioner, a practicing 198

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? lawyer was held to have no standing or locus standi in his direct petition before the High Court assailing the constitutionality of a law allowing Instant Sweepstakes by the Phil. Charity Sweepstakes Office. The petition was dismissed outright but the High Court set forth constitutional standing requirements often cited in subsequent cases: Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in the petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. (Reproduced from Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 [1995]). In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Filipinas, Inc., et al. vs. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988), petitioners, an organization of government employees, a labor union and private individuals were not declared to have standing to file and pursue their petitions questioning the constitutionality of the Value Added Tax (VAT) law. However, this deficiency was brushed aside by the High Court. It reasoned: Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions. 199

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 199 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? d) Association, etc. vs. Sec. of Agriculture of 1989 to Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague of 1991

In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agriculture, et al., and related cases,175 SCRA 343 (1989), petitioners, an association of land owners and its members were found to have standing in the several petitions filed with the Supreme Court which involved common legal questions and challenge to the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The High Court held that the requirement of proper partyis satisfied by petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of this Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional question raised. The High Court again referred to the oft-cited first Emergency Powers Cases wherein it proceeded to decide the cases in spite of standing or locus standi deficiency of petitioners due to the transcendental importance of the issues. It concluded: We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. In Bugnay Construction and Dev. Corp. vs. Laron,176 SCRA 240 (1989), petitioner, a lawyer for a plaintiff in a case who separately sued as taxpayer the same defendants of that case, over a contract, in another sala, to get a favorable ruling was held to have no standing or locus standi to sue. The contract was between Dagupan City and a third party over the use of a commercial lot owned by the latter. On appeal, when the standing to sue of the lawyer was questioned, the High Court noted that: It is all too ludicrously transparent and readily apparent that respondent Ravanzo merely sought another branch of the same court, figuratively using the hat of a taxpayer, what he failed to obtained in one branch, under the hat of a representing counsel. It thereafter declared that said lawyer: x x x was neither a real party in 200

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? interest nor could he have validly maintained said case as a so-called taxpayers suit. It concluded: No disbursement of public funds, legal or otherwise, being involved in the challenged transaction, the locus standi claimed by plaintiff x x x is non-existent. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) and companion cases, petitioners, the vice president of the Philippines and Dionisio Ojeda were not questioned at all as to their standing in their successful petitions filed directly with the High Court assailing the constitutionality of a Executive Order and stop the sale of the well-known Roppongi property in Japan. In Gonzales, et al. vs. Macaraig, Jr., et al., 191 SCRA 452 (1990), petitioners, virtually all the senators as substantial taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected by this case were declared to possess standing in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of presidential veto of a provision on the 1989

budget bill. On the standing of petitioners, the High Court briefly noted that: Petitioners have also brought this suit as taxpayers. As ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333, this Court enjoys the open discretion to entertain taxpayers suits or not. In Tolentino v. COMELEC, No. L-24150, 16 October, 1961, 41 SCRA 702, it was also held that a member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised. In Guingona, Jr., et al. vs. Carague, et al., 196 SCRA 221 (1991), petitioners, two (2) senators were found to have standing in their petition which the High Court noted as a case of first impression that questioned the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt servicing in the 1990 Budget. The High Court assured that: There can be no question that petitioners as senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful expenditures of public funds. 201

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 201 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? e) Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp of 1991 to Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr. of 1994 In Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 (1991), petitioner, a Manila councilor and his law partner, Atty. Edilberto Balce were not categorically declared to possess standing in their petition assailing the constitutionality of the law creating the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) but the High Court decided the case anyway. Citing its ruling in Kapatiran etc. vs. Tan, supra,it disregarded the procedural objection of standing of petitioners due to importance of the case and in keeping the Courts duty to see to it that other branches of government followed the Constitution and the law and have not abused their discretion. In Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., et al., 197 SCRA 771 (1991), petitioner, a senator also was considered to have standing to file this direct petition with the High Court to annul the rulings of Executive Secretary and other executive officers for exempting the National Power Corp. (NPC) from indirect tax and duties. The High Court disregarded the claim that petitioner must show that direct injury as a result of the action and that it was not sufficient that is was a mere general interest common to the public: The Court however agrees with the petitioner that as a taxpayer he may file the instant petition following the ruling in Lozada when it involves illegal expenditure of public money. The petition questioned the legality of the tax refund to NPC by way of tax credit certificates and the use of said assigned tax credits by respondent oil companies to pay their tax and duty liabilities to the BIR and Bureau of Customs. (Note: The Lozada case itself did not involve illegal expenditure of public money, although there was a pronouncement that it is only when there is such illegal expenditure that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed).

In Osmea, et al. vs Commission on Elections, et al., 199 SCRA 750 (1991), petitioners, a provincial governor, other 202

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? local executives and congressmen were not declared to have standing by the High Court in their petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law providing for synchronized elections in 1992, but it still resolved the issues raised. It declared: We held as early as in the Emergency Power Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 93 Phil. 603) that where serious constitutional questions are involved the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must technicalities of procedure. Then it invoked its discretion: As for the alleged procedural flawslack of court standing, etc., assuming the existence of such flaws, the same may be brushed aside, conformably with existing doctrine so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. In Citizen J. Antonio M. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992), a petitioner, a Citizen J. Antonio Carpio was entertained in his petition with the High Court claiming the unconstitutionality of the law establishing the Philippine National Police, without ruling on his standing. He was merely referred to as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution and his standing was not questioned at all. In De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 (1993), petitioner, a municipal councilor who questioned the validity of Comelec Resolution on apportionment of districts for election purposes was found to have no standing but his petition was decided just the same. Petitioner did not allege that he was running for reelection or that he would be prejudiced by the elections. The High Court declared that he does not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action. In any case, the High Court invoked the usual excuse for the taking cognizance of a case it wanted to resolve: x x x considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the appor203

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 203 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law?

tionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief, We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea vs. Commission on Elections. In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110 (1994), the petitioners were held to have standing or locus standi to question the contract for the operation of the lotto system. This decision shall be discussed separately in the later part of this Annotation; f) KMU Center vs. Garcia of 1994 to Bayan vs. Zamora of 2000 In KMU Center vs. Garcia, Jr., et al., 239 SCRA 386 (1994), petitioner, a labor group was allowed to question the constitutionality of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Dept. of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) memorandum circulars and/or orders particularly that which delegated to bus and jeepney transport operators authority to fix transport fares within a certain range, etc. The High Court found that Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. It further declared that: x x x petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenging memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected or ignored. It invoked again the usual excuse: even if petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing 204

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. (Underscoring supplied) In Tatad, et al. vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995), petitioners, three (3) members of the senate suing as senators and as taxpayers, were considered also to possess standing in their petition directly with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of contracts for the construction of the Light Rail Transit System (LRT). On the standing of petitioners, the High Court ruled: The prevailing doctrines to taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to question contract entered into by the national government or

government-owned or controlled corporation allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 *1989+). It closed with: For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. (Note: The petitioner in Bugnay was found to have no standing because the contract did not involve disbursement of public funds, among other grounds, not because a municipal contract was involved.) In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the same petitioners questioning the same lotto contract, who were held to have standing or locus standi, in the first Kilosbayan case (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr.) were stripped of the same, this time. This decision shall also be discussed in the later part of this Annotation. In The Anti-Graft League of the Phil., Inc. vs. San Juan, et al., 260 SCRA 250 (1996), petitioner, a nonprofit corporation for the interest of the Republic was found wanting in standing to question the resale price of about 19 hectares land in Ugong, Pasig to its previous owner. The High Court dismissed the petition because petitioner lacked standing or locus standi, and the resale price was even higher with no dis205

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 205 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? bursement of public funds involved. It also reiterated the requisites for taxpayers suit: a) public funds are illegally disbursed and b) petitioner is directly affected thereby. It noted that standing should not have been an issue in that case since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved, (citing Kilosbayan vs. Morato,supra). It concluded that: When, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas, for the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, and consequently no locus standi, in the instant case. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 (1998), petitioners, association of lawyers and a radio-TV Network company were found to have no legal standing and with legal standing respectively in their petition questioning the constitutionality of a section of a law on free use of TV and radio time during elections. As to its standing, the TELEBAP asserted its interest as an association of lawyers of broadcast media companies, as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. The High Court found that:

Petitioner TELEBAP must be held to have no standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of Sec. 92 of BP Blg. 881. But as to the other petitioner, it declared that: GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. x x x x x x xxx 206

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? Petitioners allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of Sec. 92. (Emphasis supplied). In Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), petitioner as taxpayer, citizen and former government official was held to have locus standi or standing in asking the High Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern like the disclosure of the negotiations or agreement between the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Marcoses on the recovery of their ill-gotten wealth. On the standing of petitioner the High Court said: Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. Petitioner invoked several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest. Finally, it postulated: Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. In Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), et al. vs. Zamora, et al., 342 SCRA 449 (2000), and companion cases. petitioners, cause-oriented groups, legislators, nongovernment organizations, citizens and taxpayers, were held to possess no standing in assailing the controversial Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States but the High Court proceeded to decide the case due to the importance of the issue involved. It ruled that petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of the court that they have sustained or in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Hence, petitioners as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. This time legislators or congressmen, led by Wigberto Taada do not also possess the

207

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 207 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines was also stripped of standing in these cases for lack of Board Resolution to its National President to commence the action. However, in spite of its holding of lack of standing of the petitioners, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions. g) Chavez vs. PEA of 2002 to Francisco vs. MMDA of 2006 In Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), a private citizen and former Solicitor General was held to possess standing in his petition to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts about the negotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Dev. Corp. (Amari) over reclaimed portion of the Manila Bay and to enjoin the signing of a new agreement. As to the standing of petitioner, the High Court proclaimed: The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. It then concluded: We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rightsto information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resourcesthe matters of transcendental importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. In Francisco Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al., 415 SCRA 44 (2003) and 17 companion petitions, some petitioners were held to have standing while others were not, in their petitions claiming as unconstitutional the Second Impeachment Complaint against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide regarding the illegal disbursement of the Judiciary Development Fund. The petitions were dismissed after the High Court ruled on the locus standi of each of the petitioners. It then reaffirmed that: Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a 208

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law?

personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is challenged. The High Court clarified: In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met, have been given standing by this Court. It then restated the usual requisites that a citizen who sues to assail the constitutionality of a statute must comply with per Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra. Intervenor Soriano, held the view that petitioners lack standing because it was only the Chief Justice who has sustained and will sustain direct personal injurywhich was shared by Amicus Curiae former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza. The High Court then ruled on the standing or locus standi of the petitioners: a) As taxpayerhe is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed. The Court invoked its discretion to entertain the petition. It opted to grant standing to most of the petitioners since the impeachment trial will entail expenditure of public funds; b) As legislatorhe has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office; c) As the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesit had no standing but since it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve attention of this Court the Court decided to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it; d) Mr. Vallejoshe failed to alleged any interest in the case. He does not have thus standing. e) Two lawyers who adopted the allegations of Candelaria, et al.were allowed to intervene along with the latter; f) The Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.it sought to join Petitioner Francisco. They invoked their right as citizens to intervene alleging that they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful (How, it was not explained). The Court found that the requisites of intervention had been complied with; 209

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 209 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? g) A veterans groupwho sought to intervene to raise the additional issue of whether the second impeachment was valid or based on any grounds in the Constitution, aside from alleging transcendental importance of the issues raised in other petitions, was held to possess an the interest in the matter in litigation;

h) Sen. Aquilino Pimentelhe was allowed to intervene as he alleged that the submission of the Senate president to the Courts jurisdiction will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court; i) And finally, a certain Sorianohe was denied standing in his Motion to Intervene because while he claimed interest as taxpayer, he failed to allege the standing requirement for a taxpayer suit per Dumlao vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 392; 1980). In Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 735 (2004), petitioner, as a local government unit was held to have locus standi or standing to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 seeking to declare as unconstitutional certain provisos of the General Appropriations Act (Budget Law) for 1999, 2000 and 2001 insofar as they earmarked certain amounts to local governments and imposed conditions therefor. As to the standing of the province: The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The assailed provisions resulted in the diminution of their share in the IRA. It further held: These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos x x x x x x the petitioner clearly has a plain, direct, and adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs. In Jumamil vs Cafe, 470 SCRA 475 (2005), petitioner, a private individual was held to have standing or locus standi to pursue a petition for declaratory relief to declare unconstitutional municipal ordinances appropriating funds for the construction of stalls around a public market in Panabo, Da210

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? vao Del Norte. After the trial court dismissed his petition for lack of legal standing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same because he was not a party to the contract being questioned. However, the High Court repeated the usual definition of locus standi or standing, (as set forth at the outset of this Annotation) then argued that the petitioner sued as a taxpayer and not in his personal capacity. It clarified: A taxpayer need not be a party to a contract to challenge its validity. (Note: This seems to conflict with Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, supra, which ruled that petitioners therein had no standing or locus standi to question the lotto contract because they were not parties thereto). It added that: But this rule on legal standing has been relaxed in a number of occasions. It then cited cases in support of this holding and pointed out that in IBP vs. Zamora, the High Court found that IBP

had no locus standi to bring the suit. However, it nevertheless entertained the petition, owing to the importance of the case. It finally set forth alleged determinants of transcendental importance to a case that should vest locus standi to petitioners as enumerated by Justice Feliciano in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, supra. In Olama, et al. vs. PNB, 492 SCRA 343 (2006), petitioners, barangay officials were held to have no standing or locus standi in their petition for mandamus to compel the Philippine National Bank to release Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). It held that: a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a 211

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 211 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? result of the government act that is being challenged. Clearly, not only did the petitioner fail to establish a clear legal right to the relief they are seeking, they also failed to make a case of locus standi for themselves in this case. (Note: Is it appropriate to apply the concept of standing or locus standi to petitioner in a petition for mandamus as the sole and main action? Would it be more fitting if the petitioner be described as a real party in interest, the party aggrieved and who would benefit by the avails of the suit? The petition for mandamus, in this case, did not raise any legal or constitutional challenge for which the suitor or petitioner must be clothed with such interest or qualification amounting to standing or locus standi to pursue the case. In fact in mandamus as sole action, there is an assumption that the law sought to be enforced or the action sought to be performed is Constitutional and valid which must be enforced or performed. On the other hand, in a petition involving constitutional or legal challenge, the law or act being enforced is assailed as unconstitutional or illegal.) Finally in this case under Annotation, Eduardo Francisco, Jr. vs. Bayani Fernando, et al., supra, petitioner, the leading petitioner in the Davide impeachment case discussed earlier, was categorically declared to have no standing or locus standi to bring a direct petition before the High Court questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Wet-Flag-Scheme of the Metro Manila Development Authority. Some find the scheme of rubbing commuters who venture beyond the sidewalks with wet cloth tied to a

pole flag wise as bird-brained, asinine, hilarious, farcical or plain silly. But the petitioner saw something seriousa constitutional transgression. The High Court in this brief decision forthwith dismissed the petition on the main ground of lack of standing or locus standi. It enumerated the settled requisites for a citizen and taxpayer to possess or comply with before he may have standing or locus standi to pursue a constitutional or legal challenge. The terse conclusion: Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. 212

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? The holding in this case was a mere reiteration of settled principles and positions of the High Court on standing or locus standi. Hence, the decision had no new doctrine to offer, particularly on this concept of legal standing or locus standi. VII. KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. GUINGONA, JR. 232 SCRA 110 (1994) AND KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO, 246 SCRA 540 (1995) Two (2) decisions of the High Court (First and Second Kilosbayan cases) are worth discussing here due to the opposite rulings on standing or locus standi of the High Court in a span of about a year, involving the same petitioners and about the same respondents as well as the same issues. These decisions demonstrate only too well the continuing conundrum and partisan confusion that bedevil the courts about the precise nature and proper application of standing or locus standi in our jurisprudence. Let us discuss them: a) The first case was Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra. The first Kilosbayan case: The petitioners, Kilosbayan, Inc., a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic spirited citizens, pastors, priests and nuns, committed to truth, justice and renewal, former Sen. Jovito Salonga, some congressmen and other civic leaders in their individual capacities, and as members of this civic group, taxpayers and concerned citizens filed a petition to stop the implementation of the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of the on-line lottery system, now well known as Lotto. The petition alleged that the contract would allow the PCSO to operate a lottery system in collaboration or in association with a foreign entity, like the PGMCwhich violated a law prohibiting such arrangement. Respondents, through the Solicitor General charged that petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit

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VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 213 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? citing Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, and denied this claim of collaboration or association arguing that PGMC was a mere lessor of the facilities. The High Court held: The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. It proceeded to cite the first Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra, that technicalities may be brushed aside due to the transcendental importance of the cases. And as to taxpayers suit, the High Court declared that it is not without discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained citing Sanidad vs. Comelec, supra, and that it enjoys an open discretion to maintain the same or not citing Tan vs. Macapagal, supra. It cited and discussed numerous cases wherein petitioners were held to have standing or locus standi and its liberal policy on the latter as well as its view that objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality or standing are mainly procedural matters; and considering the importance of the issues, the High Court may brush aside such technicalities of procedure and may take cognizance of the petition. Held: The contract was declared invalid. On the matter of standing or locus standi, the High Court waxed eloquent: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioner deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. 214

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law?

(Note: Seven (7) justices voted that petitioners possessed standing or locus standi, whereas six (6) voted that they did not. These seven (7) justices also voted to declare the contract invalid whereas the six (6) justices did not express their opinion on the contract in view of their position.) b) The second case was Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995) Soon thereafter, the PCSO and the PGMC signed another agreement supposedly conformable to the PCSO charter and this first Kilosbayan decision. The new contract was called Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) whereby the PCSO would rent the equipment and operate the lottery at agreed percentage of the gross by way of rental. Kilosbayan, Inc. along with about the same personages, again directly filed a similar petition with the High Court for the nullification anew of the contract insisting on its invalidity and violation of a provision of the Constitution. Respondents again questioned the right of petitioners to bring the suit on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they sought to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners argued that the previous ruling in the first Kilosbayan case that they possessed standing was the law of the case and therefore, their standing can no longer be reopened. Held: This time, the High Court declared that petitioners had no standing to sue and the contract was declared valid. The High Court came out with the following holdings: the question of standing or locus standi may be reviewed anew because the second contract was essentially different from the first one; standing or locus standi of petitioners was no longer the issue but whether they were real parties in interest under Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court since standing is a concept in constitutional law and no constitutional question was involved; petitioners were similar to the petitioner in 215

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 215 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, who was denied standing; no allegation of spending public funds to make the action a public one; and in actions for annulment of contracts, like this one, the real parties are those parties to it and petitioners who were not parties thereto, do not have such present substantial interest. Finally, the High Court twitted the majority edge in the first case of a hairline 7 to 6 in favor of standing or locus standi for petitioners: The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. c) A legal oddity?

The High Court declared in the first Kilosbayan case that the issue on petitioners standing or locus standi should, indeed, be resolved in their favorwithout explaining why. It did not test them against the direct and substantial interest requisites of People vs. Vera, supra, and Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra. In fact, the justices studiously avoided categorically declaring that petitioners met the conditions set forth in these cases, in their separate opinions. All that they said was that the rule on standing or locus standi should be relaxed owing to the transcendental importance of the case (See separate opinions of Justices Cruz, Feliciano, and Padilla.) However, in the second Kilosbayan case, the High Court made a complete about-face and reversed its earlier holding and ruled that the same petitioners had no standing or locus standi this time. It declared that the new contract is different from the first one so the holding in the previous case does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit; and since there was no constitutional law question here, the issue in this case was not standing or locus standi but whether petitioners were the real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x. The Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, was again cited to support lack of standing or locus standi because petitioners failed to meet the 216

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? conditions enumerated therein; petitioners lacked substantial interest to bring the suit; there was no allegation that public funds were misspent; and it belittled the one (1) vote advantage of the majority: The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. Thus, what happened in these two (2) virtually identical cases may stand out as a legal oddity and unique in the annals of our jurisprudence because the High Court came out with diametrically opposite rulings on standing or locus standi in a brief span of time. d) These cases witnessed justices debating, arguing or even proselytizing their respective views The justices who voted for standing or locus standi in the first Kilosbayan case felt constrained to write separate opinions in the second Kilosbayan case, to defend their earlier positions. Justice Padilla maintained his view in the first Kilosbayan case that that the rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the issue then was of paramount national interest and importance and it should not stand in the way of a review of the new contract. Justice Feliciano also maintained that all the factors which, to my mind, pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist. He even warned that the High Court may profoundly regret in the future, the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today chained on our limbs.

Justice Regalado lamented that to make the Courts judgment here turn again on technical procedural grounds by hiding within the shroud of the locus standi mystique, does not strike me as decisive and conclusive adjudication. He insisted that the issue of standing or locus standi has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case. He found it seemingly odd, if not arcane that petitioners were held to have the requisite locus standi in the first 217

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 217 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? case, but are now mysteriously divested of the same in the second case. He also warned that to pay unqualified obeisance to the beguiling locus standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would not only be an abdication of a clear judicial duty (Emphasis supplied). Justice Davide who was the ponente in the first Kilosbayan case, was disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, et al., on the issue of standing or locus standi in that case. He also warned that such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. And it puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. He took exception to that part of the ponencia of Justice Mendoza in this second case which belittled the tenuous majority of the first. He pointed out that In his Concurring Opinion in the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case did not have the same importance as the first lotto case, he thereby accepted the concession of standing to the petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and strength to the tenuous majority in the first lotto case. e) The spirited debates among justices still failed to yield a consensus What can we glean from these spirited and pointed exchanges among the justices? It is rare that a preliminary or procedural issue to a case like standing or locus standi has so divided the Court that the justices maintained opposite positions with equal fervor and conviction. In their separate opinions they not only held on but even proselytized their respective views. But from a study of the opinions of those who 218

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? maintained that petitioners possessed standing or locus standi in the two (2) decisions, it was discernible that these justices insisted it obtained, but they made no efforts to explain why. They were naturally aware of Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, with those hard-to-surmount conditions or requisites for standing or locus standi. This case was the unerring yardstick of the High Court previous cases, so much so that there was a uniform avoidance in testing the petitioners against that case. Why so, because petitioners would fail the test? The group that insisted the absence of standing or locus standi in petitioners, strongly insisted that they had no personal and substantial interest since they were not privy to the contract nor would be adversely affected thereby. It further downgraded the issue to one of real party in interest under the Rules of Court and not of standing or locus standi since they found out that no constitutional issue was involved. And as a taxpayers suit, the claim of standing or locus standi could not also prosper for there was no allegation of illegal disbursement of public funds. The result is that after extensive and spirited debates among the justices on this issue of standing or locus standi, the jury so to speak, is still out. No convincing consensus has emerged then and up to now. The readers are in the dark and as confused as before. Retired Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, who voted with the majority in the first Kilosbayan case admitted this not a little confusion, to use his words: Locus standi is a judicial concept that has caused not a little confusion even among lawyers because of its inconsistent application by the courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court. It is often applied by judges as an excuse for not deciding a case notwithstanding the importance of the issues raised and the urgent necessity to rule upon them. x x x x x xxx xxx

In the first Emergency Powers Case, 84 Phil. 368, the Supreme Court declared: The transcendental importance of these cases to the public demands that they be acted promptly and definitely brushing 219

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 219 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. This has given convenient latitude to judges to apply or brush aside technicalities of procedure on the requirement of locus standi.A case in point is Kilosbayan

v. Morato (should be Guingona, Jr.) where in 232 SCRA 111 (should be 110), the Supreme Court decided that petitioner wasthe proper partyand in 249 SCRA 628 (should be 246 SCRA 540) involving the same subject, held that it was not. (Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Locus Standi, Phil. Daily Inquirer, January 27, 2007, p. A-10; Emphasis supplied). VIII. TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: A MAGIC INCANTATION? a) No definition of the term in our jurisprudence Transcendental importance has been another elusive term that recurs and resonates in cases involving standing or locus standi in constitutional and legal challenges before the courts. It made its debut in that famous Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan,supra, and companion petitions penned by Justice Pedro Tuason. This oft-quoted and tired passage (owing to repeated use since 1949 to the present and counting) is found in the opening lines of this decision: Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners x x x x x x x x x Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Emphasis supplied). Now, about fifty-seven (57) years later, this term is alive and well and in constant harness either by the bar or bench. Lawyers usually allege in their petitions transcendental importance of the issues they raise to catch the attention of the courts. This term had often cropped up whenever stand220

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? ing or locus standi was discussed (Kapatiran, etc. vs. Tan, supra, Osmea vs. Comelec, supra, KMU vs. Garcia, supra, Basco vs. PAGCOR, supra, Association of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of Agriculture, supra, Bayan vs. Zamora, et al., Chavez vs. PEA, supra, Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra, etc.). Thus, it has also become another mischievous concept in law because if the court did not like to hear the case, it downgrades or ignores the claim of importance and sets up standing or locus standi as a barrier. On the other hand, if the court wants to hear the case, regardless of the standing or locus standi of petitioner, it simply comes up with the following magic incantation or words to the effect: Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra).

b) "Determinants of Transcendental Importance It is surprising that no definition of transcendental importance has been attempted since it was first used in Araneta vs Dinglasan, supra, in 1949 and thereafter in numerous decisions of the High Court. Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit, etc. supra, confirmed that there has been no doctrinal definition of this term yet. However, in this same case, certain instructive determinants supposedly of transcendental importance were formulated by Justice Florentino Feliciano in his Concurring Opinion in Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra: (1) the character of the funds, or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition, etc.; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. These so-called determinants were reiterated in the case of Jumamil vs. Cafe, supra. But actually, Justice Feliciano merely referred to them as considerations of principle which, in the present case appear to me to require an affirma221

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 221 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? tive answer to the question of whether or not petitioners are properly regarded as imbued with the standing necessary to bring and maintain the present petition (Emphasis supplied). Assuming they were intended by Justice Feliciano to be determinants of transcendental importance of the issues or the case, they are incapable of accurately defining its real nature. They do not focus on the nature or value of the issues to the country or the people but on matters that do not actually accord significance to them. Let us examine: a) character of the funds, or assets involved in the casethe character of the funds or assets does not necessarily elevate the level of importance of the case. Besides, character is vague. How about those cases which do not involve funds or assets like the Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra? b) clear disregard of the Constitution or the law by public authoritythis does not also elevate the level of importance of the case since this must obtain and be alleged as a requisite for a petition to be accorded due course; and c) lack of party with direct or specific interest to pursue the casethere are always petitioners that can plausibly claim such interest. Besides, our jurisprudence is replete with crusading souls ready to undertake constitutional and legal challenges, unmindful of the expenses, risks, and sacrifices. c) Attempt at definition Transcendental is an adjective. Its verb is transcend, which means in reference to this discussion, to go beyond the limits of; overstep; exceed (a story that transcends belief). The other adjective is

transcendent which means transcending; surpassing; excelling; extraordinary; and transcendental is synonymous with transcendent (Websters New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1519). Other meanings of transcendental, however, pertain to philosophical concepts and not relevant here. 222

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? Hence, transcendental importance means the level of significance or value of constitutional and legal issues raised which go beyond parochial concerns whose resolution will have an impact upon the governance of the country and/or national existence. Perhaps, the pronouncement of the High Court in the first Kilosbayan case is along this definition: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra. Emphasis supplied). IX. OBSERVATIONS What teachings have we gathered from the numerous decisions that discussed or ruled on the issue of standing or locus standi? Let us enumerate some: a) Virtually everyone can be a petitioner From the cases narrated, the following appeared as petitioners: The People of the Philippines or the Government, the Vice President, Senators, Congressmen, government officials, prominent personalities, taxpayers and plain citizens (People vs. Vera, supra, Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito, supra, Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra, etc., Laurel vs. Garcia, supra, Chavez vs. PEA, supra, Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, supra; there were also local executives, governors, municipal councilor, barangay official, (Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, supra, De Guia vs. Comelec, supra and Olama vs. PNB, supra); there were also civic organizations and association of lawyers (Philconsa vs. Gimenez, Placu vs. Cunera, supra., Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra, Telecommunications, etc. vs. Comelec, 223

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006

223 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? supra); there were also associations of planters and their members, (Asso. of Small Landowners, etc. vs. Sec. of Agriculture, supra, Gonzales vs. Hechanova, supra); there were also a trial judge and practicing lawyers, (De la Llana vs. Alba, supra, Lozada vs. Comelec, Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra); there were also a local government unit and a TV network company (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, supra. and Telecommunications, etc. vs. Comelec, supra); and finally, there were labor and veterans groups (KMU vs. Garcia, supra, Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit, etc., supra). Some of the above petitioners were found to have standing or locus standi, others were assumed to have it, others were merely allowed without even touching on their standing or locus standi, and others were held to have none at all. This only proves the point earlier made that the citizenry may launch into any constitutional or legal challenge before the courts but not all may be entertained not because they lack the wherewithal but because the court according to its lights, may hold that they did not possess the requisite standing or locus standi. b) Requisites for standing or locus standi are hard to meet Direct/personal and substantial interest The requisites for standing or locus standi set forth by Justice Laurel in People vs. Vera, supra, and its elaboration in Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, have been hard to meet. Even when the court so declares that they have been met, doubts still linger. His famous dictum was: The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Through the years, the High Court has been shackled to these requisites as enumerated in detail in Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra: 224

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? 1) The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of statute must be direct and personal; 2) He must be able to show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

3) It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. Then in this case under Annotation, the requisites were restated. It also reiterated the settled requisites for a taxpayers suit: A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the alleged illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. c) Requisites tested against petitioners in previous cases Many petitioners may flunk when tested against these conditions/requisites. Even the People or the Government may have a hard time surmounting the conditions of Justice Laurel. The idea of the People or Government as possessing personal and material interest in a Probation Law and will suffer direct injury in the enforcement of that law in People vs. Vera, supra, seems not so plausible to some lawyers. There is a presumption which should even be conclusive upon the Government that the laws it passed are constitutional and valid, otherwise it loses credibility. It is up to third parties to question them. Does it make sense for a government to assail its own laws? One instrumentality of the Government being 225

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 225 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? repulsed or countermanded by the other would certainly reflect lack of common direction and a kind of disarray. Some hold the view that the proper party to challenge the Probation Law should be the accused if he were denied its benefits because his constitutional rights were disregarded. Let us test some petitioners in the cases narrated against the requisites set forth in People vs. Vera, Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, and Francisco vs. MMDA, supra: In Tolentino vs. Comelec, a senator was allowed to question the reduction of the voting age to 18 years old. Did he have a personal and substantial interest, and would have sustained direct injury if the voting age were thus reduced? In Placu vs. Cuneta, supra, a civic group was allowed to appear because it is merely interested in upholding the law, did it have the personal and substantial interest in the

memorandums of the city mayor? Everybody is interested in upholding the law. Does that clothe everybody with standing or locus standi to question orders of local executives? In Maceda vs. Macaraig, supra, a senator was found to have standing to question the legality of tax credit for oil companies. However, the respondents claimed the senator lacked standing for he should demonstrate his direct and substantial interest and that he would sustain direct injury fom the tax credit practice of the BIR? But the High Court did not address or refute this claim and merely allowed him to pursue the case. In Tatad vs. Garcia, supra, petitioners were held to have standing to question the LRT contract but did they have personal and substantial interest in the contract and did they sustain direct injury from its enforcement? Or were they privy to the contract as the Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Morato, supra, required? Justice Fernando made that postulation in Tan vs. Macapagal, supra: Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit (Tan vs. Macapagal, supra). What is so special about a senator? Many are equally interested in upholding the Constitution and the law and would be willing to bring a suit to this end, but would they be held to have standing or locus standi? The same requisites apply to taxpayers suit. He must also specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in prevent226

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? ing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, supra and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines Inc. vs. San Juan, supra) An ordinary individual who, as taxpayer, assails a law is always open to challenge as to his interest in preventing illegal use of funds from a law being assailed. It is usually refuted by showing that he has only an indirect or generalized interest common to other citizens. Thus, the conditions as defined by Justice Fernando in Lozada vs. Comelec, supra, cannot easily be met: Petitioners standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When a person suing as a taxpayer is held to have standing or locus standi, we are confronted with the legal fiction that he has sufficient personal and substantial interest in preventing the same and will suffer direct injury from the enforcement of the questioned statute. As in fiction, this is met with a willing suspension of disbelief a term in literature. But what is really the truth?

In KMU vs. Garcia, supra, which held that KMU had standing, the High Court noted that it suffered grave and irreparable injury and damage from these questioned memoranda, circulars etc. of the LTFRB and DOTC. It found that they (its members) avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passengers fare. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected or ignored. Does this mean that any bus or jeepney passenger could successfully initiate and pursue this same petition? 227

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 227 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? In Telecommunications, etc. vs. Comelec, supra, the High Court convincingly found that a TV Network had standing to question an election law granting free airtime during elections. This was a clear example of a petitioner with a direct/personal and substantial interest in this law and it would suffer injury from its enforcement, because the High Court found that it lost money before and expected to lose money again from giving free airtime. Some lawyers are looking for this kind of direct and concrete interest in petitioners if we faithfully adhere to requisites of standing or locus standi discussed above. It is perhaps different, if public rights are being asserted because being a citizen is sufficient. As the High Court declared that when a petition for Mandamus involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore part of the general public which possess the right (Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, supra, and Chavez vs. PEA, supra). d) The Resort to Transcendental Importance and Judicial Discretion Owing to the seemingly insurmountable requisites for standing or locus standi, the courts tend to avoid confronting them by usually dismissing the latter as a mere procedural barrier or technicality which it could disregard to justify taking cognizance of a case. And the common open sesame invocations are: the transcendental importance of the case/issues which was started by the Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra, and the exercise of judicial discretion to take or not to take the case as ruled in Gonzales vs. Marcos, supra, Sanidad vs. Comelec, supra, Osmea vs. Comelec, supra, etc. The usual excuse: And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of this Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing 228

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? and resolving the serious constitutional question raised. (Association of Small Landowners, etc. vs. Secretary of Agriculture, supra). e) Standing or Locus Standi: A procedural or substantive barrier? Much of the problem that has clung to this concept of locus standi from the start has been its classification as a procedural matter that may be waived or set aside if the courts wanted to hear and resolve the issues. Standing or locus standi was referred to as technicalities of procedure (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra), as a procedural matter (Kapatiran, etc. vs. Tan, supra) as a procedural flaw (Osmea vs. Comelec, supra), as a barren procedural infirmity (KMU Center Inc. vs. Garcia, supra), as a procedural infirmity (De Guia vs. Comelec, supra), as a procedural barrier (Bayan vs. Zamora, supra) and so on, that may be disregarded or brushed aside owing to the paramount or transcendental importance of the issues, so that the case may be given due course. But is locus standi really procedural in nature? The requisites for its possession are those that inhere in the suitor that they cannot be glossed over without trenching upon his fundamental rights. For example, let us summarize the requisites provided by People vs. Vera, supra, Valmonte vs. PSCO, supra, and Francisco vs. MMDA, supra: a direct and personal interest; injury sustained; denial of right or privilege; and being subjected to burdens or penalties. These requisites are matters that go into or inhere on the person of the suitor. Can the court validly waive or merely pretend that they do not exist (even if they do) and accordingly, they go away? If standing or locus standi is to public law and real party in interest is to private law, then they must have the same classification, as substantive and not procedural barriers. If a plaintiff in a civil case who is not the real party in interest, the court has no recourse but to dismiss it. Not being a real 229

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 229 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? party in interest or lack of personality to sue, is a ground for motion to dismiss under lack of cause of action (Casimiro vs. Roque, et al., 98 Phil. 880; 1956 and Regalado, Remedial Compendium, 8th ed., p. 255). The courts desire to give due course to the case cannot prevail over this legal impediment. It cannot exercise discretion to waive this real party in interest requisite, if not met by plaintiff. If real

party in interest is a substantive barrier in private law, with more reason that standing or locus standi should also be in public law which addresses questions crucial to national life and interest? Now Chief Justice Puno contended that locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but even a constitutional requirement: It is my respectful submission, however, that we should reexamine De Guia (De Guia vs. Comelec, supra.). It treated the rule on locus standi as a mere procedural rule. It is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are actually demandable. The phrase has been construed since time immemorial to mean that a party in a constitutional litigation must demonstrate a standing to sue. By downgrading the requirement on locus standi as a procedural rule which can be discarded in the name of public interest, we are in effect amending the Constitution by judicial fiat (Concurring Opinion, Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra. Emphasis supplied). f) The need to reexamine this concept of standing or locus standi From the cases narrated, the High Court has not yet come up with a definitive rule when standing or locus standi should be appropriately applied or withheld. Justice Feliciano conceded that: This is not however, to say that there is somewhere an overarching principle or theory, waiting to be discovered, that permits a ready answer to the question when, or in what types of cases, the need to show locus standi may be relaxed in a greater or lesser degree. To my knowledge, no 230

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? satisfactory principle or theory has been discovered and none has been crafted, whether in our jurisdiction or in the United States. (Concurring Opinion, Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra). As suggested at the start of this Annotation, there is a need to take a hard look and reexamine this concept of standing or locus standi for a petitioner who raises constitutional and legal challenges and those suing as taxpayers. To repeat, the strictures provided in People vs. Vera, supra, Valmonte vs. PCSO, supra, and Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, supra, are difficult to surmount that the High Court tended to either brush aside technicalities, lower the barrier or relax the rule. Perhaps, without trenching upon the Constitution as discussed above by Chief Justice Puno, there is need to redefine or redelineate, if possible, these prudential limitations to effect consistency in rulings and enable the courts to address more constitutional and legal issues in the interest of the country. The problem however, is that courts cannot give a blanket recognition of locus standi to everybody under the fiction that the latter possesses

the requisite personal and substantial interest. Constitutional and legal challenges do not involve assertion of public right for which the mere fact of being a citizen qualifies anyone to be a petitioner. Otherwise, locus standi as prudential barrier, would have lost its rationale. As philosopher Hannah Arendt observed, if everybody is guilty, then no one is guilty. In other words, if everybody has personal and substantial interest, then no one has that anymore. We can take note of the relaxation in the requisites to make out a case for grave abuse of discretion in a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It usually pertains only to such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty en231

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 231 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? joined or to act in contemplation of law (Regalado, Remedial Law Compedium, 8th Ed., p. 718, citing Benito vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 134913, Jan. 19, 2001 and cases cited therein). The High Court must have realized that there are less dramatic infractions by judicial and executive officers which still amount to grave abuse of discretion. In a recent ruling, even the granting of the order of the Energy Regulatory Commission increasing the generation charge for Meralco without the publication of its Amended Application was stigmatized as grave abuse of discretion (Nasecore, et al. vs. ERC, et al., G.R. No. 163935 dated Feb. 2, 2006 and Aug. 16, 2006). X. CONCLUSION a) The quality of our lawmakers and the laws they pass The quality of many of our lawmakers is much snickered about because some are clowns, comedians, and those suddenly thrust into the intricate and intellectually draining task of lawmaking without the slightest idea what it is all about. Hence, it is expected that there will always be challenges on the kind of laws they would churn out. This holds true with executive and administrative issuances which subvert civil rights of the citizenry. This observation is apt: Some recent laws would indicate that lawmakers not only passed the bar but also stopped there. And to paraphrase another: Men fight for freedom (and basic rights) then start making laws to get rid of them (E.C. Mckenzie, 14,000 Quotations and Quotes, 1980 ed., pp. 293-294). One such law which must have been passed while the lawmakers were in a state of inebriation was RA 9295 which aimed at getting rid of our rights. It was touted about supposedly to develop domestic shipping but its effect was to violate the Constitution, e.g., undue delegation of the

power to fix shipping rates to the shipping operators themselves (akin to pedophiles being assigned to guard children), among others. Then officials of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), who must have also stopped in the same bar and were more inebriated than the 232

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? lawmakers, came out with equally unconstitutional Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that virtually abolished hearings/oppositions of applications for new franchises for vessels. Thus, entry into operations in a multi-million shipping industry was largely unregulated and as easy as opening a corner sari-sari store, to the detriment of prior operators who invested fortunes in the business. b) The Eugenia T. San Pablo vignette When RA 9295 was passed in May, 2005, Mrs. Eugenia T. San Pablo, a pioneer shipping operator then of four (4) RORO vessels in the Bicol Region since the 1950s filed a 56-page Petition (exclusive of annexes), assailing the constitutionality of this law and the wayward IRR directly before the High Court. She also pleaded transcendental importance of the issues to the shipping industry and to the country. Already reeling from the easy invasion of newcomers through MARINA liberal policy, she had to stop this law which disregarded the time-honored prior operator and protection of investment rules. The High Court was not persuaded and it dismissed the petition outright. It reasoned that even if petitioner has established her locus standi, there is yet no actual case or controversy; and the case should not have been brought directly to the High Court in line with the principle of hierarchy of courtsunless there are special important and compelling reasons therefor, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition. It concluded that: This Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired or the reliefs sought cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction. Here we perceive no sense of urgency. (Eugenia T. San Pablo vs. Maritime Industry Authority, and Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, et al., G.R. No. 167641, Resolution dated May 10, 2005; Unreported; Emphasis supplied). 233

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Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? Some five (5) months after the motion for reconsideration was denied or in December, 2005, she was unable anymore to stanch the financial bleeding from heavy losses due to easy entry of competitors that she was compelled to sell all her vessels to her main competitor and ceased operations. It was the prerogative of the High Court to rule as it did; to apply the principle of hierarchy of courts; to hold that even if there was locus standi there was yet no actual controversy; to hold that there was no exceptional circumstances to justify direct cognizance of the case by the High Court; and to declare that: Here we perceived no sense of urgency. From this case, a harder look at the following may be relevant: As to hierarchy of courtsperhaps there is need for a more consistent application of this principle because in most of the cases reviewed earlier, this was not used as impediment to taking on those cases, namely: Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra, Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito, supra, Gonzales vs. Hechanova, supra, Philconsa vs. Gimenez, supra, Philconsa vs. Mathay, supra, Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, Tolentino vs. Comelec, supra, Aquino vs. Comelec, supra, Sanidad vs. Comelec, supra, De la Llana v. Alba, supra, the two (2) Kilosbayan cases, and a host of other cases. All these cases allowed petitioners to bypass the hierarchy of courts. In fact, this procedural deficiency was not even discussed at all. In Aguino vs. Comelec, supra, the petitioners who directly filed their petition with the High Court, were even held to have no standing at all and the remedy they resorted to was wrong yet the High Court resolved the petition due to the far-reaching implications of the herein petition. In Osmea vs. Comelec, supra, direct resort to the High Court was allowed so that important constitutional questions may be addressed. As to exceptional circumstancesperhaps, there is also a need to provide accurate determinants for this term; and as to the perception of the High Court that there was no sense of urgencyperhaps also, Mrs. San Pablo was not convincing enough in demonstrating her plight which ended in her bankruptcy. 234

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? c) The locus standi mystique lives on The point here is that in constitutional and legal challenges, locus standi, transcendental importance, or exceptional circumstance and hierarchy of courts elude precise categorization as well as definite and consistent application. Thus, the locus standi mystique, to use the words of Justice Florenz Regalado, remains a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, to borrow the description of Russia then by Churchill. Hence, every time a new case comes up with discussions of standing or locus standi, the uncertainty and confusion continue. We are reminded of the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief

Justice William H. Rehnquist in his Dissenting Opinion in Wade vs. Roe (1973): The Courts opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it. Thus, as we have set forth to inquire at the outset, it is also debatable whether standing or locus standi has advanced the cause of constitutionalism and law, or has promoted judicial ambivalence and abdication of duty. Indeed, there is a need to a) formulate more surmountable and reasonable requisites for standing or locus standi;b) determinine whether it is really a procedural barrier that may be waived by the court at will or a substantive requisite like real party in interest in civil actions which should not and cannot be brushed aside; and c) delineate concrete guidelines when an issue is deemed of transcendental importance, etc., and when it is appropriate to ignore even in the absence of locus standi; and other related questions. d) Death of Certainty and the need for continuing debate Law can not give us certainty. In fact, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes conceded long ago that certainty is dead. Justice Benjamin Cardozo was disheartened, that there was no solid land of fixed and settled rules. The great jurist lamented through his inimitable musical prose: No doubt the 235

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 235 Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law? ideal system, if it were attainable, would be a code at once so flexible and so minute, as to supply in advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule. But life is too complex to bring the attainment of this idea within the compass of human power. (Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense, Random House, 1994, ed., p. 52). Woefully, there is no reason to be optimistic that this concept of standing or locus standi will be ensnared in a definitive jurisprudence in the near future. The High Court should not be blamed for this difficulty because it is in constant quandary as to how to reconcile those hard-to-surmount requisites for standing or locus standi and its desire to address and resolve issues of crucial importance whose resolution is of critical immediacy to the country. Hence, there is a need for a continuing discussion, examination, and debate on important legal concepts or issues, not only on standing or locus standi but also on transcendental importance, exceptional circumstances, hierarchy of courts, and the like which have an immense impact upon jurisprudence and the administration of justice. Finally, the following admonition from a US magistrate to the American judiciary is also relevant to ours:

A court which is final and unreviewable needs more careful scrutiny than any other. Unreviewable power is the most likely to self-indulge itself and the least likely to engage in dispassionate selfanalysis. . . In a country like ours, no public institution, or the people who operate it, can be above public debate. (Warren Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court, Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, to Ohio Judicial Conference on September 4, 1968nine months before being named Chief Justice of the United States). [Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law?, 507 SCRA 181(2006)]