Maintaining Lethality Dominance:

The Future of Small Arms and the Joint Force

A Monograph
By
Captain Braden R. Trent
United States Army

Expeditionary Warfare School

United States Marine Corps University
Quantico, Virginia

AY 2025

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14. ABSTRACT
The United States Army has recently changed its service rifle from the M4A1 (5.56x45mm) to
the XM7 (6.8x51mm). While it has some impressive terminal ballistic potential, the
adoption of the XM7 represents a significant downgrade to the ability of Soldiers to fight
and win the next peer on peer war. From World War I to the battlefields of the Russia-
Ukraine War, a huge majority of infantry engagements have occurred within 300 meters. The
lesson learned in blood from these conflicts is that fire superiority--not long range,
aimed fire--is what wins firefights. This monograph seeks to re-examine the lessons of the
past in combination with unclassified technical and tactical data to make a compelling
argument against the continued adoption of the XM7. It will also examine the programs
which led to the creation of the XM7, reports from units currently equipped with the XM7,
and potential alternatives for consideration.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Infantry, Service Rifle, Small Arms, Rifle marksmanship, Rifle qualification, Intermediate Cartridge, Cartridge lethality, Squad
designated marksman, M4 carbine, XM7 rifle, NGSW program, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Vietnam.
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Abstract
Maintaining Lethality Dominance: The Future of Small Arms and the Joint Force by Captain Braden R.
Trent, 52 Pages.

The United States Army currently has an iron grip on a very important trophy: it possesses the most
lethal infantry small arms in the world. This dominance is achieved through a combination of technology,
manufacturing, institutional training, and individual skill. However, recent changes put American
lethality dominance at risk—opening the possibility of entering the next large-scale war at a marked
disadvantage to our enemies.

Lethality is defined by the United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM)
as “the repeatable capacity of a system—composed of an individual, weapon, and ammunition—to
rapidly incapacitate an enemy combatant(s) by achieving a physiological stop that is likely to result in
death.” The existing infantry small arm, the M4A1, has demonstrated exceptional performance at combat
lethality. However, after 31 years of service, some believe the M4A1 is showing its age and is due for
replacement.

The Army’s NGSW (Next Generation Squad Weapon) program sought to address the perceived
shortcomings of the M4A1 while substantially increasing the lethality of the infantry. The NGSW project
began in 2017 but notably was the result of multiple attempts to replace the M4/M16, some going as far
back as the 1980’s. Stated goals of the program included increasing the range at which Soldiers could
engage targets while also increasing the ability of Soldiers to penetrate enemy body armor. On April 19th,
2022, the Army chose the Sig Sauer XM7 as the winner for the service rifle portion of the program.

While the XM7 has impressive terminal ballistic potential, its design philosophy contrasts sharply
with the battlefield lessons learned since 1914. Since World War I, almost all infantry engagements have
taken place at 300 meters or less. In urban and jungle environments this distance shrinks to engagement
distances of well below 100 meters. Studies of conflicts from World War I to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine
War indicate that small-caliber, high-velocity, automatic capable weapons enable the greatest battlefield
effectiveness.

Conversely, the XM7 reflects a philosophy favoring long range, large caliber, semi-automatic rifles
to enable engagements beyond 500 meters. Known as “gravel bellies,” believers of this school of thought
evaluate weapon performance on static rifle ranges without consideration for the combat conditions a
rifleman is expected to perform in. Evidence of the failure of this concept can be found in the M14,
America’s shortest serving service rifle. The heavy, large caliber M14 was quickly replaced with the
small caliber, lightweight M16. Disturbingly, the XM7 shares a great deal of characteristics with the ill-
fated M14 design.

The Army has the opportunity to rectify the choice to adopt the XM7 as a general issue weapon.
Alternative procurement options are available for the immediate, near, and distant future. Immediate
modifications to the M4A1 and special issue 5.56x45mm ammunitions can greatly extend the service life
of existing systems. Adoption of polymer cased ammunition can further increase the lethality of the
infantry for the near term. Finally, the distant future already shows the potential of systems that possess a
significant leap in technological capability, justifying a future full-scale separation from the status quo.
Given the eventuality of future state on state conflicts, these alternatives require emphasis from the highest
levels of military leadership.

3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 5
The Lessons of Fire Superiority – 1914-2025 ................................................................................................ 7
World War I .............................................................................................................................................. 7
The Interwar Years ................................................................................................................................... 9
World War II .......................................................................................................................................... 11
The Cold War .......................................................................................................................................... 14
Vietnam.................................................................................................................................................... 16
Global War on Terror – Present ............................................................................................................ 20
The XM7 Rifle .............................................................................................................................................. 24
The Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Program .................................................................... 24
Goals ...................................................................................................................................................................24
Competition/Selection .........................................................................................................................................25

Technical Characteristics ....................................................................................................................... 25

Barrel ..................................................................................................................................................................25
Ammunition ........................................................................................................................................................27
Gas/Recoil System ..............................................................................................................................................28
Suppressor ...........................................................................................................................................................29
Size/Weight .........................................................................................................................................................29

Performance ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Accuracy .............................................................................................................................................................30
Component Wear ................................................................................................................................................30

Tactical Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 33

Combat Load .......................................................................................................................................................34
Weight and the SPEAR Model ............................................................................................................................35
WTBN Study ......................................................................................................................................................37
Soldier Feedback: 101st ABN CALFEX ..............................................................................................................39

Strategic Considerations ......................................................................................................................... 41

Joint Force ..........................................................................................................................................................41
International Partners and Allies ..........................................................................................................................41
Russia-Ukraine War ............................................................................................................................................42
Adversary Capabilities ........................................................................................................................................42

Alternatives................................................................................................................................................... 43
Immediate Solutions ............................................................................................................................... 44
Near Solutions ......................................................................................................................................... 45
Future Solutions ...................................................................................................................................... 45
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 47
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 49
4
Introduction
The United States Army currently has an iron grip on a very important trophy: it possesses the

most lethal infantry small arms in the world. This dominance is achieved through a combination of

technology, manufacturing, institutional training, and individual skill. However, recent changes put

American lethality dominance at risk—opening the possibility of entering the next large-scale war at a

marked disadvantage to our enemies.

Lethality is defined by the United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command

(TECOM) as “the repeatable capacity of a system—composed of an individual, weapon, and

ammunition—to rapidly incapacitate an enemy combatant(s) by achieving a physiological stop that is

likely to result in death.” This definition does not place value solely on one aspect of weapon system

performance. The stopping power of a projectile, for example, is a critical piece of generating a weapon

system’s ability to incapacitate enemy combatants. However, the relationship between the size of a

projectile and the associated impact on weapon weight impacts the ability of the shooter to engage

targets successfully. This definition stipulates that human performance and mechanical characteristics

are equally important in determining the lethality of a weapon.

The existing infantry small arm, the M4A1, has demonstrated exceptional performance at

combat lethality. However, after 31 years of service, some believe the M4A1 is showing its age and is

due for replacement. That replacement is currently being fielded—the Sig Sauer XM7 Rifle, a result of

the Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon program, hereafter referred to as the NGSW program.

While the NGSW program began in 2017, it is the result of decades of small arms procurement

programs generated to replace the M16/M4 family of weapons. The characteristics of the XM7 differ

from the M4A1 significantly, particularly in weight, caliber, and philosophy of use.

5
Small arms development and the adaptations of infantry tactics to match technological change

provide greater context to the recent selection of the XM7. This monograph will provide a historical

context to the selection of service rifles from World War I to the present day while also providing insight

into the history of the NGSW program itself. The conclusion drawn from this historical context is that

fire superiority—not long distance, aimed fire—has been the determining factor in tactical success for

the infantry.

The technical characteristics and tactical considerations for the implementation of the XM7

stand in contrast to the lessons of fire superiority. Designed for optimum long range performance and

maximum armor penetration capabilities, the XM7 is a significantly heavier platform than the M4 it is in

the process of replacing. Despite its weight range of 8.14lbs (unloaded without suppressor) to 15.4lbs

(loaded w/suppressor and issued XM157 optic), the recoil force of the XM7 is significant. While capable

of fully automatic fire, the ability of a Soldier to control that force is limited—particularly by the lack of

institutional training on fully automatic fire from riflemen.

The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat

or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. 1. In order to meet the

requirements of this mission, alternatives to the XM7 must be considered. The XM7, M4A1, and other

alternatives must also be evaluated in a way that accurately captures the lethality potential of each

system. Immediate solutions can modify the M4A1—much as special operations forces have done—to

further increase its lethality. Near term solutions can consider the opportunities that polymer cased

ammunition present. Finally, long term solutions will demonstrate a significant enough leap in

technology to justify a change from the status quo.

1
U.S. Army. Infantry Branch, DA PAM 600-3. December 1,
2021. https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2022/08/03/b633bd32/infantry-branch-da-pam-600-3-1dec2021.pdf.
6
This monograph is in no way intended to disparage the United States Army, acquisitions

personnel, or private contractors/manufacturers. The goal is instead to provide greater context to the

progression of small arms development, clarify the characteristics of the XM7, and identify

opportunities for future consideration by the Army.

The Lessons of Fire Superiority – 1914-2025

In order to understand the series of events leading to the current lethality dominance of the

United States Army, greater historical context must be provided. The equipment, tactics, and

procurement process of the United States and its adversaries from 1914 to the present will provide that

context. It cannot be overstated that the logic behind the adoption of the XM7 rifle stands in marked

contrast to the lessons of history, which the following seeks to provide.

World War I

When the United States entered World War I in 1917, it was behind the power curve in the

development of infantry small arms. Due to poor preparation and administrative mismanagement, the

U.S. Ordinance Department did not have significant numbers of service rifles ready for issue. 2 The

service rifle at the time was the US Rifle, .30 caliber, Model of 1903, hereafter referred to as the M1903.

This rifle was chambered in the new .30-caliber cartridge, Model of 1906 known more commonly as .30-

06. The M1903 was shorter and lighter than most rifles of the era, with a length of 43.2 inches and

weight of 8.6lbs.3 Despite the adoption of the M1903 in its namesake year of 1903, fewer than 600,000

rifles were ready for service at the outbreak of war.4

Desperate to equip Soldiers and Marines bound for Europe, the Ordnance Department converted

the British P14 Enfield rifle to chamber the American .30-06 cartridge. This conversion rifle was dubbed

2
1. Sweetwater County Historical Museum. “County Museum Researches Military Rifle World War I Era.”
Sweetwater Now.
3
U.S. War Department. "FM 23-10 - Basic Field Manual, US Rifle, Caliber .30, M1903."
4
American Rifleman Staff. “The U.S. Model Of 1917 Rifle.” American Rifleman. July 19, 2018.
7
the US Rifle, Model of 1917, or the M1917. Unlike the shorter M1903, the M1917 was 46.25 inches long

and weighed 9.3lbs.5 By all standards a full length rifle, the M1917 was not the optimal rifle to take into

the trench warfare of World War I.

The German Army had entered the conflict with a full length rifle of their own, the Gewehr 98.

However, combat experience had demonstrated that most infantry engagements were occurring at 300

meters or less.6 The Gewehr 98, similar in length and weight to the US M1917, was designed to engage

far beyond this distance. The rear sight was adjustable to range targets from 400 to 2,000 meters with no

option to adjust to the close quarters ranges the Germans were experiencing. Recognizing the tactical

disadvantages of the full length rifle, a cut down carbine length version of the Gewehr 98 was

introduced. Originally intended for cavalry and mountain troops, the shorter Karabiner 98a began to see

service in a new type of infantry unit.

In an effort to break the stalemate of trench warfare, the German army developed “shock

trooper” tactics for new units of assault infantry. These units, known as “Sturmtruppen” (Stormtroopers)

were tasked with quickly breaking through fortified sections of the frontline. 7 Soldiers needed light,

compact, and rapid firing weapons to gain fire superiority and maneuver effectively. Weighing 7.7lbs

compared to the M1917’s 9.2lbs and almost four inches shorter, the Karabiner 98a was well suited to this

task. Supplemented with early submachineguns and light machineguns, Stormtrooper units were highly

effective when employed against the Allies in 1918.

When the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) landed in France, more than 75% of troops were

5
U.S. War Department. Field Manual 23-6: U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1917 (Enfield). Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1942.
6
Angelfire Contributor. “Long Range Combat Shooting.”
7
DTIC (Defense Technical Information Center). German Tactics in the Michael Offensive March 1918.
8
carrying the full length M1917. 8 Despite a wealth of combat reports from Britain and France, the United

States still valued long range accuracy over fire superiority at close range. Army training at the time

routinely practiced engagement distances of greater than 300 meters, with little emphasis placed on

closer distances.9 Once the AEF experienced combat, this view began to shift dramatically.

Understanding the need to suppress enemy positions to enable maneuver, the Army sought to

equip infantrymen with weapons that would enable local fire superiority. New light machineguns such as

the Browning Automatic Rifle along with additional foreign made guns were introduced in greater

numbers. Critically, the Army recognized that individual riflemen also needed increased firepower.

The experimental Pederson Device converted the bolt action M1903 into a semiautomatic rifle

that was able to use quick detach, high capacity magazines. 10 Finally, the United States could give the

infantry a tool that would enable fire superiority, even against fortified enemy positions. Testing on the

Pederson Device showed results so promising that several hundred thousand were ordered. 11 Still, the

Pederson Device was a complex conversion of a bolt action rifle that served as an interim solution.

World War I ended before the full impact of adopting a semiautomatic capable service rifle could be

observed.

The Interwar Years

Beginning in 1919, studies were conducted by the Ordinance Committee to take lessons from

World War I and use them to develop new weapons for the infantry. The War Department signed on J.D.

8
Shooting Illustrated Staff. "U.S. Rifles of WWI: The M1903 and M1917." Shooting Illustrated. June 5, 2018.
9
United States War Department. Small Arms Firing Manual, 1913: Corrected to April 15, 1917 (Changes No. 1 to 18).
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917
10
Pedersen, John. "US Automatic Pistol, Caliber .30, Model of 1918." U.S. Patent 1,355,417, filed May 28, 1918, and
issued October 12, 1920.
11
Rock Island Auction Company. "Pedersen Device and Magazine with Springfield M1903 Rifle”.
9
Pederson, creator of the venerable Pederson Device, to help create the desired outcome of an effective

semiautomatic rifle. 12 One of Pederson’s first concerns was the standard issue ammunition from the older

M1903s and M1917s, the .30-06. While .30-06 had performed admirably in bolt actions, it was a

relatively large cartridge that produced a high amount of heat, recoil, and chamber pressure. Pederson

used studies from Europe and conducted internal Ordinance testing to then develop the ideal ammunition

for use in a new rifle. The conclusion reached was that a rifle chambered in .276 caliber (7mm) would

have optimum mechanical and tactical effect. 13

The smaller caliber would cause less recoil, pressure and heat in the rifle itself. Additionally, the

smaller size of the new round would enable troops to carry larger quantities of ammunition without

carrying more weight. These advantages would translate into giving the infantry a weapon capable of

suppressing enemy position with a light weight that would enable faster maneuver as well. In 1928, the

Army also conducted wound ballistics testing on a variety of caliber options for the new rifle. Rifles

chambered in .256, .276, and .30-06 were tested against anesthetized pigs at ranges from 100 to 1000

yards. 14 Known as the Pig Board tests, the results concluded that the smallest caliber of .256 (6.5mm)

was the most lethal at 300 yards and below. In contrast, .30-06 excelled at retaining energy at the furthest

range of 1000 yards. Ultimately, the comprise between the two was chosen—the new service rifle would

be chambered in .276.

Years of development followed, resulting in the selection of a rifle designed by John Garand,

chambered in the .276 Pederson caliber. Just as large scale production was set to commence, the Chief of

Staff of the Army intervened. General Douglas McArthur was concerned with the then ongoing Great

12
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
13
Rose, Alexander. American Rifle: A Biography. New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
14
Rose, Alexander. American Rifle: A Biography. New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
10
Depression and the budget constraints that were following as a result. Believing the use of existing .30-

06 stockpiles to be more budget friendly than the implementation of a wholly new caliber, McArthur

made his decision. 15The Army’s new semiautomatic rifle would retain the older .30-06 cartridge, despite

the clear data showing the advantages of smaller calibers. The Garand rifle was configured for .30-06

and introduced as the U.S. Rifle, Caliber 30, M1. While an excellent rifle, American Soldiers had been

denied a weapon of even greater lethality to carry into the next conflict.

World War II

The dramatic operational, strategic, and tactical changes that new technologies can unleash were

on full display from the moment World War II broke out. No longer constrained by the speed of troops

on the march, the infantry could be carried into combat on mechanized vehicles or even by being

dropped from the sky out of airplanes. The positional trench fighting of the last war had been replaced

with battles of maneuver. The German Wehrmacht entered Poland in 1938 carrying carbine-length rifles,

submachine guns, and light machine guns in every infantry squad. The amount of firepower each

German squad could generate was significant in comparison to squads from armies that had held fast to

full length large caliber rifles. 16

By 1942, German forces were finding themselves bogged down in the close quarters combat of

the Russian front. The majority of German infantry were equipped with bolt action carbines, which were

accurate at distance but slow to operate. Equipped with a greater proportion of compact submachineguns,

Russian troops were better suited to close urban and forest fighting than their German counterparts.

15
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
16
Murray, Dave. "The German Infantry Platoon." Avalanche Press, January
2013. http://www.avalanchepress.com/BehindCounters2.php
11
German small arms engineers set out to resolve the main drawbacks of both the rifle and submachinegun.

The rifle was more accurate at distance, with larger calibers than those used by submachineguns. While

the submachineguns’ rapid fire rate and low recoil were ideal in close quarters, the diminutive projectiles

used were not effective beyond a few hundred meters. This solution was finalized in 1944 and an entirely

new class of rifle was created.

Designated the ‘Sturmgewehr (Storm Rifle) 44’ or STG-44, the Germans had generated a leap

forward in the development of small arms. Using a shortened version of a regular rifle round, the STG-

44’s 7.92x33 caliber provided the bridge between rifle and submachinegun. 17 This new type of firearm

has since been dubbed the assault rifle. The STG-44 was controllable during fully automatic fire while still

being accurate enough to engage targets at distance. Further, it utilized detachable 30-round magazines

which were easily carried in bandoliers and pouches. This enabled each infantry squad to generate a

significant volume of fire without the need for a lengthy belts of ammunition that would be expected of a

traditional machinegun. The Soviet Union quickly realized the benefits of this new class of weapon and

began their own assault rifle program.

When the United States entered the war in 1941, the semiautomatic M1 Garand was the Army’s

standard issue rifle. Initial concerns that a semiautomatic would waste too much ammunition or prove to

be unreliable in harsh conditions were found to be false. In all theatres of fighting, the rapid firing M1

proved to be vastly superior to Axis bolt action weapons. General George Patton went so far as to describe

the rifle as “The greatest implement of battle ever devised.” However, American weapon engineers

realized the same rifle/submachinegun gap as their German counterparts. The American solution to this

problem was the M1 Carbine, a relatively small rifle using a short .30 caliber carbine round. Designed for

use with support and rear echelon troops, the M1 was popular and effective in its intended role. However,

17
Senich, Peter R. The German Assault Rifle: 1935-1945. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1987.
12
it did not share many of the revolutionary characteristics of the STG-44.

The conclusion of World War II brought with it the beginning of a Cold War between the Soviet

Union and the Western Allies. By 1947 the Soviet Union had created its answer to the German assault

rifle, the AK-47. Building upon the lessons of the STG-44, the AK-47 would go on to become one of the

most iconic firearms of all time. The US Ordinance Department failed to see the leap in capability

represented by the assault rifle and chose to remain with the proven M1 Garand as America’s service rifle.

These two diverging paths of development would have disastrous consequences for American warfighters

in the conflicts that would follow World War I.

13
The Cold War

The 1950’s saw the breakout of the Korean War, greater proliferation of atomic weapons, and the

start of the Space Race. Despite the incredible pace of technological advancements all over the world, the

United States made minimal changes to infantry small arms or tactics. The M1 Garand of 1938 vintage

remained in service until 1958 and even then saw limited service use until 1965. 18 The Ordnance

Department sought to replace the M1 Garand with a weapon capable of replacing almost every class of

infantry arm in inventory. This new weapon would need to replace the M1 rifle, the M1 carbine, the BAR

light machine gun, and the M3 submachinegun. But what caliber should this new weapon use?

The Ordnance Department had a huge variety of data to sift through in order to make its decision.

Intelligence on the Soviet development of the AK-47 with its short 7.62x39mm cartridge was available

along with information on its predecessor, the STG-44. Furthermore, other allied nations in the newly

founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization had conducted their own extensive studies of new service

rifle calibers. Notably, Britain had concluded that .280 (7x43mm) provided the perfect balance between

speed and power.19 This new British cartridge was also suitable for use in rifles and machineguns alike,

simplifying logistical concerns. Pressure began to mount on the Ordnance Department to make a

decision, especially in light of a political desire for NATO standardization.

Despite the abundance of evidence in favor of a smaller projectile, the Ordnance Department

once again insisted on the use of .30 caliber in the new weapon. The reasoning for their decision was a

belief that smaller projectiles could not be used to make tracer, incendiary, or armor piercing specialty

18
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
19
Dugelby, Thomas B. EM-2 Concept and Design: A Rifle Ahead of Its Time. Cobourg, Ontario: Collector Grade
Publications, 1980.
14
ammunition.20 The desired caliber was a slightly shorter version of the existing .30-06, resulting in

7.62x51mm. After a tremendous amount of political turmoil, NATO adopted 7.62x51mm as its official

standardized caliber in 1953.

The desire for NATO standardization did not end with ammunition, there was a desire to equip the

West with a common rifle as well. Several nations submitted designs for consideration, but ultimately the

two final contenders were the Belgian FN FAL and the US Ordnance produced M14. The FN FAL was

so successful in trials against the M14 that the Belgian delegation to the United States returned to Europe

convinced that the result was a forgone conclusion. 21 However, due to a litany of internal politics and

even the artificial rigging of testing conditions, the United States chose the M14 as its new service rifle.

This decision was so widely rejected that no other NATO army adopted the M14—many ultimately chose

higher performing FN FAL instead. 22

The M14 rifle was mechanically similar to the M1 Garand rifle it replaced. Primary differences

included the use of the new 7.62 NATO caliber, 20-round detachable box magazines, and the ability to

fire on a fully automatic setting. The result was a rifle with nearly identical ballistic performance and

weight compared to the M1. Additionally, the M14 was extremely difficult to control in its fully

automatic setting, even in the prone position. 23 The heat and pressure generated by the M14 when firing

on fully automatic also restricted the quantity of rounds that could be fired sequentially. Critically, this

meant that it could not functionally replace a light machinegun, let alone a submachinegun—both

requirements that Ordnance had set for themselves. The proponents of the M14 argued that the

importance of long range, aimed fire justified these compromises. Then known as “gravel bellies,” these

20
Rose, Alexander. American Rifle: A Biography. New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
21
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
22
Stevens, R. Blake. The FAL Rifle. Collector Grade Publications, 1993.
23
Rose, Alexander. American Rifle: A Biography. New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
15
individuals believed that individual marksmanship at distance is what wins firefights. The lessons of fire

superiority—learned in blood during the World Wars—had not been taken to heart.

Such were the problems with producing and implementing the M14 that by 1961 a report on the

issue was conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The chairman of the committee, John

Stennis, identified that development of the M14 had started in 1945 but production took until 1959 to

begin. Even in 1961, he acknowledged that “the total requirements for the program will not be satisfied

for several years”. 24 Pressure was particularly high due to the Berlin Crisis of 1961, during which the

investigative committee reported that “troops assigned to bolster our defenses in this key area were, in

fact equipped with the World War II M-1 rather than the modern M-14”. Rounding out the problems with

the M14 were quality control issues so severe that the Congressional audit found “40% of delivered rifles

should have been rejected”.

Vietnam

By 1965, regular US troops were committed to combat in Vietnam. Embroiled in controversy and

beset by manufacturing problems, the M14 would be the rifle they carried into battle. The M14 had

endured almost two decades of lengthy development, testing, and procurement problems. In contrast, the

rifle sent to arm the North Vietnamese and their communist guerrilla forces had already been well

refined. By 1965 over three million AK-47 rifles and derivatives had been produced. Both the Soviet

Union and China provided hundreds of thousands of these rifles to Vietnamese forces. 25 The disparity

between the M14 and AK-47 in both quality and tactical function quickly became apparent.

24
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee. Investigation of the Preparedness Program: Report on the M14 Rifle Program. 88th Congress, 1st
Session, 1963.
25
Chivers, C.J. The Gun: The AK-47 and the Evolution of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.
16
The M14 was too lengthy for use in urban and jungle environments, prone to rust and swelling,

and uncontrollable on fully automatic. So severe was this uncontrollability that 90% of M14 rifles were

permanently altered by armories to be used only in semi automatic. 26 This meant that in firefights with

the NVA or Vietcong, American troops were reliant solely on light machine guns for fire superiority.

Given that the M14 was evaluated on static target ranges instead of under realistic combat conditions, it is

little wonder that US troops were being outgunned.

Mounting casualties and the related failures of the M14 eventually reached the attention of General

Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In a meeting on

November 16th, 1965, he met with senior military advisors to discuss how badly the M14 was performing

against the AK-47. 27 Troops were reporting the M14 to be inaccurate in general and uncontrollable on

fully automatic mode. 28 In comparison, the enemy carried a weapon capable of sustained bursts of fully

automatic fire at a cyclic rate of six hundred rounds a minute. 29 The outcome of the meeting was clear—

Americans were being slain due to being provided faulty equipment. General Westmoreland and his

officers decided to place a massive order for an entirely new weapon to replace the M14 in Vietnam. The

weapon in question was currently in the hands of a select number of Soldiers and was making its combat

debut as the meeting was occurring.

The Battle of Ia Drang had started two days earlier on November 14th, 1965. The five-day

engagement marked the first major clash between North Vietnamese and American Soldiers. The First

Cavalry Division was airlifted into LZ X-Ray carrying a modern, futuristic rifle—the M16. Made of

26
Rose, Alexander. American Rifle: A Biography. New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
27
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
28
19FortyFive. "M14: What Many Experts Declare the Worst U.S. Army Rifle Ever."
29
U.S. Marine Corps. "Operator's Manual with Components List for Rifle, 7.62 MM, AK-47, NSN: 1005-LL-MUS-2940."
TM 8370-50007-OR/1. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Systems Command, December 2009.
17
aluminum and plastic, it weighed almost three pounds less than the M14 while also being five inches

shorter. The caliber was even more of a departure—the M16 used 5.56x45mm ammunition, significantly

lighter and faster than the M14’s 7.62x51mm. Despite the greatly decreased projectile size, the M16 was

by all accounts a lethal weapon system. Despite having never before seen combat, First Cavalry Division

was victorious at Ia Drang. Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, commander of First Battalion, stated that

“Brave soldiers and the M16 brought this victory.” 30 Finally, US troops were equipped with a weapon

that capable of providing fire superiority in infantry engagements. LTC Moore would later say the M16

was “the best individual infantry weapon ever made, clearly the answer to the enemy’s AK-47.”

The M16 began life as the AR-15, or “Armalite Rifle-15”. The brainchild of legendary arms

designer Eugene Stoner, the weapon represented a significant jump in technology from previous designs.

Made of aircraft grade aluminum and modern plastics, the AR-15 used 20-round aluminum box

magazines of 5.56x45mm ammunition. The choice of caliber was the result of extensive testing on

lethality at distances out to 500 meters combined with historical analysis of previous small-caliber

studies. 31 Rejected outright by the Army Ordnance Department, the AR-15 was adopted by US Special

Operations in 1961 and the Air Force in 1964 as the M16.

General Westmoreland’s request for 100,000 M16’s for use in Vietnam came at the cost of

significant backlash from the Ordnance Corps. Their own M14, already battered by political turmoil, was

threatened with extinction at the hands of a weapon which they did not create. In January 1963, Secretary

of Defense Robert McNamara ordered a halt to M14 production and directed the adoption of the M16 for

general service. Ordnance continued to fight against this change, taking several steps that would greatly

30
Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once... and Young: Ia Drang - The Battle That Changed
the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992.
31
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
18
harm the reliability of the M16.

Several changes were made to the original M16 design against the advisement of its creator,

Eugene Stoner. Foremost among these changes was the use of ball-type propellent in the ammunition

produced for the M16. This type of powder, while easier to mass produce, was never intended for use in

the rifle. Despite protest from Eugene Stoner, the manufacturers at Colt, and even Ordnance testing staff,

the powder issue was not corrected. 32 This ball-type powder led to a dramatically increased rate of

malfunction—as Army testing soon discovered. Frankford Arsenal found that "The M16 with stick

powder had 3.2 malfunctions and .75 stoppages per 1,000 rounds. The same rifles, loaded with the army's

ball powder, faced 18.5 malfunctions and 5.2 stoppages per 1,000 rounds—a failure rate almost six times

as high."33 Despite clear evidence of the problems created by ball powder, no cleaning kits were sent with

M16s to Vietnam. If this wasn’t enough, troops were told by Ordnance officials that their rifles were self-

cleaning, and that they did not need to be lubricated. 34

Immediate problems with the M16’s reliability began to surface in Vietnam. In an attempt to

remedy these issues, Ordnance once again modified the M16 against the wishes of the Eugene Stoner.

Dubbed the M16A1, this new version had a host of features which helped solve the problems of ball

powder. However, these additions increased the weight and complexity of the original design. The

problems with the rollout of the M16 would cause yet another Congressional Hearing in 1967. 35 The

resulting Ichord Committee report described the failures of Army Ordnance to provide quality

manufacturing, ammunition, and training for the M16. Despite ample evidence that Ordnance had

32
Stevens, R. Blake. The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective. Cobourg, Ontario: Collector Grade Publications, 1994.
33
Frankford Arsenal. "Report on Difficult Extraction in 5.56mm XM16E1 Rifle." Letter to Commanding General,
USAMUCOM, May 26, 19661.
34
Hallahan, William H. Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. New York:
Scribner's, 1994.
35
Ichord, Richard H., ed. Report of the Special Subcommittee on the M-16 Rifle Program of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
19
deliberately harmed the reliability of the M16, no charges were filed. The M16A1 would go on to serve

until 1988, when it was then replaced by further developments of the basic M16 design.

The number of Americans killed due to the shortcomings of the M14 may never be known.

Similarly, the number lost due to M16 malfunctions which were entirely preventable may never be

known. The fact that American Soldiers and Marines were sent into battle with small arms known to be

faulty is unacceptable. The lesson of Vietnam for small arms is that long range, aimed fire—the gravel

belly philosophy—is not a viable alternative to fire superiority. For the infantry to accomplish its mission

to close with and destroy the enemy, it must have the ability to produce sufficient volume of fire even

down to the individual Soldier.

Global War on Terror – Present

Post-Vietnam refinements of the M16A1 resulted in the M16A2. This version with a heavier barrel

for greater sustained fire rate, improved iron sights, and better ergonomics. The M16A2 was adopted by the

Army in 1986 and has since received further upgrades, culminating in the optics-mountable M16A4. This

final version of the M16 continues to see service across the world and in a limited capacity in US service as

of April 2025.

The M16A1 had already been shortened for use by special operations units in Vietnam, and in 1994

the M16A2 was similarly shortened for a new purpose. Much as the M1 Carbine had been issued to rear-

echelon and support troops in World War II, the original intent of the M4 was to create an even lighter,

more compact version of the M16A2 for issue alongside regular rifles. The M4 experienced battle for the

20
first time during operations in Kosovo in 1999. 36 Battlefield successes and popularity with Soldiers led to

increased adoption of the M4, especially as the Global War on Terror accelerated.

The increase of close quarters firefights during the opening years of the Global War on Terror led

the Army to officially adopt the M4 as its primary service rifle in 2005. While the compact carbine had

many advantages, the need for sustained fire to achieve fire superiority remained. In 2011, the Army began

converting M4’s to the newer M4A1 model as part of the Product Improvement Program. 37 Upgrades

included a heavier barrel for better heat dissipation, a full-auto trigger group instead of the M4’s three-

round burst, and ambidextrous safety controls. Alongside the new rifles, the Army began issuing magnified

optics as standard issue in 2007. Further accessory packages included the AN/PEQ series of laser aiming

devices also being issued as standard. The individual infantryman now had the ability to engage targets with

greater clarity and precision, even during night operations. These upgrades did add weight to the system—

the M4A1 weighs 7.5lbs when loaded—but the fundamental ability to achieve battlefield fire superiority

through volume was not lost.

Of equal significance were changes made to the Army and Marine Corps respective marksmanship

training philosophies. Adopted in 2019, the Army’s current marksmanship qualification requires Soldiers to

rapidly change magazines, adjust shooting posture, and engage pop-up targets from 25 to 300 meters. 38The

Marine Corps has gone even further in the development of realistic marksmanship training. The Annual

Rifle Qualification (ARQ) was adopted in October of 2021 and requires Marines to shoot while wearing

full combat gear, engaging moving targets, and while utilizing barricades. 39Additional changes to both

36
Feickert, Andrew. "The Army's M-4 Carbine: Background and Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service,
RS22888, June 8, 20101.
37
United States Army. "Anniston Army Depot to modify Army M4 carbines." Army.mil, October
2013. https://www.army.mil/article/121783/anniston_army_depot_to_modify_army_m4_carbines.
38
U.S. Army. "Soldiers test new combat-focused marksmanship qualification." Army.mil, October 1, 2019.
39
U.S. Marine Corps. "Annual Rifle Qualification." Marines.mil, October 6, 2021.
21
Army and Marine qualifications are ongoing, with even greater focus on realistic combat scenarios and

shooting skills.

However, combat experiences in Afghanistan created concerns about the ability of an individual

squad to engage targets at distance. American troops were being engaged well outside of typical rifle

range—at distances greater than 500 meters. The small, high velocity 5.56x45mm ammunition was having

limited effect at that distance. 40 Medium machine guns like the 7.62 NATO M240, specialized snipers,

indirect, and guided munitions were able to close this gap in lethality. Most significantly, a specialized role

was added to each squad to provide additional standoff range: the Designated Marksman. Officially

introduced into the Army in 2002, the role of the Designated Marksman is to engage enemy automatic rifle
41
teams, antitank teams, and snipers, using precision fires.

The concept of the Designated Marksman and a rifle specific for the role are not new. The Soviet

Union introduced the role with a corresponding rifle, the SVD Dragunov, in 1963. However, when the role

was introduced to US forces in 2002, a specific rifle to fill that purpose did not exist. Given that the

M16/M4 family of rifles was not built to engage targets beyond 500 meters, a rifle of capable of greater

long range accuracy would need to be developed. The stopgap solution was the use of modified Vietnam-

era M14 rifles. 42 Even with modifications, the modified M14’s did not have the performance required for

extended precision engagements. Further iterations attempted to use a heavily modified M16 for the role,

the SDMR. The Army has since fielded the 7.62mm M110 and M110A1 rifles to serve in the designated

marksman rifle (DMR) capacity. Important to note is that heavy weight, high recoil, and the inability for

controllable fully automatic fire are irrelevant to a rifle in this role. A rifle serving as a DMR contributes to

40
Ehrhart, Thomas P. "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer." School
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.
41
United States Army. "SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad." FM 3-21.9, December 2002.
42
American Special Ops. "M14 DMR | Designated Marksman Rifle." https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-
ops-weapons/DMR.php.
22
fire superiority by adding precision fires to an infantry squad’s overall volume of fire.

Despite the introduction of a new class of rifle meant for intermediate engagements, concerns

remained over the ability of the individual infantryman to engage targets beyond 500 meters. There was

also concern about the ability of the 5.56mm rounds to produce sufficient terminal effects on enemy

combatants. 43 By the mid-2010’s it was also apparent that the United States no longer had a monopoly on

the general issue of body armor to Soldiers. Could 5.56x45mm ammunition be effective on a battlefield

were body armor was in common use by adversaries? These questions and concerns would build into what

eventually became the NGSW (Next Generation Squad Weapon) Program.

43
Ehrhart, Thomas P. "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer." School
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.
23
The XM7 Rifle

The following portion of this monograph will provide context for what led to the creation of the

XM7, a compilation of unclassified technical characteristics of the XM7, and considerations for battlefield

employment of the XM7. Included as well are first hand accounts from Soldiers of 1st BDE, 101st Airborne

Division—the first active duty unit in the Army to receive products from the NGSW program. For more

technical data on the XM7, reference TM 9-1005-482-10 “Operator Manual for Rifle, 6.8x51mm, XM7”.

This manual exceeds the classification and distribution of this project and has therefore been omitted.

The Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Program

The Next Generation Squad Weapon Program (NGSW) was introduced to find and field new

weapon systems for the infantry. New calibers, service rifles, light machine guns, and optics were tested to

produce replacements for systems already in service. The NGSW program was the result of several decades

of similar programs that had similar desired outcomes. For example, the lessons learned from 2002’s XM8

program likely impacted initial goals for NGSW. 44

Goals
The initial requirements for rifles competing in the NGSW program exceed the classification and

distribution of this project and have therefore been omitted. Further revisions to desired outcomes, changes

in program expectations, or modifications to test conditions exceed the classification and distribution of this

project and have therefore been omitted. Open source information, provided by the Department of

Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), does provide some basic context. 45 The NGSW program was

44
GlobalSecurity.org. "XM8 Lightweight Carbine 5.56mm Modular Assault Weapon System." Last modified July 7,
2011. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m8-oicw-program.htm.
45
Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). "FY2024 Annual Report - Army - NGSW." May
2024. https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2024/army/2024ngsw.pdf.

24
expected to produce a rifle with greater terminal ballistic capability than the M4A1. The new rifle would

also be expected to perform in a variety of environments. DOT&E states that “Operational environments

may range from a known traditional or conventional regional environment to an unknown complex

environment, such as an international megacity encompassing complex urban terrain.” Ultimately, three

rifles were submitted for final consideration.

Competition/Selection

The three rifles submitted for final selection were representative of three varying levels of

technological advancement. Sig Sauer submitted the XM5 (this was later changed to XM7 due to lawsuits

and will hereafter be referred to as the XM7) and a hybrid steel/brass case version of 6.8x51mm. General

Dynamics submitted the RM277, a bullpup design using polymer cased 6.8mm. Textron submitted the

CT-5, a fully caseless design also using the 6.8mm projectile. The XM7 represented the most conservate

approach to the program requirements, while the CT-5 represented the most sophisticated solution. The

RM277’s polymer cased system represented a combination of new and familiar technology—the middle of

the road option. While the exact test performance of each system is classified, the final outcome was the

selection of the Sig Sauer XM7.

Technical Characteristics

Barrel

The XM7 rifle uses a barrel that is 13 inches in length, one and a half inches shorter than the

M4A1’s 14.5 inch barrel. This is significant because barrel length directly impacts the velocity, heat, and

chamber pressure characteristics of a weapon system. The following diagram will provide greater clarity of

the relationship between these variables.

25
Solid Lines: Pressure (KSI) Dashed Lines: Velocity (FPS)

The diagram also conveys that to achieve the same velocity as a longer barrel, a short barrel must create

significantly higher peak and muzzle exit pressures. This relationship is true regardless of weapon type or

ammunition used.

The XM7’s relatively short barrel is combined with a muzzle velocity requirement of greater than

3,000 feet per second. This means that to achieve greater velocity, the XM7 must also create higher

pressures. Traditional brass cased ammunition cannot be safely used in a system with such high pressures,

leading to the creation of a proprietary steel/brass hybrid case. Higher peak pressures require stronger and

heavier components to maintain safety and reliability. Higher peak pressure also increases the risk of parts

wearing out quickly. Higher muzzle exit pressure make the weapon louder and may require the use of a

suppressor to maintain acceptable noise and blast exposure. The need to always install a suppressor negates

benefits in size, weight, and balance that a short barrel intended to provide.

26
Ammunition

The XM7 uses a proprietary hybrid brass-steel cased version of 6.8x51mm. Based on the civilian

.277 Sig FURY ammunition, this hybrid case variant is designed to withstand the high operating pressures

of the XM7. The Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute (SAAMI) is the US entity that

creates industry standards for ammunition safety. SAAMI’s report on the 6.8 hybrid ammunition states that

this ammunition has a maximum average pressure of 80,000 psi (SAAMI Z299.4). The report includes a

warning “…Maximum Average Pressure levels greater than 65,000 psi may present increased risk of unsafe

cartridge case or firearm rupture and thus require cartridge case and/or firearm designs that depart from

traditional practices…”. 46 Sig Sauer utilizes government provided projectiles for use in their hybrid case

system. Much like other types of military ammunition, these projectiles have several variations that provide

specific capabilities.

Existing variations for 6.8x51mm projectiles include: General Purpose (GP), Special Purpose (SP),

Reduced Range (RR), and Blank (B). Much like current issue M855A1 5.56x45mm for the M4A1, the

6.8mm General Purpose round is expected to be provided to troops for general combat use. The Special

Purpose projectile is designed for maximum armor penetration, while the Reduced Range projectile is

meant to enable the use of the XM7 at a greater number of existing Army range facilities. The Reduced

Range projectile is needed due to the enormous Surface Danger Zone (SDZ) created by using 6.8x51mm

ammunition. SDZs are safety buffer areas around a shooting range designed to protect personnel from by

containing projectiles, fragments, and debris. Specific data is not available on the effect the Reduced Range

projectile has on the zeroing of optics, felt recoil, and the reliability of the XM7.

46
Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI). SAAMI Z299.4-2025: Voluntary Industry
Performance Standards for Pressure and Velocity of Centerfire Rifle Ammunition for the Use of Commercial
Manufacturers. https://saami.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/SAAMI-Z299.4-CFR-2025-Centerfire-Rifle-Approved-
2-10-2025.pdf3.

27
Gas/Recoil System

The XM7 rifle utilizes a short-stroke gas operated piston system with a rotating bolt. This type of

operating system is not unique to the XM7, having seen service on a significant number of weapons in

military rifles across the world.47 The basic idea of a short-stroke piston system is to reduce the amount of

carbon, pressure, and other residue that enters the internals of the rifle while firing. Notably, this type of

operating system places more weight towards the front of the rifle, although this problem is not unique to

the XM7.

The XM7 also incorporates an adjustable gas block to control the amount of gas entering the system

while firing. Shooters can adjust the flow of gas to “suppressed/normal” and “unsuppressed/adverse”

settings. Based on open source information on the XM7 and similar systems, it is likely that the XM7 is

designed to be used with the suppressor attached at all times. 48 The removal of the suppressor may

necessitate the gas system to be switched to the ‘adverse’ setting in order to compensate for the reduction in

pressure. The use of the ‘adverse’ setting for extended periods will likely increase the rate at which internal

components must be replaced.

The recoil system used in the XM7 is housed inside of the upper receiver of the rifle, allowing for

the use of a side-folding stock to be used. The benefits of a side folding stock are that the XM7 can be made

compact for storage, transport in vehicles, or airborne operations. However, the light weight of the stock

and side folding mechanism mean that more felt weight is transferred to the front of the rifle. In

combination with the gas system, this means that the XM7 ‘feels’ more front heavy.

47
Watters, Daniel E. "The 5.56 X 45mm Timeline: A Chronology of Development." The Gun Zone
48
Moody, Blake. "What Troops Really Think of the Army's New XM7 Rifle." We Are The Mighty, September 26, 2024.
https://www.wearethemighty.com/feature/what-troops-really-think-of-the-armys-new-xm7-rifle/.

28
Suppressor

The XM7 is designed to be used in conjunction with the Sig SLX suppressor. The SLX is a flow-

through suppressor, meaning that in theory additional back pressure is not added into the system when in

use. However, the SLX heats quickly when in use, becoming especially problematic at night. This issue, as

well as specific problems with the SLX system, will be discussed on Page 33 of this monograph.

Size/Weight

The weight of the XM7 rifle is one of the most significant departures from the M4A1. The

unloaded M4A1 weighs 6.54lbs, while the unloaded XM7 without suppressor weighs 8.18lbs. Once the

SLX suppressor is added, the unloaded weight of the XM7 increases to 9.84lbs. This is a total weight

increase of over three pounds over the M4A1. This difference is further exaggerated when the XM7’s

heavier ammunition, magazines, and optics are added to the scale. A complete unloaded XM7 rifle as

issued to Soldiers weighs 13.26lbs—significantly heavier than even the Vietnam era M14.

29
The unloaded weight of the XM7 with issued accessories

Performance

Accuracy

The NGSW program stipulated a requirement for accuracy of at least 4 MOA (Minutes of Angle) at

100 yards. Simplified, if a rifle can shoot 1 MOA, it means the rifle can consistently group shots within a 1-

inch circle at 100 yards.49 In order to be selected for service, the XM7 would have needed to pass the 4

MOA benchmark. However, it has yet to be seen if component wear issues from high internal pressures

have an impact on accuracy over time. Reports have citied performance ranging from 3 MOA to 6 MOA on

evaluated XM7 rifles. Test data from a significant quantity of XM7’s now in service is not yet publicly

available.

Component Wear

The author has personally disassembled and inspected a total of twenty-three XM7 rifles in various

stages of wear. The rifles ranged from literally brand new to having seen over 5,000 rounds of ammunition

fired. The XM7s inspected came from the United States Marine Corps Systems Command and 1 st Brigade,

101st Airborne Division. Across the population of sample rifles, the author observed degradation of the

following components: barrel rifling, bolt, extractor, suppressor locking ring, suppressor.

The most serious observation of degradation was of barrel rifling, occurring in all samples that had

exceeded a count of 2,000 rounds fired. Surface damage to the rifling was visible to the eye at the same

location on rifles that had exceeded the 2,000 round count. The location of damage was four inches from

49
United States Army. "FM 3-22.10: Sniper Training and Operations." Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
2019.

30
the muzzle on the bottom portion of the barrel. In all examined rifles, the wear occurred on the bottom side

of the barrel in the same area. These diagrams will demonstrate this location.

The impact of this degradation to accuracy, reliability, or performance has not been quantified. Critical to

note is that the round count at which this problem became visible is relatively low in comparison to the

service life expected of a rifle of this type and role.

Wear to the bolt and extractor was also visible to the naked eye on rifles with a round count of

greater than 2,000. Data on the quantity of ammunition the bolt and extractor are expected to survive

without replacement is not available. Shown in the images below is a comparison between a used

bolt/extractor and a new bolt/extractor.

31
(Left) Used Bolt compared to New Bolt (Right)

Enhanced view of Used Bolt. Note the wear to the extractor. The protective coating has worn to the point

that bare metal is visible, and the previous 90 degree edge has been worn to almost 45 degrees.

32
Significant wear and damage were also visible on three of twenty three SLX suppressors examined

by the author. Soldiers interviewed by the author reported that the suppressor locking mechanism was prone

to breaking if overtightened by hand or dropped. The instability of the locking mechanism may have led to

several catastrophic suppressor malfunctions, one of which is documented in the image below.

SLX suppressor with severe damage

Supporting the findings of the author is an unclassified FY24 report from DOT&E stating that “The

XM7 with mounted XM157 demonstrated a low probability of completing one 72-hour wartime mission

without incurring a critical failure.”50 These documented instances of wear require examination and study

by more qualified personnel. The author recommends a complete investigation into the causes of these

failure points to better the XM7 platform and provide opportunities for further refinement.

Tactical Considerations

The author of this monograph was invited to attend a Company Live Fire with Soldiers from 1 st

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Notably, 1st Brigade was one of the first units to receive NGSW products:

50
Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). "FY2024 Annual Report - Army - NGSW." May
2024. https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2024/army/2024ngsw.pdf.

33
the XM7 rifle, XM250 machine gun, and XM157 fire control system. Over fifty Officers, NCOs, and junior

Soldiers spoke with the author to provide insight into their experiences using the XM7. The tactical

considerations for the XM7 are derived from direct observation, Soldier feedback, and reference to

battlefield experiences of the past.

Combat Load

Battlefield experiences from World War I to the present day highlight the importance of fire

superiority: the ability to deliver more effective fire against an enemy than they can return. The individual

infantryman must carry enough ammunition to support the goal of achieving effective fire. The M4A1’s

Universal Basic Load (UBL) is seven 30-round magazines for a total of 210 rounds of 5.56mm.51 The

XM7’s UBL is seven 20-round magazines for a total of 140 rounds of 6.8mm. Using the weights of

magazines loaded to capacity, the M4A1 UBL is 7.7lbs while the XM7 UBL is 9.8lbs. If Soldiers carried

extra XM7 magazines to return to the previous standard of 210 rounds, the XM7 UBL(+) would be

14.7lbs—nearly double the weight of the M4A1 UBL. Why is this significant?

The author observed Gunfighter Company (C/1-506th) during their daytime iteration of a Combined

Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). The Soldiers had already conducted a dry and blank iteration of the

CALFEX and were well versed in the battle drills needed to succeed. The platoon the author observed was

tasked with providing suppression of the objective in order to enable the maneuver of the other platoons in

the company. Ten minutes after making contact with the enemy, the volume of fire the platoon was able to

output was insufficient. After fifteen minutes, the platoon was almost completely out of ammunition for

rifles, light machine guns, and medium machine guns. By this point spare XM7 magazines had already been

taken from Soldiers not on the firing line—platoon leadership, radio operator, and medic.

51
United States Army. "Portfolio - PM SL - M4/M4A1 Carbine." PEO Soldier.

34
In a future state on state conflict, it is unlikely that an infantry company will be provided with

constant logistical support. While it is possible the platoon the author observed would be successful in

suppressing targets for a single engagement, it is not likely they would have been resupplied in time for a

follow on mission. The reliance on ‘internal resupply’ to overcome this problem is not new. In Afghanistan,

Soldiers would often carry extra ammunition to further increase the M4A1 UBL of 210 rounds. This could

take the form of additional magazine pouches on a chest rig or even a special bag used solely for a squad’s

extra ammunition.52 It is important to note that even with the smaller 5.56mm rounds, each additional

magazine taken for an M4A1 is over one pound of weight added. For the XM7, this weight increases to

almost one and a half pounds while also carrying ten less rounds of ammunition.

Each pound of weight added by carrying ammunition is added to the already significant weight of

rifle being carried. The unloaded XM7 with suppressor and optic weighs 13.26lbs. This figure does not

account for a night laser aiming device, such as a AN/PEQ-15. The Soldier must also carry a night vision

device like the PVS-14 with associated hardware and batteries. Communications equipment, medical gear,

and explosives must be carried. Helmets, body armor, and water must be carried into the fight as well. So

severe is the overall weight of the individual Solider that the Army Infantry School has instituted new

programs to address the issue.53 The compounded impact of weight on the ability of a Soldier to perform

will be further explored by examining shooter engagement time.

Weight and the SPEAR Model

The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to

destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. 54 The ‘close with’

portion of the infantry mission relates directly to the ability of individual Soldiers to reach positions where

52
Sandboxx News. "The Boom Bag - Tales from Afghanistan." July 1, 2022.
53
United States Army. "Army introduces Industry to Squad as a System concept." Army.mil, March 10, 2025.
54
United States Army. ATP 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. January 11, 2024. Central Army Registry.

35
their fire can be effective against the enemy. The carried, worn, and held weight that a Soldier must carry

influences the speed at which maneuver can occur. Two research studies in particular highlight this

relationship. The first, by Center for a New American Security, states that “Heavy loads reduce mobility,

increase fatigue, and reduce mission performance.” 55The second study, by Marine Corps Captain

Thompson, was more direct. In her research a direct correlation was made between carried weight and the

likelihood a Marine would become a casualty. 56 System weight also directly impacts human performance

while shooting, as explored in the SPEAR model.

The SPEAR (Speed, Precision, Executive Control, Adaptability, Risk Exposure) framework

adopted by the USMC Training and Education Command (TECOM) defines and evaluates individual

lethality in operational terms. Developed through interagency collaboration between the Office of Naval

Research, Naval Health Research Center scientists, and USMC subject matter experts, SPEAR emphasizes

that the Soldier or Marine is not separate from the weapon system—they are the system.

SPEAR defines lethality as “the repeatable capacity of a system—composed of an individual,

weapon, and ammunition—to rapidly incapacitate an enemy combatant(s) by achieving a physiological stop

that is likely to result in death.” This model acknowledges that success in infantry engagements is

determined by the human’s ability to deliver accurate, threat-stopping fire quickly.

The importance of speed is especially relevant considering that the vast majority of small arms

engagements occur inside 300 meters. Within this range, the difference between hitting first has more

impact on the outcome of a fight than marginal increases in terminal ballistic energy. Time to first vital

hit and time to incapacitation are the performance metrics that the SPEAR model consistently identifies as

decisive, and both are significantly influenced by factors like weapon weight, recoil management, and

55
Center for a New American Security. "The Soldier's Heavy Load." September 29, 2018
56
Thompson, Courtney. Paying for Weight in Blood: An Analysis of Weight and Protection Level of a Combat Load
During Tactical Operations. Naval Postgraduate School, 2019.

36
shooter fatigue over time.

This relationship has a variety of implications for the adoption of the XM7. While larger caliber

rounds may deliver more energy on impact, that energy is irrelevant if the round is delivered too slowly, too

inaccurately, or not at all. At 100–300 meters—the most common engagement band—the shooter who can

deliver two or three accurate shots before the enemy gets off one holds the real advantage.

A lighter, lower-recoiling rifle enables this advantage. It reduces target reacquisition time, shortens

split times, and lowers the physiological burden on the shooter. The result is faster follow-up shots,

improved consistency, greater control under fatigue, and better performance in battlefield conditions.

SPEAR-based simulations have shown that even a small advantage in engagement timing, just seconds,

translates into dramatic increases in win probability during close-range firefights. When compounded

across a unit, the effects grow exponentially.

WTBN Study

The relationship between the weight of a weapon system, size of caliber used, and impacts to

shooter time on target were examined in a study the author conducted with the USMC Weapons Training

Battalion (WTBN). The study used a modified version of the Infantry Marksmanship Assessment (IMA)

drill to test shot placement and engagement time. 57 Shooters used the M4A1 (7.5lbs, 5.56MM), the M110

(14.5lbs, 7.62mm) and the M39 (16.5lbs, 7.62mm) to simulate a variety of platforms currently in service.

All three rifle types were equipped with the Squad Common Optic (SCO) to ensure continuity between

systems. A relatively small sample size of twenty shooters of various skill levels, ranks, and body types

participated in the test.

57
Marine Corps Training and Education Command. Marine Corps Marksmanship Campaign Plan. September 16,
2024. https://www.tecom.marines.mil.

37
Shooters engaged targets from 7 to 300 meters in a variety of positions including standing,

kneeling, and prone. The results of the test reinforced the reality that heavier systems of higher caliber

create physiological conditions that slow the ability of a shooter to engage targets. Fatigue while

maneuvering, adjusting firing positions, and reloading under stress compound to reduce shooter reaction

time. Shooters using a ‘Light’ series weapon (M4A1) had greater hit probabilities, time on target, and

follow up shot times than those using a ‘Heavy’ series weapon (M110, M39). Time to first shot, time to

follow up shot (split time) and overall hit factor have tangible impacts on battlefield performance. These

results are corroborated by similar testing done at Weapons Training Battalion.

(Results from WTBN Testing. Green highlighting indicates an area of performance where ‘Light’

category weapons performed better than ‘Heavy’ category weapons).

The relationship between weight and performance, outlined by the SPEAR model, was

demonstrated during 1st Brigade’s CALFEX. The author observed some Soldiers physically unable to hold

up their XM7 rifles at or near the firing position for more than a few moments. This was particularly serious

during trench clearing operations, where rifles must be kept in the ‘high ready’ position to engage targets

quickly. Soldiers reported that it was not uncommon for the front heavy XM7 to hit the ground muzzle first

when diving to the next fighting position. The effect that the XM7’s weight and balance have on target hit

probability requires further study in order to quantify impacts to Soldier lethality. The author recommends

testing using the USMC IMA and the SPEAR model to quantify meaningful results.

38
Soldier Feedback: 101st ABN CALFEX

While attending the CALFEX, the author had the opportunity to speak to over fifty maintainers,

Soldiers, and Leaders about their experiences with the XM7 rifle. While exact quotes will not be given, the

general consensus and spirit of their comments will be included. Most complaints about the XM7 centered

around the overall weight of the system, the SLX suppressor, and the universal basic load (UBL) of the

6.8x51mm ammunition. Soldiers found the XM7 difficult operate with in tactical situations, uncomfortable

to carry while ruck marching for long distances, and challenging to hold at the ‘high ready’ positions during

engagements. The SLX suppressor locking mechanism was found to be fragile and the suppressor itself was

problematic during night shoots. The SLX begins to glow after a few magazines, to the extent that it washes

out the helmet mounted night vision devices used by Soldiers. The heat of the SLX is such that commercial

off the shelf purchases of suppressor covers have not been able to mitigate the problem.

Soldiers also found the ergonomics of the XM7 challenging. The side charging handle is too close

to the face of the shooter to be used comfortably, and the ‘regular’ charging handle is easily hung up on the

stock. The following images will depict this problem:

39
To avoid hitting the stock, Soldiers must pull up and out on the charging handle to lock the bolt fully. It was

also reported that pulling the charging handle up and out with too much force has the potential to break it.

Other reported problems with the rifles include the ambidextrous magazine release, handguard retaining

mechanism, and issued sling. The author recommends a thorough investigation into the causes of these

issues with the goal of improving the function of the XM7 rifle.

40
Strategic Considerations

The continued adoption of the XM7 has implications beyond the impact of the tactical level. The

ever-increasing complexity of war requires warfighting tools capable of being supported by the entirety of

the Joint Force. 58 Further, interoperability with America’s international partners and allies has never been

more important. Lessons can be learned from both the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and the technological

advancements of potential adversaries across the world.

Joint Force

The 2022 National Defense Strategy states that ‘to ensure our future military advantage, we will

build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. 59 The continued integration of the armed forces at the

strategic and operational levels is critical to maintaining American lethality dominance. Departing from the

5.56mm ammunition currently in service across the force would create unique logistical requirements for

the Army. In a contested Joint battlespace, the ability of supply chains to provide ammunition to troops in

combat would be complicated by the need for multiple calibers.

International Partners and Allies

The adoption of 7.62x51mm and later 5.56x45mm as NATO standard were critical to increasing

interoperability with some of America’s closest allies. While politically challenging to accomplish, the

shared ammunition has enabled powerful logistical integration with other nations. NATO nations carry

these calibers in arsenals, store them in the hundreds of millions, and in some cases actively produce them

as part of their defense industries. Should the United States enter a conflict in Europe or the Indo-Pacific,

58
Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 1 Volume 1: Joint Warfighting. August 27, 2023.
59
United States Department of Defense. "2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America." October
27, 2022

41
American forces will be able to source ammunition from friendly nations in the region quickly. By shifting

to 6.8x51mm, the Army risks further dependence on CONUS based supply chains. Given that no allied

nations have publicly expressed interest in adopting 6.8x51mm, the likelihood that Army units will be able

to source ammunition abroad is slim.

Russia-Ukraine War

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War provides an opportunity to gain insight into the most recent

developments in infantry tactics. Senior officers of the Ukrainian Special Forces shared first hand

experiences with the author. These officers also leveraged the opinions of those actively fighting on the

front lines as of April 2025. The officers confirmed that engagement distances for the infantry rarely exceed

300 meters. The nature of urban, forest, and trench combat shrink the average engagement to around 50

meters. There is also a strong preference towards modernized versions of the M4A1, with modifications

similar to those done by U.S. Special Forces. Notably, 5.56x45mm ammunition is not proving incapable of

defeating Russian body armor. Specifically, M955 armor piercing 5.56mm is preferred for the ease at which

it can penetrate body armor. The use of ‘black tip’ M955 Armor Piercing 5.56x45mm ammunition does not

have a significant effect on the reliability of the rifles being used. Additional open source data on the

conflict has confirmed the ineffectiveness of Russian body armor as well as the reality of infantry

engagements below 300 meters. 60 These findings are just one small data point from the war, but what is

clear is that the basic principles infantry combat have not changed.

Adversary Capabilities

The progression of firearms technology is not limited to the United States and its international

allies. Russia and China have taken steps to modernize existing service rifles in inventory while also

60
"Ineffectiveness of Russian Body Armor: Consequences for Russia's Soldiers." September 24, 2023.

42
continuing development of newer models. China’s QBZ-95 was adopted in the 1990’s for many of the same

reasons that led the US to adopt the M4.61 The QBZ-95 uses 5.8×42mm ammunition, which is slightly

larger than 5.56x45mm but maintains the same intended purpose of a small, high velocity caliber. In 2019,

the Chinese revealed the more modernized QBZ-191 that would begin to replace the QBZ-95. The QBZ-

191 uses the same 5.8x42mm ammunition but provides better shooting ergonomics over the previous

design.62 To provide further context, the QBZ-191 is two pounds heavier than the M4A1, has fewer

attachment points for accessories, and uses the same 14.5 inch barrel length.

Russian firearms development has yielded a product improved version of the older AK-74 design,

resulting in the AK-12 adopted in 2012. The AK-12 uses 5.45x39 ammunition, which itself was a Soviet

attempt to replicate the success of the 5.56x45mm ammunition found in Vietnam.63 The AK-12 is similar in

weight to the M4A1 and has a barrel length two inches longer than the M4A1. Like the QBZ-191, the AK-

12 is less modular than the M4A1 and has fewer mounting points for optics or lasers. Important to note is

that open source intelligence does not indicate that China or Russia are in the process of producing an

equivalent rifle to the XM7. Much like the United States, Russia and China instead have Designated

Marksman Rifles (DMR) that fulfill the requirement for intermediate range precision shooting.

Alternatives

The XM7 rifle was created out of a desire to improve the capabilities of the M4A1. Alternative

solutions that accomplish this goal are available immediately, in the near term, and in the future. Each of

the technologies discussed in this section are worthy of extended research, however this monograph will

only introduce the basic concepts of each system.

61
Weaponsystems.net. "QBZ-95."
62
Military Factory. "NORINCO QBZ-191 Modular Assault Rifle / Assault Carbine / DMR."
63
Military Review. "Standoff: The history of creating 5,56-mm cartridges." April 6, 2013.

43
Immediate Solutions

Special Operations, notably Army Special Forces and the 75 th Ranger Regiment, have adopted

upgraded variations of the M4A1 for use as service rifles. These variations add free floated barrels for

greater accuracy, improved gas systems for reliability, and suppressors for reduced operator signature.

Advanced magnified optics and laser aiming devices increase the range at which operators can engage

targets. These upgrades support the original intent of the M4A1 and the battlefield philosophy behind its

use. Special Operations forces supplement the modified M4A1’s with rifles developed for long range,

aimed fire—designated marksman rifles.

Concerns about penetration of body armor at distances beyond 300 meters could in part be

mitigated by the use of M955 Armor Piercing 5.56mm ammunition. M955 is already in DOD inventory and

can be produced in greater quantities. While currently uncommon for use with rifles, further developments

of tungsten-core penetrators in 5.56mm projectiles have the potential to further increase the terminal

ballistic performance of the M4A1.

The author recommends the widespread adoption of the upgrades used in Special Operations M4A1

variants. The components used are already in inventory and could be used to enhance the capabilities of the

M4A1’s now in service. The United States Marine Corps, for example, has recently fielded suppressors to a

majority of their forces using 5.56mm rifles. 64 While the existing M855A1 5.56mm ammunition has not

shown to be problematic at body armor penetration in Ukraine, widespread issue of the M955 armor

piercing variant would further increase the capabilities of the M4A1. Further research is required to

examine the impact of M955 usage in increased quantity on rifle component service life.

64
Marine Corps Systems Command. "Marine Corps begins widespread fielding of suppressors." December 30, 2020.

44
Near Solutions

Near solutions to increase the capabilities of the M4A1 are defined as being capable of

implementation within two to four years. The first is the adoption of polymer cased ammunition such as the

type developed by True Velocity.65 The use of polymer casings for ammunition has benefits that are

independent of caliber used. Polymer cased ammunition reduces the weight of each round carried by 30%

and reduces heat transfer between internal rifle components. The impact of this weight reduction could have

an enormous impact on the capabilities of the infantry. For example, the universal basic load (UBL) of the

M4A1 is 210 rounds inside of seven 30-round magazines, for a total of 7.7lbs. Applying the 30% reduction

in weight per round, Soldiers could carry an additional 60 rounds of 5.56mm without increasing the weight

carried.

When this benefit is applied to precision and belt-fed munitions, the impact is even more

significant. In addition, weight reduction would have positive effects on the logistics chains that bring

supplies to the front line. Air and ground vehicles would have a reduced total weight while bringing the

same amount of ammunition into the fight. This technology already exists and is ready for widespread

adoption by the Joint Force. Facilities currently under construction to produce 6.8x51mm could be

converted to produce polymer cased ammunition instead. Should the Army choose to adopt new calibers in

the future, the benefits of using polymer cased ammunition could still be applied.

Future Solutions

Future solutions are defined as developing technologies not yet available for use in the Joint Force.

Two emerging technologies in particular offer the greatest potential for future small arms procurement:

caseless and ‘smart’ munitions. Caseless rifle systems do not eject spent casings from the system,

65
True Velocity. "True Velocity introduces composite-cased 5.56x45mm cartridge for civilians." JEC Composites.

45
everything leaves the barrel in one unit. By removing extraction from the firing process, an enormous

amount of weight can be reduced from the system. Additionally, the movement of the extraction process

detracts from accuracy while also producing a large amount of heat.66 Similar to traditional polymer cased

ammunition, caseless systems also use polymer to reduce the weight of projectiles. The Textron/Winchester

CT-5 rifle is a caseless system that was tested as part of the trials for the NGSW program. While

unsuccessful in winning the contract, the CT-5 demonstrates that this technology is close to maturity.

Recent developments in ammunition for armored vehicles has resulted in semi-autonomous ‘smart’

munitions. The XM1223 Multi-Mode Proximity Airburst (MMPA) Round is a recently tested, fully

programmable munition for the Army’s 30mm cannons. 67 The XM1223 can be programmed for airburst,

armor piercing, drone, and air defense modes while inside the vehicle. Manufacturing techniques will

continue to advance in the field of small arms, eventually allowing for programmable smart munitions for

rifles. Incorporating AI into the targeting system of a rifle would allow the infantry to have an even greater

impact on the battlefield. With one rifle, a Solider could engage flying drones, lightly armored vehicles, or

personnel behind cover. Critically, such a system would program the target and needed effect into each

projectile fired without physical input from the Soldier.

The integration of AI, caseless projectiles, and programmable munitions into a single package

would represent a huge leap forward in the field of small arms technology. Such a step forward would

justify the costs needed to adopt a rifle capable of making use of these advancements. By combining these

advanced technologies into one package, the United States would guarantee the lethality dominance of

warfighters for decades to come.

66
2. U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory. "BRL Survey of the Army Caseless Ammunition Program." March 8,
1978.

67
Janes. "FAVS 2024: US develops 30 mm programmable proximity airburst ammunition." November 12, 2024.

46
Conclusion

The lessons of history provide ample evidence of the importance of fire superiority for the

infantry. Time and time again, the ‘gravel-belly’ concept of long range, high caliber fire from static

positions has proven to be tactically ineffective. The earliest days of World War I demonstrated the need

for shorter, lighter service rifles capable of being wielded effectively in close combat. The rapid

technological advancements of World War II brought the average infantry engagement to 300 meters or

less, where the benefits of volume over long range precision were reinforced. The semi-automatic M1

Garand provided a decisive battlefield advantage to American Soldiers facing the bolt-action rifles of the

Axis. The German STG-44, the world’s first assault rifle, bridged the gap between rifle and submachine

gun effectively.

The Soviet Union further developed the assault rifle concept into the AK-47, one of the most

successful and iconic rifles of all time. The United States, ignoring the lessons of World War II, adopted a

rifle that embodied tactical philosophies better suited for 1914. The M14 fared poorly against the Soviet

AK-47 in Vietnam, where the lessons of infantry fire superiority we re-learned at the cost of American

lives. The introduction of the light, effective M16 provided Soldiers with overmatch against enemy rifles,

enabling effective fire and maneuver once again.

The current M4A1 rifle, derived from the M16, represents the status quo of American lethality

dominance. Adversary systems are less capable and less adaptable than the M4A1. Despite the success of

the M4A1, concerns over long range effectiveness came to the forefront in Afghanistan. Seeking to

improve upon the M4A1 and increase the capabilities of the infantry, the Next Generation Squad Weapon

(NGSW) program was born.

Despite the impressive goals set out at the start of the NGSW program, the outcome reflects the

same outdated philosophy that led to the adoption of the M14. Among the final products of the NGSW

47
program were the XM7 rifle and its 6.8x51mm ammunition. Over pressured and heavy, the XM7 is a

mechanically flawed design that cannot escape the reality of physics. While capable of long range fire and

some barrier penetration, the XM7 is a tactically outdated service rifle.

Strategic realities further complicated the widespread adoption of the XM7. The unique

ammunition used is not in service with any Joint Force, NATO member, or International Partner. Further,

the ongoing war in Ukraine highlights that the realities of infantry combat have not changed from those of

the past. With most engagements still well below 300 meters, the long range benefits of the XM7 are

rendered tactically irrelevant. Adversaries continue to enhance and refine rifles that have yet to match the

superiority of the M4A1.

Immediate, near term, and future alternatives exist to the continued adoption of the XM7. Upgrades

already in inventory can further enhance the lethality of the M4A1. The increased issue of M955 armor

piercing ammunition can supplement 5.56mm armor penetration at extended ranges. In the near term, the

use of polymer cased ammunition can reduce overall system weight and enable even greater fire superiority.

Emerging technologies like caseless and programmable munitions will ensure the continued dominance of

the United States in the field of small arms.

The Army has the opportunity to rectify the decision to adopt the XM7 as America’s next service

rifle. The lessons of history show that ignoring battlefield realities come at the cost of human lives.

America’s Soldiers deserve to go into battle knowing that they have been issued the most lethal weapon

system available. They deserve to be given a weapon that is safe and efficient to operate. They deserve a

rifle capable of providing the fire superiority they need to close with and destroy the enemy. The men and

women of the infantry have always fought at the fullest extent of their capabilities, willing to achieve

victory at the price of ‘the last full measure of devotion.’ The Army must continue to provide them with

weapons capable of matching that devotion.

48
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