PEACE OPS

MULTI-SERVICE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR
PEACE OPERATIONS

ATP 3-07.31[FM 3-07.31]

MCWP 3-33.8
AFTTP 3-2.40

NOVEMBER 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release,

distribution is unlimited.

*Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, dated 26

October 2003, including all changes.
FOREWORD
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a project of
the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of
agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force
doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the
immediate needs of the warfighter.
This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for
implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as
appropriate.

THOMAS S. JAMES, JR. WILLIAM F. MULLEN, III

Major General, US Army Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Director Director
Mission Command Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Directorate

STEVEN L. KWAST
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
Commander
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education

This publication is available through the following websites:

ALSA (http://www.alsa.mil/);
US Army (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html);
US Marine Corps (https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil);
US Navy at Navy Doctrine Library System (https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil);
US Air Force at Air Force E-Publishing System (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/);
and Joint Electronic Library Plus (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0).
ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1
Change No. 1 Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 17 April 2015

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

1. Change ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, November 2014, as follows:

Change distribution to Public Release.

Remove old pages: Insert new pages:

Cover Cover
v through ix v through ix
Authentication Page Authentication Page
2. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is

unlimited.
ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army
1510503

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Not to be distributed. Electronic
means only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEVEN L. KWAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander and President
Air University

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing Web site
at www.e-publishing .af.mil for downloading or ordering.
RELEASABILITY: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release,
distribution is unlimited.

PIN: 104715-001
PREFACE
1. Purpose
This publication provides a single source multi-Service tactics, techniques, and
procedures (MTTP) manual that focuses on conducting peace operations (PO) at the
tactical level.
Note: For the Army, the term “mission command” replaced “command and control.”
Mission command now encompasses the Army’s philosophy of command (still known
as mission command) as well as the exercise of authority and direction to accomplish
missions (formerly known as command and control).
2. Scope
Use this publication at the tactical level for training, planning, and conducting joint or
multi-Service PO. It serves as the focal point guiding readers to existing TTP and
provides TTP where gaps exist. In general terms, the tactical level refers to those
operations conducted by tactical units or task forces at the O-6 level of command. This
publication offers readers a basic understanding of joint and multinational PO, an
overview of the nature and fundamentals of PO, and a detailed discussion of selected
military tasks associated with PO. To a limited degree, this publication provides training
objectives for the proper execution of PO for commanders and their staffs. This
publication has worldwide application and supplements Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace
Operations.
3. Applicability
It applies to all commanders, leaders, staff, and warfighters participating in joint
operations. In addition, it assists a joint force commander, Service component
commanders and their staffs, and anyone responsible for force protection of personnel
and resources.
4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this
publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate
it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:
Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the TTP
contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature
Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives listed on the
authentication page.
Marine Corps.1 The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication
in US Marine Corps doctrine publications as directed by the Deputy Commandant,
Combat Development and Integration (CD&I). Distribution is in accordance with the
Marine Corps Publication Distribution System.

1
Marine Corps PCN: 143 000144 01

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 i

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in
accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air
Force Instruction 33-360, Publications and Forms Management.
5. User Information
a. US Army Combined Arms Center; HQMC, Deputy Commandant, CD&I; Curtis E.
LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center); and Air
Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint
participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and update this
publication as necessary.
b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control
organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in
Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, is
incorporated in revisions to this document.
c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your
comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to:
Army
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center
ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D
Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-6900
DSN 552-4885 COMM (913) 684-4885
E-mail: [email protected]
Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration
ATTN: C116
3300 Russell Road, Suite 204
Quantico VA 22134-5021
DSN 278-3616/6233 COMM (703) 784-3616/6233
Air Force
Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
ATTN: DDJ
401 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428
DSN 493-7864/1681 COMM (334) 953-7864/1681
E-mail: [email protected]
ALSA
Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902
E-mail: [email protected]

ii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Peace Operations.
This revision, February 2014:
Updates:
Chapter I
• Changes references from psychological operations (PSYOP) to military
information support operations.
Chapter II
• Discusses the operational and information environments using the following
tools:
o Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available.
o Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available and civil considerations.
o Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
o Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.
• Combines previous Peace Operations (PO) MTTP information on media,
PSYOP, and combat camera as “information-related capabilities.”
• Enlarges information on negotiations and interpersonal engagement.
• Enhances emphasis on the importance of force protection and civil-military
operations.
• Rearranges and reprioritizes tasks on medical information.
• Changes internal “displaced persons” to “internally displaced persons (IDPs).”
Chapters III and IV
• Combines and reorganizes previous PO multi-Service tactics, techniques, and
procedures (MTTP) tasks in chapters III and IV reinforcing the following tasks
identified under “Creating a Secure Environment.” This consolidation includes:
o Military tasks.
o Observing and reporting.
o Patrolling.
o Separation of forces and interpositioning.
o Site security and protected areas.
• Searches.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 iii

o Individual.
o Vehicles.
o Homes.
• Verification of weapons and forces.
• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
• Public security and civil disturbances.
o Rule of law.
o Curfews.
o Demining and unexploded ordnance.
o Refugees and IDPs.
o Environmental protection and restoration.
o Nonlethal weapons.
• Convoys.
Chapter IV
• Adds Chapter IV, “Control of Large Areas,” with the following military tasks:
o Movement control measures.
o Checkpoints.
o Roadblocks.
o Controlling borders.
Chapter VI
• Refines doctrinal discussion on civil administration.
Chapter VII
• Moves the information from Appendix D in the previous MTTP, “Information
Operations,” into chapter VII, and updates the relationship between information
operations and informing and influencing relevant audiences to ensure
successful PO.
Appendices
• Updates appendices reflecting current doctrine and tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
• Adds a mass atrocity response operations (MARO) appendix, and identifies
MARO as a subset of peace enforcement operations.

iv ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

*ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31]
MCWP 3-33.8
AFTTP 3-2.40

ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31] US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
MCWP 3-33.8 Headquarters, USMC, Deputy Commandant, CD&I
Quantico, Virginia
AFTTP 3-2.40 Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

1 November 2014
PEACE OPS
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
PEACE OPERATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ X

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS ............................................. 1
1. Background ........................................................................................................ 1
2. Characteristics of Peace Operations.................................................................. 2
3. Information Operations ...................................................................................... 3
4. Fundamentals of Peace Operations................................................................... 3
5. Transition ........................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER II DESIGN AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 5
1. Background ........................................................................................................ 5
2. Creating a Secure Environment ......................................................................... 6
3. Staff Considerations for Personnel .................................................................... 7
4. Staff Considerations for Intelligence .................................................................. 7
5. Staff Considerations for Operations ................................................................... 8
6. Staff Considerations for Logistics..................................................................... 12
7. Staff Considerations for Communications ........................................................ 13
8. Other Staff Considerations ............................................................................... 13
CHAPTER III PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS .............................................................. 19
1. Background ...................................................................................................... 19
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

*Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, dated 26 October 2003, including all changes.

v
2. Military Tasks ................................................................................................... 19
3. Site Security ..................................................................................................... 30
4. Protected Areas ............................................................................................... 31
5. Establishing Search Operations ....................................................................... 32
6. Conducting Personnel Searches...................................................................... 36
7. Conducting Vehicle Searches .......................................................................... 38
8. Building Search (Inhabited) .............................................................................. 45
9. Building Search (Uninhabited) ......................................................................... 48
10. Search of Rural Areas .................................................................................... 49
11. Verification of Weapons and Forces .............................................................. 49
12. Military Movements and Exercises................................................................. 50
13. Convoy Operations ........................................................................................ 50
14. Convoy Security ............................................................................................. 53
15. Populace Control Measures ........................................................................... 53
16. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reconciliation ......................................... 53
17. Civil Disturbances .......................................................................................... 55
18. Curfews .......................................................................................................... 59
19. Demining and Unexploded Ordnance ............................................................ 61
20. Dislocated Civilian Operations ....................................................................... 61
21. Environmental Restoration ............................................................................. 63
22. Nonlethal Weapons........................................................................................ 63
23. Search Operations ......................................................................................... 65
CHAPTER IV CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS ............................................................. 69
1. Background ...................................................................................................... 69
2. Gaining Control of an Area .............................................................................. 69
3. Movement Control............................................................................................ 72
4. Roadblocks ...................................................................................................... 72
5. Checkpoints ..................................................................................................... 74
6. Controlling Urban Areas ................................................................................... 76
7. Controlling Underground Areas ....................................................................... 79
8. Controlling Rural Areas .................................................................................... 81
CHAPTER V FORCE PROTECTION............................................................................ 83
1. Background ...................................................................................................... 83
2. Definition .......................................................................................................... 83

vi ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 17 April 2015

3. Threat Assessment .......................................................................................... 84
4. Threat Countermeasures ................................................................................. 85
5. Terrorist Tactics ............................................................................................... 85
6. IO and Force Protection ................................................................................... 86
7. Intelligence ....................................................................................................... 87
8. Medical Role in Force Protection ..................................................................... 87
9. Force Protection Checklist ............................................................................... 87
CHAPTER VI CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ............................................................ 89
1. Background ...................................................................................................... 89
2. Objectives of CMO ........................................................................................... 90
3. Support to Civil Administration (SCA) .............................................................. 92
CHAPTER VII INFORMING AND INFLUENCING ...................................................... 105
1. Background .................................................................................................... 105
2. The Information Environment ......................................................................... 105
3. Information Operations .................................................................................. 105
4. Commander Tasks......................................................................................... 106
5. Information-Related Capabilities .................................................................... 107
6. IO Training and Predeployment Considerations ............................................ 108
7. Information Support Agencies ........................................................................ 109
CHAPTER VIII CONFLICT RESOLUTION ................................................................. 111
1. Background .................................................................................................... 111
2. Conflict Resolution Training ........................................................................... 111
3. Negotiations ................................................................................................... 112
4. Mediation ....................................................................................................... 114
5. Arbitration ...................................................................................................... 115
APPENDIX A SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS .................................. 117
1. Background .................................................................................................... 117
2. Commander and Staff’s Role in Developing the Engagement Strategy ......... 117
3. Meeting Types and Purposes ........................................................................ 118
4. Principles of Engagement .............................................................................. 120
5. The Operations Process Applied to Meetings or Engagements ..................... 121
APPENDIX B LIAISON OFFICER .............................................................................. 125
1. Background .................................................................................................... 125
2. Functions ....................................................................................................... 125

17 April 2015 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 vii

3. Liaison Responsibilities .................................................................................. 125
APPENDIX C INTERPRETERS .................................................................................. 127
1. Background .................................................................................................... 127
2. Selecting an Interpreter.................................................................................. 127
3. Training the Interpreter .................................................................................. 129
4. Communication Techniques When Employing an Interpreter ........................ 129
APPENDIX D CIVIL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND TEMPLATING ........................ 133
1. Background .................................................................................................... 133
2. Civil Considerations ....................................................................................... 134
3. PMESII ........................................................................................................... 134
4. ASCOPE ........................................................................................................ 137
5. Cultural Environment ..................................................................................... 141
APPENDIX E INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................... 145
1. Background .................................................................................................... 145
2. Organizations ................................................................................................. 145
APPENDIX F JOINT COMMISSION ........................................................................... 151
1. Background .................................................................................................... 151
2. Objectives of Joint Commissions ................................................................... 151
APPENDIX G MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS .................................. 153
1. Background .................................................................................................... 153
2. MARO Considerations ................................................................................... 153
3. Actors............................................................................................................. 156
4. Perpetrators ................................................................................................... 156
5. Victims ........................................................................................................... 157
6. Interveners ..................................................................................................... 157
7. Others ............................................................................................................ 158
8. MARO Planning and Operations .................................................................... 159
9. MARO Approaches ........................................................................................ 161
APPENDIX H KEY DOCUMENTS .............................................................................. 163
1. Background .................................................................................................... 163
2. Mandate ......................................................................................................... 163
3. Status of Forces Agreement .......................................................................... 163
4. Terms of Reference ....................................................................................... 163
5. Rules of Engagement (ROE) ......................................................................... 164

viii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 17 April 2015

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement ........... 164
7. General Orders .............................................................................................. 165
8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Documents................................. 165
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 167
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................ 169
List of Figures
Figure 1. Control Zones ............................................................................................ 23
Figure 2. Armistice Demarcation Line ....................................................................... 26
Figure 3. Deployment of PO Forces Along an Armistice Demarcation Line .............. 27
Figure 4. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation .................. 28
Figure 5. Establishment of Buffer Zones................................................................... 29
Figure 6. Establishment of Areas of Limitation ......................................................... 30
Figure 7. Suggested Roadblock in Urban Areas ....................................................... 34
Figure 8. Suggested Roadblock in Rural Areas ........................................................ 35
Figure 9. Suggested Mobile Roadblock .................................................................... 36
Figure 10. Diagram of Passenger Vehicle .................................................................. 40
Figure 11. Truck Diagram ........................................................................................... 43
Figure 12. Diagram of Buses and Coaches ................................................................ 44
Figure 13. Typical Organization for Search Operations .............................................. 45
Figure 14. Conduct of Search ..................................................................................... 47
Figure 15. Isolate the Disturbance .............................................................................. 55
Figure 16. Controlling Road Networks ........................................................................ 56
Figure 17. Deploying a “Snatch-and-Grab” Team ....................................................... 57
Figure 18. Search Operations ..................................................................................... 68
Figure 19. Civil-Military Operations Relationships ...................................................... 89
Figure 20. Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas ..................................................... 93
Figure 21. Operations Process ................................................................................. 121
List of Tables
Table 1. Quick Body Search Considerations ................................................................. 37
Table 2. Detailed Body Search Considerations ............................................................. 38
Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas ...................................................................................... 40
Table 4. Force Protection Checklist .............................................................................. 88
Table 5. Meeting Worksheet Example......................................................................... 123
Table 6. PMESII and ASCOPE Matrix......................................................................... 140
Table 7. Cultural Matrix ............................................................................................... 141
Table 8. MARO Approaches ....................................................................................... 162
Table 9. Sample Rules of Engagement Card .............................................................. 164

17 April 2015 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PEACE OPS
Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations,
including international efforts and military missions containing conflict, redressing the
peace, and shaping the environment supporting reconciliation, rebuilding, and
facilitating the transition to effective governance. PO includes peacekeeping operations,
peace building, post conflict actions, peacemaking processes, conflict prevention, and
military peace enforcement operations. Conduct PO under the sponsorship of the
United Nations, an intergovernmental organization, within a coalition of agreeing
nations, or unilaterally (Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Peace Operations).
Chapter I Introduction to Peace Operations
Chapter I describes 5 PO categories and 15 joint fundamentals of PO. The chapter
discusses transition planning for PO missions, and other PO categories for relieving
forces, and civilian agencies.
Chapter II Design and Planning Considerations
Chapter II sets the conditions for successful nonmilitary peace building activities. It
provides design and planning factors commanders and staffs must consider when
undertaking PO. It highlights factors that account for capability differences between
United States (US) forces, multinational forces, and civilian agencies.
Chapter III Peace Operations Tasks
Chapter III describes tactical-level tasks for PO forces. This includes six types of
patrols, mobile or fixed observation techniques, and movement control with roadblocks
and checkpoints. It provides techniques for vehicle, personnel, and urban searches. In
addition, the chapter presents techniques for controlling civil disturbances and handling
refugees or displaced persons.
Chapter IV Control of Large Areas
Chapter IV focuses on methods for controlling large areas and separating opposing
forces, including but not limited to, interposition, establishing areas of separation, buffer
zones, border control, and demilitarized zones.
Chapter V Force Protection
Chapter V provides checklists and basic considerations for force protection. This
includes threat assessment, force protection condition procedures, and potential
terrorist tactics. The chapter focuses on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for
intelligence usage, preventive or reactive medicine, and military information support
operations (MISO).
Chapter VI Civil-Military Operations
Chapter VI lists the principles of civil-military operations and the aspects of governance
associated with PO. It provides TTP integrating civilian and military activities for foreign
humanitarian assistance, civil affairs operations, and election support. Additionally, this
chapter provides special considerations and restrictions for military support to the rule of

x ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

law, including legal restrictions on the use of restraints, assistance to police, and
support to judiciary or penal systems.
Chapter VII Informing and Influencing
Chapter VII discusses the importance of information operations (IO), and informing and
influencing relevant audiences to ensure successful PO. IO is the integrated
employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13, Information
Operations). IO works in tandem with PA to shape the information environment to
operational advantage. IO synchronizes such information-related capabilities as military
information support operations, combat camera, civil affairs/civil military operations,
operational security and others to influence a range of audiences, particularly
indigenous populations in the area of operations to support PO and its various lines of
effort..
Chapter VIII Conflict Resolution
Chapter VIII provides techniques and considerations for conflict resolution focusing on
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
Appendix A Setting Up and Conducting Meetings
This appendix provides the purpose for conducting meetings and interpersonal
engagements and provides TTP for effective planning and execution.
Appendix B Liaison
This appendix provides an overview of the role and responsibilities of liaison officers
and approaches they use that contribute to effective coordination and collaboration
among various agencies involved in PO.
Appendix C Interpreters
This appendix discusses the vital role interpreter’s play in facilitating interactions and
negotiations between the local or indigenous population and US forces.
Appendix D Civil Component Analysis and Templating
This appendix describes the process commanders and their staffs use to analyze the
civil component of an area of operations and determine how it can help, hinder, or affect
PO.
Appendix E Intergovernmental Organizations and Nongovernmental
Organizations
This appendix gives a brief description of various intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations that work with PO forces.
Appendix F Joint Commissions
This appendix discusses joint commissions and how they facilitate more effective PO.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 xi

Appendix G Protection of Civilians and Mass Atrocity Response Operations
This appendix provides TTP on ways PO forces can protect civilians and effectively
respond to mass atrocity situations.
Appendix H Key Documents
This appendix highlights important PO documents.
Appendix I Training
This appendix provides training considerations and opportunities for the preparation of
PO.

xii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commanders and agencies participated in creating this publication:
Joint
Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Norfolk, VA
Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Lackland AFB, TX
United States (US) Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL
US European Command, Vaihingen, GE
US Joint Forces Command, J7, Suffolk, VA
US Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI
US Southern Command, Miami, FL
US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL
US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE
Army
US Army Civil Affairs Command, Fort Bragg, NC
US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS
US Army Information Proponent Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS
US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ
US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA
US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA
Marine Corps
4th Civil Affairs Group, Washington, DC
Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Quantico, VA
Marine Corp Capabilities Development Directorate, Quantico, VA
Navy
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Naval Support Facility Indian
Head, MD
Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk, VA
Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD
Air Force
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
HQ Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland AFB, TX

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 xiii

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xiv ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS
1. Background
a. The United States (US) participates in a broad range of military operations
(ROMO), including counterinsurgency, crisis response, and contingency operations,
necessitating interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Peace
operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, including
international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and
shape the environment in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitating the
transition to legitimate governance.
Note: The US adopted the term peace operations while others such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the term peace-support operations.
b. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement operations
(PEO), conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, and peace building post conflict
actions. Conduct PO in conjunction with various diplomatic activities necessary in
securing a negotiated truce and resolving the conflict.
(1) PKO are military operations, undertaken with the consent of major parties
involved in a dispute. They monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement
(ceasefire, truce, or other agreements) and support diplomatic efforts reaching
towards a long-term political settlement.
(a) PKO can prohibit intelligence gathering and military information support
operations (MISO).
(b) In some PKO missions, there is limited interaction with nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), local
populations, or agencies, because this gives the perception of the PKO units
providing services and not the host country.
(2) PEO apply military force, or the threat of its use, and is pursuant to
international authorization, compelling compliance with resolutions or sanctions
designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Examples of PEO include the
following air operations: Operations DENY FLIGHT, NORTHERN WATCH, and
SOUTHERN WATCH.
(3) Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and military
means to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict, and takes timely action to
prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the
United Nations (UN) Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention.
Conflict prevention includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings,
inspections, and monitoring. An example of military support to conflict prevention
is Operation ABLE SENTRY.
(4) Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other
forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the
issues that led to the conflict.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 1

(a) Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military
relations, security assistance, or other activities, which influence disputing
parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.
(b) An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Joint Staff plans directorate
during the development of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of Bosnia,
Croatia, and Serbia outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(5) Peace building consists of stability actions, predominately diplomatic and
economic, that strengthen governmental infrastructure to avoid a relapse into
conflict.
(a) Military forces have a limited role in supporting peace building. Peace
building begins while PKO or PEO are underway, and continues after
concluding PKO and PEO.
(b) Military support to national elections in Afghanistan and Iraq are
examples of operations in support of peace building. For more information,
see Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JP 3-57, Civil-
Military Operations.
2. Characteristics of Peace Operations
a. The typical PO operational area is characterized by complex and ambiguous
situations and may possess the following:
(1) Asymmetrical threats.
(2) Failed states.
(3) Absence of rule of law.
(4) Gross violations of human rights.
(5) Collapse of civil infrastructure.
(6) Presence of dislocated civilians (DCs).
b. Political mandates or constraints affect tactical operations and operations at the
tactical level can have strategic implications.
c. Risk management is a key consideration. PO are dangerous and leaders at every
level must continuously assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate risk
mitigation actions.
d. PO involve multiple agencies within the US Government (USG) including the
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Civil-
military operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO with military in a supporting role.
e. Most PO are multinational in character. This creates challenges because each
nation contributes its individual perspectives and unique capabilities.
f. US national policy determines US participation in PO. The US may participate
with regional organizations (e.g., NATO) under the auspices of the UN, in
cooperation with other countries or unilaterally. Refer to Appendix H, “Key
Documents,” for additional information on PO mandates.

2 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

g. There is no standard mission for PO. Each PO is unique, with its own political,
diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.
3. Information Operations
a. The definition and interpretations of information operations (IO) have evolved
over time. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations with the
objective of influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or usurping the decision making
process of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13,
Information Operations).
b. PO rely on the ability of commanders and their staffs to shape perceptions,
attitudes, and behaviors, across varied audiences, to achieve the commander’s
desired end state. Aligning higher-level themes and messages with actions, words,
and images allows them to complement and reinforce each other. This includes
recognizing events that drive positive or negative messaging e.g., lethal actions,
medical operations, convoys, and interpersonal engagements. Failure to align what
the joint force does with what it verbalizes may place the PO at risk.
4. Fundamentals of Peace Operations
a. Establishing a civil-military presence during PO inhibits hostile actions among
disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process.
b. There are fifteen fundamentals under three major actions for PO listed below and
discussed in depth in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.
(1) Apply the Following Principles:
(a) Objective and end state.
(b) Current and sufficient intelligence.
(c) Civil-military unity of effort.
(d) Mutual respect and cultural awareness.
(e) Flexibility and adaptability.
(f) Perseverance.
(g) Impartiality.
(h) Transparency.
(i) Credibility.
(2) Requires:
(a) Restraint and the minimum use of force.
(b) Freedom of movement.
(c) Unity of effort.
(3) Cultivate Within All Partners and Audiences:
(a) Consent.
(b) Legitimacy.
(c) Security.
(4) The end state of PO is codified and framed at the strategic and operational
levels, but is executed at the tactical level. Proper planning for execution of PO

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 3

must begin with the end state. The synchronization of strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives is essential to success. Actions at the tactical level can have
positive and negative strategic implications. For instance, the incidents of Abu
Ghraib or the Koran burnings in Afghanistan are examples of how actions of
individuals affect the strategic security environment.
(5) The goal is to maximize strategic goals, and minimize unintended tactical
mistakes by being culturally astute and respectful of local traditions, norms,
customs, and modes of collaboration that promote principles of impartiality,
transparency, and credibility. Nonetheless, unintended events may occur;
however, it is incumbent upon leaders to effectively manage crises, and keep
their chain of command informed of unfolding events that may have detrimental
consequences.
(6) Through the application of the fundamentals of PO, US forces reinforce
mutual respect, trust, and credibility. This engenders the perceptions of fairness
and legitimacy to the local populace.
5. Transition
a. Effective PO conclude with the transition of responsibility from US forces to other
authorities or sanctioned organizations, such as the UN, African Union, NATO, or
host nation (HN) civil authorities. Similar to a traditional relief-in-place, the PO forces
must carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force,
agency, civilian police (CIVPOL), or other legitimate authority.
b. Commanders plan for the transition phase before deployment or during the initial
phase of PO. Transitions between military forces take the form of relief-in-place or
transition-by-function (e.g., medical and engineer services, communications,
logistics, and security). Examples of transition types include the following:
(1) A transition from a UN-led coalition occurred in East Timor with Australian
forces taking over the lead role from coalition forces.
(2) When the implementation force initially entered Bosnia in 1995, it was a
peace enforcement operation. By 2000, the mission transitioned to a
peacekeeping stability force with a reduced force structure.
(3) Transitions may involve the transfer of certain responsibilities from military to
civilian control. Examples include passing DC assistance missions to
international organizations (i.e., the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), or passing military law enforcement
missions to CIVPOL.

4 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter II
DESIGN AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. Background
a. This chapter outlines the considerations the PO planning staff addresses during
each phase of PO. The operating environment (OE) where military elements conduct
PO is complex. PO present unique challenges for commanders and staffs that
require careful analysis, planning, and accountability. US forces work with foreign
militaries, various agencies, and organizations in the international community.
b. A PO staff develops a firm grasp of the OE and IE. Staffs use planning tools such
as mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time
available (METT-T); mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC); areas, structure,
capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE); and political, military,
economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) to ascertain variables that
may affect tactical, operational, and strategic-level operations.
c. Many agencies and organizations participate in PO. Commanders and global
organizations work on establishing and maintaining effective PO. There are multiple
agencies and organizations in a country during a conflict and many stay after military
PO forces are withdrawn. Their agendas cover a wide range of issues.
Organizations focus on issues, which include human rights, refugee resettlement,
disaster relief, economic development, election support, education, child welfare,
and other areas. Communication between PO organizations is essential. Many
international organizations want distinct and independent consideration from one
another, and separation from military PO forces. Units are aware of military PO
activities relating to these agencies because they understand affiliating with military
forces can critically affect their ability to act autonomously. A commander cooperates
with international agencies and establishes common civilian-military goals. A greater
appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of these organizations is achieved
through briefings, talking with leaders, and conducting training together prior to
deployment.
d. The PO staff develops the concept of operations as soon as possible. Staffs
identify capabilities and deficiencies through planning. Higher headquarters’ (HHQ’)
PO staffs include the following:
(1) Foreign policy advisor (FPA) or political advisor (POLAD).
(2) Joint military commission structure.
(3) Combined press information center.
(4) IO cell.
(5) Force protection working group.
(6) Other working groups.
e. The staff anticipates activities and coordinates augmentation required to
complete the mission. This ensures effective coordination within the multinational or
interagency environment common to PO.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 5

Note: Military personnel anticipate a close working relationship with the in-country UN
mission.
2. Creating a Secure Environment
a. The goal of a peace force is the creation of a secure environment. It sets the
conditions for political, economic, and humanitarian stability allowing a transition
from military to civil control. Peace force tasks are separating and neutralizing
belligerent forces ensuring public security, establishing or maintaining freedom of
movement, and protecting humanitarian assistance (HA) activities. Principles for
creating a secure environment include:
(1) Focus operations at the tactical level.
(2) Sustain consent for the operation.
(3) Keep the operation transparent.
(4) Act as liaison to key parties and local authorities.
(5) Understand adversary participation is required in the peace process.
(6) Ensure the PO force has freedom of movement.
(7) Observe, report, and monitor.
(8) Maintain law and order.
(9) Employ IO and create a desired effect through the integration of information-
related capabilities.
b. Military tasks of the peace force (see Chapter II, “Design and Planning
Considerations,” and section 2, of this multi-Service tactics, techniques, and
procedures (MTTP) for more information) include:
(1) Establish control over urban and rural areas through physical occupation.
(2) Separate belligerent forces.
(3) Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate.
(4) Control weapons.
(5) Control borders. Commanders regulate the movement of persons or goods
across ground and maritime borders and establish clear guidance regarding the
permitted or prohibited movements of people, units, or goods.
(6) Secure key sites.
(7) Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population.
(8) Ensure freedom of movement.
(9) Establish secure base(s).
(10) Establish and maintain presence in the area of operations (AO).
(11) Establish protected areas.
(12) Ensure public security.
c. Planning considerations for a peace force.
(1) Commanders and staffs conduct a thorough analysis of the peace
agreement.

6 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(2) Commanders use legal advisers during planning and operations to delineate
operational legalities.
(3) Urban environments require special considerations.
(4) Joint military commissions provide the cornerstones for settling problems
associated with establishing a secure environment.
3. Staff Considerations for Personnel
a. PO are inherently fluid and require flexibility when conducting operations. Many
PO include multinational personnel, and leaders must be prepared to integrate these
personnel. The personnel staff officer faces multinational issues for attached units.
For example, the personnel officer understands and anticipates requirements i.e.,
emergency leaves or unit rotations for their respective country.
b. Due to the multinational nature of PO, consideration is given to national caveats
that stipulate what coalition partners can and cannot do based on their own national
interests and laws.
c. Other considerations for integrating other nations into a military PO force include
rank structure, language, and training differences. For example, some countries
assign rank based on the knowledge of a Service member, rather than based on
time in grade. Language and training differences also apply to the integration of
other components. The key for successful integration is to harness the strengths of
each contributing nation or organization and avoid focusing on differences.
4. Staff Considerations for Intelligence
a. Intelligence is critical to the success of PO. The principal difference between
intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) for conventional war
and PO is the focus of the intelligence analysis. PO considers political, economic,
linguistic, ethnic, and other. Use this information in shaping operations and align
activities for successfully attaining a commander’s desired end state.
b. Other Intelligence Sources for PO Planning.
(1) Special Forces, civil affairs (CA) units, and military information support (MIS)
units have access to useful historical studies on the AO, and other organizations,
which have been in the area for many years.
(2) The leaders of the disputing parties.
(3) Military and political leadership from the regions bordering the AO.
(4) Civilian populations (including expected level of support, indifference, or
hostility to the force, and the potential for violence between different segments of
the population).
(5) Insurgent elements.
(6) Police and paramilitary forces.
(7) Personnel from NGOs, international organizations, and the UN. These
organizations provide general information and corroborate other sources.
However, active collection against these types of organizations is discouraged.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 7

c. Use these other intelligence sources to determine:
(1) Patterns of criminal activity.
(2) Historical context (i.e., relationships, cultural, ethnic, and religious factors).
(3) Economic conditions.
(4) Unique environmental threats.
(5) Internal and external political factors.
(6) Tracking and recording. The peace mandate often stipulates mandated
activities for the disputing parties.
d. Only release classified US information in accordance with multinational sharing
agreements.
e. A successful intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan leverages
the unique capabilities of CA, combat camera, military police (MP), criminal
investigation division (CID), Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, MISO, multinational partners, and the use of biometrics.
Biometrics is a powerful nonlethal enabler providing the means for effectively
separating combatants from the populace in an unobtrusive way.
f. Intelligence and information gathering is critical for effective operational
assessments, enabling a commander and staff to determine whether or not
operations are proceeding as planned and make adjustments as necessary. Ensure
effective assessment data integration for sensors or other collection assets to assist
in identifying areas requiring adjustment. It is important to remember PO rely heavily
on changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of audiences or actors, and takes
time to plan.
g. Synchronization Considerations.
(1) Understand information management and intelligence sharing issues.
(2) Consider multinational participants, who do not have intelligence sharing
agreements with the US.
(3) Direct special attention toward integrating NGOs, IGOs, HN police, CIVPOL,
and others into the intelligence process.
(4) Pay special attention to human intelligence (HUMINT) organizations. For
example, PO forces may develop an allied military intelligence element.
h. Situational development relies on situational awareness (SA). Situational
awareness is the process of continually collecting and integrating intelligence and
information. Units maintain SA by producing and updating the intelligence estimate.
5. Staff Considerations for Operations
a. Staff members conduct at least two predeployment site surveys to assess the
changing nature of operations.
b. Surveys include NGOs and IGOs, representatives from the HN, and an
examination of the relationship with neighboring countries. Planners coordinate with
multinational military forces contributing to the PO effort eliminating redundancies.
Additionally, analyze surveys and studies done by the UN, International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, and other organizations who have historical
engagements in the area. Surveys identify potential tasks for providing support to

8 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

civil missions such as infrastructure and DC. See Appendix D, “Civil Component
Analysis and Templating,” of this MTTP for more information.
c. The design of the command structure and physical location of the command carry
significant meaning in PO. Selecting the participation of certain nations, and the
location of ground contingents, either enhances or impedes the peace process. The
local political reality and the desires of each contributing nation significantly influence
the creation of these regions.
d. Force protection is a key command consideration when designing PO (see
Chapter V, “Force Protection,” of this MTTP for more information).
e. Military commanders address the inherent civil considerations in PO early in the
planning process (see Chapter VI, “Civil-Military Operations,” of this MTTP for more
information).
f. Commanders consider HN politics when determining the following:
(1) Which forces are better at gaining rapport with the HN?
(2) Local political, social, and economic agendas.
(3) PO force boundaries, which capitalize on the administrative and political
boundaries of the HN.
g. The operations officer continuously assesses the following:
(1) The threat to US forces.
(2) How to accommodate the agendas of contributing nations.
(3) The compatibility of other national military structures with US systems.
(4) Bilateral or multilateral agreements with the US requiring support and
funding.
(5) Historical connections between the HN and other nations.
(6) Rules of engagement (ROE) for the forces participating in the mission.
h. Organizational staffs prepare transitional records when PO last for several years.
These records capture the civilian-military work the unit has conducted and provide
context for the next commander.
i. . Commanders and staffs ensure a seamless transition of functions to appropriate
civilian organizations.
j. Chapter VIII, “Conflict Resolution,” has more information on the need for
successful negotiation and interpersonal engagements by commanders and their
staffs.
k. Information-related capabilities are tools, techniques, or activities affecting any of
the three dimensions of the IE (JP 3-13). Joint and Army forces use information-
related capabilities to create effects in the IE. Multinational forces may also use the
term information activities. Information activities are actions designed to affect
information or information systems. Anyone can perform these actions including
protection measures.
l. The integration of information-related capabilities is essential and are planned and
executed deliberately and methodically. IO does not focus on ownership of individual

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 9

capabilities, but using those capabilities as force multipliers and creating a desired
effect.
m. The IE is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect,
process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three
interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations,
and systems. The three dimensions are physical, informational, and cognitive.
n. Commanders ensure special operations forces (SOF) missions are compatible
with their capabilities, based on the following characteristics:
(1) SOF personnel are uniquely trained and maintain a high level of competency
in more than one military specialty. Most special operations personnel are
regionally oriented; however, cross-cultural communication skills are part of their
training. Selected special operations personnel survey, assess local situations,
and rapidly report the assessments.
(2) SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. Depending on mission
requirements, SOF operates independently or in conjunction with conventional
forces. SOF assists and complements conventional forces to achieve the
objectives. For more information, see FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1/NTTP 3-
05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33 MTTP for Conventional Forces and
Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability and Interdependence.
(3) The special skills and low-visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide
an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise,
focused use of force. For additional information, see JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint
Special Operations.
o. The hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) officers are responsible for the following:
(1) CBRN staff officers provide advice on toxic industrial materials (TIM) and the
collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous materials and
waste. The latter capability was important during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR,
where environmental assessment and reconnaissance teams’ encountered
hazards associated with the misuse and improper disposal of industrial hazards
and their by-products.
(2) There is a requirement for specialized HAZMAT, environmental and technical
escort teams during the recovery and reclamation of TIM that poses a hazard to
US forces. Damaged or abandoned medical facilities, universities, and industrial
facilities may contain material that poses a significant hazard to individuals
performing PO and the local populace. Additional guidance and response
procedures are available in JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
p. Engineering officers contribute the following to PO:
(1) Military engineers play a significant role in the initial stages of PO, but over
time, their role transitions to civilian contractors (logistics augmentation programs
or other sustainment contractors). In addition, direct engineers to avoid
“overbuilding” and ensure good stewardship of resources. As PO progresses and
activities transition to local control, modified force structures and availability of

10 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

materials and equipment result in changes or the closing of many engineering
activities.
(2) Engineer organizations are one of the sources for intelligence information
and can satisfy priority intelligence requirements. Conducting on-site
reconnaissance and discussions with local officials, civil engineers determine the
viability of local infrastructure supporting military operations and enhancing
engineer planning.
q. Medical personnel are aware of the following:
(1) The medical concept for supporting HA. See FM 8-42, Combat Health
Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations and Chapter VI, “Civil-
Military Operations,” of this MTTP, for more information.
(2) Civic action programs include medical, dental, and veterinary care and
operate in rural areas of a country. Unit awareness of these programs allows
them to demonstrate the benefits to the civilian populace. Biometrics aids in
managing medical care provided to the populace by enabling positive control
when distributing medical assistance, ensuring people do not receive inoculations
twice, or receive medicine they do not need.
(3) Special technical agreements with other Services on casualty evacuation and
emergency care and medical logistics.
(4) The health support estimate, which includes:
(a) Number of troops to support.
(b) Population at risk.
(c) Expected casualty or combat intensity rates.
(d) Expected disease and non-battle injury casualty rates.
(e) Bed availability.
(f) Expected admission rates.
(5) The theater evacuation policy states the maximum period injured military
members or patients, not expected to return to duty, remain within the theater for
treatment before evacuation.
(6) Force protection requirements for forensic data and unexploded ordnance
(UXO). Provide the following information to support UXO and explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) teams:
(a) Priorities. Staffs prioritize tasks for dealing with UXO. For example,
remove the wounded and fatalities, act to prevent loss of life and property
damage, or remove hazardous munitions or explosives.
(b) Area security.
(c) Medical support.
(d) Firefighting support.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 11

Note: For more information on UXO, see ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-
02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12 MTTP for Unexploded Ordnance. For more information on EOD,
see ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 MTTP for Explosive
Ordnance Disposal. For information on nonlethal weapons (NLW), see FM 3-
22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.45 MTTP for the Tactical
Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.
6. Staff Considerations for Logistics
a. Logistics planning and support for PO have an increased demand for food, water,
billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and
HN supplies and services than typical military operations. The exact amount
depends on the magnitude of the dislocated civilian situation, status of the nation’s
infrastructure, and requirements mandated in the peace implementation agreement.
Note: In coalitions, logistical challenges arise due to differing multinational logistics
processes.
b. Contractors provide a range of support, expertise, and assistance to the military
and civil organizations in PO. The staff is responsible for oversight and discipline of
contractor personnel including private security forces.
c. Logistics staffs have the following fiscal responsibilities:
(1) Determine the military’s authority for providing coalition support to the local
procurement process. Determine the additional financial support needed for
peace-related programs.
(2) Recommend proactive measures to determine the amount of UN or alliance
fiscal shortfalls.
(3) Understand common funding arrangements.
d. Transportation requirements may result in third country national or HN resource
contracts. Include integrating them into convoys as a planning consideration.
e. The logistic support concept includes multinational force support and anticipated
NGO and international organization requirements. In addition, it identifies what areas
fall under multinational control, US unilateral control, and what areas remain under
HN control.
f. Understanding the logistics capabilities of the multinational force assists in
organizing and structuring logistical support. Other considerations for the logistical
organization and structure are as follows:
(1) The requirements, shortfalls, and necessary arrangements, including support
for multinational elements and civil-military operations.
(2) The availability of HN support and contracting.
(3) Redeployment and recovery plans for transitioning to a UN force, if
appropriate.
(4) Special agreements, such as environmental cleanup, exemption from
customs duties, HAZMAT storage, and transit restrictions.
g. Technologically advanced equipment improves the ability of the force to perform
its mission. This equipment improves the probability of detecting violations of

12 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

agreements, enhancing weapons verification, supporting weapons destruction, and
enhancing force protection. Support to the zones of separation, check points (CPs),
and observation posts (OPs) require special equipment.
h. DCs pose a significant logistical challenge. Coordination with NGOs and IGOs is
critical when planning logistical support for DC.
i. The presence of the force may stimulate growth in the local economy, but there
are potential negative impacts. Consider economic impacts of leave, pass, liberty,
and rest and relaxation policies. Develop procedures reducing the negative impacts.
Two examples are regulating the amount of US dollars personnel may convert to
local currency, and keeping pay for local civilians hired to support the peacekeeping
(PK) force the same as prevailing wages for the area.
j. Movement planning responsibilities.
(1) Limited availability of movement and transport resources require planning,
coordination, and cooperation among all participants. Multinational deployments
are difficult to coordinate because each nation is responsible for obtaining
movement resources, planning, and controlling the movement of their forces,
their components of multinational forces, and, when acting as a lead nation, the
multinational headquarters (HQ) group. This requires coordination with the HN
preventing nations from deploy redundant capabilities, such as port operations
forces.
(2) If the peace effort is a NATO-led operation, a US and NATO joint movement
center (JMC) exists. In this case, the NATO JMC (sometimes called the
multinational deployment agency), is the lead agency.
k. In other multinational operations, the US JMC and liaison officers (LNOs) from
national contingents coordinate directly with the JMC.
7. Staff Considerations for Communications
a. Communications connectivity in PO include standard communication architecture
and extends support to civil-military operations. These operations require multiple
liaison teams with communications capabilities that require integrating military and
civilian communication systems.
b. Interoperability is constrained by the least technologically advanced nation.
Meeting mission requirements depend on availability, compatibility, and security.
Many multinational units do not have adequate communications equipment. This is
an issue for units operating under US control.
8. Other Staff Considerations
a. FPA/POLAD.
(1) The FPA or POLAD is a representative of the DOS who advises the PO
commander on matters of policy and political implications of PO. The FPA or
POLAD is included in all major geopolitical decisions.
(2) The FPA or POLAD is the primary for interagency communication and
collaboration between the DOS and DOD. FPA and POLADs provide political
advice to the PO commander, but the FPA or POLAD represent the DOS. The
FPA or POLAD is the principle liaison between the US military and other
diplomatic members of the international community.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 13

(3) The PO commander uses the FPA or POLAD as a sounding board, advisor,
salesperson, and marketer. One of the FPA or POLAD’s responsibilities is
offering advice, which enables the PO commander to develop approaches
demonstrating political awareness and understanding.
(4) The FPA or POLAD is a source of information for how other nations or
international organizations perceive the PO mission. This information contributes
to unit assessment efforts.
(5) The FPA or POLAD serves as a conduit when promoting or socializing a
policy within nonmilitary circles. Gauging the reaction from the diplomatic or
nonmilitary establishment is crucial to developing and implementing successful
PO.
b. Chaplains. In addition to their traditional missions, chaplains have a key and
unique role in PO. Most PO include significant religious issues. The chaplain assists
the commander by serving as a liaison with the support of CA to local religious
leaders, NGOs, and international organizations.
c. The responsibilities of the Provost Marshal include the following:
Note: For the purposes of this publication, MP encompasses the terms “military police,”
as used by the Army, and “security forces,” as used by the Air Force.
(1) The provost marshal for each level of command advises the commander on
MP support for PO across the spectrum of the core MP functionalities: maneuver
and mobility support operations, area security, police intelligence operations, law
and order, and internment and resettlement operations.
(2) MP support the commander through maneuver and mobility support
operations in a variety of ways including:
(a) Supporting straggler and displaced persons (DPs) operations.
(b) Conducting route reconnaissance and surveillance.
(c) Enforcing regulations along main supply routes within the AO.
(d) Performing presence patrols throughout the AO.
(e) Assisting in the collection of information for analysis by military
intelligence.
(3) MP operations within the mission of area security include:
(a) Reconnaissance operations.
(b) Area damage control.
(c) Conducting area and base security operations.
(d) Applying antiterrorism measures.
(e) Implementing physical security (PHYSEC) procedures.
(f) Conducting critical site, asset, and high-risk personnel security (PERSEC)
including security for convoys and very important persons (VIPs).
(g) Providing early force protection to an initial aerial port or seaport of
debarkation.

14 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(h) Providing mobility, firepower, communications, reconnaissance,
information-collection, and response-force capabilities to the command.
(4) Police intelligence operations are a MP function integrated within all MP
operations, and support the operations process.
(a) Analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected because
of police activities enhance situational understanding, protection, civil control,
and law enforcement effectiveness.
(b) MP collect information during operations which contributes to filling the
commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs); intelligence-led, time-
sensitive operations; and policing strategies necessary for forecasting,
anticipating, and preempting crime and related disruptive activities to maintain
order.
(5) Law and order operations in PO ensure stability and security is maintained
throughout the AO. MP perform various tasks under this function:
(a) Conduct law enforcement missions throughout the AO, including
coordination of joint security patrols with host-nation assets.
(b) Conduct criminal investigations by coordinating and synchronizing with
CID assets.
(c) MP are the appropriate force for conducting crowd and riot control
operations, including the extraction of mob leaders. MP also control
antagonistic masses engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating.
(d) Coordinate US customs support.
(e) Conduct HN police training, support, and police engagement.
(f) Employ forensics analysis capabilities.
(6) Resettlement operations provide security and support for DCs. DC is a broad
term that includes a DP, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person
(IDP), a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. DCs are civilians who left their
home for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence hinders
military operations. They require some degree of aid, e.g., medicine, food,
shelter, and clothing. DCs may not be native to the area or country where they
are residing. The following are DC subcategories.
(a) DPs refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. DPs
may have been dislocated because of political, geographical, environmental,
or threat situations.
(b) Refugees are people who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality, and are unable
or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.
(c) Evacuees are civilians removed from their place of residence by military
direction because of risk to their personal security or requirements of the
military situation.
(d) Stateless person are not considered as a being a national of any state
under the operation of its law.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 15

(e) War victims are civilians suffering injury, loss of a family member,
damage, or destruction of their homes because of war.
(f) Migrants are workers who move from one region to another by chance,
instinct, or plan.
(g) IDPs are people forced to flee or leave their home or places of habitual
residence to avoid the effects of armed conflict, natural or human-made
disasters, situations of generalized violence, or violations of human rights.
They have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
(h) Expellees are civilians outside the boundaries of their country of
nationality or ethnic origin forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country
for political or other purposes.
d. Public affairs officer (PAO) should:
(1) Develop a relationship with the media and assist the PO commander on
issues relating to public relations.
(2) Develop an open environment with a minimum of ground rules, but
maintaining operational security.
(3) Develop media policy before deployment and update periodically.
(4) Deploy sufficient public affairs (PA) assets early. A robust PA element is
necessary for handling high volumes of media calls. It is better to deploy more PA
assets and scale back, rather than lose initial control of media impact on
operations.
(5) Ensure the PAO is part of the planning process and advise the commander
on all PA implications to the operation. Ensure the PAO is part of the joint
targeting process, and coordinate PA operations within the operations
coordination group.
e. Space support includes the following:
(1) Space operations provide space-related tactical planning and support,
expertise, advice, and liaison regarding available space capabilities.
(2) Space operations personnel should:
(a) Determine space support requirements and request, plan, and integrate
space capabilities into operations (see JP 3-14, Space Operations, for space
support resources).
(b) Coordinate space support with national, Service, joint, and theater
resources.
(c) Prepare the space support plan.
(d) Provide space products to support planning.
(e) Provide estimates on the status, capabilities, and limitations of space-
based ISR, weather, navigation and timing, and communication satellites for
friendly, threat, and commercial systems.
f. Legal and financial considerations for PO.
(1) PO involves a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both
foreign and domestic. Some instances involve conflicting bodies of law.

16 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Operations require commanders at all levels become involved with local
governments and participate in negotiations between competing factions.
(2) Commanders determine the legal and fiscal restraints involved in logistics
and material assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations’ forces.
Commanders proactively seek assistance for obtaining the authority to execute
the mission in a multinational and interagency context.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 17

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18 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter III
PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS
1. Background
The development of military tasks during PO has evolved since the UN initiated
peacekeeping in 1948. Traditional peacekeeping tasks (interpositioning, observing and
reporting, and patrolling) have expanded significantly since the end of the cold war. The
international community has reached agreement on taking a more concerted action in
PO, diminishing gender-based violence, human rights violations, trafficking in persons,
and mass atrocities.
2. Military Tasks
a. A peace force has the following responsibilities when occupying key terrain and
establishing control in urban and rural areas.
(1) Establish secure bases for observing and reporting.
(2) Patrol.
(3) Separation of forces (interpositioning).
(4) Site security and protected areas.
(5) Searches.
(a) Individuals.
(b) Vehicles.
(c) Homes.
(6) Movement control measures.
(a) CPs.
(b) Roadblocks.
(c) Control borders (see Chapter IV, “Control of Large Areas”).
(7) Verification of weapons and forces.
(8) Disarmament, demobilization, and remobilization (DDR).
(9) Public security and responding to civil disturbances.
(a) Curfews.
(b) Demining and UXO.
(c) Refugees and IDPs.
(d) Environmental restoration.
(e) NLWs.
(f) Convoys.
(10) Rule of law.
(a) Basic public protection and security (community policing).
(b) Initial penal operations.
(c) Judicial support.
b. Observing and reporting.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 19

(1) An OP is the basic working platform for military observation. Observing and
reporting are the cornerstones of PO. Observers, military and nonmilitary,
observe and report information on activities within their AO. Observers provide
timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops in their
operational area. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all
successful PO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams,
videotapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions.
Inaccurate and biased reporting adversely affects the operational situation,
damaging the image and credibility of the PO force. Observation requires a
complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications
resulting from PO actions.
(2) Observation tasks commonly cover:
(a) The status of military installations.
(b) Activities within the operational area related to personnel or weapons.
(c) Violations of international agreements or conventions.
(d) Observance of buffer zone (BZ) and demilitarized zone (DMZ)
restrictions, and adherence to approved local agreements by the parties of
the dispute.
(3) Observers report any violations of agreements, such as:
(a) Movements of disputing forces.
(b) Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against the PO force or civilians.
(c) Improvements to disputing party’s defensive positions, and overflights by
military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ is restricted.
(4) Observers exercise discretion when communicating official information in the
course of their duties.
(5) Accomplish observing and reporting using OPs. The purposes of OPs are to:
(a) Demonstrate the presence of the peace force to all parties and the
population.
(b) Enhance confidence in the peace process.
(c) Monitor, record, and report actions supporting the stipulations of the
peace agreements, and preventing violations.
(6) Principles of observing and reporting.
(a) Only report observations.
(b) In the event of uncertain observations, submit clear, unambiguous, and
timely reports.
(7) Types of OPs.
(a) Static. A static OP is semi-permanent site established for long-term
observation.
(b) Mobile. A mobile OP is temporary and useful for detecting and deterring
violations of the peace agreements including smuggling and infiltration.
(8) Site selection planning consideration criteria answer the following questions:
(a) What observations are tasked?

20 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(b) Where are the opposing parties located?
(c) Where are the borders and frontiers?
(d) Where are the villages and camps of refugees or DPs?
(e) What is the geography of the location?
(f) Where are the access routes?
(g) Is the site tactically and logistically supported?
(h) From what distance can the site be seen?
(i) How many people will see it?
(j) What are the traffic and movement patterns of the locals?
(9) Preparation of the OP.
(a) Inform the conflicting parties and local population of the location and
purpose of the OP.
(b) Develop manuals of instructions for the OP including ROE and the quick
response force (QRF).
(c) Select the site and obtain materials.
(d) Conduct risk assessment of the site.
(10) Establishment of the OP.
(a) Occupy the site.
(b) Clearly mark the location.
(c) Establish communication.
(d) Establish force protection procedures.
(e) Rehearse initial reaction force responses.
(11) Improvement of the OP.
(a) Continue to improve the position.
(b) Maintain contact and an active information program with the local
community and dissenting parties.
(c) Maintain constant, reliable, redundant, and secure communications with
the next higher authority and other OPs as the situation dictates. Timely
reporting of activities is the key to success. Plan for communication security.
(12) The type and amount of equipment and support depends on the mission
and the following general guidelines:
(a) Maintain sufficient observation equipment to support a 24-hour mission.
(b) Keep sufficient supplies on hand to sustain the OP if cut off from support.
This includes Class I (food), Class III (fuels, petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL)), Class IV (construction materials), and Class V (ammunition). The unit
commander determines appropriate levels.
(c) Locate firefighting and first aid material onsite.
(d) Provide power and lighting support, if necessary.
(e) Provide signs and identification markings.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 21

(13) Command and Control (C2).
(a) Establish clear lines of C2, especially with a multinational OP.
(b) Conduct reaction drills ensuring everyone understands the authorities and
responsibilities of the OP. This includes a media plan addressing
informational content for any type of crisis.
(c) Rehearse and understand ROE.
c. Patrolling is the foundation of operations in a hostile area. Its primary purpose is
acquiring information, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile
groups. The kind of patrol depends on the mission and is either mounted or
dismounted. Types of patrols include the following:
(1) Combat Patrols. In situations where PO forces may encounter armed groups,
it is necessary to conduct combat patrols. Imposing a curfew helps prevent
placing a combat patrol at a disadvantage. Conducting combat patrols during
daylight hours in stabilized areas when there is no threat to forces and behaving
in a nonthreatening manner shows the population forces are in the area.
(2) Ambush Patrols. Conduct ambush patrols for detaining hostile personnel
when the situation dictates. Mission planning includes controls designed to limit
the impact of these patrols on uninvolved civilians.
(3) Reconnaissance Patrols. Reconnaissance patrols enable PO forces to visit
outlying communities, acquire information, and provide reassurance about the
presence of the security force. The patrols can search areas and set up hasty
roadblocks.
(4) Naval Patrols. Naval assets provide operational support, including patrolling
inland waterways to major ocean coastlines. Other missions commonly
performed include search and rescue (SAR) operations, observation and
reporting on pollution damage to the marine environment, and combined training
missions with ground elements of the PO force. Examples of training missions
include insertion and extraction of personnel at coastal remote sites, resupply,
SAR exercises, small arms live fire exercises, and familiarization rides, which
encourage mutual understanding and cohesion among contingents. Naval
patrolling activities ensure round the clock presence in their area of responsibility
while concurrently performing joint training missions.
(5) Technology Enhanced Patrols. Unmanned aircraft systems, unmanned land
systems, and space assets enable units to cover large or otherwise inaccessible
areas and quickly gain certain types of information. For instance, the use of
thermal imaging cameras gains timely information, both day and night, for
monitoring movement and activity. The threat of applying lethal air power can
limit movement of hostile forces.
d. Separation of forces (interpositioning).
(1) Means of Separation. Figure 1 displays geographical separation in any
environment.

22 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 1. Control Zones
(2) Cease-hostilities Line. This is the location where the fighting stopped. This
line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by the troops of the
opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. The exact location of this line is
often contentious and a topic of discussion during the peacemaking process. This
is just a reference point and not a control measure, unless otherwise negotiated
during the settlement agreement.
(3) Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). A geographically defined line from which
disputing or belligerent forces disengage and withdraw to their respective sides
following a truce or cease fire agreement. The agreement of cease-fire paves the
way for establishing a BZ, area of separation, or DMZ, and the withdrawal of
forces.
(4) BZ or Area of Separation. A defined area controlled by a PO force and
excluding disputing or belligerent forces. A BZ creates an area of separation
between disputing or adversarial forces and reduces the risk of conflict. A BZ
may contain residences, farmland, or other assets which forces patrols to monitor
and ensure delivery and protection of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). If it
is the sovereign territory of one of the adversaries, coordinate the administration
and policing of the inhabitants. The supervising authority controls and limits
access to the BZ. Maritime zones specify infringements on international shipping
rights.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 23

(5) DMZ. A defined area, which prohibits the stationing or concentration of
military forces, or the retention or establishment of military installations of any
description.
(6) Line of Demarcation. A line that defines the boundaries of a buffer zone or an
area of limitation. A line of demarcation also defines the forward limits of
disputing or belligerent forces after completion of each phase of disengagement
or withdrawal.
(7) Areas of Transfer. Transfer these areas to one of the parties involved. These
areas do not relate to the ADL.
e. The following principles apply for means of separation:
(1) Focus the operation at the tactical level.
(2) Sustain consent to the separation.
(3) Keep entire operation transparent.
(4) Liaison is essential with key parties and local authorities.
(5) Full participation of the adversaries is the only hope of success.
(6) The peace force must have full freedom of movement.
(7) Observing, reporting, and monitoring are essential tools.
f. The PO force separates adversaries by physically occupying a corridor between
the two parties.
(1) Establish and mark the ADL, DMZ, and BZ. The initial and most important
task is accurately determining the locations of the ADL, DMZ, and BZ and
marking them. The unit commander negotiates the details with the belligerent
forces.
(a) The trace follows identifiable natural or fabricated terrain features.
(b) Survey and physically mark the ground using an acceptable means, e.g.,
placing painted barrels, oil drums, stakes, single strand wire, or coiled wire
along the lines. A Global Positioning System (GPS) assists units with
accurate marking.
(c) Clearly identify markers so they are visible from 100 meters in daylight
and from both directions of travel. Permanently locate the markers in heavily
trafficked areas.
(d) When belligerent forces place the markers, they gain a sense of
ownership in the peace process and provide labor for quickly marking the
area.
(e) Belligerent forces provide maps and overlays of the disposition of their
forces and equipment.
(f) Ensure all elements of the PO force have communication with the
belligerent forces and liaisons are located in the tactical operation centers of
the peace operation.
(2) Establish control measures.
(a) Make all control measures visible and known to the local population.

24 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(b) Supervise the withdrawal of belligerent forces via designated routes to
assembly areas where initial disarmament takes place using control
measures.
(c) Move adversaries to barracks. Transfer confiscated weapons to
cantonment, weapons storage sites, or destroy them.
(d) Establish CPs, OPs, access routes, belligerent assembly areas, and
weapons cantonment sites, where necessary.
(3) Clear key areas of mines, obstacles, and fortifications. Minefields, craters,
tank ditches, berms, bunkers, and fortifications block roads and access into and
out of the zones. The PO force cannot separate belligerent forces or establish
freedom of movement until cleared areas are established. The PO force
supervises and assists the belligerents in clearing minefields and removing
obstacles, bunkers, and fortifications. PO forces may provide material to the
belligerent forces to accomplish this task.
(a) Establish surveillance, verification, and collection systems to monitor and
demonstrate progress. One technique is establishing an ISR board modeled
after a targeting board, whose function is synchronizing ISR assets and
developing ISR requirements into a workable and comprehensive plan.
(b) Coordinate the efforts of ground, air, maritime, and technical assets for
the participating nations. The collection plan focuses on named areas of
interest and monitors key belligerent force locations.
(4) Control the BZ. A series of observation and control measures supported by
active ground, air, and maritime patrolling is essential for controlling the
separation zones. Clearly defined guidelines outline who and what transits or
stops in the zones and state the authority and role of CIVPOL in the zones. The
observation and control measures also regulate agricultural activities inside the
zones. They also describe procedures for handling violators, confiscated
weapons, and ammunition. The measures establish clear communication
between participants. Joint military commissions or other consultative bodies
settle disputes, which arise from controlling the zones.
g. PO interposition tactics to separate the forces.
(1) Interpositioning places PO forces between the disputing parties in an effort to
supervise the withdrawal of the disputing parties’ forces and establish a BZ. This
operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce the inherent risks to the
PO force. Interpositioning aids in defusing sensitive or explosive situations and
allows withdrawal of the disputing parties without either side gaining an
advantage. The PO force interposes as the parties in the conflict disengage,
taking advantage of the lull in hostilities and maintaining credibility and
impartiality.
(2) When interpositioning occurs after disengagement or withdrawal has begun,
accomplish it quickly to prevent clashes leading to a renewal of the conflict or a
general breakdown in the cease-fire.
(3) After a truce or cease-fire is in effect, the disputing parties reach agreement
on the trace of an ADL, as shown in figure 2; also called a cease-fire line.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 25

Figure 2. Armistice Demarcation Line
(4) PO forces deploy along the ADL between the disputing forces as shown in
figure 3 and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of the disputing forces
behind their respective sides of the ADL. The ADL becomes the forward limit for
the disputing forces. The purpose of interpositioning is establishing a presence
and place a buffer force between disputing forces. Carefully planned
interpositioning considers the following implied tasks:
(a) The trace of the ADL follows identifiable natural or fabricated terrain
features. Artillery or engineer survey-qualified PO force personnel are
responsible for carrying out demarcation duties. Monitoring the line is required
to prevent moving the markings. PO forces use ADL markers because they
are difficult to remove and have a GPS signature.
(b) Make the size of the interpositioning force sufficiently credible to provide
the disputing parties with the confidence needed to disengage and withdraw
safely from their positions.
(c) Use precision during initial interpositioning because there is a strong
possibility of disagreements and misunderstandings. Commanders may
employ mine clearance operations for the safe deployment of PO forces
along the line.
(d) Commanders promptly mediate localized disagreements and address
potential clashes at the lowest practical level to prevent a recurrence of
conflict.

26 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 3. Deployment of PO Forces Along an
Armistice Demarcation Line
(5) After the forming the BZ, PO forces establish lines of demarcation on each
side of the ADL. The PO force supervises the withdrawal of disputing forces to
positions behind their respective lines of demarcation, as shown in figure 4, and
prepare for the establishment of the BZ. The lines of demarcation are now the
forward limits for each of the disputing forces.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 27

Figure 4. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind
Lines of Demarcation
(6) PO forces establish the BZ, begin observation, and patrol activities as shown
in figure 5. UN PO refer to the BZ as the area of separation. A BZ is an exclusion
zone or area for disputing forces. OPs provide visual coverage within the BZ.
Patrols supplement the OP by patrolling areas out of effective visual coverage.
Access to the BZ is restricted to the PO force or observer group. Commanders
negotiate special arrangements between the disputing parties and the PO force,
which allows restricted access for local civilians, such as farmers or anglers.
Commanders permit people or vehicle traffic to pass into or through a BZ.
Peacekeepers control access with a CP and can restrict the operating hours only
to daylight. Commanders determine staffing of CPs based on their analysis of the
mission and other factors.

28 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 5. Establishment of Buffer Zones
(7) Based on negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree
to extended areas of supervision called areas of limitation (AOL), as shown in
figure 6. An AOL allows peacekeepers to inspect the strength and fortifications of
disputing parties. A typical arrangement is when disputing parties agree to
maintain equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the area immediately
adjacent to the BZ. Agreements between disputing parties allows larger forces in
other areas of the AOL, but the agreement specifies an upper limit for the number
and type of formations, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and artillery (by caliber)
permitted in the area. The PO force or observer group monitors the compliance of
each side. Lines of demarcation define outer boundaries of the AOLs. The AOLs
constitute an additional measure for improving security of the BZ and increasing
confidence in the process by the disputing parties.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 29

Figure 6. Establishment of Areas of Limitation
(8) The BZ eventually becomes a DMZ following further diplomatic activity. PO
forces do not occupy DMZs, but observe and patrol with observer groups. A DMZ
creates neutral areas free from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ
is in an area claimed by two or more disputing sides and control by one party
constitutes a direct threat to the others. Lines of demarcation define DMZ
boundaries. These boundaries are easily recognizable and do not run counter to
locally accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is
restricted from disputing party aircraft.
3. Site Security
a. PO forces provide site security at various locations within their AO. Units at these
sites effectively shape and manage the messages their presence sends. These sites
include, but are not limited to:
(1) Religious sites, e.g., mosques, temples, churches, or shrines.
(2) War crime sites.
(3) Governmental buildings.
(4) Election sites.
(5) Schools.
(6) Culturally or historically significant sites.

30 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

b. Commanders conduct a thorough IPOE of the AO and determine which sites
require security. Based on threat conditions and forces available, the commander
conducts a risk assessment and determines what security is required.
c. . Commanders combine and vary fixed site security techniques according to the
local situation.
(1) Periodic observation by patrols, including overflights.
(2) Obstacles.
(3) Electronic monitoring.
(4) Guards—periodic or permanent.
(5) Patrols make periodic, random checks of guard posts; however, the checks
are part of the unit’s overall patrol plan and involve coordination with the
elements operating the guard posts. Commanders use QRFs as part of checks
during rehearsals and route recons. Depending on the size and location of the
guard force required, security of fixed sites may require area reconnaissance
patrols on a periodic basis.
(6) The type of site requiring security determines the amount of coordination
required with local authorities, owners, NGOs, and international organizations.
The situation may require entrance rosters for sites with limited access, such as
war crimes sites. School and church officials assist guards at entrances during
periods of high volume (e.g., start and end of the school day and scheduled
services).
(7) If not instituted by local authorities, commanders encourage and formalize
relations with neighborhood watch programs. Create this relationship through the
local police or international police monitors.
4. Protected Areas
a. Commanders may require the PO force to establish and maintain a protected
area. A protected area is a geographic area where the military force provides
security and facilitates humanitarian aid for at risk people. Other names for protected
areas include security zone, safe area, and humanitarian zone.
b. Principles for protected areas.
(1) The commander may compel compliance through force. The PO force uses
the appropriate ROE and capability for the situation.
(2) The local population perceives the PO force as impartial. This will require a
significant IO plan and constant command attention.
(3) Aggressively enforce military prohibitions within the demilitarized zone.
(4) The PO force enforces freedom of movement to and from the area.
(5) The commander builds consent using all means to eliminate the need for a
protected area.
c. Military tasks in a protected area.
(1) Establish the protected area.
(2) Establish and enforce weapons exclusion zone.
(3) Establish and maintain cantonment areas and weapons holding areas.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 31

(4) Dominate avenues of approach.
(5) Establish CPs, OPs, and other control access measures.
(6) Establish curfew.
(7) Conduct presence patrols.
(8) Develop and rehearse reinforcement contingency plans.
d. Planning principles for protected areas.
(1) The commander provides clear and unambiguous guidance, mission
objectives, and criteria for success.
(2) The military commander provides input regarding the military feasibility of
maintaining the protected area. Political factors significantly influence the
selection of protected areas.
(3) Commanders establish QRFs and criteria for their employment. The
commander understands and rehearses the use of the QRF.
(4) Coordinate humanitarian support with NGOs, international governmental
organizations, and HN. Adjust the size and mix accordingly if the military assists.
(5) Coordinate and understand the responsibilities for villages and towns within
the area.
(6) Understand the media plan.
(7) Understand and rehearse ROE.
(8) Establish an LNO with local law enforcement officials. Establishing liaisons is
important to PO because it produces trust on all sides involved.
5. Establishing Search Operations
a. Insertion Drill. The procedures for an insertion drill are below:
(1) The patrol commander conducts a visual check of the area, and decides to
put all teams on the road, have one team in a watch location, or a team
conducting satellite patrol activity.
(2) The patrol commander’s team, the road party, remains in an overwatch
position while cutoff personnel move into place.
(3) Cutoff personnel approach locations, establish positions, and carry out
clearance checks on their positions. The patrol commander and lead service
member (or team member) occupy a position by the road. The remainder of the
patrol covers the road position from the overwatch location. The lead scout
positions barriers across the road while everyone remains concealed. The tactics
the commander employs dictate what personnel go to each location.
(4) The road party conducts a check of their position. Detailed tasks include:
(a) Using a radio, running vehicle registration checks, and selecting vehicles
for search. The patrol leader has an alternate signal (e.g., a whistle), which
notify the cutoff personnel to move into position.
(b) Halting vehicles, speaking with the occupants, and completing the
appropriate forms.

32 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(c) Removing personal web gear and weapon, and leaving them with the
individual who is covering the vehicle. Conducting a search of the vehicle and
occupants.
(d) Observing vehicle occupants from a concealed position and protecting
the searcher's equipment. The road party stays spread out in case a problem
arises.
b. Extraction Drill. Normal extraction drill procedures are:
(1) Road party moves to an overwatch position.
(2) Cutoff personnel regroup, collect roadblock equipment, and extract from their
positions.
(3) Consider using deception when moving away from the search location.
Hostile persons have the opportunity to pinpoint the patrol during the search
process.
c. Action Drills at Roadblocks or CPs. Below are historical occurrences encountered
during a search operation and their associated response tasks:
(1) Discovery of illegal items and persons:
(a) Inform the operations center.
(b) Arrest, search, bag, restrain, and consider the application of minimum
force in accordance with ROE.
(c) Treat the vehicle as a crime scene.
(d) Consider forensic evidence preservation.
(e) Cutoff personnel cordon off the area until they receive assistance.
(2) Person refusing to allow search. If a person refuses to have their vehicle
searched, the patrol commander does the following:
(a) Inform the operations center and request police assistance.
(b) Ask again for agreement to search the vehicle.
(c) Take action against the person in accordance with standard operating
procedures (SOPs).
(d) If nothing is found in the search, complete a report form (driver retains a
copy), and allow the driver to continue.
(e) Report complete details upon returning to base.
(3) Persons try to leave vehicle while search is in progress:
(a) Ask the individuals to stay with the vehicle.
(b) Explain legal powers of the search personnel. Use common sense.
(c) Use minimum force to keep the occupants with their vehicle until the
search is complete.
(d) Keep the operations center updated.
(e) Arrest or detain as necessary. Always attempt to transfer to local
authorities.
(f) Several suggestions are provided below for roadblocks in urban areas
(figure 7), rural areas (figure 8), and for a mobile roadblock (figure 9).

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 33

Figure 7. Suggested Roadblock in Urban Areas

34 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 8. Suggested Roadblock in Rural Areas

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 35

Figure 9. Suggested Mobile Roadblock
6. Conducting Personnel Searches
a. Conduct searches in accordance with the appropriate authority. Make search
personnel aware of the extent and limits of the authority. Authority for conducting
personnel searches includes:
(1) When persons voluntarily request entry to a building or area, a search is a
condition of entry.
(2) At a security or post incident CP.
(3) When reasonable grounds for suspicion exist (e.g., possible possession of
illegal or prohibited items).
(4) When taking a person into custody.
(5) As a precautionary measure while in custody.
b. Due to allegations of brutality or unethical behavior, take care when conducting
personnel searches. Adversaries attempt to use these allegations when discrediting
the PK force. Conduct operations demonstrating professionalism and courtesy at all
times. Factors to consider when conducting personnel searches:
(1) Ensure search circumstances are legally justified.
(2) Follow predetermined procedures minimizing accusations by adversaries.
(3) Conduct same sex searches when possible.

36 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

c. Constraints when conducting personnel searches include:
(1) Same sex searches are important. When possible, conduct same gender
searches; however, this is not always possible due to speed and security
considerations. Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a respectful
manner, using all possible measures to prevent interpreting actions as sexual
misconduct or assault.
(2) There is no legal authority requiring removal of clothing other than outer
garments in public (e.g., coat, jacket, or gloves). Obtain legal authority in
situations where removal of more than outer garments is required.
d. The two categories for searching persons are the quick body search (in public
view) and a detailed body search (out of public view).
(1) Quick body search (in public). Searches carried out when dealing with a large
number of people. They can be part of a detailed search focused on detecting
anything that may cause harm to the searcher, searched person, or others. Using
the quick body search preserves evidence that is quickly disposed or destroyed.
(2) Procedure. Work in pairs, one person doing the physical search, the other
observing (both the searcher and the subject). The second person acts as cover
for the first. Table 1 shows pertinent points to consider.
Table 1. Quick Body Search Considerations
DO NOT stand directly in front or behind the subject to avoid confrontation.
DO NOT become distracted. Avoid eye contact with subject.
WATCH for nonverbal communications (e.g., increased nervousness or silent
gestures to others).
DO NOT cross the line of fire of the cover man.
POSITION the subject with legs slightly apart and arms extended parallel to the
ground. DO NOT spread eagle the subject as this may interfere with the
collection of forensic evidence.
CONDUCT the search quickly and systematically from head to toe, down one
side and up the other, covering all body parts, front, and back. PAY ATTENTION
when searching the small of the back, armpits, crotch areas, and closed hands.
USE a stroking, squeezing movement when searching. Use both hands with
thumbs and index fingers touching when searching limbs. This method increases
the chances of detecting foreign objects through the clothing.
SEARCH and be respectful of any baggage or removed clothing.
Note: Using metal detectors or X-ray machines is a force multiplier especially
when searching large groups (e.g., checkpoint operations).
(3) Detailed body search (not in public). Carried out when reasonable doubt
exists.
(4) Procedure. Conduct a detailed body search using the same procedures as
the quick body search, considering the points in table 2.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 37

Table 2. Detailed Body Search Considerations
ESTABLISH identity of the subject and ownership of baggage and other articles.
INVITE the subject to empty all pockets and remove all items.
Note: If it is necessary to remove clothing during a lawful search in public,
remove only the outer coat, jacket, and gloves. The removal of other clothing only
occurs during a lawful search in a private area. Record the subject’s consent if
the subject has consented to the search.
PAY ATTENTION to every detail (i.e., clothing seams, waistbands, belts, collars,
lapels, padding, shirt, and trouser cuffs). Socks and shoes provide easily missed
hiding places. Always suspect medical dressings. Medical personnel should
examine all dressings.
DO NOT SHOW EMOTION upon finding illegal or prohibited items. Do not
separate significant articles from others but ensure all are out of reach of the
subject.
e. Maintain a record for all categories of search, apart from initial searches a good
record contains:
(1) Details of the person.
(2) Reason for the search.
(3) Probable cause for the search.
(4) Date and time group.
(5) Location.
(6) Details of anything significant.
(7) Details of damage or injury to person or property.
Note: If conducting a search in conjunction with an investigation, do not identify search
team members. Use call signs or other identification.
7. Conducting Vehicle Searches
a. Passenger Vehicle Search. Divide search techniques into three categories. The
categories vary according to the intensity of the search. There is no clear boundary
between the categories and the extent of the investigation. Each stage depends on
the level of suspicion aroused during the search. Categories include:
(1) The initial check is the first part of the search process carried out on all
vehicles and used to select vehicles for a more detailed examination. Carry out
this check without the occupants dismounting, although search personnel may
ask the driver to open the trunk and hood. Search personnel at the entrance to
barracks and other installations if there is a threat from large vehicle-mounted
bombs. Up to three personnel are required for the search, and the search takes
about 3 minutes per vehicle.
(2) The primary search is a detailed search conducted when any search member
becomes suspicious, for any reason, during the initial check.

38 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(3) The secondary search is a thorough search of highly suspect vehicles.
Search unit members work in pairs, examining the relevant sections of the
vehicle. Search the occupants after exiting the vehicle.
(4) Hostile parties use all types of vehicles for resource movement. Searching
vehicles at CPs or other types of vehicle control points deters movement and
increases the chance of acquiring evidence used in criminal prosecution. The
high volume of vehicles makes search operations appear difficult. Intelligence
analysis targets criminal vehicle types and driver traits, reducing the number of
searches. This involves coordinating with police records personnel and vehicle
registration authorities. Suspicious persons try to avoid searches. Search
personnel should watch for the following:
(a) People avoiding the search and signaling others (e.g., flashing brake
lights or using radios).
(b) Vehicles that exit the search lanes before reaching the CP.
(c) Disturbances causing congestion at the CP.
(5) Consider the techniques during a search:
(a) Be quick, thorough, and efficient. This reduces complaints.
(b) Ensure children, pets, elderly, young women, and injured persons do not
deter operations. If necessary, request special or additional assistance.
(c) Do not damage vehicles.
(6) Train searchers on what general vehicle appearances indicate a vehicle is
suspicious. Searchers use the following:
(a) Use common sense. Look for anything unusual (e.g., scratched screw
heads, repaired upholstery, new bodywork, etc.).
(b) Remember details of searched vehicles. This is useful in future
operations.
(7) Figure 10 is a diagram of a passenger car. Vehicle searches are divided into
area 1 (exterior), area 2 (trunk), area 3 (engine compartment), area 4
(undercarriage), and area 5 (interior).

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 39

Figure 10. Diagram of Passenger Vehicle
(8) Table 3 lists guidelines for searching privately owned vehicles or passenger
cars.
Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas
Area 1: Exterior Vehicle Inspection
Check the following:
Headlights, sidelights, rear lights. Alignment—leave as found.
Bumpers.
Wheel trims and hubs. Tire pressures. Bleed a small amount of air and smell for unusual odors.
Under wheel arches, bolt-on mud deflectors.
Signs of recent welding or new undercoating (Is it soft?). Tampering with bolts on mud deflectors.
Does the inside shape of the of the vehicle match the outside?
Signs of adaptation to bodywork and roof.
Front and rear panels and spoilers.
Area 2: Trunk Vehicle Inspection
Before searching, stand back and look at the contents. Check the following:
Contents are the same as described by the driver.
Glue, undercoating, popped rivets, etc.
Spare gas tanks or false tank.
Spare wheel—deflate, check thoroughly.
Floor, roof, back, and sides of trunk.
Remove all mats, carpets, etc.

40 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas (cont’d)
Signs of welding, new paint, or lack of dirt.
Double skins and carpet stuck to the trunk frame.
Space between the trunk and rear seat.
Spaces in wings of station wagon-type cars.
Natural false floor.
Space in tailgate.
Area 3: Engine Compartment Vehicle Inspection
Areas to check:
Under battery tray.
Windshield washer bottle.
Heater and ventilation hoses and vents.
Heater and ventilation motor.
Air filter.
Hood.
Sound-deadening material under the hood or heat shield.
Area 4: Undercarriage Vehicle Inspection
Areas to check:
Chassis sections.
Drain plug seals.
New welding or undercoating.
Exhaust system.
Oil pan.
Gas tank. Tampering in this area is hard to detect; however, watch how the fuel gauge behaves on a full
tank. Ensure the tank type matches the vehicle.
Area 5: Interior Vehicle Inspection
Ensure search team members are clean. Areas to check:
Roof linings. Access gained by removing door-sealing strips, or if there is a sunroof fitted by removing
trim.
Sun visors.
Front, rear, and center window or door pillars.
Door panels.
Lower window first. Conduct the search without removing trim if possible. Avoid damage.
Rear side panels—two-door vehicles, etc.
Remove panels and check the area between the back seat and the trunk.
Back seat.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 41

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas (cont’d)
Cushions.
Back rests.
Front seats.
Space under seats.
Check inside padding.
Dashboard area.
Check battery connection—look for extra or unusual wiring, etc.
Behind dashboard panels.
Ventilation and heater hoses.
Radio, speakers, etc.
Glove compartment—behind and above.
Ashtray—contents.
Console area.
Front foot wells.
Remove panels—access to wing space, door seals, etc.
Floor.
Remove carpets—mats.
Check for signs of false floor—welding, etc.

b. Commercial Vehicle Search. Search commercial vehicles in the same manner as

passenger vehicles, displayed in figure 11. Commercial truck drivers often live in the
cabin section of their trucks. When conducting searches of commercial trucks, be
aware you are searching the driver’s “home.” Pay particular attention to the
following:
(1) Fifth Wheel. There is a hollow compartment above the trailer hitch, or fifth
wheel, on most trailers. Gain access underneath the trailer and check the
compartment with a flashlight and mirror. Fiber-optic search instruments, when
available, are recommended for searching the fifth wheel area; they are simple to
use and more versatile than a flashlight and mirror. Sometimes the only way into
the compartment is by removing the floorboards inside the trailer.
(2) Fuel Tanks and Side Lockers. Some trailers are fitted with belly tanks for
driving extended ranges. Check for a space between the top of the tank and the
floor of the trailer. Also, check the tank for recent welds or bolted panels. Often
there is space between the back of the side lockers and the chassis.

42 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 11. Truck Diagram
(3) Spare Wheel. Mounted under the trailer (positions vary), this is a prime place
for concealment.
(4) Chassis Cross Members. Trailers are constructed with two ”U” section
girders. Drivers construct a large concealment area by placing boards on the
reverse ledges bridging the gap between the girders.
(5) Battery Boxes. There is space behind the battery. Remove the wing nuts to
open the box.
(6) Crash Bar. Located at the rear end of trailers, the crash bar is hollow and
plugged at each end with rubber plugs. Remove the plugs to gain access.
(7) Open Trailers. Where the wiring goes from tractor to trailer, the connections
on the trailer are contained in a triangular-shaped plate.
(8) Refrigerator Motors and Refrigerated Trailers. Refrigerator motors consist of
a diesel engine mounted outside the trailer on the front bulkhead. The motor
drives a cooling unit mounted on the inside of the bulkhead.
(9) Engine Compartment. Open the engine compartment and the compartment
behind the switch panel for inspection. Panels held in place by screws require a
half turn with a screwdriver to release. The size of this concealment area varies.
(10) Inspection Panel. There is an inspection panel on the interior unit, which
contains a concealed space. Drivers use cold air plastic hoses to conceal illegal
or prohibited items.
(11) Search Door Panels and Side Panels at the Rear of the Cab. Some cabs
have space behind the roof linings.
(12) Console. Check the space behind the console, glove compartment, and the
space behind radio speakers.
(13) Air Filters. Accessible from beneath the vehicle. Clips hold the cover in
place.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 43

(14) False Floors and Bulkheads. Found in single units.
(15) Belly Tanks. Any sign of recent welds or a clean tank or trailer.
(16) Loads. Excess packing and using pallet spaces indicate previous
concealments. Others are under and inside tractor units and trailers.

WARNING
Switch off the whole unit before searching. Switch off the motor.
Units are thermostatically controlled and will turn on when the
temperature rises. The exposed fan is particularly dangerous.

c. Camper-type Vehicles (bus or coach). Figure 12 displays the construction of

camper-type vehicles. Campers are ideal for concealment. Consider the following
concealment locations:
(1) Unusually thick panels.
(2) Operable refrigerator with insulation intact.
(3) Adapted gas (butane or propane) bottles.
(4) Water tanks contain water.
(5) Occupied toilet.
(6) Access to space between skins.
(7) Other general points to consider include:
(a) Smell of fresh glue, paint, etc.
(b) Smell of illegal substances such as cannabis, etc.
(c) Towing trailer or boat.

Figure 12. Diagram of Buses and Coaches

44 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

8. Building Search (Inhabited)
a. Cordon and Search Overview. This section discusses the principles of command
and control, and procedures for cordon-and-search. A cordon-and-search operation
occurs when intelligence identifies a search requirement. Use police when practical.
Base the search on probable cause and act on a warrant issued by the appropriate
legal authority. In circumstances that are dangerous (e.g., PEO), emergency laws
and regulations may temporarily dispense with some legal protections. Use the least
severe method when accomplishing the mission. Use care and preserve evidence
for future legal action.
b. Cordon and Search. Plan this operation like a raid. Divide built-up search areas
into zones with search parties assigned to each. A search party consists of the
following:
(1) Security element (encircles the area, prevents entrance and exit, and secures
open areas).
(2) Search element (conducts the search).
(3) Reserve element helps as required (see figure 13).

Figure 13. Typical Organization for Search Operations

c. Establishing the Cordon. An effective cordon is critical for achieving a successful
search. Cordons prevent escape and protect forces conducting the operation.
Forces limit detection by establishing the cordon in remote areas. In volatile urban
areas, forces use a double cordon, one to protect the operation from outside threats,

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 45

and the other to prevent the escape of persons inside the cordon. Search operations
use plans for handling detained personnel. The unit accompanies police and
intelligence forces that identify, question, biometrically enroll, and detain suspects.
The principal role of the unit is reducing resistance that develops and providing force
security. It also conducts searches and assists in detaining suspects. Keeping the
use of force to a minimum and rapid deployment is important, especially if
adversaries remain in the area. The security element surrounds the area while the
search element moves in and executes the searches. Members of the security
element focus on people evading the search, but also monitor and stop adversarial
reinforcement efforts. CPs and roadblocks are established. If possible, secure and
search subways, sewers, and other subsurface routes of escape.
d. Conducting the Search. Conduct searches of built-up areas and limit the
inconvenience to the populace. Actions discourage adversaries and sympathizers
from remaining in the locale. A large-scale search of a built-up area is a combined
civil police and military operation. Plan and rehearse this type of search in detail. Do
not conduct a physical reconnaissance of the area immediately before a search.
Obtain terrain information from a variety of sources, including aerial photographs. In
larger towns or cities, local police have detailed maps showing building sizes and
locations. A successful operation uses a simple and swift search plan. Organize the
element into teams. These teams include personnel and special equipment for
handling prisoners, interrogations, documentation (using a recorder with a camera),
demolitions, MISO, CA, mine detection, fire support, employment of military working
dogs (MWDs), and tunnel reconnaissance (see figure 14). Three methods for
searching populated areas include:
(1) Assemble Inhabitants in a Central Location. This method provides the most
control, simplifies a thorough search, denies an opportunity to conceal evidence,
and allows for detailed interrogation. The disadvantage is looting may occur while
homes are vacated, increasing the potential for ill feelings.
(2) Restrict Inhabitants to their Homes. This prohibits movement of civilians,
allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The
disadvantages are that control and interrogation are difficult and gives inhabitants
time to conceal evidence.
(3) Control the Heads of the Households. Detain the head of each household in
front of the house while bringing everyone else in the house to a central location.
During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team. This
method allows the head of the household to observe the search team in
operation, giving confidence that the searchers respect the dwelling. This is the
best method for controlling the populace during a search.

46 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Figure 14. Conduct of Search
e. Objective. The objective of a house search is looking for controlled items, and
screening residents through biometrics collection and tactical questioning,
determining if they are adversaries or sympathizers. Assign search parties with at
least one local police officer, a protective escort, a female searcher, and an
interpreter. Arrange escort parties and transportation before the search. Forced
entry may be necessary if the property is vacant or the occupant(s) refuse entry. To
prevent looting, secure a house before departing if searching while the occupant(s)
are away. If necessary, the commander arranges for security of the houses until the
occupant(s) return.
f. Other Considerations. Pay attention to anything appearing out of place (e.g.,
freshly excavated ground, etc.).
(1) Reserve. Assign mobile forces as the reserve, and position them in nearby
areas if possible.
(2) Booby Traps. Treat any material found as booby-trapped until proven
otherwise.
(3) Below Ground. Search underground areas and waterways thoroughly. Use
mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater. Use
explosive detection dogs to locate firearms, ammunition, and explosives.
g. Aerial Search Operations. Leverage helicopters and fixed-wing assets when
possible; they provide exceptional search capabilities. Commanders and staff factor
in the psychological impact helicopters have on the indigenous population.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 47

9. Building Search (Uninhabited)
a. Assume all buildings are booby-trapped. Booby traps catch the unwary and focus
on maiming or killing search personnel. They create uncertainty, lower morale, and
hinder movement. Constructed from household items (e.g., clothes pegs,
mousetraps, flashlight batteries, etc.), they are usually set off by opening a door,
switching on a light, or walking on the floor. Traps activate in several ways,
including:
(1) Pull—opening a drawer.
(2) Pressure—standing on a floorboard or sitting in a chair.
(3) Release or antilift—picking up an object.
(4) Tilt—turning an object on its side to look underneath.
(5) Tremor—vibration or movement.
(6) Collapsing circuit—cutting or breaking a circuit. They also go off when the
battery expires.
(7) Light sensitive—functions when either exposed or hidden from light.
(8) Antisubmerge—placing in water activates the device.
(9) Antiprobe—relies on a search probe or prodder to complete the circuit.
(10) Combination—has more than one means of activation.
b. Procedures for approaching and entering an unoccupied building include:
(1) Initiate a visual reconnaissance of the building and area.
(2) Check for wires leading to a command-detonated device.
(3) Team leader sets up a control point and decides upon a place of entry.
(4) Detail a two-person team to enter and check for booby traps.
(5) Enter building through one of the main entrances, saving time and making
subsequent access easier if cleared early.
c. Clues assisting search teams in the identification of booby traps include:
(1) Attractive items in the open.
(2) Spoils, wrappings, sawdust, etc. in unlikely places.
(3) Out of place pegs, wires, or lengths of cord.
(4) Loose floorboards, window ledges, or stair treads.
(5) Fresh nails or screws.
(6) Lumps or bulges in chairs or under carpets.
d. After checking for booby traps, the search team performs a detailed and
systematic search. If the search personnel cannot use the front door, they clear a
path to another door. The team leader clears the outside of the door and opens it,
preferably using some device to protect search personnel from a possible blast (e.g.,
pulling cable). While clearing for traps, consider the following points:
(1) Never open any door until both sides are clear of traps.
(2) Leave all doors, drawers, and cupboards open after checking.

48 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(3) Make extensive use of tools (e.g., pulling cable or weights for remote opening
of doors, etc.) ensuring the safety of search personnel.
(4) Clearly mark routes cleared of traps with white tape.
10. Search of Rural Areas
a. Open areas are used as hiding places because adversaries have the advantage
of observing from nearby dwellings without being detected. Although associated with
a rural environment, open spaces also occur in an urban setting (e.g., parks,
gardens, or vacant lots).
b. Area searches are dependent on good planning. The IPOE process is essential
before conducting a search and does the following:
(1) Ensure the area’s boundaries are recorded and its center location is notated
using eight-digit coordinates (with addresses if possible).
(2) Identifies the owner or tenant.
(3) Gains intelligence using ISR resources.
(4) Obtains relevant information on local adversaries and sympathizers.
c. Divide area into sections and assign teams. Hedges and ditches are terrain
features that clearly define boundaries. Plan the search balancing team speed and
thoroughness.
d. Other considerations:
(1) Ensure engineers are present; not only to detect mines and obstacles, but
also to repair damages to structures caused by the search.
(2) Consider using a MWD trained in detecting explosives. They are useful to
speed up searches, especially around outside areas.
(3) Take a sufficient number of metal detectors.
(4) Record everything on a digital camera, not just for evidence, but also for IO.
(5) Take large quantities of forms to document confiscated items and property
damage.
(6) Take gloves and other protective garments, many search situations are
unsanitary.
(7) Insist personnel maintain their professionalism and under no circumstances
remove property for personal gain or as souvenirs.
e. Consider using aerial assets for reconnaissance, security, and information for
units on the ground in urban areas.
11. Verification of Weapons and Forces
a. Overview. This section addresses verification of the location, movement,
readiness, and numbers of weapons and forces specified by agreements.
Commanders understand their responsibilities under these agreements. Peace
agreements or subsequent international accords establish the parameters for
verification of weapons and force reductions.
b. Principles.
(1) HNs and belligerent forces are responsible for compliance and accountability
with the agreements.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 49

(2) The PO force is responsible for verifying compliance, and in the case of
peace enforcement, compelling compliance.
(3) The PO force has total access to all sites and locations. This is a
fundamental issue for freedom of movement.
c. Weapon and Force Levels. Divide cantonment and storage sites into four
categories:
(1) Combat sites consist of heavy weapons, air defense (AD), airfields, naval
ports, barracks, operational munitions stocks, and combat loads.
(2) Infrastructure sites consist of support activities such as logistics,
communications, HQ, and depots.
(3) Police sites consist of weapons, vehicles, and munitions.
(4) Ordnance sites consist of civilian production plants and factories, production
storage, and new weapons holding areas.
d. Procedures.
(1) Commanders establish the priority of inspections based on the four
categories listed above. Combat sites and police sites have the highest priority.
(2) Schedules for inspection include a combination of pre-inspections,
announced inspections, and unannounced inspections.
(3) The program of inspection is available to all parties of the agreement.
(4) A verification board coordinates the inspection and develops a collection
plan.
(5) The reporting system, when feasible, includes nonmilitary organizations such
as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International
Police Training Force (IPTF), or representatives of international bodies
overseeing the agreement.
12. Military Movements and Exercises
a. PO forces have ongoing operational and training requirements that cause them to
move in and between population centers, which requires careful planning and
coordination. Commanders and staffs are sensitive to perceptions of the local
populace surrounding all movements or operations.
b. Considerations when planning movements, training exercises, or support to civic
events, include:
(1) Protecting property rights of landowners.
(2) Avoiding damage to structures or other vehicles, especially cultural or
religious buildings or shrines.
(3) Observing protocol and practices of the local population.
(4) Avoiding the potential for civilian casualties.
(5) Adhering to local national laws.
13. Convoy Operations
a. Overview. The PO forces organize convoys ensuring the safe movement of
forces, humanitarian supplies, and support for civilian or commercial movements,
authorized or required to implement peace agreement(s). Convoys are allocated

50 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

road space in accordance with theater policy, standardization agreements, and the
law of the HN, as applicable to the situation. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations,
provides more detail regarding movement control procedures. See ATP 4-
01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.58 MTTP for Tactical Convoy
Operations for basic convoy techniques.
b. Types of Convoys. Convoys occur on highways, roads, rivers, and along
coastlines.
(1) Organize ground convoy elements into march units, serials, and columns as
described in ATP 4-11, Army Motor Transport Operations. Other countries use
the term “packet” to describe the concept of march and serials.
(2) ATTP 4-15, Army Water Transport Operations, and NTTP 3-06.1, Riverine
Operations, describe watercraft convoy operations.
c. Security Elements.
(1) Advance Elements. The column head is the first vehicle of each column,
serial, or march unit. The advance guard is the security element positioned with
the column head. The advance guard serves as the point element for the convoy
and consists predominantly of security vehicles. It travels far enough ahead to
enable clearing of small obstructions without getting the main body involved (the
US Army MP standard is 3–5 minutes ahead of the main body). A point patrol
element is positioned in front (but within visual range) of the advance guard and
provides surveillance of the route, monitors CPs before arrival of the convoy, and
detects mines or booby-trapped areas.
(2) The Main Body. The main body includes cargo and passenger-carrying
vehicles or vessels. Intersperse escorts with or on board these elements. A
typical order of march is:
(a) Armored vehicles.
(b) Convoy vehicles and VIP vehicles.
(c) Armored personnel carrier containing the column commander.
(d) Mounted infantry.
(3) The Rear Guard or Trail. The trail is equipped for providing recovery,
maintenance, and medical support. When the threat is high, locate a rear guard
security force with the trail. The rear guard defends the rear of the convoy and
prevents infiltration from the rear. It also assists the advance guard or main body
if a local counterattack is required. The rear guard moves far enough behind the
main body to allow freedom of action if a delay or attack occurs to the main body.
The commander tasks a helicopter-borne QRF as a reserve force. This includes
at least two helicopters, which allows greater flexibility of movement and action.
(4) Command and Control. Establish clear lines of C2 for each convoy. This is
difficult with multinational or mixed civilian and military convoys. Civilian elements
of the convoy are not part of the military C2 structure; however, the convoy
commander exercises control over their actions. This is true regardless of the
rank of military or civilian VIPs traveling with the column.
(5) Communication. Convoy commanders command the column from their
position in the convoy. Maintain secure radio communication throughout the

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 51

column and with the local security force, any mobile reserve forces, supporting
artillery, aircraft, and other security forces operating on or astride the route. Use
light signals and colored smoke grenades with prearranged codes for passing
information and indicating targets.
(6) Operations Security (OPSEC). The PO forces avoid establishing regular
patterns of movement. Create irregular patterns in routes, convoy composition
and organization, vehicle speeds, and convoy timing. Failure to do this places
lives and equipment at risk. Never divulge plans in advance to anyone without a
need to know; always consider deception measures.
(7) Liaison. The staff responsible for arranging the movement coordinates with
local commanders concerning protection measures for the convoy as it passes
through their areas. This includes the means of travel, route, timing, size of the
escort, and presence of soft-skinned vehicles.
(8) Intelligence. Convoy planners obtain timely, accurate intelligence to support a
predictive estimate of potential adversarial capabilities, intentions, and hostile
activity on proposed routes. Intelligence aids planning for the convoy, while the
convoy itself gathers intelligence. If necessary, use deception to mask the
reconnaissance effort. Aerial imagery and photographs assist the collection
process. Collect and process information from all convoy commanders, drivers,
operators, and security elements at the completion of each mission. When
possible, use military grid reference system coordinates to report the following:
(a) Identification of all relevant information concerning the status of CPs
along the route (such as their location, manning levels, and the affiliation,
ethnicity, sect of the occupants).
(b) Identification and location of adversarial elements.
(c) Problems or hazardous areas along the route.
(d) Areas where crowds are likely to assemble.
(e) Local weather conditions.
(f) Road or sea conditions along the route.
(9) Recovery and Repair of Vehicles. Plans for the prompt recovery and repair of
vehicles include having recovery vehicles in large convoys and vehicle
mechanics in each group. The recovery and repair policy is included in convoy
orders. A convoy element halts long enough to take a broken down vehicle in
tow, to hand it over to a recovery section traveling with the convoy. Forces deal
with circumstances when it is necessary to abandon a vehicle rather than hold up
the convoy.
(10) Medical Assistance. Include medical vehicles in any large convoy with
medical personnel in each group. The medical policy is included in the convoy
orders. In case of emergency, consider the possibility of casualty evacuation by
helicopter.

52 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

14. Convoy Security
a. Convoy defense techniques are described in MTTP Tactical Convoy Operations;
ATP 4-11, ATTP 4-15, and NTTP 3-06.1. Security forces accompany convoys when
contact with hostiles is likely.
b. The composition of the escort depends on the threat, size of the vehicle column,
and forces available. High threats require the use of combined arms escort forces
comprised of armor, infantry, artillery, aviation, and engineer elements for ground
convoys.
c. Water convoys require escort forces comprised of patrol boats and aviation
assets.
d. Position security elements where they best support the convoy. If only one
security element (or vehicle) is available, place it at the rear of a ground convoy
column; it is easier for vehicles to move forward on a road in reaction to a threat.
e. Plan and rehearse for ambushes along the route. FM 3-90-1, Offense and
Defense, describes ambush tactics.
f. Convoy commanders ensure the following are included in the mission rehearsal:
(1) Movement using maps, photographs, and terrain models.
(2) Communications procedures.
(3) Reaction drills ensuring everyone understands the ROE and procedures for
individual and collective action or reaction to potential situations.
15. Populace Control Measures
a. Populace control measures implemented during PO directly support the
reestablishment of a safe and secure environment and set conditions for progress
towards a long-term political settlement.
b. The authority to impose populace control measures originates from the political
mandate that established the force. Mission-specific ROE refines the authority.
Populace control measures include:
(1) Control measures for urban and rural areas, including identification cards,
biometric enrollment, watch list checks, and barrier systems.
(2) Establish and enforce curfews.
(3) Control measures supporting the separation and neutralization of belligerent
forces.
(4) Establish indigenous population movement restrictions, including travel
passes, control points, licensing, and registration of vehicles.
(5) Control the borders preventing external support to a conflict.
(6) Place restrictions on civilian assembly.
16. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reconciliation
a. DDR. Demilitarization or arms control is a task given to military forces under the
terms of its mandate, or they are local, tactical initiatives, which attempt to reduce
tension in a specific area. The possibility of demilitarization and arms control
measures arise once a cease-fire or peace agreement is in place.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 53

b. Methods of Demilitarization and Arms Control. Demilitarization and arms control
are a progressive process. Steps in the process, which require considerable
verification and policing by the military force, are shown below:
(1) Withdrawal from Front Lines. Following a cease-fire agreement, deploy
military forces along the ADL. The first stage of demilitarization is withdrawal from
wartime positions, either to barracks or behind a BZ. The aim of this zone is
moving the adversaries back, beyond small arms range, and beyond line of sight.
(2) Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons. Withdrawing heavy weapons, a specified
distance from the cease-fire line, offers a significant confidence-building
measure. Heavy weapons include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled
artillery pieces, mortars, and all types of armored fighting vehicles.
(3) Decommissioning of AD Weapons. Neutralize all active AD systems and
remove as soon as possible because they pose a significant threat to all types of
aircraft.
(4) Return to Barracks or Cantonment Sites. After separating the former
adversaries, the next step is returning the troops to barracks or new cantonment
sites. The aim is to move troops to peacetime locations that PO forces can
monitor. This assists in the demilitarization of civilian population as weapons are
collected. Cantonment sites are ad hoc because there are rarely sufficient tailor-
made military barracks available, which can accommodate all troops and
equipment in the assigned areas. Base the cantonment sites around large public
buildings, factories, or tented camps. Sites that use the civilian infrastructure may
cause problems for community recovery if military forces continually occupy
them. Depending on the mandate or the peace agreement, military forces may or
may not have authority to allocate sites.
(5) Force Levels and Restructuring. Restructuring former adversaries into
peacetime organizations is the next stage in demilitarization and arms control.
Force levels are determined at the national level, often as part of a cease-fire or
peace agreement. The senior military HQ directs the restructuring process and
involves suitability assessments, verification, and advice from units at the tactical
level.
(6) Restructuring. Restructuring includes the following elements:
(a) Setting a ceiling on military personnel by unit or location.
(b) Confining arms to designated armories.
(c) Separating arms and ammunition.
(d) Obtaining military approval for proposed sites after conducting a threat
assessment.
(e) Relocating heavy weapons to authorized sites.
(7) Verification. Verification depends on the requirements listed in the mandate.
If the situation allows, military forces restrict all military movement and training.
Authorized activities are monitored ensuring compliance. Military forces inspect
and monitor activities within barracks and cantonment sites. This provides an
assessment of readiness, capability, intent, morale, and identifies attempts to
deploy forces.

54 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(8) Enforcement. Enforcement depends on restrictions in the mandate on a
faction’s military activity, training, or movement. This includes punitive inspections
or confiscations of weapons and equipment.
17. Civil Disturbances
a. The threat of civil disturbances during PO is high. How the PO forces handle
incidents, has a decisive effect on mission accomplishment. Poorly handled
reactions to civil disturbances quickly escalate situations out of control with potential
long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation
leads to an enhanced view of the PO force’s discipline, professionalism, and results
in fewer incidents. The use of NLWs enhances the PO force’s ability to respond
appropriately to civil disturbances and afford the commander additional options
when containing and de-escalating situations. Further information on the use of
NLWs in response to civil disturbance is found in FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP
3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45, MTTP for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.
b. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) during civil disturbances include
isolating, dominating, maintaining common situational awareness, and employing
multidimensional and multi-echelon actions.
(1) Isolate the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit tactical
operation centers in theater develop TTP that isolate riots or demonstrations and
keep them from spreading into bigger and more violent explosions of emotional
expression. The goal is to isolate the location and close access in and out of the
demonstration locality with CPs (see figure 15). Once access is closed, rioters
decrease in violence within hours and the demonstration dies down, eventually
resulting in a peaceful conclusion. Figure 16 provides a technique for controlling
major road networks into and out of the demonstration area. This technique
increases their effectiveness if the riot escalates.

Figure 15. Isolate the Disturbance

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 55

Figure 16. Controlling Road Networks
(2) Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information
resources. Units demonstrate an overwhelming show of force at CPs, and
dispatch attack helicopters and conduct overflights above demonstrations and
massing civilian mobs. Using appropriate air assets gives commanders a bird's-
eye view of events on the ground. Overflights provide real-time situation reports,
ensuring units know the "ground truth" at all times. This knowledge gives
commanders a decisive advantage in negotiations with potentially hostile
elements and tactical maneuvers.
(a) Units dominate a civil disturbance using NLWs. It is important to consider
force protection issues. Lethal munitions and an employment capability
always accompany NLWs. One technique is for the M-203 grenadiers to carry
sponge rounds (or similar nonlethal rounds) while other personnel carry the
same equipment and ammunition used in combat. If aviation assets are
available, attack helicopters provide a show of force.
(b) The minimum required task organization for responding to a civil
disturbance is an infantry rifle company, or like-sized unit; augmented with
battalion scouts and snipers; a CA team; and a tactical MISO team. Position
one platoon either to prevent collateral damage or to separate opposing
factions. One platoon assists with the linkup of local police or the IPTF, and
one platoon serves as a QRF. If aviation is available, it provides a bird's-eye
view of vehicles entering and exiting the location of the civil disturbance. The
rotor wash of a helicopter is an excellent nonlethal technique for effectively
dispersing crowds.
(c) Dominate a civil disturbance by detaining group leaders or instigators. An
instigator is a person who "prods" others into committing disruptive acts or

56 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

orchestrates the group’s actions. Often, an instigator carries a bullhorn or
handheld radio. Forcibly snatching instigators from demonstrations or riots
alleviates organized violence in a crowd. The nonlethal TTP developed for a
unit conducting riot-control operations, is the positive identification of
instigators, followed by sending in a "snatch-and-grab" team to remove them
forcibly. Use nonlethal marking systems to identify the instigator for the
snatch-and-grab team.
(d) The size of the unit to conduct snatch-and-grab technique must be large
enough to support and reinforce a four-man snatch and grab team. Before a
platoon deploys to quell a riot, identify a four-person snatch-and-grab team,
two persons to secure the individual and two for security. After identifying an
instigator in a hostile crowd, the snatch-and-grab team deploys into the
crowd, grabs the assailant, and returns behind the friendly picket line. Figure
17 portrays this technique.
(e) The four-person snatch-and-grab team must wear the Kevlar helmet with
face shield and flak vest, but does not bring weapons or load-bearing
equipment with them into the crowd. The four-person team only carries
batons into the crowd. The snatch-and-grab team remains in contact with the
adjacent PO forces on the line formation as they pass through. The formation
remains ready to respond to any crowd actions that threaten the snatch-and-
grab team. After the snatch-and-grab team has apprehended the riot
instigator, it proceeds directly to a secure location out of the crowd's line of
sight.

Figure 17. Deploying a “Snatch-and-Grab” Team

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 57

(f) Employing MWD teams in conjunction with riot-control formations
increases the crowd's apprehension about approaching or engaging the
formation. Place the MWD teams behind the crowd-control formation, in plain
sight of the crowd, and in front of the command element. The MWD teams
work back and forth behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The
presence of MWDs, coupled with the presence of personnel prepared to
conduct civil disturbance operations, produces a profound psychological
effect on the crowd.

CAUTION
MWD teams must depart the area before using riot control agents
(RCAs). MWD teams must move a safe distance from the crowd
ensuring the safety of the dogs.

(g) Per Executive Order 11850, the President of the US must approve the
use of RCAs in war. The US policy is to employ RCAs in limited
circumstances during PO or armed conflict, but never as a method of warfare.
Commanders are aware that using RCAs poses a risk of escalation or public
panic and invites the erroneous perception of the military using chemical
weapon.
(h) Combat camera personnel are a crucial element for successful civil
disturbance operations. They document events and provide accountability for
personnel, factions, and gangs or groups. Control of the IE through the
synchronized efforts of the PAO, staff judge advocate (SJA), MISO, and CA
offices ensures presenting the right message.
(3) Maintain awareness through timely, accurate, and complete multisource
reporting. Commanders receive reports from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit
CPs, air assets, and close liaison with international police and other civil monitors
contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, use of
unmanned aerial vehicles, such as Predator and Pioneer, aids in the observation
of large sectors of an AO. Analyze and relay reports to each unit in the operation.
(4) Multidimensional or multiecheloned actions require the following
considerations:
(a) Policy and legal issues.
(b) ROE.
(c) Standards of conduct.
(d) Crowd dynamics.
(e) Communication skills for leaders who manage aggressive and violent
behavior of individuals and crowds.
(f) Use electronic warfare (EW) to monitor and control belligerent C2 and
communications.
(g) Tactics.
(h) Lethal overwatch.

58 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(i) Search and seizure techniques.
(j) Apprehension and detention.
(k) Neutralization of special threats.
(l) Recovery team tactics.
(m) Cordon operations isolating potential areas of disturbance.
18. Curfews
a. Commanders impose general curfews over a wide, but clearly defined, area (e.g.,
a city, district, or region) or restrict it to a small area (e.g., a town center, a housing
estate, or a particular series of streets). Commanders work with HN civil authorities
to establish and enforce curfews rather than imposing them unilaterally. Effective
curfews require large numbers of police and troops. The size of the area and
duration of the curfew is dependent on the situation.
b. Commanders use curfews to accomplish the following:
(1) Assist security forces in reestablishing control after rioting and serious
disturbances, by restricting civil movement and allowing tempers to cool.
(2) Prevent civil movement in a selected area while conducting a search or
incident investigation.
(3) Disrupt hostile groups by making movement of individuals difficult.
(4) Allow security forces greater freedom of operation.

CAUTION
Do not impose a curfew for punitive reasons or use as an
intimidation threat. The population usually obeys a curfew, but
boredom, shortage of food, or the feeling that the curfew is unfair
or ineffectively enforced can lead to curfew breaking and
consequential incidents. Planning based on a good understanding
of local conditions is essential.

c. Guidance.
(1) Clearly define the boundaries of the curfew. In towns where houses are close
together and streets narrow, it is necessary to enlarge the area under curfew until
forces achieve a clearly defined perimeter, or prohibit movement onto streets that
make up the boundary. The integrity of the perimeter of the curfew area is
essential for exercising full control. Civil authorities, in conjunction with security
forces, decide on the size and location of curfew areas.
(2) Prolonged curfews cause difficulties for innocent civilians. A study of the
pattern of local conditions is helpful when determining effective and feasible
timelines. Forces need to know:
(a) The time inhabitants wake up, go to work, and return home.
(b) The time shops open and close.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 59

(c) The amount of time it takes to implement the curfew after making the
public announcement.
(3) Implementing curfews swiftly and with little advance warning disrupts the
planning processes and operational cycle of hostile groups. Unpredictable
curfews avoid undesirable street gatherings where agitators influence people to
break curfew. OPSEC is essential when planning a curfew.
(4) Example sequence of events for a curfew.
(a) Civil authorities, in consultation with police and military commanders,
decide to impose a curfew.
(b) Make plans that include timing, area, boundaries, required troops, and
administrative arrangements.
(c) Avoid overt reconnaissance of the area.
(d) Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly into position.
(e) Announce the curfew and control instructions by the appropriate means
(e.g., press, radio, siren, and police announcements via a bullhorn). Forces
use helicopters and light aircraft to make public announcements.
(5) Civil administration and the police are responsible for issuing passes.
Specific people, such as doctors, nurses, clergy, and workers in essential
services, require freedom of movement. Civil authorities devise a pass system,
well in advance of curfew implementation, that troops and civilians can easily
understand.
(6) Mobile patrols and static posts enforce the curfew. Once operational, reduce
the number of static posts and maintain the curfew by mobile patrols. Forces use
standing patrols on rooftops to watch for illegal movement between houses and
help cover street patrols.
(7) Surveillance devices assist in enforcing the curfew and reducing the number
of static posts.
(8) Imposing curfews strands some residents outside the area. Unit SOPs
delineate a process for dealing with stranded individuals.
(9) In coordination with HN civil authorities, clearly define the actions troops take
against curfew breakers, e.g., detain, search, and hand them over to civil police.
Record evidence of the offense as well as and the arrest. This ensures evidence
is available for subsequent prosecution in court.
(10) The police are responsible for the following:
(a) Announcing the curfew to the public.
(b) Issuing any curfew passes.
(c) Detaining curfew breakers, including any arrested by PO forces.
(d) Providing police patrols, in coordination with military forces in the
operational area.
(11) Civil authorities are responsible for devising measures to address
administrative difficulties arising during an extended curfew period. The types of
problems that arise are:

60 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(a) Lack of water in houses.
(b) Shortage of food in shops.
(c) Shortage of essential food in homes.
(d) Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops.
(e) Clearance of refuse from houses and streets.
(f) Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking, and heating houses.
(g) Treatment of the sick and maternity cases.
(h) Care of animals.
(i) Lack of indoor sanitation.
(j) Homelessness.
19. Demining and Unexploded Ordnance
ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, MTTP for Unexploded
Ordnance covers demining and UXO issues in more detail.
20. Dislocated Civilian Operations
a. The term DC refers to several categories of civilians, such as a DP, an evacuee,
an IDP, a migrant, a refugee, a stateless person, a returnee, a resettled person, or a
war victim. Legal and political considerations define these categories and each has
specific rights under international humanitarian law. DCs removed from or departing
their residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural
or man-made disasters, or economic privation. DC operations may occur across a
ROMO, but are most prevalent during PO and FHA limited interventions and combat
operations. Refer to JP 3-57 and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
b. The UN or other IGOs and NGOs build and administer DC camps and provide
basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when US military
support is requested, DC support missions include security; camp organization
(basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical
treatment, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other
countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of DCs is
using non-DOD services and facilities, if possible. DC operations are often long term
and require resourcing that is not immediately available through DOD sources.
c. Responsibilities.
(1) DC. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the organization with
responding to the needs of refugees, serves the interests of IDPs and other
categories of DCs on a case-by-case basis. The UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs works to ensure the UN system protects and assists
persons not covered by other UN mandates. This office coordinates the
humanitarian response to emergencies, and advocates the interests of the
internally displaced community.
(2) Population Movement.
(a) A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur
without reason. Indicators highlight that individual rights are now, or in the

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 61

near future, in jeopardy. They request the military provide intelligence support
and assist in determining the direction and magnitude of these movements.
(b) The stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum,
repatriation, and reintegration.
• Preflight and Flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence
support used when determining the timing, magnitude, and direction of
the population movement.
• Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call
on the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN
during the initial arrival of the refugees.
• Asylum. Army forces provide asylum for DC camps and settlements in
the host country while simultaneously assisting in the stabilization of DCs’
country of origin.
• Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the
displaced community returns to its native country, they need military
support for securing repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit
sites, and returnee movement to local communities.
• Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase,
commanders require military forces to assist with the security of
returnees, as they are absorbed into their local communities. This support
is critical in the absence of a capable HN public safety establishment or
the presence of active resistance to resettlement. International CIVPOL
assumes primary responsibility for community law and order.
(3) Resettlement Conditions. The UNHCR has established the following five
conditions for resettlement:
(a) Security.
(b) Shelter.
(c) Adequate local infrastructure.
(d) Functioning institutions.
(e) Economic potential.
(4) Controlling Movement. Coordinate the following with UNHCR, NGO, or
international governmental organization community.
(a) Selection of Routes. CA personnel, in coordination with MP and the
transportation officer, coordinate routes with the international support
community.
(b) Identification of Routes. After identifying the movement routes, CA
personnel coordinate the marking of the routes with UNHCR and the HN.
Mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, US forces, and allied
forces understand. MISO units, HN military, and other allied military units help
mark the routes, CA, the international support community, and HN authorities
establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections.
Coordinate with the provost marshal and movement control center for the
locations of these points and inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.

62 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(c) Emergency Rest Areas. UNHCR or ICRC establishes these points. CA
personnel coordinate with them and determine if water, food, fuel,
maintenance, and medical services are available.
(d) Local and National Agencies. Use of local and national agencies is
essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second,
civilian authorities with legal status are best equipped to handle their own
people. Third, using local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or
translators.
21. Environmental Restoration
Effective environmental stewardship programs emphasize compliance, restoration,
prevention, and conservation. Units engaged in PO place particular emphasis on the
task of environmental restoration. The combined efforts of engineer, CBRN, CA, and
other specialized units are required to restore the environment to acceptable levels
within the AO.
22. Nonlethal Weapons
a. NLWs are weapons, devices, or munitions explicitly designed and primarily
employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities,
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target
location or surrounding environment. NLWs are not required nor expected to have a
zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries. NLWs significantly
reduce the probability of fatalities or injuries as compared with traditional military
weapons. NLWs add flexibility to all types of operations, and are especially useful in
civil disturbances and PO because they limit the risk of unnecessary casualties and
collateral damage.
b. NLWs expand the number of options available to commanders confronting
situations where the use of deadly force poses problems. They provide flexibility by
allowing US forces to apply measured military force with reduced risk of serious
civilian casualties, while still providing force protection and effect compliance.
Commanders can respond to an evolving threat situation more rapidly by employing
NLWs at a lower threshold of danger. This allows US forces to retain the initiative
and reduce their own vulnerability.
c. Planning considerations for employing NLWs:
(1) Employment of any weapons capability into the operational environment has
the potential to create intended and unintended consequences throughout the
operational environment. Prior to employment, coordination at all planning levels
occurs, ensuring the plan meets the desired objectives.
(2) Recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of understanding the human
environment. Operational planners and intelligence personnel achieve maximized
effects and mitigate collateral effects on target personnel and materiel by
participating in the process.
(3) Space limitations and mission requirements affect distribution of larger
nonlethal capability set (NLCS) NLWs. Some NLCS require large containers and
dedicated vehicles for transport to the user. Due to the large size of the NLCS,

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 63

each subordinate unit commander performs an analysis to decide which
components of the NLCS are required for each mission.
(4) According to lessons learned from exercises and operations, use of multiple
types of nonlethal capabilities in a layered approach is more effective than
employment of a single type of NLW in isolation.
(5) Leaders set conditions for executing the escalation of force (EOF) TTP. They
understand critical aspects of a successful EOF, such as early warning for people
approaching a position; clear intent of what actions personnel take when
approaching a position; and clear triggers for executing EOF TTP. These criteria
lead to success in training, resourcing, establishing, and reinforcing standards
increasing confidence in Service members executing EOF measures. For more
information on EOF, see FM 3-39, Military Police Operations.
(6) EOF TTP require continuous assessment and refinement, ensuring
appropriate responses within the context of the threat and civil environment. Each
EOF incident is unique and requires assessment.
(7) NLW employment enables the tactical commander to use proportional force
when facing an uncertain threat that is free from imminent danger. When
planning for tactical engagements, leaders should determine the anticipated
threat as well as what lethal and nonlethal capability mix is necessary for
protection of the force.
(8) Detailed and innovative planning, staff oversight, and proper troop-leading
procedures extend EOF reaction time, allowing Service members to mitigate
potentially volatile engagements. Lethal and nonlethal means of force are part of
the mission planning. Achieve optimal results by weighing and adjusting follow-on
effects and tactics during execution. Planning for the use of force protection
equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure increasing reaction
time during EOF situations. This requires analyzing the suitability of NLWs for
operational environments and missions, ensuring proper training in these
capabilities, rehearsing their employment, and maintaining adequate
maintenance and inspection schedules.
d. The Services are procuring NLCSs that are versatile packages comprised of
commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf equipment and munitions. In
addition to addressing contingency requirements, the Services’ NLCS address
training requirements by providing limited sustainment training ammunition and
appropriate sustainment training equipment. Services divide NLCS components into
four distinct categories: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission
enhancers, and training devices. The following examples of NLCS are not all-
inclusive:
(1) Personnel protectors include ballistic face shields and riot shields that protect
the individual from blunt trauma injuries inflicted by thrown objects, clubs, etc.
(2) Personnel effectors include riot batons, malodorants, stingball grenades,
pepper sprays, and other kinetic rounds (e.g., sponge grenades) designed to
discourage, disorient, or incapacitate individuals or groups.

64 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(3) Mission enhancers include bullhorns, spotlights, and caltrops. These items
facilitate target identification and crowd control, and limit personnel and vehicular
movement.
(4) Training devices include training suits, rounds, batons, and inert pepper
sprays. They facilitate realistic hands-on scenario training in preparation for
operations.
e. The core capabilities associated with nonlethal effects fall into two major
categories: counter personnel and counter materiel.
(1) Counter personnel capabilities include:
(a) Nonlethal counter personnel capabilities facilitate the application of
military force with reduced risk of fatalities or serious injury with the desired
effects being to move, deny, suppress, or disable individual noncombatants
or, in some instances, among enemy forces.
(b) PO forces require the capability to suppress or disable personnel without
inflicting death or serious injury. This distracts, disorients, or degrades an
individual’s ability to perform an unwanted action. Means to achieve these
effects include optic, acoustic, blunt trauma, directed energy, irritants, and
malodorants.
(c) US forces require a nonlethal capability to deny personnel access to an
area. This capability includes the use of physical barriers or systems that
produce physical or mental discomfort to those who enter the denied area.
Nonexplosive, nonlethal area denial technologies have none of the
restrictions applied to conventional land mines. They provide new possibilities
for barrier planning in any type of military operation.
(d) The nonlethal tasks of denying access into or out of an area, moving
individuals through an area, and suppression, or disabling of personnel by
nonlethal means in conjunction with other TTP facilitate the seizure or
apprehension of targeted individuals.
(2) Counter materiel capabilities refer to the following:
(a) The ability of PO forces to stop or disable vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft
on the ground, divert aircraft in the air, and deny access by a vehicle or
aircraft to a facility through designated entry points.
(b) PO forces require the capability to stop or disable maritime vessels and
deny access to facilities such as canal locks or pier slips. A combination of
counter personnel and counter materiel nonlethal capabilities has the
potential to facilitate visit, board, search, and seizure operations.
23. Search Operations
a. General. Security forces have the initiative in searches and decide when, where,
and how to act. The purpose of search operations is to:
(1) Protect potential targets.
(2) Gain intelligence and information.
(3) Deprive adversaries of resources.
(4) Gain evidence for subsequent prosecution.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 65

(5) Force adversaries to move illegal and contraband items, thereby increasing
their risk of discovery.
b. Joint Search Operations. Execute search operations in coordination with local
police forces with the following objectives:
(1) Capture wanted persons, arms, explosives, or other equipment.
(2) Disrupt hostile activities (e.g., bomb making or weapon manufacture).
(3) Eliminate influence of belligerent parties in a specific locality.
c. Area Assessment. An area assessment is required before conducting search
operations. Detailed procedures depend on the environment, benign or hostile, and
the technical threat. The following factors require assessment:
(1) Civil or military primacy.
(2) Level of opposition to law and order.
(3) Level of civilian support for opposition.
(4) Level of technical expertise and degree of extremism of adversaries.
(5) Access to arms and other combat-related materials.
(6) Ability of civil authorities to handle crises.
d. Considerations. Search operations require planning and liaison with other units.
Tenets of a successful operation include:
(1) Operation based on accurate intelligence.
(2) Surprise based on good OPSEC.
(3) Adequate numbers of search teams and equipment.
(4) EOD team availability, if required.
(5) Executed at the most opportune moment.
(6) Availability of adequate cordon and protection troops.
e. Search Pattern Planning Factors. Planning factors assume adversaries are
observing and documenting every operation. Rigid search patterns violate OPSEC,
place search teams at risk, and invite surprises for search teams. The recommended
planning factors for a search operation are:
(1) The Objective. Coordinate the search objective with other military operations
during the same period. This consideration provides the guidelines of time and
duration for the search.
(2) OPSEC. Introduce commanders and staffs to the plan according to their need
to know.
(3) Deception Plan. A deception plan is paramount for achieving surprise or
protecting sources. Planners may deem it necessary to conceal the true nature of
the operation from the participants until initiation to minimize the chance of
compromise.
(4) Intelligence. Reliable intelligence is the basis for search operations. When
unavailable, use other intelligence assessment tools.
(5) Tasking. Clear direction describing the operational, legal, and political
considerations is required before any searching commences.

66 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(6) Training. The mission dictates the requirements for training and types of
specialists. If training requirements are beyond unit resources, obtain advice and
support from applicable subject matter experts.
(7) Systematic Work Pattern. This applies to the planning and conduct of search
operations. In order to avoid error or oversight, carefully and systematically
approach executing search operations.
(8) Thoroughness of Work. Search operations require a high degree of
thoroughness before, during, and upon completion of any task.
f. Search Sequence. When planning the sequence of a search, as depicted in figure
18, consider the following:
(1) Anticipate Hostile Action. The commander determines whether the search
forces make themselves targets or antagonize the local populace.
(2) Isolate the Target Area. Recommend the use of a cordon or other form of
protection party. Do not allow any person in or out of a search area once the
operation has started.
(3) Coordinate Action. Coordinate all actions to ensure a systematic and
integrated search operation. Coordination includes:
(a) Interaction within a search team and between different teams.
(b) Coordination between search teams, troops, and the local authorities.
(4) Minimize Risks. A search is most dangerous upon or soon after arriving in the
area. If adversaries are surprised, violent action may rapidly ensue. If civilians are
involved, attempts to distract or delay the search may occur. Once establishing
military control, risks occur if searches move out of sequence or a sudden “find”
leads to neglecting procedures. Be aware that “find’s” acting as decoys are a way
to divert attention from more valuable targets.
(5) Maintain Records. Records are invaluable in the case of finds and providing
evidence in subsequent prosecutions. Records provide information about the
area and are useful for future operations. If a search uncovers evidence, record
and preserve the evidence in compliance with established procedures.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 67

Figure 18. Search Operations

68 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter IV
CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS
1. Background
a. PO are land operations that resolve conflicts or disputes between nations or
factions within or across borders. PO involve controlling rural and urban expanses
(or both) and are often quite large. Each has its own challenges. Cities and towns
have larger, more diverse populations and are the focus of economic and political
power. Rural areas have a more homogenous population with more entrenched
cultural and social viewpoints. Adversaries and agitators hide and stir up trouble in
both.
b. Control of land areas involves varying intensities of operations and varies from a
passive level, designed to curtail hostile activities so community life can continue, to
a highly active level involving military forces moving against activists and their
supporters. PO commanders at all levels, in concert with the international community
and HN authorities, carefully consider the level of intensity when conducting
operations, and continually adjust as necessary.
c. Operating bases launch operations focused on establishing and expanding
controlled areas, optimizing and balancing force protection, decreasing reaction
time, and increasing situational awareness. In the early stages of PO, PO forces
clear specific areas and shape the environment in a way favorable to peace. Local
paramilitary forces eventually take over cleared areas. When possible, HN
paramilitary forces, with their local knowledge, collaborate with US or international
forces to carry out or assist with initial clearing operations. Although activists may
penetrate controlled areas, their opportunities lessen as the civilian population
transitions their support to the local government. As areas are cleared and secured,
the need for forward operations bases declines and troops are available for other PO
tasks and operations.
2. Gaining Control of an Area
a. General. In an area where hostile forces prevent the civil administration and local
police from conducting their duties, mount specialized operations to reintroduce
control. The following directly influences the planning and conduct of area control
operations:
(1) Strength and organization of the hostile activity.
(2) Support given to hostile forces, whether this comes from outside the country
or is internally self-supported, is dependent on efficient PO.
(3) The nature of the countryside, its accessibility, and density of population.
(4) The available forces.
(5) The operating mandate.
b. Concept of Operations. The aim of PO is creating stable conditions, respect for
the rule of law where the civil administration functions without the backing of security
forces, and the local community moves and lives freely. This requires a dual
approach, with an overall objective of separating or marginalizing hostile elements

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 69

from the population. The following tasks are complementary and require a careful
assessment of priorities and allocation of resources; their combined purpose is to:
(1) Neutralize hostile forces and make their influence ineffective.
(2) Protect the population by denying or severely limiting free movement or
access for hostile forces within the operational area. The area denial applies to
their physical and their psychological presence.
c. Attrition. Achieve area control by denying, marginalizing, and restricting the
presence and influence of adversarial forces. Successful attrition requires constant
close surveillance of suspected organizations, entities, or persons and those who
support them. Surveillance plans are coordinated with relevant agencies and full use
is made of the range of techniques and available equipment.
d. Surveillance. Based on the information from surveillance operations, PO forces
maintain constant pressure on adversarial or agitating forces by instituting specific
search operations and using selective personnel checks, head checks, house
searches, area searches, and screenings. Effective surveillance helps gather
information on activists in order to track, neutralize, or prosecute them by law.
e. Denying Free Movement to the Adversary. This task is important because it
contributes to sealing off the activists from their bases of support, forcing them to
take risks, and limiting their ability to take aggressive action. This task includes
extensively using roadblocks and CPs; covering main lines of communications;
border patrols; and implementing special measures to combat specific tactics, such
as train and vehicle hijackings.
f. Planning. The planning principles applied to area control operations are similar to
those for other operations, but they must account for a greater dispersion of forces.
Additionally, they consider:
(1) Carefully planning and controlling all operations and making optimum use of
resources, using the best information and intelligence gathered on hostile tactics
and habits.
(2) Mutual support is often difficult to achieve across large or dense expanses,
and PO forces can easily become isolated. Therefore, commanders balance the
requirements for applying sufficient strength for countering threats and navigating
specific types of terrain, while maintaining adequate reserves at all times.
(3) Commanders do not rule out the use of infantry support weapons, artillery, air
power, and naval capabilities to support PO. The force commander provides
ROE, and obtains approval from each contributing nation, for using these
weapons in a PO situation. The tactical deployment and use of troops is similar to
conventional warfare. For instance, artillery is required to support selective
patrols, reinforce or protect OPs, and provide support for large-scale operations.
g. Patrolling. Patrols do not ensure control of an area; they are an essential means
for establishing and sustaining force presence, gathering information and
intelligence, assessing progress, and detecting problems.
h. Control Measures.
(1) Control measures, such as CP or curfews, are implemented when necessary,
to protect the people and enable effective governance. They are developed and

70 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

coordinated with civil authorities and international partners before
implementation, unless immediate harm is a result of their absence. Employ
control measures to facilitate the following:
(a) Conduct safe and controlled operations by security forces.
(b) Separate sects or factions who incite violence.
(c) Redress grievances.
(d) Deter hostile activity, particularly subversion.
(e) Encourage sharing information and providing other vital resources.
(f) Allow “cooling-off” time for the populace after a riot or other disturbance.
(2) Explain the reasons for imposing control measures to the affected population,
but discontinue the measures if they fail to produce the desired results. Measures
include:
(a) Banning all political activities.
(b) Registering civilians for elections and population census.
(c) Inspecting identity cards, permits, and passes at irregular intervals.
(d) Controlling or rationing food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs,
and medicines.
(e) Restricting civilian movement.
(f) Establishing curfews.
i. Protected or Safe Areas.
(1) The requirement for establishing and supervising a protected or safe area
arises when a community is at risk from persistent attack. Ensure the population
within the safe area is disarmed. Provide clear guidance for any force tasked with
establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Conduct efforts countering
the accusations from adversaries or agitators, within and outside the safe area.
After receiving guidance on the nature of the operation, resolve other tactical
questions, such as how to protect the area and the nature of the threat.
Answering these and other relevant questions guide’s decisions on the protecting
force’s presence, profile, and posture.
(2) Protected or safe areas contain residents, refugees, DCs, and one or more of
the belligerent forces. PO forces establish and supervise areas and provide
support and assistance to other organizations within the safe area. The first stage
in a PO designed to protect or make an area safe is demilitarization of the area.
This requires enforcement actions. Other specific military tasks include:
(a) Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
(b) Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding
areas.
(c) Occupying the ground.
(d) Dominating avenues of approach.
(e) Conducting patrols and searches.
(f) Manning CPs and other control measures.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 71

(g) Developing reinforcement and extraction plans.
3. Movement Control
a. Roadblocks and CPs are a means of controlling movement on roads, tracks, and
footpaths. Use a roadblock for blocking or closing a route to vehicle or pedestrian
traffic. CPs have a limited and specific purpose and type, such as vehicle CPs,
personnel CPs, etc. Roadblocks are set up for one or more of the following reasons:
(1) Maintain a broad check on road movement increasing security and
reassuring the local population.
(2) Frustrate the movement of arms or explosives.
(3) Assist the enforcement of movement control for people and material.
(4) Gather information and related data on suspected persons, vehicles, and
movement.
b. Use the following criteria when choosing a roadblock or CP site:
(1) Avoid bends of the road, brows of a hill, etc., this allows vehicles sufficient
time to stop after seeing the roadblock or CP.
(2) Place the roadblock or CP in an area with no turnoffs before the vehicle
operators see it.
(3) Establish cutoffs, where military members from the roadblock or CP can give
early warning, allowing time to add extra blocking equipment if needed.
(4) Allow for mutually supported patrols.
(5) Conduct a thorough check of the area before use.
4. Roadblocks
a. Types of roadblocks listed below:
(1) Deliberate. Permanent or semi-permanent roadblocks placed on a main road,
near a border, on the outskirts of a city or on the edge of a controlled area. View
deliberate roadblocks as a deterrent to movement. After the positions and
activities of the roadblocks are in place for a period, they are less likely to
produce information or contraband material.
(2) Hasty. Impromptu roadblocks established for a specific purpose and limited
time, are easy to set up and dismantle. Ground troops, already on patrol, or a
rapid reaction force deployed by helicopter, deploy the roadblock. Two vehicles
placed diagonally across and road with a search area in between is a simple
roadblock. In a rural area, heliborne forces place hasty roadblocks, or forces
improvise obstacles, such as narrow bridges or level crossing gates blocked with
a single coil of barbed wire.
(a) Triggered. This is a variation of the hasty roadblock, and is effective in
defeating convoys or reconnaissance vehicles used by hostile groups.
Allowing a suspected “scout car” to pass through the roadblock triggers the
capture of the target vehicle. Units operating the roadblock occupy covered
and concealed positions and wait for selected targets. They stop and search
personnel out of sight of anyone approaching on the road. A covert protection
force and helicopter-borne reaction force are required. Foot and vehicle
insertion, from a carefully sited patrol base, are most common.

72 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(b) Reactionary. This is a version of the hasty roadblock, but used in reaction
to an incident or attack in another area. Ground- or helicopter-based, this
roadblock is useful for interdicting hostile activity following the occurrence.
b. Tactical guidelines for setting up a deliberate roadblock include:
(1) Concealment. Locate the roadblock tactically where people cannot see it
from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide
good positions, but should meet the requirements of road safety. Leave no room
for an approaching vehicle to turn, leave the road, or reverse direction.
(2) Security. Assign enough troops to protect the roadblock, particularly during
the initial occupation. Place sentries to act as backstops on both sides, well clear
of the search area, to watch approaching traffic and prevent evasion. Whenever a
threat of an attack on a roadblock is likely, the block must have a backup force.
(3) Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED). A roadblock is vulnerable
to attack by a vehicle-borne IED. Counters to these devices include:
(a) Stopping vehicles well short of the block.
(b) Using rock ramps to shake up the vehicles.
(c) Using means to puncture tires.
(4) Roadblock Vulnerabilities. A roadblock is vulnerable to attack by IEDs, booby
traps, and ambushes.
(a) Check roadblock sites against booby-trapping and ambushes.
(b) Avoid patterned use of roadblocks.
(c) Be aware of possible snipers.
c. Construction and Layout. A simple construction is two parallel lines, each with a
gap across the road approximately 50 meters apart. Use the enclosure as a search
and administrative area. The search area contains:
(1) Separate male and female search areas.
(2) Vehicle waiting area.
(3) Vehicle search area.
(4) Holding area for detaining persons waiting for transfer to the local authorities.
(5) Roadblock HQ.
(6) Administrative area.
d. Manning. The number of troops depends upon the number of roads and expected
volume of traffic. If searching women, forces must have female searchers and
provide special accommodations. The CP commander possesses, where possible,
the rank of sergeant or above. Maintain a HN police presence at a military
roadblock, whenever possible, especially when military powers of search, arrest, or
control of movement are limited. Interpreters are useful. A platoon-sized element
operates a control point. At a minimum, operate the roadblock with the following:
(1) Control Point Headquarters. Commander, signaler, and runner.
(2) Barrier Sentries. One noncommissioned officer for each blocked road or lane
of traffic, and one sentry for each barrier.
(3) Covering Party. Two military personnel covering each set of barrier sentries.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 73

(4) Assault Force. A designated unit is critical in the event an element breaks
through a roadblock or CP.
e. Overwatch. Where possible, operate an overwatch on a nearby rooftop.
(1) Surveillance Devices. Early warning devices are valuable and give warning of
approaching vehicles. Use of airborne surveillance assets assists in warning of
approaching vehicles.
(2) Search Equipment. Forces searching heavy vehicles or certain types of loads
need additional special search equipment.
(3) Communications. External communications are essential for providing
revised instructions to searchers. Communications allow rapid report information
about wanted persons and incidents at the roadblock. Internal communications
within a large roadblock speed reaction time.
f. Legal Issues. Troops operating roadblocks know their powers and duties under
the law regarding search, arrest, and use of force.
5. Checkpoints
a. Principles. Routinely establish CPs to check and control traffic, and prevent
movement of illegal items (e.g., weapons, drugs, or persons).
b. Missions. Establish CPs pursuant to the following:
(1) Monitoring actions.
(2) Security actions.
(3) Separation of forces.
(4) Route opening and maintenance.
(5) Presence or relief actions.
c. Types. There are two types of CPs:
(1) Static CPs. Static CPs are associated with fixed- or semi-fixed structures
(e.g., guard shacks, barriers. etc.). When planning the location of a static CP,
consider road network and traffic patterns in and out of the AO by one or more of
the belligerent parties.
(a) Position static CPs where walking and mounted traffic cannot bypass it.
Narrow valleys, routes through marshy areas, embankments, dams, and
bridges are well suited for a static CP. Craters, pits, 50-gallon drums, or
barbed wire entanglements are examples of obstacles for channeling traffic
towards a CP. Static CPs are established or positioned on or near the
following:
• Existing borders or frontiers (internationally recognized).
• Cease fire lines.
• Infiltration routes.
• Towns and villages.
• Vital ground.
(b) Establish static CPs where unit personnel can observe and react to traffic
in a timely fashion. Conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area

74 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

determining if a minor shift in the CP location is required. Unlike the traditional
warfighting scenario, clearly mark CPs in a PO for easy recognition from both
the ground and air. This practice also applies to OP, but it is important for
CPs because belligerents frequently set up illegal CPs.
(c) Interim Static Checkpoint. Establish an interim static CP as soon as
possible. However, only construct semi-permanent or permanent facilities
after the best CP location is determined. An example of an interim CP
consists of a vehicle (tank or other armored vehicle with crew) and a couple of
signposts. Do not confuse an interim CP with the mobile CP established if a
sudden need arises for monitoring traffic in a particular area.
(2) Mobile CPs. Mobile CPs are effective because belligerents do not know when
and where PO forces establish them. Based on information received from OPs,
other units, patrols, or the local populace, a mobile CP is established where
suspected mandate or treaty violations occur. The unit has the capability of
establishing a mobile CP on short notice (within 30 to 60 minutes). Locate the
mobile CP where it creates complete surprise for the motorist, similar to a
CIVPOL speed trap. It is important to clearly mark the CP. Place it where
approaching traffic only sees it close to the CP. Locations immediately following a
hairpin turn or other concealing terrain feature are ideal. Approaching traffic must
have no chance of bypassing the CP. Move to a new location for a compromised
mobile CP.
d. Collocation. Collocation of CPs and OPs is an effective technique in PO. Terrain
features or fields of observation that preclude the relocation of the OP to a CP site
determine the location of an OP. Collocating the OP and CP is beneficial due to the
synergistic effect of increased security for both. Organizing a combined OP and CP,
instead of two separate posts, conserves forces, equipment, and facility
considerations (e.g., communication equipment, generators, shelters, water tanks,
showers, and latrine facilities).
e. Manning. CPs operate on a 24-hour basis. Commanders may decide to operate
the site by only day or night. When establishing a 24-hour CP with relief, use no less
than four personnel, two on duty, and two resting (reserve). If positioning OPs near a
CP, it is advisable for CP personnel to live on the OP and commute from there. This
conserves resources. Heavily trafficked CPs require an increased number of
personnel to properly carry out their duties and who are prepared to quickly deny
passage to anyone trying to force their way through or bypass CPs.
f. Procedures. The frequency of checks and CP locations are part of a cease-fire
agreement. Alternating the CP type of search is important. Total and spot-check
methods are effective, especially spot checks, because incoming traffic is unaware
which procedure is being used. Categorize CP operations as individual personnel
checks or vehicle checks. Further categorize operations by method of search.
(1) Total check searches everyone passing through the CP. This form of
checking is hard on resources (time and personnel) and is performed only when
the CP is located on borders, frontiers, etc. (e.g., national frontiers or cease-fire
lines).

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 75

(2) Spot checks refer to searching a certain number of persons or vehicles. The
remainders pass freely, stop briefly for questioning, or show their identity cards.
Over a period, spot checks prove effective in curtailing illegal movement of
people or material in the AO. This method conserves resources compared with
the total check method.
(3) HHQ determines the criteria for individual and vehicle checks. Guidelines
when determining the criteria include:
(a) Type of persons and vehicles transiting a CP.
(b) Required forms of identification.
(c) Illegal items (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives, narcotics, etc.).
g. Communication. Unit SOPs cover communication requirements and each CP
possesses reliable communications with HHQ and adjacent units. Communication is
important for a variety of reasons (e.g., advanced warning of vehicles attempting to
force passage).
h. Equipment. CP equipment type and amount of materiel depends on the mission
and is listed in the unit SOPs. After establishing a CP, equipment requirements
change based on the environment. Additional equipment includes:
(1) Technical manuals for dismantling and stripping vehicles.
(2) Lists or diagrams of hiding places in vehicles.
(3) Tools, jacks, mirrors, etc., for vehicle checks.
i. Organization. Organize a CP with the following:
(1) Observation towers or platforms to monitor surroundings.
(2) Speed-limiting capabilities (e.g., speed bumps, oil drums, and sign posting).
(3) Barriers, gates, etc., to close or open CP.
(4) Check areas.
(5) Waiting areas.
(6) Living quarters (rest, recuperation, cooking, showers, latrines).
(7) Shelters.
(8) Local defense positions.
(9) Generators.
(10) Signaling technologies such as ocular hail and warning devices and
acoustic hailing devices.
(11) POL stockpile.
(12) A helicopter landing site.
6. Controlling Urban Areas
a. Adversarial Tactics. The adversary adopts a wide range of tactics in an urban
area, including:
(1) Disrupting industry and public services by planning strikes or directing
sabotage.
(2) Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of
security forces.

76 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(3) Attacking resupply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links, or air bases.
(4) Provoking military forces in the hope, they overreact and provide material for
hostile propaganda.
(5) Sniping at roadblocks, static posts, and sentries.
(6) Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.
(7) Planting explosive devices against specific targets, or indiscriminately
causing confusion, destruction, and lowering public morale.
(8) Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.
(9) Attacking sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees.
b. Need for Alertness. PO forces in an urban area are constantly alert to avoid
exposing themselves as targets and protecting civilians. Sentries, observers in OPs,
foot and mobile patrols, and administrative vehicles present attractive targets.
Support military movement with available fire support. Make troops aware of
dangers associated with discussing anything military in nature, including names,
locations, or any type of movements, with casual civilian acquaintances.
c. Basing. Two broad basing alternatives exist. The first is basing troops outside the
urban area where they operate (or on its outskirts), or basing them within their
operational area. Both have advantages and disadvantages and one is not
necessarily better than the other. The situation and real word environment dictate
which best supports the mission. The advantages and disadvantages of each are:
(1) Bases outside the area.
(a) Advantages. Commanders set up a secure base where off-duty forces
relax, rest, and enjoy recreational facilities. Fewer sentries and fewer
defenses protect the base. It is accessible to administrative transport, with the
ability to resupply, repair, and maintain equipment on site.
(b) Disadvantages. Reaction time to incidents within the urban center is
longer and, therefore, commanders may have to keep reserves on short
notice and possibly deploy them in anticipation of their need. If unable to
return to base between patrols, etc., consider sending some administrative
transport forward into the operational area, which will require an escort and
possibly provides a target. The roundtrip travel time to the base decreases
the time available for rest and personal administration.
(2) Bases in the area.
(a) Advantages. Commanders rapidly deploy reserves in response to events,
reducing the need for a QRF, on relatively short notice. Troops gain familiarity
with the area and improve their knowledge of the local population, detailed
geography, and habits of adversary groups.
(b) Disadvantages. PO forces face constant exposure to attack. Local
protection requires more forces. Administrative traffic requires an escort and
puts a strain on PO forces.
d. Additional Basing Considerations (urban and rural operations). Mount operations
from a base that meets as many of these factors as possible, and as appropriate to
the situation and mission:

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 77

(1) Collocated with local civil administration, or nearby.
(2) Accessible by land over easily secured routes.
(3) Provides a helicopter landing point if a suitable airstrip is unavailable.
(4) Easily defensible with the minimum of force, surrounded by natural obstacles.
(5) Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic and transport support,
but small enough to defend.
(6) Provides physical protection commensurate with the prevailing threat.
e. Inter Unit Boundaries. Assign units and subunits to an operational area. Clearly
define boundaries between areas. When a boundary runs down a street, assign only
one unit responsibility for the street. Boundaries of local or United Nations police
(UNPOL) districts are an important consideration when establishing unit boundaries.
If possible, these boundaries should align.
f. Tactics. Plan, rehearse, and implement the following tactics:
(1) Guarding bases and installations.
(2) Creating roadblocks and CPs.
(3) Establishing control points.
(4) Enforcing curfews.
(5) Initiating search operations.
(6) Employing crowd dispersal and riot control.
(7) Conducting basic aspects of surveillance.
g. Snipers. Devise and rehearse immediate action drills for responding to a patrol
coming under sniper fire. This is a difficult situation, because the sniper is hidden.
Depending on the situation, it may be appropriate to improve force protection
procedures and prevent this from occurring or mount a quick cordon and search
operation of known potential sniper locations. In certain circumstances, deploy
friendly snipers to provide quick response and counterfire to adversarial snipers.
h. Control of Movement. Banning vehicle movement and parking in shopping and
other public amenity areas is necessary to limit places where activists employ
explosives to terrorize and disrupt the public. It is also necessary to require a search
of all pedestrians entering these areas. While these efforts control movement and
help to canalize hostile activity, it is labor intensive and increases public resentment
because it limits their freedom of movement. It also limits the PO force’s freedom of
movement.
i. Night Operations. Conduct night patrols on foot when possible because vehicle
movement is obvious on quiet streets. Many built up areas are noisy and busy at
night and mobile support is a vital backup to foot patrol activity. Street lighting is an
advantage but it makes unobtrusive patrolling difficult.
j. Helicopters. Helicopters hover to see into narrow streets and enclosed areas,
making them vulnerable to missiles and sniper fire. However, these and other fixed-
wing assets are useful for observing crowds as they form and move. They act as
airborne command posts, rebroadcast stations, resupply and reinforce standing
rooftop patrols, and evacuate casualties. When possible, install surveillance devices
such as optical and terminal image sights, video cameras, and night vision goggles

78 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

on helicopters. The prolonged use of helicopters over localized areas, particularly at
night, results in protests from the population. See ATP 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP
3-01.04/AFTTP 3-2.29 MTTP for Aviation Urban Operations.
7. Controlling Underground Areas
a. Operations Below Ground. Movement below ground is feasible in main towns and
cities, and is possible in smaller urban and suburban areas. Underground passages
provide additional approaches and escape routes, which commanders take into
account when planning installation defense. Most underground tunnels have a
circular cross section. If they carry any sort of roadway or rails, there is flat decking
with a space beneath it. This space is big enough for movement, and provides hiding
places for people and equipment. Tunnels have access points, usually at both ends
and at intervals throughout, allowing fresh air to circulate. Access points or fresh
airshafts may, be sealed up in disused tunnels. There is danger from accumulated
gases and foul air in any tunnel. Provide PO forces working in the area with
breathing apparatus.
b. Types of Subterranean Systems. Underground systems include the following:
(1) Sewers. These are the most common underground systems and exist in
every large urban area. They are as much as 6 meters in diameter and have
frequent access points. Some incorporate roadways, enabling speedy movement
by large parties.
(2) Railway Tunnels. Most underground railways are in large cities or under high
ground in the country. Passage of trains and the presence of maintenance crews
make such tunnels hazardous to anyone attempting to pass through them.
(3) Pipeline Subways. Tunnels designed to carry gas, water, and electricity are
normally too small to admit the passage of a person. They have frequent access
points and are up to 4 feet in diameter, allowing the opportunity to hide weapons
and other supplies.
(4) Cellars and Connection Passages. Cellars are common in urban areas.
Constructing connection doors and passages makes an extensive underground
system. This requires the cooperation or coercion of the owners.
(5) Mineral Mining Operations. Coal or other mineral mining operations are
common and occur anywhere. Access depends on the type of mining operation
and how the shafts are connected.
(6) Subterranean Rivers. Any large town built in a valley has streams and small
rivers within its boundaries. If enclosed to carry off storm water or similar
purposes, they have frequent access points.
(7) Road Tunnels. Road tunnels are open to the public; they do not offer a
covered approach for clandestine movement. Surprise attacks occur in road
tunnels below key or vulnerable points.
(8) Natural Caves and Catacombs. In some areas, there are extensive
handmade and natural caves under towns and villages.
c. Intelligence. The surveyors or public works departments of the local government
possess maps of underground systems, including accessibility details. The officials
responsible for the services using the tunnels, and for their maintenance, provides

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 79

valuable information on physical characteristics such as, fresh air supplies, volume,
rate, time of flow (if an underground waterway), and useful control and blocking
points. Supplement the information gained from civil sources with reconnaissance.
Check if other individuals or groups have accessed the underground systems.
d. Denial of Access. Deny adversarial access either by sealing entry points or
making the system unusable. The methods vary based on the type of underground
tunneling and success depends on the ability of military forces to maintain
observation. Some methods include:
(1) Spot welding access points where only occasional access is required.
(2) Installing remote sensors or intruder alarms. These need maintenance and
communications, and employees using the tunnel system know of their existence.
(3) Sealing off parts of the system by erecting internal barriers. Forces have to
weld these into place.
(4) Flushing out the system with crowd suppressor smoke at low concentration
or by flooding with water (ROE dependent). Forces permanently neutralize parts
of a tunnel system using this method.
e. Patrolling Underground Passages. This is necessary in any system (e.g., sewers
or an underground railway), which forces cannot seal. It has the dual advantage of
discouraging unauthorized use and enabling security forces to become familiar with
the tunnel system.
f. Clearance Operations. If hostile groups use an underground system in spite of the
precautions listed above, forces have to mount operations to clear the tunnels. The
main points to note are:
(1) Locating Unauthorized Users. Comprehensive maps are essential. If there
are no indications of where to look for unauthorized users, then systematically
search the tunnel systems. Guard each section after clearing. Coordinated
surface patrolling supports subterranean patrols.
(2) Flushing Out. Selectively use water or crowd suppressor smoke at low
concentration, in different parts of a tunnel system to force escapees into the
open rather than into other tunnels (ROE dependent). Exercise strict control over
the use of riot control agents in confined spaces.
(3) Siege. If possible, block all escape routes and wait for cold and hunger to
take effect.
(4) Physical Assault. Apply ordinary tactical principles in a cramped and unusual
environment.
g. C2. C2 is difficult to maintain underground. The following points and suggested
solutions are below:
(1) Communications. Radio does not work well and communication requires
laying communication lines. Maintain good communication between troops
working underground and those on the surface.
(2) Orientation. It is easy to lose all sense of direction when underground.
Supplement good maps with gyrocompasses and overt signposting.

80 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(3) Combat Identification. Good communication and strict control of badges,
insignia, or special items of clothing helps avoid clashes between different parties
in the security forces.
8. Controlling Rural Areas
a. Rural Operations Characteristics. The characteristics of rural operations are
below:
(1) The adversary relies on force of arms, stealth, or field craft for protection.
(2) Forces find it difficult to distinguish between neutral and hostile members of
the population. After identifying hostile groups who commit an aggressive act,
forces engage them with less chance of involving innocent people.
(3) The relatively open nature of the countryside provides more scope for mobile
operations and the use, where justified, of heavier weapons and aviation.
(4) Rural communities are often small, isolated, more vulnerable to local
intimidation, and difficult to protect. This makes it easier to impose hostile control
over a scattered rural community than over a neighboring town. In areas where
the authority of elected government is not recognized, hostile groups operate with
relative freedom because local people live in fear of intimidation and reprisal. The
following are two broad types of rural operations:
(a) Control by the authorities still exists, and PO forces use relatively minor
operations to control, if not eliminate, the threat of hostile activity.
(b) Authority of officials and freedom of movement is absent. Control of an
area lies in hostile hands. This requires a wider scale of operation with the
need for measures falling just short of those employed in full-scale military
operations.
b. Local Defense. Give the responsibility for local defense to a subunit because the
commander concentrates on operations throughout the operational area.
c. Intelligence. Close-knit rural communities are difficult to penetrate, making
intelligence gathering difficult in the early stages of operations. Setting up a base on
the edge of an already controlled area is helpful because information on the
operational area initially comes from sources within the controlled area. When
operations start achieving success, information becomes more plentiful, and
measures are implemented providing means for people to get in touch with security
forces without undue risk.

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82 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter V
FORCE PROTECTION
1. Background
Force protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force, providing a
commander maximum force at decisive times and places. The political dynamics of PO
place enormous pressure on commanders to avoid casualties. Commanders have the
inherent responsibility of protecting the force, but must recognize and account for risks.
Commanders accomplish the mission while minimizing loss of life. Preparing for worst-
case scenarios helps commanders attain these goals.
2. Definition
a. JP 3-0 defines force protection as, “Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile
actions against DOD personnel (including family members), resources, facilities, and
critical information.”
b. Force protection in PO consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile
actions against PO forces, resources, and facilities. Adversaries seek to frustrate
military operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics because
they are unable to challenge US forces in conventional combat. Force protection
develops remedies to counter these threats.
c. Force protection at all levels minimizes losses due to hostile action. Aggressive
counterintelligence activities, comprehensive threat assessments, and appropriate
follow-on actions decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces. Effective OPSEC
keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly information. Proper dispersion and
standoff reduce losses from belligerent action. Camouflage discipline, local security,
and field fortifications do the same. At the operational level, rear area and base
security contributes to force protection.
d. Field Discipline. Commanders ensure combat operational stress control
measures are in place and practiced by unit leaders. Field discipline protects
personnel from the physical and psychological effects of the environment.
Oppressive environments sap troop strength and morale more quickly than enemy
action. Commanders take every measure and precaution to keep their forces healthy
and maintain their morale. Actions include securing equipment and supplies from
loss or damage. Commanders ensure systems are in place for adequate health
support (include preventive medicine) and quick return to duty of minor casualties.
They provide effective systems for maintenance, evacuation, and rapid replacement
or repair of equipment.
e. Safety. Operational conditions impose significant risk to the lives and health of
military members and make equipment operation difficult. Trained crews and
operators know the capabilities, limitations, and best employment of their weapons
systems. When designing operations, commanders consider the limits of human
endurance, and balance the benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations against
the risks.
f. Fratricide Avoidance. The destructive power and range of modern weapons
increases the chance of fratricide. Leaders are responsible for positive weapons

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 83

control and controlled troop movements. Adherence to well-conceived ROE and
disciplined operational procedures contributes to avoiding fratricide and its
detrimental psychological after-effects.
3. Threat Assessment
a. Conduct a Threat Assessment. The first step in developing a force protection
program is identifying and characterizing potential threats to the force.
Understanding the threat enables US personnel to assess their vulnerability to attack
and develop effective protective and response measures. US forces follow basic
security planning steps and principles when planning force protection. These steps
and principles apply whether planning at the individual, team or unit level. They also
apply to teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. The
focus is on all threats the force may encounter.
b. Conduct a Vulnerability Assessment. A vulnerability assessment addresses the
susceptibility of the force to threats identified during the threat assessment. This
essential step helps the identification and prioritization of the resources required for
defeating the threat. The assessment provides a basis for determining antiterrorism
measures that protect personnel and assets from attacks. The vulnerability
assessment applies to fixed sites and mobile operations. It is an ongoing process
that includes all three dimensions: OPSEC, PHYSEC, and PERSEC.
(1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly
actions attendant to military operations and other activities; identifying actions
that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
(2) PHYSEC is the part of security concerned with physical measures designed
to safeguard personnel; prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations,
material, and documents; and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,
damage, and theft.
(3) PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria determining whether an
individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment
to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in US
forces consistent with national security interests.
c. Determine Appropriate Countermeasures. Countermeasures are measures taken
by a unit or individual countering a specific threat at a specific time and place.
Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal
equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require
reorganization of land use; reorientation of roadways, security improvements to
installation entries and existing structures and the surrounding site area; and
coordination with HN military and CIVPOL. They also require the creation of
specialized elements that are task organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats,
and recover from the aftermath of threats. Some threats require the identification of
multiple scenarios or alternatives for achieving the desired goal. Alternatives
undergo a suitability analysis that accounts for factors limiting the feasibility of an
action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resources, and political
constraints such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction
materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities.

84 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

d. Implement Countermeasures. Implement countermeasures as soon as possible
after identifying a threat. Incorporate the least costly and most effective protection
measures during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate force protection
measures at the planning stage precludes the need for piecemeal and costly
security enhancements later in the mission.
e. Evaluate Effectiveness of the Countermeasures. Over time, threats change as
situations change. Countermeasures effective yesterday may no longer be effective
today.
4. Threat Countermeasures
a. When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce
measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined
in JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and Department of Defense Instruction O-2000.12, DOD
Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
b. FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists
but warrants only a routine security posture.
c. FPCON ALPHA applies when there is an increased general threat of possible
terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are
unpredictable. ALPHA measures must be capable of indefinite sustainment.
d. FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist
activity exists. Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect
operational capability and relations with local authorities.
e. FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence indicates likely
terrorist action or targeting against personnel and facilities. Prolonged
implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities
of the unit and its personnel.
f. FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has
occurred or when receiving intelligence that terrorist action against a specific
location or person is imminent. Declare FPCON DELTA as a localized condition and
for shorter periods.
5. Terrorist Tactics
a. When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses
on three components: person, weapons, and tactics.
(1) Person. Terrorists generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities,
and equipment. Their objectives include:
(a) Inflicting injury or death on people.
(b) Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
(c) Stealing equipment, material, or information.
(d) Creating publicity for their cause.
(2) Weapons. Terrorists use various tools, weapons, and explosives when
achieving their objectives. Examples are listed below:
(a) Forced entry, vehicles, and surveillance methods.
(b) Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons,
man-portable air defense systems, and mortars.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 85

(c) Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and IEDs.
(d) Weapons of mass destruction.
(3) Tactics. Tactics refer to the offensive techniques employed by adversaries,
reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the common tactics include:
(a) Place IEDs in an improvised manner, which incorporate destructive,
lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals, and are designed to
destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. They are emplaced, person-borne,
vehicle-borne, bicycle-borne, or applied via other unexpected means.
(b) Detonate stationary IEDs by time delay or remote control.
(c) Execute follow-on IED and deception attacks designed to target first
responder and recovery forces.
(d) Conduct exterior attacks at close range to a facility or exposed asset
using clubs, rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or hand-
placed bombs, to inflict destruction and death.
(e) Execute standoff weapon attacks using military or improvised direct- and
indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars.
(f) Attempt covert entry by entering the facility using false credentials. The
adversary may carry weapons or explosives into the site or facility or remove
items or information from the site.
(g) Deliver small bombs or incendiary devices incorporated into envelopes or
packages disguised as mail and delivered to the targeted individual or facility.
(h) Deliver bombs or incendiary devices, larger than mail bombs,
incorporated into various containers, and delivered to facilities or installations.
(i) Contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation using chemical or
biological agents, or radiological particles.
(j) Contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation using chemical,
biological, or radiological agents.
6. IO and Force Protection
a. Commander use IO to support force protection by assessing the IE and
determining the most effective application and integration of information-related
capabilities, including operations security, to deny adversaries critical information
and observable indicators.
b. Examples of ways IO enhances force protection include:
(1) Using MISO and PA to emphasize the legitimacy of the PO force’s mission
and presence in the AO.
(2) Minimizing casualties through the dissemination of checkpoint or other
procedures involving EOF and applying lethal action.
(3) Using MISO and PA to explain undertaking specific programs, activities, and
events.
(4) Employing OPSEC to ensure protection of critical information, while
simultaneously promoting transparency.

86 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(5) Using tactical transmitters or radios-in-a-box to disseminate information
rapidly promoting overall safety and security or reporting on malign actors or
influencers who threaten safety and security.
(6) Employing EW systems to protect personnel and equipment from IEDs.
(7) Establishing and enforcing unit requirements for local security (using
biometrics for access control).
7. Intelligence
a. Each Service maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences in
perspective among Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Services, or combatant
commanders’ threat analysis lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist
threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, a local
commander may decide PO forces face no threat in other locations.
b. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to
provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the
installations, resources, and personnel. The DIA identifies threats and sets watch
conditions outside the continental US for DOD installations and provides
recommendations to combatant commanders for force protection levels. The
information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following
section, influences decisions on the application of force protection measures.
8. Medical Role in Force Protection
a. Medical Response and Consequence Management Program. Medical personnel
play an active role in force protection. Commanders integrate the medical response
and consequence management program into the force protection plan.
b. Preventive Medicine Measures. Commanders ensure preventive medicine
measures are undertaken as necessary (e.g., protection from and education on
insects or rodents which carry diseases; weather-related injuries from heat, cold,
wind, or humidity; unsafe or contaminated food or water; importance of good
personnel hygiene) and include these threats in their force protection plan.
c. Combat and Operational Stress Control. Part of the commander's overall force
protection program. PO result in extended periods of boredom and inactivity for
peacekeepers. In addition, PO forces exposed to atrocities and the aftermath of
mass devastation places the force at higher risk for combat stress injuries.
Commanders should include stress inoculation training specific to the mission,
combat and operational stress awareness and resilience building training, emphasis
and minimizing exposure to tragic events where possible.
9. Force Protection Checklist
Use the force protection checklist (Table 4) during PO when not all parties in conflict
have consented to the imposition of a PK force. The belligerents have military and
paramilitary organizations capable of employing implements of war including high-
performance aircraft and CBRN weapons, requiring PO forces to take necessary force
protection precautions. Compare the checklist with published ROE and the status of
forces agreement for any limitations and constraints.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 87

Table 4. Force Protection Checklist
TASK STANDARDS:
1. Unit conducts risk assessment to manage risks.
2. Unit defines threats, determines attack probability, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops effective
countermeasures.
3. Unit develops, disseminates, and updates force protection policy to mitigate threats.
4. Unit leaders recognize force protection as the most important element of the peacekeeping mission.
5. Unit adheres to rules of engagement (ROE).
6. Unit conducts information operations (IO) to ensure understanding and acceptance of and support for protection
efforts, measures, and outcomes, and mitigate unintended consequences.
SECONDARY STANDARDS GO NO GO
1. Unit develops a force protection policy that balances—
a. Attack probability.
b. Cost of adequate protection.
c. Cost of inadequate protection.
2. Unit concentrations, compounds, sites, and facilities evaluated. Evaluations
include—
a. Protection against vehicle-delivered explosives.
b. Protection against exterior attack.
c. Protection from standoff weapons attack.
d. Protection from covert entry or insider compromise attack.
e. Electronic and acoustical eavesdropping denial.
f. Visual surveillance denial.
g. Prevention of mail- or supply-truck-delivered explosives.
3. Unit develops plans to react to demands to search vehicles.
4. Unit OPSEC measures (active and passive) are consistent with higher headquarters
policy.
5. Unit establishes and sustains a situational awareness program (e.g., mine awareness,
regional political, military, and contingency force posture.
6. Unit establishes and enforces requirements for local security.
7. Unit ensures guards are prepared to perform their duties.
All guard posts have special instructions for that specific post. It may include special ROE
instructions.
8. Unit develops and enforces safety guidelines. It includes high-risk countermeasures for the
following—
a. Weapons handling and clearing procedures.
b. Use of stoves, fuels, and combustibles in personnel areas.
c. Driving.
d. Weather extremes.
9. Unit considers weapon effects and fratricide reduction measures in base defense planning.
10. Unit provides adequate field hygiene and sanitation resources.
11. Commander determines arming posture for personnel executing their duties and when in the
compound.
a. Secure arms when not in possession of peacekeepers to prevent theft.
(1) Weighs effect of centralized security (arms room) versus decentralized (squad hut
weapon rack) on defense reaction time.
(2) Considers peacekeeper sense of vulnerability.
b. Unit develops procedures for ammunition storage and authority for issue.
12. Commander designates and assigns security and safety duties to specific individuals.
13. Unit develops an IO synchronization matrix to ensure effective integration of information-
related capabilities.

88 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter VI
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
1. Background
a. Within PO, CMO foster a cooperative relationship between military forces, civilian
organizations participating in the operation, governments, and populations in the
operational area (see JP 3-57). Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders
at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of US presence and
operations among locals, while minimizing friction between military and civilian
organizations in the field. These operations include local security operations,
processing, and movement of DCs, project management and nomination, civil
reconnaissance, and basic health service support.
b. Properly executed CMO provide an environment that enables military
commanders at all levels of command to achieve unified diplomatic, information,
military, and economic objectives of PO. CMO supported by civil affairs operations
(CAO), are an information-related capability when integrating with other information-
related capabilities, and provides the commander the ability to affect the operational
environment, as depicted in figure 19.

Figure 19. Civil-Military Operations Relationships

c. Unity of effort is a central feature of CMO and enhances the credibility of the PO
force, promotes consent and legitimacy, and encourages the parties in the conflict to
work toward a peaceful settlement, thereby facilitating the transition to civil control.
Unity of effort involves the coordination, integration, and synchronization of civil and
military efforts and actions aimed at building the peace. At the tactical level, timely

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 89

and effective coordination with all relevant stakeholders is essential for mission
success. Establishment of committees and action groups, supports coordination and
robust liaison with agencies and organizations involved in the operational area, and
builds respect for their roles and missions. Commanders assist in the coordination of
activities by creating a civil-military operations center (CMOC), or a NATO civil-
military cooperation center that is a potent resource for tactical level commanders to
effect coordination and ensure unity of effort.
d. CMO serve the larger purpose of shaping the operational and information
environments and achieving the commander’s intent and desired end state.
e. A complete discussion of CMO and related functions is in JP 3-57. Commanders
and staffs use the CA area assessment and study contained in FM 3-57, Civil Affairs
Operations, as the basis for all planning analysis and mission execution.
2. Objectives of CMO
a. CMO activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military
forces, governmental and civilian organizations, authorities, and the civilian populace
in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area facilitating military operations and
achieving operational US objectives. Military forces perform CMO activities and
functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government.
These activities occur prior to, during, or after other military actions. They also occur,
if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other
military forces, or a combination of CA and other forces, perform CMO.
b. CMO integrates civil and military actions while conducting:
(1) Support to Civil Administration (SCA). SCA helps stabilize management by a
governing body of a foreign nation’s civil structure by assisting an established
government or establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA
consists of planning, coordinating, advising, and assisting with activities that
reinforce or restore a civil administration, which supports PO objectives. An
example of tactical level SCA is providing security to local civil authorities or
infrastructures until they have the capacity to fulfill their duties or functions and
speed the peace restoration process.
(2) Populace and Resources Control (PRC). PRC assists HN governments or de
facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, mitigating
problems that hinder PO mission accomplishment. PRC measures identify,
reduce, relocate, or access population resources that impede or otherwise
threaten peace or its restoration. PRC measures are the responsibility of HN
governments; however, a joint force may implement them, as necessary, when
HN civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake this
responsibility:
(a) Populace control provides for security of the populace, mobilization of
human resources, denial of personnel availability to the adversary, and
detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy or agitating agents. Populace
control measures—many executed at the tactical level—include curfews,
movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards,
and voluntary resettlement. DC operations involving populace control require

90 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary
organizations.
(b) Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel
resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy or
adversary. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or
guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs,
and inspecting facilities. Implement most of these controls at the tactical level.
(3) FHA. FHA operations are DOD activities, in support of the USAID or DOS,
conducted outside the US, its territories, and possessions, to relieve or reduce
human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by US forces is
limited in scope and duration. The primary planning consideration is available
funding from the primary USG agency. The foreign assistance supplements or
complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have primary
responsibility for providing FHA.
(a) FHA operations are inherently complex operations and require a
significant amount of interagency coordination. Unity of effort facilitates
coordination through entities such as the CMOC, HA coordination centers,
and humanitarian operations centers.
(b) The USAID is the lead federal agency for coordinating FHA. Within
USAID, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead
office in the USG for facilitating and coordinating USG emergency assistance
overseas. The OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in
coordination with other government agencies. JP 3-29 covers command,
control, and coordination of FHA in more detail.
(4) General Procedures. The following are general procedures for assessing and
executing FHA tasks:
(a) Understand the command’s overall objectives and the end state for the
political military operation.
(b) Understand the legal and fiscal restrictions.
(c) Determine and establish contact with local authorities and NGO(s) in the
region.
(d) Establish coordination and communication processes for synchronizing
the relief effort. For instance, CMO operations as part of PO is required to
coordinate and synchronize efforts through organizations such as USAID,
resident UN offices, other IGOs, UNHCR, or a lead NGO such as Cooperative
for Assistance and Relief Everywhere.
(e) Plan and execute the operation in accordance with internationally
recognized standards for FHA.
(f) Consider purpose, short- and long-term goals, consequences, and
perceptions of local populace, HN authorities, international community,
others. Depending on US goals and objectives, it is prudent to include HN
civilian and military resources in civil-military action projects, to promote the
legitimacy of the local government.
(g) Integrate IO into all projects.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 91

(5) Nation Assistance (NA). NA is civil or military assistance (other than HA)
rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime,
crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements between the US and
another nation. NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is promoting long-
term regional stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security
assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance.
Integrate all NA actions into the US Ambassador’s mission strategic plan. NA
may or may not be a part of PO at the outset of operations, but evolves as the
political and diplomatic situation dictates. Tactical-level NA is often characterized
by training support to HN or foreign nation institutions or through civic action
programs designed to assist HN forces in improving living conditions.
(6) Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is the set of DOD activities that
contribute to unified action by the USG supporting the development of capability
and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.
FSF are organizations and personnel under HN control with the mission of
protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal and external threats. Elements of
FSF include full-time, reserve, auxiliary military forces, police, corrections
personnel, border guards (including the Coast Guard), or other similar capabilities
from the local up to national level. Supporting institutions of FSF include
government ministries or departments, academies, training centers, logistics
centers, and other similar activities at the local through national levels that
provide doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities, and policy support to the FSF.
(7) Civil Information Management (CIM). CIM contributes to increased
interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. CIM is a CA planning
consideration. CIM is the process where civil ASCOPE information is gathered,
analyzed, and entered into a central database. The timely availability of
information is a result of fusing the information with the supported JFC, HHQ,
DOD, and joint intelligence organizations, and other USG departments and
agencies, interagency partners, NGOs, and the private sector. The raw
information used for analysis receives the widest possible dissemination.
3. Support to Civil Administration (SCA)
a. SCA covers a wide array of factors, including rule of law, health, information,
policing, and infrastructure. Establish a civil administration, in some PO, to exercise
some local government authorities. In many instances, the commander on the
ground may be responsible for civil administration tasks. PO may mandate support
to civil administration or may temporarily occur in the PO. In most cases, the military
will assist an established or interim government (see JP 3-57).
b. The US Army’s civil affairs command (CACOM) provides force structure
specifically designed to support the civil administration mission. CACOM plans and
helps set the conditions for transitioning the missions of stabilization, reconstruction,
and development to civil authority. Additionally, they conduct short-term support to
civil administration, enable HN government functions, and routinely support IGOs
and interagency core capabilities in indigenous government capacity building and

92 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

delivery of government services. The CACOM provides three organic functional
specialty cells with functional experts that plan and enable HN government
operations across six CA functional areas (see figure 20) and are suited for the civil
administration mission. The six CA functional specialty areas are rule of law,
economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public
education and information. All six functional specialties are interrelated, and
specialists often work together.

Figure 20. Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas

(1) The functional specialty cells and their mission are discussed in the following
six CA functional areas:
(a) Rule of law pertains to the fair, competent, and efficient development,
application, and effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of a
society through impartial legal institutions and competent corrections
systems. This functional area includes judge advocates trained in
international and comparative law and CA specialists in related subjects.
(b) Economic stability pertains to the efficient management (example.
production, distribution, trade, and consumption) of resources, goods, and
services ensuring the viability of a society’s economic system. This discipline
includes CA specialists in economic development, civilian supply, and food
and agriculture.
(c) Infrastructure pertains to designing, building, and maintaining the
organizations, systems, and architecture required to support the utilities
transportation, water, communications, and power. This discipline includes
CA specialists in public transportation, public works and utilities, and public
communication.
(d) Governance pertains to creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining
the institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a
society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public administration,
environmental management, and public safety.
(e) Public health and welfare pertains to the systems, institutions, programs,
and practices that promote the physical, mental, and social well-being of a
society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public health and cultural
relations.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 93

(f) Public education and information pertains to designing, resourcing, and
implementing public education and public information programs and systems
through media and formal education institutions. This discipline includes CA
specialists in public education and civil information.
c. Rule of Law.
(1) Background. The purpose of rule of law operations is creating security and
stability for the civilian population by restoring and enhancing the effective and
fair administration and enforcement of justice. Rule of law is important for
stability. Rule of law operations are particularly significant in the immediate
aftermath of major ground combat operations, when it is imperative to restore
order to the civilian population in the vacuum that results when combat disrupts
the routine administration of society. Close coordination is critical between the
rule of law section and governance section for synchronization and synergy
between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and
efforts to restore, reform, and assist the public safety system. A judicial system is
powerless without an effective public safety system, whereas a public safety
system is not legitimate without a fair and efficient judicial system. For further
information, see the USJFCOM Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and
Security Sector Reform, 13 June 2011.
(2) Measures.
(a) Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military
operations.
(b) Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, including vetting
and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors and
administrators, and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities.
(c) Restore and reform the HN civil and criminal legal system, including
reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws ensuring
compliance with international legal standards, and adopting interim measures
for the immediate administration of justice.
(d) Provide an effective corrections system that complies with international
standards, including selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials, and
constructing or renovating appropriate facilities.
(3) Considerations. This task is primarily a civilian function and involves
providing assistance to design new institutions, drafting new legislation giving
legal institutions the authority to function effectively, training professionals
working in the new institutions, and educating the public on what the rule of law
means. Rule of law operations are seldom exclusively a military or USG activity.
Rule of law operations are a collaborative effort involving the following:
(a) U.S. military assets, including military police, engineers, combat forces,
logistics elements, legal personnel, and CA personnel.
(b) Other agencies of the federal government, including DOS, DOJ, and
USAID.
(c) IGOs.

94 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(d) Coalition and other national elements, including military and civilian
agencies.
(e) NGOs engaged in judicial and legal reform.
(f) HN legal professionals, including judges, prosecutors, defense
counselors, legal advisors, legal administrators, and legal educators.
(g) HN law enforcement personnel, including administrators, police,
investigators, and trainers.
(h) Other HN government officials.
(4) Functions. In CA organizations and task-organized forces similar to CA
organizations, judge advocate personnel, CA public safety specialists with law
enforcement backgrounds, and others with backgrounds in judicial administration,
corrections, and other relevant areas carry out rule of law operations.
Commanders detail rule of law section personnel to work with an HN interagency,
international, or other group carrying out rule of law operations. The judge
advocates in the rule of law section have extensive training in international,
comparative, and human rights law.
(a) Many activities conducted in rule of law operations involve the practice of
law, and attorneys must perform these activities. These activities include the
following:
• Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes,
ordinances, and other measures intended to bring immediate order to
areas where the HN legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning.
• Evaluating the reform of HN laws ensuring compliance with international
legal standards and providing appropriate assistance to the drafting and
review process when necessary.
• Evaluating legal training given to HN judges, prosecutors, defense
counselors, and legal advisors, and providing appropriate training when
necessary.
• Evaluating legal training given to police and corrections officials
ensuring compliance with international human rights standards.
• Serving as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counselors, and
legal advisors for transitional courts.
• Evaluating legal and administrative procedures ensuring compliance
with international law, the law of the power administering the territory, and
the law of the supported country.
• Determining which HN offices and functions have legal authority to
evaluate, reform, and implement the law.
• Advising US military commanders, US international, and HN authorities
on the status of the HN legal system and its compliance with international
standards, and providing recommended reforms.
• Advising others and US military commanders on the application of
international law, US domestic law, and HN law to the process of
restoring and enhancing rule of law in the HN.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 95

(b) The SJA is a senior judge advocate (typically a lieutenant colonel or
colonel) assigned to act as the SJA and senior rule of law officer for the
organization conducting CAO. The SJA or senior rule of law officer is the legal
advisor to the commander and is the chief of the rule of law section. The SJA
or senior rule of law officer provides staff supervision over rule of law
operations and other legal activities of judge advocates in the organization.
The SJA or senior rule of law officer is under the technical supervision of the
higher-level command or task force SJA.
(5) Capabilities. Organize the rule of law section to:
(a) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of the HN legal systems and
their impact on joint force CMO strategy.
(b) Evaluate the HN legal system, including reviewing statutes, codes,
decrees, regulations, procedures, and legal traditions for compliance with
international standards. Advising and assisting the HN and other rule of law
participants in the process of developing transitional codes and procedures
and long-term legal reform.
(c) Evaluate personnel, judicial infrastructure, and equipment of the HN court
system and determining the requirements for training, repair, construction,
and acquisition.
(d) Provide support to transitional justice system, including acting as judges,
magistrates, prosecutors, defense counselor, legal advisors, and court
administrators when required.
(e) Coordinate rule of law efforts involving US and coalition military, other US
agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities.
(f) Assist the SJA in educating and training US personnel in the indigenous
legal system, obligations, and consequences.
(g) Advise and assist the SJA in international and HN legal issues as
required.
(h) Assist the SJA regarding status-of-forces agreement and status-of-
mission agreement issues.
(i) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government public safety systems supporting administration of the penal
systems.
(6) Additional Considerations.
(a) Include public security issues in CCIRs. Obtain the advice of the SJA,
MP, CID, and other national and international experts when determining what
information or evidence could assist in future criminal investigations.
(b) Establish a fusion cell with links to the special advisor for rule of law or
the coordinating body established by the task force or the international
authority for coordinating public security. This cell integrates information from
deployed military units, special Gendarmerie (French) units, special police
units, UNPOL, DOJ trainers, and other public security organizations. Share
actionable intelligence among military, policy, judiciary, and penal authorities.

96 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

d. Economic Stability. The economic stability section consists of functional
specialists in economic fields and business administration. It provides technical
expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The
section assesses government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using
these assessments, based on the civilian skills of its members, the team determines
how to help efficiently manage resources, goods, and services enhancing viability of
the society’s economic system. The economic stability section provides
recommendations and, when appropriate, directions to maintain, sustain, and
improve economic systems and services. Skills found in this section include
economists, bankers, civilian supply and distribution technicians, business
administrators, entrepreneurs, agriculturalists and farmers, food specialists and
technicians, marketing and distribution specialists, and other officer and enlisted
personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s economic
system.
(1) Functions.
(a) Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational
oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural
systems, and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting,
distributing, and marketing.
(b) Coordinates the use of indigenous government and commercial food and
agricultural resources for military use, CMO, and supporting government
administration.
(c) Assists in coordinating indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), IGOs,
NGOs, and US assistance and resources supporting food and agricultural
systems as part of CMO (e.g., crop and livestock improvement, agricultural
training, and education).
(d) Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational
oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and
commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
(e) Develops and implements plans reducing or mitigating black-market
activities.
(f) Conducts liaison efforts and coordinates with local government
administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CAO.
(g) Ensures compliance with international laws, and conventions, in
coordination with the SJA, regarding use of local labor and when acquiring
and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities). Develops
plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or
establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
(h) Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private
property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use,
CAO, and government administration.
(i) Establishes policies and procedures, in coordination with the SJA, on the
custody and administration of public and private property.
(2) Capabilities.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 97

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel,
resources, and facilities.
(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural
systems and the impact of those systems on CAO.
(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and
agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber,
and forestry) management supporting government administration.
(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and
maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.
(e) Assist in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and resources
supporting food and agricultural systems as part of CAO (crop and livestock
improvement, agricultural training, and education).
(f) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and
assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities,
agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
(g) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and
the impact of those systems on CAO.
(h) Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies,
revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.
(i) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating
economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.
(j) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of
employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention
of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).
(k) Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including
labor, supporting government administration, CMO, and military use.
(l) Assist in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and resources
supporting local economic development as part of CMO.
(m) Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials concerning
indigenous peoples’ cultural intricacies.
(n) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services,
personnel, resources, and facilities.
(o) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems
and the impact of those systems on CAO.
(p) Determine the availability of local supplies.
(q) Identify private and public property available for military use.
(r) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining
government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
(s) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for
government and commercial supply resources supporting government

98 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

administration (transportation, storage, distribution including rationing, and
using captured and salvaged items).
e. Infrastructure. The infrastructure section consists of functional specialists in
public works, transportation, utilities, and communications. It provides technical
expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The
section assesses the indigenous public infrastructure and systems. Using these
assessments and the civilian skills of its members, the team, in coordination with the
US Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, HN officials, and vetted contractors,
determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, architecture,
and systems for supporting transportation, water, sanitation, communications, and
power. The infrastructure section provides recommendations and, when appropriate,
directions to maintain, sustain, and improve the indigenous public systems and
services, such as transportation, utilities, and postal systems. Skills required in this
section include engineers (civil, mechanical, electrical, and environmental); water
and sanitation specialists; electrical distribution specialists and administrators; road
construction, telephone, radio, and television specialists; and other officers and
enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s
basic infrastructure.
(1) Functions.
(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.
(b) Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial transportation
resources for military use, CAO, and supporting government administration.
(c) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities,
and systems.
(d) Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial public works
and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, CAO, and
supporting government administration.
(e) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and
systems.
(f) Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private
communication equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, CAO, and
supporting government administration.
(2) Capabilities.
(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing foreign nation (FN) or HN public and commercial transportation
systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
(b) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and
the impact of those systems on CAO.
(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government and commercial transportation resources supporting government

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 99

administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and
waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).
(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining
government transportation systems and agencies.
(e) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing FN or HN public and commercial works and utilities systems,
agencies, services, and facilities.
(f) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities
systems and the impact of those systems on CAO.
(g) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government and commercial works and utilities resources supporting
government administration (electric power; natural gas; water production and
distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public
facilities).
(h) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and
maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
(i) Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources
supporting government administration and CAO.
(j) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies,
services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
(k) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems
and the impact of those systems on CAO.
(l) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government and commercial communications resources supporting
government administration (postal services, telephone, radio, television,
computer systems, and print media).
(m) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining
government communications systems and agencies.
f. Governance. The governance section consists of functional specialists in public
administration and services (excluding public health and welfare, cultural relations,
and education). It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance
to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the
institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a society.
Skills required in this section include public administrators, public safety
administrators and managers, environmental administrators and managers, and
other administrators whose civilian duties include upper-level management of any
public institutions at various levels (example, city, county, local, state, federal).
(1) Functions.
(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and
resources.

100 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(b) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
(c) Assists in employing public safety resources supporting government
administration, CAO, and military use.
(d) Coordinates with HN government administrators and agencies supporting
CAO.
(e) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems,
agencies, equipment, and facilities.
(f) Coordinates HN government and private environmental management
resources for the following:
• Military use.
• CAO.
• Support of the government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond
to, and recover from environmental activities.
(2) Capabilities.
(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing FN or HN public administration systems, agencies, services,
personnel, and resources.
(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration
systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
(c) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing indigenous public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel,
and resources.
(d) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and
the impact of those systems on the supported commander’s mission.
(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government public safety systems supporting government administration
(police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, and emergency
rescue).
(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining
government public safety systems and agencies.
(g) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating
public government systems and agencies.
(h) Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements,
policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local
population.
(i) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies,
services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
(j) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and
pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 101

(k) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
environmental management services and resources supporting government
administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources
and provide pollution control).
(l) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and
maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies.
(m) Advise, assist, and support the coordination of IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US
assistance and resources supporting local government environmental
management as part of CMO.
g. Public Health and Welfare. The public health and welfare section consists of
functional specialists qualified in public health and medical services. It provides
technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command
in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes
through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of its
people. Professions required in this section include doctors, dentists, hospital
administrators, nurses, veterinarians, public health specialists, environmental
scientists and specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian
duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and
archives.
(1) Functions.
(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and
facilities.
(b) Coordinates the use of IPI government and private sector health
resources for use in CMO and supporting HN government administration.
(c) Assists in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and
resources supporting local government public health systems as part of CMO.
(d) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public welfare systems, agencies, equipment,
and facilities.
(e) Assists in familiarizing, educating, and training US personnel in the FN or
HN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and
language.
(f) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities
(religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments,
art, archives, and libraries).
(g) Assists in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in
determining ownership.
(2) Capabilities.
(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing IPI public and private health systems, animal husbandry systems,
sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

102 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation
systems and the impact of those systems on CAO.
(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public
health services and resources supporting government administration (clinics,
hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance
transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and
maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
(e) Advise and assist IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US agencies in preventing,
controlling, and treating diseases among human and animal populations
(education, immunization, and sanitation).
(f) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public welfare systems
regarding the most vulnerable portion of the population (mentally
handicapped, aged, infirmed, women, and children) and the impact of those
systems on CAO.
(g) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and
maintaining government public welfare systems and agencies.
(h) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public
welfare services and resources to support government administration.
(i) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on HN social and
cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social well-
being of the society and the effects on CAO.
(j) Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting
significant cultural property.
(k) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for
government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect,
preserve, and restore cultural property.
(l) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining
cultural property systems and agencies.
h. Public Education and Information. The public education and information section
consists of functional specialists in education and information services. It provides
technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command
in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information
programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. Skills
required in this section include educators at all levels, education specialists, school
administrators, public relations personnel, media and marketing specialists, and
others whose civilian duties include education and information management.
(1) Functions.
(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in
rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities,
and resources.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 103

(b) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in the
use of HN mass communication supporting CAO and the supported
commander’s inform and influence objectives.
(c) Recommends information control and civil censorship policies in the
controlled territory.
(2) Capabilities.
(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing HN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies,
services, personnel, and resources.
(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and
the impact of those systems on CAO.
(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public
education system supporting government administration (primary, secondary,
post-secondary, and technical educational systems).
(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public
education systems and agencies.
(e) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of government, commercial,
and private mass communication systems and determine the impact of those
systems on the populace and the effects on CAO.
(f) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and
assessing mass communication themes and the impact on inform and
influence objectives.
(g) Advise and assist HN institutions in developing and coordinating public
relations activities supporting government administration and the “single
voice” message.

104 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter VII
INFORMING AND INFLUENCING
1. Background
Achieving PO objectives requires commanders and PO forces to understand how to
integrate information-related capabilities into joint operations creating effects and
operationally exploitable conditions necessary for achieving the joint force commander’s
objectives.
2. The Information Environment
a. In PO, the involved factions, friendly or adversarial, use information for their own
advantage and employ tactics such as censorship, propaganda, misinformation, and
disinformation to gain an advantage.
b. Local and international media are operating before, during, and after PO forces
arrive and depart, and are one of the contributing factors in the military’s
engagement.
c. Allies and coalition member countries participating as a multinational force may
have troops engaged before US military involvement, and their ongoing IO campaign
must reconcile with the US campaign. Successful operations result from aligned and
reconciled competing narratives.
d. Individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines broadcast information and
shape perceptions by interacting directly with the media or online through social
media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. The messages either enhance or
inhibit operational objectives. Commanders balance transparency with security when
deciding whether to manage or restrict these activities.
e. Minor or local events have rapid international significance as the global media
broadcasts them across multiple platforms, and operate around the clock.
f. Enemies and adversaries exploit gaps between what PO forces say and do.
3. Information Operations
a. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related
capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting
US interests. IO is chiefly focused on affecting adversary decision making but
recognizes that influencing foreign, most especially indigenous audiences in the
area of operations, is a means to this end.
b. The aim of IO in PO is reassuring, persuading, and influencing communities
within the operational area to support PO efforts toward attaining a sustainable
peace.
c. The fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand military commanders
engage openly and routinely with multiple audiences gaining support for PO.
d. PO forces carefully consider the effects of actions, operations, and activities
before undertaking them and avoiding unintended consequences. For example,
destroying a belligerent’s radio or television broadcast capability diminishes their

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 105

means of propaganda making and brings favorable tactical results, but it also has a
destabilizing effect on the peace process.
e. If the population is subject to propaganda by adversaries, PO forces quickly
provide the population with objective, factual, and credible information.
4. Commander Tasks
a. Commanders drive operations through a clear articulation of their intent and
desired end state. Commanders frame the narrative used by the entire force,
speaking with one voice, and interacting with the right audiences and shaping the IE
in favor of the commander’s intent.
b. In PO, commanders are often chief negotiators and the focus of media in
sensitive situations.
c. Actions commanders take unifying the IO effort includes:
(1) Establish critical information requirements.
(2) Ensure development of a media policy including media guidelines, embed
procedures, and support to media while in the AO.
(3) Provide guidance on message and talking point development. Ensure these
messages nest with higher-level themes and objectives across all PO partner
nations and agencies.
(4) Designate a qualified individual to serve as the staff IO planner if one does
not exist. Additionally, appoint a qualified individual for each IRC capability as
necessary.
(5) Chair the IO working group, as available, and invite relevant participants to
participate, including interorganizational and HN partners, when appropriate. The
composition of the working group changes depending on the situation.
(6) Augment IO personnel with expertise and a work force that focus on local
nationals, interpreters, and media analysts.
(7) Support IO with intelligence. Without detailed intelligence, encompassing the
complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues, units cannot
properly plan or execute IO. The IO planner requires nodal and link analysis
based on accurate and up-to-date intelligence. Intelligence assets assist in
obtaining assessment data.
(8) Establish and sustain an integrated team approach. Successful IO requires
unifying the effects of all participating organizations, units, or entities involved in
the peace process, including nonmilitary agencies.
(9) Keep the IO planner, PAO, and MIS team leaders abreast of operational
changes and upcoming operations.
(10) Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth offsetting
propaganda efforts, correcting misinformation, or setting the record straight.
Employ the PA rule of maximum disclosure and minimum delay, but remain
mindful of OPSEC considerations and PA policy guidelines concerning release of
information.

106 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(11) Disseminate relevant information, including bad news and mistakes, as
quickly as possible gaining and maintaining credibility with international media
and the HN.
(12) Involve every military member. The most powerful way to influence
populations is for every member of the force to be an information transmitter and
receiver. Ensure all members of the force understand the IO plan and clearly
articulate its messages and talking points to others.
(13) Obtain appropriate approvals. The chain of command approves certain
aspects of IO, particularly MISO and military deception. Certain approvals exist at
higher headquarters and take time to process, requiring advanced planning.
d. The following are operations planner tasks for PO:
(1) Integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all information-related capabilities
executed as part of the commander’s IO efforts.
(2) Lead or chair the IO working group when the commander, deputy
commander, chief of staff, and executive officer are unavailable.
(3) Develop and maintain a combined information overlay and an IO running
estimate.
(4) Monitor execution of approved activities by maintaining the IO
synchronization matrix and other staff tools.
(5) Assess measures of performance and effectiveness against the intended
plan.
(6) Advise the commander and staff when the assessment requires adjustments
in the plan.
(7) Provide information requirements for the information collection plan.
(8) Advise the commander on how subordinate commanders help shape an
operational environment.
(9) Provide training to subordinate leaders and PO forces on IO, such as
conducting interpersonal engagements and media interview techniques.
(10) Maintain master key leader or Soldier and leader engagement plan, and
submit nonlethal targets to the targeting board.
5. Information-Related Capabilities
a. Commanders delegate specific organic capabilities and request others
capabilities that support their objectives in shaping their operational environments.
Per JP 3-13, many military capabilities contribute to IO and commanders consider
using the following capabilities during the planning process.
(1) Strategic communication.
(2) Joint interagency coordination group.
(3) PA.
(4) CMO.
(5) Cyberspace operations.
(6) Information assurance.
(7) Space operations.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 107

(8) MISO.
(9) Intelligence.
(10) Military deception.
(11) OPSEC.
(12) Special technical operations.
(13) Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.
(14) Key leader engagement.
b. Information-related capabilities support a commander’s ability to inform and
influence audiences across the ROMO and shape desired outcomes. IO integration
specialists or planners synchronize and integrate information-related capabilities
bringing about and enhancing desired effects within the IE. Theoretically, all
capabilities send a message or make an impression. Therefore, commanders
consider all capabilities when devising solutions and plans. Although PA is an
information-related capability, it should be considered distinct from IO, given the
statutory prohibition against influencing the U.S. domestic audience. However, its
efforts and effects must be coordinated and de-conflicted from other information-
related capabilities. In PO, the commander and staff regularly use the following
designated information-related capabilities to inform and influence audiences:
(1) PA.
(2) MISO.
(3) Combat camera.
(4) CAO or CMO.
(5) Human environment system or human environment teams.
(6) OPSEC.
(7) Military deception.
c. Other capabilities that support IO include the following:
(1) Cyber electromagnetic activities.
(2) EW.
(3) Cyberspace operations.
(4) Electromagnetic spectrum management operations.
(5) Special technical operations.
(6) Presence, posture, and profile.
(7) Physical attack.
(8) PHYSEC.
d. For more information about these capabilities, see JP 3-13, FM 3-13, Inform and
Influence Activities, and FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare.
6. IO Training and Predeployment Considerations
a. Begin, when alerted, an IO running estimate for the anticipated AO.
b. Commence analysis of the AO’s IE, with particular emphasis on cultural
considerations affecting the way audiences perceive, receive, and transmit
information.

108 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

c. Undertake language and cultural awareness training, as available.
d. Prepare and train for IO before deployment. Send personnel to training, such as
the Army’s Tactical IO course.
7. Information Support Agencies
Several agencies are established and structured to support the IO process. Each of the
agencies provides support to operational and strategic commands but selectively
supports the tactical level. Work through HHQ IO planning cells when requesting
assistance and representatives. Below are examples of agencies able to support PO
commanders, either directly or indirectly.
a. The First Information Operations Command (Land) is under the command of US
Army Intelligence and Security Command and is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia
(VA). The First Information Operations Command’s mission is providing full-
spectrum IO support to Army commands, specifically tailored to support the land
component commander. The First Information Operations Command:
(1) Deploys tailored field support teams helping operational and tactical battle
staffs integrate IO with plans and operations within PO.
(2) Provides access to DOD intelligence and IO-related intelligence from other
government agencies.
(3) Coordinates multidisciplined intelligence and other support for PO planning
and execution. Its mission areas include IO database support, HUMINT, and
counterintelligence.
b. An IO operations group provides limited information-related capabilities subject
matter expertise to the Army Service component command and its subordinate
commands. The units affiliate with the National Guard and Reserve Components of
the US Army. There are currently four IO groups in the Army with two in the US
Army Reserve and two in the Army National Guard. The IO groups support the joint
and Army missions with IO planning, preparation, coordination, and assessment
capabilities. Across the ROMO, they provide the warfighting commander with a
scalable capability focused on the region and culture.
c. The Marine Corps Information Operations Center provides operational support to
the Marine components and Marine air-ground task forces and provides IO subject
matter expertise supporting US Marine Corps IO advocates and proponents
enabling effective integration of IO into Marine Corps operations.
d. Navy Information Operations Command advances IO warfighting capabilities for
naval and joint forces by providing operationally focused training and planning
support; developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; advocating
requirements supporting future effects-based warfare; and managing functional data
for IO.
e. Air Combat Command, 8th Air Force, and 67th Network Warfare Wing provides
Air Force IO. These organizations provide reach back support to IO teams and other
entities supporting Air Force, combatant command, and national tasking’s. Assets
include electronic systems security assessment centers, network operations support
centers, an information aggressor flight, and the Air Force Information Operations
Center.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 109

f. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, subordinate to the Joint Staff,
provides expertise to combatant commands by providing IO teams to assist in the
planning, coordination and execution of IO.

110 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Chapter VIII
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. Background
a. This chapter provides techniques that assist military members in resolving
situations requiring two or more parties to find a mutual agreement. Knowledge of
these techniques does not qualify a military member to act as a hostage negotiator
or a negotiator for international, national, or regional agreements. Those types of
agreements require specific expertise and legal status beyond the normal scope of
PO activities. There are three basic methods for reaching an agreement: negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration.
(1) Negotiation is reaching an agreement by disputing parties directly conferring,
discussing, or bargaining.
(2) Mediation is reaching decisions between disputing parties with the assistance
of a neutral third party.
(3) Arbitration is the conflict resolution method where a neutral party makes the
final decision for the disputing parties.
b. When resolving disagreements between parties, military members display a
combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus. They show integrity,
tolerance, patience, innovation, flexibility, and resourcefulness to succeed. The
military member shows respect to all parties, takes charge, expects change, and
works toward a mutual agreement. Perseverance is critical for long-term success.
Examples of conflict resolutions requiring military personnel include:
(1) Getting local leaders to implement a “stay put policy” preventing displaced
civilian movement during combat operations.
(2) Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HN support contracts.
(3) Assisting former belligerents in resolving relocation agreements during post
hostilities operations.
(4) Deconflicting military HA activities with those of NGOs and IOs.
c. A successfully negotiated agreement is fair, efficient, wise, and enduring.
(1) Fairness implies treating all sides without bias.
(2) Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with minimum of effort.
(3) Wisdom pertains to following the soundest course of action.
(4) Endurance refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the
agreement to last.
2. Conflict Resolution Training
a. Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration training is essential for military leaders in
PO. Training includes all levels of leader and subordinate hierarchies. CA personnel
are instrumental in this area, but the nature of PO means all leaders need conflict
negotiation skills to accomplish the mission.
b. Leaders need a conceptual foundation for conflict management and resolution,
and conceptual skills helping them analyze and select the correct approaches when
dealing with conflicts. Ideally, organizations participating in PO include negotiation

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 111

education as part of leader development prior to a pending deployment.
Commanders, staff officers, and selected leaders greatly benefit from this type of
training. Military training centers also offer training opportunities for resolving specific
conflicts.
c. The following institutions provide expertise in the various types of conflict
resolution. Instructors are available to travel to units. Additionally, some courses are
online.
(1) The West Point Negotiation Project conducts mobile training for requesting
units on an as-available basis. The breadth of training content covered is
dependent on the amount of time available for training, but includes determining
the appropriate goals for a negotiation, identifying and challenging assumptions,
negotiating with difficult counterparts, conducting cross-cultural negotiations, and
negotiating in multiparty contexts. More information is available at
http://www.usma.edu/wpnp/SitePages/Training.aspx, via e-mail at
[email protected] or by calling 845-938-3177.
(2) The Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) recognizes
negotiations are a key Air Force leadership skill. The NCE designs and delivers
culturally adaptable education, training, and research in negotiation methods and
techniques fostering collaborative relationships, building partnerships, and finding
interagency solutions. The NCE program is practitioner oriented, and located at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/negotiation_ctr/.
(3) The Foreign Service Institute is part of the DOS and located in Arlington, VA.
It offers one-week Negotiation Art and Skills courses several times a year. More
information is available at http://www.state.gov/m/fsi. You may also call the
course director at 703-301-7186.
(4) The US Institute of Peace is located in Washington, DC. It is an independent,
nonpartisan conflict management center created by Congress to prevent and
mitigate international conflicts without resorting to violence. It’s Center for
Mediation and Conflict Resolution offers various online and onsite courses on
conflict resolution. More information is available at http://www.usip.org/education-
training or via phone at 202-457-1700.
(5) The Executive Education Program at the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts (MA) offers different conflict
resolution courses on an evolving basis. More information is available at
https://exed.hks.harvard.edu// or via phone at 617-495-1142.
(6) The Harvard Negotiation Institute located at the Harvard Law School in
Cambridge, MA, offers several courses under its program of instruction for
lawyers, and is open to everyone. More information is available at
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/courses-and-training/harvard-negotiation-
institute-5-day/ or via phone at 617-495-3187.
3. Negotiations
a. Conduct negotiations at several levels. There are negotiations among
departments and US agencies; between multinational partners; between the military
and UN agencies; and between military leaders on the ground and local leaders.
Negotiations require the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open

112 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity,
and careful planning. The Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence provides
negotiations training, and published the “Practical Guide to Negotiating in the
Military,” located at http://Culture.af.mil/NCE/.
b. Commanders and subordinate leaders serve in the role of a negotiator during
PO. Acting as a negotiator is similar to acting as a mediator, but military leaders are
interested in an outcome consistent with the unit’s missions and objectives. Military
members negotiate for rites of passage; barter for use of facilities, buildings, roads,
and services; negotiate between hostile factions; or seek compliance with a curfew
without resorting to using force.
c. When a military member is a party in a negotiation, the other parties see them as
a competitor, and not a disinterested party. If the military member surrenders
impartiality and actions become suspect, it is very difficult to overcome suspicion
and mistrust, even by subsequent representatives or US actions.
d. The following four considerations guide preparations for negotiations.
Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. Negotiations are an exercise in persuasion.
Study the alternatives to negotiating an agreement and be attuned to cultural
differences.
(1) Understand the broader issues of the conflict. Leaders must understand the
broader issues of conflict and their changing nature. This includes maintaining
dialogue with all parties, groups, organizations, and civil authorities. Prevent one
incident from destroying dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating a hostile
atmosphere does not lead to a resolution.
(2) Get input from the disputing party. Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion
and a method to advance US interests through jointly decided action. Both
parties must fully cooperate.
(3) Determine each party’s alternatives to a negotiated settlement.
(4) Be attuned to cultural differences. The negotiating parties’ culture shapes
how they reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to
decision making. Words and actions have different connotations to members of
other cultures. At meetings, nonverbal behaviors such as symbolic rituals or
protocols are important.
e. For successful negotiations, base procedures on the following nine steps.
(1) Establish communications.
(2) Identify common ground for building meaningful dialogue.
(3) Consider cultural aspects of negotiations.
(4) Set clear goals and objectives.
(5) Set clear and reasonable code of conduct for the negotiation process.
(6) Develop a plan and diagram the results of the analysis.
(7) Determine composition of negotiating forum and decision-making
mechanisms.
(8) Establish a neutral venue.
(9) Implement the agreement.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 113

4. Mediation
a. During mediation, the military acts as a facilitator guiding the disputing parties
toward an agreement. The agreement should not conflict with goals of the USG. The
mediator does not represent the aspirations of any of the disputing parties, but
furthers the goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of
the military commander's intent and international agreements.
b. Considerations for mediation.
(1) The mediator assumes some level of resistance from the parties. Numerous
groups or individuals, either actively or passively, hamper attempts to establish
peace. The US military member understands all positions, but does not advocate
for the aims or goals of either party. Keeping an impartial position helps reduce
the likelihood of animosity and aggression directed at US forces or civilian
organizations.
(2) The mediator anticipates participants’ behavior and outlines all possible
outcomes if mediation fails. The mediation process carries the risk of upsetting a
participant, but also prevents long-term friction through effective communication.
c. During most mediation efforts, the mediator negotiates with one party of a dispute
at a time finding common ground among the parties. Mediators address the following
items and ensure impartiality:
(1) Facilitation. Mediators provide practical assistance to all parties by passing
messages; providing a hot line; or securing a safe, practical venue for a meeting
or further discussion. Mediators ensure the parties understand the meaning of
agreements they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international
community and parties when implementing the agreements.
(2) Incentives and Disincentives. Support mediation by identifying a
comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives, which encourage positive
steps and dissuade parties from taking action detrimental to the peace effort. This
“carrot and stick” approach varies according to circumstances. Identifying
effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the
mediation strategy.
(3) Languages. The mediator places a premium on basic language skills for
effectiveness. For most tactical-level mediation, a commander and subordinates
work through interpreters. This procedure improves through training. Using locally
recruited interpreters provides a short-term solution; however, commanders
should not rely on this procedure indefinitely. There are pitfalls to using local
interpreters (e.g., ethnic identifications, political orientation, and social standing).
Local interpreters may cause unintended consequences because military
members can never be sure if the interpreter is working in concert with the PO
force, or has an alternative agenda. In the long term, PO negotiations and
mediation require the military commander to emphasize language training for the
peace forces.
(4) Location. The mediator conducts meetings and negotiations at a site viewed
as neutral by both parties. The individual negotiating on his “home turf” has the
upper hand. The following locations are commonly used:

114 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(a) UN locations.
(b) Embassies.
(c) Other neutral sites.
(5) Mediation Site Factors. Consider the following factors when selecting a
mediation site:
(a) Security. The forces are physically able to secure the venue with
protection provided by the host authorities or another appropriate agency.
(b) Accessibility. Do not waste time traveling to remote venues unless this
promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.
(c) Communications. If necessary, the negotiating team provides
communications facilities parties use to liaise with their authorities.
(d) Comfort. During protracted negotiations, ensure a basic level of comfort
to facilitate a successful outcome.
(6) Techniques. Use the following factors to leverage the mediation process:
(a) Identify the decision makers at negotiations.
(b) Use and exploit the media during and after negotiations.
(c) Maintain secrecy and confidentiality.
(d) Recognize political and military parties to negotiation.
(e) Use interpreters and translators.
(7) Competencies. Effective mediators develop competencies in conflict style
management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural
awareness.
5. Arbitration
a. Arbitration is a formalized process of dispute resolution involving the appointment
or designation of a neutral party by an appointing authority (commander), or
representative, in a dispute resolution procedure. Two or more parties with opposing
views meet to resolve their differences in a formal setting similar to the less formal
methods of negotiation and mediation. The central goal of arbitration is resolving
controversy between parties after negotiation or mediation efforts fail.
b. Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution where the military members act as a
judge, and make decisions that adversely affect one or more parties. Military
members conduct arbitration at a higher level than the other forms of conflict
resolution. Gaining adherence to the arbitrator’s decision is difficult. Without mutual
support for the decision, the local military commander loses influence with advisors
who feel slighted by the decision.
c. At the outset of the dispute resolution process, the parties in the dispute agree
formally, in writing (if culturally acceptable), to the arbitration process as the chosen
means of dispute resolution. This includes agreeing to the appointment of an
arbitrator, abiding by the rules and procedures of the arbitration proceeding, and
agreeing to respect and comply with the final decision of the arbitrator. Appointment
to this position by a key leader whom both parties find agreeable adds to the
arbitrator’s credibility and helps support the overall decision.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 115

d. The arbitrator convenes sessions or hearings necessary to document the
arguments of the opposing parties, listens to witness testimony, and reviews all
available evidence. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator renders
a final decision based on the facts presented by the parties. The arbitrator also
prepares a written decision, complete with a summary of the evidence supporting
the decision. Provide the arbitrator’s final decision to the appointing authority and the
parties in dispute. The guiding principle of arbitration is that the decision of the
arbitrator is final.
e. The arbitration procedure is a useful tool in reaching finality, resolving complex
issues, unusual factual questions, or matters where the parties reach an impasse,
despite the application of less formal negotiation sessions. Important considerations
in arbitration are the structured nature of the method, selection of an impartial and
trained arbitrator, willingness of each participating party to accept the finality of the
arbitrator's decision-making power, and the formal nature of the arbitration process
(adherence to strict rules and procedures). Two forms of arbitration are binding and
nonbinding:
(1) Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to
comply with the arbitrator's decision before the proceedings.
(2) Nonbinding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to
comply with the arbitrator's decision.

116 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Appendix A
SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS
1. Background
Interpersonal engagements and meetings are essential for successful accomplishment
of peace operations (PO) objectives. Meetings facilitate establishing personal and
professional relationships and set conditions for future negotiations. Successful
outcomes of meetings are functions of thorough preparation and meeting management
techniques.
Note: For the purpose of this publication, the term engagement describes interaction
with the populace of a foreign country, including interaction with military and civil
authorities. It does not replace the definition of military engagement found in JP 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, but is meant to
supplement it by including the populace in general. For more detailed information on
engagement operations, see Air Land Sea Application Multi-Service Tactics Techniques
and Procedures for Engagement Teams.
2. Commander and Staff’s Role in Developing the Engagement Strategy
a. A commander sets the tone for all engagements conducted by subordinates
through the establishment and expression of a vision on host nation (HN) personnel
interaction. The commander promotes engagement by adhering to the following
guidelines:
(1) Develops a robust engagement strategy.
(2) Provides a guided purpose, intent, and desired end state for engagements in
support of the unit mission.
(3) Develops and disseminates unit themes and messages.
(4) Fosters a culture of engagement and interaction.
(5) Develops reporting requirements supporting the gathering of atmospheric
information.
(6) Ensures pertinent information gathered from engagements is properly
transmitted, disseminated, and analyzed both up and down the chain of
command (e.g., civil information management, key local leader contact
database).
(7) Resources and organizes the staff to facilitate engagements (e.g., staffing,
funds, time).
(8) Employs information-related capabilities, public affairs, or military information
support operations for advice and assistance.
(9) Personally conducts engagements.
(10) Develops engagement-training requirements (e.g., culture, language,
negotiation).
(11) Provides guidance for collaborating with joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 117

b. Commanders are key “engagers” within a unit because their position and
authority has the greatest degree of credibility and access. Commanders maximize
interactions with the local populace to accomplish the following:
(1) Assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first hand.
(2) Sense shifts in perceptions, positive and negative, and take appropriate
action.
(3) Engender trust and confidence of the local populace.
(4) Understand social networks in the area of operations (AO).
(5) Identify local key leaders and trusted, credible voices, formal and informal.
(6) Bolster confidence in and consensus behind deserving local leaders.
(7) Deliver messages.
(8) Assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and
make appropriate refinements.
(9) Counter adversary information and disinformation quickly.
(10) Ensure subordinate leaders are effectively engaging the populace.
c. The commander’s intent, guidance, and mission narrative provide the foundation
for the staff to develop plans and orders using engagements for shaping and
supporting operations. The staff:
(1) Develops an overall engagement strategy supporting the commander’s line of
effort.
(2) Coordinates information capabilities supporting planning and execution of the
engagement strategy and avoiding information fratricide.
(3) Assists the commander in writing mission narrative and themes.
(4) Utilizes a targeting process, integrates and synchronizes deliberate
engagements, and ensures deconfliction.
(5) Analyzes target audiences or individuals of interest; providing information on
targeted audience.
(6) Develops military information support products and delivery.
(7) Collects and maintains engagement information.
(8) Assesses results of engagement strategy.
(9) Recommends, coordinates, and refines future engagements and
reengagements.
3. Meeting Types and Purposes
a. Meetings or engagements range from informal one-on-interactions to large
group gatherings. The meeting types below include the following aspects:
(1) Introduction. Commanders or their designated representative introduce
themselves to prominent leaders (political, social, religious, etc.,) and encourage
continual dialog between and among all parties. The purpose is getting to know
the key influencers in the AO and fostering a habitual relationship.

118 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(2) Coordination. The PO mission coordinates with a broad range of local
leaders or influencers facilitating access to areas, structures, people, etc.,
supporting a detailed assessment, survey, or operation.
(3) Periodic or Habitual. Transparency, trust, and credibility rarely happen after a
single meeting. Undertake efforts engaging key leaders or influencers on an
ongoing basis. Interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental
relationships and cooperation benefit from engagement.
(4) Deliberate. Meetings with key leaders or influencers are deliberate. They are
scheduled, planned, rehearsed in advance, and follow a set format and agenda.
(5) Dynamic. At the individual Solider, Sailor, Airman, and Marine level, meetings
or engagements are spontaneous or impromptu. For example, meetings occur as
a natural consequence of a unit conducting a patrol or convoy.
(6) Joint Committees. Establish joint committees in the peace agreement or
accord assisting its implementation.
b. Meetings enable the following desired outcomes:
(1) Give voice to local concerns or grievances and priorities. Stability, credibility,
trust, and consent are possible when addressing local issues or, at the very least,
hearing them. Active listening is a powerful means fostering cooperation and
advancing conversation in positive ways.
(2) Allow discussion on mutual concerns. It is rarely possible to achieve PO
objectives forcibly. They come about because ongoing dialog enables all sides to
express their concerns and desires and work in cooperation to find common
ground among competing interests and priorities.
(3) Enable rapid communication of incidents, accidents, and emergencies and
promote unified action to resolve them. Meetings are especially necessary when
a serious incident has occurred involving coalition or United States (US) forces
and military investigators must work with local authorities on the incident
investigation.
(4) Serve as opportunities to inform and influence key leaders or influencers on a
range of issues. In many cultures, face-to-face meetings are the most effective
means of influencing outcomes that align with PO unit objectives. In addition, the
best way to disseminate information out to wider audiences is through key
leaders or influencers.

“Commanders must build teams—joint and interagency partners—and they must

be able to understand complex environments and information (that are available)
to influence friends and adversaries.”
LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 119

4. Principles of Engagement
a. The six principles of engagement are:
(1) Consistency.
(2) Culturally attuned.
(3) Adaptive.
(4) Credible.
(5) Balanced.
(6) Pragmatic.
b. Consistency. Engagements are consistent and communicate the same essential
meaning as other operational activities. When audiences perceive engagement
dialogue (words) as inconsistent with observable behavior (actions), individual
Service members, US leaders, and the US government lose credibility.
c. Culturally Attuned. Conduct engagements in the context of local cultural
customs, beliefs, and methods of communicating. This builds understanding and
cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust. Developing messages
unilaterally from US cultural perspectives and simply translating them into the local
languages is ineffective because concepts are lost in translation or the message
conflicts with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from target
audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same
key audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction informs or influences
audiences as desired. Units balance using these individuals against security
concerns.
d. Adaptive: Adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond to a
changing environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Effective
engagement depends on adaptability. Adaptability relies on leaders who think
critically and use reasonable judgment, are comfortable with ambiguity, are willing to
accept prudent risk, and have the ability to adjust to evolving situations. Recognizing
the interpersonal and often cross-cultural nature of engagement, adaptability
requires a commitment to learning. Successful adaptation requires acknowledging
that in-depth understanding of the target audience improves communication.
Engagement characterized by an assumed superiority—a conviction that a
message’s inherent rightness disqualifies it from audience scrutiny—fails to support
the conditions necessary for discovering and adopting effective communication
approaches. Thus, effective engagement is more about dialogue and advising rather
than dictating expected behavior.
e. Credible. Successful engagement depends on trust. A fundamental criterion for
trust is the degree of confidence the populace has in the credibility of the US armed
forces with whom they interact. Credibility results from an observable, sustained,
and consistent pattern of factually accurate words and principled deeds attuned to
the local culture. Openness and transparency, with consideration for operations
security, are fundamental to this effort.
f. Balanced. A balanced approach to engagements helps ensure both parties
benefit from the event. Balance engagement efforts between the inclination to
create the desired effect and the requirement to actively listen and understand the

120 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

other’s point of view. Perceptions that an audience’s ideas are irrelevant,
disrespected, or marginalized are significant obstacles to future engagements and
achieving a commander’s intent.
g. Pragmatic. Leaders must have a realistic, “down to earth” approach to
engagements. Pragmatic engagement accepts the unpredictable nature of personal
interactions and communications and operates with realistic expectations. HN
officials do not always act in the people’s best interest due to corruption,
incompetence, or both, may be uncooperative. Leaders accept prudent risk and
understand that small setbacks may occur. Leaders cannot control how others
interpret messages and actions.
5. The Operations Process Applied to Meetings or Engagements
Figure 22 is an overview of the operations process for meetings or engagements.

Figure 21. Operations Process

a. The following list is a useful guide for the time prior to a meeting or engagement.
In preparing for meetings or engagements, plan and address the following issues:
(1) Location of the meeting.
(2) Security needs.
(3) Parties in the engagement.
(4) Reason for the engagement.
(5) Attendees of the meeting.
(6) Desired outcomes of the meeting.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 121

(7) Ways the desired outcomes are achieved.
(8) Meeting setup (space and personnel).
(9) Agenda.
(10) Designate person to keep agenda on track.
(11) Designate person to observe, take notes, and track promises or
commitments made during the meeting.
(12) Designate person to record meeting minutes and enter appropriate
information into the management system.
(13) Develop talking points.
(14) Time of the rehearsal.
(15) Assign an interpreter if needed,
(16) Determine accepted cultural norms and protocols.
(17) Determine important information the personnel; likes or dislikes, biases,
connections with other key leaders, etc.
(18) Determine the required frequency of engagement.
(19) Determine if a follow-up meeting necessary.
(20) Review existing promises or commitments and determine person
responsible for follow-up.
(21) Complete an after-action review.
b. Table 5 is an example of a worksheet for planning the meeting and capturing
information.

122 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Table 5. Meeting Worksheet Example
Contact: Name/Provincial Total Miles Used Date, Time: Copy 1 of 1
Governor

Intended Outcome: Provincial Governor agrees to conduct operation establishing……………………

Intended Outcome or Strategy: Counterparts’ Predicted Intended Outcome or

• Occupy population centers within two Strategy:
months • Increase political standing by allowing
occupancy of population centers

Information Operations Message: The population becomes supportive of the government as security
increases.
Talking Points Supporting Intended Order of Events:
Outcome 1300:
• Greater security allows progress 1330:
• Increased public sentiment increases 1445:
confidence in leadership
Possible Impasse Issues: Offers:

Counterpart Biography: Exit Strategy: Apologize for only having 2 hours for
the meeting due to other issues
Coordination Measures: 549th Military Police Company: 1LT Ewing (1st Platoon), 1LT Wilkes (2nd
Platoon), 1LT Harris (3rd Platoon), and 1LT Weisner (4th Platoon) provides area security in designated
areas of canal zone near Fort Clayton.
Previous Promises Made:

Promises Kept:

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Appendix B
LIAISON OFFICER
1. Background
a. Liaison is contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of
military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of
purpose and action. Effective liaison is critical for peace operations (PO). Create
unified action between various military, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental
organizations.
b. The liaison officer (LNO) is a special staff officer or noncommissioned officer
responsible for representing the commander at the headquarters (HQ) of another
organization to effect coordination, integration, and cooperation between the two
organizations. LNOs establish and maintain physical contact and communications
between elements of military forces and nonmilitary agencies during unified action.
Liaison activities ensure cooperation and understanding among commanders and
staffs of different HQ. Liaison creates understanding of implied or inferred
coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.
2. Functions
LNOs perform several critical functions that are consistent across a range of military
operations. The allowable extent of performance in a PO is dependent on the mission
and the charter established by the providing organization’s commander. The four basic
LNO functions are to monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.
(1) Monitor. The LNO must monitor the operations of the sending unit and the
receiving organization and understand how each affects the other. At a minimum,
the LNO must monitor the current and planned operations, understand and
monitor pertinent staff issues, and anticipate potential problems.
(2) Coordinate. The understanding and procedures the LNO builds while
monitoring the situation helps synchronize the providing unit’s operations or plans
with those of the receiving organization by coordinating the communication
process.
(3) Advise. The LNO is the receiving organization’s expert on the sending
command’s capabilities, limitations, and intent. The LNO must be able to advise
the receiving organization commander and staff on how to synchronize to the
maximum extent possible with the command they represent.
(4) Assist. The LNO must assist on two levels. First, the LNO must act as the
conduit between the sending command and the receiving organization. Second,
by integrating into boards, meetings, and planning sessions, the LNO can ensure
those groups make informed decisions.
3. Liaison Responsibilities
a. LNOs need to understand the strategic, operational, and tactical aims of the PO.
An LNO represents a commander and must have the commander’s full confidence
and experience for the mission. The professional capabilities and personal
characteristics of an effective LNO encourage confidence. When possible, liaison is
reciprocal among higher, lower, supporting, and supported organizations. Each

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 125

organization sends a liaison element to the other. It should be reciprocal when
placing US forces under control of a headquarters of a different nationality.
b. The following is a list of tasks for liaison personnel to perform before departing
the sending unit.
(1) Understand the sending commander’s intent.
(2) Receive a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements on
current and future operations.
(3) Receive and understand the tasks from the commander’s staff.
(4) Obtain the correct maps, traces, and overlays.
(5) Arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes,
signal instructions, and the challenge and password—including their protection
and security. Arrange for replacement of these items as necessary.
(6) Complete route-reconnaissance and time-management plans so the liaison
team arrives on time at the designated location.
(7) Ensure liaison team and interpreters have security clearances and access
appropriate for the mission.
(8) Verify the receiving element received the liaison team’s security clearances
and will grant access to the level of information the mission requires.
(9) Verify orders.
(10) Know how to destroy classified information in case of an emergency during
transit or at the receiving unit.
(11) Inform the sending unit of the LNO’s departure time, route, arrival time, and,
when known, the estimated time and route of return.
(12) Pick up all correspondence designated for the receiving element.
(13) Conduct a radio check.
(14) Bring accredited information systems needed to support liaison operations.
(15) Pack adequate rations and water for use in transit.
(16) Arrange for the liaison party’s departure.
c. See ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, for a detailed discussion
of liaisons for more detailed information.

126 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Appendix C
INTERPRETERS
1. Background
a. During peace operations (PO), achieving trust, legitimacy, and consent requires
PO forces to interact with the local populace by speaking their native tongue and
adhering to their local customs, norms, and traditions. In most instances, individual
Service members and civilians lack the linguistic ability to communicate personally
and effectively with the local populace; therefore, using linguists and interpreters
becomes essential for mission accomplishment. Identifying, selecting, employing,
and caring for linguists and interpreters require command emphasis and ongoing
involvement.
b. A linguist is an expert, not simply in translation, but in the nature of language
itself, its origins, and history. Linguists do more than simply translate; they strive to
understand deeper meanings and nuances. Choose linguists when translating
agreements and other significant documents or for conducting media analysis. They
typically work at higher levels. This chapter focuses on interpreters.
c. An interpreter is someone able to translate from one language to another. Some
are more adept at translating written products, others at verbal exchanges, and
some at both.
2. Selecting an Interpreter
a. Selecting an interpreter is an opportunity for PO forces to influence the outcome
of the mission. Interpreters come from a number of sources including Service
members or government civilians with the requisite language skills or training or
contractors hired before the deployment or immediately after arriving in the area of
operations (AO). The following guidelines are critical for successful mission
accomplishment.
b. Considerations for selecting an interpreter:
(1) Native Speaker. Find interpreters who are fluent in the language of the AO,
and the localized dialect. The interpreter’s speech, background, and mannerisms
are completely acceptable to the target audience so the content is the focus
rather than the interpreter’s “otherness”.
(2) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, if the interpreter is perceived
as having a lower social standing than the audience has, the interpreter is
ineffective. This includes significant differences in military rank or membership in
an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the PO unit’s feelings on social status,
the job is accomplishing the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform.
Accept and work with local prejudices.
(3) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the
interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands PO forces and
PO forces understand the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English
is satisfactory. Check the interpreter’s level of understanding by asking them to
paraphrase a native-language statement in English.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 127

(4) Intellectual Agility. Find interpreters who are quick, alert, and responsive to
changing conditions and situations. An interpreter must be able to grasp complex
concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence.
Although education does not equate to intelligence, the better educated the
interpreter, the better the interpreter is able to perform due to exposure to diverse
concepts.
(5) Technical Ability. In certain situations, PO forces need an interpreter with
technical training or experience in special subject areas. The interpreter needs to
translate the meaning as well as the words. The interpreter also needs to know
the specialized vocabulary of the subject matter. For example, a native speaker is
fluent in both languages but unversed in terminology for medical, mechanical,
engineering, or military operations.
(6) Punctuality. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many
countries, time is relatively unimportant. Make sure the interpreter understands
the military’s concern with punctuality.
(7) Loyalty. If the interpreter is a local national, it is likely the interpreter’s first
loyalty is to the host nation, or subgroup, and not the US military. Consider the
security implications when dealing with the interpreter.
(a) Certain tactical situations require using uncleared indigenous personnel
as "field expedient" interpreters. Be aware of the increased security risk
involved in using these personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus potential
gain.
(b) If uncleared interpreters are used, keep sensitive information to a
minimum.
(8) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race of the interpreter affect the
mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In
predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions affect the allowable gender
of the interpreter. Another example is the Balkans, where ethnic divisions limit the
effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since
traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check
with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable
characteristics for interpreters.
(9) Compatibility. PO forces and interpreters work as a team. The target
audience is quick to recognize personality conflicts between team members,
which undermines the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible,
when selecting an interpreter, PO forces look for compatible traits and strive for a
harmonious working relationship.
(10) Number. Choose more than one interpreter. If several qualified interpreters
are available, select at least two. Interpreting is an exhausting job; 4 hours is the
maximum active interpreting time for an interpreter’s peak efficiency. Whatever
the mission, with two or more interpreters, PO forces provide quality control and
assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique is useful when
conducting coordination or negotiation meetings, as one interpreter is active used
in an interpreting role and the other pays attention to body language and side
conversations. Many times, PO forces gain important side information that aids

128 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

negotiations from listening to what others are saying outside of the main
discussion.
(11) Knowledge of Target Population. A careful analysis of the target population
is necessary. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as
individuals, and a genuine concern for an accurate information exchange is
important for accomplishing the mission.
(12) Reputation and Social Standing. Hire honest interpreters who are free from
unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants, and whose reputation or
standing in the community is such that persons of higher rank and standing do
not intimidate them.
(13) Mutual Respect and Rapport. The interpreter is a vital link to the target
audience. An uncooperative or unsupportive interpreter jeopardizes the mission.
Mutual respect and understanding between PO forces and the interpreter are
essential to effective teamwork. Establish rapport early in the relationship and
maintain it throughout the joint effort.
3. Training the Interpreter
a. As part of the initial training, tactfully convey the military member always directs
the interview. Put the interpreter’s role in proper perspective; ensure the interpreter
understands they are there to facilitate the conversation rather than to participate in
it. Stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between the
military member and the target audience. Appeal to the interpreter’s professional
pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information is directly
dependent upon their interpreting skills.
b. Some interpreters, because of cultural differences, attempt to "save face" by
concealing a lack of understanding. The interpreter may attempt to translate without
asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this results in misinformation and
confusion, and impacts credibility, PO forces emphasize the need to ask questions
when there is doubt.
c. Initially, direct the interpreter to translate literally or directly. After building trust
with the interpreter and the target audience, ask the interpreter for an idea-to-idea
versus a literal translation when appropriate.
4. Communication Techniques When Employing an Interpreter
a. An important first step in communicating through an interpreter is polishing
personal English language skills. The clearer the English, including diction, the
easier it is for the interpreter to translate.
(1) Avoid using profanity, slang, idioms, colloquialisms, and military jargon. In
many cases, these expressions do not translate easily. If they do translate, they
do not always retain the desired meaning. Examples such as "Gee Whiz" or
"Golly" are hard to translate. In addition, if using a technical term or expression,
be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language.
(2) Speak in low context, simple sentences. For instance, the military member
adds words usually left off (such as “air” to the word “plane”). This ensures the
meaning is obvious, and does not refer to the Great Plains or a wood plane.
Avoid flowery language.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 129

(3) Think about what to say, break it down into logical bits, and say it in short
sentences. Use short, simple words, and low context for quick and easy
translation. As a rule of thumb, never say more in one sentence than the
interpreter can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each
sentence contains a complete thought.
(4) Use transitional phrases and qualifiers sparingly, because they confuse the
audience and waste valuable time. Examples include “for example,” “in most
cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.”
(5) Be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language differences lead
to misinterpretations by other cultures. The peacekeeper works with the
interpreter and determines what is easiest to understand and translate
meaningfully early in the training process.
(6) Identify cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with
particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross
one's legs? Gestures vary from culture to culture. The interpreter relates these
cultural restrictions, and the Service member uses them, whenever possible, in
working with a particular group or individual.
(7) Speak slowly and clearly. This requires conscious effort for most Americans,
who tend to speak quickly. The individual in the conversation may have some
formal training in English, but not enough for them to be comfortable conversing
without an interpreter. By speaking slowly and enunciating your words, the
individual has a much better chance of understanding the meaning directly.
Speaking slowly also gives the interpreter time to process and translate the
words accurately. Repeat statements as often as necessary.
b. Techniques for working with an interpreter:
(1) Position the interpreter by the peacekeeper’s side (or even a step back). This
keeps the subject or audience from shifting their attention or fixating on the
interpreter.
(2) Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the
tendency to talk to the interpreter.
(3) Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the
interpreter. Avoid saying, "tell them I'm glad to be their instructor." Rather say,
"I'm glad to be your instructor." Address the subject or audience directly.
(4) Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be
enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and
inflections that an English-speaking group uses.
(5) Side comments to the interpreter that are not for translation create the wrong
atmosphere for communication and are a distraction.
(6) While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening,
avoid doing anything distracting. Do not pace the floor, write on the blackboard,
teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on other distracting activity while
the interpreter is actually translating.

130 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(7) Periodically check the interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Ideally,
have another American, fluent in the language, sit in on a lesson, or interview.
This assures the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally.
(a) If multiple interpreters are available, one technique is using another
trusted interpreter to verify the interpretation and discretely report
discrepancies after the engagement is complete. Another way is learning the
target language, which allows a check of the interpreter’s loyalty and honesty.
(b) Check with the audience if military members suspect they are
misunderstood, they stop immediately and clarify the information. Using the
interpreter, ask questions eliciting answers that let the military member
determine if the point is clear. If it is not clear, rephrase the instruction and
illustrate the point again.
(c) Use repetition and examples whenever necessary facilitating learning. If
the class asks few questions, this may mean the peacekeeper or the
interpreter are not getting the message across.
Note: When military members acquire effective interpreters, make them feel like
valuable members of the team. Give interpreters recognition commensurate with the
importance of their contribution.

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132 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

Appendix D
CIVIL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND TEMPLATING
1. Background
a. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) is the process
commanders and their staffs follow to analyze an enemy (threat) situation and its
effect on military operations. Civil component analysis is the process by which
commanders and their staffs analyze the civil component of an area of operations
(AO) determining how it can help, hinder, or affect military operations. During peace
operations (PO), the military has civil-military components supporting nation
assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, and support to civil administration
operations.
b. IPOE is a function of all staff members, with the staff intelligence officer taking the
lead in guiding the staff through the process. Civil component analysis is also a
function of all staff members, but civil component analysis is most effective when
guided by the civil-military operations (CMO) staff officer.
c. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment includes
developing information critical to planning PO populace control measures. While not
all-inclusive, answering the following questions provides a common framework for
civil information requirements:
(1) What is the characterization of the operational environment (permissive,
uncertain, or hostile)?
(2) What is the status and character of the indigenous civil government?
(3) Do the civil government public safety authorities have the capability and
capacity to maintain public order within the AO?
(4) What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, religious affiliations, and
concentrations of the indigenous population within the AO?
(5) Does a significant dislocated civilian (DC) population currently exist?
(6) What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, points of origin, directions
of movement, and modes of transportation of the DC population?
(7) What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the
population (political, religious, economic, and private sector)?
(8) What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, or
hostile)?
(9) What is the assessment of key intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the AO?
(10) What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the civil government,
particularly in the areas of medical, transportation, public utilities, and
communications infrastructure?
(11) What authority exists for the implementation of populace control measures?
(12) Do the existing rules of engagement address populace control, such as
crowd and riot control, criminal activity, and looting?

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 133

d. A simple technique for analyzing civil considerations is for the commander or
planner to answer the following questions:
(1) What civilians are in the AO?
(2) What activities are civilians engaged in affecting CMO?
(3) How do the CMO affect civilian activities?
2. Civil Considerations
a. Civil considerations influencing military operations include fabricated
infrastructure, civilian institutions, and the attitudes and activities of the civilian
leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO. At the operational and tactical
levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on
the operational knowledge of the civil component, and enhance the commander's
decision process for selecting objectives, locations, movement, control of forces, use
of weapons, and force protection measures.
b. Civil considerations affect larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and
informational issues. Discounting issues taxes military or government resources and
hinders transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the military mission is
supporting civil authorities, the civil considerations listed above define the mission.
c. Civil considerations are continually analyzed. CMO planners (civil-military
operations staff section: J-9), coordinate with numerous organizations and provide
conduits for information sharing and support requests. The CMO staff also
synchronizes and integrates civilian activities with military operations, compiles
relevant information on the civil environment, and performs analysis supporting the
commander's assessment. CMO planning eases the transition to civilian control from
the outset of an operation.
d. CMO planners ensure their input to the planning process supports the
commander’s objectives by factoring civil vulnerabilities into unit operations. They
analyze the following variables in an AO: political, governance, military, security,
economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) identifying operational
conditions in the local area. Strategic and operational factors focusing on the
population include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
(ASCOPE).
3. PMESII
a. PMESII describes specific variables of an AO, and helps staffs determine the
strengths and weaknesses of forces while estimating the effects military actions
have on the AO across these variables.
(1) Political. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and
power at all levels of governance. Political structures and processes enjoy
varying degrees of legitimacy with populations from local through international
levels. Formally, constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers
strongly influence events. Political leaders use ideas, beliefs, actions, and
violence to enhance their power and control over people, territory, and resources.
Many sources of political motivation exist. These include charismatic leadership;
indigenous security institutions; and religious, ethnic, or economic communities.
Political opposition groups or parties also affect the situation. Each cooperates

134 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

differently with the United States (US) or multinational forces. Understanding the
political circumstances helps commanders and staffs recognize key organizations
and determine the aims and capabilities of the organizations.
(a) Understanding political implications requires analyzing relevant
partnerships—political, economic, military, religious, and cultural. This
analysis captures the presence and significance of external organizations and
other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include
private security organizations, transnational corporations, and
nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.
(b) A political analysis also addresses the effect of will. Will is a primary
intangible factor; it motivates participants to sacrifice and persevere against
obstacles. Understanding what motivates key groups (for example, political,
military, and insurgent) helps commanders understand the groups’ goals and
willingness to sacrifice to achieve their ends.
(c) The political variable includes the US domestic political environment.
Mission analysis and monitoring the situation include an awareness of
national policy and strategy.
(2) Military. The military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed
forces in a given operational environment. For many states, an army is the
military force primarily responsible for maintaining internal and external security.
Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces influence friendly and hostile
military forces. Militaries of other states not directly involved in a conflict also
affect them. Therefore, analysis includes the relationships of regional land forces
to the other variables. Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate
actual capabilities for each armed force. Analysis focuses on each organization’s
ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally. Military
analysis examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, host-nation, and
multinational military organizations. Capabilities analyzed include:
(a) Equipment.
(b) Manpower.
(c) Doctrine.
(d) Training levels.
(e) Resource constraints.
(f) Leadership.
(g) Organizational culture.
(h) History.
(i) Nature of civil-military relations.
(3) Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual and group
behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Specific
factors include the influence of the following on the economic variable:
(a) Industrial organizations.
(b) Trade.
(c) Development (including foreign aid).

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(d) Finance.
(e) Monetary policies and conditions.
(f) Institutional capabilities.
(g) Geography.
(h) Legal constraints (or the lack of them) on the economy.
Note: Indicators measuring potential benefits or costs of changing a political-economic
order enhance a commander’s understanding of the social and behavioral dynamics of
friendly, adversary, and neutral entities. Differences in local economies significantly
influence political choices, including individuals’ decisions to support or subvert the
existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups
to change the economic status quo.
(4) Social. The social variable describes societies within an operational
environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same
political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share
a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. They include diverse social
structures. Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within
a system of groups. It includes institutions, organizations, networks, and similar
groups. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, discusses socio-cultural factors
analysis and social network analysis.
(a) Culture comprises shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and
artifacts society members use to cope with their world and with one another.
Societies have a dominant culture and may have many secondary cultures.
Different societies share similar cultures, but societal attributes change over
time. Changes occur in any of the following areas:
• Demographics.
• Religion.
• Migration trends.
• Urbanization.
• Standards of living.
• Literacy and nature of education.
• Cohesiveness and activity of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups.
(b) Social networks, social status, and related norms and roles supporting
and enabling individuals and leaders require analysis. This analysis also
addresses societies outside the operational area whose actions, opinions, or
political influence affect the mission.
(c) People base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and
values. Cultural awareness identifies points of friction within populations,
builds rapport, and reduces misunderstandings. It improves the commander’s
insight into individual and group intentions and enhances the unit’s
effectiveness. However, US forces require training in cultural awareness
before deploying to an unfamiliar operational environment and continuous
updating while deployed. Commanders develop their knowledge of the

136 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

societal aspects within their areas of operations to a higher level of cultural
awareness. This gives them an understanding of how their operations affect
the population and prepares them to meet local leaders face-to-face.
(5) Information. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the
aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process,
disseminate, or act on information (see Joint Publication 3-13, Information
Operations). The environment shaped by information includes leaders, decision
makers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s access and use
of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the
operational environment. Commanders use information activities to shape the
operational environment as part of their operations.
(a) Media representatives significantly influence the information shaping the
operational environment. Broadcast and Internet media sources rapidly
disseminate competing views of military operations worldwide. Media
coverage influences US political decision making, US popular opinion, and
multinational sensitivities. Adversaries often use media coverage to further
their aims by controlling and manipulating how audiences perceive a
situation’s content and context.
(b) Global telecommunications networks provide immense amounts of
information. Observers and adversaries have unprecedented access to
multiple information sources. They attempt to influence and counter opinion
by providing their own interpretation of events. Televised news and
propaganda reach many people. However, in developing countries,
information flows by less sophisticated means such as messengers and
graffiti. Commanders need an understanding of the nature of information flow
within their AO and apply the best available methods when communicating
with the local populace.
(6) Infrastructure. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and
installations a society needs to function. Degrading infrastructure affects the
entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes technological
sophistication—the ability to conduct research and development and apply the
results to civil and military purposes.
(a) Not all segments of society view infrastructure in the same way. Others
may perceive improvements viewed as beneficial by some as a threat. For
example, introducing cellular networks helps a local economy, but offends
influential and conservative local leaders who view it as permitting access to
salacious material.
(b) Actions affecting infrastructure require a thorough analysis of possible
effects.
4. ASCOPE
ASCOPE is population-focused in contrast to a traditional area assessment. ASCOPE
organizes and examines strategic and operational factors for their relevance to local
stability.

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 137

a. Areas. Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s AO
not typically categorized as militarily significant. Failure to consider key areas
seriously affects the success of the military mission. A commander analyzes key
areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission, and
how do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas? At times, the
answers to these questions dramatically influence the courses of action considered
by the commander. Examples are:
(1) Locations of government centers. These areas are richer, more populated,
better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than
outlying areas. They are frequently the center of influence over the populace in
outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider
aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.
(2) Areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city, or
municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are often well defined and
respected by political leaders and the area’s population. Commanders consider
overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for practical control purposes
during long-term operations.
(3) Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. These are sources of potential
problems and may threaten force protection.
(4) Agricultural, mining regions and trade routes. Routine economic activities
hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Interfering with operations
related to the economy of an area places an unnecessary burden on military units
or logistical resources in the area.
(5) Potential sites for temporary settlement of displaced persons (DPs) or other
civil functions. The same considerations making a site ideal for positioning a
military unit also make it ideal for a DC camp or other types of settlement.
Commanders consider the long-term practical and environmental consequences
of occupying specific civil areas.
b. Structures. Existing structures take on many significant roles. Some, such as
bridges, communication towers, power plants, and dams, are traditionally high pay-
off targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are
cultural sites generally protected by international law or other agreements. Others
are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools,
television stations, radio stations, and printing plants and are useful for military
purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining their location, function,
capability, and application supporting military operations. It involves weighing the
consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic,
religious, social, informational implications, reactions of the populace, replacement
costs, etc.
c. Capabilities. View capabilities from several perspectives. The term capability
refers to the following:
(1) Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, through public
administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agricultural
systems.

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(2) Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such as public works and
utilities, public health, economy, and commerce.
(3) Contract resources and services supporting the military mission, such as
interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local
vendors, the host nation (HN), or other nations provide these resources and
services. In hostile territory, military forces take and use civil capabilities and
resources consistent with international law.
(4) Civil affairs (CA) identifies the capabilities of partner countries and
organizations involved in the operation. They make recommendations on
addressing shortfalls and capitalizing on strengths and capabilities.
d. Organizations. Organizations are organized groups affiliated with government
agencies. They include church groups; fraternal, patriotic, or service organizations;
community watch groups, and NGOs. Civil organizations assist the commander by
keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and
influencing the actions of civilians. They form the nucleus of self-help programs,
interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.
e. People. Individually or collectively, nonmilitary personnel affect a military
operation positively, negatively, or in a neutral manner. The term “people” includes
all the civilians in or around an AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence
affect the military mission. In PO, US forces prepare to work closely with civilians of
all types. When analyzing civil considerations, consider the questions listed below.
(1) What types of civilians do PO forces encounter in the AO? There are many
different kinds of civilians living and operating in and around a given AO; it is
useful to separate the term into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these
categories include local nationals; HN civil authorities; expatriates; foreign
employees of multinational corporations; international relief organizations; US
Government and third nation government agency representatives; United Nations
representatives; contractors; morale welfare and recreation personnel;
Department of Defense (DOD) civilians; and the media.
(2) What activities are civilians engaged in affecting operations? The type of
environment in which activities occur dictates civilian activities. Consider each
category of civilian activity separately, because activities have different effects,
positive and negative, on planning factors and warfighting functions.
f. Events. Many categories of civilian events affect the military mission. Some
examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations
(voluntary and involuntary), creating DPs. Military events also affect the lives of
civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires,
deployments and redeployments, and payday. Once an analyst determines what
events are occurring, it is useful to analyze the events for their political, economic,
psychological, environmental, and legal implications. Table 6 shows the relationship
between PMESII and ASCOPE when they are used to assess the AO.

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Table 6. PMESII and ASCOPE Matrix
Areas: Key elements of
Political Governance:
the formal, informal,
Political actors, Why is the factor relevant to
and shadow systems of
P agendas, government A government, which
the local population? How
capability, and does it affect stability?
significantly influence
capacity.
the local population.
Military or Security:
Capabilities in the area
Structures: Key Why is the factor relevant to
of operations (e.g.,
M equipment, mission, S elements influencing the local population? How
the security situation. does it affect stability?
and resource
constraints).
Economic: Trade,
development, finance, Capabilities: Key
Why is the factor relevant to
institutional elements influencing
E capabilities, C economic activity in the
the local population? How
does it affect stability?
geography, and area.
regulation.
Social: Demographics, Organizations: Key
migration trends, elements describing or Why is the factor relevant to
S urbanization, living O influencing traditional the local population? How
standards, literacy and social dynamics in an does it affect stability?
education level, etc. area.
People: All civilians
within an AO (the
populace) as well as
Infrastructure: Basic Why is the factor relevant to
those outside the AO
I facilities, services, and P whose actions,
the local population? How
installations. does it affect stability?
opinions, or political
influence can affect the
mission.
Events: Events are
Information: Means of routine, cyclical,
communicating using planned, or Why is the factor relevant to
I media, E spontaneous activities the local population? How
telecommunications, that significantly affect does it affect stability?
and word of mouth. organizations, people,
and military operations.

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5. Cultural Environment
The cultural matrix in Table 7 assists in the identification of major groups. Efforts to
understand local conditions, grievances, and norms; cultural characteristics; and
religious beliefs are important.
Table 7. Cultural Matrix
Cultural Codes, Traditional Conflict
Major Cultural
Interests Traditions, and Resolution
Groups
Values Mechanics
Identify the major Identify the things Identify cultural codes, Identify how conflicts
cultural groups in cultural groups care traditions, and values between individuals
the area of about or consider to the major cultural and groups have
operations. be valuable, both groups live by. been traditionally
material and resolved.
intangible.
How Malign Actors and
Disruption of Authorities and
Traditional Authorities Stabilizing Forces Leverage
Mechanisms
Cultural Factors
Identify the traditional Describe what new actors or Describe how malign actors
authorities to whom the conditions have disrupted the leverage or exploit these
locals give respect or traditional conflict resolution cultural factors to their
normally turn to for mechanisms or undermine the advantage. Also, consider how
assistance. influence of traditional peacekeeping forces could
authorities. leverage these factors.

a. Local nationals are town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and
nomads in the AO. Answering the following questions provides data for analyzing
the people factor.
(1) Do they face disruption in their daily lives to the point they require outside
assistance or are the local nationals going about their daily activities peacefully?
(2) Are they evacuating their homes for safer rear areas, clogging the major
supply route, and placing a burden on limited resources to sustain them?
(3) Are they staying put in basements and other temporary shelters?
(4) Are they supportive or unsupportive of US military presence?
(5) What resources do they have available for purchased or obtained by contract
to augment our logistics needs?
b. HN civil authorities are elected or appointed and traditional leaders serve at all
levels of government. The following questions help in evaluating the leadership
situation:
(1) How much influence do the leaders have over their constituents?
(2) Are they supportive of US military presence or are they inciting the local
nationals against the military?
(3) Do the leaders have viable civil defense plans and the capability to
implement the plans?
(4) Are they seeking direct assistance to alleviate their plight?

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(5) Can they provide useful information about the AO?
c. Use the following questions to evaluate the involvement of United Nations (UN)
representatives:
(1) What UN agencies are present and what are their charters?
(2) What is the relationship between military and UN operations?
(3) Are very important persons expected in the AO?
d. US agency and third nation government representatives are members of the
country team. The following questions will help with integration:
(1) What US and third nation government agencies are in the AO and how do
their operations relate to the US military?
(2) What useful information do they have?
(3) Are liaison officers needed?
e. Contractors consist of US citizens, local nationals, and third nation citizens
providing contract services to military operations. The following questions will help
with integration:
(1) What contractors are present and what support activities are they providing?
(2) Do they need US military resources such as security, subsistence, real
estate?
(3) DOD civilians are not contractors. DOD civilians play a role in combat support
and combat service support. How many DOD civilians are in the AO and what
roles do they play in the organization?
f. Use the following questions to evaluate the media including journalists from print,
radio, and visual media:
(1) Are they self-sufficient, or do they require support such as transportation and
security?
(2) Does coverage of military activities help or hinder the overall mission?
(3) What aspects of the area is the focus of the media?
g. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. In PO, commanders
consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impacts of
their operations on the categories of civilians they have identified in their AO. The
following are examples of the types of questions CA personnel and staff planners
consider for the warfighting functions' activities in foreign operations.
(1) Political.
(a) Do operations support the overall political objective of the military
mission?
(b) Do actions improperly or inappropriately favor one group faction or leader
over another?
(c) Can opposing political groups, factions, or leaders exploit military actions?
(2) Economic.
(a) Is military seaport, airport, or highway traffic interfering with commercial or
developmental traffic in the AO?

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(b) Are military operations attracting large numbers of vendors to the AO?
(c) Is the local community truly benefiting from the military presence or are
the actual beneficiaries’ inappropriate or criminal elements?
(3) Psychological.
(a) Do military efforts mitigating hardship influence the amount of cooperation
the military receives from the populace?
(b) Are military forces doing everything possible ensuring proper care for
innocent victims?
Note: Negative public sentiment directed toward US forces often creates force
protection issues from asymmetric threats. Commanders consider this in the operations
security plans.
(4) Environmental.
(a) What effect are military operations having on shelters, infrastructure, and
subsistence mechanisms in the AO?
(b) Does PO planning properly take into account contractor and DOD civilian
ability to support the mission?
(c) Do contractors have enough freedom of movement throughout the AO to
be effective?
(5) Legal.
(a) During all overseas operations, US forces adhere to customary
international law (CIL) and the law of war minimizing harm to noncombatants
and their property. The commander’s primary responsibilities are the
successful completion of the mission and protecting PO forces.
(b) Pursuant to the law of armed conflict (e.g., Geneva Conventions and
CIL), US forces are under no affirmative legal obligation to provide food,
water, or shelter to any noncombatants, detainees, or refugees who are not in
the custody of US forces; unless there has been a declaration of occupation
ordered by higher headquarters as part of a PO mission. In all other cases,
the responsibility is with local civil authorities and international relief agencies.

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Appendix E
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. Background
a. During peace operations (PO), there are occasions when United States (US)-
military forces work closely with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are
often critical to the overall success of peace operations, and especially important in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. It is imperative US military
forces understand how to communicate with NGOs as well as their roles, strengths
and weaknesses.
b. NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are civilian organizations that
do not fall into a military-style chain of command structure. They often have limited
exposure to the military, and it is important to educate them on how the military
operates.
c. The number of NGOs and IGOs operating in PO varies from small to very large.
There are approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of
humanitarian relief operation. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) collaborates with NGOs and IGOs delivering assistance
across all regions. USAID publishes a yearly report, entitled “Voluntary Foreign Aid
Programs” describing the aims and objectives of each registered organization. This
appendix provides a brief description of several IGOs and NGOs working alongside
PO forces.
d. The basic consideration for planners is remembering IGOs and NGOs try to
preserve their neutrality. For detailed information of specific NGOs, refer to Joint
Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. NGOs
and IGOs consist of the following four groups:
(1) Humanitarian organizations.
(2) Human rights.
(3) Civil society and democracy building.
(4) Conflict resolution.
2. Organizations
a. The following list of organizations supporting humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief is representative of many of the larger organizations potentially
present in PO.
b. United Nations (UN) Organizations. UN organizations primarily concerned with
PO include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
United Nations disaster management team (UN-DMT), and the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The UN resident
coordinator (UN-RC) creates a UN-DMT coordinating disaster response. The
UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced
persons. Except in special circumstances, they conduct material assistance activities
through national or local authorities of the concerned country, other organizations of
the UN system, NGOs, IGOs, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the

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UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with
UNHCR before and during the operation, or failure to meet UNHCR standards,
precludes the UNHCR from accepting transfers of equipment, supplies, and facilities
as the military disengages. To preclude this, a commander establishes a working
relationship with UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR
(http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html).
c. The UN-DMT is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to
persons compelled to leave their homes because of disasters, natural and
otherwise. The highest-ranking UN official in a country is the UN-RC. The UN-RC is
responsible for creating a UN-DMT, to coordinate, exchange information, and seek a
consensus on disaster-related initiatives. The following UN IGOs help form the UN-
DMT when mobilizing the UN system to assist in an emergency: The following
descriptions are on each organization’s website:
(1) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) promotes the long-range
incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical
assistance for all aspects of disaster management. The UNDP appoints a senior
member as a regional coordinator and serves as the UNOCHA in-country
coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the
resident coordinator and to the UN-DMT
(http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html).
(2) World Food Programme (WFP) is the food assistance branch of the UN. It
provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-
reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence
aligned to a specific segment of the population. This organization mobilizes and
coordinates the delivery of complementary emergency and program food aid from
bilateral and other sources (http://www.wfp.org/).
(3) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is a relief-oriented organization. It
attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health and
nutrition. The activities of this organization include social programs; food, in
collaboration with WFP; water supplies; sanitation and direct health intervention,
in coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO). UNICEF provides
related management and logistical support (http://www.unicef.org/).
(4) The WHO is involved in long-range programs providing advice and
assistance for all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance
includes the preparedness of health services for rapid response to disasters
(http://www.who.int/en/).
(5) The Food and Agriculture Organization is involved in long-range programs. It
provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation
of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization emphasizes local food
production. It also monitors food production, exports, and imports, and forecasts
requirements for exceptional food assistance (http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm).
d. The UNOCHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It
mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation
(through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes
awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related

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matters. UNOCHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management
entities and emergency services worldwide, and is able to mobilize specialized
resources. The appointed UNOCHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in
providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates locally
represented NGOs. The resident coordinator convenes the UN-DMT at country
level, seeking unity of effort among all the various NGOs and agencies
(http://www.unocha.org/).
e. The following NGOs are among the most active worldwide in supporting
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peace operations. The following
descriptions are on each organization’s website:
(1) ActionAid International. They work in partnership with poor and excluded
people to eradicate poverty and injustice. Their programs focus on advancing
women's rights, the right to education, food, security during conflict and
emergencies, to live with dignity in the face of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and the right to just and
democratic governance (http://www.actionaid.org/).
(2) The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Their motto is “Every person
deserves to live a healthy and productive life.” Its Global Development Program
explores the opportunities to help the world’s poorest people lift themselves out of
hunger and poverty. The Gates Foundation’s Global Health Program leverages
advances in science and technology to save lives in developing countries
(http://www.gatesfoundation.org/).
(3) The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction). They
are an alliance of more than 190 US-based international development and
humanitarian NGOs. InterAction seeks to shape important policy decisions on
relief and long-term development issues, including foreign assistance, the
environment, women, health, education, and agriculture. Members are at the
forefront in responding to humanitarian crises and disasters worldwide and
InterAction acts as a hub for these efforts (http://www.interaction.org/).
(4) American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim. They promote
development efforts and provide emergency assistance in Africa, Asia, and the
Caribbean. It focuses on primary health care, potable water, environmental
sanitation, and agriculture-based income generation. The most basic commitment
is enhancing local capacities at the community and central levels.
(5) Catholic Relief Services (CRS). They carry out the commitment of the
Bishops of the United States (US) assisting the poor and vulnerable overseas.
Their goals is promoting human development by responding to major
emergencies, fighting disease and poverty, and nurturing peaceful and just
societies, and live their faith in solidarity with people around the world
(http://crs.org/).
(6) Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). CARE conducts
relief and development programs in over 40 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and the Caribbean. CARE promotes lasting change by strengthening
capacity for self-help, providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in
emergencies, and influencing policy decisions at all levels. Programs are carried

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out under three-way partnership contracts among CARE, private or national
government agencies, and local communities in the areas of health, nutrition,
AIDS, population management, natural resources management, agriculture,
small economic activities, and emergency assistance. CARE provides technical
assistance, training, food, other material resources, and management in
combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. Their particular strength is
in food distribution, emergency transport, and general logistics
(http://www.care.org/).
(7) Concern Worldwide is an international humanitarian organization dedicated
to working with the world’s poorest people to transform their lives. They work in
partnership with vulnerable communities tackling poverty and suffering. Concern
Worldwide uses its knowledge and experience to influence decisions made at
local, national, and international levels to reduce extreme poverty
(https://www.concern.net/).
(8) Doctors without Borders/Médicines Sans Frontières. They provide medical
assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. The US organization is
closely associated with its counterparts in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France.
Medical relief teams depart on over 700 yearly missions to areas of conflict,
refugee camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care
facilities. Their particular areas of expertise are emergency medicine,
vaccinations, and basic hygiene services (http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/).
(9) The International Medical Corps (IMC). They are a global humanitarian
nonprofit organization dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through
health care training and relief and development programs. Established in 1984 by
volunteer doctors and nurses, IMC is a private, voluntary, nonpolitical,
nonsectarian organization. Its mission is improving the quality of life through
health interventions and related activities building local capacity worldwide. The
IMC provides health care and establishes health-training programs in
undeveloped countries and distressed areas. It specializes in areas where few
other relief organizations operate. The goal of IMC is to promote self-sufficiency
through health education and training. Its particular areas of expertise are
immunizations and primary health care (https://internationalmedicalcorps.org).
(10) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial,
neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is
to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of
violence and to assist them. The ICRC assists refugees and internally displaced
victims of war and civil strife. Services range from refugee resettlement in the US
to emergency relief and assistance programs. In addition, it provides emergency
medical support, public health, and small-scale water and sanitation capabilities
(http://www.icrc.org/eng/).
(11) International Rescue Committee (IRC). They serve refugees and
communities victimized by oppression or violent conflict worldwide. Founded in
1933, the IRC is committed to freedom, human dignity, and self-reliance
(http://www.rescue.org/).

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(12) The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) is the world's largest humanitarian organization, providing assistance
without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political
opinions. The IFRC seeks to prevent and alleviate human suffering, and
contribute to maintaining and promoting human dignity and peace in the world.
This society assists other federation members through their international alliance
provisions (http://www.ifrc.org/).
(13) Lutheran World Relief (LWR). They provide financial, material, and
personnel support, usually through counterpart church-related agencies, in the
areas of disaster relief, refugee assistance, and social and economic
development. LWR also provides health care (http://lwr.org).
(14) Save the Children. They are the world's leading independent organization
for children. They work in almost 120 countries to save children's lives, fight for
their rights, and help them fulfill their potential. This organization concentrates on
supplementary feeding, seeds, tools, and general infrastructure
(http://www.savethechildren.org/site).
(15) Mercy Corps. They alleviate suffering, poverty, and oppression by helping
people build secure, productive, and just communities
(http://www.mercycorps.org/).
(16) Partners in Health. They provide quality health care to the world's poorest
and most vulnerable people by working with local partner organizations and
ministries of health to build and staff hospitals and clinics that treat patients
regardless of ability to pay (http://www.pih.org/index.php/).
(17) OXFAM International. They have a vision of a just world without poverty.
They seek to influence decisions that allow citizens of the world to be valued and
treated equally (http://www.oxfam.org/).
(18) World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. They are a Christian relief and
development organization dedicated to helping children, families, and
communities worldwide reach their full potential by tackling the causes of poverty
and injustice. They work in nearly 100 countries, including the US, through
interventions such as nutrition and safe drinking water programs, poverty relief
and community development programs, disaster assistance, and more.
Development programs include child survival, vitamin A, prosthetics and
handicap rehabilitation, child development, and AIDS prevention and education
(http://www.worldvision.org/).

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Appendix F
JOINT COMMISSION
1. Background
a. The techniques and procedures in this appendix are applicable to military units
and help when working with host nation leaders and the local populace to bring
about mutually agreed upon peace arrangements through joint commissions.
b. In peace operations, joint commissions generally seek to create an opportunity
for disputing parties to negotiate and implement a peace agreement or a formal
treaty settlement. A joint commission is composed of two or more governmental,
nongovernmental, and military entities working together developing an agreement
reducing, preventing, or countering conflict.
c. Joint commissions operate at national, regional, and local levels and focus on
solving political, military, economic, and humanitarian issues. Because joint
commissions occur at various levels, commanders attend commission meetings at a
higher headquarters or other locations deemed appropriate.
2. Objectives of Joint Commissions
Joint commissions synchronize efforts to implement a joint peace agreement through
the joint commission system. The terms of a settlement provide mechanisms initiating
and sustaining a peace process. When military forces seek to implement peace
mechanisms, they coordinate and work with joint commission members. Joint
commissions serve the following three functions:
a. Translate Political Agreements into Actions on the Ground. Gaps and ambiguities
exist in peace agreements to achieve agreement by all parties. Military forces work
within the guidelines of these gaps to implement the agreement.
b. Act as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Joint commissions are a way for parties
to resolve disputes that arise over the course of time. Some disputes are appropriate
for the joint commission military channels to resolve. However, some disputes are
purely civil in nature and are not resolved through the joint commission military
channels. Commanders refer these issues to long-range planning staffs and joint
commission civil channels for resolution.
c. Assist in Peace Building. Joint commissions act as vehicles in the reconciliation
process to help build a sustainable peace.
(1) Joint commissions identify and support structures that consolidate peace and
advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. These efforts
include disarmament programs, restoration of order, repatriating displaced
civilians, and advisory and training support for security personnel. Additionally
they advance efforts protecting human rights, reforming or strengthening
governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of
political participation.
(2) At the local level, military forces use this process of teamwork to build other
mechanisms or institutions promoting a sustainable peace; however, subsequent
agreements may contribute to other disputes while implementing the peace
agreement.

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Appendix G
MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS
1. Background
a. A mass atrocity refers to widespread and systematic acts of violence against
civilians or other combatants including killing, causing serious bodily harm, or mental
harm. Mass atrocities include acts of genocide intended to eliminate a group.
b. Mass atrocity response operations (MARO) are military activities preventing or
halting mass atrocities. Incorporate MARO efforts during any phase of a joint
operation or theater campaign plan in response to concerns about actual or potential
mass atrocities.
c. Mass atrocity situations may be difficult to distinguish from other circumstances
such as political violence, massacres, or violations of human rights, especially during
the early stages of a conflict or when lower levels of violence have occurred for an
extended period. Political leadership determines the categorization of situations, as
an actual or potential mass atrocity. Military commanders incorporate MARO
considerations in their planning and operations whenever appropriate.
d. For more information on MARO, reference the MARO publication titled, Mass
Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, by the Harvard
Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the United States (US)
Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
2. MARO Considerations
a. A MARO is a complex operation, and planning addresses several unique factors.
Situational understanding, unity of effort, information operations (IO), and
operational design are all significant planning factors. A MARO combined joint task
force (CJTF) requires a comprehensive and continuously updated understanding of
the strategic objectives, operational environment, relevant actors, and conflict
dynamics. Effective management of information from a variety of nontraditional
sources is critical for successful planning.
b. During the early stages of a MARO, strategic guidance for the operation may be
vague, delayed, incomplete, changing, or conflicting. The military commander
provides recommendations regarding the guidance. Strategic guidance provides
clarity on the following issues:
(1) Actions taken against the host nation (HN) government or its military (if they
are complicit in the atrocities).
(2) MARO forces focus on the apprehension of perpetrators.
(3) Which partners MARO forces coordinate with and in what manner.
(4) Anticipated actions once the atrocities halt. This addresses any
responsibilities for post-conflict stabilization, governance, and reconstruction
including transitioning responsibilities to other actors.
c. A high degree of political-military interaction in the MARO planning process is
critical. Civilian authorities resolve most of the issues related to a MARO (e.g.,
identifying perpetrators and addressing the symptoms or root causes).

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d. Understanding the operational environment provides a situational understanding
of key geographic and political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure (PMESII) factors. This identifies significant actors, critical nodes, and
grievances contributing to the MARO situation. Identification of resiliencies and
opportunities is important to capitalize on later in the operation.
(1) The region’s physical features, such as rivers, mountains, coastlines, and
deserts, significantly affect the MARO crisis and CJTF operations. Perpetrators
use restrictive terrain such as jungles to facilitate or conceal mass atrocities.
Mountains, deserts, and cold climates hinder victim survival. Some geographical
particularities are at the root cause of or serve as flashpoints for conflict. For
example, river areas are primary sources of water and fertile agricultural land, are
concentration points for population, and are sources of conflict.
(2) MARO situations are inherently political. National, transnational, and
subnational political dynamics affect the crisis and resolution efforts. Political
dynamics give the planner insight into the main goals of a perpetrator’s actions.
Key elements include the country’s political structure, political doctrine, centers of
political power, level of competence, extent of control, and factions complicating
the problem. The country may be a failed or fragile state with limited central
government control, or have a totalitarian regime with virtually absolute power.
Political leaders may attempt to foster ethnic tensions to consolidate power and
seek scapegoats. Other potential issues affecting the MARO situation include
levels of corruption, key charismatic leaders, secessionist tendencies of factions,
and existing peace agreements. It is important to understand who is politically
dominant and who is subordinate, and who stands to gain from the atrocities.
(3) The perpetrators may be regular military units operating under the direction of
the state, rogue military units operating independently, temporary paramilitary
units, police units, internal security forces, or other armed groups such as rebels,
militias, gangs, or private armies. Other armed factions may be aligned with
victim groups (who have developed their own self-defense militias) or uninvolved
in the mass atrocity. The CJTF needs an understanding of all armed entities; not
all armed groups may be involved in the mass atrocities, but they can act as
adversaries or potential partners during a MARO intervention. Security forces,
including secret police, may be the primary orchestrators of mass atrocities, and
rival organizations compete with the military and each other for the leader’s favor.
This accelerates tendencies toward mass atrocities or, alternatively, creates
vulnerable divisions MARO forces can exploit. The military assessment includes
identifying actors such as the United Nations (UN), regional peacekeeping forces,
and neighboring countries, and an overview of their military capabilities relating to
a MARO intervention.
(4) The economic assessment identifies economic grievances and drivers of
conflict affecting the operation; mass atrocity situations develop over a struggle
for control and access to natural and strategic resources, or because the majority
resents an economically advantaged minority. The analysis includes key
considerations about agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic product,
natural resources, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, corruption, black
marketing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and humanitarian assistance

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(HA) needs. If not controlled, HA supplies are at risk for appropriation by
criminals, military forces, or other armed groups and fuel black market activities.
The assessment identifies key trading and investment partners, their roles in the
situation, and their support for and advantage over the government. Consider
economic sanctions as a means of prevention and response.
(5) Contrary to conventional wisdom, religious or ethnic diversity itself does not
necessarily create a greater likelihood for genocide or mass atrocity. The
manipulation of differences related to tribal, ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, or
regional differences by perpetrators convincing members of the perpetrating
group and internal and external bystanders, to participate in or provide support
for mass atrocities. Planners identify refugee and internally displaced person
(IDP) camps. They account for previously established camps, either formally or
spontaneously, and note their populations, conditions, and who controls them. In
the early stages of a mass atrocity situation, the flow and encampment of
displaced persons is not evident or easily recognizable. Internal gangs often run
refugee and IDP camps to the detriment of the refugees and IDPs, or serve as
safe havens for insurgents and incite government action against the camps.
Additionally, the camps provide lucrative targets for mass atrocities. Another
significant societal characteristic is the fear of foreigners (xenophobia), which
galvanizes national resistance against outsiders, even if the intervention is well
intentioned. Social issues such as crime, drug use, child soldiers, and human
trafficking have direct linkages to MARO situations. Finally, the analysis includes
significant health issues such as diseases, which affect the population and the
CJTF.
(6) Analysis address infrastructure relevant to MARO operations, CJTF support,
and related humanitarian operations and logistics. Key considerations include
power generation and distribution, road and rail networks, ports, airfields, medical
systems, water sources, and communications systems. It is useful to prioritize
new infrastructure projects or old infrastructure requiring replacement, when
assisting the CJTF’s intervention. Port capacities, airfield capacities, and rail
capacities are particularly important when deploying and sustaining the operation,
and are significant to other actors such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).
(7) An analysis of information handling, both internationally and locally, is critical
for understanding the dynamics of a mass atrocity, planning a response, and
deciding the most advantageous use of media and information. International
media reports about an unfolding mass atrocity are a catalyzing agent for
response, and shape the perception and prioritization of various elements of an
operation. Perpetrators and victims act and respond to the situation based on
how they perceive the international community responds. They are heavily
influenced by perceptions of international and local media. Perpetrators are less
likely to conduct mass killings in the direct presence of international observers,
peacekeepers, or foreign media. Perpetrators attempt to control, or decisively
shape, the information environment (both international and local). Local and
national media—whether it is radio, television, word-of-mouth, village
loudspeakers, or the Internet—are an important part of a perpetrator’s efforts.

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Victim groups use media to campaign for a response or for retribution against the
perpetrators. Both groups use media to recruit from any group dispersed outside
their traditional homeland (Diasporas). Information analysis includes details about
media outlets, i.e., are open or restricted, balanced or partisan. The language
and rhetoric advanced by perpetrators and victim groups are closely monitored
by the US (or other relevant) country team, and the CJTF. They focus on
identifying hate media, inflammatory speeches, and the dehumanization of victim
groups. They also examine the potential for dissuading or blocking inflammatory
information and promoting other messages. Planners consider the need for
additional surveillance and reconnaissance elements. The identification of key
national, regional, and international audiences and appropriate themes is
required to support the IO plan.
3. Actors
Actors include individuals, organizations, nations, or identity groups based on
characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, gender, tribe, education, political affiliation,
economic class, or region. In a MARO situation, the populace views actors as
perpetrators, victims, interveners, or as bystanders, positive actors, and negative actors.
Many actors do not fall permanently in a category, and some are simultaneously
identified as falling into more than one category (for example, a tribal group are victims
and perpetrators of mass atrocities).
4. Perpetrators
a. Perpetrators include those conducting or likely to conduct mass atrocities against
civilians, and are state or nonstate actors. When the perpetrator is a state, the
intervening force faces issues of HN no consent, delays, and the potential
requirement for forcible intervention against organized militaries. State control of a
mass atrocity may be at the highest level, or the result of decisions made by lower-
level figures. States use their security forces, paramilitary groups, or proxy forces to
conduct mass atrocities. Alternatively, independent perpetrators receive informal
support from the government or operate beyond the government’s control or original
intentions. Nonstate actors operate without government involvement or in spite of
government efforts to halt the perpetrators. In failing or fragile states, nonstate actors
act independently of, or in opposition to, the government because they have
sufficient local power to do so. Nongovernmental perpetrators are identity-based,
such as tribal groups, or reflect common ideological factors.
b. In some situations, multiple belligerents instigate mass atrocities; the level of the
violence against civilians is uneven or unequal among the parties. Understanding a
perpetrator’s motivations is essential for determining how to counteract the violence.
Perpetrators are motivated by identity factors, perceived historical wrongs, territorial
claims, racism bred out of fear, desire to extend political control or impose a political
ideology, economic issues, support for criminal enterprises, or establishing a reign
by terror. Rebel groups conduct mass atrocities to intimidate populations, undermine
the government’s legitimacy, or provoke a disproportionate response.
c. Perpetrators adopt a range of strategies; mass atrocities appear to be relatively
spontaneous and intensely violent, or they evolve incrementally over an extended

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period initially using lesser measures such as expropriation of possessions,
relocation, isolation, and gradually reducing resources necessary for survival.
5. Victims
a. Victims are civilians who are the direct or indirect targets of the perpetrators’
actions, or are at risk. Identifying all the real and potential victims is not a
straightforward task, and “who is a victim” may shift, depending on the perpetrators
and interveners’ actions. Displacement or government negligence could cause
victims to be vulnerable to a variety of indirect threats in addition to direct attacks.
Victims are easily targeted when concentrated in specific locations or “safe havens.”
When displaced from their homes for extended periods they will likely become more
susceptible to disease, starvation, or dehydration.
b. Women are vulnerable to rape and being forced into slavery. In many societies,
they face a grim future if they become widows. Rape is a weapon of war in some
cultures and regions in the world, and commanders need to have appropriate
reporting and medical procedures in place dealing with these circumstances.
c. Children are vulnerable to abuse and being forced into slavery. They face an
uncertain future if they become orphans. Commanders need to have appropriate
reporting and medical procedures in place dealing with these circumstances.
d. Victims seek to survive through hiding in place, fleeing to perceived safe havens,
or organizing resistance. Victimized groups may have, or may develop, some means
of defense. Large numbers of victims seek security or HA from CJTF units and
establish camps at their bases.
e. In the aftermath of an intervention, victims require significant HA and want to
return to their land, seek justice and retribution against the perpetrators, and
determine what happened to family members or acquaintances that disappeared
during the crisis. In many cases, perpetrators target leaders, teachers, doctors, and
other members of the educated elite, making it difficult for victim groups to self-
organize after the violence ceases. This impairs the CJTF’s ability to coordinate with
victims, and it may need to identify suitable representatives.
f. Victims and perpetrators may change roles during a conflict—atrocities committed
by one side may inspire retaliatory atrocities by another, particularly if the MARO
intervention significantly weakens the initial perpetrators.
6. Interveners
a. Interveners include external military forces with a role in the intervention as
independent actors. In addition to the CJTF, a UN or other international
peacekeeping force may already be present. This creates unity-of-effort challenges,
because each force has a separate chain of command. Additionally, a country may
have units in the CJTF and units in one of the other peacekeeping forces, and
retains de facto control over all these units.
b. Regular or irregular forces from neighboring countries may also conduct
operations in the crisis area for various reasons. The intervening forces may request
CJTF support. In some situations, their presence complicates matters and they
become perpetrators themselves.

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7. Others
a. Divide the “other actors” category into three subgroups: bystanders, negative
actors, and positive actors. It includes previously uninvolved populations in the
country, neighboring populations or leaders, regional organizations, UN agencies or
political missions, local and international NGOs, and portions of the media.
b. The key to the “others” category analysis is understanding the likelihood of these
actors turning into perpetrators, victims, interveners, or remaining neutral or passive
bystanders. In many cases, their actions are decisive in the crisis’s eventual
outcome, and one goal of a MARO is encouraging constructive contributions from
these other actors, while discouraging them from playing a negative role.
(1) Bystanders.
(a) Bystanders are motivated by perceived self-interest and are risk-averse.
HN bystanders are referred to as the “soft middle;” they are swayed or
coerced by perpetrators into complicity with the mass atrocities, and could
become targets. Alternatively, it is possible to persuade bystanders to support
the victims or interveners, particularly if assuring the intervention’s legitimacy,
capability, and their own protection.
(b) Key international bystanders that facilitate or impede a MARO include
regional countries, global powers, and intergovernmental organizations. In
some fragile state situations where the government is not directly complicit in
mass atrocities, it assumes a bystander role because it is unwilling or unable
to confront the perpetrators.
(2) Positive Actors.
(a) Nonmilitary actors, such as UN agencies, NGOs, and parts of the media,
have a direct and significant influence supporting the intervention. However,
their need to preserve “humanitarian space” limits the ability of many NGOs to
interact with an intervening military force. This generally motivates them to
maintain a distance between themselves and military forces. The agencies
listed above maintain a separation of their actions from military actions to
retain access to vulnerable populations and adhere to their mandate of
impartial assistance. The different end states of humanitarian NGOs and a
MARO force affect the ability of the two groups to cooperate closely. Political
objectives drive military actions. Mass atrocity or genocide is one of the few
situations where humanitarian NGOs support a military intervention, and
override their general opposition to coordinating with military forces.
(b) The CJTF’s goal is achieving “unity of effort” within the MARO operational
environment (OE). When the CJTF and NGOs understand each other’s
missions and end state, operating rules, constraints, and restraints they are
able to operate optimally within the MARO OE. NGOs are more comfortable
dealing with other civilian agencies such as the United Nations, the United
States Agency for International Development, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, or Field Advance Civilian Teams, even if these relationships may be
limited. These entities are effective intermediaries between the CJTF and
NGOs.
(3) Negative Actors.

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(a) Negative actors have a negative influence on the situation, including
supporters of the perpetrators or criminal groups exploiting the chaotic
conditions. Other countries could become negative influences by providing
diplomatic, military, or economic support to the perpetrators or by opposing
the intervention.
(b) Actions against third party enablers are vital to disrupting, undermining, or
influencing perpetrators. Many of these actions are nonmilitary in nature and
conducted in other countries. CJTF commanders prepare recommendations
for these situations.
(c) A critical factors analysis of key actors is useful for identifying centers of
gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.
Actors may switch categories because a MARO situation is dynamic; for
example, bystanders join with perpetrators or support the interveners. One of
the keys to a successful MARO plan is influencing relevant actors to have a
positive influence on the situation, while preventing them from becoming
perpetrators or victims.
8. MARO Planning and Operations
a. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) include the possibility
of mass atrocities. The following priority intelligence requirements and friendly force
information requirements are essential questions to answer when developing CCIRs:
(1) Priority intelligence requirements.
(a) What are the locations, composition, activities, capabilities, weaknesses,
and intention of perpetrators or other adversaries?
(b) Who is providing support to lawless perpetrators and what support are
they providing?
(c) Have there been new mass atrocity incidents or significant acts of
violence against civilians?
(d) Has the HN government had a change in its composition or policies?
(2) Friendly force information requirements.
(a) Have there been any relevant policy changes in the US, UN, regional
organizations, or other key countries?
(b) Are there any significant changes in the capability of the MARO force or
its partners?
(c) What significant problems and successes are the MARO force and its
partners experiencing?
(d) What are the plans for the MARO force subordinates, supporting
command, and partners?
(e) What additional resources are required?
b. MAROs are addressed within the doctrinal construct of six phases (shape, deter,
seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority).
(1) Phase 0: Shape. Phase 0 is the steady-state situation where mass atrocities
are neither being committed nor appear imminent; however, a mass atrocity
situation could develop. Emphasis is on prevention by diplomatic, economic, or

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informational means. Military activities support these efforts while preparing for
possible contingencies. Preparations include plan development, establishing and
monitoring indications and warning (I&W), planning, and exercises. Theater
security cooperation activities support broader national policy goals in the region,
but may have MARO relevance. This phase ends when I&W suggest mass
atrocities in the concerned region are likely and warrant additional deterrent
measures.
(2) Phase I: Deter. This phase begins when I&W show mass atrocities are
occurring or may be imminent. The intent is to conduct targeted activities or
provide military support to diplomatic crisis management, defusing the situation
and deterring escalation, while preparing for an intervention if necessary. While
mass atrocity indicators are context-specific and not an exact science, common
indicators appear and include sporadic acts of violence, inflammatory speeches
by political leaders, and other examples of hate media.
(a) As a mass atrocity builds, policymakers want options for interrupting the
escalation of violence. Military flexible deterrent options (FDOs) supplement
diplomatic, economic, and informational measures and are employed to
expose perpetrators to international scrutiny, establish the credibility of a
potential intervention, build capability, isolate perpetrators, protect potential
victims, dissuade or punish perpetrators, or build and demonstrate
international resolve.
(b) FDOs require different levels of resources, risk, and intrusion to the target
country’s sovereignty. Military measures include activating commands
participating in the intervention; establishing necessary bases; mobilizing and
deploying forces; conducting shows of force; increasing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; or conducting a noncombatant
evacuation operation. Stronger measures include imposing no-fly zones or
blockades, or deferring implementation until later.
(3) Phase II: Seize Initiative. This phase begins on D-Day and initiates
operations to halt actual or imminent mass atrocities, by directing the MARO
force to execute the planned mission. Diplomatic, economic, and informational
measures intensify, but the main features of the phase are force employment in
the country and the commencement of full-spectrum operations. Key to success
in this phase is attaining a foothold in the area of operations (AO) and
establishing the force’s credibility as a capable actor. Employ air power as a
temporary shield when ground forces are not available in sufficient numbers to
protect vulnerable populations. Achievement of low-cost “quick-wins” is
instrumental in gaining the initiative and establishing the credibility of the
intervention.
(4) Phase III: Dominate. This phase begins when the MARO force is prepared to
expand its operations from its initial lodgments throughout the AO. The CJTF
completes the deployment of all forces, reinforces them as required, secures the
desired freedom of operation, and achieves the results necessary to end mass
atrocities and secure vulnerable populations. If required, the MARO force
establishes a transitional military authority over parts of the country.

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(5) Phase IV: Stabilize. This phase begins as transition of responsibility to civilian
authority commences. In addition to addressing any residual security challenges,
transfer interim control of the area to designated civilian authorities (HN,
Department of State, UN, or some other entity) during this phase. Civilian
authorities begin “rebuilding” preventing a relapse to conditions that prompted the
intervention. The military supports the initial efforts of the civilian authorities in
establishing governance and rule of law, providing essential services, and
beginning economic recovery.
(6) Phase V: Enable Civil Authority. This phase begins when a legitimate HN
government (or other designated authority) assumes responsibility for
governance. Emphasis in this phase is on resolving the root causes of the conflict
and establishing conditions supporting transitional justice and long-term peace,
stability, and development. A long-term peacekeeping force may be required. The
UN or a regional organization provides the necessary forces. The military focus
during this phase includes peacekeeping operations; security force assistance;
security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and
redeployment, marking the end of the phase and operation.
9. MARO Approaches
a. Joint forces use one or more of the seven approaches listed in table 8 when
conducting a MARO. These approaches include the following:
(1) Area security—secure a large area with sufficient force deployed in unit
sectors.
(2) Shape-clear-hold-build—systematically secure limited areas and expand
when able.
(3) Separation—establishes a demilitarized zone or similar buffer zone between
perpetrators and victims.
(4) Safe areas—secure concentrations of vulnerable populations such as IDP
camps.
(5) Partner enabling—provide advisors, equipment, or specialized support such
as deployment or airpower to coalition partners, HN, or victim groups.
(6) Containment—influence perpetrator behavior with strikes, blockades, or no-
fly zones.
(7) Defeat perpetrators—attack and defeat perpetrator leadership and
capabilities.
b. More than one employment option exists, and it is appropriate to emphasize
different approaches as the operation progresses across the AO. For example, the
containment approach is appropriate as an initial effort when speed of response is at
a premium.

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Table 8. MARO Approaches
Approach Characteristics Considerations
• Wide area control • Requires adequate forces, extensive
• Unit sectors logistics, and a weak adversary
• Mobile patrols • Suitable when victim population is widely
Approach 1 • Quick Response Forces (QRFs) dispersed
Area Security • Outposts • Extensive stability operations necessary
• Mobile Operating Bases
• Similar to Counterinsurgency
operations (COIN) in Iraq
• Focused, systematic advance within • Fewer forces required than area security
Approach 2 capabilities • Suitable with strong perpetrators and
• “Mobile” forces clear concentrated victim populations
Shape-Clear-Hold- • “Static” forces maintain security • Cedes territory to perpetrators
Build • Based upon classic Galula COIN • Extended commitment
approach
• Controlled buffer zone between • Limited forces required
perpetrators and victims • Suitable when perpetrators and victims are
Approach 3 • Outposts, patrols, QRFs separated
• Supporting fires as required • Cedes territory to perpetrators
Separation • Similar to traditional peacekeeping or • Forces may be caught between belligerent
demilitarized zone operations groups
• Potential long-term division
• Protect internally displaced person • Limited forces required
camps • Suitable when victims are concentrated
Approach 4 • Secure areas of victim concentration • Cedes territory to perpetrators
• Defensive posture • Large humanitarian assistance burden
Safe Areas • Security on migration routes • May inadvertently “reward” perpetrators
• Expect increased numbers of civilians
seeking protection
• Most ground forces from coalition • Partners bear most of the burdens
partners or victim groups • Minimizes US footprint
• United States (US) provides security • Helps build indigenous capability
Approach 5 force assistance, equipment, or key • Partners have capability limitations
Partner Enabling enablers (deployment, air, special • US relinquishes control of effort
operations forces (SOF))
• Similar to East Timor or Northern
Alliance operations
• Reliance on air, maritime, cyber power, • Capitalizes on US military strengths (air
and SOF and sea)
Approach 6 • No-fly zones, blockades, strikes • Limited in country presence
• Integrated with diplomatic and • Does not provide direct protection of
Containment informational efforts victims
• Similar to 1990s Iraq containment • Increased risk of collateral damage
• Precursor to other approaches
• Offensive focus against perpetrators • Large force required
• Defeat perpetrator leadership and • May be required for long term resolution
Approach 7 military capability • Extensive reconstruction and stabilization
Defeat Perpetrators • Regime change or collapse if effort required
necessary • Potential for high casualties and collateral
• Iraq 2003 model damage

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Appendix H
KEY DOCUMENTS
1. Background
The following is a list of key documents for conducting peace operations (PO). Not all
documents are applicable to every operation nor are they all-important at every level.
2. Mandate
a. Mandates are in the form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR). The PO force conducts operations based on a mandate describing the
scope of operations.
b. A mandate addresses the following points:
(1) Role of the peace operation.
(2) Mission of the peace operation organization.
(3) Tasks or functions.
(4) Size and organization of the force or mission.
(5) Appointment of the commander, any special mediators, and their terms of
reference (TORs).
(6) Nomination of the office responsible for supervising the operation.
(7) General arrangements for financial and logistical support.
(8) Division of sponsoring organization and national responsibilities.
(9) Time limit of the mandate.
(10) Terms or conditions the host nation (HN) is imposing on the force or
mission.
(11) Statements of the rights and immunities of force or mission members.
c. Current and former United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs)
mandates are located at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.
d. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Peace Operations, Appendix A, provides more
detail on UN involvement in peace operations.
e. The UN charter is located at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.
3. Status of Forces Agreement
A status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) defines the legal position of a visiting military
force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of
visiting military forces are bilateral or multilateral. Agreements between the HN, military
forces, and other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders contribute to
developing the SOFA. For more information, see JP 3-07.3.
4. Terms of Reference
Based on the mandate and situation, develop TORs governing implementation of PO.
The TORs describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics,
accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of military units
and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. In addition, the TORs require the
endorsement of all parties in dispute. For more information, see JP 3-07.3.

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5. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
a. ROE are directives issued by a competent military authority, delineating the
circumstances and limitations under which United States (US) forces initiate or
continue combat engagement with other encountered forces. For more information,
see JP 3-07.3.
b. Individual nations have different ROE, and this causes confusion and tension. In
addition, PO forces have multiple missions each with a separate ROE. US Service
members understand this dynamic and know US ROE takes precedence for US
Service members. Table 9 is an example ROE card.
Table 9. Sample Rules of Engagement Card
Note: Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take
appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit
• Service members have the right to use force to defend against attacks or threat
of attack.
• Hostile fire is returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts.
• When attacked by hostile elements (mobs, rioters, etc.), United States (US)
forces use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and
proportional to the threat.
• Protect property with less than deadly force.
• Do not seize the property of others to accomplish the mission.
• Detain civilians for security reasons or in self-defense.
REMEMBER
• The US is not at war.
• Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
• Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation.
• All persons must report suspected violations of the law of war committed by US,
friendly, or enemy force. Notify the chain of command, Judge Advocate,
Inspector General, military police, or appropriate Service-related investigative
branch.

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement

a. The standing rules of engagement (SROE) apply to US forces during military
operations and contingencies, including PO. Commanders augment the SROE for
specific operations. Commanders assess the capabilities and intent of other forces
and make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command.
Clearly state the ROE in simple language. For additional ROE guidance, refer to
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement or Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.
b. Use SROE for the following:

164 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

(1) Implementing the right of self-defense, this is applicable worldwide, at all
echelons of command.
(2) Providing guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission
accomplishment.
(3) Using SROE in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from
peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of
superseding guidance.
7. General Orders
Commanders issue general orders for various reasons, including conduct of personnel
participating in PO.
8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Documents
a. The following NATO documents comprise the orders and ROE implementation
process for operations. The NATO orders process, as expressed in MC 133/3,
NATO’s Operational Planning Systems, 6 September 2000, includes three NATO
requests or orders and three responses by the nations. These document formats are
NATO Classified.
(1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN). A decision taken by NATO bringing the
organization to a new state of military preparedness by allowing nations to
identify available militaries if operations take place. Answered by nations with
informal force offers.
(2) Activation Request. A decision taken by NATO preparing previously identified
military assets for action. This decision generates a formal force generation
process by issuing a statement of requirements. This formalizes the informal
request for forces made in the ACTWARN phase. This is not a political decision
to use military force. Answered with a final force preparation (FORCEPREP).
(3) FORCEPREP. Statements by the nations to a NATO strategic commander of
their commitment to provide forces for a specific operation.
(4) Activation Order. A NATO order authorizing the execution of a military
operation and requesting nations transfer authority of forces committed via the
final FORCEPREP. Approval of this order is the final political decision by the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) required before executing a military operation.
(5) Transfer of Authority. Statement by the nations transferring authority of units
committed via the FORCEPREP to a NATO security committee for execution of a
specific operation.
b. The NATO ROE process includes three requests or orders.
(1) ROE Request. Request by a NATO security committee to the NAC for
authorization implementing ROE measures previously approved in an operation
plan (OPLAN). Only request measures listed in the OPLAN.
(2) ROE Authorization. Approval by the NAC to a NATO security committee
authorizing implementation of the requested ROE measures.
(3) ROE Implementation. Order by a NATO security committee to forces
implementing ROE measures previously authorized by the NAC. The NATO

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 165

security committee is not required to implement all authorized ROE measures.
The ROE implementation includes any known national caveats.

166 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

REFERENCES
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force
for US Forces, 18 June 2008
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15
October 2013
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011
JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 16 July 2014
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 14 March 2014
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011
JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 4
October 2013
JP 3-13, Information Operations, 27 November 2012
JP 3-14, Space Operations, 29 May 2013
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013
JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 3 January 2014
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013
JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations, 21 February 2013
JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, 19 December 2013
ARMY
ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011
ATP 4-02.42, Army Health System Support to Stability and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities Tasks, 9 June 2014
ATP 4-11, Army Motor Transport Operations, 5 July 2013
ATTP 4-15, Army Water Transport Operations, 11 February 2011
FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, 25 Jan 2013
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, CH 1, 2 June 2014
FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare, 9 November 2012
FM 3-39, Military Police Operations, 26 August 2013
FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011
FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, 22 March 2013
FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014
NAVY
NTTP 3-06.1, Riverine Operations, February 2008
AIR FORCE
USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence, (accessed on 5 March 2014)
http://culture.af.mil/nce/PDF/cnsworksheets/1_multipage.pdf

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 167

MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
ATP 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP 3-2.29 Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations, 19 April 2013
ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.58 Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, 18 April 2014
ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 20 September 2011
ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance, 20 September 2011
FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, 24
October 2007
FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33 Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special
Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability and Interdependence, 13 March 2014
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Department of Defense Instruction O-2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, 1
March 2012, incorporating change 1, 9 September 2013
Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975
MC 133/3, NATO’s Operational Planning Systems, 6 September 2000
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945
United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Carr
Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School: Mass Atrocity Response
Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, May 2010
USJFCOM Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform,
13 June 2011

168 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

GLOSSARY
A
ACTWARN activation warning
AD air defense
ADL armistice demarcation line
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ALSA Air Land Sea Application (Center)
AO area of operations
AOL area of limitation
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and
events
ATP Army tactical publication
B
BATNA best alternative to a negotiated agreement
BZ buffer zone
C
C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
CACOM civil affairs command
CAO civil affairs operations
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CD&I Combat Development and Integration
CEMA cyber electromagnetic activities
CID criminal investigation division
CIL customary international law
CIM civilian information management
CIVPOL civilian police

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 169

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF combined joint task force
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
COA course of action
CP check point
D
DC dislocated civilian
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ demilitarized zone
DOD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DP displaced person
E
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EOF escalation of force
EW electronic warfare
F
FDO flexible deterrent option
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FM field manual
FN foreign nation
FORCEPREP force preparation
FPA foreign policy advisor
FPCON force protection condition
FSF foreign security forces

170 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

G
GPS Global Positioning System
H
HA humanitarian assistance
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HHQ higher headquarters
HN host nation
HQ headquarters
HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps
HUMINT human intelligence
I
I&W indications and warning
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP internally displaced person
IE information environment
IED improvised explosive device
IGO intergovernmental organization
IMC International Medical Corps
IO information operations
IPI indigenous populations and institutions
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
IPTF International Police Training Force
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J, K
JMC joint movement center
JP joint publication
L
LeMay Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and
Education

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 171

LNO liaison officer
LWR Lutheran World Relief
M
MA Massachusetts
MARO mass atrocity response operations
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available and civil considerations (Army)
MIS military information support
MISO military information support operations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MP military police (Army and Marine)
MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures
MWD military working dog
N
NA nation assistance
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCE Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLCS nonlethal capability set
NLW nonlethal weapon
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command
O
OE operational environment
OFDA Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
OP observation post
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

172 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

P
PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PEO peace enforcement operations
PERSEC personnel security
PHYSEC physical security
PK peacekeeping
PKO peacekeeping operations
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure
PO peace operations
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD political advisor
PRC populace and resources control
PSYOP psychological operations
Q
QRF quick response force
R
RCA riot control agent
ROE rules of engagement
ROMO range of military operations
S
SA situational awareness
SAR search and rescue
SCA support to civil administration
SFA security force assistance
SFOR Stabilization Force
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 173

SOP standard operating procedure
SROE standing rules of engagement
T
TIM toxic industrial materials
TOR term of reference
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U
UN United Nations
UN-DMT United Nations disaster management team
UNDP United Nations development programme
UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
UNPOL United Nations police
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
UXO unexploded ordnance
V
VA Virginia
VIP very important person
W, X, Y, Z
WFP World Food Programme (UN)
WHO World Health Organization (UN)
ZOPA zone of possible agreement

174 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
buffer zone—A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which
disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of
separation in some United Nations operations. Also called BZ. See also line of
demarcation; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
casualty evacuation—The unregulated movement of casualties that can include
movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Also called
CASEVAC. See also casualty; evacuation; medical treatment facility. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 1-02)
civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized,
trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to
support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil-military operations.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57)
civil-military operations— The activities of a commander performed by designated
civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by
directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or
maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 1-
02. Source: JP-57)
civil-military operations center—An organization normally comprised of civil affairs,
established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of
the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector,
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational
forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force
commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57)
combat camera—The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support
of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations
and during joint exercises. Also called COMCAM. See also visual information.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-61)
commander’s critical information requirement—An information requirement
identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision
making. Also called CCIR. See also information requirements; intelligence;
priority intelligence requirement. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
conflict prevention—A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil,
and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of
conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or
resumption of hostilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
detainee—A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an
armed force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-63)
Diaspora—the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an
established or ancestral homeland. (Source: Merriam-Webster dictionary)

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 175

displaced person—A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced
persons collectively. See also evacuee; refugee. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29)
force protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against
Department of Defense personnel (including family members), resources,
facilities, and critical information. Also called FP. See also force; force protection
condition; protection. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
force protection condition—A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved
standard for identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats
against US personnel and facilities. Also called FPCON. See also antiterrorism;
force protection. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-02)
foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities, normally in
support of the United States Agency for International Development or
Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and
possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.
Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29)
host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or
NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its
territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57)
human intelligence—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)
humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by
predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises.
This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section
401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. See also foreign
humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29)
intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement
between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to
protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called
IGO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-08)
international organization—An intergovernmental, regional or global organization
governed by international law and established by a group of states, with
international juridical personality given by international agreement, however
characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of
fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims. (JP 4-08. Source: AAP-06)
interoperability—The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems
or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services
can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.
The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 6-0)
joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of
Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint
task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

176 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. See also rules of engagement.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04)
line of demarcation—A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone used to establish
the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of
disengagement or withdrawal has been completed. See also buffer zone
disengagement; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
mass atrocity response operations—Military activities conducted to prevent or halt
mass atrocities. Also called MARO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s
objectives. Also called MISO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.2)
multinational operations—A collective term to describe military actions conducted by
forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a
coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-16)
nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization
dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health
care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic
institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-08)
nonlethal weapon—A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as
to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury
to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Also
called NLW. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-28)
operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.
Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.3)
peace building—Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that
strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a
relapse into conflict. Also called PB. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping;
peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
peace enforcement—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally
pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or
sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace
building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-
07.3)
peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a
dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement
(cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to

1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 177

reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace
enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
peacemaking—The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of
peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that
led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace
operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
peace operations—A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational
crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of
national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and
shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the
transition to legitimate governance. Also called PO. See also peace building;
peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3)
reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or
geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 2-0)
repatriation—The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in
accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-0)
rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called
ROE. See also law of war. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04)
status-of-forces agreement—A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the
legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-16)
terrorism—The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or
other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually
political. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force
protection condition. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.2)
unexploded explosive ordnance—Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused,
armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped,
launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to
operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either
by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO. See also
explosive ordnance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-15).

178 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014

*ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31]
MCWP 3-33.8
AFTTP 3-2.40
1 November 2014
By Order of the Secretary of the Army

Official: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1428203
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve. Not to be distributed;
electronic media only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEVEN L. KWAST
Major General, USAF
Commander and President
Air University

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at

www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering.
RELEASABILITY: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release,
distribution is unlimited.
* Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 dated 26 October 2003, including all
changes.
MARINE CORPS PCN: 143 000144 01 PIN: 104715-000