LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Reading between evidentiary necessity. A blanket judicial
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
the Lines on Privacy nod not only opens the door to misuse
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965), but may also embolden parties to manu-
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj
A lok Prasanna Kumar’s recent column,
“No Privacy in a Marriage” (EPW, 19
July 2025), offers a compelling critique
facture, curate, or selectively leak sensi-
tive material with the sole purpose of
damaging each other’s reputation. It is
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. of the Vibhor Garg v Neha (2025) judg- precisely in these relational ruptures
Editor ment, which upheld the admissibility of that the judiciary must act with sensitiv-
Pyaralal Raghavan covert spousal recordings by reaffirming ity. As Clare Chambers has noted, when
SENIOR Assistant editors
INDU K established precedents in Yusufalli Es- the state recognises marriage, it does
Nachiket kulkarni mail Nagree v The State of Maharashtra three things: it defines, it endorses, and
Assistant editors (1968) and R M Malkani v State of Maha- it regulates. Against this backdrop, the
Sahba Fatima
Shweta Shetty rashtra (1973). The Court emphasised Court’s view that the marriage was “al-
Editorial Assistants the threefold test comprising relevance, ready broken” and thus no longer de-
Saket Moon speaker identification, and accuracy served privacy protections is both con-
Jasmin Naur Hafiz
Editorial Coordinator
while holding that the absence of con- stitutionally and sociologically untena-
Shilpa Sawant sent or knowledge of the person being ble. The state cannot simultaneously en-
copy editor recorded is not a bar to admissibility, dorse marriage as a protected institution
jyoti shetty
prioritising the litigant’s right to a fair and disclaim its duty to balance privacy
Assistant Copy Editor
Priyanka Dhaundiyal trial. The Indian evidentiary law has ac- and procedural fairness when that mar-
production cepted the “fruit of the poisoned tree” riage deteriorates. The very existence of
suneethi nair doctrine where genuineness and rele- a state-recognised marriage invokes a
Chief Administrative and Finance Officer vance are demonstrated. The Court’s duty to uphold competing rights simulta-
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
reasoning in Vibhor Garg narrowly em- neously, not pick one (fair trial) at the
Advertisement Manager
Kamal G Fanibanda phasised admissibility under the three- cost of another (privacy). Instead of har-
Circulation fold test, implicitly assuming that these monising these rights, the Court reduced
Deepali Chandrashekhar
recordings arose in neutral conditions. a constitutionally protected intimate
General Manager & Publisher
Gauraang Satish Pradhan For instance, a spouse’s emotionally relationship to a procedural dispute,
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Economic & Political Weekly cruelty, impropriety, or infidelity. Pre- tion against the common mala fide prac-
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Economic & Political Weekly is registered induced stress. Thus, while the Court is ates space for a new trend in litigation:
as a trademark with the Govt. of India.
not entirely erred in applying settled the use of “self-preservation” as a
EPW Research Foundation evidentiary doctrine, it failed to inter- post-hoc justification for keeping a
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on fi nancial and macro-economic issues in India. pret the exceptions in Section 122 of the spouse under surveillance or recording
Director Indian Evidence Act, 1872 through a
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate socio-legally sensitive lens. In this regard,
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 NOTICE
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 the learned amicus curiae’s suggestion
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EPW encourages readers to send critical
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(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) 2024 is relevant, especially regarding reflections on editorials and other
Board of Trustees
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman the reproduction and handling of sensi- published articles. Readers are
Shyam Menon, Managing Trustee tive material.
requested to refer to EPW ’s Notes for
André Béteille, Deepak Parekh, There is relative rigidity in this logic:
Romila Thapar, Dipankar Gupta, Contributors for further details.
N Jayaram, SUDIPTO MUNDLE, once litigation begins, the threshold of
Bharat Bhushan privacy recedes entirely in favour of
Published by Gauraang Satish Pradhan, for and on
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The following article has been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section ([Link]/engage).
Editor: Pyaralal Raghavan (Editor responsible for (1) BJP’s Tribal Challenge Continues as Hemant Soren Retains Power — Chhotelal Kumar
selection of news under the PRP Act).

4 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

LETTERS
interactions. As T Havard and M Lefe- distinguish genuine self-preservation asymmetries and lack of external
vre had observed in their study of mo- with a proportionality framework. witnesses, especially in domestic and
bile-phone-mediated coercive control, To be clear, this is not an argument intimate abuse settings. Applied to the
“the pervasive nature of these technol- against all forms of such evidence. Indian context, this suggests that courts
ogies creates a constant sense of visibil- Closed-door cruelty is real and often must evolve from formal admissibility
ity and control, which can be misrepre- leaves no physical trace. But the solu- tests to proportionality frameworks
sented as protective measures.” When tion lies not in blanket admissibility. that recognise the “relational intent”
such tactics are imported into family Comparable sociolegal dilemmas have behind recordings, whether they arise
courts and validated as evidence, the emerged internationally as well. I from coercion, emotional manipulation,
law inadvertently legitimises a psycho- Hloviuk et al have argued that courts or genuine distress. In such spaces,
logical pattern of coercion already doc- must distinguish between “secret oper- the judiciary’s responsibility is not only
umented in abusive domestic settings. ations” and “situational recordings” by procedural fidelity, but constitutional
The pervasive use of phone-based tech- vulnerable victims. They caution that if empathy. If family courts are to remain
nologies creates a “new panopticon,” a courts interpret every act of covert doc- institutions of equitable justice, they
dynamic in which intimate partners umentation as premeditated evidence- must be guided not only by evidentiary
are subjected to constant monitoring, gathering—that is, operational search rules but by constitutional values, espe-
misrepresented as self-preservation. activity—it risks excluding critical self- cially when the stakes involve intimacy,
In such contexts, covert recordings protective acts from evidentiary consid- vulnerability, and the possibility of
are not neutral evidence-gathering but eration. Crucially, their analysis urges future healing.
constitute coercive tools of informational that secret recordings be seen as digital Alisha S Karpe, Syed Mohd Uzair Iqbal
domination. Courts must therefore self-defence in the context of power Pune

Errata
The author note for Indrani Sengupta, co-author of the special article, “Does a Mother’s Education Matter for Childcare in India? Evidence from
Time Use Survey” (EPW, 23 August 2025), contained an error. It should be noted that Sengupta teaches at Shiv Nadar University Chennai.
The author note for Muhammed Haneefa, author of the commentary, “Why Kerala Needs Anthrotherology to Handle Human–Wildlife Confl ict”
(EPW, 23 August 2025), was erroneous. Haneefa teaches at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Jammu.
For the insight, “Premature Deindustrialisation: Not in India” (EPW, 30 August 2025), in the sentence, “Second, among five emerging market … studying
the trends in the real MVA share)” occurring on p 38, the phrase, “the present author,” should have read “Goldar (2025)”. In the same article, in the
sentence, “A similar analysis … (based on PLFS)” on p 39, the in-text citation, “Goldar (2023)”, should have read “the author for this article.”
The errors have been corrected on the EPW website.
The errors are regretted —Ed.

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Data presented for all the survey years starting from 1961, at the All-India and State levels, separately for rural and urban area,
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 5

LETTERS

6 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

EDITORIALS

From 25 Years Ago families. In the abstract sense, caste means population in the country not only by religion
status or position with occupation [Havanur and language, but also by caste and tribe.
1975]. For census enumeration, caste in the The United Nations has stipulated norms
concrete sense is relevant. for conducting a census. It has also specified
Census operation in India has been hailed the details to be collected during the census
Vol XXXV, No 36 AUGUST 26, 2000
as the world’s biggest administrative exer- operations. While admitting regional varia-
Caste Enumeration in Census: cise. India has a very long history for con- tions, the UN has insisted on compulsory
Constitutional Imperative ducting census. Koutilya’s Arthashastra re- collection of details of about 17 items of
fers to the practice of conducting census in which Item No 13 pertains to collection of
Ravivarma Kumar India. The village statistics would, inter alia, comprehensive details about the communi-
The last five decennial censuses have es- reveal the exact population of the brahmins, ties and citizenship characters which would,
chewed enumeration of caste particulars. kshatriyas, vysyas and shudras, separately, in the case of India, necessarily include col-
The three national commissions and scores besides giving statistics of agriculturists, lection of data in respect of castes and tribes.
of state commissions for backward classes cowherds, artisans, labourers, slaves and India is not only a union of states, it is also
(BC) have found these census data useless in merchants. Abul Fazal, a minister in Akbar’s a union of castes, tribes and communities.
identification of BC. Every time census is cabinet and a well-known historian, in his The Constitution of India has recognised
taken, this vital data is suppressed render- book Ain i-Akbar, has referred to the census and continued the personal laws of castes,
ing the decennial census useless to the wel- operations in India which were being carried communities or tribes that were in force at
fare of 70 to 80 per cent of the population of out on a scientific basis, extensively and sys- the time the Constitution was adopted. We
BC. This necessitates a review of the practice tematically, during the 16th and 17th centu- also have matriarchal and patriarchal sys-
of excluding caste details in the census. ries. The modern census in India was started tems. Even the communities which believe
The word caste could be used in a con- in 1872. But a scientific and nationwide cen- in equality by birth, unlike the graded caste
crete or in an abstract sense. In the concrete sus has been done beginning 1881. These system, have come to be divided on lines
sense, ‘caste’ means a group of persons or censuses collected full details of the entire comparable to the caste divisions.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 9

EDITORIALS

From 50 Years Ago stations for rural development. By the bilat- development. The experience of the Radio
eral agreement with the National Aeronauti- Farmers’ Forum (RFF) is still fresh in our
cal Space Agency (NASA), the establishment minds: The RFF did play a significant role in
of a powerful satellite over the Indian ocean bringing technical information to the door-
Vol X, No 36 September 6, 1975 in recent years helped bring the Satellite In- step of the farmer, but the changes brought
structional Television Experiments (SITE) about by RFF can hardly be regarded as tre-
Rural Telecast for under operation from the middle of 1975. mendous. The provision of an extended net-
Development: An In 1972-73, villages around Bombay, Am- work of communication is a necessary, but
Impressionistic Model ritsar, and Shrinagar have also had exposure not a sufficient, condition for rural develop-
to the regular transmission of television pro- ment. It will only provide the facility or op-
N P Singh, P M Shingi grammes. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year portunity to establish contact between the
Much has been made of the potential of tel- Plan, the Madras, Lucknow, Calcutta, and scientist and the farmer. But in the last anal-
evision for helping to enrich the life and liv- Jullunder centres were to be on the air with ysis, the impact of the facility will be deter-
ing of the rural people in the developing eight relay transmitters. All India Radio has mined by the manner in which it is used.
countries. Television in India has provided proposed in the Fifth Plan another 11 sta- Rural development, admittedly, is a very
service for seven years to rural communities tions with 48 relay transmitters with the tar- broad concept. It connotes the total devel-
around Delhi. Nearly 80 community sets get of covering 42 per cent of the total ac- opment of man and his rural environment.
have been installed in Delhi villages, and counting for 58 per cent of the total popula- The creation of such a climate of develop-
a few more have been given to the villages tion of 550 million. ment consists principally in the growth of
of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which come It is hoped that these extensive commu- the farming sector and in the overall devel-
under the terrestrial range of the Delhi nication campaign efforts will play an im- opment of people involved in it. It also im-
TV Centre. portant role in accelerating the process of plies a change among people, as a result of
Intensive studies are under way to explore rural development. But the mere provision information. Rural society in India is in a
the technical feasibility of using space com- of a country-wide network of TV communi- transitory phase; and so is the communica-
munication alongside conventional television cation will not necessarily ensure rural tion technology.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 9

EDITORIALS

Israeli Assassinations of Territorial Sovereignty

International law stands unravelled through the murder of Yemen’s Prime Minister.

O
n 28 August, Israeli air strikes targeted and assassinat- same logic, does the astronomical death toll in Gaza—most of
ed Ahmed al-Rahawi, the Prime Minister, along with which comprises civilians—give the Palestinians a similar right
several ministers of the Houthi (Ansar Allah) govern- vis-à-vis the Israeli regime? Or does Israel have greater rights as
ment in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. This follows multiple at- compared to its neighbouring states?
tacks by Israel on Houthi-controlled territories, which Israel Israel’s end goal is the creation of a Greater Israel and the
claims are in response to the Houthis’ repeated attacks on Israel status of the dominant power in West Asia (“West Asia:
as well as on Western vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Regional Wars, Strategies, Tragedies,” EPW, 12 October 2024).
The assassination of Houthi Prime Minister al-Rahawi is a In its core, it is a settler-colonial project whose goals are estab-
part of a larger pattern of Israeli foreign policy, which targets lishing a hegemonic presence through brute militarism. These
the top political and military leadership of a foreign gov- goals create conditions that necessitate a transition into a
ernment in a foreign land. From Iran and Lebanon to Syria, “rogue state” that cannot abide by international law. On 3 Sep-
Palestine, and now Yemen, the assassination of civilian, diplo- tember, the Israeli finance minister announced a plan to annex
matic, and military leadership has become a standard Israeli 82% of the West Bank. This, he noted, was to prevent the crea-
tactic. Three features become apparent. The first is that Israel tion of a Palestinian state and sovereignty. Such announce-
has conducted these assassinations with flagrant impunity and ments, demonstrating an intent to ethnic cleansing, are not
with the tacit support of its allies. Second, these assassinations new and not mere rhetoric. The ongoing ethnic cleansing and
are meant to destabilise the region and prolong the conflict. A mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza is proof enough.
case in point is the assassination of the political leader of What is clear is that Israeli sovereignty and nationhood has
Hamas in July 2024 as he was leading the ceasefire negotia- reached a stage where it is threatened by the sovereignty of its
tions. Another is the failed attempt on the life of the political neighbours. This impels it to actively undermine the sovereign-
adviser of the Supreme Leader of Iran in June 2025, who was ty of neighbouring states and attempt regime change opera-
overseeing the United States (US)–Iran negotiations on the nu- tions across West Asia. That these actions have the blessing of
clear peace agreement. The assassination of al-Rahawi comes the US and other Western nations does not merit further
at a time when the US and Yemen entered a ceasefire mere description or justification.
months ago. The intent to reignite the conflict and draw the US However, these acts shall only deepen the crisis in West Asia
and other actors into the conflict is an obvious subtext of the and foreclose for the immediate future any possibility of peace
28 August attack. Third, and perhaps the most insidious, is the and security in the region. The conflict in West Asia—created
gradual erosion of the principle of national sovereignty by and sustained by the US–Israel axis—threatens to draw in other
Israeli attacks—justified by the US and Israel’s Western allies— actors and transform into a larger conflict. Further, institutions
that seek to normalise illegal Israeli military interventions in that were created to prevent such a possibility—such as the
its ambition to become an unquestioned local hegemon (“Esca- United Nations (UN)—have become mired in inaction and re-
lation and De-escalation in West Asia,” EPW, 20 April 2024). duced to only issuing statements, but after much ado.
Such assassinations by Israel—dubbed by some as “decapita- The situation in West Asia is beyond dire. Israel-manufac-
tion strikes”—are not an Israeli innovation. Rather, they bor- tured famine pushes the genocide in Gaza to unprecedented
row a page from the imperial playbook that has engaged in levels, while Israeli forces have intensified the bombardment of
regime change operations across the globe for the better part Gaza City, now home to half of the entire population in Gaza.
of the last 100 years. The aim is to ethnically cleanse Gaza and annex it. Yemen has
The Houthi attacks on Israel are a response to the ongoing vowed revenge and has intensified counterattacks on Israeli
genocide in Gaza, and have not resulted in any massive loss of positions and vessels. The way forward is through a solidarity
life in Israel. The logic purported by the Israeli regime is that beyond the imperial axis that has frozen all forms of interna-
the assassination of the Houthi Prime Minister and the mem- tional action. Such an incipient solidarity can be seen through
bers of his cabinet is a just response to these attacks. By the the Tianjin declaration by the Council of Heads of State of the
8 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—including India—on have led to “numerous civilian casualties and a humanitarian
1 August. The declaration strongly condemned US–Israel mili- disaster in the Gaza Strip.” Although it may be argued that this
tary aggression against Iran in June 2025 and noted that such unprecedented solidarity is a result of short-sighted coercive
actions “seriously violate the norms of international law and US policy (“A Strategic Setback?” EPW, 16 August 2025), it has
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, infringe on nonetheless led to a situation wherein voices against unilateral
Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, undermine regional and illegal violations of national sovereignty and international
and international security, and have serious consequences for law by the imperial axis have been joined by prominent na-
global peace and stability.” The declaration also calls for a last- tions from the global South. After a long period of uncritical
ing ceasefire in Gaza and strongly condemns the actions that acceptance or strategic silence, it is a step in the right direction.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 9

SEPTEMBER 6, 2025

The Annual Survey of Industries Sends Mixed Signals

Weak proprietorship and partnership firms and spatial concentration remain major constraints.

T
he Annual Survey of Industries results for 2023–24 pro- has remained rather static. The comparable numbers for the last
vide some interesting insights into the recent trends in nine years between 2015–16 and 2023–24 show that the share of
the factory sector. The results show that the growth in factories, workers, wages and output in the corporate segment,
the number of factories, which has averaged at around 1.4% in which is the dominant segment in the factory sector, has re-
the long term, suddenly surged up to 2.7% in 2023–24, the high- mained almost static. Overall, the corporate sector accounted
est in more than half a dozen years. Overall, there were 2.6 lakh for around one-third of the factories, three-fourths of the work-
factories in 2023–24 as compared to 2.3 lakh in the middle of ers, four-fifths of the wages, and close to 90% of the output in
the last decade. the factory sector.
Interestingly, employment was slightly more buoyant. Al- The real cause for worry is the lack of dynamism in the indi-
though the annual growth rate of employed workers has slowed vidual proprietorship and partnership firms, each of which ac-
down after the post-pandemic bounceback, it remains a re- counted for around a quarter of the factories. Their share of
spectable 6.2%, much larger than the annual increase in the la- workers, wages, and output either remained static or even
bour force. Similarly, the growth in the number of persons en- declined. The share of workers in proprietorship firms came
gaged in the sector, which includes clerical and managerial down by almost one-fourth to 7.6% over the period, while wag-
staff, was also a significant 5.9% in 2023–24. While the total es dipped marginally to 5%, and their share of output in the
number of workers in factories has gone up from 1.1 crore in the total factory sector remained stuck at 3%. In the case of part-
middle of the last decade to 1.6 crore in 2023–24, the number of nership firms, their share of workers, wages paid, and output
persons engaged in these factories has moved up from 1.2 crore remained almost static at around 14.3%, 10.6%, and 7.7%, re-
to 2 crore during the same period. spectively. So, while individual proprietorship seems to be
The trends in production measured in terms of total output are slowly losing ground, the partnership firms have been either
also very robust. Whereas the growth of output, which bounced stagnant or in decline.
back sharply after the pandemic, has slipped to 5.8% in 2023–24. An analysis of the geographical distribution of the factories
The long-term trends are encouraging as the average annual sector provides more interesting insights. An important aspect
growth of output in the last four years was around 15%, which is of the structure of the factory sector is its concentration in a few
double the average of the last four years. Consequently, the an- states. The top 5 of the 33 states and union territories accounted
nual output of the factory sector rose from ₹68.6 lakh crore to for more than 50% of the factories, workers, and output in the
₹153.2 lakh crore between 2015–16 and 2023–24. factory sector, both in 2015–16 and 2023–24. The scenario was
What is even more significant is the substantial improvement similar in the case of the top 10 states, with their share of facto-
in the growth of both wages and gross emoluments. Though ries, workers and output hovering close to three-fourths of the
wages paid to workers have slowed down over the last two total in both years.
years, it was still significantly high at 12%, which is 2 percent- The top three states in terms of factories and employed
age points higher than the long-term growth rates. The im- workers were Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, in that
provements in total emoluments were broadly similar. The order. While Tamil Nadu accounted for 15.4% of the factories
growth of both wages and emoluments has shot up by double and 16% of the workers in 2023–24, the share of Gujarat was
digits in the last nine years. So, overall, the factory sector seems 12.8% each, and that of Maharashtra was 10.2% and 11.9%, re-
to be on a winning streak. This is also buttressed by the national spectively. However, when it comes to output, Gujarat topped
income statistics numbers, which show that the manufacturing with a 17.2% share, followed by Maharashtra with 14.5% and
sector grew by a high 9.7% in 2023–24. Tamil Nadu with 10.1%.
But despite the substantial improvement in the performance In summary, while the growth rate in terms of factories,
of the factory sector in recent years, its organisational structure workers, wages, and output has picked up in recent years, the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 7
EDITORIALS

structure of the factory sector remains relatively stagnant. The constraint. The inability to boost the growth of the factory sec-
corporate segment continues to dominate the factory sector, tor in a large majority of the states weighs heavily on the pros-
and the proprietorship and partnership firms, accounting for pects of the industrial sector. Improving productivity and com-
about half the factories, are still stuck at low productivity lev- petitiveness of factories outside the corporate sector, especially
els. Similarly, the excessive concentration of the factory sector in some of the lagging states, can go a long way to boost em-
in a few states, with the top 10 states accounting for three- ployment and output in the industrial sector, accelerating over-
fourths of the factories, workers and output, is yet another major all economic growth.

8 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

INSIGHT

livelihoods, while rainfed agriculture

Odisha Migration Survey 2023 has been adversely affected by the vagar-
ies of climate change (Mishra et al 2016;
Mitra and Pradhan 2016). It is in this
S Irudaya Rajan, Amrita Datta broad context that migration from the
state is understood to have been on the

I
Migration from Odisha is n India, there has been a dominant rise, and in 2014, the Government of
understood to be increasing, and, discourse on low internal migration. Odisha identified 11 of the state’s 30
This had emerged predominantly from districts as migration-prone.1
in 2014, the state government
official statistics—the census and National According to census data, the number
identified 11 of its 30 districts as Sample Survey Office (NSSO) data—that of migrants from Odisha increased
migration-prone. However, little underestimate migration and mobilities, rapidly from 0.84 million in 1991 to 1.1
is known about the magnitude, as they have an underlying bias towards million in 2001 to 1.54 million in 2011
long-term and permanent migration (Census of India 2011). The last NSSO
patterns or processes of Odisha
and tend to miss out on a significant report on migration—of 2007–08—esti-
migration. Based on a primary proportion of short-term and circular mi- mates the migration rate to be 14 per
survey of 15,000 representative gration (Government of India 2017; Sriv- 1,000 households and 302 per 1,000 per-
households, the Odisha Migration astava 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic sons (NSSO 2010). Official statistics such
brought to the forefront the migration as the census and NSSO underestimate
Survey 2023 estimates migration
question, particularly, the sheer scale migration; these datasets—on account of
from the state, examines its key of rural–urban circular migration, not their survey design, and conceptual and
characteristics disaggregated adequately captured by official data definitional limitations—are unable to
by region and social group, (Datta and Rajan 2024). However, in the adequately capture short-term and circular
post-reform period, disaggregated and migration streams, and tell us very little
presents migration corridors and
context-specific empirical studies show about migration for work or employment.
destinations, and studies migrant high levels of mobility and find that Thus, though there is evidence that
remittances and the reasons for migration has increasingly become an migration from Odisha is increasing, it
migration and return. important livelihood strategy among is dated, and little is known about its
rural households (Choithani et al 2021; current magnitude, patterns or processes.
Datta 2023). It is within this context Against this backdrop, this article pre-
of growing mobilities in the post- sents key results of the OMS 2023,
reform period that this article on the which is part of a larger research project,
Odisha Migration Survey (OMS) may the Odisha Migration Study, a multi-
be located. disciplinary empirical research project
The eastern Indian state of Odisha, undertaken in 2023–24 in Odisha.2
with a population of nearly 42 million
persons, is among the poorest states in Objectives and Methodology
the country. Marginalised social groups— The main objective of the OMS was to
the Scheduled Tribes (STs) (22.85%) and determine the overall extent of migration
the Scheduled Castes (SCs) (17.13%)— from Odisha, including detailed break-
comprise nearly 40% of the state’s popu- down of intra-state (within the state),
lation (Census of India 2011). Despite interstate, and international migration
high economic growth for the last three flows. Additionally, the survey delved
decades, Odisha remains a largely agrari- into several aspects of social and economic
an society: 83.3% of Odisha’s population development, including education, work
lives in rural areas, where more than and employment, access to government
half of the workers are employed in agri- programmes, housing and amenities,
culture (Government of Odisha 2023). asset ownership, land use and cropping
Development in the state has been char- patterns, household food consumption
S Irudaya Rajan (rajan@[Link]) is with
the International Institute of Migration and acterised by increasing levels of education, and security, and women’s autonomy
Development, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. a growing workforce, and limited employ- and mobility. In this article, we focus
Amrita Datta (amritadatta@[Link]) is ment opportunities (Padhi and Panda on migration estimates and patterns,
with the Department of Liberal Arts, Indian 2021). Simultaneously, there has been disaggregated by social group and re-
Institute of Technology Hyderabad, Telangana.
a shrinking of forest-based traditional gion, migration destinations, reasons for
36 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
INSIGHT

migration and return, remittance esti- reliability of the findings. To achieve undertook the task, utilising the computer-
mates, and the use of remittances. this, the distribution of sample house- assisted personal interviews (CAPI) tech-
Drawing on the Kerala Migration holds across districts was designed using nique to gather data.
Surveys, the methodology for selecting a proportional allocation strategy. Sample weights—or raising factors—
sample households for the OMS was built Odisha consists of 30 districts, result- were used to enhance the representa-
upon a stratified multistage random sam- ing in the establishment of 57 distinct tiveness of survey estimates. The number
pling approach (Zachariah and Rajan strata, encompassing 30 rural and 27 of households in each district in 2023
2012, 2014; Rajan and Zachariah 2020). urban strata. For the selection of house- was estimated from Census 2001 and
The primary unit of sampling was a holds, localities within each segment, 2011 data. The raising factor based on
household. The choice to establish a known as gram panchayats (for rural households was calculated by dividing
fixed sample size of 15,000 households areas) or municipal wards (for urban this number by the number of house-
was aimed at achieving a reasonably areas), were chosen using a proportional holds sampled from each district. These
accurate estimate of the migrant popu- sampling methodology. Within these raising factors are of utmost importance
lation. Nonetheless, the determination selected localities, systematic random for our estimation process, ensuring the
of this sample size took into account a sampling was implemented to ensure that validity of our findings.
range of factors, including the desired every household within the chosen locali-
confidence level, acceptable margin of ties had an equal chance to be included Estimated Odisha Migrants
error, the resources at hand (both in in the research. Specifically, 30 house- For the estimation of migration, the study
terms of finances and workforce), time holds were selected from each chosen focused on two main migration types:
limitations, and logistical complexities. locality. This process was meticulously current migration and return migration.3
By employing a larger sample size, the carried out across a total of 500 locali- There are three estimates of different
resulting estimates tend to offer a higher ties, spread throughout the 30 districts levels for getting an approximate num-
degree of representativeness for the en- of Odisha (Table 1). During this re- ber of current and return migrants from
tire population, thereby enhancing the search phase, skilled field investigators Odisha, namely state-level estimates,
district-level estimates, and locality-level
Table 1: Sample Households and Sample Localities by District
estimates. These estimates at different
District Total Households Sample Households Sample Localities
levels were calculated by using the ratio
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
Angul 2,97,050 2,49,733 47,317 450 390 60 15 13 2
method of estimation by households
Balangir 4,14,749 3,69,273 45,476 600 540 60 20 18 2 and population.
Baleshwar 5,33,001 4,77,434 55,567 840 750 90 28 25 3 The process of estimation was used
Bargarh 3,70,308 3,36,130 34,178 570 510 60 19 17 2 for calculating the overall number of
Baudh 1,06,961 1,02,402 4,559 240 240 0 8 8 0 current migrants, regardless of whether
Bhadrak 3,06,333 2,70,791 35,542 480 420 60 16 14 2 they had moved within the state, outside
Cuttack 5,79,170 4,29,454 14,9,716 870 630 240 29 21 8 the state but within India, or outside India
Debagarh 75,452 70,058 5,394 240 240 0 8 8 0
altogether. This same approach was
Dhenkanal 279,364 2,53,446 25,918 450 420 30 15 14 1
used for estimating the total number of
Gajapati 1,28,523 1,12,365 16,158 240 210 30 8 7 1
Ganjam 7,58,267 5,96,062 1,62,205 1,050 810 240 35 27 8 return migrants. Estimations at both the
Jagatsinghapur 2,61,307 2,33,626 27,681 420 390 30 14 13 1 household and population levels were
Jajapur 4,07,851 3,78,645 29,206 600 540 60 20 18 2 performed. Since OMS is a household-
Jharsuguda 1,36,061 84,287 51,774 240 150 90 8 5 3 level survey, it provides more accuracy
Kalahandi 4,01,251 3,73,304 27,947 600 570 30 20 19 1 when estimating household-based mi-
Kandhamal 1,72,022 1,55,256 16,766 270 240 30 9 8 1 gration (Table 2).
Kendrapara 3,21,934 3,05,868 16,066 510 480 30 17 16 1
Kendujhar 4,05,272 3,48,448 56,824 600 510 90 20 17 3
Estimation: Current Migrant Households
Khordha 4,94,212 2,47,304 2,46,908 780 390 390 26 13 13
Koraput 3,37,677 2,82,783 54,894 540 450 90 18 15 3
in a district of Odisha = No of Current
Malkangiri 1,37,599 1,26,225 11,374 240 210 30 8 7 1 Migrant Households in a District)/
Mayurbhanj 5,86,253 5,42,726 43,527 870 810 60 29 27 2 Sample Households for OMS 2023 × Total
Nabarangapur 2,73,423 2,53,208 20,215 420 390 30 14 13 1 No of Households in Odisha (estimated
Nayagarh 2,28,315 2,10,850 17,465 360 330 30 12 11 1 for 2023)
Nuapada 1,52,210 1,44,299 7,911 240 240 0 8 8 0 Current Migrants’ Households in Odisha =
Puri 3,67,269 3,13,188 54,081 570 480 90 19 16 3 Sum of current migrant households in
Rayagada 2,26,144 1,91,568 34,576 360 300 60 12 10 2
all the districts
Sambalpur 2,49,597 1,79,411 70,186 360 270 90 12 9 3
A similar method was applied to estimate
Subarnapur 1,51,136 1,39,346 11,790 240 210 30 8 7 1
Sundargarh 4,79,109 3,12,497 1,66,612 750 480 270 25 16 9
the return migrant households.
Odisha 96,37,820 80,89,987 15,47,833 15,000 12,600 2,400 500 420 80 The estimation of current and return
Source: OMS (2023). migrants in Odisha based on population
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 37
INSIGHT
Table 2: District-level Estimates of Current and Return Migration in Odisha, 2023 was done by substituting “sample house-
Districts Estimation Based on Household (HH) Estimation Based on Population holds” with “sample population,” and
Sample HH HH 2023 Estimated Estimated Sample Population Estimated Estimated “total number of households in Odisha”
(Projected) Current Return Population (Projected) Current Return
Migrants Migrants Migrants Migrants with “total population of Odisha.”
Bargarh 570 4,95,638 25,217 0 2,007 16,61,122 24,002 0 The OMS estimates 2.82 million current
Jharsuguda 240 1,85,449 0 0 732 6,75,977 0 0 migrants and 0.74 million return migrants
Sambalpur 360 3,26,468 28,113 1,814 1,335 11,83,496 27,482 1,774 in Odisha. It is observed that approxi-
Debagarh 240 1,05,333 23,700 3,072 632 3,65,785 31,254 4,051
mately 17.5% of households have at least
Sundargarh 750 6,08,972 43,846 7,308 2,881 24,59,003 46,090 7,682
Kendujhar 600 5,28,704 1,10,147 5,287 2,238 21,38,478 1,19,441 5,734 one current migrant, and 4.6% of house-
Mayurbhanj 870 769613 1,28,269 46,000 3,077 29,27,842 1,37,971 49,480 holds include at least one return migrant
Baleshwar 840 7,67,906 2,80,651 38,395 3,260 27,33,432 2,57,412 35,216 (Table 3). Overall, the incidence of mi-
Bhadrak 480 4,23,273 2,53,082 7,936 2,289 17,43,170 2,18,563 6,854 gration is the highest, from the relatively
Kendrapara 510 3,97,757 91,250 58,494 1,911 16,25,930 99,547 63,812
advanced coastal region, compared to the
Jagatsinghpur 420 322106 22,241 1,534 1,492 12,40,077 24,103 1,662
Cuttack 870 7,63,069 3,05,228 1,05,251 3,864 30,10,156 2,71,101 93,483
backward southern and northern regions.
Jajapur 600 5,39,906 2,04,264 2,700 2,718 21,04,325 1,75,747 2,322 At the aggregate level, interstate mi-
Dhenkanal 450 3,75,975 1,83,810 43,446 1,924 13,63,702 1,55,933 36,857 gration, that is, migration outside Odisha,
Angul 450 4,15,252 98,738 4,614 1,883 14,55,295 82,696 3,865 but within India, is the most dominant
Nayagarh 360 3,16,950 1,17,976 7,924 1,361 10,95,572 1,07,867 7,245 migration stream, followed by intra-
Khordha 780 6,99,248 92,337 20,619 3,190 28,00,562 90,426 20,192
state migration, that is, migration with-
Puri 570 5,04,264 79,621 9,731 1,911 19,68,036 92,686 11,328
Ganjam 1,050 9,24,333 3,73,254 64,263 4,048 40,28,217 4,21,928 72,643 in Odisha, and migration outside India
Gajapati 240 1,52,832 8,278 0 982 6,57,509 8,704 0 (Table 4). However, it can be seen that
Kandhamal 270 2,10,543 24,953 6,238 1,046 8,49,807 25,998 6,500 international migration from Odisha is
Baudh 240 1,45,990 12,166 3,041 901 5,38,947 11,963 2,990 very low. Disaggregated by region, a ma-
Subarnapur 240 2,16,233 28,831 12,614 848 7,03,675 26,554 11,617
jority of migration from the coastal and
Balangir 600 6,13,257 1,86,021 1,84,999 2,395 21,20,559 1,61,145 1,60,259
Nuapada 240 1,98,999 61,358 72,137 1,083 7,21,962 49,331 57,997
southern regions is outside Odisha, while
Kalahandi 600 5,27,714 55,410 23,747 2,099 19,24,775 57,771 24,759 migration from the northern region is
Rayagada 360 2,78,181 26,273 2,318 1,527 11,62,113 25,875 2,283 within Odisha (Table 4). However, in the
Nabarangpur 420 3,41,843 11,395 11,395 1,457 15,04,784 14,459 14,459 case of return migrants, the stream,
Koraput 540 4,14,224 27,615 16,109 2,093 16,63,221 28,608 16,688 “Outside Odisha, Within India,” the inter-
Malkangiri 240 1,81,293 20,395 18,885 952 7,75,516 21,995 20,365
state migration stream, is predominant
Odisha 15,000 1,27,51,325 29,24,439 7,79,871 58,136 4,92,03,045 28,16,652 7,42,117
Source: OMS (2023). in all regions (Table 4).

Table 3: Incidence of Migration by Region (% of households)

Top 10 migration districts: According
Region Resident Households Current Migrant Households Return Migrant Households All Households
Coastal/central 74.0 21.7 4.3 100.0
to data from the Government of Odisha,
Southern 80.4 14.5 5.0 100.0 certain districts, namely Balangir, Bar-
Northern 81.2 14.0 4.8 100.0 garh, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Saharanpur,
Total 77.9 17.5 4.6 100.0 Ganjam, Gajapati, Rayagada, Koraput,
Central /Coastal division: Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur, Kendrapara, Jajpur, Balasore, Bhadrak, Puri, Khorda, Nayagarh and Mayurbhanj; Nabarangpur, and Khurda, were identified
Southern division: Ganjam, Gajapati, Koraput, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Malkangiri, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Kandhamal, and Boudh;
Northern division: Sambalpur, Deogarh, Jharsuguda, Bargarh, Bolangir, Sonepur, Sundargarh, Dhenkanal, Angul, and Keonjhar. as migration-prone districts. However,
Source: OMS (2023). the OMS 2023 survey, conducted in the
post-pandemic period, has produced
Table 4: Estimated Current and Return Migrants by Destination Type and Region
Number %
contrasting results, revealing a different
Within Outside Odisha Outside Total Within Outside Odisha Outside Total set of top 10 districts in terms of both es-
Odisha within India India Odisha within India India timates of current and return migrants
Estimated current migrants (Table 2) as well as the percentage of mi-
Coastal 6,09,827 8,37,591 28,005 14,75,423 41.3 56.8 1.9 100.0 grant households (Table 5, p 39). It is
Southern 1,65,859 4,81,472 19,301 6,66,632 24.9 72.2 2.9 100.0
noteworthy that only three districts (Gan-
Northern 3,52,030 3,21,794 773 6,74,597 52.2 47.7 0.1 100.0
Total 11,27,716 16,40,857 48,079 28,16,652 40.0 58.3 1.7 100.0 jam, Nuapada and Balangir) from the
Estimated return migrants government’s list align with the OMS, in
Coastal 98,264 1,88,216 5,114 2,91,594 33.7 64.5 1.8 100.0 terms of the share of households with
Southern 41,645 1,73,060 3,980 2,18,685 19.0 79.1 1.8 100.0 migrants, and it is only two districts
Northern 38,777 1,92,174 885 2,31,837 16.7 82.9 0.4 100.0
(Ganjam and Balangir) when we take
Total 1,78,686 5,53,450 9,980 7,42,117 24.1 74.6 1.3 100.0
Central / Coastal division: Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur, Kendrapara, Jajpur, Balasore, Bhadrak, Puri, Khorda, Nayagarh and
migrant estimates into account.
Mayurbhanj; Southern division: Ganjam, Gajapati, Koraput, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Malkangiri, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Ganjam district is the source of the
Kandhamal, and Boudh districts; Northern division: Sambalpur, Deogarh, Jharsuguda, Bargarh, Bolangir, Sonepur,
Sundargarh, Dhenkanal, Angul, and Keonjhar.
highest number of current migrants,
Source: Estimated from OMS (2023). followed by Cuttack and Baleshwar.
38 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
INSIGHT

However, in terms of the incidence of stream (Table 6). Like other source regions migrants). Other destinations include
household-level migration, Ganjam district in the country, migration from Odisha can Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait,
is only fourth (29.2%)—after Bhadrak be understood to be driven in search of Bahrain, Iraq, Malaysia, South Africa,
(40.6%), Denkanal (34.2%) and Nayagarh employment, better economic opportu- Sri Lanka and the United States.
(32.2%). On the other hand, Nuapada nities, a desire to earn a higher income, With regard to internal migration with-
(29.2%), Balangir (19.3%), and Kendra- and an improved standard of living. in the state, Khorda district is the desti-
para (12.5%) have the highest share of Table 6: Migration Streams by Social Group nation for the highest number of migrants
households with return migrants (Table 5). (% households) within Odisha (32.1%). Given that it is
Social Group Rural– Rural– Urban– Urban– Total
Table 5: Incidence of Migration by District Rural Urban Rural Urban
where the capital city of Bhubaneswar is
(% households) located, it experiences a notable demand
Scheduled Caste 26.0 69.6 0.2 4.2 100.0
District % Current % Return % Migrant
Migrant Migrant Households Scheduled Tribe 26.8 69.3 0.4 3.5 100.0 for labour, particularly in sectors such as
Households Households (Return +Current) Other Backward construction, domestic services, and
Bargarh 5.3 0.0 5.3 Classes 17.4 75.0 0.5 7.0 100.0 transportation. Cuttack district, home to
Jharsuguda 0.0 0.0 0.0 Upper caste 14.0 75.5 0.4 10.0 100.0 the “millennium city” of Cuttack, on ac-
Sambalpur 6.7 0.6 7.2 Total 19.8 73.2 0.4 6.6 100.0
Debagarh 17.9 2.5 20.4
count of its strategic proximity to the
Source: OMS (2023).
Sundargarh 5.9 0.8 6.7 state capital, Bhubaneswar, emerges as
Kendujhar 18.0 1.0 19.0 Disaggregated by region and social the next most popular destination for
Mayurbhanj 13.3 5.2 18.5 group, there is substantial variation in intra-state migrants (10.5%).
Baleshwar 28.2 4.5 32.7
migration streams. For instance, vulner- There exist several important migration
Bhadrak 40.6 1.5 42.1
Kendrapara 20.4 12.5 32.9
able social groups like the SCs and STs are corridors (Table 8), of which a major
Jagatsinghapur 6.4 0.5 6.9 over-represented in the more precarious one is Tamil Nadu—Baleshwar district
Cuttack 26.4 9.1 35.5 rural–rural migration streams, and under- (22.4%). Ganjam district forms a signifi-
Jajapur 29.2 0.5 29.7 represented in the more remunerative cant migration source, accounting for 40%
Dhenkanal 34.2 9.8 44.0
rural–urban and urban–urban migra- of its current migrants going to Gujarat.
Angul 16.9 1.1 18.0
Nayagarh 32.2 1.1 33.3 tion streams. In contrast, the upper Migrants from Bhadrak district mainly
Khordha 10.8 2.6 13.3 castes are less likely to be in the rural– go to Karnataka, constituting approxi-
Puri 13.0 1.8 14.7 rural streams, and most likely to be in mately 32.4% of the total migration from
Ganjam 29.2 4.2 33.4 the rural–urban and urban–urban mi- the district, and the most important desti-
Gajapati 4.2 0.0 4.2
gration streams. In a similar vein, the nation for the migrants from Balangir is
Kandhamal 9.6 1.9 11.5
Baudh 9.6 2.1 11.7 relatively advanced coastal region has a Andhra Pradesh (37.4%).
Subarnapur 13.7 4.6 18.3 higher-than-average share of rural–ur- Table 8: Distribution of Current Migrants by
Balangir 19.0 19.3 38.3 ban and urban–urban migration, while Destination
Nuapada 27.9 29.2 57.1 the northern region dominates in the Destination % Current Estimated
Kalahandi 10.0 4.0 14.0 Migrants Current Migrants
share of the most precarious rural–rural
Rayagada 7.5 0.8 8.3 Within Odisha (district)
Nabarangapur 3.1 3.3 6.4 migration stream (Table 7). Khorda 12.3 3,46,448
Koraput 4.8 3.0 7.8 Table 7: Migration Streams by Region (% households) Cuttack 4.0 1,12,666
Malkangiri 11.2 10.4 21.7 Region Rural– Rural– Urban– Urban– Total Kendujhar 2.5 70,416
Total 17.5 4.6 22.1 Rural Urban Rural Urban Angul 2.4 67,600
Source: OMS (2023). Coastal 12.4 79.6 0.5 7.5 100.0 Others 18.8 5,29,531
Southern 17.0 75.6 0.1 7.3 100.0 Outside Odisha (state)
Age at first migration: The average age
Northern 38.7 56.9 0.7 3.8 100.0 Tamil Nadu 10.8 3,04,198
at first migration for current migrants in
Total 19.8 73.2 0.4 6.6 100.0 Karnataka 9.2 2,59,132
the OMS was 23 years, with females typi- Source: OMS (2023). Gujarat 8.6 2,42,232
cally migrating at a younger age of 20 Andhra Pradesh 8.3 2,33,782
years and males at a slightly older age of Migration Destinations
Maharashtra 4.8 1,35,199
24 years. In contrast, return migrants Within the interstate migration stream West Bengal 3.0 85,824
had a slightly higher average age at first discussed in the previous section, Tamil Telangana 2.7 76,050
migration, at 25 years. This suggests that Nadu emerges as the top destination for Kerala 2.5 70,833
the average age of migration has de- Odisha migrants, followed by Karnataka, Other states 8.4 3,91,515
clined over time. Among return mi- Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Outside India
All destination countries 1.7 47,883
grants, females tend to migrate at an av- West Bengal and Telangana. Other promi-
Total 100.0 28,16,652
erage age of 21 years, while males typi- nent destination states include Delhi Source: OMS (2023).
cally migrate at 25 years of age. (2.7%, among all interstate migrants),
Uttar Pradesh (1.4%), Assam (0.7%) and Reasons for Migration and Return
Migration stream by region and social Punjab (0.6%). For international migrants, Employment emerged as the most impor-
group: The OMS shows that rural-to-urban the United Arab Emirates is the top tant reason for migration from Odisha.
migration is the most common migration destination (40%, of all international The OMS shows that, overall, nearly six in
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 39
INSIGHT

10 migrants from Odisha had migrated that the most important reason for of rural households. The OMS estimates
for employment. However, disaggregated their return was that they missed their the average monthly household remit-
by sex, we can see that this migration is families. COVID-19 was another reason tances to be ₹5,101. The average monthly
gendered; while for men, the most impor- for their return (13.9%). This was also remittance per household was deter-
tant reason to migrate was employment, evident from the year of return, as mined by taking the mean of remittances
for women, it was to accompany family we saw a large number of people re- received across all households. However,
members, and employment emerged as turning in 2020. A considerable portion for this calculation, we considered only
the next most important reason. Addition- of return migrants cited retirement as 95% of the observations and excluded the
ally, migration was undertaken to accu- a reason (10.9%). One in 10 return remaining 5% to eliminate any outliers.5
mulate savings, and migration for educa- migrants reported that the reason for There were significant variations in
tion also emerged as important (Table 9). their return was a preference to work in household remittances by region and
Table 9: Reasons for Migration by Sex Odisha (Table 11). This is driven by a social group. In the relatively advanced
(% current migrants) connection to their place of origin, or coastal region, both the share of house-
Reason for Migration Male Female Total opportunities in the local job market. 4 holds receiving remittances and the
Get employment 64.8 28.7 59.2 Together, this corroborates the circular amount of remittance received were the
Accumulate savings 8.2 6.5 7.9
nature of migration from Odisha as in highest, followed by the southern and
Marriage of siblings/
children 1.1 4.3 1.6
other studies in the state (Mishra 2020) northern regions, respectively (Table 12).
Construction/purchase and region (Datta 2023). Table 12: Households Receiving Remittances by
of house 0.7 0.2 0.7 Region (% migrant households)
Table 11: Reasons for Return Migration
Repay debts 0.5 0.2 0.5 (% return migrants) Region Migrant Households Monthly Average
Receiving Remittances Remittance, Last 12
Education 5.4 19.4 7.5 Reason Male Female Total
(% of households) Months (₹)
To accompany family To retire 10.7 11.3 10.9
Coastal 75.0 5,387
members 19.0 40.6 22.3 Missed family 27.3 25.0 26.6
Southern 64.6 4,782
Others 0.3 0.2 0.3 To care for elderly 4.8 5.3 4.9
Northern 55.5 4,582
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Migration goals accomplished 0.8 1.0 0.9
Total 67.9 5,101
Source: OMS (2023). Prefer to work in Odisha 10.8 9.3 10.4 Source: OMS (2023).
Lost job/laid off 5.1 4.2 4.8
Source of information for current Illness/accident 5.2 6.5 5.6 By social group, the share of households
migration: The source of information Expiry of contract 1.2 0.8 1.1 receiving remittances varied substantially
about current work or job opportunities COVID-19 13.4 15.4 13.9 (Table 13). There was also a clear caste
is mainly through social networks—of Compulsory expatriation 0.4 0.5 0.4 pattern, with the upper castes and OBCs
friends, family and relatives. It is interest- Low wages 9.4 6.8 8.7 having higher-than-average remittances,
ing to note, however, that for men, friends Poor working conditions 2.6 2.2 2.5 whereas the SCs and STs had lower-than-
were the most important source of infor- Social exclusion at destination 2.0 1.1 1.8 average remittances (Table 13).
mation, whereas, for women, it was their To migrate again 0.3 0.4 0.3 Table 13: Households Receiving Remittances by
family members. Migration through adver- Seasonal/short-term migrant 6.1 10.2 7.2 Social Group (% migrant households)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Social Group Migrant Households Monthly Average
tisements, professional networks and Receiving Remittance, Last
Source: OMS (2023).
agencies or intermediaries, such as middl- Remittances 12 Months
(% of Households) (₹)
men and brokers, was limited (Table 10). The data suggest the need for policies
Scheduled Caste 71.8 4,814
Table 10: Source of Information about Current that address the economic vulnerabilities Scheduled Tribe 47.2 3,261
Work (% current migrants) of migrants and provide support during Other Backward 73.7 5,531
Source of Information Male Female Total
crises such as pandemics. Understand- Classes
Family 20.2 62.7 26.6 Upper caste 68.7 5,402
ing the factors behind the desire to work
Friends 57.9 13.9 51.3 Total 67.9 5,101
Relatives 13.4 13.2 13.4
in Odisha could help in creating employ-
Source: OMS (2023).
Middlemen (brokers) 1.2 0.4 1.1 ment opportunities and retaining local
Unregistered agencies 0.3 0.2 0.3 workers, particularly the youth. Further Estimating remittances: To calculate
Registered agencies 2.2 1.9 2.1 research could explore the experiences the total monthly remittance received at
Mass media advertisement 3.8 4.4 3.9 and challenges faced by migrants during the state level, we multiplied the average
Community 0.4 0.9 0.5 short-term migration and the implica- monthly remittance per household by
Professional network 0.1 0.0 0.1 tions for both the migrants and their the total number of households in Odisha
Others (specify) 0.5 2.3 0.8 place of origin. that receive remittances.
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Remittance = Total number of
Source: OMS (2023).
Household Remittances remittances receiving households × Aver-
Reasons for return migration: Family A majority—67.9%—of all migrant house- age remittances received by households
ties are a significant driver of return holds received remittances. As we will per month
migration, as is evident from the high see later, remittances sent by migrant Using the formula, first, remittances at
percentage (26.6%) of migrants citing members are critical for the sustenance the district level were estimated and
40 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
INSIGHT

then aggregated for the entire state. For Bhadrak (Table 14). Districts with higher- In conclusion, remittances serve as a
Odisha, estimated remittances amount than-average households with remit- lifeline for many households in Odisha,
to ₹772.47 crore. However, it is impor- tances include Bhadrak, Baudh, Dhen- addressing both subsistence needs as
tant to note that this figure is likely to be kanal, Jajapur, Khordha, Puri, Cuttack, well as aspirations.
an underestimate. This underestimation Kalahandi, Ganjam, Nayagarh and Bar- Table 15: Use of Remittances (% of households)
can be attributed to the fact that indi- garh. It is interesting to note that in a Use of Remittances % of
Households
viduals often tend to under-report their majority—8 of 11—of these districts, the
Everyday consumption (food/clothing/ 90.7
income and remittances. monthly remittances are higher than the drinks/tobacco)
Before migrating, some migrants also average remittances for the state. This Health and medical expenses 73.2
typically receive an upfront lump sum suggests that districts where the share of Children’s education 40.4
payment. It is important to note that this households receiving remittances is high House construction or renovation 31.8
lump sum payment has not been taken also tend to have higher-than-average Special occasions (for example, 29.1
weddings/funerals)
into the calculation of remittances. A to- monthly remittances.
Savings and fixed deposits in banks 15.3
tal of 4.8% of households with migrants What about the size of remittances?
SHG debt repayment 13.1
reported receiving lump sum payments, Ganjam receives the maximum amount Religious activities, including pilgrimage 12.6
which ranged from ₹3,600 to ₹2,00,000. of remittances, nearly ₹120 crore, followed Agricultural production (purchase of 12.1
The total lump sum received by the sample by Bhadrak (₹104 crore) and Cuttack seeds/irrigation/water/labour costs)
households before their migration, as re- (₹85.6 crore). Districts falling within the Debt repayment 11.6
ported in the OMS, amounts to ₹0.58 crore. range of ₹60 crore–₹70 crore in remit- Purchase household/electronic goods 9.9
(for example, furniture, home utensils,
By district, too, there were significant tances include Jajapur, Baleshwar, and computer, TV, fridge, washing machine)
variations in the percentage of house- Dhenkanal. Notably, the remaining dis- Donation to temple/mosque/church/ 9.2
holds receiving remittances—ranging tricts receive remittances below the thresh- other religious/charitable organisations
from 9% in Sudgargarh to nearly 90% in old of ₹46 crore, significantly lower than Purchase of jewellery/gold 3.3
the top recipient districts in Purchase of agricultural equipment 2.5
Table 14: Households Receiving Remittances (%) and
Other 9.1
Remittance Estimates by Districts, 2023 the state; thus, there are stark This question captures multiple responses from the same
District % HH Receiving HH Receiving Monthly Average Estimated disparities in remittance in- household.
Remittances Remittance Remittance, Last Remittances
Source: OMS (2023).
(from sample) (projected) 12 Months (₹) per Month flows across Odisha’s districts.
(Crore) Table 16: Remittance by Place of Residence
(% of households*)
Bargarh 70.0 18,260 2,874 5.25 Use of remittances: More than Place of Percentage of Percentage Remittance Monthly
Sambalpur 33.3 7,255 2,311 1.68
9 in 10 households reported Residence HH Receiving of Total in Crores Average
Debagarh 32.6 6,144 3,362 2.07 Remittances Remittance Remittance,
using remittances for everyday Last 12
Sundargarh 9.1 3,248 1,208 0.39
Kendujhar 52.8 50,227 6,293 31.61
consumption, and nearly three- Months* (₹)

quarters used remittances for Rural 69.1 94.5 733.07 5,126

Mayurbhanj 63.8 65,461 3,019 19.76
Urban 52.6 5.5 39.40 4,627
Baleshwar 67.5 1,46,268 4,460 65.24 health and medical expenses
Total 67.9 100.0 772.47 5,101
Bhadrak 89.2 1,53,436 6,779 104.01 (Table 15). Remittances also * Only for remittance-receiving households.
Kendrapara 51.0 41,336 5,319 21.99 appear significant in funding Source: OMS (2023).
Jagatsinghpur 63.0 13,038 1,755 2.29 children’s education, house con- Remittances are a crucial source of
Cuttack 77.0 1,55,245 5,513 85.58 struction and renovation, agri- financial support for source families.
Jajapur 83.4 1,31,377 5,362 70.44 cultural production, religious The share of migrant households receiv-
Dhenkanal 85.7 1,10,286 5,948 65.60
and special occasions such as ing remittances and the monthly aver-
Angul 42.1 29,529 4,258 12.57
weddings, funerals and pilgri- age remittances are both higher for
Nayagarh 73.3 74,835 6,181 46.26
mages, and paying off debt. poorer rural households compared to
Khordha 83.3 62,753 6,580 41.29
Puri 79.7 52,196 5,316 27.75
Thus, the receipt of remittances urban households. That the reliance on
Ganjam 74.6 2,01,593 5,876 118.45 is critical for the sustenance of remittances is higher in the rural areas
Gajapati 20.0 1,274 2,792 0.36 living standards and life pros- of the state shows the criticality of mi-
Kandhamal 50.0 10,137 2,497 2.53 pects of recipient households in gration and remittances, particularly in
Baudh 87.0 12,166 3,349 4.07 Odisha (Table 16). It provides poorer regions of Odisha.
Subarnapur 57.6 17,118 3,044 5.21 them with the means to meet
Balangir 50.9 59,282 2,205 13.07 their immediate needs, access Advance payments: Apart from remit-
Nuapada 53.7 29,850 2,721 8.12 healthcare and education, and tances, the practice of advance or lump
Kalahandi 75.0 39,579 3,275 12.96
improve their housing condi- sum payments to migrant workers or
Rayagada 25.9 5,409 983 0.53
tions. Additionally, remittances their families is prevalent in some regions
Nabarangpur 53.8 5,697 1,690 0.96
Koraput 34.6 6,904 3,398 2.35
can alleviate financial burdens of Odisha. Advance payments are typi-
Malkangiri 22.2 4,532 1,150 0.52 by helping families pay off cally associated with middlemen and
Total 67.9 15,14,435 5,101 772.47 debts, ultimately contributing labour contractors, and in turn, more pre-
Source: OMS (2023). to their economic well-being. carious migration streams and vulnerable
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 41
INSIGHT

occupations. More than three-quarters The OMS estimates that there are 2.82 for the state as a whole, the OMS esti-
of all advances were concentrated in million current migrants and 0.74 million mates the total remittance amount to be
five districts—Balangir (41.7%), Nuapada return migrants from Odisha, with out- ₹772.47 crore. Ganjam district received
(15.4%), Bargarh (7.3%), Subarnapur migration to other states in India being the maximum amount of remittances.
(6.7%), and Dhenkanal (5.4%). the dominant stream of migration. In However, there existed significant dis-
At the aggregate level, 4.8% of migrant contrast to the data of the Government of parities in remittance inflows across dis-
households reported receiving advances. Odisha regarding migration-prone dis- tricts as the majority of the districts (21)
As expected, by social group, this was tricts from the state, the OMS 2023 finds received remittances below ₹30 crore.
higher for SC (8.1%) and ST households a new set of top districts with the highest By social group, upper castes and OBCs
(7.3%) compared to OBC (4.2%) and upper migration rates, with only 3 out of 11 had higher than average remittances,
caste households (1.5%). Similarly, the districts (Ganjam, Nuapada and Balangir) whereas the SC and ST households re-
northern (12.9%) and southern regions being the same in both lists. Migration ceived lower than average remittances.
(4.8%) had the highest incidence of ad- patterns varied substantially by region By region, the more advanced coastal
vance payments compared to the more and social group; the relatively better-off region received higher average remit-
advanced coastal region (1.2%). rural–urban and urban–urban migration tances. In the context of the decline of
streams were predominant from the agriculture and limited non-farm employ-
Conclusions coastal region, compared to the northern ment opportunities, remittances serve
Based on the OMS, this article has laid out and southern regions. In terms of social as a lifeline for many households in Odi-
Odisha’s migration story. The OMS finds groups, the precarious rural–rural migra- sha, addressing both subsistence needs
that migration is widespread in Odisha; tion stream was dominated by SC and ST as well as aspirations.
more than one in five households have households, compared to OBC and upper Up-to-date migration data, such as
current or return migrants, and interstate, caste groups. On the whole, poor and that of the OMS, can be useful for policy.
remittance-based rural–urban migration marginalised households with scarce For instance, using the data on migration
emerges as the dominant stream of mi- resources used circular migration as a corridors, specific policy interventions
gration from Odisha. At the same time, livelihood strategy for their survival. can be undertaken in both source and
marginalised social groups like the SCs More than two-thirds of migrant house- destination regions. In this study, Ganjam-
and STs are overrepresented in precari- holds received remittances. The average Gujarat, Baleshwar-Tamil Nadu, Bhadrak-
ous and distress migration streams. monthly remittances were ₹5,100.7, and Karnataka and Balangir-Andhra Pradesh/

42 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

INSIGHT

Telangana emerge as the most impor- In Odisha, this is particularly relevant in attitudes towards agriculture (see Datta and
Rajan 2025 for details).
tant migration corridors. In the past, the the case of Dadan labour and family- 3 Current migrants were household members
Governments of Odisha and Andhra based migration systems. The OMS data who were away on migration at the time of the
Pradesh have signed a memorandum of shows that some streams of migration survey, while return migrants were household
members who had migrated in the past.
understanding (MoU) specifically targeted from the southern and northern regions, 4 Studies undertaken in Phase 2 of the OMS
towards the vulnerable brick kiln migrant such as rural–rural migration and advance- show that long-distance migration is not pre-
ferred in precarious and distress migration
workers. Apart from devising methods to based migration, are quite vulnerable and streams (see Datta and Rajan 2025 for details).
improve migrant registration, such col- precarious. In contrast, migration from 5 Specifically, we included observations falling with-
in the range of ₹458 to ₹14,167 in the calculation.
laborations have also aimed to enhance the advanced coastal region is to urban
the convergence of government schemes areas and is remittance-based.
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Census of India (2011): Census of India, Office of the
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Choithani, C, R J Duijne and J Nijman (2021):
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India: The Bihar Experience, Routledge.
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keep the database of all inter- and intra- India’s social security architecture, particu- and Development in India,” Indian Journal of
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tion Study, Springer.
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as Bihar and Jharkhand, migration from been outside the ambit of social security 2016–2017, Ministry of Finance Department of
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Government of Odisha (2023): Economic Survey
also suggests that over time, the average migrant and informal workers. Correct- 2022–23, Planning and Convergence Depart-
age of migrants has declined. This, in ing this anomaly in our development ment, Directorate of Economics and Statistics,
Bhubaneswar.
turn, has implications for the education process will contribute towards reducing Mishra, D, N C Sahu and D Sahoo (2016): “Impact
and skilling of young persons and inequalities, migrant well-being, and of Climate Change on Agricultural Production of
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prospective migrants. In high migration economic justice. al Environmental Change, Vol 16, pp 575–84.
pockets, skill programmes and aware- Last, while migrant rights and dignity Mishra, D K (2020): “Seasonal Migration and Unfree
Labour in Globalising India: Insights from Field
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migration targeting the youth population be able to exercise their choice to migrate Economics, Vol 63, No 4, pp 1087–1106.
Mitra, A and Basanta K Pradhan (2016): “Migration,
through migration facilitation centres can to their preferred destination, policy Remittances, and Changing Patterns of Liveli-
be established. The government can set attention is also needed in the source hood: Evidence from Western Odisha Villages,”
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up migration information centres at the regions. In particular, employment and
Padhi, B and S Panda (2021): “Employment and
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nomic & Political Weekly, Vol 55, No 4, pp 41–49.
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means that family members live and work Market Inequality in India: Migration, Infor-
in different locations, for long periods of Notes mality, Segmentation and Social Discrimination,”
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time. This has profound implications for 1 The 11 districts include Balangir, Bargarh, No 2, pp 147–71.
Kalahandi, Nuapada, Saharanpur, Ganjam, Zachariah, K C, E T Mathew and S I Rajan (2003):
family members—children, women, the Gajapati, Rayagada, Koraput, Nabarangpur Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Determinants,
elderly, and migrants. Policies need to and Khurda. A majority of these districts are Differentials and Consequences, Orient Longman.
located in the deprived, tribal-dominated region
acknowledge and address the social and of southern Odisha. Zachariah, K C and S I Rajan (2009): Migration and
Development: The Kerala Experience, Delhi:
psychological impacts of male migration 2 Undertaken by the Indian Institute of Technology,
Daanish Publishers.
Hyderabad, the Odisha Migration Study was
in both source and destination regions. funded by the CGIAR Gender Platform. It was — (2012): A Decade of Kerala’s Gulf Connection,
Fourth, accurate and reliable data helps conducted in two phases with technical support Delhi: Orient Blackswan.
from the International Institute of Migration — (2014): Researching International Migration:
us identify and locate vulnerable migra- and Development, Kerala. Phase 1 comprised a Lessons from the Kerala Experience, Delhi:
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other studies—conducted in Phase 2—exam- — (2015): “Dynamics of Emigration and Remit-
more necessary for the state to be proac- ine the role of agriculture, non-agriculture tances in Kerala: Results from the Kerala Migra-
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 43

ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

The Law of the Bulldozer the case: (i) What is the process that state
authorities must follow before demo-
lishing a property? (ii) Can state action
be discriminatory, even if said process
Anindita Mukherjee is followed? To the first, the Supreme
Court made a feeble attempt to address,

I
The response of the Supreme n November 2024, the Supreme Court and the second, as I discuss later, it
Court towards state action delivered a 95-page-long judgment, avoided entirely.
In Re: Directions in the Matter of Central to the Supreme Court’s app-
demolishing properties associated
Demolition of Structures (2024) (hereafter roach in this matter, and implicit in some
with persons accused of In Re: Directions), answering a question of the arguments advanced by both sides,
committing certain crimes it had framed for itself: is an uncontested notion of “illegality”:
indicates an ignorance of the [W]hether the properties of the persons,
that the state has the right, even an obli-
who are accused of committing certain gation, to “remove” illegally constructed
manner in which illegality is
crimes or for that matter even convicted for properties. The question, therefore, is
structurally produced in relation commission of criminal offences, can be reduced to how the state should act, not
demolished without following the due pro-
to land in India. The Supreme whether it should act in the first place.
cess of law or not?1
Court judgment has depoliticised This completely effaces the state’s role
To sum up the 95 pages, the Court held in the production of illegality, both
the issue by not engaging with the
that due process must be followed, through the law and despite it.
arguments on discrimination. except when it need not be followed. It is important, therefore, to fore-
In April 2025, soon after the terror ground the fact that in Indian cities and
attack in Pahalgam in which 26 civilians in forests, illegality is both pervasive and
were killed by armed militants, state contested. The word “illegal,” in this con-
agencies demolished over 10 houses of text, hides multiple truths within it, very
terror suspects in Kashmir (Sengar 2025). few of which point to individual moral
Between April and May 2025, bulldozers failing. For instance, three-fourths of
razed upwards of 12,000 structures New Delhi’s population live in unplan-
around Ahmedabad’s Chandola Lake, ned colonies (Bhan 2009), one-third in
with the state arguing that the locality “sub-standard” housing, and—by the gov-
was situated on a lake-bed and har- ernment’s own reckoning—the city has
boured “Bangladeshi aliens and other a deficit of 24 lakh housing units, con-
anti-national elements” (Raja 2025). The centrated among the urban poor (Plan-
last week of July saw the eviction of over ning Department, National Capital Ter-
10,000 people, predominantly Muslim, ritory of Delhi 2024: 279). Housing
without rehabilitation, from reserved informality, given these facts, is not a
forestland in Assam (Zaman 2025). The choice as much as a necessity. The law
bulldozer trundles on. does not have to map illegality (and, by
association, illegitimacy) onto informal-
Asking a Question, ity. Doing so is a choice.2 Countries like
Addressing Another Brazil have chosen, within limits, to
It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court recognise squatters’ rights instead, ack-
responding to the question it framed in nowledging the structural reasons for
the affirmative. No court in a country the existence of informality.3
based on the rule of law could possibly A particular set of laws that construct
suggest that state agencies are free to illegality, both in urban and rural spaces,
demolish properties without following have to do with environmental protec-
the due process of law. The fact that this tion, that is, the protection of lake beds,
question has arisen within our legal sys- river banks, forests, and the prevention
tem and has required a serious response of pollution. This seemingly benign desire
is, in itself, an indictment of the state of has rendered forest-dwellers encroach-
Anindita Mukherjee (anindita@[Link]) legality in India. That said, in framing ers on their own lands for upwards of
teaches at NALSAR University of Law, the conflict in these terms, the Court a century, despite a legislation that rec-
Hyderabad.
veiled the real points of contention in ognises their rights (Chakma 2018). In
10 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

the city, it has justified the displacement in the Court’s imagination—transform a Apart from its glib endorsement of
of lakhs of residents, often on the orders demolition from an act of brute force to inequity, the mischief of the exception
of courts (Bhuwania 2017; Bhan 2016), legitimate state action. also lies in its breadth and vagueness. In
without the state ever being held to effect, it renders the Court’s directions
account for permitting, tacitly or expres- An Exception That Defeats immaterial in most cases, since it gives
sly, entire neighbourhoods to exist for dec- the Norm the state the freedom to demolish with-
ades before being razed to the ground. Nowhere is the Court’s profound igno- out notice, as long as it can claim that
A question worth asking, therefore, rance of the reality of housing struggles the illegality fell within the exception.
is whether a working-class family in in India more apparent than in the It could take a court years to determine
the city has, in fact, the option of living exception it creates to its directions:4 whether that claim was valid, by which
in formal, legal housing. If the answer At the outset, we clarify that these directions time the damage would have been
to that question is “no”—and in most will not be applicable if there is an unauthor- long done.
ised structure in any public place such as
Indian cities, that is the answer—the
road, street, footpath, abutting railway line
conversation about “illegality,” “enc- or any river body or water bodies and also to
The Remedy That Is Not
roachment,” and “squatting” must shift cases where there is an order for demolition While the focus of the Court’s directions
to the systemic failures that cause this made by a Court of law. is on setting out the “due process of law”
state of affairs. The failures that successive The first question to be asked, of that must be followed preceding a demo-
governments are squarely responsible course, is why, in the Court’s under- lition, the pressing question before it was
for are not the country’s most impover- standing of constitutional safeguards, a about the abuse of power by state officials.
ished residents. pavement dweller, say, is not entitled to After all, the judgment was not address-
The Court does not go down this road, procedural justice. Legally speaking, ing “routine” demolitions but the use of the
except to the extent that the procedure it such an exception is suspect, given the bulldozer as punishment. At first glance,
lays out requires the state to explain why long series of Supreme Court decisions it appears as though the Court takes this
demolition is the only available option. mandating a notice requirement for any question seriously, as most of the judg-
The operative part of the judgment is forced eviction that began, ironically, with ment is devoted to an analysis of the rule
essentially a series of directions to state a case involving residents of Mumbai of law, the separation of powers, princi-
authorities on the procedure that would— living on footpaths.5 ples of natural justice, the presumption

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 11

ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

of innocence, and how arbitrary state An Exercise in Depoliticisation The judgment begins by recounting its
action like the demolitions in question and Erasure interim orders from September 2024,
militates against these ideals. In 2022, the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind filed erasing entirely the Court’s role in per-
However, as the adage goes, what the writ petition that would lead to this mitting, unchecked, the march of the
counts is not what judges say, but what judgment, asking the Court to intervene bulldozer between 2022 and 2024. It
they do with what they say. The Court in the context of an alarming rise in the proceeds to aggregate suggestions from
chooses to address the issue of abuse of use of demolitions as a tool of intimida- the petitioners and the solicitor general
power entirely in abstraction, at the tion and punishment. The targets of the on what the procedure for demolition
level of principle. It does not move from bulldozer were predominantly Muslim, should be, discusses the unconstitution-
principle to the facts before it. As a con- and several state functionaries—police ality of demolition as punishment and
sequence, the procedure it lays out for officers, ministers, and municipal offi- then lays out its own procedure in its
demolitions is detailed and granular— cials—had gone on record to say that operative directions.
demanding the creation of online portals, demolitions were undertaken to instil In doing so, the Court indicates that
video recording of demolitions, email fear or teach alleged rioters a lesson even as it is aware of the statements
records of notice being served to prevent (TNN 2022). The Supreme Court refused being made by state officials outside the
back-dating, etc—while on the conse- to intervene, wondering aloud during courtroom which demonstrate that the
quence of state failure to abide by this hearings if it had the power to issue demolitions have nothing to do with
procedure, it says that the “violation of omnibus orders against demolitions the illegality of structures and every-
any of the directions would lead to initi- nationwide (Kakkar 2022). In 2023, state thing to do with the individuals or com-
ation of contempt proceedings in addi- authorities demolished over 1,200 struc- munities to whom the state wants to
tion to the prosecution” and should the tures in Haryana’s Nuh district in send a message, it is choosing to accept
demolition be found to be in violation of response to riots in Gurugram and Nuh. the state’s argument within the court-
the directions, personal liability would The demolition halted with the Punjab room on the issue merely being one of
attach to the officers concerned.6 Other and Haryana High Court taking suo motu municipal governance and illegality. A
remedies were suggested by counsel, as cognisance of the matter, noting in their choice that renders the entire exercise
discussed in the next segment, but were interim order that they feel constrained one in futility.
not adopted by the Court. to ask “whether the buildings belonging If we recognise that illegality is perva-
Therefore, the only remedy available to a particular community are being sive in Indian cities and forests—and per-
to an aggrieved party is to file a brought down under the guise of law vasive by design—then the procedure
contempt petition before a high court or and order problem and an exercise of the Court has laid down does very little
the Supreme Court, which is as inacces- ethnic cleansing is being conducted by to protect communities being targeted by
sible as it gets. Nevertheless, in the the State,”7 after which the bench hear- the state. The question the Court needed
months that have passed since these ing the matter was promptly changed to answer is this: If 100 households in a
directions were issued, several contempt (Hindustan Times 2023). The Supreme neighbourhood are “illegal” or “unau-
petitions have been filed in response to Court remained silent. thorised,” but notice is served to only 30
demolitions across India. In certain After maintaining a studied silence of the households whose owners belong
cases, petitioners received stay orders for nearly two years, the Court issued to one community or class—all of the
(often after some level of demolition the very same omnibus stay on demoli- Supreme Court’s guidelines are followed
had already happened) and in several tions that it had earlier refused to issue, to the tee—is the state’s action legal?
others, the Supreme Court has directed with, of course, the exception dis- The procedural safeguards recom-
petitioners to go to the high court cussed. Two months later, the judg- mended to the Court by the petitioners
(Bhalla 2025). In just one order, so far, ment, In Re: Directions, was delivered, and other interested parties who had
has the Supreme Court actually taken strangely shorn of the names of the impleaded themselves in the case do, in
action against the state for violating its petitioners. Neither the word “Muslim” fact, grapple with this issue. One sugges-
directions, ordering Uttar Pradesh to nor “minority” is to be found anywhere tion, for example, inserts an additional
pay the petitioners ₹10 lakh each in within its 95 pages. step into the procedure:8
damages (Shrivastava 2025).
While the Court used its power to do
“complete justice” under Article 142 of
the Constitution to issue its directions, its available at
inability to create meaningful remedies
points to both the institutional limits of Skandaa Distributors
the courtroom as a space to address deeply 30-265/25/19, Flat No. S-1, Sai Enclave, Geetha Nagar,
political issues, and the choice the Court Near Sai Vidya Vihar, RK Puram Post, Malkajgiri,
made in centring procedure at the cost
Hyderabad 500 056, Telangana
9908074973
of the substantive question at hand.
12 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

If an officer believes a dwelling unit, house, particularly in the wake of the Pahalgam why-does-bulldozer-justice-continue-in-spite-of-
or shop is subject to demolition, they must incident. The actions being taken for main- the-supreme-court-ruling-it-illegal-in-november.
first conduct a neighbourhood survey to taining the safety and security of the peo- Bhan, Gautam (2009): “‘This Is No Longer the City
ple at large of the State as also protecting I Once Knew’: Evictions, the Urban Poor and
determine how many properties in the area the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi,”
are also liable for demolition based on National Security, cannot be hounded by the
Environment & Urbanization, Vol 21, No 1,
municipal law. principles of natural justice.11 (emphasis pp 127–42.
added) — (2016): In the Public’s Interest: Evictions, Citi-
Another speaks in terms of appeals The Gujarat High Court, having been zenship, and Inequality in Contemporary Delhi,
Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan.
against the decision to demolish, thus:9 given this evidence of the motivations Bhuwania, Anuj (2017): Courting the People: Public
In any proceedings where demolition is chal-
of the state in writing, instead notes Interest Litigation in Post-Emergency India, New
that the land abuts a lake, which is a Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
lenged on the ground of the same being puni-
Chakma, Shyamal Bikash (2018): “Conservation
tive, the fact that the aggrieved person has waterbody and thus falls within the Refugees: A Methodology of Tribal Marginali-
been singled out for action and no action has exception carved out by the Supreme zation,” The Problematics of Tribal Integration:
been taken against similarly situated per- Voices from India’s Alternative Centres, Bodhi S R
Court. “Therefore, the arguments can-
sons in the vicinity must be a valid consider- and Bipin Jojo (eds), Hyderabad: The Shared
ation for grant of relief.
vassed of breach of principles of natural Mirror, pp 162–75.
justice by non-issuance of notice prior Hindustan Times (2023): “Nuh Demolitions: New
High Court Bench to Hear the Matter,” 11 August,
Another recommends judicial over- demolition does not merit acceptance
[Link]
sight:10 and thus rejected.”12 And so, a Supreme news/nuh-demolitions-new-high-court-bench-
Court judgment that purports to articu- [Link].
Judicial Examination of Demolition Orders:
In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of
Courts must assess whether the proposed late the contours of due process finds Structures (2024): SCC OnLine, SC, p 3291.
demolition is motivated by malice or itself being used to deny the bare-mini- Kakkar, Shruti (2022): “Can Omnibus Orders Be
bad faith. Passed against Demolitions? Supreme Court
mum requirement of notice today.
Asks in Jamiat Pleas Challenging ‘Bulldozer’
Presumption of Malice in Law: To quote Upendra Baxi out of context, Actions,” Live Law, 13 July, [Link]
In Re: Directions is a prime example of a [Link]/top-stories/supreme-court-asks-in-jamiat-
(a) If the demolition is triggered by the own- pleas-challenging-bulldozer-actions-demoli-
little done, the vast undone. Until our
er’s or a family member’s involvement in a tions-203646.
criminal case, it will be presumed punitive judges find the gumption to ask govern- Mukherjee, Anindita (2019): The Legal Right to
and illegal, making the action malicious. ments hard structural questions and look Housing in India, New Delhi: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
(b) If the authority acts with undue haste the politics of their decisions in the eye,
Patel, Suchak (2025): “How Lack of Recognised Land
after the owner or family member becomes the Court will not stop the bulldozer. It Rights Fuelled Forced Evictions in Chandola
involved in a criminal case, malafide intent will, at best, construct a piddling speed- Lake,” Land Conflict Watch, August, https://
will be presumed. [Link]/conflicts/how-lack-
breaker in its path. of-recognised-land-rights-fuelled-forced-evic-
(c) If the authority selectively targets a prop-
tions-in-chandola-lake#.
erty while ignoring neighbouring properties
Planning Department, National Capital Territory of
with similar violations, this “pick and choose” Notes Delhi (2024): Economic Survey of Delhi 2023–24,
action will also be presumed malicious. 1 Paragraph 12. New Delhi: Government Press.
2 On the manner in which the “illegal” resident Raja, Aditi (2025): “Why Gujarat HC Rejected Pleas
The Court did, therefore, have the is constructed through a complex web of law, Against Demolition of Suspected Bangladeshi
see Mukherjee (2019: 71–100). Immigrants’ Homes in Ahmedabad,” Indian
option to engage with the issue of 3 Articles 5 and 183, the Federal Constitution of Express, 9 May, [Link]
discrimination that prompted the peti- Brazil (1988). cle/explained/explained-law/gujarat-hc-demoli-
4 In Re: Directions, para 91. tion-bangladesh-chandola-ahmedabad-9983892/.
tion in the first place, even within the
5 Olga Tellis and Ors v Bombay Municipal Corpo- Sengar, Mukesh Singh (2025): “10 Terrorists’ Homes
procedural route. Not doing so was an ration (1985): SCC, SC, 3, p 545. in Kashmir Razed Amid Crackdown after
active choice. Its consequences are 6 In Re: Directions, para 93–94. Pahalgam Attack,” NDTV, 27 April, [Link]
7 Court on its own Motion v State of Haryana [Link]/india-news/10-terrorists-homes-in-
already apparent. kashmir-razed-amid-crackdown-after-pahal-
CWP-PIL 68/2023; High Court of Punjab and
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Haryana order dated 7 August 2023. gam-attack-8267126.
demolished over 12,000 structures in 8 Suggested by M R Shamshad. Shrivastava, Amisha (2025): “ ‘Shocks Our Conscience’:
9 Suggested by Mohd Nizammudin Pasha and Supreme Court Asks UP Authority to Pay Rs 60
neighbourhoods surrounding Chandola Rashmi Singh. Lakh Compensation for Illegal Demolition of
Lake, between April and May 2025. 10 Suggested by C U Singh and Fauzia Shakil. Houses,” Live Law, 1 April, [Link]
in/top-stories/supreme-court-asks-up-author-
Persons affected by the demolitions 11 Fuljaha Noormohammed Shaikh and Ors v State
of Gujarat and Ors C/SCA/6119/2025; High ity-to-pay-rs-60-lakh-compensation-for-illegal-
went to the Gujarat High Court seeking Court of Gujarat order dated 29 April 2025, demolition-of-houses-288098.
a stay, arguing that they had lived in para 5.3. TNN (2022): “Continue with Bulldozer Action, Says
12 Fuljaha Noormohammed Shaikh and Ors v State Uttar Pradesh CM Yogi Adityanath,” Times of
that locality for over half a century, and
of Gujarat and Ors C/SCA/6119/2025; High India, 12 June, [Link]
were being evicted without being given Court of Gujarat order dated 29 April 2025, com/city/lucknow/continue-with-bulldozer-
notice or a hearing (Patel 2025). The para 8. action-says-uttar-pradesh-cm-yogi-adityanath/
articleshow/[Link].
state argued that the area had been Zaman, Rokibuz (2025): “Behind Wave of Assam
“illegally encroached upon by illegal References Evictions, a Hungry River, and a Land Policy
immigrants” and it was incumbent upon Bhalla, Vineet (2025): “Why Does ‘Bulldozer Loaded against Miya Muslims,” [Link], 7 August,
Justice’ Continue in Spite of the Supreme Court [Link]
them to clear the area in the interest of Ruling It Illegal in November?” [Link], of-assam-evictions-a-hungry-river-and-a-land-
public order, 26 March, [Link] policy-loaded-against-miya-muslims.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 13

COMMENTARY

balance between efficiency and effective-

Pumping the Brakes ness. Only then can the world, and India,
manage to successfully decarbonise the
Why Electric Vehicles Are Not transportation sector.

the Answer Yet Electric Vehicles:

Narrow Adoption, Narrower Focus
Abating transport emissions has been
Akash P Poojari, Gopakumar K U deemed vital to fulfilling the goals of the
Paris Agreement since the sector is respon-
Addressing emissions from Efficiency is doing things right. Effective- sible for nearly a quarter of the global
ness is doing the right things. carbon emissions on average. Further, of
transport, particularly road —Peter Drucker
the total transport sector emissions,
transport, which accounts

T
wo years ago, the Intergovern- nearly 75% originate from road trans-
for two-thirds of the sector’s mental Panel on Climate Change portation (Ritchie and Roser 2024a). To
emissions, is of crucial (IPCC 2022) stated that global car- decarbonise road transport, governments
importance. Yet, myopic policies bon emissions would have to peak by began offering financial and non-finan-
2025 and have to be brought down 43% cial incentives for electric vehicles to
like electric vehicle adoption
from that level by 2030. This requires manufacturers and consumers alike.
face several challenges that substituting fossil fuels for alternatives These include clean vehicle tax credits,
exacerbate environmental such as hydrogen, improved energy effi- direct subsidy on purchase price, exemp-
degradation and mineral ciencies, and widespread electrification tion from road taxes, state-level subsi-
across multiple carbon-intensive sectors. dies, expansion of charging infrastruc-
dependency, adding to energy
As the call for action against climate ture, and regulated price for electric
security concerns. Developing change has gotten much more intense, vehicle charging, among others.
nations require sustainable and reinforcing a sense of urgency among Despite this, electric vehicle adoption
environmentally friendly policy policymakers, climate change policies remains sluggish as they make up only 3%
today embody a ruthless pursuit of effi- of the cars on the road globally (Ritchie
approaches that prioritise
ciency. Actions taken seek to maximise and Roser 2024b), and less than 1% of
long-term effectiveness over all available resources and efforts, prior- the Indian automobile fleet, with owner-
short-term efficiency. itising progress to meet the set goal, that ship mostly concentrated in tier-1 cities.
is, abating climate change. The glut in demand for new electric
However, the efficiency mindset in- vehicles is already causing major manu-
duces myopia and an excessive orienta- facturers to either abandon their plans
tion towards the ends while ignoring the to go all-electric by 2030 (Financial
means. In doing so, it deters policy de- Times 2024a) or consider factory closures
signers from reflecting on an important to cut costs (Bloomberg 2024a). First,
consideration—that effectiveness matters high prices of electric vehicles relative to
and is crucial to the employment of ap- traditional vehicles are a significant bar-
propriate means. One such area where rier, especially in developing countries
myopic thinking has come to dominate like India, where car ownership is still
is the electrification of the transportation aspirational.1 Further, for many first-
sector, particularly road transport, which time buyers, even factoring in subsidies,
is the focus of this article. From ignorance an electric vehicle is not their primary
about the practical challenges of electric choice since the overall cost of owning
vehicles to the substitution of oil depend- an electric vehicle over a 10-year period
ency with critical mineral dependency, is higher than that of a traditional vehi-
the goal of road transport electrification cle. Electric vehicle ownership only be-
will not produce the outcomes one ex- gins to pay dividends in terms of lower
pects. Further, by subsidising inefficient costs if it is utilised for more than 45 kil-
technologies, policymakers inadvertent- ometres (km) per day, but most urban
Akash P Poojari (akashpoojari.p@[Link])
is consultant at the Department of Economic ly hinder future innovation by enabling travellers only utilise their private vehi-
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of substandard technologies to stay viable cles for less than 45 km per day on aver-
India. Gopakumar K U (gopakumar@[Link]) longer than they naturally would. age (Bansal et al 2018). Comparing two of
teaches at School of Liberal Arts, Indian Mitigating road transport emissions the most popular electric vehicle choices
Institute of Technology Jodhpur.
needs new strategies that achieve a in India (Tata Tigor and Tata Nexon),
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 19
COMMENTARY

while offering every advantage possible Figure 1: China’s Share in Global Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals
to electric vehicles, we find that it is still 100
much cheaper to own a traditional car in
the long run despite its higher running 80
costs.2 Since they only get cheaper the
longer they are driven, electric vehicles 60
are not paying the expected dividends
due to their use as a secondary vehicle
40
for short-distance travel (Krishna 2021).
Second, while policies have been fo-
20
cused on doling out generous subsidies
and incentives for higher electric vehicle
adoption, not once has anyone stopped to 0
Lithium Nickel Cobalt Rare Farths
question the sustainability or the practi- % of global mining output %of global processing output
cality of replacing the entire road-going Source: Goldman Sachs (2023).
fleet with electric options. As of 2020,
the International Organization of Motor would be needed to meet the demand and national security. The shift away
Vehicle Manufacturers estimated that there fulfilled by one diesel truck of each type. from fossil fuels towards green energy
are nearly 1.2 billion passenger cars on the It is also implausible to assume that was partly motivated by climate concerns
road globally. The number inflates sub- battery packs could be made lighter than but also by national security concerns.
stantially when two- and three-wheelers they already are, since lithium is already The emergence of the global economic
are included in the tally. Additionally, a the third lightest element on the periodic order and its dependency on oil and nat-
significant portion of road transport is table. Although hydrogen vehicles are an ural gas allowed those who control the
also dedicated to freight. Transitioning exciting energy-dense alternative to tra- supply of these fuels to shape geopoli-
long-haul vehicles, such as trucks and ditional and battery vehicles, it is utopi- tics. But the move away from fossil fuels
buses, to battery power presents several an to expect large-scale adoption within will substitute oil dependency with criti-
technological and regulatory challenges the coming decade since the state of fuel cal mineral dependency. Of the 33 criti-
that will require time to resolve. cell technologies and hydrogen produc- cal minerals important for India’s eco-
tion processes are not enough to support nomic security, an analysis by the Minis-
Electric Cargo: Charged Up, its wider adoption (Crownhart 2024). try of Mines (2023) highlighted that 24
Weighed Down Hydrogen production, especially green minerals presently face high supply risk
Testifying to the United States Senate on hydrogen, is a highly energy-intensive due to the concentration of production,
the practicalities of replacing freight and process, making it a best fit for just non- import reliance, and potential trade re-
farm vehicles with electric vehicles, energy applications presently (Bhat- strictions, which could disrupt the nec-
Andrew Boyle, Vice Chair of the American tacharyya et al 2021). Similar challenges essary supply chains.
Trucking Associations (ATA 2023), stated haunt the electrification of long-distance China, due to its long-term strategy
that replacing diesel trucks with electric buses, meaning diesel-powered heavy and the advantages it has, managed to
ones is not feasible under current condi- vehicles will likely remain the dominant establish itself in this sector and now
tions. Batteries on cargo trucks can means of long-distance road transport commands a significant share of critical
weigh up to 4,000 kilograms, which lim- for the foreseeable future. mineral production and processing. As
its their range and efficiency. This seen in Figure 1, they are now responsi-
means that truckers can only drive for Mining for Miles ble for processing the majority, all lithi-
up to 530 km on a single charge, com- Assuming for a moment that technological um, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth miner-
pared to the 1,900 km that a diesel truck improvements make a full transition prac- als (Goldman Sachs 2023). Furthermore,
can travel on a full tank. A chemically tical, a second question arises: Do we have in minerals where China has limited or no
complex and expensive battery is still not enough minerals to meet the demand for domestic production capacity, state finan-
capable of matching the energy density electric vehicles? Electric vehicles, like cial backing has allowed it to gain a foot-
of diesel (Gross 2020). The weight also renewable electricity, require significantly hold in mineral-rich countries. For in-
matters from a regulatory perspective due more materials and minerals to manufac- stance, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
to the government-imposed limits on gross ture. Compared to a conventional car, which is responsible for 70% of the glob-
vehicle weights, for instance, in India.3 electric vehicles require as much as six al cobalt supply, has seen ownership or
This means that more electric trucks times more minerals to produce (IEA 2021), majority stakes of nearly all its mines go
would be required on the road to haul the with much higher resource demands ex- to Chinese entities (Burrier and Sheehy
same amount of cargo. Estimates by Zhao erted by electric trucks and buses. 2023). Similarly, Indonesia, which now
et al (2024) show that nearly four electric However, the mineral supply chain is accounts for 57% of the world’s refined
delivery trucks and three semi-trailers not without risks for both energy security nickel, has been the recipient of billions
20 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

Figure 2: Global Energy Transition Investment per Annum (billion $) Figure 3: Share of Fossil Fuels and Renewables in Total Global Energy
Consumption
2,000 90
1,800 80
1,600 70
1,400 60
1,200 50
1,000 40

800 30
600 20
400 10
200 0

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Share of Gossil Guels Share of Senewables
Source: Bloomberg (2024b). Source: Energy Institute (2024).

in Chinese capital for the last four years, consumption to decline by 2% (Figure 3). is a well-known pollutant that can harm
all directed towards mining and pro- In absolute terms, fossil fuel consumption local vegetation and water resources as
cessing projects (Financial Times 2024b). from coal, oil, and gas is up by 35.2%, it mixes with rainfall (Izydorczyk et al
The electrification of the transport 17.6%, and 50%, respectively (Energy Insti- 2021). Acute intoxication from SO2, of
sector would leave most economies, in- tute 2024). Shifting away from fossil fuels more than 51,000 people in the Venta-
cluding India, highly exposed to Chinese is not as straightforward as one would ex- nas Industrial Area in Chile, was directly
policies such as the export bans on pect due to how our global economic sys- linked to copper mining in the region
graphite that came into effect on 1 Decem- tems and infrastructure are structured. (Gayo et al 2022). Furthermore, the case
ber 2023 (Benson and Denamiel 2023). The rise in mining activities for electric for cobalt and graphite is no different.
vehicle-related minerals is also the source Synthetic graphite production is directly
Clean Ride, Dirty Roots of significant environmental damage, linked to substantial quantities of green-
The sizeable mineral demand also means while extracting a heavy toll on other re- house gas emissions and other pollut-
that electric vehicles are more energy- sources within the countries they are be- ants (Whattoff et al 2021), while energy
intensive, and, consequently, more emis- ing sourced from. For instance, lithium is consumption in the cobalt production
sion-intensive to produce. While the typically mined from underground salt process is found to adversely impact the
emissions narrative is focused on discus- water reserves through evaporitic tech- environment (Farjana et al 2019).
sions surrounding tailpipe emissions, niques and has been found to pollute lo- We acknowledge that the extraction
the spotlight rarely falls on the produc- cal waterbodies and also deplete biodi- of gas, coal, and oil too is rife with envi-
tion-related emissions. Material extrac- versity in the process (Parker et al 2023). ronmental concerns, but do we not real-
tion, refining and battery production Mining activity in the “lithium triangle” ise that the whole point of the green
alone account for half the total emis- of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile has led transition is to minimise the adverse im-
sions of an electric vehicle (Volvo 2023). to the deterioration of saline lakes, veg- pacts of our society on the planet. If a
Add to this the charging-related emis- etation, and soil moisture while also be- focus on emissions alone brings about
sions of electric vehicles due to the cur- ing the cause of increased daytime tem- the desecration of biodiversity with no
rent power mix, the life-cycle emissions peratures and droughts (Gutiérrez et al standards on how resources for the
of the alternative are only 18% lower 2018; Maxwell and Mora 2019). Even green transition are supplied, how is the
than a traditional vehicle. Considering more efficient methods, such as direct higher cost for green technologies in any
that a total of $1.1 trillion was invested lithium extraction (DLE), are no better as way justified?
globally in electric vehicles and charg- they use fresh water to flush out solid
ing infrastructure in the last two years lithium. It is documented that producing Conclusions
(Bloomberg 2024b), one needs to care- 1 tonne of lithium requires approximately There is a dire need for policymakers to
fully assess if electric vehicles are truly 4,00,000 litres of water (Flexer et al 2018), balance efficiency with effectiveness as
delivering the bang for the buck in terms resulting in quinoa farmers competing the road to decarbonising transport is
of climate change mitigation. with miners for water (UNCTAD 2020). headed down a path from which there is
While there is talk of electric vehicles Similarly, copper mining too presents no reversing. Fossil fuel vehicles will
getting cleaner as the power grids get many environmental challenges. Waste eventually be replaced by better, more
greener, this too is a distant dream due management in the case of copper mines efficient means of personal transporta-
to the difficulty in weaning off fossil fuels. mostly ends up in landfills, polluting the tion because technology will get better.
Between 2004 and 2024, the world has terrestrial and aquatic environment However, for this to happen, market
collectively invested $9.6 trillion on ener- with heavy metals (Timofeev et al 2018). forces must be allowed to operate freely.
gy transition (Figure 2), only for the share Copper smelting also releases large Historically, our society has produced
of fossil fuels in total primary energy volumes of sulphur dioxide (SO2), which millions of innovative ideas, many of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 21
COMMENTARY

which impact our lives for the better on capped at 49 tonnes while a two-axled truck Gutiérrez, J S, J G Navedo and A Soriano-Redondo
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J P François, D Rodríguez, K Klock-Barría, Z Zhang, J Liu, Z Wang, C Ratti and Y Wu (2024):
policy discourse. Adopting a long-term P R Sheppard, I Aguilera-Betti, C Alonso- “Challenges and Opportunities in Truck Elec-
viewpoint will broaden the pool of avail- Hernández, M Mena-Carrasco, A Urquiza and trification Revealed by Big Operational Data,”
L Gallardo (2022): A Cross-cutting Approach Nature Energy, Vol 9, No 11, pp 1427–37, https://
able choices, providing a clear under- for Relating Anthropocene, Environmental In- [Link]/10.1038/s41560-024-01602-x.
standing of the underlying trade-offs justice and Sacrifice Zones,” Earth’s Future,
Vol 10, No 4, e2021EF002217, [Link]
and guiding the selection of options that 10.1029/ 2021EF002217.
deliver the most benefit per dollar spent. Goldman Sachs (2023): “Resource Realism: The
Geopolitics of Critical Mineral Supply Chains,” available at
September, [Link]
notes insights/articles/resource-realism-the-geopol- Forum Book House
1 As per the National Family Health Survey 5, itics-of-critical-mineral-supply-chains. 170/1, Rastreeya Vidyalaya Road
only 8% of Indian households own a car. Gross, S (2020): “Why Are Fossil Fuels So Hard to Visveshwarapuram
2 TCO Calculator, Bureau of Energy Efficiency. Quit?” Brookings, [Link]
articles/why-are-fossil-fuels-so-hard-to-quit/.
Bengaluru 560 001
3 Gross weights in India for the largest trucks are

22 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

CGHS Rate-based Private medical care, leads to catastrophic health

expenditures, and reinforces deep-rooted

Healthcare Services in Bihar health inequities. Paradoxically, while

the public health infrastructure remains
severely under-resourced and overstretch-
A Limited Reform or a Scalable Policy ed, the private healthcare sector—often
Opportunity? the primary provider by default—remains
largely unregulated. It operates with
minimal mechanisms for price regula-
tion, quality control, or accountability.
Aviral Pandey The findings of the recent Comptroller
and Auditor General (CAG) Report (2024)

B
The Government of Bihar has ihar’s chronically poor health out- (Table 1, p 27) stark ly illustrate these
adopted an innovative comes reflect a deeper structural failures, documenting critical gaps in in-
malaise in India’s health financ- frastructure, human resources, diagnos-
public–private partnership model
ing and delivery systems. With a score of tic services, and essential medicines
to address the critical gaps in only 31 on NITI Aayog’s Health Index across Bihar’s public health system. The
healthcare by collaborating with (2019–20), Bihar ranks among the low- absence of basic facilities such as emer-
a reputed private hospital under est-performing states, far behind states gency operation theatres, functional
like Kerala (82.2) (NITI Aayog 2021). blood storage units, and adequately
a pre-existing contract. Through
While weak infrastructure plays a role, staffed ambulances further highlights
this arrangement, selected the more fundamental issue lies in en- the urgent need for systemic reform and
beneficiaries receive treatment trenched disparities in access, particu- greater investment in equitable, acces-
at central government health larly between urban and rural popu- sible, and accountable healthcare.
lations. Although Bihar accounts for In this context, public–private part-
scheme rates, with the state
around 9% of India’s population, it pos- nerships (PPPs) have emerged as a pol-
reimbursing the costs of sesses only a limited share of the nation- icy instrument to bridge public re-
critical illness treatment for al health infrastructure. Internally, the source constraints and expand service
below-poverty-line patients. imbalance is equally stark: nearly 60% provision (Dwivedi and Bhargava 2022).
of the state’s hospital beds are concen- Bihar’s recent initiative—offering cen-
While this initiative has improved
trated in urban centres, even though tral government health scheme (CGHS)
access for some, its limited only around 12%–16% of its population rate-based reimbursements for select-
coverage raises concerns about resides in these areas (Central Bureau of ed beneficiaries through a designated
equity, especially in a state where Health Intelligence 2023). These sys- private hospital—reflects a hybrid a
temic deficiencies are compounded by pproach. The scheme introduces fi xed
the majority of the population
India’s chronically low public expendi- tariffs for medical services within
remains poor. ture on health, which continues to hover a PPP framework, aiming to reduce
around 2% of the gross domestic prod- out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPE s),
uct (GDP).1 This persistent underinvest- impose cost ceilings, and leverage pri-
ment pushes the financial burden onto vate sector capacity. Although limited
households, with over 50% of total in scope, this intervention raises im-
healthcare spending borne through out- portant policy questions: Can such
of-pocket payments.2 In a predominant- targeted models be scaled effectively?
Aviral Pandey ([Link]@[Link]) ly poor and informal economy like Bihar’s, Do fixed-price contracts ensure af-
is with the P G Department of Economics, this model of financing healthcare has fordability without compromising ser-
Patna University, Patna.
severe consequences: it delays timely vice quality?
26 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Table 1: Key Deficiencies in Bihar’s Healthcare System CGHS provides cashless outpatient and
Category Key Findings inpatient services through a mixed net-
Emergency operation theatres Not available in any of the four sub-divisional hospitals (SDHs)
work of public facilities and empanelled
audited—violation of IPHS norms
Ventilators Only 54% (71 out of 132) were functional; 57 ventilators unused due
private providers. Its fixed, standardised
to lack of staff or non-functional ICUs tariffs—spanning multiple systems of
Diagnostic facilities 19% to 100% of required diagnostics missing across 68 facilities; medicine, including allopathy, Ayurveda,
severe shortage of lab technicians and homoeopathy—have emerged as a
Lab technicians Up to 100% shortage in some facilities during 2016–22
normative benchmark for public pro-
Blood storage units (BSUs) 0 out of 10 SDHs, RHs, and CHCs had functional BSUs—mostly due to
curement and health service contract-
lack of humanpower or licensing
ing. However, CGHS remains largely ur-
Doctors (allopathic) Need: 1,24,919; available: 58,144—1 doctor per 2,148 people versus
WHO norm of 1:1,000 ban-centric and restricted to the formal
Staff nurses Shortage ranged from 18% (Patna) to 72% (Purnia) sector, thereby excluding informal work-
Paramedics Shortage ranged from 45% (Jamui) to 90% (East Champaran) ers and rural populations, who consti-
Overall vacancies 49% of posts in health departments and medical colleges remain tute the majority in Bihar. In this con-
vacant
text, the Bihar government has adopted
Essential medicines (OPD) 21% to 65% of required drugs unavailable
CGHS pricing not as part of the original
Essential medicines (IPD) 34% to 83% drug shortage reported
scheme, but as a regulatory reference
Ambulances All 25 ambulances inspected lacked required equipment and
medicines; shortage ranged from 14% to 100% point for delivering state-subsidised care
Major hospitals (eg, DMCH, PMCH) Equipment shortage ranged from 25% to 100%—affecting critical care through private providers. While this
Sub-divisional healthcare 47 subdivisions lacked SDHs model imposes cost ceilings and enables
PHC to CHC upgrade Of 399 PHCs sanctioned for upgrade (2007–10), only 191 completed streamlined reimbursements for a select
by March 2022
group of beneficiaries, it raises critical
Policy alignment Healthcare planning not aligned with the National Health Policy (2017)
concerns regarding replicability, equity,
Source: Author’s compilation using report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2024).
and the potential reinforcement of
The scheme’s (the CGHS rate-based to a single private hospital could exa- healthcare dualism within an already
reimbursement model) conceptual un- cerbate inequalities or facilitate elite fragmented health system.
derpinning draws on key insights from capture. The long-term effectiveness
welfare economics. Healthcare consti- of such models, therefore, depends not Analysis of CGHS and
tutes a quasi-public good plagued by only on financial design but also on in- Non-CGHS Pricing
market failures such as information stitutional capacity, regulatory over- The pricing mechanisms in India’s
asymmetry, adverse selection, and ex- sight, and adaptability. healthcare system are fragmented and
ternalities. These failures justify state Given the background, this article vary significantly across user groups.
intervention, yet traditional public de- critically evaluates Bihar’s CGHS rate- Different schemes apply distinct pricing
livery mechanisms have often under- based PPP initiative within the broader structures for beneficiaries, including
performed in low-resource settings like discourse on healthcare financing, regu- holders of health insurance, Employees’
Bihar. The CGHS tariff model thus oc- lation, and universal health coverage. State Insurance (ESI), Ex-Servicemen
cupies a middle ground—combining It interrogates whether such micro- Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS),
price regulation with strategic contract- models can offer a meaningful alterna- and the CGHS. Among these, CGHS has
ing. It also seeks to address the “missing tive to unregulated market-based pro- emerged as a dominant reference model
middle,” a group excluded from both vision or overstretched public systems. for pricing in PPP, often perceived as of-
government-financed insurance schemes More broadly, it examines whether hy- fering optimal cost-based rates. How-
like Ayushman Bharat-Pradhan Mantri brid pricing and contracting approach- ever, the coexistence of CGHS tariffs
Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY) and em- es can navigate the equity–efficiency with markedly higher private sector
ployer-sponsored coverage, through a trade-offs that define healthcare deliv- rates underscores a broader dual-pricing
replicable, subsidised delivery model. ery in low-resource federal contexts. regime. This stark disparity raises criti-
Nevertheless, such targeted inter- cal questions about distributive justice
ventions entail significant risks. From CGHS as a Benchmarking Tool in and the adequacy of regulatory oversight
a contract theory perspective, fixed- Public–Private Health Contracts in India’s healthcare financing landscape.
tariff PPPs raise issues of incentive mis- The CGHS, established in 1954, is India’s While private hospitals assert that their
alignment, service skimping, and qua- oldest contributory health insurance elevated charges are necessitated by
lity erosion—concerns well recognised model, designed to serve central govern- substantial capital investments in ad-
in the theory of incomplete contracts ment employees, pensioners, and their vanced medical infrastructure, robotic
(Hart and Moore 1990). Without ro- dependents. It currently covers approxi- technologies, and specialist humanpower,
bust oversight, the pressure to reduce mately five million beneficiaries across these costs are disproportionately borne
costs may lead providers to under- 80 urban centres. Administered by the by the general population, who are ex-
deliver. Moreover, limiting the scheme Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, cluded from state-subsidised schemes
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 27
COMMENTARY

and must rely on out-of-pocket spending left out a vast “missing middle,” estimat- for the missing middle, public investment
or private insurance. In sharp contrast, ed to be over 30% of citizens, who nei- may continue to reinforce elite capture
beneficiaries under the CGHS—compris- ther qualify for government subsidies and systemic exclusion, rather than ad-
ing government employees, pensioners, nor can afford private insurance. This vance the broader constitutional promise
and select public servants—receive access segment, as highlighted by NITI Aayog’s of equitable and universal healthcare.
to the same or similar services at heavily Health Insurance for India’s Missing Mid-
subsidised rates, sometimes up to 80% dle report (Kumar and Sarwal 2021), re- Evaluating Bihar’s Medanta PPP
lower than private sector prices.3 This mains acutely vulnerable to medical ex- Initiative
cross-subsidisation is financed through penditure shocks, often turning to ex- The PPP initiated by the Government of
general taxation, raising critical con- pensive private providers without any Bihar (GoB)7 in Patna signals a signifi-
cerns about the regressivity of public regulated pricing structure or financial cant evolution in the state’s health poli-
healthcare financing. While the tax bur- backing. In this vacuum, costly proce- cy, aiming to overcome entrenched in-
den is broadly shared by the population, dures, medical debt, and even crowd- frastructural deficiencies, a chronic
the benefits are concentrated among a funding have become routine survival shortage of skilled personnel, and inad-
limited formal workforce segment, strategies for the uninsured. This vul- equate access to advanced medical care.
thereby reinforcing existing social and nerability stands in sharp contrast to the Implemented under the design, build, fi-
occupational hierarchies. Moreover, the secure insulation of the formal sector. nance, operate, and transfer (DBFOT)
lack of uniform pricing in the private Between 2019–20 and 2023–24, reim- framework, the initiative allocated a
healthcare sector is exacerbated by the bursements to private hospitals under 7-acre land parcel on a 33-year lease to
partial and uneven implementation of the CGHS increased by nearly 300%, Global Health Patliputra Private Ltd, a
the Clinical Establishments (Registration reaching ₹3,646 crore for just 47.6 lakh Medanta Group subsidiary, to establish
and Regulation) Act, 2010,4 which man- beneficiaries. This amounts to approxi- and operate a multi-specialty hospital. A
dates minimum standards of service de- mately ₹7,660 per person annually— central component of the agreement
livery, infrastructure, and rate transpar- nearly 30 times higher than the ₹228 per mandates that 25% of the total hospital
ency across clinical facilities. Many capita allocation under PMJAY, which beds be designated as price-regulated,
states have yet to adopt or enforce this covers nearly 41 crore beneficiaries with care delivered at CGHS rates. These
act, thereby limiting the central govern- (based on data accessed on 8 June 2025 subsidised beds are reserved for individ-
ment’s capacity to regulate hospital from the official website). The result is a uals below the poverty line (BPL), whose
charges outside of CGHS-affiliated insti- tiered system where one segment bene- treatment costs are reimbursed by the
tutions. In this context, the Supreme fits from regulated tariffs and cashless state, creating a model of cross-subsidi-
Court’s directive5 urging the government access, while the other is left to navigate sation in which revenues from market-
to notify standardised rates—provision- a fragmented, often exploitative private priced services support access for the
ally aligned with CGHS benchmarks— market. Although the Economic Survey underserved. However, access to these
highlights the urgent need for a cohesive 2024–25 cites a reduction in OOPE from services for BPL patients is mediated by
regulatory framework that ensures not 62.6% to 39.4%,6 such averages obscure the government, meaning that utilisa-
only cost transparency but also equitable the persisting financial risks faced by tion depends not only on the presence
access. Without comprehensive adoption uninsured citizens. Without extending of medical need but also on the gov-
of the Clinical Establishments (Registra- CGHS-style negotiated rate frameworks ernment’s capacity and willingness to
tion and Regulation) Act and alignment or designing inclusive insurance products facilitate access.
of CGHS and non-CGHS pricing mecha-
nisms under a unified regulatory archi-
1 Title of Newspaper: Economic & Political Weekly
tecture, healthcare delivery in India risks 2 Language in which it is published: English
remaining fragmented, inequitable, and 3 Place of publication: 320-322, A - Z Industrial Estate,
biased towards a privileged beneficiary Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013
base subsidised by the broader public. 4 Periodicity of its publication: Weekly
5 Editor's name: Pyaralal Raghavan
Missing Link of Universal CGHS Whether citizen of India: Yes
Address: 21/401, East End Apts, Mayur Vihar,
Rate Regulation
Phase - 1 Extension, New Delhi 110 096
The COVID-19 pandemic acted as a bru- 6 Publisher's name: Gauraang Satish Pradhan for Sameeksha Trust
tal stress test for India’s healthcare sys- Whether citizen of India: Yes
Address: 179/14 Hindu Colony, Shakti Niwas,
tem, exposing its chronic underfunding, Dadar, Mumbai 400 014
capacity limitations, and deep-rooted 7 Printer's name: Milan Arun Keswani
structural inequities. While flagship Whether citizen of India: Yes
8 Premises where printing is Modern Arts & Industries, 1st Floor, 106,
schemes like AB-PMJAY have significant- conducted: A To Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
ly improved financial protection for the Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013
bottom 50% of the population, they have
28 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

However, questions persist regarding to access care in the unregulated pri- well-executed, serve as the linchpin for
the broader implications of this model vate sector. This selective coverage en- equitable health transformation in a
for systemic equity and scalability. Giv- trenches a two-tiered system, where a state of around 13 crore people? Without
en Bihar’s population and the substan- privileged few benefit from cross-subsi- complementary investments in public
tial burden of critical health disease con- dised, high-quality services while the health, primary care, and regulation,
centrated in the lower-income strata, re- majority navigate a fragmented, over- such models risk reinforcing the very in-
liance on a single hospital—even under stretched infrastructure. equalities they aim to dismantle.
a well-designed PPP—appears insuffi- More troubling is the rigidity in the
cient. Moreover, the CGHS-linked pricing tariff structure. Government-mandated Policy Recommendations
mechanism is applicable only within the rates like those under the CGHS are often To transform Bihar’s health PPP model
scope of this partnership, leaving vast misaligned with actual cost structures, into a scalable and equitable healthcare
segments of the population exposed to making participation financially unat- delivery mechanism, a series of integrat-
unpredictable, often inflated pricing in tractive (at a broader scale—universal) ed policy reforms is essential. A critical
unregulated private settings. This frag- to many private providers. The wide- first step involves adopting the CGHS
mentation highlights the concern that spread reluctance to join schemes like rates as a universal reference tariff.
such isolated interventions may not sub- PMJAY due to low reimbursement rates Aligning the state’s model with national
stantially alleviate the structural vulner- and operational hurdles is telling. Such frameworks such as AB-PMJAY could ex-
abilities of Bihar’s healthcare landscape. pricing constraints can lead to covert pand the risk pool, minimise adminis-
The initiative also exposes a deeper exclusion, with hospitals favouring pa- trative redundancies, and promote equi-
policy paradox: despite India’s liberal- tients under higher-paying packages, ty in access. Standardising reimburse-
ised economic environment, its health- effectively undermining the model’s ment tariffs is equally important, as
care system continues to grapple with promise of equity. Unless tariff revisions fragmented pricing across schemes in-
exploitative pricing and inconsistent ser- are regularly adjusted for inflation and centivises providers to prioritise higher-
vice quality. In this situation, when indi- negotiated transparently with providers, paying patients, thereby undermining
vidual states try to set price limits to pro- the PPP risks devolving into a tokenistic the equity objective. Bihar should work
tect patients, it can discourage private gesture rather than a scalable solution. with the union government to adopt
investment or push it to the states with Adding to this strain is the fragmented CGHS-linked tariffs, allowing calibrated
weaker rules—worsening regional gaps health financing architecture in India. local adjustments. A transparent, infla-
in healthcare access and infrastructure. With a patchwork of schemes operating tion-indexed pricing mechanism—de-
This raises a critical policy question: under different rates (Dey 2019), eligi- veloped through structured stakeholder
How can states achieve affordability and bility norms, and administrative proto- engagement—could encourage sustained
equity without undermining the finan- cols, the system incentivises cherry- private sector participation while ensur-
cial viability of private providers? Rec- picking and undermines continuity of ing cost-efficiency and service quality.
onciling this tension will be vital for care. Without harmonisation, Bihar’s PPP Beyond inpatient care, Bihar can stra-
PPPs to transition from pilot models into risks becoming another disconnected pi- tegically expand PPPs to address critical
integral instruments of national health lot—impressive on paper but misaligned infrastructure gaps in diagnostics, tele-
system reform. with national health financing strate- medicine, emergency transport, and
gies. Greater coherence—through inte- blood storage. Contracting private agen-
Structural Constraints and gration with platforms like the National cies for service delivery—such as mobile
Policy Gaps Health Authority or convergence to- X-ray units, diagnostic labs, and ambu-
While the Patna-based PPP project signals wards interoperable reimbursement struc- lances—through build-own-operate (BOO)
a bold shift in Bihar’s health policy land- tures—is not optional, it is essential. or build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT)
scape, it also surfaces uncomfortable Also, the absence of strong govern- models presents a financially viable ap-
truths about the limitations of such ance and regulatory safeguards invites proach to scaling access with limited
models in addressing systemic inequi- serious risks. In a system already vulner- public investment. Such models, success-
ties. Despite its promise, the initiative able to exploitation, lack of oversight fully implemented in several Indian
risks becoming a high-visibility enclave could open doors to overbilling, sub- states, are adaptable to Bihar’s resource-
of quality care in a sea of unmet need. standard care, and exclusionary prac- constrained setting. Concurrently, suc-
By design, it offers subsidised care only tices. To prevent this, Bihar must move cess depends on robust digital infra-
to a narrowly defined segment—exclud- decisively: adopt biometric-linked digi- structure. An integrated electronic plat-
ing vast swathes of the population such tal claims systems, ensure mandatory form for real-time beneficiary authen-
as informal sector workers, the unin- accreditation, conduct independent au- tication, claims processing, and service
sured poor, and those without docu- dits, and establish grievance redressal tracking—ideally linked with Aad-
mentation. These individuals remain mechanisms. And yet, even if these is- haar—can mitigate fraud, enhance ef-
reliant on chronically underfunded sues are resolved, a deeper question ficiency, and generate dynamic policy-
public hospitals or are forced into debt looms: Can a single PPP project, however relevant data.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 29
COMMENTARY

Equally vital is the creation of an inde- remains excluded from comparable sup- medicine, excluding Armed Forces institu-
tions. It proposes a framework of national,
pendent governance architecture. Bihar port. Informal workers, low-income
state, and district-level authorities to ensure
should establish an oversight body com- households, and those outside public em- compliance, maintain registers, and oversee
prising representatives from the govern- ployment structures are largely left to inspections. While aiming to ensure uniformi-
ty in infrastructure, staffing, and service qual-
ment, civil society, and the medical com- navigate the private healthcare system ity, its effectiveness hinges on adoption by indi-
munity to ensure compliance, uphold with little or no financial protection, de- vidual states, highlighting the complexities of
quality standards, and strengthen ac- spite facing similar or even greater implementing healthcare regulation within In-
dia’s federal structure.
countability. Contractual frameworks health risks. This dual-track approach 5 In February 2024, the Supreme Court criticised
must include measurable key perfor- risks institutionalising inequity in the centre for failing to implement the Clinical
mance indicators (KPIs), conflict-of-in- healthcare access. It privileges those Establishments (Central Government) Rules,
2012, which mandate standardised hospital
terest protections, and defined penalties within the administrative machinery of treatment charges. Highlighting stark cost dif-
for non-compliance. Importantly, the the state, while leaving large sections of ferences between public and private hospitals,
the Court directed the union health secretary
PPP framework must supplement, not society to bear the burden of OOPE s or to convene a meeting with state health secre-
supplant, the public healthcare system. rely on under-resourced public facilities. taries within a month to finalise standard
Formal referral pathways that require The government’s willingness to negoti- rates. If the centre and states fail to act, the
Court warned that CGHS rates will be enforced
initial triage at public facilities before ate favourable rates with private provid- nationally to ensure affordable and transpar-
accessing private services can reinforce ers for a narrow beneficiary group sug- ent healthcare pricing.
the public sector’s gatekeeping role and gests that similar mechanisms could— 6 [Link]
private-hospitals-share-in-cghs-spend-up-
help ensure that advanced care is direct- and should—be extended to a broader from-24-to-60-in-4-years/article-
ed to those who need it most. population base. Private hospitals, which show/[Link].
To ensure transparency and course continue to operate profitably under 7 [Link]
best-practice-detail/jay-prabha-medanata-
correction, regular third-party audits CGHS rates, indicate that expanding hospital-in-patna,-bihar.
should assess the scheme’s effectiveness in such models is not economically un fe-
terms of health outcomes, fiscal sustain- asible but rather a matter of political and References
ability, and patient satisfaction. These administrative prioritisation. Without sy- Central Bureau of Health Intelligence (2023):
findings must be publicly disseminated stemic reforms, this selective subsidisa- “National Health Profile 2023 (18th issue),”
and used to periodically recalibrate eli- tion undermines the principle of health Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Gov-
ernment of India, [Link]
gibility norms and benefit packages. as a public good. A more just and sus- [Link]/[Link]?lang=1&level=1&sublink
Also, enhancing public awareness is cru- tainable path forward would involve id=75&lid=1135.
cial for increasing service uptake and integrating fragmented schemes under Dey, Sushmi (2019): “Same Procedure Sees Vary-
ing Rates under Government Health Plans,”
accountability. Communication strate- a unified administrative framework, Times of India, 16 September.
gies—such as helplines, feedback sur- ensuring that subsidised quality care is Dwivedi, Neelima and Ruma Bhargava (2022):
veys, and targeted IEC campaigns—can not a privilege for the few but a right How Public–Private Partnerships Could Be the
Booster Dose for India’s Healthcare Ecosystem,
help identify service gaps and inform for all. Expanding coverage, enhancing World Economic Forum, 9 September.
iterative improvement. Collectively, these portability, and building an inclusive Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990): “Property
measures offer a robust pathway for digital infrastructure must accompany Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol 98, No 6, pp 1119–58.
Bihar to institutionalise an inclusive, ac- these efforts. Bihar’s experience serves
Kumar, A and R Sarwal (2021): Health Insurance
countable, and efficient PPP model that as a stark reminder that while PPPs can for India’s Missing Middle, NITI Aayog.
can strengthen health system resilience be powerful tools for service delivery, NITI Aayog (2021): Healthy States, Progressive
India: Report on the Ranks of States and Union
and deliver quality care to over 130 mil- their design must be rooted in equity
Territories, Government of India.
lion residents. and universality—not convenience or Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2024):
privilege—if they are to advance the “Performance Audit on Public Health Infra-
Conclusions structure and Management of Health Servic-
goals of universal health coverage.
es,” Government of Bihar (Report No 4 of
Bihar’s CGHS rate-based private health- 2024), [Link]
care scheme illustrates an attempt to Notes report/details/120622.
leverage private sector infrastructure 1 [Link]
within fiscal constraints. However, its tamil-nadu/union-budget-2025-26-increase-
in-health-allocation-negligible-says-amalorpa-
current structure raises fundamental vanathan/[Link].
questions about equity, public accounta- 2 [Link]
aspx?PRID=2097868.
available at
bility, and the ethical allocation of
healthcare resources. While government 3 [Link] Gyan Deep
vate-hospitals-financial-impact-of-cghs-rates-
employees—who are often more econo- [Link]. Near Firayalal Chowk,
mically and administratively empower- 4 The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Ranchi 834 001
ed—receive access to subsidised, high- Regulation) Bill, 2010 seeks to regulate and Jharkhand
standardise healthcare services by mandating
quality care through CGHS-linked tar- registration and minimum standards for all Ph: 09470564686
iffs, a vast proportion of the population clinical facilities across recognised systems of

30 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

administration must be provided across

Windfall and Warning long distances to sparse populations. Newer
pillars are coming into view—tourism (no-
What ECONOR 2025 Tells Us about tably in Iceland and parts of Alaska), met-

the Arctic als manufacturing (especially Finland and

Sweden), and renewable-power-driven
data centres (notably Iceland and Norway).
These do not yet displace extraction at
K M Seethi scale, but they broaden the base and
generate jobs in towns that need them.

T
A booming but narrow Arctic he Arctic is no longer a distant, The report also underlines a produc-
economy now sits at the junction frozen periphery of the world tivity paradox. With around 0.1% of the
economy. Once treated as marginal, world’s population, the Arctic generates
of new sea routes, wartime
it has become a region of difficult choices roughly 0.4% of the world’s gross domestic
geopolitics, and rising climate and mounting pressures. Rich in resources, product (GDP). However, disposable house-
costs. Drawing on The Economy strategically located, and ecologically frag- hold income per person in many Arctic
of the North—ECONOR 2025, ile, it now figures in global trade, energy regions is lower than in non-Arctic parts
politics, and climate change. The latest of the same countries. Distance, high liv-
published by the Arctic Council,
report of The Economy of the North— ing costs, small markets, and capital-in-
this article reads the report ECONOR 2025, published by the Arctic tensive extraction help explain why
against ground realities— Council—appears at a moment when the headline productivity does not consist-
militarisation, the Northern Northern Sea Route (NSR) is busier than ently translate into household welfare.
ever, the High North is more heavily mili- ECONOR’s message is cautious but clear:
Sea Route’s promise and risk,
tarised, and the costs of climate change are growth built on extraction does not au-
and indigenous well-being rising fast. All this rests on fragile eco- tomatically spill over into broad-based
—arguing for people-centred logical and social ground, showing that prosperity. That caution reflects two
metrics and policy. the Arctic economy cannot be separated decades of human-development research
from the turmoil shaping today’s world. in the region, which has repeatedly shown
ECONOR 2025 gives a comparable base- that well-being, equity, and cultural in-
line across the eight Arctic states. In 2022, tegrity must be assessed alongside in-
the circumpolar economy is estimated at come if policy is to reflect lived realities
$666 billion (purchasing power parity (Larsen and Fondahl 2014).
[PPP])—almost three times the 2003
level—indicating a trend growth of nearly Northern Sea Route:
6% a year over two decades. The pattern Promise and Pressure
is concentrated and familiar: Russia is the The NSR’s significance is growing as sea-
largest Arctic economy and has grown its sonal sea-ice retreats and ice-class fleets
share since the early 2000s; the United expand. For liquefied natural gas, crude,
States (Alaska) is the second pole, though and some bulk or container flows between
its share has slipped; the Nordic Arctic Northern Europe and Northeast Asia, the
(Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland) ac- NSR can save up to two weeks off Suez
counts for a modest fraction of output but transit times. ECONOR 2025 describes a
matters for diversification, high-value logistics architecture forming around
fisheries, and robust public services. What coastal terminals, reloading hubs at ice-free
produces this output is clear. Extraction ends of the route, and specialised carriers
is the engine: hydrocarbons and hard- that bridge Arctic and temperate seas.
rock mining dominate value added in Much of today’s traffic is export-orient-
the Russian Arctic, Alaska, and northern ed—outbound hydrocarbons and miner-
Canada. Fisheries and aquaculture anchor als—rather than domestic coastal ship-
K M Seethi (kmseethimgu@[Link]) is many coastal economies—from Green- ping. For Arctic Russia, the opening of the
Academic Advisor to the International Centre land and the Faroe Islands to coastal NSR has the character of a windfall: it low-
for Polar Studies and Director, Inter University Norway—and connect to processing and ers the cost of moving heavy commodities
Centre for Social Science Research and logistics. The public sector is large every- out and machinery in, and it ties projects
Extension, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala.
where because health, education, and more closely to Asian demand, notably in
14 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

China. However, the same warming that treat the High North as a place where abrasive. In Sápmi, for example, operators
opens the sea route raises costs on land— science, shipping, and security now inter- and authorities have closed landings
permafrost damage to roads, foundations sect, often uncomfortably (Seethi 2021b). and removed infrastructure at sensitive
and pipelines; ecosystem change; and sites after dialogue with Sámi communi-
pressure on reindeer pasture. ECONOR is Indigenous Communities, ties. A more militarised High North can
cautious about the speed and scale of NSR Demographics, and SDGs deepen these stresses if training schedules
growth. Insurance, sanctions compli- Who lives in the Arctic matters as much as and access restrictions are insensitive to
ance, finance, seasonal operating win- what is produced there. The circumpolar subsistence calendars and migration
dows, and the sheer lumpiness of port and population numbers only a few million routes; the corrective is not abstract, but
fleet investments make this a long build- across eight countries, spread thinly across suggests the co-design of land use, emer-
out rather than a quick pivot. The route vast distances. Indigenous peoples include gency planning and infrastructure with
will matter more across the 2030s, but it the Sámi (Norway, Sweden, Finland, indigenous institutions.
is not a near-term substitute for Suez. Russia/Kola), Inuit (Greenland, Canada’s
These cautions go with the earlier anal- Inuit Nunangat, Alaska), as well as Aleut, Do the Numbers Match
ysis that tracked the NSR through the lens Yupik, Nenets, Chukchi, Gwich’in and Ground Realities?
of India’s own Arctic engagement—science others. ECONOR is explicit about the place For researchers, officials and journalists,
diplomacy and resource access on one of traditional economies: hunting, fishing, ECONOR 2025 is the best common ledger
side; hard geopolitics, shipping risks, gathering and herding are not side activities now available for the Arctic economy. Its
and fiscal priorities on the other (Seethi but, in many communities, a prerequisite value is threefold. First, it provides com-
2021a). Another analysis underlined how for a decent life, bound with identity, dig- parability: a harmonised, PPP-adjusted,
US–Russia frictions and the emergence nity and social resilience. However, most of circumpolar baseline that now spans five
of China as a systemic player would push this activity is invisible in GRP and house- editions since 2006. Second, it gives con-
logistics, insurance and investment timing hold-income aggregates. This invisibility text beyond cash: sectoral structure behind
into the realm of rivalry (Seethi 2021b). has policy consequences. If budgets and GRP; the dynamics of tourism; and climate-
project appraisals count only market trans- related infrastructure risks that will re-
War, Rivalry, and a Militarised actions, they undervalue subsistence as a shape budgets. Third, it is transparent
High North source of nutrition, health and cultural about uncertainty: the editors are frank
The invasion of Ukraine shifted Europe’s continuity. ECONOR’s contribution here is about data gaps, the under-measurement
security map. Finland joined the North practical. It urges Arctic-specific Sustaina- of subsistence, and the limits of applying
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in ble Development Goal (SDG) indicators and national PPP factors to remote regions with
2023, followed by Sweden in 2024, anchor- data sovereignty principles so that com- different price baskets. Those strengths
ing the alliance across the Nordic Arctic munities help define what should be also highlight the limits. A resource-heavy
and Barents (NATO 2023; NATO 2024). measured; it points to at-risk-of-poverty lens can make growth look strong even
ECONOR 2025 traces how these changes rates, households on permafrost, and food when household welfare lags. Without local
show up in the accounts. In the Russian and water security, alongside indicators price baskets, PPP conversions may mis-
Arctic, industrial structure tilted further that recognise relational values with land state real purchasing power. Coverage dif-
towards state priorities after 2019: manu- and water. This approach reflects the long ferences and statistical lags make it hard
facturing expanded rapidly as factories arc of Arctic human-development work to see fast-moving shocks in real time.
were mobilised; public administration, that has insisted on connecting material The NSR’s path will depend on politics,
military, and social security grew their well-being with cultural integrity and finance and ice; a single scenario cannot
share; and energy-price spikes lifted the local control (Larsen and Fondahl 2014). capture project-level risk. And while the
gross regional product (GRP) via higher ex- The immediate pressures are already volume engages seriously with indige-
port prices in 2021–22. On the other side of visible. Climate change is reshaping daily nous economies and SDGs, many of the
the border, sanctions and travel restric- life: sea-ice loss, shifting tundra, and more indicators it calls for are not yet standard
tions sharply reduced Russian tourism to frequent wildfires alter travel safety, in administrative datasets. Policymakers
Finland, Norway and Iceland, complicat- undermine food security, and threaten therefore still need to triangulate statis-
ing diversification in those destinations. reindeer pasture. Permafrost thaw makes tical tables with community knowledge.
The report does not take a political posi- infrastructure costlier to build and main- In sum, the Arctic’s future will be shaped
tion; it does what a statistical baseline tain; the scale of replacement in the coming as much by forces outside the region—wars,
should do—describe the structure, flag the decades may be modest in national GDP sanctions, freight insurance, shipbuilding
trade-offs, and show where better meas- terms but would be large relative to GRP finance—as by choices within it. That is why
ures are needed to judge net welfare. For and local budgets—binding in practice. a grounded, comparable baseline matters.
India and other observer states, the earlier Infrastructure and digital gaps persist, For now, the circumpolar economy is large
warning that militarisation could erode the from broadband to housing and water relative to its population, narrowly based,
Arctic’s long-standing “zone of cooperation” systems. Tourism’s post-pandemic rebound and exposed to global cycles. The NSR offers
reads as a thoughtful guide to strategy: has been uneven and, in places, culturally opportunities and traps in equal measure.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 15
COMMENTARY

Militarisation raises budgets and risks. And Tromsø: Arctic Council Secretariat; printed by — (2024): “Sweden Officially Joins NATO,” 7 March,
Statistics Norway, Oslo–Kongsvinger, https:// Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the people who will live with the conse- [Link]/items/d7c37504- [Link]
quences—especially indigenous commu- e348-4a82-a856-baa6b15a1c15/full. [Link].
nities—must be at the centre of the ledger. Larsen, Joan Nymand and Gail Fondahl (eds) (2014): Seethi, K M (2021a): “Contours of India’s Arctic Policy,”
Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Pro- EPW Engage, Vol 56, No 20, 15 May, Economic &
ECONOR 2025 helps move that conversa- cesses and Global Linkages, Copenhagen: Nordic Political Weekly, [Link]
tion from rhetoric to numbers. Council of Ministers, [Link] article/contours-indias-arctic-policy.
org/smash/[Link]?pid=diva2%3A788965& — (2021b): “Russia, the United States, and Chu-
dswid=-4788. rning Arctic Geopolitics,” The Arctic Institute,
References NATO (2023): “Finland Joins NATO as 31st 27 July, [Link]
Arctic Council Secretariat (2025): The Economy of Ally,” 4 April, Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty sia-united-states-churning-arctic-geopolitics/.
the North—ECONOR 2025, edited by Solveig Organization, [Link]
Glomsrød, Gérard Duhaime and Iulie Aslaksen, natohq/news_213448.htm. [All URLs viewed on 25 August 2025.]

16 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

Public Policy Dilemmas those with whom he associates. (R W Branth-

waite cited in Edman 2015: 23)
The international conferences had an
Dealing with the Liquor Sector impact on policy formulation in India.

in Kerala They set a standard, which resulted in a

combination of controls from the van-
tage point of health, hygiene, illness,
heredity, prevention, treatment, and re-
Rahul V Kumar, Justine George, Akhil Menon stricted consumption, and ultimately
led to the prohibition of alcohol. In ad-

K
Kerala has grappled with public erala’s alcohol policy has under- dition, Article 47 of the Constitution
policy dilemmas regarding the gone significant and inconsistent echoes this concern and empowers the
changes. The recent policy change state to prohibit intoxicating substances
liquor sector, raising questions
from a restrictive to a more liberal ap- given public health concerns. However,
about the effectiveness of the proach is one such instance. However, state interventions are balanced bet-
state’s alcohol policy. Recent discretionary policies often lead to unin- ween concerns of public health on the
discretionary state policies on tended outcomes. In 2014, the Congress- one hand and potential revenue loss
led United Democratic Front (UDF) gov- on the other.
alcohol have led to unintended
ernment in Kerala implemented a re- Alcohol was perceived as a traditional
outcomes, spanning from the strictive liquor policy aimed at total al- source of pleasure enjoyed by the collec-
emergence of illegal substitutes cohol prohibition by 2025. When the Left tive, with a chequered existence in Kera-
to the escalation of the drug Democratic Front (LDF) government came la (Menon 1995). Exogenous and endog-
into power in 2016, it adopted a more enous factors have influenced changes
menace. Policy changes are
liberal stance, reopening the sector. The in state policy on alcohol, and these fac-
needed to control illegally time gap between these policy changes tors created new spaces for the sector
available substances in the has created a space for the market to and its constituent stakeholders in Kerala
context of rising concerns of evolve, filled with many substitutes for (Menon 1995). The authorities cited sev-
alcohol. As a result, the challenges sur- eral factors, including the breakdown of
public health, violence and
rounding liquor policy in Kerala, par- productive labour, disregard of children’s
social distress. ticularly the existence of a prevalent il- material and moral requirements, do-
legal market and the availability of illicit mestic abuse, and the loss of family in-
alcohol substitutes, necessitate further come, as justifications for banning, and
discussion on public policy dilemmas in therefore, prohibition and the control of
this sector. the sector had a severe impact on the so-
The conduct of international confer- cial life in Kerala. However, all these
ences worldwide, as part of the temper- policies have not been able to discipline
ance movement that began in the late the sector but were instead based on the
19th century, has raised awareness political and economic needs of their
about the adverse health consequences time (Manoj 2018).
of alcohol consumption and defined the There were changes in how people
norms that currently shape the under- drank (from collective to individual) and
standing of the alcohol industry (Edman the spaces that fostered drinking (from
2015). The first complete prohibition of arrack shops to bars). Now, Kerala has a
alcohol in Russia, in 1914, can be linked completely controlled liquor industry
to the deliberations of these interna- with an overwhelming presence of the
The authors would like to thank the tional discussions. Edman (2015) notes state. As of 2023, Kerala has 384 FL-1 re-
anonymous reviewers for their helpful how controls developed in the sector tail shops, 721 FL-3 bar hotels, 295 FL-II
comments and feedback. and quotes R W Branthwaite, the In- beer and wine parlours, and 44 FL-4A club
Rahul V Kumar ([Link]@[Link]) spector of Alcoholic Institutions in licences. There are 11 distilleries, eight
teaches at the Department of Economics, 1909, who describes the “alcoholic” in foreign liquor blending and bottling units,
NSS College, Ottapalam. Justine George
such terms as needing some form of and three breweries in Kerala. Two
(jusgeorge@[Link]) teaches at the
Department of Economics, St Paul’s College, control. To him, breweries and one blending unit remain
Kalamassery. Akhil Menon (menonakhil95@ Every inebriate is either a potential criminal,
non-operational (GoK 2023). The num-
[Link]) teaches at the Department of a burden upon public funds, a danger to him- ber of stakeholders involved in the sec-
Commerce and Economics, Presidency tor, directly or indirectly, has also in-
self or others, or a cause of distress, terror,
University, Bengaluru.
scandal, or nuisance, to his family and to creased amid these changes.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 23
COMMENTARY

Tax, Taboo, and Consumption to 24.04% in the fifth round. In the rural were detained for drug-related offences,
of Liquor areas, a severe decline occurred bet- which increased to 6,704 in 2021 (Praveen
The shift from “traditional pleasure to a ween the fourth and fifth rounds of NFHS. and Joseph 2022). Combating the availa-
taboo” (Menon 1995) in the life of alco- The percentage of alcohol consumption bility and proliferation of drugs is the ma-
hol occurred when the excise depart- in rural areas was 40.73% in the fourth jor theme discussed in the latest liquor
ment in Kerala attempted to define alco- round and 27.86% in the fifth round. policy (GoK 2023). Various departments
hol, and a distinction was made between Among the districts, Alappuzha has of Kerala have been engaged in multiple
fermentation and distillation—the for- the highest alcohol consumption at 29%, awareness programmes on drug usage.
mer being natural and the latter indus- and Malappuram is reported to have the For the operation of Vimukthi de-addic-
trial. While fermentation was a knowl- lowest alcohol consumption at 7.7%. The tion facilities and the state government’s
edge passed down across generations by southern districts reported a higher rate anti-drug campaign, Kerala Budget
communities, distillation required no of alcohol consumption than the north- 2022–23 allotted ₹9.43 crore (Times of
such traditional knowledge. The transi- ern districts. A slight positive relation- India 2023). As part of the Nasha Mukt
tion also occurred when taxes were im- ship exists between the per capita in- Bharat Abhiyaan under the National
posed on the commodity. It had the con- come of districts and alcohol consump- Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction
sequence of evolving unstable and com- tion. In addition, the frequency of alco- (NAPDDR) (Nambudiri 2021), a state-
plex relationships between the commod- hol consumption has declined in the wide campaign is being run to increase
ity and its various stakeholders. In addi- successive rounds of NFHS as people awareness of substance misuse among
tion, taxes on methanol were lower than move from being daily to occasional individuals in Kerala.
on ethanol, creating a conducive envi- drinkers. The percentage of people who
ronment to adulterate (Manoj 2018), drink in the “almost every week” catego- Drug Menace in Kerala
which became a reason for the state to ry is 11.2% in the third round of NFHS, An alarming increase in narcotics cases
come up with strict regulations on the declining to 9.2% in the fifth round. The has been reported in Kerala in the recent
alcohol business. “about once a week” is 27.5% in the third period. While 5,695 cases were reported
Liquor tax revenue has been a signifi- round of NFHS, and it increased to under the NDPS Act in 2021, it increased
cant source of revenue for Kerala since 40.6% in the fifth round. Two questions to 24,701 cases by November 2022 (show-
the ban on arrack in 1996. It continued confront policymakers in this context: ing a staggering rise of 333%). The ex-
up to the second decade of the 21st cen- (i) Has the demand for alcohol/intoxi- cise department’s database of NDPS cas-
tury. From 2015–16 to 2019–20, the tax cants reduced in the state because of a es increased from 3,922 in 2021 to 6,116
on alcohol has been increasing in Kerala dramatic increase in taxes? (ii) Should in 2022 (an increase of 55%). The inci-
and reached a level of 251% on the base the state be complacent if official data for dents registered over the same period
price. The tax was initially a weapon in alcohol consumption shows a decline? under the Abkari Act and NDPS Act con-
the hands of the state and a good instru- Elementary microeconomic theory sequently represent the structural chang-
ment to be resorted to reduce the con- suggests that a change in the price factors es in the consumption of alcohol and
sumption of alcohol. However, growing could lead to a movement along the de- drugs in the state. The Abkari Act con-
revenues from taxes on alcohol made mand curve without an actual shift in the solidates and amends the law relating
the government adopt discretionary tax curve. Continuous price rises of alcohol to the state’s import, export, transport,
increases to compensate for revenue due to tax hikes might have forced peo- manufacture, sale, and possession of in-
losses elsewhere. As of now, discretion- ple to consume less alcohol without an toxicating liquor. In contrast, the NDPS
ary increases have reached a zenith, and actual shift in the demand curve. There- Act, 1985 makes it illegal to produce,
the state government policy objective fore, it is challenging to conclude that the manufacture, cultivate, possess, sell, buy,
seems to have been realised, achieving a price rise of alcohol has led to a reduc- transport, store, use, or consume any
decline in liquor consumption in Kerala. tion in the consumption of intoxicants in narcotic drug or psychotropic substance.
The Kerala State Beverages Corporation, general in the first place. That is where Figure 1 (p 25) shows the number of
an official wing of the Government of the question of substitutes, especially incidents under each act in Kerala, divid-
Kerala, reported a decrease in liquor sales illegal drugs, gained prominence in the ed by the total number of cases in India
from 356 lakh cases to 334 lakh cases context of Kerala, in which the state wit- under both acts. The rate of incidents
from 2019–20 onwards. nessed a massive increase in drug con- under the Abkari Act was high in Kerala
According to the National Family Health sumption over the years, and is reported but showed a rise in 2008 and reached
Survey (NFHS), alcohol consumption in to have the highest number of de-addic- the rate of 13 in 2012, which fluctuated
the state has been declining; it was tion centres in Asia (Hindu 2022). around that level and has declined dras-
45.23% in the third round of the NFHS. It The Kerala Excise Department regis- tically since 2017. However, the inci-
consistently decreased to 26.02% in the tered 31,607 cases under the Narcotic dence rate under the NDPS Act was 2.6 in
fifth round of NFHS (2019–21). A severe Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) 2013, showed a drastic increase after
decline is noted in urban areas, where it Act, 1985 in the last five years (Praveen that, and reached a rate of 15 in 2017. The
was 53.24% in the third round, declining and Joseph 2022). In 2020, 5,674 people incidence rate slightly declined after that
24 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Figure 1: Rate of Incidents under the Abkari Act and the NDPS Act harmful drugs, while substances such as
16
NDPS Act, 1985
tobacco and marijuana ranked 10th and
12th. It must be remembered that the
14
Abkari Act state governments of India had their
12 own retail stores where all cannabis de-
rivatives, including marijuana, hashish,
10
and bhang, were legally sold (Times of
8 India 2012). When the NDPS Act was
passed in 1985, it prohibited all drugs,
6 including marijuana, hashish, and bhang,
along with hard drugs such as crack,
4
smack, heroin, and cocaine. Although
2 the risk remained the same, the earn-
ings from hard drugs were much larger;
0
thus, the entire trade shifted from mari-
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
juana, hashish, and bhang to hard drugs
Source: Compiled from annual reports of the National Crime Records Bureau.
such as smack, heroin, and cocaine (Times
but was consistently higher under the as well as long-term disabilities like blind- of India 2012).
Abkari Act. The relative increase in drug ness (Kumar and Prakash 2016). Given The NDPS Act, 1985 sets the frame-
consumption in the state, proxied by the the context, state governments adopt work for drug laws in India, which typical-
rise in incidence under the NSDP Act, is various discretionary policy measures ly punish ordinary drug users while drug
concomitantly associated with a fall in on alcohol, such as quantity restrictions, traffickers remain in business (Vidhi
incidents under the Abkari Act. This high taxes, licensing, and so on. However, 2024). Given the rise of drug abuse, a
shows the dynamic relationship bet- Kerala’s discretionary policies on alcohol state like Kerala can think of a similar
ween alcohol and drug consumption. need to be reviewed, given the rise in al- act like the Sikkim Anti-Drugs Act, 2006,
cohol substitutes. Effective alcohol strat- which decriminalises drug use and fo-
The Challenge egies must include a multilevel-cum-multi- cuses more on drug addiction as a health
The public policy challenge in Kerala is component approach and target multiple problem. Such policies avoid the fear of
addressing the impact of discretionary determinants of drinking and alcohol- arrest from drug users and create im-
alcohol policies, particularly given the related harms, such as availability, price, proved access to de-addiction centres
rise in alcohol substitutes such as illegal and marketing (WHO 2018). and other health services. As a result of
drugs. However, there is a causal rela- The conventional approach of illicit this act in Sikkim, the number of under-
tionship between alcohol access and drug control is to shrink the extent of trials for drug offences in the Gangtok
drug-related crimes in which an increase the black market, which contains several Central Jail has reduced dramatically
in alcohol access reduces drug-related negative externalities. Quality stand- from over 200 to just 66 (Vidhi 2024).
crimes (Conlin et al 2005). Therefore, ards are absent in the illicit market, and Therefore, the state government can
more studies are required to fully com- there are no channels for reporting in- think of a similar act that focuses on a
prehend the externalities of alcohol con- stances of fraud or deception, as coer- public health-based approach, such as
sumption in Kerala, particularly its con- cion is a constant factor, violence is a prevention, de-addiction, and treatment,
nections to the illicit drug market. possibility, and ultimately, precious to replace the current criminalised re-
The public policy dilemma also in- lives may be lost. The evidence shows sponse to drug abuse.
cludes finding an optimum balance be- that the prohibition of drugs could lead
tween tax revenues from the alcohol sec- to driving the product underground, References
tor and public expenditure needed to re- creating a black market for it (Miron Ananthpur, K (2018): “To Drink or Not to Drink—Is
Not the Question!” Economic & Political Weekly,
duce the possible health risks associated 2016). The state can also think of a poli- Vol 53, No 3, pp 46–52.
with alcohol consumption. Each state has cy change of legalising at least some Conlin, M, S Dickert-Conlin and J Pepper (2005):
political considerations when it comes to drugs and adopting appropriate regula- “The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on Illicit-
Drug-Related Crimes,” Journal of Law and Eco-
striking this balance (Ananthpur 2018); tions, such as taxes, sales restrictions, nomics, Vol 48, No 1, pp 215–34.
however, the state has a limit in prevent- advertising restrictions, and age-based Edman, J (2015): “Temperance and Modernity: Al-
ing excessive alcohol consumption to prohibition, given the easy access to the cohol Consumption as a Collective Problem,
1885–1913,” Journal of Social History, Vol 49,
reduce the adverse impact on health. illegal drugs market in Kerala. The gov- No 1, pp 20–52.
Moreover, states have the option of a ernment must determine the cost of GoK (2023): “The Kerala Abkari Policy 2023–24,”
total ban on alcohol, but extreme poli- drug consumption among various alter- Kerala Excise, Government of Kerala, https://
[Link]/wp-content/uploads/
cy measures like those implemented in native substances.
2023/07/[Link].
Bihar have resulted in the growth of il- Nutt et al (2007) estimated that alco- Hindu (2022): “Kerala Equipped to Tackle Sub-
legal alcohol markets and caused deaths hol ranked third on the list of most stance Abuse: Rishiraj Singh,” 25 June.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 25

COMMENTARY
Kumar, S and N Prakash (2016): “Bihar’s Alcohol on Drugs?” Center for Indonesian Policy Stud- Times of India (2012): “The Joint Campaign: Should
Ban,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 51, No 1, ies, 3 October. We Not Legalize Recreational Use of Canna-
pp 13–15. Nambudiri, S (2021): “Kerala Govt Set to Study bis?” 10 November.
Manoj, N Y (2018): “The Political Life of Alcohol in Drug Abuse Among Adolescents,” Times of — (2023): “Kerala Budget: Rs 15 Crore Set Aside
Kerala,” ISDA Journal, Vol 28, No 1, pp 1–30. India, 7 October. for Anti-drug Activities,” 4 February.
Menon, D M (1995): “From Pleasure to Taboo: Nutt, D, L A King, W Saulsbury and C Blakemore Vidhi (2024): “Reshaping the Public Narrative on
Drinking and Society in Kerala,” India Inter- (2007): “Development of a Rational Scale to Drug Laws in India,” Vidhi Centre for Legal
national Centre Quarterly, Vol 22, Nos 2 and 3, Assess the Harm of Drugs of Potential Misuse,” Policy, [Link]
pp 143–56. Lancet, Vol 360, No 9566, pp 1047–53. the-public-narrative-on-drug-laws-in-india/.
Miron, J (2016): “Prohibition Harms the Weakest: Praveen, M P and A M Joseph (2022): “On the Sub- WHO (2018): “Global Status Report on Alcohol and
Does Consumer Irrationality Justify the War stance Abuse Trail in Kerala,” Hindu, 12 November. Health 2018,” World Health Organization.

26 SEPTEMBER 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

Missing in Policy Maharashtra, Dudhgaon and Kavathe-

piran, each shaped by distinct yet en-
during configurations of caste domi-
Caste and Functional Exclusion in nance and agrarian capital. Through in-
Rural Infrastructure Development terviews and site observations, we dem-
onstrate that road infrastructure is not
implemented on an even social terrain.
Sandeep Hegade, Yogini Andalgavkarkulkarni Rather, it is shaped by informal influ-
ence, elite mediation, and institutional

I
Infrastructure, especially in the nfrastructure holds a privileged and practices that privilege dominant caste
rural areas, is not caste-neutral. largely unchallenged status within interests. Even when Scheduled Caste
India’s developmental imagination. (SC) settlements are not spatially by-
Caste hierarchies mediate access
Rural roads, in particular, are valorised as passed, their ability to derive benefit from
to and benefits of rural instruments of progress—connecting road connectivity is significantly cur-
infrastructure in Maharashtra. isolated habitations to markets, health- tailed. What emerges is a condition of
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork care, education, and state services. The functional exclusion, wherein the pres-
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana ence of infrastructure does not translate
in two villages, the article reveals
(PMGSY), launched in 2000, exemplifies into mobility, access, or economic gain
that Scheduled Caste settlements, this ethos. Celebrated as a technocratic for marginalised communities.
though not always spatially success, the programme is defined by These findings challenge the techno-
excluded, face functional exclusion quantifiable metrics—kilometres con- cratic ideal of infrastructure as a univer-
structed and villages connected—while sally levelling force. Caste-blind policy,
due to limited capital and
presenting itself as a politically neutral far from being neutral, constitutes a
institutional influence. Challenging and universally beneficial scheme. mode of governance that reproduces
the fiction of caste-neutral Yet, embedded within this narrative spatial hierarchies and material disad-
development, the article argues of inclusive connectivity lies a persistent vantage under the guise of develop-
epistemic omission: the absence of caste ment. This article calls for a critical re-
for embedding caste as a central
as an analytic in infrastructure policy. thinking of infrastructure policy—one
analytic in infrastructure and Despite its role in structuring access, mobi- that foregrounds caste not as a periph-
policy design to ensure equitable lity, and opportunity in rural India, caste eral demographic marker but as a struc-
and socially just outcomes. remains excluded from both the design turing axis of spatial justice. Only by
and evaluation of infrastructural inter- confronting the political economy of
ventions. As Mosse (2018) argues, such exclusion embedded in rural connecti-
The authors thank the anonymous reviewer for silence reflects a broader epistemological vity can development begin to fulfil its
their insightful feedback which helped strengthen erasure within development discourse, egalitarian promise.
the clarity and structure of this article.
where caste is seen as antithetical to mo-
Sandeep Hegade (sandeephegade@[Link]) is dernity rather than central to it. Similarly, Research Design and Rationale
with the Ashank Desai Centre for Policy Studies, Cox and Koglin (2020) remind us that in- This article emerges from ethnographic
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay.
Yogini Andalgavkarkulkarni (p20230526@
frastructure is not merely technical; it is fieldwork conducted between December
[Link]) teaches at Rajarambapu political, constituting material expressions 2024 and January 2025 in two caste-
Institute of Technology, Sangli and is a research of social power and spatial inequality. stratified villages in western Maharash-
scholar at the Department of Economics and This article interrogates these tensions tra. The first one is Dudhgaon, a Jain-
Finance, BITS Pilani, Hyderabad Campus, through a study based on ethnographic Digambar-dominated village with a small
Telangana.
fieldwork in two villages in western SC population (6.38%), historically tied to
16 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

mercantile networks and cooperative as “logistical revolutions” that amplified caste-coded myths that prop up deve-
capitalism. The second village is Kavath- their market reach and profitability. lopment’s glossy facade.
epiran, a Maratha-dominated agrarian By contrast, SC respondents, most of
hub with a larger SC presence (16.26%), whom are landless labourers or marginal Rethinking Development
shaped by the region’s sugar politics and cultivators, experienced no comparable The findings of this article challenge the
feudal legacies (Census of India 2011). transformation. Lacking both productive prevailing notion of infrastructure as a
Both villages are the recipients of PMGSY assets and institutional support, their neutral and universal equaliser. While
roads, and show the nexus of caste domi- proximity to infrastructure did not trans- the PMGSY performs effectively on tech-
nance and economic power in rural Maha- late into economic opportunity. Instead, nical metrics, such as kilometres con-
rashtra. Using ethnography and 60 in- they remained embedded in subsistence structed and habitations formally con-
depth interviews with respondents across economies, their relative immobility nected, it falters in its capacity to address
caste and institutional positions, the study underscoring a broader condition of func- the deep-seated social asymmetries
traces the everyday practices that shape tional exclusion. This asymmetry reveals embedded within rural geographies. By
infrastructure outcomes. While not statis- that rural roads, while physically acces- omitting caste as an analytical and opera-
tically generalisable, the cases offer the- sible, do not confer equal benefit; rather, tional category, infrastructure policy con-
oretical depth through “thick description” they operate within a socio-spatial econ- tributes to the reproduction of spatial
(Geertz 2008), illuminating how caste omy where caste structures mediate hierarchies, enabling dominant castes to
structures operate within the ostensibly who gains and who remains left behind. convert connectivity into economic and
neutral logic of state-led development. political advantage, while functionally
Informal Influence and excluding SC communities from its trans-
Key Findings Elite Capture formative potential.
Road planning is not a technocratic exer- This is not an unintended outcome,
Connectivity without inclusion: Al- cise but a political one, riddled with but a structural feature of caste-blind
though SC localities are often situated informal influence. A crucial but often governance, wherein the rhetoric of neu-
near or along PMGSY roads, the benefits of overlooked dimension of this process is trality serves to obscure institutionalised
connectivity, such as access to transport the role of entrenched political elites. patterns of neglect and exclusion. The
services, markets, and economic mobility, While the PMGSY guidelines formally man- stakes of this exclusion are not merely
tend to disproportionately serve the dom- date that the priorities of elected repre- developmental but moral and political.
inant caste groups. This reflects a deeper sentatives, such as members of Parliament Rural roads are not inert artefacts of state
institutional exclusion, wherein develop- and members of the legislative assembly, planning; they are instruments that shape
ment projects are aligned with existing be “duly taken into account and given access to markets, healthcare, education,
caste-capital structures. In both these vil- full consideration” (NRIDA 2012), this pro- and ultimately, dignity. When infrastruc-
lages, while the main road connects the vision institutionalises elite mediation ture bypasses or underserves historically
core, SC residents remain underserved by within infrastructure planning process- marginalised communities, it compounds
ancillary infrastructure or transport ac- es. In the study region, both the politi- cumulative disadvantage and reproduces
cess, resulting in limited capacity to con- cal constituency and financial institu- caste-based inequities under the guise of
vert infrastructure access into social or tions, including cooperatives and agri- technocratic objectivity.
economic mobility. cultural societies, are disproportionate- Addressing these inequities demands
The economic dividends of rural con- ly influenced and controlled by domi- a paradigmatic shift, one that fore-
nectivity are distributed unevenly along nant caste groups. This consolidation of grounds caste not as a residual demo-
caste lines, reflecting entrenched hier- power reinforces a political economy of graphic variable but as a constitutive
archies of capital, landownership, and development, wherein caste dominance axis of development. Infrastructure must
institutional access. In both villages, and political incumbency converge to be reimagined not only as a mechanism
the Jain and Maratha landowning groups shape the spatial and distributive out- for physical connectivity, but as a tool
reported significant benefits from im- comes of infrastructure provision. for social justice capable of confronting
proved road infrastructure—expedited Upper-caste respondents framed infra- entrenched hierarchies and enabling
sugar cane transport, reduced input costs, structure success as a reward for their equitable inclusion.
and the expansion of commercial ven- “hard work” and “entrepreneurial spirit,”
tures such as petty shops and transport casting SC exclusion as a natural outcome Inclusive Infrastructure Policy
services. These gains reveal how domi- of laziness or dependency. This moralising Redressing the functional exclusion of
nant caste groups, endowed with eco- narrative echoes colonial and neo-liberal marginalised communities requires a
nomic and social capital, are structural- tropes of deservingness, absolving struc- fundamental shift in how infrastructure
ly positioned to convert connectivity tural inequities. The SC respondents is conceptualised, designed, and evalu-
into upward mobility. Local shopkeep- countered with their own accounts of ated. Planning processes must embed
ers, predominantly from upper-caste landlessness, denial of access to credit, indicators of social vulnerability from
backgrounds, described these changes and systemic neglect, exposing the the earliest stages of project formulation.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 17
COMMENTARY

Caste must be treated not as a residual training in infrastructure policy, budget gains of connectivity, while SCs, despite
demographic variable but as a central oversight, and participatory planning tools. their formal inclusion in planning geo-
analytical category in rural planning. Given the social risks faced by these actors, graphies, remain functionally and struc-
Utilising disaggregated data from the especially when confronting dominant turally excluded from its benefits.
census, especially the socio-economic caste interests, there is an urgent need for Rural roads, often celebrated as sym-
and caste census, the planners should protective mechanisms, like anonymous bols of inclusive progress, emerge here
explicitly map SC localities to ensure whistle-blower channels, safeguarded as spatial artefacts of unequal power
their spatial and institutional visibility grievance redress platforms, and legal aid relations. Their alignments, usages, and
in road alignments. The development networks. Civil society mentorship pro- economic dividends are deeply mediated
and operationalisation of a social equity grammes can further empower reserved by local hierarchies of caste and capital.
index can serve as a redistributive representatives with the normative and The PMGSY’s technical achievements
framework, guiding the allocation of re- political resources needed to act as agents obscure a deeper failure: its inability to
sources towards historically excluded of equity. democratise access to mobility, opportu-
geographies. Feasibility studies should Crucially, infrastructure must not be nity, and dignity. Infrastructure, in this
include mandatory equity assessments conceptualised in isolation from broader light, is not a neutral conduit of develop-
that compel engineers and planners to redistributive frameworks. Road connec- ment but a site where historical injustices
justify alignment decisions in relation to tivity alone cannot overcome entrenched are either reproduced or redressed.
caste-based settlement patterns and ac- disadvantage, unless paired with coordi- True connectivity, therefore, cannot
cess disparities. nated interventions in land reform, hous- be measured solely in kilometres paved
While participatory mechanisms such ing, education, and livelihood generation. or villages linked. It must be redefined
as the gram sabha are constitutionally Targeted PMGSY sub-schemes should be through the lens of social justice, requir-
mandated, they frequently operate as introduced for SC/ST hamlets, fast-track- ing a reckoning with caste-based disad-
formalistic rituals that obscure rather than ing neglected areas through equity-led vantage, participatory accountability, and
address caste power asymmetries. To planning. Such investments should be redistributive intent. A caste-conscious
ensure meaningful participation, plan- coupled with access to microcredit and approach to infrastructure does not under-
ning processes must proactively engage MGNREGA enhancements in Dalit-majority mine the developmental project; rather,
SC/ST communities through door-to- localities to support economic mobility it strengthens it by ensuring that the
door outreach, the provision of linguis- beyond mere physical access. benefits of public investment are equitably
tic and cultural facilitators, and targeted Finally, the metrics by which infra- shared. Building an inclusive rural India
invitations. Enhancing procedural trans- structure is assessed must be redefined. demands more than engineering exper-
parency requires that proposed road Moving beyond the technocratic obses- tise; it calls for ethical vision, political
alignments be made publicly available sion with kilometres built, evaluations will, and the courage to confront the
digitally and in vernacular formats, must incorporate caste-disaggregated question too often left unanswered:
alongside justifications for the rejection outcomes and qualitative indicators of Who remains excluded, and why?
of alternative alignments. Participatory lived experience. These might include
mapping techniques, including GIS-ena- reductions in travel time to clinics or References
bled community workshops, should be schools, ease of market access, or per- Census of India (2011): “Primary Census Abstract,
institutionalised to incorporate subal- ceived improvements in social mobility. Maharashtra – Village and Town Wise Primary
Census Abstract (PCA),” Office of the Registrar
tern knowledge into planning. The annual reports of public policies
General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of
Post-construction, equity must be con- should visualise the distribution of in- Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi,
tinuously monitored through third-party frastructural benefits across caste and [Link]
Cox, P and T Koglin (2020): The Politics of Cycling
equity impact assessments, designed to space, making visible the inequities that
Infrastructure: Spaces and (In)Equality Great,
evaluate the differential distribution of often remain obscured in dominant de- Britain: Policy Press.
benefits across caste, class, and gender. A velopment narratives. Geertz, C (2008): “Thick Description: Toward an
disaggregated, publicly accessible PMGSY Interpretive Theory of Culture,” Cultural Geog-
raphy Reader, pp 41–51, Routledge, [Link]
dashboard could serve as a key transpar- Conclusions [Link]/chapters/edit/10.4324/
ency tool, enabling social audits and The article foregrounds a critical paradox 9780203931950-11/thick-description-toward-
interpretive-theory-culture-clifford-geertz.
real-time accountability. Annual spatial at the heart of India’s rural development
Mosse, D (2018): “Caste and Development: Contem-
equity audits should be institutionalised paradigm: caste neutrality in infrastruc- porary Perspectives on Structure of Discrimi-
as corrective mechanisms to detect pat- ture planning is less a marker of techno- nation and Advantage,” World Development,
Vol 110, pp 422–36, [Link]
terns of systematic bypass and recom- cratic impartiality than a mechanism of
worlddev.2018.06.003.
mend spatial rebalancing. institutionalised erasure. By systemati- NRIDA (2012): “Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana:
Institutional capacity must also be cally omitting caste as a category of analy- Programme Guidelines,” (3rd ed), National
Rural Infrastructure Development Agency,
strengthened at the grassroots level. Re- sis and intervention, the state enables a
Ministry of Rural Development, Government
served panchayat representatives from governance regime in which dominant of India, [Link]
SC/ST communities require structured castes disproportionately capture the PMGSY_Guidelines.pdf.

18 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

NOTES

life and overall well-being of the

Seasonal Migration, Gender, migrant households.

and the Maharashtra Female Migrants, Power

Structures, and Polyvictimisation
Migration Tracking System Female migrants are crucial stakehold-
ers in achieving sustainable and equitable
socio-economic development. However,
Kuldeepsingh Rajput, Manoj Jatav they face multiple vulnerabilities at both
their place of origin and destination,

S
Female seasonal migrants are easonal internal migration is a remaining largely excluded. Their migra-
the key stakeholders in bringing common coping livelihood strat- tion is deeply influenced by sociocultural
egy among rural households. It gender norms that reinforce gendered
sustainable and equitable
usually involves the migration of la- power relations in the labour market,
socio-economic development. bourers from areas of lesser demand which favours men (Bhagat 2017). At
Considering their precarity, the for labour to those with higher demand, both ends of migration, these structures
Government of Maharashtra particularly during the post-harvesting perpetuate patriarchal dominance, lim-
season in October and November (Shah iting female migrants’ economic oppor-
has developed an app-based
2021). Such a pattern of migration is tunities (Rai 2020). Consequently, they
Migration Tracking System to supposed to be functionally crucial in endure discrimination as both migrants
enumerate and track inter- and poverty reduction as it might bring eco- and women, compounded by economic
intra-state migrating children, nomic welfare. However, it is primarily deprivation and cultural biases (Bhagat
for survival rather than well-being or 2017; ILO 2020; Rajput and Jatav 2022).
pregnant women, and lactating
profit and exacerbates the poverty trap Their mobility and access to resources
mothers and facilitate the (Nienkerkea et al 2023). The earnings are controlled by patriarchal institutions,
delivery of services. Although the from such migration are mostly utilised making them systemically dependent on
Maha-MTS model seeks to take for debt repayment and day-to-day male partners.
expenses (Jaleel and Chattopadhyay For instance, Maharashtra’s “Jodi or
a rights-based approach and is a
2019), hence, this form of mobility Koyto” system in sugar cane farming man-
welcome development, certain becomes extremely distressed. Among dates hiring couples, restricting women’s
challenges need to be addressed all types of migrants, temporary, sea- employment prospects without a male
to make it more productive sonally migrating groups are one of counterpart (Oxfam India 2020; Das et al
the most vulnerable and disenfran- 2022). This system acknowledges only
and comprehensive.
chised groups in India (ILO 2020) and males as workers, rendering female labour
experience multiple exploitation at invisible (Srivastava 2020; Jayaram et al
different levels. Looking into the socio- 2019). Women are confined to the lowest
demographic picture, it is evident that tiers of the labour hierarchy, rarely valued
seasonal migration is critical to the as productive resources, and remain sec-
livelihoods of socially deprived ondary to male co-workers (ILO 2020).
groups, especially tribals (Keshri and This marginalisation exacerbates their
Bhagat 2012). vulnerability and economic dependence
During a specific time of the year, (Jaleel and Chattopadhyay 2019).
the pre-harvest lean season, house- Precarious working conditions expose
The authors thank the reviewer for thoughtful holds face a scarcity of work and an female migrants and adolescent girls to
comments and valuable feedback, which have increasing frequency of skipped violence and exploitation. Many face
contributed to enhancing the clarity and depth meals (Mobarak and Reimão 2020). sexual harassment, coercion for favours,
of the article.
This exacerbates indebtedness and and, in extreme cases, assault by em-
Kuldeepsingh Rajput (rajputkdr@[Link]) food insecurity among households, ployers and middlemen (Das et al 2022).
is the chief executive officer and founder
creating despairing conditions that Some fall victim to trafficking or are
of Rubal Foundation (Maharashtra) and
a postdoctoral fellow at the International ultimately lead to distress-driven forced into sex work for survival (UNESCO
Institute of Migration and Development, seasonal migration. Such seasonal and UNICEF 2012). Safety concerns push
Thiruvananthapuram. Manoj Jatav (jatavjnu@ mobility brings temporary relief but young girls into migration with parents,
[Link]) is a fellow at the V V Giri National does not necessarily bring a signifi- often leading to school dropouts (Adhikari
Labour Institute, Noida.
cant change in the socioeconomic and Shree 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 67
NOTES
Figure 1: Percentage Distribution of Female and Male the loading process (Oxfam parents took advantage of the situation
Workers in India by Usual Employment Status* during
pre-COVID-19 (2018–19) and Peak-pandemic (2020–21) India 2020). After prolonged (Chakraborty 2020). However, such early
Periods (age 15–59 years) standing and bending, overex- marriages created a pathetic situation
100 ertion and strenuous work at for migrating girls in adolescent age,
10.3 11.1 14.2 14.8
90
28.9 26.2 29.5 28.0 the site, they have to look after consequently resulting in early pregnan-
80
70 9.5
domestic responsibilities and cies (15–17 years), delivering in the ab-
11.6 51.4 15.5 14.9
60 56.0 48.9 47.1 care work. All these elements sence of a trained birth attendant, fre-
%

50 9.8 11.8 adversely affect female workers’ quent childbirth, no exclusive breast-
40 38.0 42.5
12.2
4.2 4.6 bodies, resulting in back and feeding for the first six months, and no
30 9.4
20 45.2 45.3 hip pain, neck pain, swelling of complementary feeding (UNESCO 2013).
32.7 33.5
10 21.4 21.8 24.3 25.3 limbs, and joint pain, causing It has been observed that many urban
0 many musculoskeletal disorders. female migrants preferred home deliv-
2018–19 2020–21 2018–19 2020–21 2018–19 2020–21 2018–19 2020–21
(79.3) (116.9) (26.9) (30.8) (221.3) (239.0) (102.3) (102.0) Jaleel and Chattopadhyay (2019), eries (Borhade 2012). It can be perilous
Rural Urban Rural Urban in their study on seasonal mi- due to the lack of medical supervision,
Female Male grants of Beed district in Maha- increasing the risk of complications
SE: OAW/E SE: UFW RS CL rashtra, found a high prevalence during childbirth, which might lead to
Total number of workers (in millions), adjusted with the census population of non-communicable diseases, an increase in incidences of maternal
projected for the corresponding year, are given in parentheses; especially back and joint pains or infant mortality. Access to healthcare
SE: OAW/E – self-employed: own account worker/employer;
SE: UFW = self-employed: unpaid family worker; RS – regular salaried; (musculoskeletal disorders) at destination centres is critical for de-
CL – casual labourer. among female migrants, on ac- termining the health status of female
*Usual principal and subsidiary statuses are combined.
Source: Annual unit-level estimates, Periodic Labour Force Surveys, count of their working conditions. seasonal migrants; however, its indica-
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, The lack of awareness and tors remain poor due to expensive private
Government of India.
unhygienic, risky living and health facilities, conflicting timing of
intensified these hardships, disproportion- working conditions are ground realities work and availability of medical practi-
ately affecting women’s employment and that have severe consequences on the tioners, cost of missing hours of work,
increasing their unpaid labour burden sexual and reproductive health of fe- long distances to access services, as well
(Foley and Piper 2020; Rajput et al 2022). male migrants. For them, the situation as language barriers (UNESCO 2013).
gets worse and more humiliating during Migrants are often highly vulnerable
Profound Vulnerability of Health their menstrual cycles because of the in- to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
Migration itself is a social determinant ability to maintain menstrual hygiene risk (UNAIDS 2014). There is a signifi-
of the health of migrants, as their travel- due to the lack of toilets and water, caus- cant association between seasonal la-
ling, living, and working conditions often ing urinary tract infections, fungal and bour migration and HIV risk (Saggurti
carry exceptional risks to their physical bacterial infections, leading to pelvic et al 2012). Male migrants are commonly
and mental well-being (Global Migration inflammatory diseases (PID), vaginitis referred to as the “bridge population”
Group 2017). Seasonal female migrants and uterine infections of several forms because they serve as conduits for infec-
face several health-related issues due to and, in extreme cases, leading to cervical tion transmission between high-risk
their hazardous working conditions and cancer (Adhikari and Shree 2020). The groups, such as female sex workers,
work environment, and lack of access to hard labour at the worksite led to re- and the low-risk general population,
basic amenities such as healthcare ser- curring and untreated gynaecological primarily their spouses (Abdulkader et al
vices, clean water and sanitation, subsi- issues, forcing young women to undergo 2015). Consequently, female migrants
dised food, nutrition, and adequate hysterectomies (Shelar 2019). Despite remain highly vulnerable to HIV-AIDS,
housing. Hence, this poses a serious and such dangerous repercussions, female sexually transmitted diseases, and as-
particular concern for female migrants. migrants suffer in silence because of sociated risks caused by their husbands’
Work conditions at the destination the stigma around their hygiene issues mobility.
places remain a critical determinant for (UNESCO 2013). The perpetuation of patriarchal values
pushing female migrants at a greater Early (and forced) marriages (13–18 contributes to violence, exacerbating
health risk. Working in extremely haz- years) are prevalent among poor migrat- the mental health struggles of female
ardous, difficult, and unsafe conditions ing families, which is another grave con- migrants. They frequently bear the
(Borhade 2012) directly causes severe cern. Chakraborty (2020) observed that brunt of displaced frustrations from
health risks to them. In the case of cane- amid the COVID-19 pandemic in India, their husbands or male counterparts,
cutters, seasonal migrants in Maharashtra, with the influx of returning migrants to intensifying their crisis. The stress and
female workers head-load cane bundles their villages, parents were arranging depression among male workers are re-
and carry a heavy weight of 40–45 kilo- marriages for their daughters to protect leased, exposed, and directed towards
grams on trucks or trolleys. This loading them and prevent unwanted romantic their wives (who are often their coun-
usually occurs after sunset (late even- entanglements. Also, it became less ex- terparts at work) by subjecting them to
ing), resulting in several accidents during pensive due to the lockdown norms, and violence and abuse.
68 september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
NOTES

The health of children is also terribly development of origin and destination remained underresearched (Jaleel and
impacted by the seasonal migration. places (Global Migration Group 2017). Chattopadhyay 2022). Therefore, it is
Migrating children frequently have to go The inability to “delineate the scope, critical to categorise them appropriately
without meals, some become malnour- scale, patterns, aspirations and micro- by the reason for real migration.
ished and lose weight, and miss out on level realities” of female migration is
their immunisation schedule (Das et al nothing but a reflection of how their Maha-MTS: An Initiative
2022). Migrant children are likely to be gender identity is not adequately taken to Enumerate
underweight and suffer from diarrhoea into consideration in developing migrant- Seasonal migration in Maharashtra,
(UNICEF 2020). Migration also has a neg- related development strategies and poli- which has played a critical role in the
ative impact on the psychosocial, emo- cies (Majumdar et al 2013). The benefits economic development of the state, is
tional health of children. A field study of migration to female migrants remain closely linked to the seasonality in agri-
revealed that many children were dis- underinvestigated (UNESCO and UNICEF culture. It usually occurs in the post-
satisfied with the conditions at their des- 2012). It is equally essential to mention monsoon months of October and Novem-
tinations and often experienced feelings that the reasons for migration are most ber, and the return journey takes place in
of sadness, stress, anxiety, or depression often reported by the head of the house- the summer months of April and May
(Das et al 2022). hold, who is usually a man (Bhagat (Das et al 2022). As per the Census 2011,
2017), ignoring the aspirations of female Maharashtra has the highest number of
Feminisation of Migration migrants. Consequently, the employment seasonal migrants (19.07%) in India for
and Androcentric Data aspirations and status after “migration employment/work-related reasons (PIB
The latest available normal-time migra- for marriage” have been overlooked, mis- 2022). Seasonal migration is a crucial
tion data,1 that is, Census 2011, indicates understood, and mismeasured (ILO 2020). feature of rural livelihoods and is a cop-
the trend of the feminisation of internal Female migrants appear to have dif- ing and survival strategy to deal with
migration for reasons related to marriage ferent migration motivations, patterns, acute unemployment and income unpre-
and movement of household, in which and options, and obstacles from their dictability (Jaleel and Chattopadhyay
females constitute an overwhelming male counterparts (UNESCO and UNICEF 2022). Despite the huge volume of sea-
majority (Table 1). The share of females 2012). Migration can be a forced or sonal migrants in Maharashtra, they re-
in total migration for business also bonded movement, making the experi- mained critically marginalised due to
seems to be increasing over the period, ences during migration and in the post- the lack of an adequate inclusion policy.
from 2001 to 2011; however, it is less migration period particularly disturbing To ensure the effectiveness of an
than that of their counterparts. The mi- (Jaleel and Chattopadhyay 2022). Spe- inclusion policy, it is essential to have
gration discourses and information are cifically, the gender dimension in the timely access to a dependable, credible,
generally not only suffering from inad- health and nutrition status of seasonal thorough, and comprehensive migration
equacy, paucity, and ambiguity but are migrants remains underexplored (Das database. Inadequate data functions as a
also considered androcentric or gender- et al 2022). The females experience pov- critical apparatus for the exclusion of
less. In the data and literature, female erty, climate change, food insecurity, migrants and creates significant gaps in
migrants are predominantly perceived/ unemployment, health issues, and edu- welfare schemes. Therefore, creating a
portrayed as “marriage migrants” (ILO cation of migrating children differently database of seasonal migrants is a pre-
2020) or as left-behind or associational from males, which the migration data requisite for policymakers, demographers,
migrants or family followers (Jaleel and should capture. Therefore, gender-spe- and other development stakeholders to
Chattopadhyay 2022). cific migration experiences still need to frame welfare policies and ensure social
Female migrants are frequently seen be adequately addressed in the contem- protection. Considering the multidimen-
as vulnerable dependents, rather than as porary discourse on migration (UNESCO sional vulnerability of (seasonal) female
migrant workers contributing to the and UNICEF 2012). Female migration has migrants in particular, the inclusion poli-
cy must be evidence-based, data-driven
Table 1: Distribution of Seasonal Migrants (duration less than 1 year) in India and Maharashtra by and in line with local contexts, gendered
Reason for Migration, 2001–11
Reason for Migration Total Migrants (in millions) Females (%) realities, and associated vulnerabilities.
India Maharashtra India Maharashtra In early 2021, the chief minister of
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 Maharashtra visited Palghar district,
Work/employment 20.7 31.6 6.2 7.0 24.2 20.8 26.2 22.7
observing the challenges faced by seasonal
Business 1.1 1.4 0.1 0.2 23.6 26.7 18.1 39.3
Education 3.6 8.3 0.7 1.2 32.8 42.5 31.3 36.7
migrants and expressing concern for their
Marriage 14.0 37.7 1.4 3.8 98.1 97.2 98.7 96.6 well-being. His observations led to
Moved after birth 7.0 16.1 2.1 3.5 47.7 47.8 46.9 46.5 the establishment of a State Migration
Moved with the household 27.7 47.3 6.9 8.6 59.1 58.1 59.1 57.5 Committee under the leadership of the
Others 13.9 31.1 2.6 6.0 50.0 46.7 51.2 44.4 Integrated Child Development Services
Total migrants 88.1 173.7 19.8 30.3 53.2 55.8 48.2 49.6
Migrants are classified based on place of last residence, excluding overseas migration.
(ICDS) commissioner. It was to ensure
Sources: Census of India, 2001 and 2011. interoperability of universal health and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 69
NOTES

nutrition benefits/schemes during the administered by the anganwadi workers. a strong political will and institutional
period of seasonal migration so that service Initially, only intra-state seasonal migrants mechanism. Hence, it is crucial to iden-
delivery to the migrant beneficiaries con- in Maharashtra were enumerated and reg- tify the key challenges and prospects
tinues uninterrupted.2 The recommenda- istered. Subsequently, seasonal migrants to make Maha-MTS more productive
tions include ensuring nutrition, immu- from other states were also included in the and comprehensive.
nisation, early childhood care, and pro- registration process. After tracking the First, parallel to Maha-MTS, another
tection for all children aged 0 to 18 years, targeted set of women and children, the mobile-based application, the Poshan-
pregnant women, and lactating mothers Maha-MTS has envisioned providing all tracking was rolled out in 2021 under
from seasonal migrant families at both the welfare services belonging specifically the Prime Minister’s Overarching Scheme
the source and destination areas (Das et to the ICDS and the Integrated Child for Holistic Nourishment (POSHAN)
al 2022). An app-based migration tracking Protection Scheme (ICPS). According to Abhiyaan (also known as the National
system, Maharashtra Migration Tracking the official Maha-MTS website dashboard, Nutrition Mission) of the Ministry of
System (Maha-MTS) model, developed as of 15 May 2024, 15% of the total regis- Women and Child Development, Gov-
by the Department of Women and Child tered migration (26,897 individuals) origi- ernment of India, to track and monitor
Development, Government of Maha- nated from other states. nutrition status and services for the
rashtra, with the help of a start-up called pregnant women, lactating mothers,
SETTribe, was introduced to enumerate Pertinent Challenges and and children. In addition to the Maha-
and track children, pregnant women, the Way Forward MTS, anganwadi workers also handle
and lactating mothers, and facilitate the The necessity to register migrants in beneficiary registration for the Poshan-
delivery of services. In 2021–22, a pilot India was initially recognised with the tracking system. The primary distinc-
testing of Maha-MTS was implemented in enactment of the Inter-state Migrant tion between the Maha-MTS and Poshan
Jalna, Amravati, Nandurbar, Chandrapur, Workmen (Regulation of Employment tracking projects lies in their beneficiary
Palghar, and Gadchiroli districts of Maha- and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979. focus; the former registers seasonal
rashtra. In the next phase, the statewide Unfortunately, till the COVID-19 pan- migrant populations, whereas the latter
Maha-MTS—a revised system based on demic, the significance of enumerating covers all villagers. Both systems docu-
pilot testing—has been developed. the internal seasonal migrants to ensure ment the health status of beneficiaries.
The pilot study’s selected districts are social security protection coverage for Considering potential challenges with
predominantly tribal, characterised by them and their meaningful inclusion anganwadi worker availability and other
severe issues such as acute malnutrition, was largely overlooked. Millions of human resource constraints, there arises
related illnesses, early marriages, and migrants remained undocumented, ex- a question about the necessity of main-
mortality among children and women. cluded and, hence, invisible. Hence, any taining two separate tracking systems
These challenges disproportionately government initiative to enumerate with similar characteristics, one at the
affect children and female migrants. migrants, whether through the e-Shram state level and another at the central
Migrants in these areas are also food portal, the Maha-MTS, or other methods, level. This duplication could lead to inef-
and climate migrants, typically beginning should be appreciated. However, the fective implementation and underutili-
their seasonal migration to nearby vil- enumeration of migrants is ineffective sation of limited human resources.
lages, towns, and cities after the monsoon. without using it for framing a robust social Second, to strengthen social inclusion
They often find employment in the in- protection framework, which stems from of seasonal female migrants and their
formal sector, including brick kilns, con-
struction, stone crushing, sugar factories, National Conference & Research Workshop
and sugar cane cutting. Their return on Plantation and Development
migration starts before the monsoon,
Organized by
during kharif, for sowing in the fields.
Given the health vulnerability of tribal National Research Programme on Plantation Development, CDS,
Thiruvananthapuram, Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change & Development
migrants, particularly females, and their (OKDISCD), Guwahati, Department of Geography, Sikkim University.
limited healthcare access, the ICDS has
Venue: OKDISCD, Guwahati, Assam
focused on these tribal districts. It initi-
Seven-Day Residential Capacity-Building Workshop on Plantation and Development
ated migrant enumeration via the Maha-
Dates 27 Oct–2 Nov 2025
MTS, an app-based registration platform.
National Conference: Production, Employment and Marketing of Plantation Crops in India
Here, anganwadi workers input demo- Dates 3–4 Nov 2025
graphic and health information of Open to PhD Scholars, Young Faculty, and Researchers in Plantation Studies & Social Sciences.
migrants and their children, categorising Selected participants will receive travel support, accommodation, and certificates.
them by nutritional status. Subsequently, Important Deadlines:
nutritional benefits are provided to Workshop Applications: 21 Sept 2025
Conference Abstracts: 14 Sept 2025
migrant children at their new destinations
For details & submissions: [Link]; [Link]
through the app-based portability system
70 september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
NOTES

children, we propose expanding the governments and other stakeholders nature, offering guidelines for necessary
Maha-MTS system to encompass all fe- design vulnerability-specific intervention adjustments. The Smart India Hackathon,3
male migrant workers rather than limit- strategies for seasonal migrants. Incor- a central government initiative to improve
ing it to pregnant and lactating mothers. porating a real-time vulnerability index governance and effective implementation,
This broader coverage, facilitated into the Maha-MTS system would have may be converged at the state level for
through inter-ministerial collaboration, been crucial for ensuring timely and improving app-based solutions, such as the
would enable improved access to essen- targeted interventions. Given the vola- MTS. Effective coordination and political
tial services such as nutrition, health- tile nature of vulnerability, a dynamic harmony between central and state gov-
care, education, and skill development. assessment framework, updated period- ernments, as well as among states, are
By fostering coordinated efforts among ically rather than as a one-time static ex- essential prerequisites for the smooth
ministries, including labour and em- ercise, can help capture shifts in socio- operation of such an interstate MTS.
ployment, education, skill development economic and health conditions, mobility, Fifth, the requirement for identity cards
and entrepreneurship, social justice and employment status, and access to wel- such as Aadhaar or PAN to register on the
empowerment, women and child devel- fare schemes among the migrants. For Maha-MTS portal serves as a barrier in
opment, health and family welfare, rural this purpose, a defined set of parameters the registration process. An anganwadi
development, panchayati raj, jal shakti, must be established to assess the level of worker from Nandurbar district said:4
housing and urban affairs, and others, vulnerability. By leveraging technology, Some female migrants still lack Aadhaar or
the system can effectively bridge service such as automated data analytics, real- ration cards, and many have not updated
gaps and provide sustained support, time interactive dashboarding, and peri- their Aadhaar details. Several do not have a
thereby enhancing the overall well-being odic assessment surveys, the system permanent mobile number, while some use
their husband’s number instead. Aadhaar is
and empowerment of female migrants could provide more responsive support.
a prerequisite to claim entitlements. Some-
and their children. However, implementing a real-time times, we identify a female migrant as a
Third, it is high time we realise the vulnerability and risk ranking poses potential claimant. However, we could not
relevance of a holistic approach in un- challenges, including administrative assist without her Aadhaar card, and, in this
derstanding the labour dynamics among complexity, potential exclusion errors, situation, she remains excluded from the en-
titlements and social protection mechanism.
seasonal migrants and the strong corre- and the risk of implementing agencies
(Field survey, September 2024)
lation between various types of vulnera- treating it as a static exercise. Given the
bilities among them and create a database current state of the system, this approach An anganwadi worker from Palghar
accordingly. The focus of the Maha-MTS may be overly ambitious. district said:
primarily revolves around the health Fourth, though the Maha-MTS has Not having Aadhaar is the primary reason for
status of seasonal migrants. However, it tried to cover both intra-state and inter- exclusion. Despite repeated reminders, some
is imperative to explore intersectionality state seasonal migrants, the primary migrants fail to complete the required docu-
mentation. This could be due to their illit-
among various vulnerabilities. Therefore, focus seems to be on the former. A lot
eracy, lack of information and awareness, or
disaggregating the MTS data and mak- of seasonal migration happens in simply because they do not have the time to
ing it publicly available for researchers Maharashtra from the adjoining states of complete the process due to their daily work.
and policymakers is essential. This real- Telangana, Karnataka, Gujarat, Madhya As a result, they remain excluded. (Field
time data can then be utilised effectively Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh. These are all survey, September 2024)
in policy implementation. Such data may bigger states in terms of geographical To address this issue, the ICDS can col-
be provided along with socio-economic area. Maha-MTS effectively monitors laborate with local organisations to issue
(including caste group, religion, income migrants from origin to destination but temporary identity cards to seasonal mi-
group, and so on), demographic, current lacks clarity on tracking interstate grants. Several not-for-profit organisations
employment status, wage structure, social migrants at their origins due to its have already provided such temporary
protection coverage, and other important state-specific nature. Clear strategies identity cards, which have proven benefi-
particulars of the beneficiaries. Such in- are needed to ensure no interstate cial for migrants to access various entitle-
terlinking can only make the Maha-MTS seasonal migrant is overlooked in regis- ments and prevent their exclusion. Aad-
comprehensive, inclusive, and result- tration and benefit distribution. Estab- haar card camps can be arranged regularly
oriented. Therefore, the Maharashtra lishing a centralised app-based solution at different destination workplaces to ad-
government must look at the Maha-MTS is crucial for an interstate MTS to pro- dress the incomplete documentation, Aad-
as a pivotal opportunity to effectively vide comprehensive social protection. haar card updation and new enrolments.
reduce the vulnerability and to create a Converging central and state-specific Fifth, anganwadi workers serve as the
robust and sustainable system in place. programmes and schemes is vital for primary link for villagers and migrants
To make the system more innovative, productivity. It would prevent potential in coordinating ICDS welfare schemes.
the database could be utilised to rank duplications in existing systems, saving However, they constitute a temporary and
the seasonal migrants by the level of resources, time, and energy. Moreover, vulnerable workforce, struggling for
vulnerability and risks with the help of it would assist in identifying multiple fair wages and official recognition (as
a vulnerability index. It will help the social protection schemes of a similar regular workers) from the governments.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 71
NOTES

Recently, they have initiated an indefinite significant risks affecting female seasonal Partnership for Migration and Development
(KNOMAD), World Bank.
strike for these reasons (Chakraborty migrants unevenly across regions. ILO (2020): Road Map for Developing a Policy
2020). Their absence significantly ham- Seventh, the Maha-MTS initiative Framework for the Inclusion of Internal Migrant
Workers in India, International Labour Organization.
pered the Maha-MTS registration and appears to focus primarily on seasonal Jaleel, A C P and A Chattopadhyay (2019): “Liveli-
monitoring efforts, leading to the dis- migration in rural areas, leading to a hood Crisis and Distress Seasonal Migration in
Beed District of Maharashtra,” Economic &
continuation of documentation in many skewed service delivery and a bias to- Political Weekly, Vol 54, No 41, pp 30–35.
areas of Maharashtra. It is crucial for the wards rural areas. To ensure inclusivity — (2022): “Health and Quality of Life of Seasonal
state to promptly address the concerns and effectiveness, it is imperative to Migrant Women Workers Engaged in Sugar-
cane Harvest in Maharashtra, India,” Internal
of anganwadi workers. Meanwhile, alter- extend its scope to urban areas. This Migration within South Asia, U Mukhopadhyay
native resources should have been utilised expansion would enhance the Maha- (ed), Singapore: Springer, pp 205–20.
Jayaram, N, P Jain and S S Sugathan (2019):
to ensure continued registration on the MTS’s comprehensiveness and relevance. “No City for Migrant Women: Construction
Maha-MTS, as migrants are adversely In conclusion, the Maha-MTS model Workers’ Experiences of Exclusion from Urban
Governance and Discrimination in Labour
affected by the strikes. could be promising if attempts are made Markets in Ahmedabad,” Gender & Development,
An anganwadi supervisor from to understand seasonal migration, espe- Vol 27, No 1, pp 85–104.
Keshri, K and R B Bhagat (2012): “Temporary and
Nandurbar district said: cially of female migrants, with a broader Seasonal Migration: Regional Pattern, Charac-
Anganwadi workers play a crucial role in purview of social justice and human teristics and Associated Factors,” Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 4, pp 81–88.
the survey process due to their strong grass- rights. Mere enumerating and tracking Majumdar, I, N Neetha and I Agnihotri (2013):
roots connections. However, they are often exercises without finding their implica- “Migration and Gender in India,” Economic &
underpaid and overburdened with multiple Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 10, pp 54–64.
responsibilities. Despite the training, some
tions in the context of inclusion of mi-
Mobarak, A M and M E Reimão (2020): “Seasonal
workers still lack the technical and digital grants in the social protection frame- Poverty and Seasonal Migration in Asia,” Asian
skills needed for app-based registration, work will remain as a too-many-cooks- Development Review, Vol 37, No 1, pp 1–42.
which impacts the quality of data collection Nienkerke, I M, A Thorat and A Patt (2023): “From
spoil-the-broth experience. Distress Migration to Selective Migration:
and registration. Additionally, it can be par- Transformative Effects of Agricultural Devel-
ticularly challenging for female Anganwadi opment on Seasonal Migration,” World Devel-
notes
workers to reach out to migrants, especially opment Perspectives, Vol 29, p 100483.
those in remote locations. (Field survey, 1 The migration data was also collected by the Min- Oxfam India (2020): “Human Cost of Sugar: Living
istry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, and Working Conditions of Migrant Cane-cut-
September 2024) Government of India, under its Periodic Labour ters in Maharashtra,” Discussion Paper, Oxfam
Anganwadi workers might lack profi- Force Survey (PLFS) 2020–21. However, the same International.
has not been utilised in this paper as it does not
PIB (2022): “Data on Seasonal Migrants,” Press
ciency in managing app-based registra- reflect a normal migration situation due to the
Information Bureau, Ministry of Labour and
tion processes and adequate resources to effect of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Employment, Government of India, 7 April.
2 [Link]
address the digital gap, thereby jeop- Rai, P (2020): “Seasonal Masculinities: Seasonal
3 [Link] Labor Migration and Masculinities in Rural
ardising migrant inclusion. Hence, it is 4 To ensure the privacy of the anganwadi workers Western India,” Gender, Place & Culture, Vol 27,
and protect them from any potential repercus- No 2, pp 261–80.
imperative to provide them with capaci- sions, their identities have been kept anonymous. Rajput, K, J Karade and S Rajput (2022): “Gendered
ty-building training, considering their Labour Market and Persistent Precarity: A
front-line roles. Given the overburden References Longitudinal Study of Women Construction
Workers,” Explorations, Vol 6, No 2, pp 86–103.
on anganwadi workers and the huge Abdulkader, R S, K Goswami, S K Rai, P Misra and
Rajput, K and M Jatav (2022): “Migrant Urban
S Kant (2015): “HIV-risk Behavior among the
number of seasonal migrants, engaging Male Migrant Factory Workers in a North Indian
Youth in the Draft National Youth Policy 2021,”
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 57, No 38,
other stakeholders is essential. Accred- City,” Indian Journal of Community Medicine,
pp 13–16.
Vol 40, No 2, pp 108–15.
ited social health activist (ASHA) work- Adhikari, P and V Shree (2020): “Suffering in
Saggurti, N, S Nair, A Malviya, M R Decker,
ers, Nehru Yuva Kendra volunteers, and Silence: Migrant Cane Cutters of Maharashtra,” J G Silverman and A Raj (2012): “Male Migra-
India Water Portal, [Link] tion/Mobility and HIV among Married
local civil societies should collaborate [Link]/articles/suffering-silence-migrant- Couples: Cross-sectional Analysis of Nationally
with anganwadi workers to expedite cane-cutters-maharashtra. representative Data from India,” AIDS and
Behaviour, Vol 16, No 6, pp 1649–58.
the enumeration and tracking efforts. Bhagat, R B (2017): “Migration, Gender and Right
to the City: The Indian Context,” Economic & Shah, R (2021): “Seasonal Migration and Children’s
Sixth, examining gender dynamics in Political Weekly, Vol 52, No 32, pp 35–40. Education in India,” Social and Political
Research Foundation, New Delhi.
seasonal migration and the labour market Borhade, A (2012): “Migrants’ (Denied) Access
to Health Care in India,” UNESCO-UNICEF Shelar, J (2019): “A Harvest of Crushed Hopes:
is crucial. Understanding how existing National Workshop on Internal Migration and Why Number of Hysterectomies Are High in
Human Development in India, Workshop Papers, Maharashtra’s Beed District,” Hindu, 10 August.
gender norms, social identity, caste dy- Srivastava, R (2020): “India’s ‘Invisible’ Women
UNESCO and UNICEF, New Delhi.
namics, and power relations contribute to Chakraborty, R (2020): “Child Marriages in Maha- Hope for Recognition at Farmers Protests,”
rashtra Surge by 78.3% Amid Lockdown Thomson Reuters Foundation, 16 December.
vulnerabilities, especially for female sea-
as Families Reel Under Poverty,” Hindustan UNAIDS (2014): “The Gap Report 2014,” Joint
sonal migrants, is essential. In addition to Times, 7 October. United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
traditional data collection methods, pro- Das, K C, A K Roy, R B Bhagat, A Vora and Y Suvarna UNESCO (2013): Social Inclusion of Internal Migrants
(2022): “Protection of Children Affected by in India, United Nations Educational, Scientific
moting alternative methodologies such Seasonal Migration: A Study in Jalna District, and Cultural Organization.
as those based on mixed methods or Maharashtra,” IIPS and UNICEF, Mumbai. UNESCO and UNICEF (2012): For a Better Inclusion of
Foley, L and N Piper (2020): “COVID-19 and Women Internal Migrants in India, Policy briefs, United
qualitative research is necessary to grasp Migrant Workers: Impacts and Implications,” Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
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stereotypes, structural constraints, and Data for Development, Global Knowledge Children’s Fund.

72 september 6, 2025 vol Lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

BOOK REVIEW

Towards a New Grammar dominant (Guha 1999: 28). On the other

hand, while performing this negative

of Resistance project of inversion, he failed to evolve

a language of modernity, and ended up
mediating his incipient notions of power
through the semi-feudal idioms of com-
Ayan Guha munity and religiosity (Guha 1999: 76).
Therefore, in the conceptual ambit de-

T
he governmentality of the modern lineated by Guha and his fellow mem-
Resistance as Negotiation: Making States and
state informed by the wisdom of Tribes in the Margins of Modern India by Uday bers of the subaltern collective, there is
disciplinary social sciences has Chandra, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, only room for negation or undiluted re-
always demonstrated a tendency to 2024; pp xv + 320, $75. sistance to the colonial state and all
draw a distinction between its ordinarily other forces of modernity as far as the
pliant subjects who embrace modernity detail in Ranajit Guha’s masterpiece, The subaltern subjectivity is concerned.
and the associated practices of state- Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency Consequently, in Guha’s account, the
craft and those, presumably restive, ab- in Colonial India (1999), a host of taken- tribal rebel no longer remains pre-po-
original communities who perennially for-granted assumptions were severely litical but still gets relegated to being
struggle to come to terms with moder- jolted. The tribal peasants were finally pre-modern and primitive.
nity’s institutional intrusion in the form declared to be the makers of their own Taking the vexed question of subal-
of polychromous practices of state-mak- rebellions and the proprietors of a politi- tern subjectivity as his vantage point,
ing. In line with established intellectual cal consciousness that enabled them to Uday Chandra’s Resistance as Negotia-
traditions—whether nationalist, Marx- make sense of the injustices of the colo- tion: Making States and Tribes in the
ist or otherwise—India’s tribal popula- nial rule as rooted in the mutuality of Margins of Modern India problematises
tion concentrated in the marginal to- interests between the British officials, and unsettles the presumed antithesis
pography of relatively isolated hills and landlords and moneylenders. From between the tribal subjects and the
forests, as contrasted with a putative spontaneous and wayward rebels, they modern state. While arguing that the
geographic mainstream, is widely seen were finally uplifted to the status of negation of state and modernity has
to be perfectly conforming to the ideal politically conscious anti-colonial rebels never been a default mode of operation
prototype of the latter group. Conse- thoroughly involved in the project of for the tribals since the onset of coloni-
quently, the tribal uprisings, when fil- negating and annihilating the colonial alism, Chandra masterfully lays bare
tered through the conceptual vocabu- state (Guha 1999: 4). the grand failure of the subaltern
lary of these dominant analytical per- Nevertheless, Guha (1999: 11) was studies to see numerous instances of
spectives, appear to be nothing else prepared to concede to the peasants the tribal communities’ negotiation
than violent and spontaneous responses only an embryonic form of political with the state, both in its colonial and
to modernity. Their spontaneity is consciousness, which was “inchoate” postcolonial avatars. The idea that the
considered to be a mark of the absence and “naive.” This incapacitated the pro- modern state was imposed from above,
of any political consciousness, as re- ject of subaltern rebellion in two funda- on an ostensibly primitive and hapless
flected by their inability to fashion a mental ways. On the one hand, it re- group of tribals, is called into question
political ideology, programme of action mained wholly negative in character. by Chandra’s remarkable ethnohistory
and a blueprint for political change. The rebel’s political imagination re- of Chotanagpur, which also reveals
When such epistemic apriorism un- mained limited to the envisioning of a how the discourse of primitivism has
derlying the normative apparatus of tra- mutual inversion of the dominant and been used by the tribals for negotiating
ditional historiography met its powerful the dominated through demolition or with the state in order to influence
and worthy counter in subaltern historio- appropriation of those insignia of domi- the process of modern state-making
graphy, sketched out with immaculate nance, which embody the power of the from below.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 33
BOOK REVIEW

Problematising the Idea of Goddesses, does not evade Chandra’s Chandra emphasises that the aim of the
Tribal Margins perceptive gaze either. It is pertinent to Mundas and Mankis was to consolidate
The starting point of Chandra’s analy- mention here Eck’s (2012) insightful ob- their political authority locally and re-
sis is the notion of primitivism that servation that in popular imagination, gionally, rather than mount an offensive
shaped the colonial policy towards the temples and religious places of India are on British colonialism. They merely hoped
tribal regions, converting them into the connected with each other through com- to replace the forest rajas, who patron-
margins of the state. Primitivism is a mon stories in a manner that creates a sa- ised the landlords, with the British East
conceptual juxtaposition of two inter- cred landscape or, in other words, a India Company as overlords by negoti-
related assumptions about tribal back- sense of belonging to a shared locale. ating nominal rents and spheres of sov-
wardness and civilisational antiquity. The temples of tantric deities, therefore, ereignty for them. As an outcome of
It represents the notion that, as a pre- clearly make Chotanagpur an integral such negotiation, Chotanagpur became
Aryan indigenous population, tribal part of this mainstream sacred geogra- a marginal place on the colonial map,
people are wild, primitive and unruly phy, not a marginal region of “cultural governed separately as a non-regulation
and hence require special protection refusal” (Scott 2011: 2) or an “arcadian province under the administration of a
and civilising efforts through a separate space” with “visions of alternative mo- military proconsul.
set of special administrative and legal ralities” (Shah 2010: 190). In a similar manner, far from negat-
provisions. Accordingly, tribal areas Chandra chronicles how the emer- ing the colonial state, the Bhuinhars,
like Chotanagpur were created as ad- gence of tribal margins is a modern by converting to Christianity, attempt-
ministrative zones of exception or the collaborative endeavour jointly under- ed to effectively negotiate with the
margins of the state, where ordinary taken by the British and the tribal sub- colonial state with missionary support.
laws and administrative regulations jects of the empire. Highlighting the In order to claim exemption from
did not apply. The postcolonial Indian active tribal participation in the genesis rent payments and official recognition
Constitution also kept alive the notion of the idea of primitivism and also in of their Bhuinhari status, they took
of primitivism by providing for a separate the subsequent construction of tribal up the method of petitioning the state
administrative mechanism for tribal margins, he shows them as efforts to and the courts with the assistance of
regions through Schedules V and VI. negotiate with the colonial state from the Christian missionaries. In this con-
Chandra’s analytical exploration of below in order to extract favourable text, Chandra highlights the active role
the genealogy of primitivism and the benefits and special treatment. of the tribals in constructing the logic
resultant construction of tribal margins of state-making in colonial Chota-
begins by showing that in the medieval Negotiation with the Colonial State nagpur by showing how their petitions
era, Chotanagpur was not a marginal Chandra particularly focuses on the at- made strategic use of the notion of
geography. In this regard, he particu- tempts of negotiation with the colonial primitivism. They claimed special
larly highlights the continuing influ- state by two influential groups in tribal protection from the state against the
ence of the Tantra tradition, chiefly society, the Mundas/Mankis and the oppression of the landlords and money-
associated with the esoteric practices of Bhuinhars. The Mundas and Mankis were lenders by presenting them as helpless
veneration of feminine power and traditional village headmen and possessed aboriginal settlers.
sexual energy on the religious practices certain customary rights. The Bhuinhars Chandra also portrays the violent re-
of the tribal communities. Interestingly, in were descendants of those who had orig- bellions of the Santals (1855) and Mun-
the medieval era, the Tantra tradition, inally reclaimed village land for cultiva- das (1899) not as an overt expression of
which is closely linked with the Sakta tion and hence they enjoyed exemption anti-colonial attitude, but as efforts to
school of Hinduism, formed the core of from rent payment under customary ar- negotiate with the colonial state from
mainstream Hindu religion. rangements. Both these groups were below. With the help of archival materi-
The author draws our attention to affected by the attempts by the forest als, he shows that the rebels wanted to
the presence throughout the forested rajas of Chotanagpur in the early 17th get rid of the landlords, moneylenders
landscape of Chotanagpur of numerous century to raise more revenue by leasing and other local power holders by placing
temples dedicated to tantric deities, out land to a group of wealthy outsiders. their village communities directly under a
which are different forms of Goddess This led to the imposition of rents on distant and paternalistic colonial state.
Sakti (cosmic feminine energy), such as previously rent-free lands and the in- In this connection, the author also
Candali, Dombini, Vetali, Janguli, Sar- fringement of customary rights. takes care to clarify that, contrary to
bari, Dakini, and Yogini, as well as Shiva The first phase of negotiations with the common intellectual wisdom, safe-
temples with aniconic representation of the British was led by the Mundas and guarding tribal religion and way of life
interlocked male and female sexual Mankis, who were aggrieved by the from colonial intervention was never a
organs. The presence of a deep hollow encroachment on their lands and cus- motive for the rebels. Leaders of both
smeared with red coloured vermillion tomary rights by alien landlords in the the movements did not endorse the old
and lac, symbolising womb and men- wake of the widespread civil strife known tribal religion and attempted to craft new
strual blood beneath the idols of these as the Kol insurrection in 1830–32. theological forms, drawing inspiration
34 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW

from a variety of old and new sources, non-traditional livelihood options. More- keeps the insurgent violence at a man-
ranging from Tantra-Shakta, Vaishnava, over, guns bring power, modernity and ageable level and creates conditions for
to Christian influences. cash from rangdari (road tax on busi- the recurrent reproduction of the post-
nesses and wealthy individuals). With colonial state in its margins.
Negotiation with cash comes English liquor and sleekest
the Postcolonial State motorbikes. Another incentive is the Concluding Observations
Chandra finds a great deal of continuity Maoists’ disregard for traditional prohi- The book is a significant work of scholar-
between the colonial and postcolonial bitions on marriages between clans and ship borne out of meticulous academic
periods when it comes to the tribals’ way across tribal communities. research. It presents us with a provoca-
of dealing with the state through negoti- Furthermore, in Maoist-infested tribal tive, yet welcoming invitation to rethink
ation, both peaceful and violent. The region, Chandra has discovered a unique our received ideas about resistance and
peaceful form of negotiation continues form of political order, “a regime of plu- subaltern consciousness. Its analytical
to use the idea of primitivism as a strate- ral sovereignties” (p 224), where sover- brilliance is evident in the way Chandra
gic resource. Chandra foregrounds this eign bodies, both formal and informal, has been able to peel off, bit by bit, the
through his analysis of the hugely suc- compete as well as collaborate with each deceptive outer layers of the conceptual
cessful Koel-Karo anti-dam agitation, other. He explains the dynamics of this category of negation to venture into its
which spoke back to the state in its own regime, embedded in an elaborate web inner core, the embodiment of the real
language of primitivism by cleverly mo- of tacit arrangements between business- subaltern subjectivity. Chandra’s impres-
bilising Adivasi customs and culture men, Maoist rebels, local government sive foray into the deeper dimensions of
against the agents of the state, Hindu and civil society organisations, through subaltern subjectivity has enabled him
engineers and officials from Bihar. Fur- the micro-politics of lac (a minor forest to conceptualise apparent acts of nega-
ther, those who participate in electoral produce) production and distribution. tion of the state and modernity as efforts
politics at local and regional levels, The first set of arrangements requires of negotiation with the same. However,
mostly belonging to the dominant line- the payment of a levy by the traders to in doing so, Chandra seems to have set up
ages of Munda, Manki, and Pahan, also the Maoists. The Maoists do not obstruct an absolute antithesis between negation
appeal to the essentialised Adivasi identi- trading and business operations, if the and negotiation, turning them into mu-
ty by raising emotive identitarian issues agreed levy is paid, simply because they tually exclusive categories. This has fore-
concerning tribals’ relationship with Hin- cannot survive without business activi- closed the analytical possibility of con-
duism and Christianity. ties that create the possibility for extor- ceiving a rebellious act as a contradictory
Chandra focuses a great deal on the tion. This tacit understanding is but- unity of both negation and negotiation.
Maoist movement, which has the declared tressed by the state playing its part by In other words, the prospect of identifying
objective of overthrowing the Indian exempting the forest produce from taxes. the coexistence of radical and reformist
state. In this regard, Chandra’s depar- This enables the businesses to make tendencies within the same movement
ture from the conventional wisdom is sufficient profits even after the payment is precluded by Chandra’s analytical
both striking and refreshing, as he is not of a substantial amount as a levy to the framework. Nevertheless, Chandra de-
prepared to see the tribals’ participation Maoists. Allegedly, the cooperation of serves credit in reopening questions
in the Maoist movement as a vindication the local state officials is also ensured by and debates through painstaking archi-
of their desire to negate and overthrow reserving some proportion of the rang- val and ethnographic research, which
the postcolonial state. According to him, dari collection for them. have long been considered settled by
the Maoist movement for the tribals is a Lastly, non-governmental organisa- scholars of postcolonial studies.
form of negotiation that aims to remake tions (NGOs) like Utthaan studied by
the political order as well as the tradi- Chandra are supported by the state with The author received funding from the
British Academy.
tional tribal community from below. funds to carry out special development
Chandra shows that the incentive for and welfare activities like promotion of Ayan Guha (ag928@[Link]) is a British
participation in the Maoist movement lac and forest-based livelihood activities Academy International Fellow, School of Global
Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
for the tribal youths comes from the among the tribal population. As the
opportunities it offers to dismantle and Maoist threat makes them relevant and
References
break free from the oppressive traditional necessary actors, and at the same time,
Eck, Diana L (2012): India: A Sacred Geography,
tribal social structure, which is wrongly unwanted interference by the Maoists is New York: Three Rivers Press.
presumed to be egalitarian. In a geron- worth avoiding for smooth functioning, Guha, Ranajit (1999): Elementary Aspects of Peasant
Insurgency in Colonial India, Durham/London:
tocratic and patriarchal tribal society the NGOs ensure that the benefits of Duke University Press.
founded on the authority of the village their work and a proportion of the funds Scott, James C (2011): The Art of Not Being Gov-
erned: An Anarchist History of Upland South-
elders, the young men are supposed to they receive and generate, pass on to east India, New Haven: Yale University Press.
farm and feed the elders, while the the Maoists and their constituents. This Shah, Alpa (2010): In the Shadows of the State:
women remain tied to domestic duties. interlocking grid of negotiations by re- Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism, and
Insurgency in Jharkhand, India, Durham, NC:
But the Maoists offer non-farming, making the political order from below Duke University Press.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 35

Historical Lessons from Tripura severe economic difficulties, exacerbated
by World War II, the partition of India,
and local political instability, set the
stage for the GMP’s rise. The GMP’s agen-
George Chakma da included social reforms like abolish-
ing child marriage, promoting universal

S
aqib Khan’s Tribe-Class Linkages: book reviewS education, and challenging superstitions,
The History and the Politics of the including the belief in the monarch’s di-
Agrarian Movement in Tripura is a Tribe-Class Linkages: The History and the vine status, progressive measures; end-
significant scholarly contribution to the Politics of the Agrarian Movement in Tripura by ing mandatory Brahmin roles in ceremo-
historiography and political sociology of Saqib Khan, New York: Routledge, 2024; pp 187, ₹1,000. nies, combating untouchability and inte-
North East India. In a region often dis- grating marginalised groups like the tea
cussed through the prisms of ethnic of the Great Depression and World War II tribes and Reangs into a more equitable
identity or insurgency, Khan shifts the were severe for the people. Rising prices social framework; and adopting a pro-
lens to the material and class dimensions of essentials led to extreme hardships, gressive ideology to transform economic
of tribal politics. His book explores the particularly for peasants and hill com- conditions and social structures and ad-
interwoven trajectories of land, class, munities, creating a famine-like situation dressing political and other social issues.
identity, and state formation in Tripura, similar to Bengal’s. This context spurred Khan’s analysis underscores the GMP’s
unpacking how agrarian movements political activism in the late 1930s and unique integration of economic and
and tribal assertion were deeply shaped 1940s. Khan categorises the political asso- identity concerns, which reflects a com-
by economic dispossession, demographic ciations of this period into three groups: prehensive response to the complexities
shifts, and ideological contestations. Nationalist (Tripura Rajya Ganaparsihad), facing tribal communities in post-inde-
Through a close reading of historical de- Communist-influenced (Jana Mangal pendence North East India.
velopments and political mobilisations, Samiti, Jana Siksha Samiti, Tripura Rajya
Khan provides a compelling narrative of Praja Mandal), and ethnic/religious Alienation to Autonomy
how class and tribal questions were not solidarity groups (Anjuman Islamia, Tripur In Chapter 4, the author examines
mutually exclusive but deeply enmeshed. Sangha, Hindu Mahasabha). These diverse Tripura’s land question, highlighting the
groups responded to economic and interplay between agrarian structures,
The Imperative of Modernity political challenges, shaping Tripura’s migration, and land alienation from the
The transition of Tripura from an abso- evolving political landscape. 19th century to the early 1970s. In Tripura,
lutist monarchy to a democratic state Chapter 3 examines the Ganamukti settled rice cultivation was predominant
represents a significant sociopolitical Parishad (GMP) and its unique position in in the plains, while jhum (slash-and-burn)
evolution. The introductory chapter out- tribal movements in post-independence cultivation was practised in the hills.
lines this shift, while the first substantive North East India. From 1948 to 1951, the Historically, the monarchy encouraged
chapter examines early 20th-century GMP emerged as a distinct movement Bengali settlers, who were construed as
political developments. Modern educa- addressing economic and identity issues more efficient cultivators, over local
tion, introduced in the late 19th century, within tribal communities, contrasting tribals. Land grants to intermediaries
fostered an educated middle class by the with the broader trend where tribal move- and reforms such as the Rajaswa Sam-
1930s, which became crucial in advocat- ments often prioritised ethnic identity bandhiya Niyamabali (1880) and the
ing democratic reforms. This class was over agrarian concerns. Founded by Landlord and Tenancy Act, 1886 aimed
shaped by expanding economic activities leaders such as Dasarath Deb, Sudhanwa, to regulate tenure but often protected
and the broader influence of Bengal’s Hemanta Debbarma, and Aghore Deb- landlord interests over peasant rights.
political climate. Leaders like Aghore barma, the GMP started as a civil organi- From the 1940s to 1971, the large-scale
Debbarma, Hemanta Debbarma, and sation but quickly became an armed migration, particularly of Hindu Bengalis,
Dasrath Deb emerged from both tribal revolutionary movement using guerrilla radically altered the demographic com-
and Bengali backgrounds, contributing tactics. This evolution highlights the position of Tripura. By 1971, official records
to the state’s political engagement. Early intensity of the movement’s grievances listed over 6,00,000 refugees, though the
political associations such as Anusilan and its commitment to socio-economic real figure was likely higher. This demo-
Samiti and Yugantar further shaped and political reform. graphic shift had far-reaching consequences
Tripura’s political landscape. The author draws parallels between the for landownership. Refugee resettlement
The interwar period was marked by GMP and other contemporary movements programmes, frequently administered
significant hardship. The Kingdom of in Telangana, Kakdwip, and Hajong, without adequate land assessment, priori-
Tripura supported the British during noting shared conditions of agrarian tised cultivating arable tribal lands. These
World War I, but the economic impacts distress and political repression. Tripura’s policies, shaped in part by the Congress
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 31
BOOK REVIEW

party, served political ends: resettling debt but had a limited impact on im- effective government policies and the
Hindu Bengali refugees in tribal areas was proving conditions for farmers. As a result, repeal of the Armed Forces (Special
a strategic move to undercut the influ- tribal disillusionment grew, leading to Powers) Act (AFSPA), 2015, marked a sig-
ence of the left, particularly the Commu- demands for more radical measures to nificant step towards stability and peace.
nist Party of India (CPI) and Communist secure land rights. This frustration even-
Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M]), who tually fuelled a stronger push for au- Beyond Identity, towards Justice
were actively organising among tribal tonomy and intensified political activism Khan’s book makes a twofold contribu-
and peasant populations and voicing among the tribal population. tion. First, it fills a significant gap in the
resistance to land alienation. Chapter 6 explores the autonomy literature on Tripura, a region under-
Bengali moneylenders and intermedi- movement for Tripura’s tribes, empha- studied in the mainstream English-lan-
aries further exacerbated the crisis. Tribal sising three critical aspects: demographic guage scholarship, particularly concern-
communities, often driven into debt, were changes, identity focus, and ideological ing its agrarian and tribal politics. Second,
forced to sell or lease their land frequently approaches. The autonomy movement in the work challenges simplistic identity-
through coercive or legally dubious Tripura was significantly influenced by based readings of Tripura’s political his-
means. Although voices from within the the large-scale influx of Bengali refugees, tory, demonstrating that tribal assertion
GMP, CPI, and CPI(M) raised these issues which altered the state’s demographic was often rooted in class-based griev-
at state and national levels, including in balance and heightened tensions between ances and structural inequalities. This
the Lok Sabha, the government’s response tribal and non-tribal communities. This echoes similar scholarly efforts to move
remained limited. As tribal populations shift played a crucial role in catalysing beyond essentialist identity frameworks,
faced increasing marginalisation, their the demand for greater tribal autonomy. as seen in works like Sanjib Baruah’s
political demands evolved from calls for The movement’s emphasis on preserving India against Itself (1999), which fore-
land restoration to demands for autonomy tribal identity was central to its drive. As grounds the material basis of ethnic
and political recognition, sowing the seeds non-tribal populations grew, concerns politics in the North East.
of future ethno-nationalist mobilisations. over losing cultural heritage intensified, By focusing on the interconnections
Chapter 5 examines the complexities fuelling the push for self-determination. between land, class, and identity, the
of land reforms in Tripura, focusing on The movement was characterised by author show that the agrarian question
the challenges faced in implementing two main ideological perspectives: the remains central to understanding political
legislation related to tribal land and land GMP and various leftist groups promoted mobilisation in Tripura. This resonates
restoration. The Tripura Land Reforms broader social and political reforms, with Ranajit Guha’s (1983) concept of
and Land Revenue (TLRLR) Act, 1960 whereas advocating an ethno-nationalist the “subaltern” in peasant studies, where
was a significant post-monarchy legisla- approach, tribal parties such as the Indig- class and caste intersect to shape the tra-
tive measure driven by demands from enous Nationalist Party of Twipra (INPT), jectory of resistance. Khan’s attention to
peasant organisations and leftist groups Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS), and the GMP and the dual role of tribal leaders
like the GMP and CPI. The act aimed to Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura as both ethnic and class actors helps
reform land tenure and ownership, (IPFT) focused on tribal identity and self- de-essentialise tribal identity, situating
repealing outdated monarchical laws. rule. The more radical faction, Tripura it within the structural realities of land
Key provisions included the abolition of National Volunteers (TNV), also emerged alienation and political marginalisation.
intermediaries between tenants and during this period. That said, the book occasionally leans
sharecroppers, the introduction of land- From the early 1980s through the heavily on the perspective of the Left Front,
holding ceiling limits, and protection 2000s, the state experienced significant particularly in its treatment of events
for tillers. Section 187 of the act was violence driven by militant groups and post-1950s. While the book is critical of
particularly noteworthy for its attempt radical Bengali nationalist organisations the Congress and its role in demographic
to prevent the alienation of tribal land like Amra Bangali and the United Bengali engineering, the narrative occasionally
by prohibiting its transfer to non-tribals Liberation Front (UBLF). The violence appears sympathetic to the left’s histori-
without collector approval. peaked with the June 1980 communal cal role, glossing over the internal con-
However, the implementation of these riots, which resulted in approximately tradictions and shortcomings of leftist
reforms faced significant obstacles. The 1,300 deaths. Tripura’s militancy was governance, especially in implementing
widespread use of benami (proxy) deeds unique for its focus on opposing the land reforms and managing mass migra-
allowed non-tribals to bypass the section Bengali community rather than the tion. Scholars like Bhattacharya (2018)
and acquire tribal land indirectly. Addi- Indian state, and it lacked a coherent highlighted the limitations of radical
tionally, Section 187 lacked penalties and political ideology. The Tripura Tribal Areas politics in Tripura, noting how govern-
mechanisms to reverse illegal land trans- Autonomous District Council (TTAaDC) ance often fell short in addressing the
fers, which diminished its effectiveness. Act, 1979, upgraded to the Sixth Sched- complex sociopolitical realities faced by
Subsequent legislative efforts, such as the ule in 1985, aimed to address tribal tribal populations
Tripura Agricultural Indebtedness Relief grievances and provide greater autono- Moreover, the book could benefit from
Act, 1979, aimed to address agricultural my. The decline in militancy, aided by deeper archival engagement and more
32 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW

voices from affected communities, scholars interested in North East India, References
which would lend more texture and eth- agrarian movements, and identity politics. Baruah, Sanjib (1999): India Against Itself: Assam
nographic grounding to its arguments. and the Politics of Nationality, Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Nonetheless, Tribe-Class Linkages is George Chakma (georgechakma96@gmail.
Bhattacharya, Harihar (2018): Radical Politics and
a well-researched, thought-provoking com) is a doctoral candidate at the Centre Governance in India’s Northeast: The Case of
for International Politics, Organisation Tripura, New York: Routledge.
intervention that foregrounds the and Disarmament, School of International Guha, Ranajit (1983): Elementary Aspects of Peas-
material dimensions of tribal politics Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, ant Insurgency in Colonial India, Kolkata:
in Tripura. It is essential reading for New Delhi. Oxford University Press.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 33

SPECIAL ARTICLE

Fish of Discord
‘Hilsa Diplomacy’ in Indo-Bangladesh Relations, 1950–2024

Aryama Ghosh

T
The interim Government of Bangladesh has temporarily he recent political upheaval in Bangladesh has resulted
banned hilsa fish exports to India, contradicting Sheikh in a predicament for Bengali cuisine enthusiasts—a
shortage of hilsa fish from the Padma river. Due to a ban
Hasina’s “Hilsa Diplomacy.” This prompts a reconsideration
on cross-border transportation, the prices of hilsa fish in
of the diplomatic significance of the Bengali hilsa amid Kolkata have hiked, despite imports from Burma and other
environmental, political, and cultural contexts. The hilsa parts of India (Sur 2024). Farida Akhtar, the interim govern-
population has been declining since the early 1900s due ment’s minister of fisheries and husbandry, introduced a new
Bangladeshi hilsa fish policy, sparking the dispute. Hilsa
to anthropogenic activities such as dam construction.
would be preferred for home consumption before exporting
Rather than focusing on habitat preservation, the Indian under this approach, which contrasts with Sheikh Hasina’s
fisheries department has prioritised hilsa hatcheries “Hilsa Diplomacy,” in which she sent enormous amounts of
repeatedly. The post-Partition hostility, adversarial water hilsa fish to India between August and October as a symbol of
goodwill (Lahiri 2024).
politics, and trade restrictions ultimately intensified the
Recently, Akhtar further declared that no hilsa would be ex-
political tensions surrounding hilsa fish between West ported to India this year. This decision seems to reflect the in-
Bengal and Bangladesh. Hasina’s Hilsa Diplomacy has terim government’s desire to not go against the overtly anti-
turned the issue into soft power diplomacy, rather than India feeling among the masses (Anandabazar Patrika 2024).
However, the interim government soon had to revise the poli-
offering a sustainable solution to the dwindling hilsa
cy of banning imports. This was partly due to the ban’s failure
population or promoting a coordinated transregional to decrease the domestic price, which remained high because
fishing policy. of supply shortages and bad weather conditions (Bose 2024).
Rejaul Kerim, the minister of fisheries and husbandry in the
Hasina government, declared a year ago that hilsa had become
a diplomatic issue that could influence South Asian diploma-
cy (Prothom Alo 2023). Following the shift in political govern-
ance and the rising public demand against the export of hilsa
to India, this paper re-evaluates the diplomatic importance of
hilsa within Bengali cuisine, considering the environmental,
political, and diplomatic contexts that underpin this issue.

Love Affair with Hilsa: A Nostalgic Necessity

“Nothing exemplifies” the Bengali identity “better than the
region’s love affair with hilsa” (Banerji 2007: 17). This “love
affair” is associated with the cultural and nostalgic significance
of taste, a culinary symbol of sustenance as well as luxury.
Taste has been associated with middle-class lifestyles; a
theoretical paradigm much used as a model by later scholars
of varied disciplines. Bourdieu (1984: 1) argued that cultural
practices could be understood fully only if “the elaborated
taste for the most refined objects is reconnected with the ele-
The author thanks Ranjan Chakraborty for stimulating his interest in mentary taste for the flavours of food.” He perceived it as “a
this field. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers for their
class culture turned into nature, that is, embodied, helps to
thoughtful comments on the paper.
shape the class body” (Bourdieu 1984: 190). The “flavour” of
Aryama Ghosh ([Link]@[Link]) teaches at the hilsa fish has long been associated with common Bengalis.
Department of History, Narasinha Dutt College, Howrah.
However, environmental and political forces have made this
52 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE

delicacy scarce gradually, affordable only to the rich and the Government of Bengal, demonstrated that the hilsa popu-
middle class. Priyalal Das (1922: 500) wrote about hilsa fish lation saw a drop similar to that of the American shad fish and
in 1922, underlining its sentimental value from a middle- British herring fish. Prior to that, K G Gupta’s (1910) study on
class perspective. Decades later, the novel Madhyabitta (the the decreasing population of hilsa fish in the Ganges suggested
Middle Class), set in post-Partition India during the 1950s, the establishment of an artificial hatching station for hilsa.
portrays the socio-economic reality of a changed time. As a result of this recommendation, a hatching station was
Through the protagonist, the story highlights that in Bengal, established at Monghyr, but it, unfortunately, failed. In 1933,
hoarders and black-marketeers emerged as the new elite Robert S Finlow identified eastern Bengal as the primary
class, as they were the only ones who could afford to buy hilsa spawning area for hilsa (Hora 1938).
fish from the Ganges (Dutt 1951: 447). There is a striking dif- During 1937–38, researchers studying the fish population at
ference between the 1920s and 1950s depictions of middle- the Palta Water Works discovered that hilsa could be observed
class Bengali households and their everyday aspirations. consistently throughout the year, but the population of these
Once affordable indulgences have now become a luxury over fish showed an upward trend from July to August, and only
the course of three decades. experienced a decline in May (Arthik Unnati 1940). Palta Water
While the decline of hilsa in the Ganges created rudimentary Works conducted research to explore the feasibility of cultivat-
culinary nostalgia for West Bengal’s population, the refugee ing hilsa fish, similar to the British variation known as Killar-
population from eastern Bengal after Partition brought with ney Shad, in large lakes or expansive tanks. The Palta Water
them memories of abundance, now radically changed due to Work Experiment (1937–38) demonstrated the feasibility of
the situation. This culinary nostalgia of taste is both a memory breeding hilsa fish in controlled aquatic environments. How-
of good times as well as a reminder of losing the elementary ever, the experiment was unsuccessful in locating hilsa eggs
forms of happiness: a “nostalgic longing for a homeland and hatchlings. Due to this, it became clear that “attention
through one’s relationship to seemingly intractable culinary should be paid to the conservation of the hilsa fisheries rath-
practices which yoke national identity with culinary taste and er than the establishments of hatcheries for the artificial
practices” (Mannur 2007: 13). breeding of this fish” (Hora 1938: 157).
The second form of nostalgia has culturally elevated the Initially, T Southwell, director of fisheries for Bengal, Bihar,
significance of hilsa, not just as a highly valued food item, and Orissa, believed that enacting laws to save the hilsa was
but as a taste associated with the collective experience of a unnecessary. However, later on, individuals such as K G Gupta
“Proustian moment” of culinary nostalgia. Chitrita Banerji and Beni Prasad advocated for legislation, warning that
(2007: 17) mentioned hilsa as “both a memory of joyful without it, the Indian hilsa would face the same fate as
family meals and a symbol of loss.” She further reminisced the American Shad fish, which had gone extinct since 1879
about the heated ghoti-bangal debates regarding “which was (Dover 1932). Some experts have suggested implementing a
superior in flavour and taste—the hilsa from the Ganges or period of restricted fishing, known as a closure season, from
the one from the Padma” (Banerji 2007: 17), a debate which 1 November to 15 February to protect the hilsa fish population
became insignificant with the dwindling number of hilsa in (Gupta 1911). However, this was not given much attention
the Ganges. So, hilsa gradually became “an index of East Bengal because there was no prohibition on indiscriminate fishing.
identity” (Janeja 2010: 18), which the bangal refugees brought On the other hand, the problem of diminishing fish populations
with them as a memory of belonging and loss. In addition, has been a growing concern for the middle class in Bengal
Partha Ghosh (2015: 56) contended that the presence of since the 1940s. News of juvenile hilsa fishing became
inexpensive domestic workers from the refugee population led rampant (Arthik Unnati 1942). Additionally, they reported a
to a fascinating culinary transformation in West Bengali kitch- falling number of captured hilsa in the Damodar, Rupnarayan,
ens, where the traditional eastern Bengali hilsa recipe became and Hooghly rivers.
a sought-after delicacy for both ghotis and bangals. Not only in After independence, both the West Bengal and the union
case of the refugees, but Johan Pottier (2014: 18) showed that government tried to solve the issue of dwindling hilsa popula-
the East London’s Bangladeshi restaurants mobilised “nostalgic tions in the Bengal rivers. In 1966, the member of the legislative
images, emotions and discourses” to put forward an “authentic” assembly (MLA), Mriganka Bhattacharya, inquired of the
national cuisine, often through the imagery of “the memory Minister of Fisheries regarding this. In response, the minister
of bigger and tastier River Padda hilsa fish.” The pursuit of attributed these changes to the diminishing depth and industrial
genuine gastronomic nostalgia, driven by the lingering memories waste-related water pollution of the Ganga and the Rupnarayan
of a bygone era, has elevated hilsa to the status of a scarce and rivers (WBLA 1966: 192). At the Lok Sabha, the Minister of
highly prized natural resource worth fighting for. Parliament, C K Bhattacharyya, inquired of the food minister
Govinda Menon about the extent to which the construction
Decline of the Hilsa Population in Bengal of dams by the Damodar Valley Corporation has contributed
Since the start of the 20th century, British zoologists have to the decrease in the hilsa population in the Damodar and
conducted research on the factors contributing to the low Rupnarayan rivers. Menon acknowledged that dams have
population of hilsa fish in the Ganges. In his 1910 paper titled been a noteworthy factor in the decline of the hilsa population
“The Spawning of Hilsa,” J Travis Jenkins, fishery advisor of (LSD 1966).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 53
SPECIAL ARTICLE

From 1965 to 1968, several research projects were initiated Indian government’s developmental discourse since the Nehru
to deal with this matter, one of which specifically concentrated era centred around dams, and no government turned away
on studying the causes of the fluctuating hilsa population and from that. As the dams could not be replaced, artificial breed-
proposing corrective solutions (Ministry of Agriculture 1968). ing was the only way.
Two research units, namely the Estuarine Fisheries Research
Sub-station at Barrackpore and the Riverine Fisheries Sub- Hilsa Importation from Bangladesh since Partition
station at Bhagalpur, were established, studying the hilsa Following the Partition, the importation of fish from East
population in the Hooghly and the Ganges, respectively. The Pakistan had a significant decline, reducing from 13,000
committee stated that the hilsa population in southern India tonnes to approximately 5,000 tonnes over a span of one year.
decreased as a result of dams. Apart from that, the committee Similarly, the importation of hilsa declined by 50% from the
specifically emphasised the impact of industrial waste being previous monthly total of 20 tonnes (Arthik Jagat 1948). Follow-
released into the Ganges as the primary reason for the ing the Partition, the act of importing hilsa from East Pakistan
decreasing population (Ministry of Agriculture 1968). Similar became challenging. Gualundo has historically been the primary
to the Palta experiment, attempts at controlled breeding were exporter of hilsa to the Calcutta market, principally using
unsuccessful (Ministry of Agriculture 1968). In the 1980s, the railways. Additionally, hilsa from Faridpur, Jessore, and Khulna
fishery department again tried experimental breeding in the were exported through country boats via canals (Department
Hooghly district (WBLA 1985). In 1993, in answer to the recur- of Fisheries 1923). In the 1950s, the Bengal fish market relied
ring questions, agriculture minister Krishna Kumar stated the entirely on imported hilsa from East Pakistan because Ganges
initiative to replenish the rivers with hilsa seeds from Farakka hilsa declined (Prabasi 1955).
(LSD 1993). The Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of Animal In 1959, the Pakistan government implemented a ban on
Husbandry, Dairying, and Fisheries initiated a significant project the importation of hilsa fish. To enforce this ban, police
on hilsa fisheries in conjunction with Bangladesh, known as boats were sent to prevent fisherfolk from East Bengal from
the Bay of Bengal programme, during 2010–11 (Ministry of illegally importing hilsa through regions such as Hasnabad
Agriculture 2010). Even though fishery departments have (Bharatbarsha 1959). In the 49th session of 1969, West Ben-
failed to artificially raise hilsa fish, political authorities con- gal’s fisheries department decided to import fish, but the Paki-
tinue to trust them, ignoring fishery researchers’ warnings stan government were not interested in negotiating a partial
about riverine and estuary conservation. diplomatic solution, such as hilsa importation, with the Indian
The decrease in hilsa fish population caused by the con- government. Instead, Pakistan refused to export fish to India
struction of river dams, such as the Farakka Barrage (erected until the Kashmir issue was addressed (WBLA 1970). While
in 1972), has become a significant concern, leading to a more legalised importation stopped, smuggling of hilsa became an
visible drop in the hilsa population in eastern Bengal as well issue of political debate as well as public concern (WBLA 1970).
(Pottier 2014). In the case of India, the impact was more dire. For Bengalis in West Bengal, an utterly Bengali fish suddenly
Particularly before 1972, Allahabad used to get a moderate turned into “Pakistani,” a change both unjust and painful to
amount of hilsa between 7.87 and 40.16 tonnes per year, but many, just like being banished away from their “home.” It
since the making of the dam, the amount dwindled between was like being deprived of their basic delicacy. However, the
0.13 and 2.04 tonnes per year (Seth and Panwar 2001). Now, it governmental secretary, Nishapati Majhi, agreed that the
is not the case of Bengal alone, but the making of the dam in partition had badly harmed the fisherfolk communities and
different rivers all across India had the same effect on the hilsa the natural ecosystem of the hilsa spawning site in both
population. The Sardar Sarovar dam, erected in 2017 on the Bengals. Due to territorial demarcation, their usual fishing
Narmada, affected Bharuch, one of the last breeding places of grounds had diminished, forcing them to use smaller nets to
hilsa, just like the Farakka Dam on the Ganges, the Stanley catch fewer fish, which devastated the fish’s normal life cycle
Dam of 1934 on the Kaveri, and the Ghulam Mohammad dam (Majhi 1959). Thus, political turmoil led to further problems of
of 1955 on the Indus, had a deleterious effect on nearby hilsa overt exploitation of the hilsa fisheries.
breeding places (Roy 2016). The dams at Ukai and Kakrapara After Bangladesh became independent in 1971, most people
in Gujarat similarly reduced the hilsa migration in the Tapti in West Bengal were excited to get their beloved fish again.
river (Bhaumik 2013). However, in 1972, the Farakka barrage generated a bilateral
Despite dams being a major factor in the dwindling hilsa dispute between West Bengal and Bangladesh and affected
population, the government’s fisheries department has long the hilsa population in western and eastern Bengal. Both
prioritised hilsa hatcheries over hilsa fisheries conservation, governments debated on hilsa production without success.
because dams were important for irrigation and energy pro- The Bangladesh government claimed that the dam’s withdrawal
duction. The livelihoods of 10,000 fishing families were at of water threatened the hilsa’s natural habitat and breeding
stake in the recent hilsa controversy surrounding the Sardar ground, but India responded that the dam stops diverting the
Sarovar dam, but the government has reiterated its intention Ganges water during the rainy season, protecting the hilsa’s
to mitigate the loss by replenishing the reservoir with fish main monsoon catch. By then, no special research on hilsa had
raised in hatcheries (Roy 2016). The whole hatchery-centric drawn any conclusion on the dam’s effect on population
governmental argument seemed a reiterative one because the decline (Crow 1995). Later, Bangladesh’s research showed that
54 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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increased river salinity due to dam-making at the estuary are- the ongoing issue of scarcity and unequal distribution of
as disturbed the hilsa breeding. Eventually, based on 1975’s imported hilsa (WBLA 1996). In the policymaking and legisla-
statistical data of the annual hilsa catch, the Indian government tive position of the state, we would see that the preliminary
accepted that the Farakka barrage led to the decline of the discussions regarding environmental and occupational dis-
hilsa population (Crow 1995). The “regional hydro-politics” placement of the early days would be replaced with import,
and global capitalism of dams compromised the hilsa, a theme distribution, and scarcity-related concerns, as supplying fish to
which would remain less discussed, while politicians and the middle-class platter would be the most striking concern for
governments would squabble over the depleting numbers of the governing and the opposition parties.
the ethnic delicacy. Ananya Jahanara Kabir (2013: 206–07) Importing hilsa from Bangladesh became controversial in
argued that, since the Partition in 1947 to the making of the the 1990s when the Left Front-led fishery department tried to
Farakka barrage in 1971, “boundary-crossing ilish signals a market it through government-approved agents. The fishery
search for sustainable emotional alternatives,” a “poetics of minister, Kiranmoy Nanda, declared in 1993 that hilsa exports
memory,” which Farakka complicated with a “politics of place.” from Bangladesh were legitimate and distributed through
After Bangladesh became independent, the hilsa conundrum licensed brokers. Due to Bangladeshi exporters’ control over
persists because the environmental issue remains unresolved. export volume, the government had trouble controlling pricing.
The Ganges hilsa population had been falling for years, forc- In addition to high demand and price, unequal distribution
ing West Bengal to import hilsa from Bangladesh. was a worry. Later, the government’s overtly partial attitude
The West Bengal government faced difficulties in obtaining towards Calcutta became an issue. District MLA s such as
hilsa from Bangladesh due to the importance of bilateral Purulia’s Natabor Bagdi were often dissatisfied that most im-
commercial relations, where the union government remained ports were consumed in Calcutta or North Bengal, leaving out-
the dominant authority, as well as the absence of adequate lying districts disadvantaged (WBLA 1993). The government
preservation and transportation methods (Darpan 1973). In promptly took action by implementing the Central Fishermen
1974, the union government planned to import hilsa worth Cooperative Society to disperse the resources across various
₹3 crore from Bangladesh due to immense popular pressure districts (WBLA 1994b). Due to a limited supply, the government
(WBLA 1974). The state assembly throughout the 1980s often was only able to furnish a few number of outlets distributing
rumbled on the issues regarding hilsa scarcity, scanty import, hilsa. These district outlets include Burdwan, 24 Parganas,
and smuggling (WBLA 1985, 1987). In 1984, the South and East Howrah, Hooghly, Purulia, and Darjeeling (WBLA 1994a). But
Asia Report showed that the smugglers used to smuggle fish the solution was not good enough to deal with the problem.
from Bheramara of Kustia, the biggest hilsa selling hub, to This made the opposition state the problem as a rural versus
Jalangi of West Bengal by a riper route via Raita station urban problem.
on trucks (JPRS 1984). In 1994, Nasiruddin Khan, who was an MLA for the All India
In 1985, Rajkumar Mondal of Hooghly expressed his con- Trinamool Congress, accused Kiranmoy Nanda of dispro-
cern regarding the fact that the non-availability of hilsa fish portionately sending the majority of the exported hilsa to
would leave the fishing community, dependent only on hilsa Calcutta, depriving other districts. Again, this grievance was
fish in the rainy season, jobless (WBLA 1985). Various district echoed by several other district MLAs, including Nishikanta
MLAs started to criticise the Ministry of Fisheries for not taking Mehta (WBLA 1994b, 1994c). However, as Nanda stated, the
proper initiatives. This was worrying, because diminishing government fishery known as Benfish received funding
hilsa in West Bengal fish markets prompted middle-class specifically for Calcutta and its neighbouring areas. During
anger, which was another major issue for the government. The the 1990s, there was a problem with importing hilsa from
administration struggled between occupationally deprived Bangladesh and distributing it through licensing. However, by
fisherfolk and hilsa-deficient middle class, but it focused inter- 1998–99, private groups became overwhelmingly influential in
estingly on the latter. Political disputes within and outside the hilsa imports, causing the government to retreat (WBLA 2001).
legislative assembly will continue to focus on the Ganges river In 1999, the government ceased importing hilsa from Bangla-
pollution and the declining hilsa fish population (Sen 1991). desh, as private importers had completely taken over the im-
Newspapers and periodicals often reported such issues but all portation (WBLA 2000). Private importers began participating
in vain. The local fisherfolk in the Rupnarayan river area have in the market when the importation of hilsa fish transitioned
reported that the toxic waste from the Kolaghat thermal from restricted licensing to general licensing, resulting in an
power plant has significantly damaged the river’s ecosystem, increase in imports (WBLA 1999). This change in licensing was
resulting in a yearly decline in the hilsa fish population due to the coming of the Hasina government, who found a
(Ahamed 1984). diplomatic opportunity in West Bengal’s middle-class long-
Again in 1996, Subhas Chandra Naskar, a member of the ing—a perfect backdrop for soft power diplomacy.
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and MLA of Basanti, criticised
the fishery minister, Kiranmoy Nanda, for failing to provide Hasina’s Hilsa Diplomacy: 1996–2024
ice infrastructure, for which the distribution of fish became a A few years ago, top South Asian diplomatic journals began to
problem. This resulted in the fisherfolk of Sundarbans being praise Hasina for her successful use of “Hilsa Diplomacy” to
compelled to sell their hilsa fish at a low price, exacerbating improve ties between India and Bangladesh. If we consider
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 55
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the background, which we have already discussed, Hasina’s Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute of the Awami Govern-
approach was a try at finding a middle ground while leveraging ment, praised Hasina for establishing a separate Hilsa Research
Bangladesh’s diplomatic potential in South Asia. By 2010, Wing in 2014. But if we look closely into the project summary,
Bangladesh became the largest catcher of hilsa (76%), followed we would see the core project objective focused on “semi-natural
by India and Myanmar (19% together). Hilsa contributed to breeding” and “feasibility of cage culture” for hilsa, while
10% of the total fish production and 1% of the gross domestic surveying on the impact of climate change and anthropogen-
product (GDP) of Bangladesh, pointing out their unchallenged ic causes remained secondary (Mahmud 2020), much like
monopoly over the hilsa aspect of the Bay of Bengal’s blue the previously mentioned Indian governmental projects that
economy (Lobo 2022). Bangladesh has the power to set policy failed repeatedly.
on the sharing of this transregional blue economy due to its Furthermore, the extensive reverence for hilsa, along with
monopoly, just the way India exploited its geographical its diminishing population in the rivers of West Bengal, has
advantage to control water-sharing. India and Bangladesh necessitated the imperative importation of hilsa from eastern
share 54 rivers, most of which are dammed and under Indian Bengal, now recognised as Bangladesh by the 21st century.
control (Kumar 2013). The combination of these historical circumstances provided a
Hasina leveraged this geographical and environmental ad- favourable setting for the execution of Bangladesh’s Hilsa
vantage as a strategy for garnering soft power when she took Diplomacy. It could be contended that the notion of Hilsa
office in 1996 (Sen 2022). Another cause of this monopoly Diplomacy bears greater resemblance to diplomatic interac-
over the most lucrative asset of the Bay of Bengal’s blue treas- tions over fisheries rather than the conventional practice of
ure is the absence of transboundary fisheries resources manage- gifting animals in international diplomacy. Researchers have
ment through mutually agreed-upon policy guidelines (Sayed analysed the participation of several nations in diplomatic
and Alamgir 2022). Hasina sent hilsa as a sign of friendship efforts concerning the sustainable utilisation of fish resources
after the Ganges water-sharing treaty in 1996. She also sent it in Norwegian waters, referred to as “fishery diplomacy” (Leira
to Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee when she took office in and Neumann 2016: 20). This notion resembles Hasina’s Hilsa
2010, and it helped her achieve a favourable outcome for the Diplomacy, although hilsa’s cultural significance to Bengalis
Teesta water-sharing issue. substantially influences its symbolic meaning. Thus, it may be
From 2012 to 2018, when Mamata Banerjee was fighting cultural or public diplomacy.
over water-sharing from the Teesta river, the Hasina govern-
ment stopped hilsa from being brought into West Bengal Soft Power
(Chowdhury 2022). Regarding the Teesta water-sharing issue, As public opinion plays an important part in international rela-
Hasina famously said laughingly, “You (India) are not giving tions, public diplomacy has become a way of influencing the
us enough water, so I cannot give you hilsa fish right now” foreign populace (Frederick 1993). This diplomatic act works
(Sreedathan 2022). Hasina’s stance on exportation demon- as “soft power” projection because, in this case, Bangladesh,
strates how she skilfully used that desire to subtly influence economically and militarily much lesser than India, “conditions
India’s policymaking to her advantage. the target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations
Between 2020 and 2022, Hasina frequently used her Hilsa would like them to do” (Gallarotti 2011: 28). In addition, Hasina
Diplomacy to address the water-sharing problem on the Teesta would personally give hilsa to Indian politicians like Jyoti Basu,
river (Basu 2022). Besides West Bengal, Tripura, which also Pranab Mukherjee, and Mamata Bannerjee as a symbolic
has a majority Bengali population, imports hilsa during festive gesture, similar to animal diplomacy. Thus, it is a sort of
occasions. Through the Hilsa Diplomacy, Hasina not only diplomatic discussion that combines animal, fishery, and public
maintained a friendly bilateral relationship but also leveraged diplomacy. However, the flip side of this diplomatic success
this favourable perception of the Bengali majority states to story reveals that the increasing export of hilsa fish has affected
exert soft power influence in other matters (Mitra 2023). The the ever-increasing demand among the Bangladeshi middle
scholars of diplomacy commended her for effectively employ- class (Pottier 2014). Without being much aware of the endan-
ing soft power to cultivate goodwill and secure favourable gered biodiversity as well as increasing demand, the common
terms in the Teesta river dispute with West Bengal. However, populace had long been “lamenting the scarcity of hilsa and its
while the Hasina government prioritised diplomatic leverage ever-rising price” (van Schendel 2009: 245).
from hilsa, conservation policies remained largely unchanged. This could have resulted in internal resentment against
The Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules, 1985 in Hasina. The concept of fishery diplomacy highlights the chal-
Bangladesh required significant amendments concerning lenge faced by fisheries diplomats who aim to establish coop-
the delineation of hilsa sanctuary areas (Islam et al 2014). erative governance for sustainable international fisheries.
However, the lack of attention to these amendments and the These diplomats not only have to negotiate with other countries
exclusion of fishing communities from conservation initiatives on international fisheries issues, but they also have to simulta-
have hindered the achievement of sustainable development neously engage in domestic negotiations with their own govern-
goals (Islam et al 2024). While fishery experts like Muhammad ments and constituents. This is necessary in order to gain
Islam criticised the Hasina government’s approach to hilsa support and acceptance for any international agreements that
conservation, Yahia Muhammad, the Director General of promote sustainable cooperative governance (Barkin et al 2018).
56 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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Robert Putnam (2017, 2019) referred to this complex intersect- through her good relations with India (Kumar 2014). Following
ing situation of international diplomacy and domestic policies Hasina’s abrupt resignation on 5 August 2024, amid widespread
as a “two-level game.” The media in Bangladesh has exten- protests and the replacement of the Awami League government
sively reported on the widespread dissatisfaction among the with an interim government, the “shadow of the domestic
general population regarding the large-scale shipment of the political competition” soon overshadowed the incumbent’s
hilsa fish to the Indian market. As a result, the retail price of diplomatic policy. This shift occurred when Hasina’s championed
hilsa in the fish market in Bangladesh increased (Jasimuddin Hilsa Diplomacy met with another ban, reminiscent of the
2023). From 2019 to 2023, Bangladesh’s annual hilsa fish ex- pre-Hasina period. The ban had been a hasty decision from
ports amounted to 5,541 metric tonnes. However, in 2023–24, the interim government as a popular move, which they
this figure declined to 3,950 metric tonnes. This decline can revised within a week. However, they publicly mentioned
be attributed partly to the scarcity of the hilsa population that this time, the hilsa export signifies an “economic move,”
and the increasing demand for hilsa in the domestic market unlike the Hasina era’s diplomatic “gift” (Economic Times
(Prothom Alo 2023). 2024). So, the lifting of the ban does not signify any reversal
In the case of Bangladesh, Putnam’s two-level game concept of Hilsa Diplomacy but a departure from its prior objective.
is important, because, despite their huge production level su-
periority, Bangladesh exported only 12%. A majority of this Conclusions
export has always been sent to India, nearly 63% in 2010–11 Ever since the colonial fisheries department was involved, the
(Hossain et al 2019). But this low amount of export is because dwindling hilsa population in India’s riverine and estuary regions
the government has always been under pressure, as the has been a major environmental and cultural concern. Never-
national market has been deprived of its prized produce. Every theless, the reminiscence value of the hilsa’s flavour was am-
time the local price went up, popular consensus usually criti- plified upon Partition. Bengalis were already worried about
cised exportation as the cause of the price hike. Which is why, losing their cultural icon before separation, and trade obstacles
in 2007 and 2012, the Bangladesh government imposed a ban only made things worse. Without successful cross-border
on hilsa export, but as per hilsa exporters, “the ban increased cooperation, the governments on both sides of the Radcliffe
Hilsa smuggling to India,” while it had not been “effective line sought to solve the problem of hilsa fisheries protection. At
enough to reduce local retail price of Hilsa” (Hossain et al the same time, the Indian government tried and failed repeat-
2019: 1730). The global game of diplomacy “always occurs in edly to artificially spread hilsa. The Hilsa Diplomacy approach,
the shadow of domestic political competition” (Malis and which Hasina’s government used to end years of animosity be-
Smith 2019: 480). tween West Bengal and Bangladesh over hilsa imports, in-
Keeping in the background, Hasina’s Hilsa Diplomacy, the volved regulating hilsa imports as a form of soft power to-
recent violent change of regimes in Bangladesh, obviously, wards India. Hasina’s Hilsa Diplomacy was thus against a his-
would affect the bilateral relations regarding the exportation torical, cultural, political, and ecological setting.
of hilsa. Bangladesh’s “anti-India” feeling had long been Up until the recent political changes in Bangladesh, this
brewing since the Liberation War due to various causes such strategy was in place. A lack of trust about the sustainable use
as unfavourable trade relations or the making of the Farakka of the blue economy evolved between the two countries during
dam. After the counterterror task force plan, anti-India feeling bilateral diplomatic engagements, as an obvious consequence
has been whipped up by the main anti-India factions, such as of the ineffective and biased hydro politics. In short, public
the Jamat and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Since 2010, diplomacy helped with the export–import problem but did not
whenever Hasina visited India, the anti-India factions became solve or rather did not give a thought about solving the perma-
more enraged, while Hasina expanded her political capital nent environmental issue of declining hilsa.

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An Online Course on Urban Futures in South and South-East Asia
Kabir, A J (2013): Partition’s Post-Amnesias: 1947, An online course on “Urban Futures in South and Southeast Asia” will be jointly organised
1971 and Modern South Asia, New Delhi: Women by the Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG) and the Gender and Displacement
Unlimited.
Programme of the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Bangkok, from 17 January to
Kumar, A (2013): “Impact of West Bengal Politics
7 March 2026 with two-hour sessions held every Saturday. Course themes include:
on India-Bangladesh Relations,” Strategic
Analysis, Vol 37, No 3, pp 338–52. (a) The literary, artistic, and cultural imagination of a desirable city
— (2014): “Domestic Politics of Bangladesh and (b) The political histories of subaltern classes and their demands for a humane and just
India-Bangladesh Relations,” Strategic Analysis, urban order
Vol 38, No 5, pp 652–67.
Lahiri, A (2024): “Bangladesh Hilsa: Bharate Band- (c) The experience of public disasters (climatic or epidemiological), and the solidarities
ha Padmar Ilish! Kara Bara Naya Bangladeshi of care and mutual protection that arise in response
Upadeshthar,” TV9 Bangla, 12 August. (d) The visions of planners and administrators shaped by intergovernmental aid,
Leira, H and I B Neumann (2016): “Beastly Diplo- investment, and public–private partnerships
macy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol 12,
(e) The presence of refugees, migrants, and outsiders whose contributions lend cities a
pp 1–23.
plural and cosmopolitan character in tension with nativist claims
Lobo, A S (2022): “Lessons from the Hilsa: An
Aquascape Approach to the Sustainable Man- (f) The evolution of an urban economy in place of the industrial economy, and the
agement of Blue Foods and Threatened Aquatic central role played by informal economies and public finance in shaping these
Species in the Bay of Bengal,” Connectivity and trajectories.
Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal Region, Centre The last date for receiving applications is 10 October 2025. Applications will have
for Social and Economic Progress, C Xavier and
to be accompanied by CV, one recommendation letter, and a statement of purpose.
A Palit (eds), pp 83–90.
Application may be sent to Priya Singh priya@[Link], Madhubanti Talukdar
LSD (1996): “Lok Sabha Debates, 15th Session,
Third Series, Vol LIX, No 21–30,” Lok Sabha
madhubanti@[Link] and Subhashree Rout subhashree@[Link]
Secretariat, New Delhi, 23 August. For further details on course structure and fees, please visit CRG website (www.
— (1993): “Lok Sabha Debates, 6th Session, Tenth [Link]) or see [Link]
Series, Vol XIX, No 16,” Lok Sabha Secretariat, Course_2026_%20Call_For_Applications.pdf
New Delhi, 16 March.

58 september 6, 2025 vol lX no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

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Economic Development in the Indian States

Convergence versus Divergence

Sushanta Kumar Mahapatra, Pareswar Sahu

I
In this paper, the nature of convergence or divergence n recent days, the increasing inter- and intra-regional dis-
in the level of development across Indian states is parities in the level of development across the globe and its
manifestations in different forms in the economy have be-
re-examined using the coefficient of variation technique
come a challenge for policymakers, social thinkers, and the
and by classification of states into the categories of general public. Regional disparity is reflected through differential
“green“ (developed states), “pink” (middle-developed access to resources, public provisioning, and employment by
states), and “red” (less-developed states), based on different groups of people, leading to differences in the quality
of social, economic, and political life (Reddy 1976; Kurian 2000;
their average values of the multidimensional index that
Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 2004; Han 2006; Bhattacharya
comprises socio-economic and fiscal indicators 2009; Bakshi et al 2015). Prolonged and growing regional dis-
between 2011–12 and 2017–18, unlike earlier literatures parities not only harm economic growth but also incite public
which have used the cvs of either one or two of these unrest due to the ongoing exclusion of certain sections of soci-
ety in various spheres of life. With the introduction of econom-
indicators. Although disparity persists in the level of
ic reforms in the form of liberalisation, privatisation, and glo-
development among states, it is found to decrease in balisation, disparity has increased across the states of the
the later period, reflecting convergence. Development country. States with better physical and social infrastructure
converges at a higher level due to a significant rise in or the capacity to invest in infrastructure attracted a larger
share of private investment than states with deficient infra-
the average level among less developed states. This
structure (Ahluwalia 2000; Mundle et al 2016).
convergence is attributed to fiscal and health indicators, In the same vein, regions with better infrastructure and
and it would have increased if economic and education mineral resources attracted large foreign investment within
indicators had not shown divergence. This phenomenon the state and accentuated the process of regional disparity. Al-
though the centre and states have taken remedial measures
is found relatively more in special category states than
through direct public investment in infrastructure, guiding
in the general category states. While there is forward private investment, and capacity building since the inception
convergence in SCS, backward convergence is observed of planning (Singh 2012), the measures have not been success-
among GCS. Still, the level of development in the SCS is ful in bridging the imbalance as expected due to (i) the domi-
nant role of political leaders of advanced areas against back-
lower than in the GCS.
ward areas in the planning process, financial distribution, and
political activism; and (ii) inequity. The union finance com-
mission (UFC), the constitutional body tasked with dealing
with revenue transfer from the centre to state, in order to miti-
gate regional disparity across states, also failed due to the dis-
incentive effect of its methodologies and their weights (Maha-
mallik and Sahu 2015). Economic development ensures the
provision of a minimum level of basic public goods, enabling
people to live a long and healthy life with a minimum standard
The authors are grateful to the anonymous referee and the editorial
team for constructive comments and suggestions, which helped in
of living. In this context, reducing disparity in the level of eco-
improving the quality of the paper significantly. nomic development across the states is of significant impor-
tance. However, to undertake remedial measures for this ail-
Sushanta Kumar Mahapatra ([Link]@[Link])
teaches economics at the ICFAI School of Social Sciences, the ICFAI ment, an understanding of the reasons behind this disparity is
Foundation for Higher Education Deemed University, Hyderabad. the need of the hour.
Pareswar Sahu ([Link]@[Link]) teaches at the The literature review for this study examined inter- and intra-
Department of Economics, Barpali College, Barpali under state disparities by focusing on social, economic, or fiscal
Sambalpur University, Odisha.
dimensions. Further, the disparity was investigated across all
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 59
SPECIAL ARTICLE

Indian states, ignoring larger heterogeneity in terms of geo- poverty line. The composite development index was developed
graphical area, hilly and terrain area, climatic conditions, and using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of all 14 indicators.
population composition. However, no clear-cut conclusion re- Disparity in socio-economic development across states was found
garding convergence and divergence in the level of develop- to have increased till 1980–81 and subsequently diminished.
ment was found. This paper explores the extent of conver- Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) compared the disparities
gence in the level of development in India covering social, eco- between pre- and post-reforms periods in terms of aggregate
nomic, and fiscal dimensions and dividing states into general and sectoral domestic product of major states of India. They
category states (GCS) and special category states (SCS) based found a significant increase in regional disparity in the state
on geographical area, hilly and terrain area, climatic condi- domestic product (SDP) in post-reform period due to high
tions, and population composition using a multidimensional growth rates in industrial states relative to backward states
index (MDI) and tries to find out the reasons behind it. Conver- and the absence of convergence in growth rates among states.
gence was examined across all states taken together (along Kurian (2007) observed an increasing regional disparity in
with GCS and SCS) between 2011–12 and 2017–18. Convergence per capita income due to higher economic growth and lower
is observed in each state category. There was greater conver- population growth in western and southern states compared
gence across SCS than GCS and all states taken together. The to northern and eastern states between 1983 and 2004–05. In
states’ efforts to increase tax revenue enabled the level of de- the developed regions, large-scale employment opportunities
velopment towards convergence across all states. However, were created. But backward regions showed a higher labour
divergence is found in the standards of living indicators among force growth rate, resulting in a large number of labourers mi-
all states and in the GCS. Further, the average level of develop- grating from backward regions to developed regions in search
ment decreases across GCS, even if it increases across all states of employment. The social and economic lives of people in ad-
and SCS. The UFC should assign proper weights to fiscal disci- vanced regions were adversely affected. The migrants’ remit-
pline and equity criteria in the distribution of central shared tances added to the purchasing power at home, but the lack of
taxes to encourage states to increase convergence in the level availability of skills in the home market due to migration de-
of development (Sahu et al 2024). Besides this, grants provid- pleted the development of their home states. In terms of literacy
ed to states under the central ministries should be linked to and health, the economically better-off states fared well on ac-
performance in specific sectors. count of significant public expenditure on socially relevant
programmes, expenditure efficiency, and the multiplier effect
Review of Literature of private investment in health and education. Kar and
Available pieces of literature in social science analyse the con- Sakthivel (2007) explored the impact of pro-market reform on
vergence and/or divergence in the interstate level of development regional inequality in India at an aggregate and sectoral (agri-
over the periods. Some studies argue in favour of convergence culture, industry, and service sector) level among 17 major
(Lahiri 1969; Bakshi et al 2015), while some others favour states. They had observed stagnant (during the 1980s) and in-
divergence (Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 2004; Kurian 2007; creasing (during the 1990s) regional disparity on account of
Nayyar 2008; Dholakia 2009; Singh 2012: Mahamallik and convergence and divergence in per capita output from the
Sahu 2015; Mundle et al 2016) and others favour a mixed manufacturing and service sectors, respectively.
picture of divergence and convergence (Sarker 1994; Kar and Using panel data on per capita income for 16 Indian states
Sakthivel 2007; Chakraborty 2009) in the levels of develop- from 1978–79 to 2002–03, the convergence of state rates to a
ment across states. steady rate was explored. It was observed that states were not
The interstate disparity in industrial development in terms converging to an identical level of per capita income. When
of employment was found to be declining from 1956 to 1965. factors affecting steady-state income were controlled, poorer
While the share of factory employment declined in industrialised states grew faster than rich states due to disparities in private
states, that of backward states increased in 1965 (Lahiri 1969). and public investment and the lack of an equalising impact of
Sarker (1994) studied disparity in development among the 15 federal transfers (Nayyar 2008). The regional disparity among
major states of India using the coefficient of variation and all states of India increased from 1980–81 to 2006–07 when
average Euclidean distance of the composite development in- better-off states significantly contributed to the growth rate
dex of 14 indicators over the five-year planning periods from (Dholakia 2009). Chakraborty (2009) found a reduction of
1960–61 to 1986–87. The 14 development indicators studied dispersion in human development using data on the composite
were: per capita consumption of electricity, percentage of vil- index of school infrastructure during 2005–06 and the literacy
lages electrified, net area irrigated as a percentage of net area rate as per the 2001 Census, but increased inequality in per
sown, per capita state domestic income from agriculture, per capita SDP. Raju (2012) examined the growth rate among all
capita foodgrain production, per capita income from the man- states, GCS, and SCS of India during 2001–10 and found conver-
ufacturing sector, number of average daily employment, num- gence among all states and GCS but weak convergence among SCS.
ber of small-scale registered units, road length, and number of Using investment data from 1991 to 2009 and per capita
registered motor vehicles per one lakh population, per capita gross state domestic product (PCGSDP) data from 1980–81 to
expenditure on health, effective literacy rate, percentage of 2001–02 of India’s 14 major undivided states, Singh (2012)
urban population, and percentage of population below the discovered a sharp increase in interstate disparities in the
60 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE

post-reform period in terms of the concentration of more income reliability of the inferences drawn. Unfortunately, data, par-
growth on rich states relative to poorer ones. Bakshi et al (2015) ticularly on social indicators, are not available continuously over
observed greater convergence in the human development time. Further, data on these variables are available up to 2017–
index (HDI) relative to per capita income across all states of 18. Convergence/divergence in the level of development is ex-
India and the presence of an increasing concentration of back- plored between two time periods (2011–12 and 2017–18) using
wardness at the intra-state level, particularly in Adivasi com- coefficient of variation and classification of states into “green,”
munities, as reflected by the census data on agricultural work- “pink,” or “red” based on the average value of the MDI of states.
ers, female literacy, and families without water and sanitation The MDI is the geometric mean of HDI and the FDI. The
facilities, electricity, or access to banking facilities. Mahamallik higher value of MDI indicates a higher level of development,
and Sahu (2015) found growing inequality across 14 major while the lower value reflects a lower level of development.
states while examining the horizontal fiscal imbalance in India HDI and FDI, with their sub-indices, are constructed using the
from 1980–81 to 2014–15. The inequality was calculated using same formula as used for the construction of HDI by the United
coefficient of variation on the state’s total independent capacity Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2020) in its Human
to meet its basic and total responsibilities, the share of basic in Development Report of 2020. The formulae for the construction
total responsibilities, and the state’s independent capacities of different indices and sub-indices are as follows.
and responsibilities per capita. Mundle et al (2016) found
Acutal valueെMinimum value
growing regional disparity when examining the performance Dimensional index value = … (1)
Mamixum valueെMinimum value
of Indian states on infrastructure, social services, fiscal health,
Actual life expectany of state i െ 20
justice, law and order, and legislature quality between 2001–02 HI = … (2)
Mamixum value െ 20
and 2011–12.
Actual expected years of schooling of state i െ 0 … (3)
Trigunayat (2024) argued about the existence of greater ESI =
Mamixum value െ 0
divergence across regions within a state in terms of regional
Actual mean years of schooling of state i െ 0 … (4)
value added between 2004–05 and 2011–12. MSI =
Mamixum value െ 0
There is no clear-cut conclusion regarding the existence of ESI + MSI
EI = … (5)
convergence in the level of development in India. Either the 2
indicators/period and/or methodologies and/or sample states, ln(Per capita GSDP୧ ) െ ln (Minimum per capita GSDP)
SI = … (6)
all used in kinds of literature, may not be sufficient to explain ln (Mamixum per capita GSDP) െ ln (Minimum per capita GSDP)
the convergence and/or divergence in the level of development. ଵ
HDI = (HI ‫ כ‬EI ‫ כ‬SI)ଷ … (7)
Literature used either fiscal (Mahamallik and Sahu 2015) or
economic (Singh 2012; Nayyar 2008; Kar and Sakthivel 2007; ଵ
… (8)
FDI=(TEI‫כ‬REMCI‫כ‬TEMCI)ଷ
Rao 1973; Lahiri 1969; Sarkar 1994; Bhattacharya and Sakthivel
ଵ
2004) or social and economic (Bakshi et al 2015; Chakraborty MDI=(HDI‫כ‬FDI) ଶ … (9)
2009; Kurian 2007; Sarkar 1994) or social, political and fiscal
(Mundle et al 2016) indicators to examine the situation. where HI = Health Index, ESI = Expected Years of Schooling
Although two or three indicators were used in the literature, Index, MSI = Mean Years of Schooling Index, EI = Education
the basic variables of the indicators differed. Little attention Index, SI = Standard of Living Index, HDI = Human Development
was drawn to exploring the nature of convergence and/or di- Index, TEI = Tax Effort Index, REMCI = Revenue Expenditure
vergence using recent data, combining social, economic, and Meeting Capacity Index, TEMCI = Total Expenditure Meeting
fiscal indicators across all states, GCS, and SCS through the Capacity Index and MDI = Multidimensional Index.
method used for the construction of HDI. The minimum value of life expectancy at birth is 20 years
and zero years for both expected and mean years of schooling,
Materials and Methods respectively. Minimum value affects comparisons. Zero is thought
Secondary data on social (life expectancy at birth for health, of as an appropriate subsistence or natural value for both expect-
mean year of schooling, and expected years of schooling for ed and mean years of schooling since society can exist without
education) and economic (PCGSDP at constant prices 2011–12) any formal education. The minimum value of life expectancy is
indicators were collected from the Directorate of Economics based on historical evidence from “Maddition 2010” (UNDP 2010).
and Statistics, Government of Odisha, for the years 2011–12 The maximum values are based on the actual maximum values
and 2017–18. “State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2020–21,” observed among the states. The highest and lowest values of
published in the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI 2020) Annual economic and fiscal indicators are taken as the maximum and
Publication on its website in 2020, was used to collect data on minimum values, respectively, for calculating their indices.
fiscal indicators (tax effort, own revenue as a percentage of The maximum value for the state with the highest value of an
revenue expenditures, and own revenue as a percentage of to- indicator is scaled up by 25%, and the minimum value for the
tal expenditures) for the same years as that of the social and state with the lowest value of an indicator is scaled down by
economic indicators. Raw data collected for the HDI and fiscal 25% while calculating their respective indices (UNDP 2011).
discipline index (FDI) are shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 Growth, stability, and equity—the three basic objectives of
(p 66). Continuously updated period data ensured the complete government policies—are interrelated in the long run. Growth
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 61
SPECIAL ARTICLE

helps to reduce poverty, leading to greater equality in the dis- tax efforts and reducing revenue expenditures by states. Dis-
tribution of income (Balasubramanian et al 2023) and social parity within SCS has decreased to a greater extent than dis-
output indicators. Equity encourages economic growth. How- parity within GCS, indicating larger convergence. SCS has per-
ever, economic growth is slowed in the absence of fiscal stabil- formed comparatively better than GCS in maintaining fiscal
ity (Campo and Tommasi 1999). While growth relates to the discipline and in improving human development. The reduc-
economic indicator, stability comprises of the fiscal indicator, tion of disparities increased the average level of development.
and equity is to be viewed from the economic, fiscal, and social The level of development converges towards a higher level in
indicators. Although the differences in socio-economic, demo- the case of SCS, while convergence of development among GCS
graphic, geographical, and fiscal structures and the policy de- is observed to be towards a lower level. Divergence is found in
cisions of the country, to some extent, lead to differences in education, income, revenue expenditure meeting capacity,
the levels of development across units, the simultaneous im- and total expenditure meeting capacity across the GCS.
provement in social, economic, and fiscal indicators may in- The persistence of disparity among all states measured in
crease the level of development of a country. HDI reflects the terms of coefficient of variation of MDI was around 41% during
basic capacities of healthy and long lives, access to education, 2011–12. Although the country had an average level of develop-
and the standard of living of people. Life expectancy at birth, ment of 52%, the level of development varied from 8% in Mizoram
expected and mean year of schooling, and PCGSDP can better to 81% in Tamil Nadu. This is the outcome of variations in HDI
explain healthy life, access to education, and decent standard and FDI, which is 14.78% and 58.01%, respectively. The ine-
of living of people, respectively. Similarly, tax effort, revenue quality in HDI is attributed to disproportion in the standard of
expenditure, and total expenditure meeting capacity repre- living (32.32%), education (14.56%), and health (7.26%) indi-
sent the fiscal discipline of a state. The disparity in the level of ces, in descending order. Tax effort index (TEI) of 56.23%, rev-
development is estimated in this study across all 28 states tak- enue expenditure meeting capacity (REMC) of 58.14%, and to-
en together, and for 17 GCS and 11 SCS separately, using the de- tal expenditure meeting capacity (TEMC) of 58.91% are respon-
velopment index by combining socio-economic and fiscal indi- sible for dispersion in FDI. There is significant inequality in per
cators called MDI. In India, states are broadly divided into GCS capita income, tax effort, and state expenditures (Table 2). As
and SCS depending on the proportion of hilly and difficult ter- stated earlier, fiscal indiscipline results in low economic
rain areas, population density, the share of tribal population, growth, which in turn leads to low tax effort and state expen-
strategic location along borders with neighbouring countries, ditures. Thus, there is a vicious circle of low development.
economic and infrastructural backwardness, and the non-via- During 2017–18, inequality among all states fell by 10.5%,
ble nature of state finances (Bhattacharjee 2014). Further- resulting in a 1% increase in the average level of development.
more, states in each category are classified as “green” (devel- However, the level of development ranged from 17% in Nagaland
oped states), “pink” (moderately developed states), and “red” to 76% in Maharashtra and Telangana. The same proportionate
(less developed states) based on the average value of the MDI decline in the disparity of both FDI and HDI resulted in a con-
to determine the nature of convergence or divergence. States traction of inequality. Even if the contraction of disparity in
whose values of MDI are greater than the average value of all FDI is around four times the decline of HDI during this period,
states are treated as green states. Pink states are the states the extent of inequality in FDI is also around four times that of
whose MDI is greater than the average of all other states, be- HDI during 2011–12. The reduction of disparity in the former is
sides green states, and the others are included in red states. attributed to a decline in the disparities of TEI (19.4%), REMCI
(5.84%), and TEMCI (5.26%). Although inequality in education
Understanding disparities in economic development: and living standards had increased by 0.8% and 0.45%, respec-
When disparity in economic development exists in a country, tively, better healthcare provision enabled the maintenance of
people do not get the common minimum level of public goods. more or less the same human resource provision (Table 2). In
Alleviation of the disparity needs the urgent attention of other words, the maintenance of the same inequality is a result
the government, which requires the application of policy of increased investment in health facilities and state tax efforts.
measures at the appropriate place and time. However, with- There is still greater variation in per capita income and revenue
out understanding the intricacies of disparity, it is difficult to Table 1: Summary Statistics for All States during 2011–12 and 2017–18
adopt suitable policy measures. This study investigates the Constant 2011–12 2017–18
LE MYS EYS PGSDP LE MYS EYS PGSDP
nature of disparity using socio-economic and fiscal indicators
Mean 67 6 13 76,819 69 6 14 1,10,661
simultaneously, as stated earlier. The summary statistics of
Standard error 1 0 0 6,596 1 0 0 10,064
the basic variable of the indicators are presented in Table 1. Standard deviation 3 1 2 34,272 3 1 2 53,256
An empirical investigation of all states taken together, and of Skewness 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
GCS and SCS separately, reveals the persistence of disparity Minimum 64 4 10 23,525 65 4 10 29,385
with convergence in the level of development across states in Maximum 75 8 16 1,81,842 75 9 19 2,70,235
Count 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28
each category between 2011–12 and 2017–18 (please see LE =Life expectancy (years), MYS = Mean year of schooling (Population age>=25 years),
Tables 2, 3, and 4, p 63). EYS = Expected years of schooling (years), and PGSDP = Per capita gross state domestic
product in Indian Rupees (INR).
There is a greater proportionate increase in human develop- Sources: For data on HDI, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha
ment and the maintenance of fiscal discipline through increasing (2018); For data on the FDI, RBI (2020).

62 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

SPECIAL ARTICLE

expenditures among states. It corroborates the findings of the health index (8.19%), education index (12.37%), and standard
study of Bakshi et al (2015). of living index (63.30%) of HDI during 2011–12. The level of
Analysis shows that disparity exists across GCS to the development ranges from 9% in Nagaland to 70% in Uttara-
extent of 29.54% during 2011–12, reflecting the variation in khand. This inequality is reduced by 18.53% due to 28% and
the level of development from 25% in West Bengal to 83% in 5% decline in FDI and HDI, respectively, during 2017–18. Ine-
Tamil Nadu. This is due to the combined variation in HDI and quality occurs in descending order for TEMCI (62.93%), REMCI
FDI of 15.91% and 40.49%, respectively. Inequality in the (62.13%), and TEI (54.99%) of FDI, with the same order of ine-
standards of living (34.50%), education (13.21%), and health quality among the indicators of HDI during 2011–12 but with
(6.10%) have contributed, in descending order, to the varia- lower levels. While FDI inequality was three times that of HDI
tion in the HDI. In a similar manner, tax effort (45.69%), REMCI in 2011–12, the latter’s decline in inequality was five times that
(42.49%), and TEMCI (39.07%), in descending order, led to of the former in 2017–18. In other words, the reduction in the
the inequality in FDI (Table 3). Disparities among GCS are par- disparity is significantly attributed to the decline in FDI.
ticularly due to greater variations in per capita income, tax The comparative analysis of inequality between GCS and
effort, and revenue expenditures. SCS reveals that (1) the inequality among SCS was around two
It is observed that disparity declined by 6.25% from 2011–12 times the disparity across GCS during 2011–12; and (2) during
to 2017–18. The level of development varied from 33% in Bihar 2017–18, the disparity across SCS became closer to that of GCS
and West Bengal to 79% in Telangana. This decline is attribut- due to a 4.5 times decline in the inequality among SCS when
ed to a fall in the disparity of FDI by 1.96% due to a reduction compared to that of GCS.
in the variation in tax effort by 5.09%. Although the health in- The inequality in the level of development between the two
dex variation is reduced by 0.77%, the rise in the variation of time periods shows the sign of a declining trend, indicating
education and standard of living has exerted a significant in- convergence. Still, increasing trends are observed in the ine-
fluence on the HDI, increasing its dispersion. The average level quality of certain indicators, showing signs of divergence.
of development declined from 60% to 54% between these two When all states and GCS are examined separately, education
periods. If the variation in REMCI and TEMCI had been reduced, and standard of living indicators show increasing inequality.
then convergence might have been achieved to a greater extent. Further, increasing inequality is observed in the cases of REMC
Inequalities of 50.28% and 31.75% during 2011–12 and 2017–18, and TEMC from the analysis of all states taken together. This
respectively, are also observed across SCS (Table 4). Inequality supports the findings of Nayyar’s (2008) study.
exists in descending order from TEMCI (84.69%), TEI (84.46%),
and REMCI (76.20%) of FDI and in ascending order from the Convergence versus divergence: Convergence refers to a
movement towards equity, which may be forward or back-
Table 2: Disparity in Development across All States between 2011–12 and
2017–18 ward. In the case of forward convergence, poorer states
Indices 2011–12 2017–18 become richer, meaning movement towards a higher level of
Average SD CV Average SD CV development, whereas in backward convergence, rich states
Tax effort index 0.50 0.28 56.23 0.63 0.23 36.83 become poorer, indicating movement towards a lower level of
REMCI 0.55 0.32 58.14 0.46 0.24 52.29
development. Forward convergence helps to maintain growth
TEMCI 0.53 0.31 58.91 0.49 0.26 53.65
Fiscal discipline index 0.52 0.30 58.01 0.51 0.23 45.57 and stability in the economy. Convergence towards a higher
Health index 0.64 0.05 7.26 0.66 0.04 5.86 level of development ensures stability at a higher level of
Education index 0.59 0.09 14.56 0.58 0.09 15.36 growth. As mentioned earlier, the nature of convergence is
Standard of living index 0.53 0.17 32.32 0.54 0.18 32.77 examined in this study through the coefficient of variation and
Human development index 0.58 0.09 14.78 0.59 0.09 14.88
classification of states on the basis of the average of MDI.
Multidimensional index 0.52 0.21 40.58 0.53 0.16 30.08
REMCI = Revenue Expenditure Meeting Capacity Index, TEMCI = Total Expenditure All states are converging towards a higher average level of
Meeting Capacity Index, SD = Standard Deviation, and CV =Coefficient of Variation. development (Table 2). While SCS are converging towards a
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018); RBI (2020).
higher level of development (Table 4), GCS are converging
Table 3: Disparity across General Category States between 2011–12 and Table 4: Disparity across Special Category States between 2011–12 and
2017–18 2017–18
Indices 2011–12 2017–18 Indices 2011–12 2017–18
Average SD CV Average SD CV Average SD CV Average SD CV
Tax effort index 0.51 0.23 45.69 0.50 0.20 40.60 Tax effort index 0.39 0.33 84.46 0.47 0.26 54.99
REMCI 0.66 0.28 42.49 0.45 0.21 47.17 REMCI 0.40 0.31 76.20 0.40 0.25 62.13
TEMCI 0.64 0.25 39.07 0.51 0.22 44.12 TEMCI 0.39 0.33 84.69 0.39 0.24 62.93
Fiscal discipline index 0.59 0.24 40.49 0.46 0.18 38.53 Fiscal discipline index 0.37 0.30 80.55 0.40 0.21 52.67
Health index 0.66 0.04 6.10 0.67 0.04 5.33 Health index 0.65 0.05 8.19 0.66 0.04 6.37
Education index 0.61 0.08 13.21 0.64 0.09 13.95 Education index 0.66 0.08 12.37 0.64 0.08 12.1
Standard of living index 0.67 0.23 34.50 0.67 0.24 35.31 Standard of living index 0.34 0.22 63.30 0.36 0.22 60.08
Human development index 0.64 0.11 16.92 0.65 0.09 13.28 Human development index 0.50 0.15 30.15 0.51 0.13 25.52
Multidimensional index 0.60 0.18 29.64 0.54 0.13 23.39 Multidimensional index 0.38 0.19 50.28 0.43 0.14 31.75
REMCI = Revenue Expenditure Meeting Capacity Index, TEMCI = Total Expenditure REMCI = Revenue Expenditure Meeting Capacity Index, TEMCI = Total Expenditure
Meeting Capacity Index, SD = Standard Deviation, and CV =Coefficient of Variation. Meeting Capacity Index, SD = Standard Deviation, and CV =Coefficient of Variation.
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018); RBI (2020). Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018); RBI (2020).

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towards a lower level of development (Table 3). The reduction in due to improvement in the average level of less developed
the value of coefficient of variation for different values of MDI states. When disparity is examined among all states of the
for all states from 40.58% during 2011–12 to 30.08% during country, one pink state (Tripura) during 2011–12 turned out to
2017–18 reflects convergence among states. Convergence at a be red in 2017–18 and the other remained in the same position.
higher level of development is found as a result of an improve- The percentage of the number of less-developed states increased
ment of 1% in the average value of MDI when disparity is meas- in the latter period. Further, the average level of development
ured by taking all states together. SCS is moving from 38% in of green states declined by 3% from 2011–12 to 2017–18. But
2011–12 to 43% during the 2017–18 variation in the level of de- since the relative strength (increase in average value) of an
velopment. However, the value of GCS has fallen from 60% in average level of development of pink (4%) and red states
2011–12 to 54% in 2017–18. (12.6%) between the two periods is higher than the average
As far as the nature of convergence is concerned, there is for- level of development of green states, the average level of devel-
ward convergence at a higher level of development, particularly opment of all states ramped up marginally (1%), indicating
forward convergence of states (Table 5).
Table 5: Classification Based on Nature of Convergence for All States
Year Green State Pink State Red State
The exploration of disparity within GCS presents conver-
2011–12 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Arunachal gence towards a lower level when three green states in the pe-
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Pradesh, riod 2011–12, namely Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Gu-
Haryana, Karnataka, West Bengal, Mizoram,
jarat, became pink states in 2017–18 (Table 6). In other words,
Kerala, Maharashtra, Assam, Tripura, Nagaland,
Punjab, Tamil Nadu, MP, Jammu and and Manipur some highly developed states have joined the ranks of the
Odisha, Rajasthan, UP, Kashmir, moderately developed states. Although the average level of de-
Himachal Pradesh, and Meghalaya,
velopment of red states increased by 9% and that of green and
Uttarakhand and Sikkim
2017–18 Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Bihar, Arunachal pink states decreased by 1% and 2%, respectively, from the for-
Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Jharkhand, Pradesh, mer to the latter period, the higher relative strength of decline
Nadu, Telangana, Andhra West Bengal, Mizoram, in average development of green and pink states compared to
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Jammu Nagaland,
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Kashmir, Manipur, and the former group of states led to the contraction in the average
Odisha, Rajasthan, UP, Meghalaya, Tripura level of development of all GCS by 6%.
Himachal Pradesh, and and Sikkim However, a reverse order of convergence from that of GCS
Uttarakhand
Converging/ Tripura
was observed in the case of SCS. In this case, states moved
diverging state(s) from a lower to a higher level of development. One red state
Source: Compiled by the authors from the data obtained from the Directorate of Economics (Mizoram) and one pink state (Assam) during 2011–12 entered
and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018) and RBI (2020).
into the categories of pink and green states, respectively, dur-
Table 6: Nature of Convergence for General Category States ing 2017–18 (Table 7). The average level of development of
Year Green State Pink State Red State green, pink and red states increased by 0.4%, 6% and 8.2%
2011–12 Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Jharkhand,
respectively, during the same period of time.
Gujarat, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh and West
Karnataka, Kerala, Bengal Conclusions and Policy Suggestions
Maharashtra, Punjab,
and Tamil Nadu
The development of a country is determined by the extent of
2017–18 Haryana, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, achievement of its basic policy objectives of equity, growth,
Kerala, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, and stability. Because these three policy goals are intertwined,
Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, and West a lag in one goal drags the other goal down to a lower level.
Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan and UP Bengal
Telangana, and Due to the consistent efforts in implementing policy measures
Odisha in human development and fiscal health over time, there has
Converging/ Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, been forward convergence at a higher level of development in
diverging state(s) Uttar Pradesh Chhattisgarh and
the country. Although disparity exists in the level of develop-
Gujarat
Source: Compiled by the authors from the data obtained from the Directorate of Economics ment among all states, it decreases in the latter period, reflect-
and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018) and RBI (2020).
ing convergence in the level of development. Further, it con-
Table 7: Nature of Convergence for Special Category States verges at a higher level due to a significant rise in the average
Year Green State Pink State Red State level of development in less developed states. This conver-
2011–12 Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram gence is attributed to fiscal and health indicators. It would
Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Manipur, and and
Meghalaya, Sikkim, Tripura Nagaland have increased if economic and education indicators had not
and Uttarakhand diverged. Also, the convergence is relatively more in the SCS
2017–18 Assam, Himachal Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland than in the GCS. While there is forward convergence in SCS,
Pradesh, Jammu and Meghalaya, Manipur,
Kashmir, Sikkim, and Mizoram, and Tripura backward convergence is observed among GCS. Still, the level
Uttarakhand of development in SCS was found to be lower than GCS. The
Converging/ Assam Mizoram reason behind this greater inequality is due to high variation
diverging state(s)
Source: Compiled by the authors from the data obtained from the Directorate of Economics
in FDI. All states should increase tax efforts and manage public
and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018) and RBI (2020). expenditure economically, efficiently, and effectively, which
64 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE

may ensure physical and human capital formation to increase convergence. However, this study is constrained by not using
economic growth. The UFC should assign optimum weights the drinking water index in the MDI because the availability of
to fiscal discipline and equity criteria in the distribution of safe drinking water protects life from health hazards, constitut-
central shared taxes, as suggested by Mahamallik and Sahu ing an important ingredient of the level of development. Exam-
(2015). These optimum weights may discourage rich states ining the disparity between states by including the drinking
engaging in fiscal profligacy and encourage poorer states to water index may be useful for future research in measuring
raise tax efforts, which in turn would increase the level of the level of economic development.

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 65

SPECIAL ARTICLE
Appendices

Table A1: Raw Data of Indicators of Human Development Index

State 2011–12 2017–18
Long and Healthy Life Knowledge Income Long and Healthy Life Knowledge Income
Expectation of Life at Mean Years of Expected Years Per Capita GSDP at Expectation of Life Mean Years of Expected Years Per Capita GSDP
Birth (Yrs) Schooling (Population of Schooling Constant Prices 2011–12 at Birth Schooling (Population of Schooling at Constant Prices
Age>=25 Years) (Yrs) (₹) Age>=25 Years) (Yrs) 2011–12 (₹)
Andhra Pradesh 68.5 4.46 10.01 76,997 69.7 4.43 11.38 1,16,542
Bihar 68.1 3.87 9.9 23,525 68.9 4.66 10.18 29,385
Chhattisgarh 64.8 4.62 12.39 61,305 65.2 5.34 12.38 76,073
Gujarat 68.7 5.57 11.27 1,01,075 69.7 6.33 11.66 1,63,090
Haryana 68.6 6.23 11.28 1,16,408 69.7 7 12.66 1,77,652
Jharkhand 66.6 4.52 11.49 45,318 68.6 4.67 12.31 57,465
Karnataka 68.8 5.79 12.11 98,567 69.2 6.21 12.84 1,59,061
Kerala 74.9 7.85 12.13 1,08,666 75.2 8.7 13.73 1,50,922
Madhya Pradesh 64.2 4.7 13.62 43,023 66 5.06 12.31 61,220
Maharashtra 71.6 6.69 13.48 1,13,192 72.5 7.3 13.96 1,59,605
Odisha 65.8 4.58 11.46 54,855 68.4 5.2 12.55 83,107
Punjab 71.6 6.11 12.19 95,379 72.4 7.37 14.2 1,24,152
Rajasthan 67.7 3.99 11.4 62,907 68.5 4.59 12.25 84,064
Tamil Nadu 70.6 6.11 13.95 1,03,743 71.7 6.8 14.2 1,49,717
Telangana NA NA NA NA 69.7 6.17 12.93 1,47,697
Uttar Pradesh 64.1 4.38 12.47 35,917 65 5.39 11.45 48,900
West Bengal 70.2 5.14 12.78 56,693 71.2 5.63 13.99 71,312
Arunachal Pradesh 63.9 5.37 15.65 79,019 66.2 5.21 15.6 1,00,972
Assam 63.9 5.67 10.73 45,538 66.2 6.34 13.69 65,138
Jammu and Kashmir 72.6 5.24 10.87 61,852 74.1 5.8 11.33 76,724
Himachal Pradesh 71.6 6.43 14.37 1,05,376 72.6 7.73 14.67 1,52,128
Manipur 63.9 7.73 14.87 44,649 66.2 8.65 15.44 56,919
Meghalaya 63.9 7 15.22 66,304 66.2 6.47 18.96 66,113
Mizoram 63.9 7.56 15.37 65,347 66.2 8.22 17.95 1,21,287
Nagaland 63.9 8.46 13.1 61,159 66.2 7.61 13.62 79,369
Sikkim 63.9 5.36 13.75 1,81,842 66.2 7.48 15.39 2,70,235
Tripura 63.9 5.24 13.98 51,999 66.2 5.63 14.46 85,480
Uttarakhand 71.7 6.23 12.09 1,13,456 71 8.25 14.09 1,64,165
Source: Compiled by the author from the data obtained from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018) and RBI (2020).

Table A2: Raw Data of Indicators of Fiscal Discipline Index

States 2011–12 2017–18
Tax Effort OR%RE OR %Total Expenditures Tax Effort OR%RE OR %Total Expenditures
Andhra Pradesh 7.0 71.9 56.1 6.6 52.0 43.0
Bihar 5.1 29.6 22.4 6.3 34.1 25.6
Chhattisgarh 6.8 65.3 51.4 8.0 52.6 43.8
Gujarat 7.2 78.7 59.9 5.5 75.1 55.9
Haryana 6.9 78.5 63.2 6.4 69.5 56.1
Jharkhand 4.6 47.6 38.4 5.4 45.2 7,534.0
Karnataka 7.7 77.7 59.0 6.7 67.9 51.9
Kerala 7.1 61.5 52.6 6.9 59.4 50.7
Madhya Pradesh 8.5 65.4 42.7 6.9 50.2 38.8
Maharashtra 6.8 77.5 64.4 7.2 78.0 66.1
Odisha 5.8 57.4 47.2 7.1 54.9 40.5
Punjab 7.1 61.2 55.0 6.7 57.3 49.6
Rajasthan 5.8 64.4 52.9 6.5 48.0 39.0
Tamil Nadu 7.9 77.8 59.6 6.6 63.9 52.7
Uttar Pradesh 7.3 50.7 40.8 7.5 57.4 48.0
West Bengal 4.8 35.8 31.3 5.9 43.1 33.8
Telangana 7.7 87.9 62.5
Arunachal Pradesh 2.9 15.4 10.2 7.8 19.4 14.4
Assam 5.3 39.6 34.7 5.5 35.2 29.9
Himachal Pradesh 5.6 43.3 34.8 5.5 36.8 28.9
Jammu and Kashmir 6.1 29.7 22.6 7.7 37.0 27.8
Manipur 2.9 13.6 9.9 4.7 14.9 12.5
Meghalaya 3.5 22.0 17.9 6.4 26.8 23.1
Mizoram 2.5 9.3 7.7 4.4 18.2 13.6
Nagaland 2.5 11.0 8.3 2.8 10.5 8.9
Sikkim 2.6 41.4 33.9 3.6 38.4 26.5
Tripura 4.5 22.3 16.7 4.3 22.7 18.9
Uttarakhand 4.9 52.1 41.6 4.9 53.8 42.5
OR = Own Revenue of state and RE = Revenue Expenditure of state.
Source: Compiled by the authors from the data obtained from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Odisha (2018) and RBI (2020).

66 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign Trade

The year-on-year WPI-inflation rate declined to -0.6% in July 2025 from Foreign trade widened to $27.3 billion (bn) in July 2025 from $24.8 bn reported
2.1% registered a year ago and -0.1% a month ago. The index for primary a year ago. Exports increased by 7.3% to $37.2 bn and imports by 8.6% to $64.6 bn
articles dropped by (-)5.0% against 3.2% a year ago and -3.4% a month from $34.7 bn and $59.5 bn, respectively. Oil imports increased by 7.5% to
ago. The rate of inflation for food articles fell to -6.3% from 3.5% a year $15.6 bn from $14.5 bn a year ago and non-oil imports by 9.0% to $49.0 bn
ago. The index for fuel and power declined by (-)2.4% compared to 1.9% from $45.0 bn. During April–July 2025–26, the cumulative exports rose by
a year ago while that for manufactured products increased by 2.0% 3.1% to $149.2 bn and imports by 5.4% to $244.0 bn compared to $144.8 bn and
against 1.6%. $231.6 bn, respectively, recorded in the same period a year ago.

Consumer Price Index Index of Industrial Production

The CPI-inflation rate decreased to 1.6% in July 2025 from 3.6% registered a The IIP grew by 3.5% in July 2025 compared to 5.0% a year ago. The IIP for
year ago and 2.1% a month ago. The consumer food price index declined by manufacturing sector increased by 5.4% against 4.7%. Growth in the mining segment
(-)1.8% against 5.4% recorded a year ago and -1.0% a month ago. The CPI-rural declined to -7.2% and electricity generation to 0.6% from their respective growth rates
inflation rate declined to 1.2% and urban inflation rate to 2.0% from 4.1% and of 3.8% and 7.9%. As per use-based classification, the production of capital goods grew
3.0%, respectively, reported a year ago. According to Labour Bureau data, the by 5.0% and consumer durables by 7.7% compared to 11.7% and 8.2%, respectively,
CPI for industrial workers (CPI-IW) stood at 2.7% in July 2025 compared to 2.1% registered a year ago. Growth in infrastructure goods segment increased to 11.9% and
a year ago and that for agricultural labourers (CPI-AL) at 0.8% against 6.2%. consumer non-durables to 0.5% from their respective growth rates of 5.5% and -4.2%.

Movement of WPI-Inflation Rate January 2024–July 2025 Merchandise Trade July 2025
Year-on-Year in % July 2025 Over Month Over Year April–July
($ bn) (%) (%) (2025–26 over 2024–25) (%)
20
Exports 37.2 6.0 7.3 3.1
Primary Articles Imports 64.6 19.8 8.6 5.4
10 Trade balance -27.4 45.6 10.4 9.2
2.0% Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

0
Trade Balance January 2024–July 2025
Manufactured $ billion
Fuel and Power -2.4% -5.0%
-10 Products
7

0
Non-Oil Oil
-20
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J July* -7
-$11.2 bn
2024 2025
* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12 = 100. -14
-$16.1 bn

Trends in WPI and Its Components July 2025* (%) -21

Financial Year (Averages) -28

Weights Over Month Over Year 2022–23 2023–24 2024–25 -$27.4 bn
All commodities 100 0.4 -0.6 9.4 -0.7 2.3 -35
Total Trade Balance
Primary articles 22.6 1.2 -5.0 10.0 3.5 5.2
-42
Food articles 15.3 1.0 -6.3 7.3 6.6 7.3 Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J July*
2024 2025
Fuel and power 13.2 1.1 -2.4 28.1 -4.7 -1.3
Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
Manufactured products 64.2 -0.1 2.0 5.6 -1.7 1.7
*Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12=100. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of Index Values of Components of IIP January 2024–July 2025
Index Value
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2024–July 2025 221.5
230
Year-on-Year in % Electricity
15 184
156.9
12 138
Consumer Food Manufacturing 107.7
92
9 Mining
CPI 46
5.0%
6
0
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J July*
3 2024 2025
Miscellaneous
1.6% * July 2025 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.
0

-1.8% Industrial Growth: Sector-wise July 2025* (%)

-3
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J July* Weights Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
2024 2025 Month Year 2023–24 2024–25
* Data is provisional. Source: National Statistical Office (NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation,
Base: 2012=100.
General index 100 1.1 3.5 5.9 4.0
Mining 14.4 -12.6 -7.2 7.5 3.0
CPI: Rural and Urban July 2025* (%) Manufacturing 77.6 3.2 5.4 5.5 4.1
Latest Over Over Financial Year (Avgs) Electricity 8.0 0.6 0.6 7.1 5.2
Month Index Month Year 2023–24 2024–25
CPI Combined 196.0 0.9 1.6 5.4 4.6 Industrial Growth: Use-based
Rural (2012=100) 197.6 1.1 1.2 5.6 5.0 Primary goods 34.0 -3.0 -1.7 6.1 3.9
Urban (2012=100) 194.2 0.8 2.0 5.1 4.1 Capital goods 8.2 4.5 5.0 6.3 5.6
Intermediate goods 17.2 3.8 5.8 5.3 4.3
CPI: Occupation-wise Infrastructure/Construction goods 12.3 1.9 11.9 9.7 6.7
Industrial workers (2016=100) 146.5 1.0 2.7 5.2 3.4 Consumer durables 12.8 4.3 7.7 3.6 7.9
Agricultural labourers (Base: 2019=100) 135.31 0.9 0.8 7.1 5.7 Consumer non-durables 15.3 2.7 0.5 4.1 -1.5
* Provisional; Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL). * July 2025 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100. Source: NSO, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: [Link]

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 73

CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
India’s Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
2023–24 2024–25 2025–26
` Crore | At 2011–12 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Private final consumption expenditure 2343903 (7.4) 2366539 (3.0) 2629135 (5.7) 2567198 (6.2) 2537917 (8.3) 2518254 (6.4) 2843368 (8.1) 2720039 (6.0) 2716723 (7.0)
Government final consumption expenditure 419571 (5.3) 387040 (20.1) 345292 (2.3) 517772 (6.6) 418344 (-0.3) 403592 (4.3) 377374 (9.3) 508419 (-1.8) 449511 (7.4)
Gross fixed capital formation 1439564 (8.4) 1459663 (11.7) 1424622 (9.3) 1591439 (6.0) 1535297 (6.7) 1557503 (6.7) 1499134 (5.2) 1741150 (9.4) 1655346 (7.8)
Change in stocks 71043 (46.5) 76306 (59.8) 72654 (55.8) 85607 (52.0) 76390 (7.5) 77908 (2.1) 75228 (3.5) 89701 (4.8) 80897 (5.9)
Valuables 27109 (-25.4) 105308 (-6.4) 73371 (54.7) 63318 (63.1) 20849 (-23.1) 132482 (25.8) 72974 (-0.5) 44453 (-29.8) 16160 (-22.5)
Net Trade (Export - Import) -268007 -192085 -121183 16155 -180517 -174993 2839 191380 -241823
Exports 846035 (-7.0) 962378 (4.6) 944238 (3.0) 1072844 (7.7) 916189 (8.3) 991508 (3.0) 1046234 (10.8) 1114167 (3.9) 974179 (6.3)
Less Imports 1114042 (18.0) 1154463 (14.3) 1065420 (11.3) 1056689 (11.4) 1096706 (-1.6) 1166500 (1.0) 1043395 (-2.1) 922788 (-12.7) 1216002 (10.9)
Discrepancies 136932 (-187.8) 52035 (-148.8) 19746 (-115.9) -59456 (-55.1) 33384 (-75.6) -21160 (-140.7) -144377 (-831.2) -159979 (169.1) 111811 (234.9)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 4170114 (9.7) 4254806 (9.3) 4443638 (9.5) 4782032 (8.4) 4441664 (6.5) 4493587 (5.6) 4726542 (6.4) 5135163 (7.4) 4788623 (7.8)

India’s Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

2024–25 ($ mn) 2025–26 ($ mn) 2024–25 (` bn) 2025–26 (` bn)
Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Current account -8676 -16798 -11345 13448 -2370 -724 [-0.9] -1407 [-1.8] -958 [-1.1] 1165 [1.3] -203 [-0.2]
Merchandise -63805 -84630 -79304 -59485 -68464 -5323 -7089 -6698 -5155 -5857
Invisibles 55129 67832 67959 72933 66094 4599 5682 5740 6320 5654
Services 39681 44625 51210 53307 47920 3310 3738 4325 4619 4100
of which: Software services 37447 39624 41057 41483 41471 3124 3319 3468 3595 3548
Transfers 26304 32400 33182 31504 31019 2194 2714 2803 2730 2654
of which: Private 26598 32683 33427 31848 31216 2219 2738 2823 2760 2671
Income -10857 -9193 -16433 -11878 -12845 -906 -770 -1388 -1029 -1099
Capital account 13107 35862 -26621 -5423 7700 1093 [1.4] 3004 [3.8] -2248 [-2.6] -470 [-0.5] 659 [0.8]
of which: Foreign investment 7168 17029 -14182 -5492 7313 598 1426 -1198 -476 626
Overall balance 5226 18614 -37660 8789 4508 436 [0.6] 1559 [2.0] -3181 [-3.7] 762 [0.9] 386 [0.4]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

22 August 23 August 31 March Month Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2025 2024 2025 Ago Ago 2024–25 2025–26 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23 2023–24 2024–25
` crore 5260751 5168900 5006123 2523 91851 255832 254628 590416 302585 102680 572770 93056
$ mn 600987 616011 585727 -6748 -15025 26929 15259 94535 21435 -31532 60999 -3355

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` Crore 2025 2023–24 2024–25 2022–23 2023–24 2024–25
Money supply (M3) as on 8 August 28290469 149183 (0.5) 2480866 (9.6) 869742 (3.5) 1003879 (3.7) 1958274 (9.6) 2487858 (11.1) 2346729 (9.4)
Components
Currency with public 3727565 -1451 (-0.0) 302229 (8.8) 15060 (0.4) 96813 (2.7) 240747 (7.9) 133840 (4.1) 220476 (6.5)
Demand deposits 2990208 45284 (1.5) 432462 (16.9) -29142 (-1.1) 150185 (5.3) 107607 (4.9) 266290 (11.5) 253135 (9.8)
Time deposits 21462974 105760 (0.5) 1729155 (8.8) 885659 (4.7) 760466 (3.7) 1590603 (10.5) 2070952 (12.3) 1854348 (9.8)
Other deposits with RBI 109722 -411 (-0.4) 17020 (18.4) -1834 (-1.9) -3585 (-3.2) 19318 (33.1) 16774 (21.6) 18771 (19.9)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 8680407 66202 (0.8) 940499 (12.2) 136338 (1.8) 169582 (2.0) 779460 (12.0) 346481 (4.8) 907255 (11.9)
Bank credit to commercial sector 19407493 147727 (0.8) 1763426 (10.0) 441236 (2.6) 339365 (1.8) 2343803 (18.6) 2242508 (15.0) 1865297 (10.8)
Net foreign exchange assets 6503298 217735 (3.5) 665770 (11.4) 270025 (4.9) 354771 (5.8) 57963 (1.2) 655478 (13.3) 581024 (10.4)
Banking sector’s net non-monetary liabilities 6338787 282888 (4.7) 892580 (16.4) -21270 (-0.4) -138737 (-2.1) 1225222 (35.2) 759759 (16.1) 1010047 (18.5)
Reserve money as on 22 August 4915063 27129 (0.6) 286704 (6.2) -3088 (-0.1) 85820 (1.8) 317872 (7.8) 244688 (5.6) 197796 (4.3)
Components
Currency in circulation 3811491 10098 (0.3) 298550 (8.5) 1480 (0.0) 87044 (2.3) 244804 (7.8) 132940 (3.9) 212986 (6.1)
Bankers’ deposits with RBI 993927 15029 (1.5) -29669 (-2.9) -1853 (-0.2) 2438 (0.2) 53751 (6.1) 94972 (10.2) -33960 (-3.3)
Other deposits with RBI 109645 2003 (1.9) 17823 (19.4) -2714 (-2.9) -3661 (-3.2) 19317 (33.1) 16774 (21.6) 18770 (19.9)
Sources
Net RBI credit to government 1511706 9556 (0.6) 486162 (47.4) -167668 (-14.1) 3601 (0.2) 528 (0.0) -257913 (-17.8) 314893 (26.4)
of which: Centre 1484286 6119 (0.4) 485501 (48.6) -187870 (-15.8) 8826 (0.6) 1403 (0.1) -263720 (-18.2) 288805 (24.3)
RBI credit to banks and commercial sector -216783 68897 (-24.1) -114925 (112.8) -55710 (120.7) -97767 (82.1) 449259 (-82.6) 48295 (-51.1) -72868 (157.9)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 5870992 1312 (0.0) 307398 (5.5) 322512 (6.2) 320045 (5.8) 145136 (3.3) 653467 (14.2) 309865 (5.9)
Govt’s currency liabilities to the public 38057 405 (1.1) 3751 (9.8) 874 (2.6) 1426 (3.9) 2272 (8.1) 3146 (10.4) 3199 (9.6)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 2288911 53043 (2.4) 395681 (20.9) 103095 (5.8) 141484 (6.6) 279324 (21.3) 202311 (12.7) 357292 (20.0)

Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Indicators ( ` Crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 8 August) 2025 2023–24 2024–25 2022–23 2023–24 2024–25
Aggregate deposits 23473888 148152 (0.6) 2144245 (10.1) 854417 (4.2) 893287 (4.0) 1578601 (9.6) 2431312 (13.5) 2105375 (10.3)
Demand 2846826 44695 (1.6) 432265 (17.9) -29293 (-1.2) 148777 (5.5) 107683 (5.2) 263424 (12.1) 254195 (10.4)
Time 20627062 103457 (0.5) 1711980 (9.1) 883709 (4.9) 744510 (3.7) 1470917 (10.2) 2167890 (13.7) 1851179 (10.3)
Cash in hand 77650 -6891 (-8.2) -10953 (-12.4) -829 (-0.9) -4224 (-5.2) 4337 (5.0) -830 (-0.9) -7558 (-8.5)
Balance with RBI 926802 -3397 (-0.4) -44250 (-4.6) 39569 (4.2) 44387 (5.0) 126470 (18.5) 121575 (15.0) -49068 (-5.3)
Investments 6749293 33045 (0.5) 421055 (6.7) 221680 (3.6) 51365 (0.8) 686200 (14.5) 691410 (12.8) 591370 (9.7)
of which: Government securities 6748834 33140 (0.5) 420970 (6.7) 222255 (3.6) 51536 (0.8) 686142 (14.5) 691288 (12.8) 591689 (9.7)
Bank credit 18606042 142879 (0.8) 1725741 (10.2) 448137 (2.7) 362069 (2.0) 1783921 (15.0) 2756929 (20.2) 1811809 (11.0)
of which: Non-food credit 18553760 149590 (0.8) 1701390 (10.1) 443287 (2.7) 346319 (1.9) 1819027 (15.4) 2753753 (20.2) 1798358 (11.0)

Capital Markets 29 August Month Year Financial Year So Far 2024–25 End of Financial Year
2025 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 2022-23 2023–24 2024–25
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 1978–79 = 100) 79809.65 (–2.8) 81337.95 82134.61 (26.2) 73137.90 84058.90 72079.05 85836.12 58992 (0.7) 73651 (27.8) 77415 (5.1)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 1983–84 = 100) 25556.76 (–4.0) 26035.40 26628.64 (34.3) 23182.38 26840.88 22978.78 27689.88 17602 (–0.7) 23294 (35.6) 24578 (5.5)
S&P BSE-200 (1989–90 = 100) 11048.51 (–5.0) 11285.91 11632.69 (37.6) 9998.81 11614.10 9901.08 12072.35 7389 (–2.0) 10100 (40.0) 10604 (5.0)
CNX Nifty-50 (Base: 3 November 1995 = 1000) 24426.85 (-2.9) 24821.10 25151.95 (30.0) 22161.60 25637.80 21884.50 26216.05 17360 (-0.6) 22327 (31.7) 23658 (6.0)
CNX Nifty-500 22462.95 (-4.9) 23007.35 23631.40 (39.6) 20105.7 23620.15 19880.90 24496.90 14558 (-2.3) 20255 (42.5) 21538 (6.3)
Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: [Link]

74 september 6, 2025 vol lx no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly