ATP 3-37.

34
MCTP 3-34C

SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS

APRIL 2018

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to Department of Defense agencies and their contractors
only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use only and to those
containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 6 March 2018. Other
requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-
CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.

This publication supersedes ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6, 28 June 2013.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Foreword
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands
as appropriate.

Kevin S. Brown Robert S. Walsh

Colonel, Engineer Lieutenant General, USMC
Commandant Deputy Commandant for
U.S. Army Engineer School Combat Development and
Integration

This publication is available at the Army Publishing

Directorate site ([Link]
the Central Army Registry site
([Link] and the USMC
Doctrine site at [Link]
*ATP 3-37.34/
MCTP 3-34C
Army Techniques Publication Headquarters
No. 3-37.34 Department of the Army
Washington, DC,16 April 2018

Marine Corps Tactical Publication Headquarters

No. 3-34C Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Department of The Navy
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC

Survivability Operations

Contents
Page
PREFACE.............................................................................................................. vi
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. vii
Chapter 1 SURVIVABILITY OVERVIEW ............................................................................ 1-1
Survivability ........................................................................................................ 1-1
Survivability Operations ...................................................................................... 1-4
Survivability in the Offense ................................................................................. 1-6
Survivability in the Defense ................................................................................ 1-7
Survivability Supporting Stability or Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Tasks .................................................................................................................. 1-7
Engineer Role in Survivability ............................................................................. 1-7
Chapter 2 SURVIVABILITY INTEGRATION ...................................................................... 2-1
Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................. 2-1
Planning .............................................................................................................. 2-3
Preparation ......................................................................................................... 2-6
Execution ............................................................................................................ 2-7
Assessment ........................................................................................................ 2-7
Assessment Tools .............................................................................................. 2-7

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to Department of Defense agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use only and to those
containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 6 March 2018. Other
requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-
CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.

*This publication supersedes ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6, 28 June 2013.

ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C i

Contents

Chapter 3 COVER ............................................................................................................... 3-1

Types of Weapons Effects .................................................................................. 3-1
Weapons Effects Mitigation ................................................................................ 3-3
Materials and Techniques ................................................................................... 3-6
Chapter 4 FIGHTING POSITIONS ...................................................................................... 4-1
Fighting Positions Plans and Designs................................................................. 4-1
Individual Fighting Positions ............................................................................... 4-3
Crew-Served Weapons Fighting Positions ......................................................... 4-6
Bunkers and Towers ........................................................................................... 4-9
Vehicle Fighting Positions ................................................................................. 4-10
Artillery Positions............................................................................................... 4-16
Chapter 5 PROTECTIVE POSITIONS ................................................................................ 5-1
Vehicle and Equipment Protective Positions ...................................................... 5-1
Observation Posts and Protective Shelters ........................................................ 5-2
Rehabilitation and Upgrade of Existing Structures ............................................. 5-6
Chapter 6 CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT ............................................................ 6-1
Threat Overview .................................................................................................. 6-1
Principles ............................................................................................................. 6-5
Techniques ........................................................................................................ 6-11
Natural Conditions............................................................................................. 6-13
Materials ............................................................................................................ 6-14
Considerations for Offensive Tasks .................................................................. 6-17
Considerations for Defensive Tasks ................................................................. 6-19
Considerations for Stability or Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks ...... 6-23
Camouflage and Concealment Planning .......................................................... 6-23
Fixed Assets ...................................................................................................... 6-24
Relocatable Assets ........................................................................................... 6-26
The Geneva Emblem and Camouflage of Medical Facilities ............................ 6-26
Chapter 7 CRITICAL ASSETS ............................................................................................ 7-1
Command Posts.................................................................................................. 7-1
Logistics Sites ..................................................................................................... 7-3
Aviation Sites ...................................................................................................... 7-5
Chapter 8 SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS .............................................................................. 8-1
Jungles ................................................................................................................ 8-1
Mountainous Areas ............................................................................................. 8-2
Deserts ................................................................................................................ 8-4
Cold Regions ....................................................................................................... 8-6
Urban Areas ...................................................................................................... 8-11
Appendix A ENTRY CONTROL POINTS .............................................................................. A-1
Appendix B REACHBACK TOOLS....................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C EXAMPLE SURVIVABILITY CAPABILITIES AND TRACKING TOOLS......... C-1
Appendix D BUNKER AND SHELTER ROOF DESIGN ....................................................... D-1
Appendix E SURVIVABILITY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GUIDELINES .. E-1

ii ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Contents

Appendix F ULTRALIGHTWEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE NET SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL

CAMOUFLAGE CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................ F-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures
Figure 3-1. Poor sandbag technique .................................................................................... 3-14
Figure 3-2 Proper sandbag technique .................................................................................. 3-14
Figure 3-3. Properly sandbagged concrete shelter .............................................................. 3-14
Figure 3-4. Earth berms........................................................................................................ 3-16
Figure 3-5. Soil-filled containers used as protective perimeter walls ................................... 3-17
Figure 3-6. Metal revetment walls used as blast protection ................................................. 3-17
Figure 3-7. Earth walls with revetment ................................................................................. 3-18
Figure 3-8. Soil bin walls with revetment .............................................................................. 3-18
Figure 3-9. Predetonation and shielding layers .................................................................... 3-19
Figure 3-10. Predetonation screen concept ......................................................................... 3-21
Figure 3-11. Typical predetonation screen standoff framing using dimensional lumber
(front view) ........................................................................................................ 3-22
Figure 3-12. Typical predetonation screen standoff framing using dimensional lumber
(side view) ......................................................................................................... 3-22
Figure 3-13. Key components of the MPS ........................................................................... 3-24
Figure 3-14. MPS-OHC solution ........................................................................................... 3-24
Figure 4-1. Hasty prone position ............................................................................................ 4-5
Figure 4-2. Deliberate two-man fighting position with built-up OHC (without
camouflage) ........................................................................................................ 4-6
Figure 4-3. Position with firing platforms ................................................................................ 4-7
Figure 4-4. Hull defilade M1 tank position ............................................................................ 4-13
Figure 4-5. Fully developed deliberate fighting position ....................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-6 Patriot launcher station protective and backblast berms .................................... 4-16
Figure 4-7. Towed howitzer emplacement (105-millimeter and 155-millimeter
howitzer) layout ................................................................................................. 4-20
Figure 4-8. Towed howitzer completed emplacement (105-millimeter and 155-
millimeter howitzer) ........................................................................................... 4-21
Figure 4-9. Emplacement for 155-millimeter howitzer, self-propelled (M109 series)
(semipermanent installation) ............................................................................. 4-22
Figure 5-1. Metal culvert shelter ............................................................................................. 5-3
Figure 5-2. Belowground metal shipping container shelter .................................................... 5-4
Figure 5-3. Metal container reinforcement assembly ............................................................. 5-4
Figure 5-4. Timber post buried shelter ................................................................................... 5-5
Figure 5-5. Modular timber frame shelter ............................................................................... 5-5

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C iii

Contents

Figure 5-6. Timber frame buried shelter ................................................................................ 5-6

Figure 6-1. Geneva Convention protection symbols (left: Red Cross; middle: Red
Crescent; right: Red Crystal) ............................................................................ 6-26
Figure 8-1. Belowground fighting position in snow ................................................................ 8-9
Figure 8-2. Dismounted antitank and machine gun positions in snow ................................ 8-10
Figure 8-3. Individual fighting position in snow .................................................................... 8-10
Figure 8-4. Snow trench with wood revetment..................................................................... 8-11
Figure A-1. Operational phases for ECPs.............................................................................. A-3
Figure B-1. TCE-D ................................................................................................................. B-4
Figure B-2. Broadband Global Area Network terminal .......................................................... B-5
Figure B-3. ENFIRE components .......................................................................................... B-6
Figure C-1. Example survivability capabilities matrix ............................................................. C-2
Figure C-2. Example commander’s card used to track M/CM/S effort in cartoon ................. C-3
Figure C-3. Example commander’s card used to track countermobility and
survivability effort ................................................................................................ C-4
Figure C-4. Example commander’s card to track survivability effort ..................................... C-4
Figure C-5. Example commander’s card to track countermobility and survivability .............. C-5
Figure D-1. Basic roof design for a simple stringer roof ........................................................ D-1
Figure D-2. Axis orientation, timber ....................................................................................... D-2
Figure D-3. Axis orientation, steel, wide-flange members ..................................................... D-4
Figure D-4. Roof stringer design equation ............................................................................. D-9
Figure D-5. Comparison graph for stringer relationships ..................................................... D-13
Figure D-6. Quick-check chart for roof capability ................................................................. D-14
Figure D-7. Existing wood stringer roof example ................................................................. D-15
Figure E-1. Sample camouflage and concealment checklist ................................................. E-2

Tables
Introductory table 1. Modified Army/Marine Corps terms ....................................................... viii
Table 2-1. Survivability operations planning considerations during the planning
process ............................................................................................................... 2-3
Table 2-2. Correlation of mission analysis/problem framing and the engineer running
estimate .............................................................................................................. 2-5
Table 3-1. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against direct hits by
direct-fire projectiles ........................................................................................... 3-7
Table 3-2. Small-arms protection characteristics of various materials .................................. 3-9
Table 3-3. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against direct-fire HE
shaped charges ................................................................................................ 3-10
Table 3-4. Material thickness required to protect against a direct hit with an RPG with
HEAT/thermobaric warhead ............................................................................. 3-11
Table 3-5. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against indirect-fire
fragmentation and blast exploding 50 feet away .............................................. 3-11
Table 3-6. Recommended material options for predetonation layers .................................. 3-20

iv ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Contents

Table 3-7. Material options for shielding layers .................................................................... 3-20

Table 3-8. Predetonation screen facing material requirements ........................................... 3-23
Table 3-9. Protective wall material thickness at 10-foot (3-meter) standoff from
predetonation screen ........................................................................................ 3-23
Table 4-1. Characteristics of individual fighting positions ...................................................... 4-4
Table 4-2. References for crew-served weapons fighting positions....................................... 4-7
Table 4-3. Characteristics of crew-served weapons fighting positions .................................. 4-8
Table 4-4. Dimensions of vehicle positions .......................................................................... 4-11
Table 4-5. Excavation capabilities of selected survivability equipment ................................ 4-15
Table 4-6. Dimensions of field artillery vehicle positions ...................................................... 4-17
Table 5-1. Dimensions of protective positions for radar systems........................................... 5-1
Table 6-1. Camouflage and concealment techniques .......................................................... 6-11
Table 6-2. Expedient paints .................................................................................................. 6-16
Table 8-1. Snow wall construction for protection from grenades, small-caliber fire,
and HEAT projectiles ....................................................................................... 8-11
Table 8-2. Survivability requirements for troops in urban buildings ..................................... 8-12
Table 8-3. Building characteristics for fighting positions in urban buildings ......................... 8-13
Table 8-4. Minimum floor sizes for firing weapons in enclosed areas ................................. 8-14
Table D-1. Transmission coefficients for different soil types ................................................. D-2
Table D-2. Moment of inertia and section modulus for different timber sizes ....................... D-3
Table D-3. Modulus of elasticity and maximum dynamic flexural stress for different
timber species .................................................................................................... D-3
Table D-4. Moment of inertia and section modulus for different steel wide flange
members ............................................................................................................ D-4
Table D-5. Maximum span of dimensioned wood roof sheathing for earth cover ................. D-5
Table D-6. Maximum span of wood stringer roof support for earth cover ............................. D-5
Table D-7. Maximum span of steel picket roof supports for sandbag layers ........................ D-6
Table D-8. Center-to-center spacing for wood supporting soil cover to defeat contact
bursts ................................................................................................................. D-7
Table D-9. Converting dimensional timber to round timber ................................................... D-8
Table D-10. Standard stringer roof procedure (contact burst rounds) ................................ D-10
Table D-11. Charge equivalency table ................................................................................ D-11
Table D-12. Example wood stringer roof procedure............................................................ D-16
Table D-13. Example steel stringer roof procedure............................................................. D-18
Table F-1. Example battle drill ................................................................................................ F-2

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C v

Preface
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C provides updates of previous terms, data and characteristics, current tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) for survivability activities. Although it focuses on engineer contributions to
survivability, this publication provides enduring TTP for fighting positions, protective positions, hardened
facilities, camouflage, and concealment.
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C is suitable for Army and Marine Corps commanders/leaders and their staffs at all
echelons, but the principal audience for this manual is the engineer staff, officers at brigade/Marine air-ground
task force (MAGTF) and below, and planners who have staff proponency for survivability operations. It is also a
valuable reference for Army and Marine Corps trainers, educators, and combat developers and for other Services.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that
their Soldiers/Marines operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (see
FM 27-10 and MCTP 10-10B).
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions
appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C is the proponent (the
authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for
which ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions
shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, United States Army Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE). The
preparing agency is the MSCoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID); Concepts,
Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division (CODDD); Doctrine Branch. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-
8929; by e-mail to <[Link]@[Link]>; or submit an electronic DA
Form 2028. Marine Corps readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes to Deputy
Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, ATTN: C116, 3300 Russell Road, Suite 204, Quantico,
VA 22134-5021 or by e-mail to <doctrine@[Link]>.

vi ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Introduction
Survivability, in its common usage, refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For
the Army and Marine Corps, however, survivability is about much more than mere survival—it is also about
remaining effective.
Updates to ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C include redefining survivability operations to change the activities from
military to protection activities, thereby completing its nesting as a supporting task of the protection warfighting
function. Previously named areas of survivability operations are now survivability operations tasks because they
are continuing activities throughout the range of military operations. Expanded discussion on threats to
survivability to include near-peer threat considerations. Language was added related to withstanding chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazard conditions, which affect survivability and describe how
immediate and operational decontamination allows forces to retain the ability to perform their mission.
Additional updates relate to the roles of the engineer staff officer, brigade engineer battalion commander, and
assistant brigade engineer regarding survivability operations roles and responsibilities. Army engineer staff
officer resourcing was differentiated from the Marine Corps resources. Updated language that provides
clarification of marking and proofing roles for vehicle fighting and protective positions was also added.
Language updates offer further clarity regarding survivability considerations in special environments. They also
provide additional information for users of this publication and supply doctrinal updates to the commander’s card
sketch example.
Figures were added as examples of individual and crew-served survivability positions as well as an air defense
artillery firing position. Updated engineer equipment construction times for individual and crew-served tables
using the latest equipment production rates and corrected dimensions for some vehicles. Updated the artillery
position and radar tables with the most current systems and included air defense artillery launcher data.
Information pertaining to direct- and indirect-fire weapons effects was updated with the most current data. More
precise terminology and information was also added in relation to CBRN considerations for survivability in the
offense and defense. CBRN hazard mitigations were updated and realigned with CBRN doctrine. Descriptions of
explosive hazards (EHs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were updated to align with the latest joint and
proponent doctrinal publications.
The language on the standard issue camouflage net systems from the older Lightweight Camouflage Screen
System (LCSS) to the Ultra-Lightweight Camouflage-Net System (ULCANS) was replaced and updated.
Expanded the discussion of command post survivability to align with near-peer threat considerations.
Considerations related to unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) were added to the discussion on aerial attacks.
To most effectively use this manual, readers should first become familiar with the foundational doctrine upon
which it is built (ADP 3-0, ADP 5-0, ADRP 1-02, ADRP 3-37, FM 3-34, MCRP 1-10.2, MCWP 3-34, MCWP
5-10).
This manual uses the term planning process to indicate both the military decisionmaking process/Marine Corps
planning process and troop-leading procedures. This manual uses the term mission variables to indicate both the
Army and Marine Corps use of the term. For the Army, mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). For the Marine Corps
(and in joint doctrine), mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available (METT-T).
When this manual uses two terms separated by a slash (/), the first term is the Army term, and the second term is
the Marine Corps term. Key differences in Army and Marine Corps terms include—
 (Army) mission analysis/(Marine Corps) problem framing (written in this manual as mission
analysis/problem framing).

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C vii

Introduction

 (Army) intelligence preparation of the battlefield/(Marine Corps) intelligence preparation of the

battlespace (written in this manual as IPB).
 (Army) scheme of movement and maneuver/(Marine Corps) scheme of maneuver (written in this
manual as scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver).
 (Army) mission command warfighting function/(Marine Corps) command and control warfighting
function (written in this manual as mission command/command and control warfighting function).
 (Army) protection warfighting function/(Marine Corps) force protection warfighting function (written
in this manual as protection/force protection warfighting function).
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C contains eight chapters and six appendixes that provide supplemental material:
 Chapters 1 and 2 provide an overview of survivability operations, including key definitions and
constructs, roles and responsibilities, and survivability integration.
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide TTP for constructing fighting and protective positions and for hardening
facilities.
 Chapter 6 provides TTP for applying camouflage and concealment.
 Chapters 7 and 8 provide TTP for providing cover, camouflage, and concealment for critical assets and
in special environments and situations.
 Appendix A provides information on entry control points (ECPs).
 Appendixes B and C provide information on various reachback and tracking tools.
 Appendix D provides information on bunker and shelter roof design.
 Appendix E provides information on guidelines for standard operating procedures (SOPs).
 Appendix F provides information on camouflage systems and personal camouflage considerations.

The following paragraphs, figures, and tables are considered to contain technical and sensitive information that
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure per AR 530-1, DODM 5205.02M, and 22 USC:
 Chapter paragraphs: Paragraphs 3-59, 3-66, 3-67, 3-68, 4-3, 4-8, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24,
4-25, 4-26, 4-28, 4-29, 4-30, 4-34, 4-39, 4-40, 4-41, 4-43, 4-44, 5-1, 5-7, 5-9, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-
12, 6-13, 6-16, 6-17, 6-21, 6-22, 6-25, 6-26, 6-27, 6-28, 6-30, 6-31, 6-32, 6-33, 6-34, 6-36, 6-37, 6-40,
6-52, 6-65, 6-66, 6-67, 6-68, 6-74, 6-79, 6-84, 6-86, 6-93, 6-97, 6-98, 6-102, 6-103, 6-105, 6-106, 6-
107, 6-109, 6-112, 6-113, 6-115, 6-116, 6-146, 6-147, 6-148, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-7, 7-11, 7-12, 7-12
Note, 7-13, 7-17, 7-18, 7-20, 7-21, 7-21, 7-25, 7-27, 7-28, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-18, 8-19, 8-32, 8-
38, 8-39, 8-41, 8-44, 8-45, 8-47, 8-48, 8-49, 8-50, 8-51, 8-52, 8-53, 8-65, 8-67, 8-68, 8-68 Warnings,
8-69, 8-74, 8-75, 8-76, 8-77.
 Chapter figures: Figures 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 5-3, 8-4.
 Chapter tables: Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4 ,4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-5,
6-1, 8-1, 8-3, 8-4.
 Appendix paragraphs: Paragraphs A-6, A-7, A-8, D-5, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-15, D-19, D-21, D-22,
F-9.
 Appendix figures: Figures A-1, C-1, D-4, D-5, D-6, D-7.
 Appendix tables: Tables D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-10, D-11, D-12, D-13, F-1.

This manual modifies the terms shown in introductory table 1.

Introductory table 1. Modified Army/Marine Corps terms
Term Remarks
survivability operations Modified definition to change military activities to be protection activities.

A listing of preferred metric units of general use is contained in Fed-Std-376B, available at

<[Link]
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

viii ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Chapter 1
Survivability Overview
All personnel and physical assets have some degree of inherent survivability that is
affected by various threats and factors. Survivability activities enhance the inherent
survivability of a unit through various active and passive measures that shape the
operational environment. This chapter defines and describes survivability and the
threats and factors affecting it. It then describes survivability operations, activities,
tasks, and enablers. Next, it discusses survivability in support of decisive action.
Finally, it focuses on the engineer role in survivability operations.

SURVIVABILITY
1-1. Survivability is a supporting task of the protection/force protection warfighting function (see
ADP 3-37). Although the focus of this manual is on survivability operations, a basic understanding of
survivability itself is necessary. The two terms—survivability and survivability operations—are not
interchangeable. Survivability refers to a quality or capability, while survivability operations are a specific
group of activities that enhance survivability. This section defines and describes survivability and provides
the basis for understanding the next section, which addresses survivability operations.
1-2. JP 3-34 defines survivability as all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while
simultaneously deceiving the enemy (JP 3-34). The Army and Marine Corps expand on the joint definition
of survivability as a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand
hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.
This quality or capability of military forces is closely related to protection (the preservation of the
effectiveness of a military force) and to the protection/force protection warfighting function (the tasks or
systems that preserve the force). See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-37, and MCDP 1-0 for more information about
protection and the protection/force protection warfighting function.
1-3. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent
survivability qualities or capabilities. These inherent qualities or capabilities can be enhanced through various
means and methods. Some (but not all) means and methods for enhancing survivability are provided by
survivability operations. Survivability can also be enhanced by other tasks within the protection/force
protection warfighting function (see ADRP 3-37), tasks within other warfighting functions, and
environmental conditions.
1-4. Some of the means and methods for enhancing survivability become part of the protected personnel or
physical assets, enhancing their survivability, even while on the move. For example, the body armor or
mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, when properly worn by personnel, enhances their
survivability wherever they move. Other means and methods only enhance survivability at a particular
location. For example, an individual fighting position provides no enhanced survivability for personnel unless
they remain stationary and occupy it.
1-5. Survivability has two aspects—avoiding and withstanding. The capability to avoid seeks to prevent an
enemy attack, surveillance, or accurate targeting. Susceptibility is the inability to avoid attack and is a
function of tactics, countermeasures, and the probability of enemy attack. In a military operation, a force with
greater susceptibility normally has less capability to avoid attack. The capability to withstand seeks to prevent
degradation as a result of having been subjected to an attack. In a military operation, a force with greater
vulnerability normally has less capability to withstand degradation as a result of an attack.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 1-1

Chapter 1

THREATS TO SURVIVABILITY
1-6. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). U.S. forces must exhibit
survivability during conflicts with regional near-peer enemies able to employ the complexity of a hybrid
threat. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist
forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects (ADRP 3-0). Friendly units
can expect an enemy will engage forces with a wide variety of ground and unmanned aerial systems to detect
and permit engagement by direct and indirect fires.
1-7. ADRP 3-37 describes three general categories of threats and hazards—hostile actions, nonhostile
activities, and environmental conditions. Although all three categories of threats can cause damage,
destruction, death, or injury to personnel and physical assets, survivability is concerned with avoiding or
withstanding threats posed by two of those categories—hostile actions and environmental conditions.

Hostile Actions
1-8. Threats from hostile actions include any capability that armed forces or criminal elements possess that
can inflict damage on personnel, physical assets, or information. Army and Marine Corps forces today face
hybrid threats, which are the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist
forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects (ADRP 3-0). These forces
and elements often employ hostile actions to inflict damage on personnel, physical assets, or information.
Such hostile actions pose threats to survivability (which, as previously mentioned, concerns the protection of
personnel and physical assets). Chapter 3 addresses various types of weapons effects and the design
considerations to mitigate them.
1-9. Adversaries use sensors to increase the effectiveness of their weapons. Sensor systems are categorized
based on the part of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in which they operate. Chapter 6 addresses sensor
systems and the principles and techniques for using camouflage and concealment to defeat them.

Nonhostile Activities
1-10. Nonhostile activities include hazards associated with Soldier/Marine duties within their occupational
specialty, Soldier/Marine activity while off duty, and unintentional actions that cause harm. Examples include
on- and off-duty accidents, operations security (OPSEC) violations, network compromises, equipment
malfunctions, or accidental CBRN incidents. While nonhostile activities are cause for concern, they are not
specifically addressed in survivability operations. See ATP 5-19 for more information about managing these
risks. See JP 3-13.3 for OPSEC information.

Environmental Conditions
1-11. Hazards associated with the surrounding environment also pose threats to survivability. Weather,
natural disasters, and disease are common examples, as are terrain-related hazards. Hazards from
environmental conditions are generally outside the scope of this manual and are addressed in
ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, ATP 3-34.5/MCRP 4-11.B, ATP 3-90.97, FM 3-05.70,
FM 90-3/MCTP 12-10D, FM 90-5, and MCRP 8-10B.7.

Note. Hostile actions and environmental conditions can sometimes overlap, making it difficult to
distinguish between them. Hostile actions can affect environmental conditions, and their effects
sometimes linger for significant periods, such as when CBRN weapons have been employed. In
addition, threat forces and elements may, as a hostile action, create hazardous environmental
conditions. For example, they may set forest fires or create flooding by destroying a dam.
Regardless of whether a particular threat is categorized as a hostile action, an environmental
condition, or both, the capability to avoid or withstand such a threat is critical to the survivability
of military forces.

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Survivability Overview

FACTORS AFFECTING SURVIVABILITY

1-12. In addition to the threats discussed above, many other factors can affect survivability. Dispersion,
redundancy, morale, leadership, and discipline (including noise and light) are examples of such factors. This
section focuses on the factors of mobility, situational understanding, terrain and weather conditions, and
withstanding CBRN hazards, which are among the factors that can enhance the capability to avoid or
withstand threats and hazards.

Mobility
1-13. Survivability of friendly forces is typically greater when they are moving or when they possess the
ability to reposition quickly. Maintaining the freedom of movement and maneuver often increases
survivability. Static units must maintain the capability to move on short notice. Because of this, assured
mobility is an important factor that can enhance survivability. Assured mobility is a framework—of
processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where
and when desired, to achieve the commander’s intent (ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8).

Situational Understanding
1-14. Situational understanding is another important factor that can enhance survivability. Situational
understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the
relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (ADP 5-0). It requires
the ability to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what occurs inside
a commander’s area of operations (AO). Having an accurate situational understanding provides the baseline
for hazard assessments. For example, situational understanding of terrain (by applying geospatial information
and proper terrain analysis) is important to survivability and the development of survivability positions,
minimizing the requirements to adjust terrain and leading to the efficient use of survivability assets. See
ADP 5-0, ADP 6-0, and MCWP 5-10 for more information about situational understanding.

Terrain and Weather

1-15. In addition to the threats posed by terrain and weather as part of environmental conditions (discussed
above), terrain and weather can also enhance survivability. Existing terrain features (natural or man-made)
can provide cover (protection from the effects of fires) and concealment (protection from observation and
surveillance). Terrain features can also be reinforced or constructed with natural and man-made materials to
provide or enhance cover, camouflage, or concealment. Such terrain-altering activities are commonly called
survivability operations, which are discussed in the next section and are the focus of this manual. Geospatial
engineer teams within brigade and higher staffs can provide an assessment of the terrain impact on
survivability operations.
1-16. Natural and man-made terrain can also enhance survivability by providing shelter from the elements.
Terrain features can be reinforced or constructed with natural and man-made materials to provide or enhance
shelter. This may be accomplished by erecting tents, constructing field-expedient shelters, or constructing
more substantial structures requiring engineer support.

Note. There is a close connection between cover (protection from the effects of fires) and shelter
from the elements. Often, things that provide cover also provide some shelter from the elements
and vice versa. This is particularly true when considering CBRN weapons since many of their
effects have similar characteristics to some weather conditions. This manual focuses on terrain-
altering activities that provide cover, camouflage, and concealment. Activities aimed at providing
shelter from the elements, with no intent to protect from the effects of fires (for example,
unhardened snow shelters) are outside the scope of this manual. See FM 3-05.70 and
MCRP 8-10B.7 for information about field-expedient shelters. See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7
for information about general engineering support, much of which is directed at constructing
structures that provide shelter from the elements.

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Chapter 1

1-17. Weather conditions can also enhance survivability. For example, the reduced visibility caused by fog
or snow can provide concealment for personnel and physical assets, reducing the effectiveness of threat
sensor systems. See chapter 8 for additional discussion about weather effects in special environments.

Withstanding CBRN Hazards

1-18. CBRN hazards created from the intentional or accidental release of toxic industrial materials, CBRN
agents, or materials from employed weapons of mass destruction could create an environment that may cause
damage to personnel and equipment during the execution of military operations. To withstand the
environmental conditions created by CBRN hazards and to retain the ability to continue the mission, forces
must be familiar with the four levels of decontamination—immediate, operational, thorough, and clearance.
Immediate and operational decontamination support friendly force operations and survivability when
encountering CBRN environments.
 Immediate decontamination. Immediate decontamination mitigates CBRN effects, saves lives,
stops agents from penetrating, and limits agent spread. Within 1 minute of contamination,
individuals should conduct skin decontamination. This may include the tasks of personal wipe
down, operator wipe down, and spot decontamination, which should be conducted within 15
minutes of contamination. Immediate decontamination is a lifesaving measure that should be
conducted as soon as possible by individual, buddy, or crew at the point of contamination.
 Operational decontamination. Operational decontamination allows the force to survive extended
periods in a CBRN environment and continue operations without spreading contamination
throughout the operational area. It consists of two components—MOPP gear exchange and vehicle
wash down. Operational decontamination limits the spread of contamination, allows the force to
continue operations within the contaminated area, and enables the freedom of maneuver.

Note. For more information about all four types of decontamination, see ATP 3-11.32/
MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37.

SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS
1-19. As discussed in the previous section, personnel and physical assets have inherent survivability qualities
or capabilities that can be enhanced through various means and methods. One way of enhancing
survivability—when existing terrain features offer insufficient cover and concealment—is to alter the
physical environment to provide or improve cover and concealment. Similarly, natural or artificial materials
may be used as camouflage to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy. Together, these are called survivability
operations—those protection activities that alter the physical environment by providing or improving
cover, camouflage, and concealment. While these activities often have the added benefit of providing
shelter from the elements, survivability operations focus on providing cover, concealment, and protection to
avoid or withstand hostile actions.
1-20. All units conduct survivability operations within the limits of their capabilities. Engineer and CBRN
personnel and units have additional capabilities to support survivability operations. Engineer support to
survivability operations is a major portion of the enhance protection line of engineer support (described in
FM 3-34). CBRN support to survivability operations includes conducting decontamination operations, which
allows forces to withstand CBRN hazards for extended times. Obscurants can enhance survivability by
concealing friendly positions and screening maneuvering forces from enemy observation. See ATP 3-11.50
for additional information about employing obscurants.
1-21. Survivability encompasses capabilities of military forces while on the move and when stationary, while
survivability operations focus more on stationary capabilities—constructing fighting and protective positions
and hardening facilities. However, in the case of camouflage and concealment, survivability operations
include stationary and on-the-move capabilities.
1-22. Conducting survivability operations is a task of the protection/force protection warfighting function,
but survivability operations can also be used to enable other warfighting functions. For example, military
deception (MILDEC)—part of the mission command/command and control warfighting function—can be
enabled by the use of survivability operations intended to help mislead adversary decision makers. This may

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Survivability Overview

include the use of dummy or decoy positions or devices. For more information about MILDEC, see ADRP
3-37, FM 3-13, JP 3-13.4, and MCRP 3-32.2.

SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

1-23. Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the
physical environment. They accomplish this through four tasks: constructing fighting positions, constructing
protective positions, hardening facilities, and employing camouflage and concealment. The first three tasks
focus on providing cover (although not excluding camouflage and concealment), while the fourth task focuses
on providing protection from observation and surveillance. These four tasks (especially the first three) often
have the added benefit of providing some degree of shelter or protection from the elements. All four tasks
are often addressed in combination. For example, constructing fighting positions and protective positions
usually also requires employing camouflage and concealment. Employing camouflage and concealment often
accompanies activities to harden facilities.

Constructing Fighting Positions

1-24. A fighting position allows personnel and their weapon systems to engage and destroy enemy forces
while avoiding or withstanding hostile actions. Such positions include individual, crew-served, combat
vehicle positions, bunkers, and towers. Fighting positions provide cover and (often) camouflage and
concealment. For maximum effectiveness, they must also support the unit defensive plan. This requires close
integration with the concept of operations and its supporting schemes, particularly the scheme of movement
and maneuver/scheme of maneuver and the scheme of fires. See chapters 3 and 4 for more information about
fighting positions.

Constructing Protective Positions

1-25. A protective position protects personnel, vehicles, and equipment occupying the position by allowing
them to avoid or withstand hostile actions. As with fighting positions, protective positions provide cover,
camouflage, or concealment (or a combination of the three). Unlike fighting positions, protective positions
are not focused on providing a position from which to engage the enemy. See chapters 3 and 5 for more
information about protective positions.

Hardening Facilities
1-26. Military forces use many facilities in addition to fighting and protective positions. When a facility
offers insufficient protection, hardening it provides or improves cover to the structure and its occupants.
Hardening helps to avoid or withstand hostile actions and is accomplished by using barriers, walls, shields,
berms, or other types of physical protection. It also includes hardening facilities to reduce the impact of
CBRN hazards. Chapter 3 provides additional information on designing hardened facilities.
1-27. While hardened facilities are specifically reinforced for protection against direct and indirect fire, the
concept extends to include additional protection for key assets from explosive and nonexplosive hazards. For
example, bridges can be hardened with bridge protective devices (antimine booms, impact booms,
antiswimmer nets). These devices typically protect bridges or crossing sites from waterborne demolition
teams, floating mines, or floating debris (see ATP 3-90.4/ MCWP 3-17.8).

Employing Camouflage and Concealment

1-28. Camouflage and concealment are materials and techniques used to hide, blend, disguise, or disrupt the
appearance of military targets and their backgrounds to prevent visual and electronic detection of friendly
forces. Employing camouflage and concealment helps to avoid or withstand hostile actions by preventing an
enemy from detecting or identifying friendly troops, equipment, activities, or installations.
1-29. Camouflage uses natural or artificial materials on personnel, objects, and tactical positions to confuse,
mislead, or evade the enemy. It contributes to survivability by causing the enemy not to consider these things
as a target; or it confuses the enemy as to the nature, parameters, or specifics associated with those potential

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Chapter 1

targets. For instance, camouflage nets may be used to conceal vehicles, tents, shelters, and equipment, while
vegetation is generally used to disrupt the outline of the target rather than completely hide it.
1-30. Concealment makes use of terrain and other natural or man-made features to protect from observation
and surveillance. Along with cover, concealment is one of the five military aspects that commanders use to
analyze terrain during mission analysis/problem framing. Concealment must be considered when identifying
potential friendly positions (assembly areas [AAs], routes, assault positions, battle positions [BPs]). Chapter
6 provides camouflage and concealment techniques.

ENABLERS OF SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS

1-31. In addition to activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover, camouflage,
and concealment, other capabilities and activities can be used to conduct or support survivability operations.
When properly integrated, these capabilities and activities are effective enablers of survivability operations.
An enabler of survivability operations refers to a military capability or activity with a primary purpose of
something other than survivability operations but which can be used for conducting or supporting
survivability operations. Common enablers include MILDEC, protective obstacles, and obscuration.
Commanders consider other activities in addition to these based on the mission and operational environment.
1-32. Military deception is defined as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military,
paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). MILDEC
enables survivability operations by presenting enemy forces with false information, causing them to expend
ordnance or resources on nonthreatening targets. That, in turn, improves the effectiveness of survivability
operations. For more information about MILDEC, see FM 6-0, JP 3-13.4, and MCRP 3-32.2.
1-33. Protective obstacles (though often considered as part of countermobility operations) are key enablers
to survivability operations. They provide friendly forces with close-in protection, enhancing the effectiveness
of survivability positions. For more information about protective obstacles, see ATP 3-90.8/ MCWP 3-17.5.
1-34. A major enabler of concealment is obscuration—the effects of weather, battlefield dust, and debris, or
the use of smoke munitions (or other potential obscurants) to hamper observation and target-acquisition
capability or to conceal activities or movement. Battlefield obscuration is typically provided by fires or hand-
employed devices. Additional information about the employment of obscurants is in ATP 3-11.50.

SURVIVABILITY IN THE OFFENSE

1-35. In the offense, movement and maneuver-related tasks often preclude extensive fighting and protective
position development for tactical vehicles and weapon systems. Camouflage and concealment typically play
a greater role in survivability during offensive tasks than the other survivability operations activities.
However, protective positions for artillery, air and missile defense, and logistics positions may still be
required in the offense. Stationary command posts (CPs) (and other facilities for the mission
command/command and control warfighting function) may also require protection to lessen their
vulnerability.
1-36. Although the use of terrain provides a measure of protection during halts in the advance, units should
still develop as many protective positions as necessary for key weapons systems, CPs, and critical supplies
based on the threat level and unit vulnerability. During the early planning stages, geospatial engineer teams
can provide information on soil conditions, vegetative concealment, and terrain masking along march routes
to facilitate survivability for the force.
1-37. The survivability task of decontamination primarily occurs in the offense. Units encountering CBRN-
contaminated environments must withstand the hazard to complete their mission and move out of the area
without spreading contamination. Initial protection from contamination occurs from protective equipment
(such as MOPP gear). Immediate and operational decontamination help maintain combat power by saving
lives and allowing the mission to continue when time is not available for thorough decontamination.

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Survivability Overview

SURVIVABILITY IN THE DEFENSE

1-38. Defensive missions typically demand the most effort and resources for survivability operations.
Activities in the defense include constructing survivability positions for CPs, artillery, air and missile defense,
and critical equipment and supplies. They also include preparing individual and crew-served fighting
positions and combat vehicle fighting positions. Survivability efforts must consider conventional threats
(direct and indirect fires) and unconventional threats (suicide bombings, vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices [VBIEDs], CBRN hazards). The relative amount of survivability effort placed against these threats
depends on the threat analysis and the available resources. During this period, countermobility efforts
compete with survivability activities for resources and assets. Because of this, it is critical that commanders
provide clear guidance on resources and priorities of effort.
1-39. When developing defensive fighting positions, proper siting must consider the surrounding terrain and
the most effective employment of key weapons systems in relation to designated engagement areas (EAs).
Survivability planners must also include other considerations when conducting survivability operations in
the defense. In areas such as base camps or logistical support areas, planners consider structure height and
its proximity to the perimeter. Defensive protective positions include, but are not limited to, CPs, signal nodes
(and other facilities for the mission command/command and control warfighting function), critical equipment
(to include sensors), supply and ammunition storage/holding areas, and other items that are likely to be
targeted by enemy action. Consider protecting hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and petroleum, oil, and
lubricants (POL) storage areas against material loss and health threats to personnel if the storage containers
are damaged or destroyed. The degree of protection provided for these items is based on the availability of
time, equipment, and resources. An additional consideration is the probability/risk of acquisition/attack and
the risk assessment made for each site/facility.
1-40. Stationary facilities emitting a strong electromagnetic (EM) signal or substantial thermal and/or visual
signature may require additional protection against potential enemy attack. Electronic protection involves
actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy use of the
EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Electronic protection focuses on the
effects of friendly or threat use of the EMS. See ATP 3-36 for further information on electronic protection.
1-41. Collective protection is an aspect of CBRN passive defense that enables survivability when CBRN
hazards exist in a defensive position. The planning and use of collective protection systems pose unique
organizational challenges. Their use may be limited to critical activities that degrade quickly in a CBRN-
contaminated environment, such as communications and medical care.

SURVIVABILITY SUPPORTING STABILITY OR DEFENSE SUPPORT

OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASKS
1-42. When conducting stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions, survivability
remains a concern and may require that significant effort be applied to survivability operations. Although the
likelihood of combat operations is reduced, key resources and personnel remain vulnerable to conventional
and unconventional threats.
1-43. Commanders must consider protecting vital resources (fuel sites, ammunition holding areas, living
areas, critical infrastructure, medical facilities, other logistics support areas) because the entire stability AO
has a greater potential for enemy attack and looting or theft during DSCA. The priority of work focuses more
on protecting these resources than on constructing fighting positions for combat vehicles or crew-served
weapons. Vital resources requiring protection may also include facilities that are critical to the civilian
infrastructure, such as key industrial sites, pipelines, water treatment plants, and government buildings.

ENGINEER ROLE IN SURVIVABILITY

1-44. Although all units conduct survivability operations within the limits of their capabilities, the Army and
Marine Corps have a broad range of diverse engineer capabilities that can enhance survivability. Engineering
tasks in support of survivability operations include tasks to build, repair, or maintain fighting and protective
positions and to harden, conceal, or camouflage roads, bridges, airfields, and other structures and facilities.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 1-7

Chapter 1

These tasks tend to be equipment-intensive and may require the use of equipment timelines to optimize the
use of low-density, critical equipment.
1-45. The Army categorizes its engineer capabilities into three engineer disciplines/functions—combat,
general, and geospatial engineering—and employs capabilities from all three disciplines to support
survivability operations. The Army uses four lines of engineer support to help commanders and staffs
combine the capabilities from all three engineer disciplines and align their activities according to their
purpose. Of the four lines of engineer support (described in FM 3-34), engineer support to survivability
operations is most often aligned with the enhance protection line of engineer support. This line of engineer
support is the combination of engineer disciplines to support the preservation of the force so that the
commander can apply maximum combat power. It consists largely of survivability tasks, but it can also
include selected mobility, countermobility, and EH operations tasks. Geospatial engineering tasks also
reinforce this line of support. See FM 3-34 for more information about the Army engineer disciplines and
lines of engineer support. The Marine Corps categorizes its expeditionary engineering capabilities into four
lines of engineer support. Survivability tasks are included within enhance protection. Tasks such as
constructing field fortifications (hardening of command, communication, and combat train locations; weapon
system firing positions; and infantry fighting positions) are critical to MAGTF efforts to reduce exposure to
threat acquisition, enemy targeting, and engagement. See MCWP 3-34 for more information about
engineering within the MAGTF.

1-8 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Chapter 2
Survivability Integration
Competing demands and limited resources for conducting survivability operations are
a predominant factor in the operational environment. Careful planning, prioritization,
and allocation of those resources must occur to accomplish objectives. This chapter
centers on planning, preparing, executing, and assessing survivability operations. The
construct of essential tasks for mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability
(M/CM/S) and inclusion in the running estimate are highlighted to assist planners in
integrating survivability operations.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-1. Roles and responsibilities for integrating survivability operations may vary based on the organization
of functional and integrating cells at different echelons and should be prescribed in unit SOPs. This section
presents guidelines for roles and responsibilities for survivability operations at the brigade/MAGTF level and
below.

COMMANDER
2-2. The challenging and unpredictable nature of operational environments requires that commanders at
every echelon thoroughly understand survivability requirements and issue clear intent, guidance, and
prioritization for survivability operations conducted by, or in support of, their units. The commander uses the
construct of essential tasks for M/CM/S to prioritize actions and concentrate survivability efforts. See
FM 3-34 for additional information about essential tasks for M/CM/S. Commanders must understand their
survivability requirements across the range of military operations and the capabilities of available assets to
perform survivability operations within the AO. The commander provides focus through the essential tasks
for survivability operations during planning and preparation, enforces safety and construction standards
during execution, and continuously assesses the effectiveness of survivability against expected threats.
2-3. In addition to the responsibilities shared by all commanders, engineer commanders at every echelon
must also completely understand the capabilities and requirements of the supported unit and grasp how best
to integrate maneuver support (engineers, CBRN personnel, and military police) as part of combined arms
operations. The engineer commander ensures that survivability missions are properly planned, designed, and
constructed to standard. The engineer commander works together with the appropriate engineer staff officer
to ensure that the survivability effort is synchronized and meets the needs of the supported unit.

ENGINEER STAFF OFFICER

2-4. In the Army, the engineer staff officer is a special staff officer, typically the senior engineer officer on
staff at echelons above the brigade combat team (BCT) level. The senior engineer in the BCT is the brigade
engineer battalion commander. The assistant brigade engineer is a member of the BCT staff that receives
guidance from the brigade engineer battalion commander for coordinating and synchronizing engineer assets
across the BCT AO (including engineer support to survivability operations).
2-5. The Marine Corps table of organization for the infantry regiment and battalion headquarters does not
contain an engineer staff officer billet. As a result, the combat engineer battalion commander can provide an
officer from his organization to advise each supported infantry regiment/battalion. Usually, the officer that
fulfills this role is dual-hatted as the unit commander for the combat engineer unit assigned in direct support
of the regiment/battalion. As the engineer staff advisor, this officer assists in coordinating engineer activities
within the regiment/battalion AO, similar to the actions of the BCT engineer staff officer.

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Chapter 2

2-6. While the two Services may resource the engineer staff officer differently, the duties remain relatively
the same. In addition to engineer activity coordination and synchronization, the engineer staff officer—
 Advises the maneuver commander on engineer assets and capabilities.
 Makes recommendations on the priority of engineer effort based on the commander’s guidance.
 Develops recommended essential tasks for M/CM/S.
 Makes recommendations on engineer task organization and determines if additional assets are
needed to execute the anticipated engineer tasks.
 Integrates survivability guidance and tasks into mission orders and monitors execution of the
orders.
 Supervises terrain analysis and makes recommendations on incorporating terrain effects into
M/CM/S planning.

OTHER STAFF OFFICERS

2-7. The operations staff officer (S-3) is the coordinating staff officer for matters concerning tactical
operations. The S-3 integrates and synchronizes survivability efforts within the scheme of movement and
maneuver/scheme of maneuver based on recommendations from the engineer staff officer. The CBRN officer
and the provost marshal are typically major contributors to the planning and resourcing of survivability
operations.
2-8. The intelligence staff officer (S-2) provides information on enemy capabilities and expected enemy
courses of action (COAs). This allows the engineer and CBRN planners to plan and recommend the type and
amount of survivability positions needed to protect friendly forces.
2-9. The logistics staff officer (S-4) is responsible for planning and executing sustainment requirements for
operations. This includes the delivery of fuel, construction and barrier material, and ammunition. The S-4
coordinates for the establishment of logistics sites and materials issued to forward units based on the mission.
Survivability missions are often very resource-intensive. Early coordination with the S-4 is essential to ensure
that adequate types and quantities of materials and transportation assets are available to support the mission.
2-10. Depending on the situation, other staff officers may also play a role in integrating survivability
operations. For example, the CBRN officer and the surgeon coordinate Army Health System Support
requirements for CBRN operations, some of which may involve survivability operations. Because
survivability operations (and their resulting positions and structures) may involve significant risk, the safety
officer advises and assists with risk management and compliance with safety requirements.
2-11. Divisions, BCTs, and aviation units have an Aviation Mission Survivability Officer on staff. The
Aviation Mission Survivability Officer serves as the subject matter expert on TTPs designed to increase
survivability by reducing the threat risk to aviation assets and missions. An Aviation Mission Survivability
Officer serves as the commander’s primary advisor and tactical/technical expert on aviation mission analysis
for Army aircraft tactical employment, aircraft combat survivability, and personnel recovery. Aviation
Mission Survivability Officers are critical staff officers who participate in all phases of the operations
process.

PROTECTION CELL AND PROTECTION WORKING GROUP

2-12. The protection cell, located at the division and corps level, integrates and synchronizes protection tasks
and their associated systems (see ADRP 3-37) throughout the operations process. The risk management
process (see ATP 5-19 or MCO 3500.27C) is the overarching process for integrating protection into Army
operations. The protection cell coordinates with the mission command cell to facilitate the information
protection task.
2-13. Protection integration in the BCT/regimental combat team may require commanders to create a
protection working group and designate a staff lead (as the protection officer) who has the experience to
integrate risk management and other integrating processes. The executive officer, S-3, or a senior
noncommissioned officer (Army)/senior staff noncommissioned officer (Marine Corps) could accomplish
these duties. Assistant operations officers and other staff officers could be designated as the protection
coordinators to facilitate the integration of the protection tasks into operations. In all cases, protection officers

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Survivability Integration

and coordinators work with higher and lower echelons to nest protection activities with complementary and
reinforcing capabilities.

PLANNING
2-14. Planning survivability operations is supported by the construct of the engineer running estimate during
the planning process described in ADP 5-0 and MCWP 5-10. As part of the combined arms team conducting
the planning process, engineers and other planners focus their efforts on specific survivability considerations
for each step of the process (see table 2-1). Survivability operations often begin concurrent with the planning
process to maximize available time for constructing fighting positions.
Table 2-1. Survivability operations planning considerations during the planning process
Steps of the Steps of the
Survivability Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
• Receive higher headquarters plans, orders, and annexes.
• Understand the unit mission, concept of the operation, and
Receipt of the commander’s intent and priorities for survivability (two levels up).
Mission • Understand the engineer mission, intent, and scheme of engineer
operations (two levels up).
• Understand the higher echelon essential tasks for M/CM/S.
• Identify specified and implied tasks for survivability; develop a
recommended list of essential tasks for survivability (for the
commander’s approval during the mission analysis/problem framing
brief).
• Initiate RFIs.
• Evaluate terrain, climate, and threat capabilities to determine the
potential impact on survivability.
Problem Framing • Determine the availability of construction and other engineering
materials.
• Review the current and future availability of survivability capabilities,
Mission including Army/Marine Corps, joint, multinational, HN, and by contract.
Analysis • Determine protection requirements for supported forces.
• Review existing data from reconnaissance or assessments.
• Determine the threat (including environmental and EHs).
• Determine survivability-related IRs (terrain and mobility restraints,
threat capabilities, and critical infrastructure); make recommendations
for inclusion in the CCIR, as necessary.
• Integrate survivability IRs into the R&S plan.
• Provide the commander with suggested guidance for survivability
operations that can be included in the commander’s guidance for COA
development.
• Identify priority survivability requirements; refine essential tasks for
survivability, if necessary.
• Integrate survivability support into COA development and in the
COA COA scheme of engineer operations for each COA.
Development Development • Array survivability assets using task and purpose.
• Recommend an appropriate level of protection effort for each COA
based on the expected threat.
• Develop COA evaluation criteria focused on survivability efforts.
COA Analysis COA Wargaming • Refine the survivability plan based on wargaming results.

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Chapter 2

Table 2-1. Survivability operations planning considerations during the planning process
(continued)
Steps of the Steps of the
Survivability Planning Considerations
MDMP MCPP
• Provide advantages and disadvantages of each COA from the
COA
survivability perspective (such as the ability to support and risk to
Comparison forces or equipment).
COA
Comparison and • Gain approval for changes to the essential tasks of survivability.
Decision • Gain approval for survivability priorities of effort and support.
COA Approval
• Gain approval for requests for engineer augmentation to be sent to
higher headquarters.
Orders Orders • Provide input to the appropriate plans and orders.
Production, Development • Ensure that engineer forces and critical equipment are properly
Dissemination, allocated in the task organization.
and Transition Transition
Note.
The Army uses the MDMP, and the Marine Corps uses the MCPP. The processes are similar, but the steps are different. The
MDMP is described in ADP 5-0, and the MCPP is described in MCWP 5-10.
Legend:
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
COA course of action
EH explosive hazard
HN host nation
IR information requirement
M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability
MCPP Marine Corps planning process
MDMP military decisionmaking process
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
RFI request for information

THE ENGINEER STAFF RUNNING ESTIMATE

2-15. The engineer staff running estimate is a logical thought process and an extension of the planning
process. It is conducted by the engineer staff officer concurrent with the planning process of the supported
maneuver force, and it is continuously maintained throughout planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment. This running estimate allows for the early integration and synchronization of essential tasks for
M/CM/S into the planning process. It drives the coordination between the engineer, the supported
commander, and other staff members in the development of engineer plans, orders, and annexes. Table 2-2
shows the relationship between mission analysis/problem framing during the planning process and the
engineer running estimate, including the identification of essential tasks for M/CM/S.

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Survivability Integration

Table 2-2. Correlation of mission analysis/problem framing and the engineer running estimate
Mission Analysis/Problem Framing Engineer Running Estimate
• Analyze the higher headquarters • Analyze the higher headquarters orders, including
plan or order. the—
• Perform an initial IPB.  Commander’s intent.
• Determine specified, implied, and  Mission.
essential tasks.  Concept of operation.
• Review available assets, and  Timeline.
identify resource shortfalls.  AO.
• Determine constraints. • Conduct IPB, including—
• Identify critical facts, and develop  Terrain and weather analysis.
assumptions.  Enemy mission and M/CM/S capabilities.
• Begin risk management.  Friendly mission and M/CM/S capabilities.
• Develop initial CCIRs and EEFIs. • Analyze the engineer mission, including the—
• Develop initial R&S  Specified M/CM/S tasks.
synchronization tools.  Implied M/CM/S tasks.
• Update the plan for the use of  Assets available.
available time.
 Limitations.
• Develop initial themes and
 Risk as applied to engineer capabilities.
messages.
 Time analysis.
• Develop a proposed problem
statement.  Identified essential tasks for M/CM/S.
 Restated mission.
• Develop a proposed mission
statement. • Conduct a risk assessment, including—
• Present the mission  Safety.
analysis/problem framing briefing.  Environment.
• Develop and issue the initial • Determine the terrain and mobility restraints, obstacle
commander’s intent. intelligence, threat engineer capabilities, and critical
• Develop and issue the initial infrastructure.
planning guidance. • Recommend CCIR.
• Develop COA evaluation criteria. • Integrate the engineer reconnaissance effort.
• Issue a warning order.
Legend:
AO area of operations
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
COA course of action
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace
M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance

2-16. The running estimate parallels the planning process. Mission analysis/problem framing, facts and
assumptions, and an analysis of mission variables furnish the structure for running estimates. In the running
estimate, the engineer staff continuously considers the effects of new information and updates the following:
 Facts.
 Assumptions.
 Friendly force status (assessment of M/CM/S capabilities to ongoing and planned operations).
 Enemy activities and capabilities (that can affect current operations and future plans).
 Civil considerations (effects on current engineer operations and future plans).
 Conclusions and recommendations.

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Chapter 2

2-17. The running estimate provides the basis for action. When an estimate reveals a variance that requires
correction, staff representatives act within their authority to correct it. When the decision required is outside
their authority, they present the situation to the commander or staff officer delegated as the authority to act.
2-18. Engineer staff representatives do more than collect and store information; they process it into
knowledge and apply judgment to get the knowledge to those requiring it. When the estimate reveals
information that answers an information requirement (especially a commander’s critical information
requirement), engineer staff representatives send that information to the element requiring it.

ESSENTIAL TASKS FOR SURVIVABILITY

2-19. Increased engineer requirements in the operational environment may limit engineer resources
immediately available to support survivability operations. Other engineer tasks are often in competition for
the same engineer assets. Early integration and the establishment of priorities are essential to allocate
resources and ensure adequate time for mission completion. The commander sets priorities to allow the force
to perform the most critical tasks. Planners (typically elements such as engineer, CBRN, military police, or
explosive ordnance disposal personnel) assist the commander in his decision by providing recommended
essential tasks for survivability during mission analysis/problem framing. They develop the recommended
essential tasks for survivability in conjunction with the staff development of the protection prioritization list
and as part of EA development and combined arms obstacle planning. For information about the protection
prioritization list, see ADRP 3-37. For information about EA development and combined arms obstacle
planning, see ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5.
2-20. After the essential tasks for survivability are approved, the engineer staff officer and other planners
integrate them into COA development. They develop associated methods to complete the essential tasks for
survivability by assigning resources and recommending priorities. The engineer staff officer and other
planners, in coordination with the maneuver planner, then synchronize the methods to achieve the desired
effects on enemy or friendly forces. A fully developed essential task for survivability includes the task and
the purpose, described as follows:
 Task. A task is a measurable action performed by individuals or organizations. These are the most
important survivability tasks that must be accomplished. Often, the entire operation is dependent
on completing these tasks; and without their successful completion, the operation is at risk.
 Purpose. The purpose is the desired or intended result of the task stated in terms relating to the
purpose of the supported unit. This portion of the essential task for survivability explains why it
must be accomplished. It also provides intent to the engineer commander so that he can react as
the situation changes.
2-21. The commander uses essential tasks for survivability to communicate to subordinate units what he
wants accomplished with available assets to perform survivability tasks. This provides the unit with clear
priorities and unity of purpose in planning, preparing, and executing. Essential tasks for survivability also
provide nonengineer elements with clearly articulated tasks related to survivability. Example engineer-related
essential tasks for survivability might include—
 Essential task for M/CM/S #1.
 Task: Construct primary and supplementary fighting positions for vehicles and
crew-served weapons at BP Patriots.
 Purpose: To provide Company A with effective cover and concealment from direct and
indirect fire during their defense of Task Force England—western flank.
 Essential task for M/CM/S #2.
 Task: Construct revetments and berms around the bulk fuel site at Base Camp Bears.
 Purpose: To provide effective cover from direct and (near miss) indirect fire for 1st Brigade
fuel supply.

PREPARATION
2-22. Preparing to execute survivability operations begins as relevant information and guidance are
developed during the planning phase. The early identification of the essential tasks for survivability during

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Survivability Integration

planning initiates the requisitioning and transportation of survivability materials (such as soil-filled
containers, concrete barriers, and construction materials) and prompts requests for unit augmentation. The
early identification of engineer survivability assets and task organization of personnel who are skilled in
survivability planning and emplacement pay dividends in a time-constrained environment. The use of
warning orders and planning in parallel facilitates early coordination between engineer and supported units,
the pre-positioning of equipment and materials, and the preliminary design work for survivability positions.
2-23. Based on the task organization, survivability guidance, identification of critical assets (such as
command and control nodes and air defense systems), and locations of unit positions, subordinate engineers
begin coordinating survivability efforts with supported units. Early initiation of troop movements and pre-
positioning of survivability assets and materials within the AO enable the timely execution of survivability
operations.
2-24. Certain survivability measures, such as protective positions and facility hardening, may require
significant design efforts. Engineers coordinate with the supported unit, conduct reconnaissance and
assessments, and develop designs. Designs are verified to ensure that they defeat the specified threat and
meet safety requirements and that the bills of material are correct. Tele-engineering and other reachback
capabilities (see appendix B) can aid designing efforts. Some basic survivability design considerations are
discussed in chapter 3.
2-25. During preparation, the engineer running estimate continues to track the resource status. Priority for
assessment is on answering priority intelligence requirements and friendly forces information requirements
that fall within the engineer’s area of expertise. Assessing during preparation also includes confirming or
disproving assumptions that were made during planning.

EXECUTION
2-26. Survivability missions should begin as soon as possible (which is often before completion of the
supported unit planning) and continue through periods of limited visibility. This maximizes the amount of
survivability support that blade and construction assets can provide. Execution involves monitoring the
situation, assessing the operation, and adjusting the order, as needed. Fighting and protective positions are
constructed, facilities are hardened, and camouflage and concealment measures are implemented. Units
assess the completion of missions and reallocate resources as the situation requires. Quality assurance and
quality control are implemented to ensure that survivability efforts meet the commander’s intent and proper
design and construction standards to ensure safety.
2-27. During execution, the engineer running estimate focuses on identifying variances, assessing their effect
on achieving the end state, and recommending corrective actions to keep the operation within the
commander’s intent. Assessments also address the supportability of possible sequels and future operations.

ASSESSMENT
2-28. Survivability measures are continuously assessed for effectiveness. Assisted by the staff, commanders
compare the current situation with forecasted outcomes (evaluation) using measures of performance and
measures of effectiveness (see ADP 5-0 and MCDP 1-0) to judge progress toward success. Staffs analyze the
situation in terms of the mission variables (or operational variables, or both) to understand the mission and
prepare the running estimates. They continuously assess the effects of new information on the conduct of the
operation, update the running estimates, and determine if adjustments to decisions are required. As threat
conditions change, enemy tactics adapt, lessons are learned, and new survivability measures are established
and implemented. This may include changes in employment methods, design modifications, and the use of
different or improved materials.

ASSESSMENT TOOLS
2-29. Several tools assist engineers, other staff, and commanders in assessing survivability operations.
Survivability timelines and matrices are used to indicate priorities of effort, assess progress, and update the
commander on the status of survivability operations. Examples of a survivability capabilities card and other
tracking tools are provided in appendix C.

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Chapter 2

2-30. The survivability timeline helps leaders understand the employment of engineer assets and the timing
for initiating and completing survivability missions. It can include link-up times and locations, the
designation of units supporting the task, and the duration of engineer efforts for a specific area. It
synchronizes the effort by establishing time limits for completing the site layout and marking fighting
positions before the arrival of engineer equipment. A timeline also provides a visual display of asset
employment, assisting the staff in ensuring the optimal use of engineer equipment.
2-31. The survivability matrix or commander’s card (see appendix C) can be used to show the commander
the amount of survivability effort for each unit or BP. It provides an estimate of the type and number of
fighting or protective positions to be accomplished within a designated timeframe.

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Chapter 3
Cover
When existing cover is insufficient, commanders can use survivability operations to
provide or improve cover by altering the physical environment. Of the four activities
of survivability operations, three involve providing or improving cover, which protects
personnel and physical assets from fires by mitigating their effects. This chapter
describes the types of weapons effects and the considerations for mitigating them. It
also describes various techniques that can be employed for providing or improving
cover.

TYPES OF WEAPONS EFFECTS

3-1. Providing or improving effective cover requires a thorough understanding of the types of weapons
effects. This section provides an overview of the effects of direct- and indirect-fire projectiles, EHs, and
CBRN agents and weapons.

DIRECT-FIRE PROJECTILES
3-2. Direct-fire projectiles are primarily designed to strike a target with a velocity sufficient enough to
achieve penetration or to detonate a warhead. This section discusses two types of direct-fire projectiles—
chemical energy and kinetic energy.

Chemical Energy Projectile

3-3. Chemical energy projectiles use some form of chemical energy and blast to achieve penetration. They
detonate at impact or when maximum penetration is achieved. Chemical energy projectiles carrying impact-
detonated or delayed detonation high explosives (HE) charges are used mainly for direct fire from systems
with high accuracy and consistently good target acquisition ability. Tanks, antitank (AT) weapons, and
automatic cannons are usually capable of using this type of projectile.
3-4. HE rounds include high-explosives antitank (HEAT) rounds, recoilless rifle rounds, and AT rockets.
They are designed to detonate a shaped charge on impact. At detonation, an extremely high-velocity molten
jet is formed. This jet perforates large thicknesses of high-density material, continues along its path, and sets
fuel and ammunition on fire. The HEAT rounds generally range in diameter size from 60 millimeters
(2.36 inches) to 125 millimeters (4.92 inches).

Kinetic Energy Projectile

3-5. Kinetic energy projectiles use momentum (both high velocity and mass) to penetrate targets. Direct-
fire kinetic energy projectiles include ball, tracer, armor-piercing, and armor-piercing incendiary rounds.
3-6. Ball and tracer rounds are normally small caliber (5.56 millimeters to 14.5 millimeters) and are fired
from pistols, rifles, and machine guns. The projectile penetrates soft targets on impact at a high velocity. The
penetration depth depends directly on the projectile velocity, mass, and angle at which it hits.
3-7. Armor-piercing and armor-piercing incendiary rounds are designed to penetrate armor plates and other
types of homogeneous steel. Armor-piercing projectiles are constructed with a special jacket that encases a
hardened core or penetrating rod that is designed to penetrate when fired with high accuracy at an angle
nearly perpendicular to the target. Incendiary projectiles are normally used to penetrate a target and ignite its
contents. They are used effectively against fuel supplies and storage areas.

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Chapter 3

INDIRECT-FIRE PROJECTILES
3-8. Indirect-fire projectiles include rifle grenades, mortars, artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft-
delivered ordnance that cause blast, incendiary, and fragmentation damage to affected structures. Unlike
direct-fire projectiles, indirect-fire projectiles do not need a direct line-of-sight between the gun and target.
Instead, they are aimed through azimuth and elevation angles.
3-9. A blast caused by the detonation of an explosive charge creates a shock wave that knocks apart walls
or roof structures. Contact bursts cause excavation cave-in from ground shock or structure collapse. Overhead
bursts can buckle or destroy the roof. Blasts from HE shells or warheads can occur in the following three
ways:
 Overhead or proximity burst (fragmentation from an airburst shell).
 Contact burst (blast from an explosion on impact).
 Delay-fuze burst (blast from a detonation after penetration into a target).

3-10. The severity of blast effects decreases as the distance between the structure and the point of impact
increases. Delay-fuze bursts are the greatest threat to covered structures. Repeated surface or delay-fuze
bursts further degrade fighting and protective positions by the cratering effect and soil discharge.
Indirect-fire blast effects also cause concussions. The shock from an HE round detonation causes headaches,
nosebleeds, and spinal and brain concussions. It may also cause a spalling effect against certain materials.
3-11. Fragmentation occurs when the projectile detonates, producing a quantity of high-speed steel
fragments that can perforate and become embedded in fighting and protective positions. The pattern or
distribution of fragments greatly affects the design of fighting and protective positions. An airburst of artillery
shells provides the greatest unrestricted distribution of fragments. Fragments created by surface and delay
bursts are restricted by obstructions on the ground.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS
3-12. EHs include mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and ammunition, IEDs, and explosive booby traps
that were dropped, projected, thrown, or emplaced in past conflicts or in current operations. These hazards
are often difficult to detect and present serious concerns across the range of military operations. See
ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D and ATP 3-90.37 for additional information.
3-13. An IED is a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating
destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate,
harass, deny mobility, or distract (JP 3-15.1). IEDs are designed to cause injury or death by use of explosives
alone or in combination with chemical, biological, or radiological materials. IEDs can use homemade
explosive materials or military ordnance and ordnance components. IEDs can be initiated directly or remotely
and include VBIEDs and suicide bombers. VBIEDs have a capability to inflict large-scale damage to facilities
and cause multiple casualties.
3-14. Booby traps are victim-initiated explosive or nonexplosive devices that are deliberately placed to cause
casualties or provide a warning when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or
performs an apparently safe act (see ATP 3-34.20/MCRP3-17.2D). Booby traps are commonly placed in
buildings or under rubble and are connected to items of equipment or to human or animal remains. Like IEDs
and VBIEDs, they create both psychological and physical threats. While designed primarily to attack
personnel, they may also damage or destroy equipment.
3-15. A Mine, in land mine warfare, is a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area
and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle (JP 3-15).
3-16. UXO is explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and
which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to
operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or
for any other cause (JP 3-42). Like IEDs and booby traps, UXOs can be difficult to detect and neutralize.
They may often be encountered during the conduct of stability tasks, when those tasks take place in areas
that have experienced armed conflict. UXOs are also encountered on the training areas of military
installations and may occur when ammunition storage facilities have been attacked during a conflict.

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Cover

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREATS AND HAZARDS

3-17. The large variety of CBRN threats and hazards includes weapons of mass destruction, CBRN agents,
and toxic industrial materials. The mechanisms for the dissemination of contamination differ in that
biological and chemical weapons undergo low-order detonations or employ some less violent form of release
to disperse the agent without destroying it—whereas nuclear weapons can produce radioactive contamination
from an explosion or a simple rupture, and the extent of contamination increases with the violence of the
event.
3-18. Traditional chemical agents include nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. They are primarily
designed for use against personnel and to contaminate terrain and material. Chemical agents do not destroy
material and structures, but they do make them unusable for periods of time because of chemical contaminant
absorption. The duration of chemical agent effectiveness depends on weather conditions, dispersion methods,
terrain conditions, physical properties, the quantity used, the type used, and whether the agent is persistent
or nonpersistent.
3-19. Biological agents are categorized as disease-producing organisms (pathogens) and toxins. The time
from exposure to maximum effects generally ranges from a few hours to several days. Biological agents have
the potential to cover thousands of square kilometers. Infective doses can be provided with a very small
volume of biological agent due to the organism’s microscopic size, its ability to replicate in its host, its
potential transmissibility, and the high levels of toxicity in comparison to traditional chemical agents. A
biological attack is not likely to be identified until medical surveillance systems respond to patients with
clinical symptoms or until biological point detection systems provide a presumptive identification result that
is likely to be used to support detect-to-treat recommendations.
3-20. The effects of nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from those of biological or chemical
weapons. Nuclear weapons effects are classified as residual and initial. Residual effects (such as fallout) are
primarily of long-term concern. Initial effects occur in the immediate area shortly after detonation and are
the most tactically significant because they cause casualties and material damage within the immediate time
span of an operation. The principal initial casualty-producing effects are blast, thermal radiation (burning),
and ionizing radiation.
3-21. The blast from nuclear bursts destroys, overturns and crushes equipment, collapses lungs, ruptures
eardrums, hurls debris and personnel, and collapses positions and structures. Thermal radiation sets fire to
combustible materials, causes flash blindness or burns in the eyes, and produces personnel casualties from
skin burns. Ionizing radiation is an effect of nuclear and radiological weapons that transmits enough energy
to remove an electron from an atom or molecule. As ionizing radiation passes through living tissue, it
damages cells throughout the body. Moderate exposure may cause headaches, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea
(collectively called radiation sickness). Severe exposure usually results in death. The severity of radiation
sickness depends on the size of the dose and the dose rate during exposure. Effects of ionizing radiation can
occur within several hours, several months, or up to several years after exposure. Ionizing radiation is the
dominant casualty-producing effect of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
3-22. Other initial effects of nuclear weapons may produce significant damage and casualties, depending on
the weapon type, yield, burst conditions, and degree of personnel and equipment protection. An EM pulse
damages electrical and electronic equipment. It occurs at distances from the burst at which other nuclear
weapons effects produce little or no damage, and it lasts for less than a second after the burst. The pulse also
damages vulnerable electrical and electronic equipment at ranges of up to 5 kilometers (3.11 miles) for a
10-kiloton surface burst and hundreds of kilometers for a similar high-altitude burst.

Note. See ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37, FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP

3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42, and JP 3-11 for additional information about CBRN threats and hazards.

WEAPONS EFFECTS MITIGATION

3-23. When planning the construction of fighting and protective positions or the hardening of existing
facilities, many items must be taken into consideration. The terrain, weather, material availability, and the
type or level of threat dictate many of the designs that are used. For instance, the use of existing buildings in

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Chapter 3

built-up areas may enhance survivability based on the location and construction materials. In other
circumstances, new construction that requires the integration of survivability measures is undertaken. There
are several common areas that must be considered in the design of survivability construction.

DIRECT-FIRE MITIGATION
3-24. Direct-fire weapons aim projectiles directly at the position or structure. These projectiles include
various kinetic-energy projectiles and chemical-energy projectiles. Good position location and camouflage
and concealment measures (see chapter 6) help to prevent position detection and effective engagement. If the
position does become a target, proper survivability construction mitigates the damage. The goal of direct-fire
survivability construction is to provide a target surface that is thick enough (and therefore strong enough) for
the given material or that provides for an oblique impact of projectiles to the structure. An oblique impact
surface increases the apparent thickness of the structure and decreases the possibility of penetration. The
potential for ricochet off a structure increases as the angle of impact from the perpendicular increases.
Designers of protective structures should select the proper material and design exposed surfaces with the
maximum angle from the perpendicular to the direction of fire. Also, a low-structure silhouette design makes
the structure harder to engage with direct fire. Providing projectile-resistant construction is referred to as a
high level of protection in common security engineering practice, as defined in UFC 4-020-01. Hypervelocity
projectiles pose significant challenges in survivability position design. The materials used must dissipate the
projectile energy and thus prevent total penetration. Shielding against direct-fire projectiles should initially
stop or deform the projectiles to prevent or limit penetration.
3-25. Another technique used to mitigate direct-fire weapons effects is the use of predetonation screens,
which can provide effective protection from rocket-propelled grenades. These are solid screens placed
between potential vantage points and the target that incoming rounds impact before striking the target. In
doing so, the rounds detonate, dissipating their effects between the screen and the target. Predetonation
screens are commonly constructed of wood slat or plywood. They may also serve as obscuration screens,
which are addressed in chapter 6 of this manual.

INDIRECT-FIRE MITIGATION
3-26. Indirect-fire weapons include mortars, rockets, missiles, artillery, and grenade launchers (in an
indirect-fire role). In indirect fire, survivability from fragmentation requires measures similar to those needed
to protect from direct-fire penetration. Protection against fragments from airburst artillery is provided by a
thickness of shielding required to defeat a certain size shell fragment, supported by a roof structure adequate
for the dead load of the shielding. Survivability construction may also be conducted to mitigate the effects of
direct hits from various sizes of artillery mortar rounds and rockets.
3-27. Protection against direct impacts from indirect-fire weapons usually requires a significant amount of
effort. These measures generally include some form of soil cover on the structure and may be supplemented
by a bursting layer of harder material, such as stone or masonry rubble. Appendix D discusses the design of
roof structures to defeat contact bursts of indirect-fire projectiles. Contact the United States Army Corps of
Engineers Reachback Operations Center (UROC) (see appendix B) for assistance with the design of roof
structures used to defeat delay-fuze burst projectiles. In all cases, great care in the design must be taken to
ensure the safety of personnel occupying the structure.
3-28. Because roofs constructed to resist direct-blast effects and fragmentation from indirect-fire rounds tend
to be quite thick and heavy, an alternate approach is to provide a lightweight sacrificial roof at a short distance
above a hardened roof to detonate the round at a standoff, thus minimizing the required thickness of the
hardened roof. In addition, walls and windows need protection against the fragmentation and blast effects of
incoming rounds. See GTA 90-01-018 for further guidance.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARD MITIGATION

3-29. The effect of EHs may be mitigated by several means. Proper training in the recognition of, and
reaction to, EHs is the first line of defense against them. Reconnaissance and site selection to avoid potentially
hazardous areas help to reduce the chances of encountering EHs. The proper use of personal protective
equipment (including the wearing of body armor and eye protection) and the use of armored vehicles reduce

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Cover

the impact against personnel and equipment. Employing ECPs and using explosive detection devices and
military working dogs reduce the chances that an IED or VBIED attack can occur on a base camp. If an IED
is employed, proper protective construction and standoff distances from facilities mitigate the effects.
Maintaining a situational understanding of the threat; hardening structures, equipment, and personnel against
attack; and employing security and route clearance techniques are essential to defeat the IED threat. ATP
3-90.37 contains doctrine on IED defeat operations.
3-30. Mines and UXO can be countered by many of the measures employed against IEDs. In addition, good
information and intelligence about past conflicts in the AO and a reconnaissance of possible hazard sites
reduce the chances that personnel may encounter mines and UXO. Good planning in the selection of base
camps also helps avoid sites that may present significant mine and UXO hazards.

Note. See ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D for additional information on EH operations.

ATP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17-2B /NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12 contains doctrine on procedures for
explosive ordnance. TM 3-34.82/MCRP 3-17.7L provides information on explosives and
demolitions.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREAT AND HAZARD

MITIGATION
3-31. Survivability positions can enhance protection against CBRN threats and hazards. Certain vehicles and
tent systems have built-in protection, generally in the form of overpressure systems that keep out
contaminated air. In other cases, structures can be sealed against the inflow of contaminants. Engineer
assistance is also required in the construction of operational, thorough, and clearance decontamination sites.
See ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37 and MCRP 10-10E.9/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for
more information on CBRN protection and CBRN decontamination.
3-32. In some instances, such as for a toxic industrial chemical spill, the best survivability measure is to
shelter in place. Shelter in place may be used when evacuation may cause greater risk than remaining in
place. The purpose of shelter in place is to make a shelter out of a current location for low cost and short
term. Many buildings may be converted into temporary shelters if cracks are carefully sealed and a chemical
and biological filter system with a ventilating mechanism is installed. For collective protection from
biological agents, personnel may be housed inside a shelter with an efficient air filter system.
3-33. Nuclear weapons survivability includes the dispersion of protective positions within a suspected target
area. Deep-covered positions minimize the danger from blast and thermal radiation. Personnel should wear
complete uniforms with hands, face, and neck covered. Ionizing radiation is minimized by avoiding the
radioactive fallout. Facilities can be hardened against blast effects, and fire prevention techniques can be
integrated. In addition, electronic equipment can be protected against some EM pulse effects by turning off
the systems and disconnecting antennas and peripheral devices.
3-34. Increasing the amount of earth cover significantly improves protection from radiation. An open
fighting position blocks most of the line-of-sight radiation and allows only a fraction of scattered radiation
to enter. Each added 15.24 centimeters (6-inch) thickness of overhead earth cover reduces the scattered
radiation by a factor of 2. Adding layers of sandbags also improves shielding. Each layer of sandbags, if filled
with sand or compacted clay, reduces the transmitted radiation by a factor of 2. Sand or compacted clay gives
better radiation shielding than earth because it is denser. Each layer of sand- or clay-filled sandbags can give
up to 66 percent more radiation protection than the same thickness of soil or soil-filled sandbags. See tables
B-1 and B-2 in ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37 for additional information.

Note. For additional information on cover and other protection from CBRN agents and weapons,
see ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37.

STANDOFF
3-35. Standoff pertains primarily to facility protection. Standoff provides distance between the existing
facility and the location from which the facility could be attacked. If the threat is commonly using explosive

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-5

Chapter 3

devices to attack friendly facilities, the effects of the explosion on a facility decrease exponentially with
distance. Standoff must be considered when hardening a facility. This becomes especially critical to defeat
the blast effect of VBIEDs. For more information about standoff, see GTA 90-01-011, UFC 4-010-01, and
UFC 4-020-01.

COMPARTMENTALIZATION
3-36. In areas where there are high concentrations of personnel—such as dining facilities, sleeping quarters,
fitness centers, and recreation centers—survivability is greatly increased by compartmentalization.
Compartmentalization refers to dividing a large, heavily populated facility into smaller components through
the use of ballistic-resistant walls. These walls can be placed inside and outside a facility. If a fragmenting
weapon detonates near or inside the facility, the fragmentation effects can be contained. Fragmentation from
exploding munitions and flying debris from construction materials caused by the blast inflict the most injury.
However, special care must be taken to ensure that the protective walls do not also become a hazard. They
should be properly designed to minimize the motion generated by the blast. This is especially true when the
compartmentalization walls are inside the structure and personnel are in close proximity. For more
information about compartmentalization, see GTA 90-01-011.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS SHIELDING

3-37. Considerations for the design of information systems shielding are a complex topic and seldom apply
to initial facilities protection designs. Grounding, bonding, and shielding of telecommunications-electronics
facilities are approached from a total system concept, which comprises four basic subsystems according to
current Department of Defense (DOD) guidance (see MI-HDBK-419A). These subsystems include—
 An earth electrode subsystem.
 A lightning protection subsystem.
 A fault protection subsystem.
 A signal reference subsystem.

MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES

3-38. This section discusses various materials and techniques for providing or improving cover. These
materials and techniques can be employed in constructing fighting positions (which are addressed in more
detail in chapter 4) or protective positions (addressed in more detail in chapter 5) or in hardening facilities.

MATERIALS
3-39. Deployed forces rely on the most abundant local materials and the materials that are usually available
through routine supply channels. Materials such as soil, steel, concrete, rock, wood, bricks, and masonry
provide shielding and protection against the penetration of projectiles, fragments and radiation. Tables 3-1,
3-2, 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5, pages 3-7 through 3-12, contain the shielding requirements of various materials to
protect against direct hits by direct-fire projectiles and indirect-fire fragmentation and blasts. If additional
data is needed, contact the UROC (see appendix B).

Note. Information about the shielding values of various materials from radiation can be found in
ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37.

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Table 3-1. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against direct hits by direct-fire
projectiles
Small- Small-
Caliber Caliber
and and 75-mm
Small- AT Rifle
Machine Machine 20-mm Direct-
Material Caliber (76-mm) 37-mm AT 50-mm AT Remarks
Gun Gun AT Fire fire at
(5.56-mm) Fire at Fire at Fire at
(7.62- (12.7- at 200 500 to
Fire at 100 400 Yards 400 Yards
mm) mm) Yards 1,000
100 Yards Yards
Fire1 at Fire1 at Yards
100 100
Yards Yards
Solid walls
Solid clay
brick 9 16 NR 24 30 60 NR NR None
masonry
Concrete
masonry
9 16 NR NR NR NR NR NR None
unit (grout
filled)
Steel 7/16 5/8 1 3/8 NR NR NR NR NR None
Structurally
Concrete,
8 12 22 12 18 36 42 48 reinforced
reinforced
with steel.
Stone Values are
8 12 22 18 30 42 54 60
masonry guides only.
Values are
Timber NR NR 36 60 NR NR NR NR
guides only.
Values are
Wood NR NR 24 36 48 NR NR NR
guides only.
Walls of loose material between boards
Brick rubble NR NR 12 24 30 60 72 NR None
Add 100%
Clay, dry NR NR 36 48 NR NR NR NR to thickness
if wet.
Gravel/
small NR NR 12 24 30 60 72 NR None
crushed rock
Add 50% to
Loam, dry NR NR 24 36 48 NR NR NR thickness if
wet.
Add 100%
Sand, dry NR NR 12 24 30 60 72 NR to thickness
if wet.
Sandbags filled with—
Brick rubble NR NR 20 30 30 60 70 NR None
Add 100%
Clay, dry NR NR 40 60 NR NR NR NR to thickness
if wet.
Gravel/small
NR NR 20 30 30 60 70 NR None
crushed rock
Add 50% to
Loam, dry NR NR 30 50 60 NR NR NR thickness if
wet.
Add 100%
Sand, dry NR NR 20 30 30 60 70 NR to thickness
if wet.

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Chapter 3

Table 3-1. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against direct hits by direct-fire
projectiles (continued)
Small- Small-
Caliber Caliber
and and 75-mm
Small- AT Rifle
Machine Machine 20-mm 37-mm 50-mm Direct-
Material Caliber (76-mm) Remarks
Gun Gun AT Fire AT Fire AT Fire fire at
(5.56-mm) Fire at
(7.62- (12.7- at 200 at 400 at 400 500 to
Fire at 100
mm) mm) Yards Yards Yards 1,000
100 Yards Yards
Fire1 at Fire1 at Yards
100 100
Yards Yards
Loose parapets of—
Add
100% to
Clay NR NR 42 60 NR NR NR NR
thickness
if wet.
Add 50%
to
Loam NR NR 36 48 60 NR NR NR
thickness
if wet.
Add
100% to
Sand NR NR 24 36 48 NR NR NR
thickness
if wet.
Snow and ice
Frozen
NR NR 80 80 NR NR NR NR None
snow
Frozen soil NR NR 24 24 NR NR NR NR None
Icecrete
(ice + NR NR 18 18 NR NR NR NR None
aggregate)
Tamped
NR NR 72 72 NR NR NR NR None
snow
Unpacked
NR NR 180 180 NR NR NR NR None
snow
Notes.
Except where indicated, protective thicknesses are for a single shot only. Where weapons place five or six fire projectiles in
the same area, the required protective thickness is about twice the amount indicated.
1
One burst of five shots.
Legend:
AT antitank
mm millimeter
NR not recommended

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Table 3-2. Small-arms protection characteristics of various materials

Small-Arms Projectile (at Range of)1
7.62-mm 7.62- .50-cal
9-mm 5.56-mm 7.62-mm 7.62-mm .50-cal M2
x 54R mm x AP M2 & 14.5-
Material1 M882 x 45 M855 x 39 M67 x 51 M80 & M33
Type 51 M61 API-T mm API
Ball2 Ball2 Ball Ball2 Ball
LPS Ball AP M20
A36 Mild 1/2 3/8 5/8 1/2 13/16 15/16 1-7/8
Steel Plate (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) -
-
Thickness
(in inches)
Armor Steel 1/16 5/16 1/4 3/8 7/16 1/2 3/4 1-1/4 1-5/8
Plate (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m) (0 m)
MIL-A-
12560
Thickness
(in inches)
Concrete 2 4 4-3/8 6-5/16 6-1/2 10-5/8 10 15-3/8
Thickness (50 m) (10.5 m) (0 m) – (0 m) (–) (200 m) (6 m) (200 m)
(in inches)
Wythes of 1 2 1 2 2 2 6
Nominal 4- (50 m) (100 m) (23 m) (23 m) (–) (–) (100 m) – –
in Thick
Brick
Layers of 1 3 2 3 7 12 14
Nominal (muzzle (muzzle (muzzle (muzzle (muzzle (muzzle (muzzle
9/16-in velocity) velocity) velocity) velocity) velocity) velocity) velocity)
Thick E- – –
glass,
Ballistic
Grade3
Layers of 1 2 2* 2* 2 2 3 3 3
Nominal 8 (50 m) (100 m) (100 m) (100 m) (100 m) (100 m) (100 m) (200 m) (200 m)
in–10 in
Thick
Sandbags
8-in Thick Protects Fails Fails Fails* Fails Fails* Fails Fails* Fails*
Hollow (–) (19 m) (19 m) (19 m) (100 m) (–) (19 m) (19 m) (19 m)
CMU
8-in Thick Protects* Protects Protects Protects Protects Protects Fails* Fails* Fails*
Grout-Filled (–) (100 m) (23 m) (23 m) (–) (–) (100 m) (200 m) (200 m)
CMU
4-in Protects* Protects* Protects Protects Protects Protects Fails* Fails* Fails*
Brick/2-in (–) (23 m) (23 m) (23 m) (23 m) (23 m) (100 m) (200 m) (200 m)
Air/8-in
Hollow
CMU
10 in of 10 in of 10 in of 20 in of
sand + sand + sand + sand +
Sand and 0.4 in 0.4 in 0.8 in 0.4 in
Steel – – – mild steel – mild – mild steel mild steel
Plates4 (30 m) steel
(30 m)

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-9

Chapter 3

Table 3-2. Small arms protection characteristics of various materials (continued)

Notes.
Table taken from GTA 90-01-011, revised and with additional information provided by the ERDC. Table data based on single
shots. Multiple shots in or near the same area may penetrate. A dash indicates no data.
1
All thicknesses are in inches, and all ranges are in meters.
2
NATO small-arms projectile.
3
National stock number 9340-01-533-3758.
4
Other sand-filled containers of equal thickness can be used. Data is for dry sand. For wet sand, use twice the indicated
thickness.
* Inferred from other data.
Legend:
AP armor piercing
API armor piercing incendiary
API-T armor piercing incendiary-tracer
cal caliber
CMU concrete masonry unit
ERDC Engineer Research and Development Center
GTA graphic training aid
in inch
m meter
mm millimeter
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
U.S. United States

Table 3-3. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against direct-fire HE shaped
charges
120-mm
Material 73-mm RCLR 82-mm RCLR 85-mm RPG-7 107-mm RCLR Sagger
(ATGM)
Aluminum 36 24 30 36 36
Concrete 36 24 30 36 36
Granite 30 18 24 30 30
Rock 36 24 24 36 36
Snow, packed 156 156 156 — —
Soil 100 66 78 96 96
Soil, frozen 50 33 39 48 48
Steel 24 14 18 24 24
Wood, dry 100 72 90 108 108
Wood, green 60 36 48 60 66
Note.
Thicknesses assume perpendicular impact. A dash indicates no data.
Legend:
ATGM antitank guided missile
HE high explosives
mm millimeter
RCLR recoilless rifle
RPG rocket-propelled grenade

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Table 3-4. Material thickness required to protect against a direct hit with an RPG with
HEAT/thermobaric warhead
Required Thickness for Protection in Inches (Millimeters)1, 2
Material
Minimum Recommended
Armored steel 26.1 (663) 33.1 (840)
Mild steel 32.6 (828.75) 41.3 (1050)
Aluminum 45.7 (1160.25) 57.9 (1470)
Lead 23.0 (583.44) 29.1 (739.2)
Copper 24.5 (623.22) 31.1 (789.6)
Concrete 47.5 (1206.66) 60.2 (1528.8)
Earth 64.5 (1637.61) 81.7 (2074.8)
Granite 43.9 (1113.84) 55.6 (1411.2)
Rock 45.7 (1160.25) 57.9 (1470)
Water 73.1 (1856.4) 92.6 (2352)
Green wood 77.5 (1969.11) 98.2 (2494.8)
Notes.
Table was developed using information provided by UFC 3-340-01, the U.S. Army Research and Development Center, and
the National Ground Intelligence Center. Calculations assume an RPG-7 with an 85-millimeter shaped charge warhead
detonating in direct contact with protective material.
1
Thicknesses listed in the minimum column provide protection against lethal injury but may not protect against
nonlethal injury. To achieve maximum protection for personnel, use the thickness listed in the recommended column.
2
The use of predetonation screens at an appropriate standoff distance can enable smaller thicknesses to provide the same
level of protection. For assistance with determining appropriate predetonation screen designs and standoff distances,
contact the UROC.
Legend:
HEAT high explosives antitank UROC United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback
RPG rocket-propelled grenade Operation Center
UFC Unified Facilities Criteria U.S. United States

Table 3-5. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against indirect-fire fragmentation
and blast exploding 50 feet away
HE HE
Mortars Mortars Rockets Shells Bombs Bombs Bombs Bombs
Material Shells
82 mm 120 mm 122 mm 122 100 lb 250 lb 500 lb 1,000 lb
mm 152 mm

Solid walls
Brick
4 6 6 6 8 8 10 13 17
masonry
Concrete 4 5 5 5 6 8 10 15 18
Concrete,
3 4 4 4 5 7 9 12 15
reinforced
Timber 8 12 12 12 14 15 18 24 30
Walls of loose material between boards
Brick rubble 9 12 12 12 12 18 24 28 30
Soil1 12 12 12 12 16 24 30 NR NR
Gravel,
small 9 12 12 12 12 18 24 28 30
stones
Sandbags filled with—
Brick rubble 10 18 18 18 20 20 20 30 40

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Chapter 3

Table 3-5. Material thickness (in inches) required to protect against indirect-fire fragmentation
and blast exploding 50 feet away (continued)

HE HE
Mortars Mortars Rockets Shells Shells Bombs Bombs Bombs Bombs
Material
82 mm 120 mm 122 mm 122 152 100 lb 250 lb 500 lb 1,000 lb
mm mm
Clay1 10 18 18 18 20 30 40 40 50
Gravel,
small 10 18 18 18 20 20 20 30 40
stones, soil
Sand1 8 16 16 16 18 30 30 40 40
Loose parapets of—
Clay1 12 20 20 20 30 36 48 60 NR
Sand1 10 18 18 18 24 24 36 36 48
Snow
Tamped 60 60 60 60 60 NR NR NR NR
Unpacked 60 60 60 60 60 NR NR NR NR
Note. 1 Double the values if material is saturated.
Legend:
HE high explosives
lb pound
mm millimeter
NR not recommended

3-40. Soil is often used for protection against the penetrating effects of projectiles. There are a few general
rules about the ability of soil to protect against such penetration:
 Coarse-grained and well-graded soils protect better than fine-grained soils.
 Protection increases with increased levels of soil compaction.
 Protection decreases with increased soil moisture content.

3-41. Steel is a commonly used material employed to protect against penetration by projectiles and projectile
fragments. Many field-expedient types of steel (such as culvert sections, steel drums, and U-shaped pickets)
can be used in construction. Steel may be used for shielding, while steel structures (such as culverts) may be
used as expedient protective shelters when covered with soil or other protection. With proper reinforcement,
containers express (CONEXs) may also be used, aboveground and belowground, as bunkers and protective
positions. When using steel for shielding, the most effective application is the use of plate steel. Place
multiple members in contact with each other, and add the thicknesses of the individual members until they
meet or exceed the thicknesses listed in table 3-1, page 3-7. Ensure that the material is thick enough to defeat
the threat for which it is designed. Steel that is not thick enough to defeat the threat but is used on the surface
of a survivability position provides an additional source of fragmentation that can kill or injure personnel.

Note. United States Air Force (USAF) 463-L pallets are not structurally suitable for protective
position construction.

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WARNING
When using a CONEX as a bunker, the roof and walls offer minimal
structural support or protection and require reinforcement due to
the primary load-bearing ability residing at the corner posts.
Failure to properly reinforce the walls and roof could result in
structure failure and serious injury or death. Refer to
GTA 90-01-011 or contact the U.S. Army Engineer Research and
Development Center (ERDC) regarding appropriate container
reinforcement.

3-42. Concrete is also very effective for shielding, but it should not be used without steel reinforcement. A
potential consequence of concrete penetration is spalling. If a projectile partially penetrates concrete
shielding, particles and chunks of concrete often break or scab off the back of the shield at the time of impact.
These particles can kill when broken loose, but they are commonly not lethal. The entries for concrete in
table 3-1 include the thicknesses of concrete necessary to prevent spall. Another option is to place sandbags
up against the inner face of a wall that is not thick enough to prevent spall. The sandbags minimize the hazard
associated with the spalling concrete. Other materials (such as wood or steel) can also be used to minimize
spall effects. Concrete provides excellent protection against ionizing and thermal radiation. Prefabricated
concrete barriers are used to protect structures against observation and attack and to provide standoff to
mitigate the effects of explosive detonations. Prefabricated concrete structures are also commonly used as
protective shelters in base camps and other contingency construction.
3-43. Rock (especially in layers) can protect against penetration by projectiles and projectile fragments. The
more dense the rock properties, the better the protective qualities. Sandstone is less effective than basalt,
shale, or gneiss. Rock is often used as a bursting layer in overhead cover (OHC).
3-44. Wood is often used for structural support in a survivability position. The low density and relatively
low compressive strength of wood limits its ability to protect against penetration by projectiles and projectile
fragments. Greater thicknesses of wood than soil are needed for protection from penetration. The greater the
thickness, the better the protection; but quantities are usually limited. Wood provides poor protection from
ionizing and thermal radiation. Because of its low ignition point, wood is easily destroyed by fire from
thermal radiation. In some areas of the world, wood construction materials are not readily available. Wood
can also be subject to damage from pests.
3-45. Brick and other masonry can be effective for shielding. They provide protection similar to that of
concrete, but they are less effective because of their lower compressive strengths. Generally, solid masonry
or masonry with its voids filled with grout should be used for shielding against projectiles. Note that masonry
can exhibit spalling behavior similar to concrete as well; therefore, it should be treated similarly to concrete
as previously discussed. Ionizing and thermal radiation protection by brick and masonry are 1.5 times as
effective as for soil. This is due to the higher compressive strength and hardness properties in brick and
masonry. Because density determines the degree of protection against initial radiation, unreinforced brick
and masonry are not as effective as concrete for penetration protection.
3-46. Sandbags can be used in a number of ways. They can be filled with soil, but they should contain
minimal rock to minimize spalling when a sandbag is hit. There are also a number of techniques for quickly
filling sandbags, such as those that use the palletized load system concrete mobile chute and the small
emplacement excavator attachment. Sandbagging is the least preferred soil construction method because it is
the most costly in terms of materials and labor. If layers are not interlocked, sandbags are not useful.
Structures constructed of sandbags have a life of 6 months to a maximum of 1 year. The effects of sun and
other weather considerations and the type of sandbags used have an effect on their longevity.

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Chapter 3

3-47. One of the most common mistakes made in building sandbag structures is inadequate overhead support
for the overhead sandbag cover. Ensure that such support is correctly designed. Figure 3-1 depicts an example
of a poor sandbag technique; the sandbags are improperly filled, not interlocked and, therefore, do not form
effective protection. Proper training and leader supervision prevent the waste of a Soldier’s/Marine’s time
and resources.

Figure 3-1. Poor sandbag technique

3-48. Figure 3-2 shows a line diagram of the proper stacking of sandbags with headers, footers and stringers.
Figure 3-3 depicts a concrete shelter with sandbags being used to provide an additional level of protection.
In this example, the sandbags are compact and properly supported by the bunker structure. The sandbags
have been used to reduce the amount of fragmentation that can enter the bunker. As shown, the sandbags are
interlocked, thus maximizing their overall effectiveness.

Figure 3-2 Proper sandbag technique

Figure 3-3. Properly sandbagged concrete shelter

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3-49. Soil-filled containers are a common option for survivability construction. Soil-filled containers are
easy to emplace, come in various sizes, are stackable to different heights, and may be used to protect existing
structures or may be configured as structures themselves. They typically come in multiple sizes that also
allow for circumstances that require a taller soil-filled container, such as for aircraft revetments. Soil-filled
containers consist of a fabric-lined, metal framework that interconnects and is then filled with soil. They may
be used for walls and overhead protection as long as the supporting structure is adequate. When building with
soil-filled containers, ensure that the ground is level and well compacted and that provisions are made for
water to drain out of the enclosed area.

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
3-50. The structure of a protective position depends on the weapon or weapon effect it is designed to defeat.
All fighting and protective positions have some configuration of a floor, walls, and roof designed to protect
material and/or occupants. The floor, walls, and roof support the shielding discussed earlier, or they may
make up that shielding themselves. These components must also resist blast and ground shock effects from
the detonation of HE rounds, which place greater stress on the structure than the weight of the components
and the shielding. Designers must make structural components of the positions stronger, larger, and/or more
numerous to defeat blast and ground shock.

Floors
3-51. Fighting and protective position floors are made from almost any material, but they require resistance
to weathering and wear and must provide trafficability. Soil is most often used, yet it is the least resistant to
water damage and rutting from foot and vehicle traffic. Wood pallets or other field-available materials are
often cut to fit floor areas. When possible, integrate drainage into the design of the structure. At a minimum,
anything that helps keep personnel and equipment out of the mud and water (such as wooden floors, pallets,
or crushed rock) improves the position. Ensure that there is a way for water to drain out of an area with
aboveground structures (such as enclosed areas protected by soil berms, sand bag walls, and soil-filled
containers).

Walls
3-52. Walls of fighting and protective positions include two basic types: belowground (earth or revetted
earth) and aboveground. Belowground walls are made of the in-place soil remaining after excavation of the
position. This soil may need revetment or support—depending on the soil properties and the depth of the cut.
A revetment is usually a mound or wall of earth, masonry, timber, sandbags, or other suitable material erected
as a protection against small-arms or artillery fire, bomb splinters, or blast. When used to support roof
structures, earth walls must support the roof at points no less than one-fourth the depth of cutout from the
edges of the excavation to prevent cave-in. Aboveground walls are normally constructed for shielding from
direct fire and fragments. They are usually built of revetted earth, sandbags, concrete, or other materials.
When constructed to a thickness adequate for shielding from projectiles and projectile fragments, they are
thick and stable enough for roof support.

Roofs
3-53. Roofs of protective positions are easily designed to support earth cover for shielding from fragments
and small-caliber direct fire. However, contact burst protection requires much stronger roof structures and,
therefore, careful design. See appendix D for a detailed discussion of roof design, including roofs required
to defeat contact burst projectiles. For information about roofs that protect against delay-fuze burst
projectiles, contact the UROC (see appendix B). Roofs for support of earth cover shielding are constructed
of almost any material that is usually used as beams or stringers and sheathing.

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Chapter 3

PROTECTIVE WALLS
3-54. While some walls only provide support for the structure or fulfill some other purpose, protective walls
provide protection against the effects of fires. They are constructed to satisfy a variety of conditions, such as
weather and topographical, tactical, and other military requirements. The walls range from simple ones
constructed with hand tools to more complicated walls requiring specialized engineering and equipment
capabilities.
3-55. Protection provided by walls is restricted to stopping fragment and blast effects from near-miss
explosions of mortar, rocket, or artillery shells; some direct-fire protection is also provided. OHC is not
practical due to the size of the position surrounded by the walls. In some cases, modification of the designs
shown in the following graphics increases nuclear protection. The wall effectiveness substantially increases
by locating it in adequately defended areas. The walls need close integration with other forms of protection
such as dispersion, concealment, and adjacent fighting positions. The protective walls should have the
minimum inside area required to perform operational duties. Further, the wall height should be at least equal
to the height of the equipment being protected. See GTA 90-01-011 for additional information about
protective walls (referred to as sidewall protection in that publication).

Earth Walls and Berms

3-56. Earth walls are constructed entirely of compacted earth fill and are used for protection against blast
and shell fragments, to contain liquid material spills, and to stop or channel vehicle and pedestrian movement.
Berms are earth mounds comprised of uncompacted fill and are used for the same functions as earth walls.
Berms are generally easier and faster to build and require fewer resources. The sides should have a 1:1 slope,
so a large area is required. Earth walls and berms (see figure 3-4) must be maintained to keep their protective
capability, particularly in areas with high wind or excessive rainfall.

Figure 3-4. Earth berms

Revetments
3-57. Revetments are walls constructed of concrete, timber, sandbags, soil-filled containers, or other suitable
materials that may be used to support earth walls and berms or as stand-alone barriers designed to stop
fragments, reduce blast effects, function as vehicle and pedestrian barriers, provide standoff from facilities
and critical targets, and channel vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Figure 3-5 and figure 3-6 provide examples
of revetments.

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Figure 3-5. Soil-filled containers used as protective perimeter walls

Figure 3-6. Metal revetment walls used as blast protection

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-17

Chapter 3

Earth Walls With Revetments

3-58. An earth wall with a revetment is a wall constructed of soil placed at a 1:1 slope against a revetment.
Normally, the revetment is located on the inside of the wall, with the revetment as close to the equipment
being protected as possible. The wall height should be at least equal to the height of the equipment being
protected (see figure 3-7).

Figure 3-7. Earth walls with revetment

Soil Bin Walls With Revetment

3-59. Soil bin walls are constructed by placing compacted soil between two revetments. This is extremely
effective and may be used in various ways. When compartmentalizing high troop concentration areas, soil
bin walls have proven effective in protecting personnel and equipment. Many materials are available to
construct the revetments, including plywood, corrugated metal sheeting, and prefabricated metal revetments.
Soil thickness should be a minimum of 1 foot, with 2 feet desired. Soil bin walls with revetments are proven
to defeat artillery, mortar, and rocket shell fragments exploding as close as 5 feet from the walls (see figure
3-8).

Figure 3-8. Soil bin walls with revetment

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Soil-filled Container Revetments

3-60. Soil-filled container revetments are quickly constructed and can provide excellent cover for various
types of equipment and resources. Additional hardening can be added by constructing OHC and
predetonation roofs in conjunction with the revetments. For additional information on soil-filled container
revetments, see GTA 90-01-011.

ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION
3-61. Additional protective construction can aid in survivability by providing standoff from direct- and
indirect-fire weapons. Units can achieve this standoff by building predetonation roofs and screens.

Predetonation Roofs
3-62. Predetonation roofs (see figure 3-9) are sacrificial layers built over existing roofs to cause detonation
of indirect-fire munitions before they reach the permanent structure. A variety of materials (see table 3-6 and
table 3-7, page 3-20) can be used to construct these systems, but must be properly chosen based on the threat
weapon fuze characteristics. Predetonation roofs are intended to detonate the munitions and provide increased
standoff to minimize the blast effect. These roofs must be supported by structure capable of supporting the
weight of the structure itself (static load) and the force of the detonation and other moving or changing forces
(dynamic loads); proper standoff is determined by threat analysis. (Contact the UROC [see appendix B] for
assistance with determining the proper standoff.) Additional measures must be taken to stop the
fragmentation hazards generated during the detonation. A more substantial shielding layer is typically used.

Figure 3-9. Predetonation and shielding layers

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-19

Chapter 3

Table 3-6. Recommended material options for predetonation layers

Predetonation Layer 60-mm 82-mm 120-mm 107-mm 122-mm
Material Mortar Mortar Mortar Rocket Rocket
1 layer of ballistic E-glass — Yes — — —
22-gauge corrugated steel Yes Yes No — Yes
19–20 gauge steel deck — Yes — Yes —
1/2-inch cement board Yes Yes No — Yes6
1/2-inch OSB Yes5 Yes No — Yes
1/2-inch plywood Yes Yes Yes — Yes4
¾3/4-inch plywood1 Yes Yes Yes Yes —
4-inch sandwich panel
(sheet steel/foam/sheet Yes Yes Yes7 — —
steel)2
1/4-inch steel plate3 — Yes Yes — —
Notes.
Sources: Data from ERDC Executive Summary of Phase IV, the Draft AFRL Report on Fuze Initiation, and
the TSWG Desert Cobra Final Test Report. The table is based on live-fire tests. YES indicates round
detonated, NO indicates poor or no detonation, and a dash indicates no data.
1 The recommendation for the 60-mm mortar is based on tests against 1/2-inch plywood.

2 A 2-inch thick panel was also tested but was not as consistent as the 4-inch panel in detonating mortar

rounds. The recommendation for the 82-mm mortar is based on results of the 2-inch panel.
3 Potentially hazardous secondary debris may be generated when the 120-mm mortar predetonates on a

steel plate.
4 Based on the performance of 1/2-inch OSB.

5 Based on the performance of 1/2-inch plywood.

6 Based on the performance of 3/8-inch cement board.

7 Based on tests in which 2 of 3 rounds detonated.

Legend:
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory mm millimeter
ERDC Engineer Research and OSB oriented strand board
Development Center TSWG technical support working group

Table 3-7. Material options for shielding layers

120-mm
Shielding Layer Material 60-mm Mortar 82-mm Mortar 107-mm Rocket3
Mortar
3 1/2 inches of sand Yes Yes Yes1 Yes
1/4-inch steel plate Yes Yes No No
5/8-inch steel plate Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 layers of ballistic E-glass Yes Yes No No
3 layers of ballistic E-glass2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes.
Source: Data from ERDC C-RAM Overhead Protection Quick Look Report.
YES indicates fragments were stopped, and NO indicates that fragments penetrated the material.
1 Experiments show that 3 1/2 inches of sand stop approximately 90 percent of the fragments, and 7 inches

stop nearly 100 percent of the fragments.

2 Assumes a 5-foot minimum space between predetonation and shielding layers. For spacing between 3 1/2

feet and 5 feet, use four layers. For spacing between 2 1/2 feet and 3 1/2 feet, use five layers.
3 Based on 120-mm mortar results.

3-20 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Cover

Table 3-7. Material options for shielding layers (continued)

Legend:
mm millimeter
C-RAM counter rocket, artillery, and mortar
ERDC Engineer Research and Development Center

3-63. Currently, plywood, structural insulated panels, and the Modular Protective System (MPS) are the most
effective materials to cause detonation of most threat munitions. Solid predetonating roofs must be used
instead of roofs composed of materials such as chain link fence fabric because the fuze mechanisms of the
mortar rounds require impact on a solid surface in order to trigger detonation. Predetonation roofs can be
used on temporary structures and permanent fixed facilities if additional precautions are taken to address the
fragmentation effects. For additional information about predetonation roofs, see GTA 90-01-011.

Predetonation Screens
3-64. Predetonation screens (see figure 3-10) protect against direct-fire weapons with explosive warheads
and against indirect-fire rounds with relatively low trajectories. Screens are similar in function to
predetonation roofs, but screens are constructed vertically. A properly designed support structure must be
provided to hold the material at a height equal to or greater than the elevation of the protected asset. To be
effective, the predetonation screen must be built using a solid material such as wood. Soil-filled containers
and walls can also effectively predetonate direct-fire rounds. Mitigating the effects of blast-induced
fragmentation hazards requires the addition of a blast or fragmentation barrier.

Figure 3-10. Predetonation screen concept

3-65. Predetonation screens are separately built or added to existing structures and are used to activate the
fuze of an incoming shell or projectile away from the protected structure (see figure 3-11 and figure 3-12,
page 3-22). A variety of materials can be used to construct the screen, but they must be properly selected
based on the fuze characteristics of the threat weapon to minimize blast effects. Properly designed screens
are particularly effective against superquick fuzes because detonation occurs immediately on impact.
However, delay shells require more material to limit penetration and activate the fuze. If a projectile fuze is
capable of delay settings, the additional projectile travel distance after impacting the screen must be
accounted for when specifying the standoff distance.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-21

Chapter 3

Legend:
ft foot
in inch
H height

Figure 3-11. Typical predetonation screen standoff framing using dimensional lumber
(front view)

Legend:
ft foot
in inch
RL random length
RW random width

Figure 3-12. Typical predetonation screen standoff framing using dimensional lumber
(side view)

3-22 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Cover

3-66. Incoming projectiles with superquick fuzes are defeated at a standoff distance with several types of
predetonation materials. Table 3-8 lists the thicknesses associated with various facing materials for the
construction of predetonation screens, but such screens only detonate the incoming shell—they do not defeat
fragments from the shell. Table 3-9 provides the required thickness for each of the materials associated with
the wall used to absorb the resulting fragments. Collectively, the predetonation screen and the associated wall
(at a 10-foot standoff) are designed to defeat incoming projectiles with superquick fuzes. Contact the UROC
(see appendix B) for additional information about materials and techniques for predetonation screens and
assistance with determining the proper standoff.
Table 3-8. Predetonation screen facing material requirements
Material Triggering Requirements1
Plywood, dimensioned timber 2 ½-inch (63.5-mm) thickness
Soil in sandbags with plywood or metal facing 2-inch (50.8-mm) thickness (24-gauge sheet metal)
Structured steel (corrugated metal) 1/4-inch (6.35-mm) thickness
Tree limbs 2-inch (50.8-mm) diameter
Ammunition crates 1 layer of 1-inch (25.4-mm) thick wood
Snow 3 feet (914.4-mm)
Note.
1 For detonating projectiles up to and including 120-millimeter mortar, rocket, and artillery shells. For
information about triggering requirements for other projectiles, contact the UROC.
Legend:
mm millimeter
UROC United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center

Table 3-9. Protective wall material thickness at 10-foot (3-meter) standoff from predetonation
screen
Incoming Shell Size1
Material
82 mm 120 mm 122 mm
Soil 10 in (254 mm) 18 in (457 mm) 18 in (457 mm)
Soil, frozen 5 in (127 mm) 9 in (229 mm) 9 in (229 mm)
Sand 8 in (203 mm) 16 in (406 mm) 16 in (406 mm)
Clay 10 in (254 mm) 18 in (457 mm) 18 in (457 mm)
Steel ½ in (12.7 mm) 1 in (25.4 mm) 1 in (25.4 mm)
Wood (fir) 5 in (127 mm) 14 in (356 mm) 14 in (356 mm)
Concrete 4 in (102 mm) 6 in (152 mm) 6 in (152 mm)
Snow 60 in (1,524 mm) 80 in (2,032 mm) 80 in (2,032 mm)
Note.
1 For information about wall material thicknesses for other projectiles, contact the UROC.
Legend:
in inch
mm millimeter
UROC United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 3-23

Chapter 3

Modular Kit Solution

3-67. The MPS OHC concept is based on combining two modular kits into a unified protective solution. The
MPS (see figure 3-13) consists of an expandable steel frame that accepts fragment-resistant E-glass and ultra-
high-strength concrete panels. The frame contains Z-bar clips that allow panel insertion. Armor panels can
be Underwriters Laboratory Level 3 ballistic E-glass, ultra-high-strength concrete, or a combination of the
two. These panels mitigate mortar fragments and small-arms projectiles. The MPS requires a reasonably level
site and at least two people for setup. The system is portable, easily relocated, and able to protect straight-
line areas or turn corners.

Figure 3-13. Key components of the MPS

3-68. The OHC system is formed by two open-web steel joist decks. The upper predetonation deck consists
of sandwich foam panels, while the lower shielding deck consists of E-glass panels. In the combined MPS-
OHC system, the MPS walls support the OHC decks (see figure 3-14). The MPS-OHC system provides
protection from direct- and indirect-fire weapons, including direct hits of up to 120-millimeter mortars and
107-millimeter rocket warheads. The MPS-OHC system in figure 3-14 consists of a 20 feet long, 20 feet
wide, and 12 feet high protected volume. These internal dimensions support expedient CPs, communications
shelters, troop shelters, or aid stations. The MPS-OHC system shown can be assembled in eight daylight
hours and 12 to 14 nighttime hours (see GTA 90-01-011).

Figure 3-14. MPS-OHC solution

3-24 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Chapter 4
Fighting Positions
Fighting positions provide cover and (often) camouflage and concealment for
personnel and assets. At the same time, fighting positions must allow personnel and
their weapon systems to engage and destroy enemy forces from the position. Fighting
positions include individual and crew-served weapons fighting positions, bunkers and
towers, vehicle fighting positions, and artillery positions. While individual and crew-
served weapons fighting positions can be—and often are—constructed entirely without
engineer support, the other categories (bunkers and towers, vehicle fighting positions,
and artillery positions) usually require engineer support. This chapter provides
planning, design, and construction considerations for fighting positions, focusing on
those aspects that most commonly require engineer support.

FIGHTING POSITIONS PLANS AND DESIGNS

4-1. Fighting positions should be selected, designed, and built to support unit direct and indirect fires while
simultaneously enhancing the protection provided to the individuals or vehicles occupying those positions.
When planning and designing fighting positions, several basic design requirements must be considered.
These design requirements help to ensure that the positions are effective. Requirement considerations include
weapons employment, cover, simplicity and economy, ingenuity, and progressive development.

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
4-2. Although it is desirable for a fighting position to provide maximum protection to personnel and
equipment, the primary consideration is always given to effective weapons employment. In the offense,
fighting positions for weapons systems are often sited where natural or existing positions are available or
where terrain provides the most protection—while maintaining the ability to engage the enemy in a selected
EA. Because of the speed typically associated with offensive tasks, these positions are sited where minimal
preparation and digging are required. In the defense, when more time may be available, positioning of
weapons systems for the most effective employment becomes more critical. The best use of available terrain
is always considered; but in the defense, terrain may be modified or changed to provide the most protection
while still maximizing the capabilities of the weapons system. It is the responsibility of the unit, not the
engineer, to locate unit positions where they are most effective.

COVER
4-3. Fighting positions are designed to allow the most effective use of weapons systems while providing
the maximum amount of protection to personnel and their equipment. The primary function of most fighting
positions is to defeat the effects of conventional direct and indirect fire. When nuclear and chemical attacks
or other threats (including EHs) are anticipated, the design of the fighting position must consider the potential
effect of the enemy weapon or threat and increase the protection level accordingly. Designing and
constructing fighting positions are based on the type of cover that is needed to defeat the particular effects

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-1

Chapter 4

of enemy weapons systems. The following three different types of cover are used to make fighting positions
more survivable:
 Frontal cover. The primary purpose of frontal cover is to provide protection from direct-fire
weapons, but it also provides some protection from the effects of indirect-fire weapons. The use
of effective natural frontal cover (such as rocks, thick trees, thick logs, and rubble) is preferred
because it is more difficult for the enemy to detect. In selecting a construction material, consider
its capability to withstand enemy weapons effects, its potential to produce secondary shrapnel, and
its ability to improve concealment. If these natural materials are not available or are not adequate
to provide the desired protection, it then becomes paramount to employ spoil (excavated from the
fighting position and compacted) as frontal cover. Frontal cover requires that the fighting positions
be built to correct dimensions to allow personnel adequate room to move and fight. It also requires
adequate thickness to stop small-caliber direct fire and the correct height to facilitate proper
overhead protection. Constructing cover to protect from large-caliber (greater than
12.7 millimeters) direct-fire weapons can be very difficult and resource-intensive. It is usually
easier to achieve such protection by placing protective positions where the enemy cannot
effectively engage them and by concealing the protective positions, making pinpointing the exact
location difficult.
 Overhead cover. The primary purpose of OHC is to provide protection from indirect fire and
fragmentation, but it also provides some protection from direct fire delivered from a higher
position (for example, from a hill) or from enemy aircraft. When possible, OHC is always
constructed to enhance protection against airburst indirect-fire rounds. OHC dramatically
increases survivability and protection for a position. Most individual fighting positions are not
constructed to withstand a contact burst from an indirect-fire weapon.

CAUTION
Safety remains paramount when constructing fighting positions. The
improper construction of OHC can lead to collapse and result in injury
or death to personnel. Common construction errors include the lack of
support (beams) on which to stabilize the stringers or improper stringer
spacing. Eighteen inches of OHC provided by sandbags on a two-
person fighting position can weigh up to 4,000 pounds. It is critical that
positions are built according to established guidelines outlined in this
Army techniques publicaton, GTA 05-08-001, and TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-
17A. Once constructed, inspect these positions frequently, especially
after the area experiences heavy rainfall and immediately after an
attack.

 Flank and rear cover. The primary purpose of flank and rear cover is to provide protection from
the effects of indirect fire to the flanks and rear of the position and from the effects of friendly fire
hazards, such as the petals from discarding sabot ammunition. Flank and rear cover also provides
some protection against direct fire delivered from the flank or rear of the position. In ideal
conditions, natural cover and terrain provide this type of cover; however, in urban environments,
it is often desirable to take advantage of existing man-made cover. If this is not possible, flank and
rear cover are constructed as the situation permits.

SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY

4-4. Normal characteristics of fighting positions are simplicity and strength, providing the maximum
amount of protection possible to the Soldier/Marine and equipment. Providing this protection through the use
of readily available materials or existing structures is typically the most desirable, as this requires the least
amount of engineer equipment to construct the position. Occupying (and modifying, if necessary) existing
positions can also save significant time and resources over constructing new positions.

4-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

INGENUITY
4-5. The most effective use of available materials and time requires a high degree of imagination. Various
materials found on the battlefield and prefabricated materials from built-up areas and industrial sites make
excellent fighting position components.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT
4-6. Fighting positions should be progressively developed as time and the situation permit. Hasty fighting
positions provide immediate protection for personnel, but to a minimum degree. As time and resources are
available, these positions should be improved into deliberate positions as quickly as possible. Given available
time, fighting positions may be enhanced by the construction of tunnels and trenches connecting other nearby
fighting positions. This provides the flexibility to move from position to position for engagements or resupply
while remaining protected. Positions with grenade sumps and drainage increase the level of survivability.
4-7. In cases where the design and development of fighting positions can be planned well ahead of their
actual emplacement, deliberate positions can be located and bills of material can be identified for their
construction. In addition, where advanced planning is possible, more effective and more efficient
construction materials (such as concrete barriers, soil-filled containers, or other materials) can be employed
in fighting position construction. Such materials are especially advantageous for OHC. Using these materials
can save time in obtaining protective materials and constructing fighting positions.

INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS

4-8. Individual fighting positions protect one or more dismounted personnel armed with individual
weapons—intended to be operated by an individual rather than by a crew—while supporting their ability to
engage the enemy from the position. Such positions typically consist of a hole in the ground, supplemented
with frontal, overhead, and flank or rear cover as time and the situation permit. Individual fighting positions
are generally constructed in the defense in generally rural areas. Other individual fighting positions may be
constructed in urban terrain (see chapter 8) or may be constructed in support of base camps. The positions
should be planned and designed so that they are concealed, are mutually supporting, and have interlocking
fields of fire in all directions. Each weapons system must be assigned a primary sector of fire to support the
defensive plan. Alternate positions that overwatch the primary sector should also be selected. Finally, each
weapon should be assigned a supplementary position to engage attacks from other directions.
4-9. Design considerations include the mission variables and the following:
 Availability of materials. Certain materials (such as logs and dressed lumber) may be available
locally. Other materials (such as U-shaped pickets, sandbags, plywood, and specialized materials)
may be acquired through the supply system.
 Soil. Soil type is a design consideration when constructing individual fighting positions. Different
soils can affect the integrity of the fighting position hole and its ability to remain structurally stable
and drain rainwater. In general, the looser the soil, the more standoff from the edge of a fighting
position is required when placing supports for OHC.
 Drainage. Water can seriously degrade the structural stability of fighting positions and create
unhealthy conditions for personnel occupying them. Proper drainage is often difficult to achieve
when constructing fighting positions. In areas or seasons where rainfall is expected, drainage or
some form of waterproofing should be implemented. The use of sumps, gravel, or wood decking
at the bottom of positions assists in water drainage and helps protect personnel from the water.
Additionally, waterproofing OHC using plastic garbage bags, ponchos, or other suitable material
helps prevent water infiltration. Care should also be taken to ensure that the surrounding terrain
drains water away from fighting positions.
 Safety. Care should be taken not to deviate from designs established in this and other Army and
Marine Corps references. The collapse of fighting positions has led to death and serious injury due
to improper construction. See the caution statement on page 4-2.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-3

Chapter 4

4-10. Individual fighting positions are categorized in two types: hasty and deliberate. The type of position
constructed depends on time, equipment available, and the required level of protection. Characteristics and
planning factors for individual fighting positions are found in table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Characteristics of individual fighting positions

Estimated Protection Provided

Estimated
BHL/HME
Construction Direct Indirect-fire Indirect-fire
Type Position EDig Remarks
Time1 Small- Blast and Blast and Nuclear
Time2
(Man-Hours) Caliber Fragmentation Fragmentation Weapons4
(Minutes)
Fire (Near Miss)3 (Direct Hit)
Better than in
Provides
Hasty

Prone open–no
1.0 NA 7.62 mm None Fair all-around
position overhead
cover.
protection
Medium
artillery no
One- —
closer than 30
person 3.0 2/1.5 12.7 mm None Fair
feet–no
position
overhead
protection
Additional
cover
One-
provides
person Medium
protection
position artillery no
8.0 NA 12.7 mm None Good from
with 1.5 closer than 30
direct-hit,
feet feet
small-
OHC
mortar
blast.
Medium
Deliberate

artillery no
Two-
closer than 30
person 6.0 5/2.5 12.7 mm None Fair —
feet–no
position
overhead
protection
Additional
cover
Two-
provides
person Medium
protection
position artillery no
11.0 NA 12.7 mm None Good from
with 1.5 closer than 30
direct-hit,
feet feet
small-
OHC
mortar
blast.
Medium
artillery no
SLM closer than 30
3.0 5/2.5 12.7 mm None Fair —
position feet–no
overhead
protection
Notes.
Chemical protection is assumed because of individual protective masks and clothing.
A dash indicates no data.
1
Estimated construction time assumes the use of hand tools to prepare the position.
2
Equipment dig rates are for planning purposes only and only account for digging the position—not equipment preparation,
movement, or maintenance times. Times may vary depending on soil type, time of operations, or operator experience. Refer
to unit tactical standard operating procedures for accurate dig rates for unit equipment and operator experience. Calculations
were based on real hours and 66 BCY excavation capacity for HMEE or BHL from table 4-5, page 4-15, and rounded up to
the nearest half minute.
3
Shell sizes are— Light Medium
Mortar 82 mm 120 mm
Artillery 105 mm 152 mm
4
Nuclear protection ratings are poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent.

4-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

Table 4-1. Characteristics of individual fighting positions (continued)

Legend:
BCY banked cubic yard
BHL backhoe loader
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator
mm millimeter
OHC overhead cover
SLM shoulder-launched munition

4-11. Personnel are responsible for constructing their individual fighting positions. They use hand tools and
the detailed descriptions and construction procedures found in ATP 3-21.8, TC 3-21.75, TM 3-34.85/MCRP
3-17A, GTA 05-08-001, GTA 07-06-001, and MCRP 3-10A.3. See ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-
10B for information about individual fighting positions in urban terrain. While engineer support is desirable,
supported commanders usually allocate such support to other tasks ahead of supporting the construction of
individual fighting positions. When engineer support is available to support individual fighting positions, it
should be used to assist with the most time-consuming and labor-intensive tasks—such as digging holes—or
tasks requiring special equipment or expertise. Engineers typically use engineer equipment to support the
digging effort, but rocky areas may require the use of explosives. Clearing the site of boulders, trees, roots,
or other obstructions may require heavy engineer equipment, explosives, chain saws, or other engineer tools
and equipment. However, care should be taken to minimize disruptions to the site that make camouflage and
concealment more difficult or less effective. Engineers can also assist with clearing selected obstructions
from the fields of fire.

HASTY POSITIONS
4-12. When time and materials are limited, troops in contact with the enemy use a hasty fighting position
located behind whatever cover is available, maximizing the advantages provided by the existing terrain and
natural or man-made cover. Hasty positions may only provide limited protection; however, positions should
be selected to provide, as a minimum, frontal protection from direct fire while allowing personnel to fire to
the front and at oblique angles. Because of the situation and limited time typically associated with selecting
a hasty position, extreme care must be taken to select a position that reduces the risk of fratricide. For
protection from indirect fire, a hasty fighting position can be located in a depression or hole that is at least
l ½ feet deep. While there may be little or no natural cover, these positions can provide limited protection
from fragmentation. If the unit remains in the area and/or as the situation permits, hasty positions should be
continually improved to provide as much protection as possible. See MCRP 3-10A.3 and TC 3-21.75 for
additional information on hasty individual fighting positions (see figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. Hasty prone position

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-5

Chapter 4

DELIBERATE POSITIONS
4-13. Deliberate fighting positions are often modified hasty positions prepared as the situation and time
permit. The unit leader should verify the sectors of observation/fire, interlocking fields of fire, adequate size
for occupants, and safe backblast areas before improving each position. Continued improvements are made
to strengthen the position during the period of occupation. In some cases, particularly in urban environments,
it may be necessary to build up or construct a position within an existing structure. Improvements include
adding OHC, digging trenches or opening routes to adjacent positions, and maintaining camouflage. Chapter
6 provides information about camouflage and concealment of fighting positions. TC 3-21.75 provides
detailed information about deliberate individual fighting positions, and additional information can be found
in ATP 3-21.8, GTA 05-08-001, GTA 07-06-001, MCRP 3-10A.3, and TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. For
material thicknesses for different types of material against specific threats, see tables 3-1 through 3-5, pages
3-7 through 3-12. See figure 4-2 for a completed deliberate two-man fighting position with OHC without
camouflage.

Figure 4-2. Deliberate two-man fighting position with built-up OHC (without camouflage)

CREW-SERVED WEAPONS FIGHTING POSITIONS

4-14. Like individual positions, crew-served weapons positions are also classified as hasty and deliberate.
The same principles apply to the crew-served weapon, although minor changes include dimensions of the
position and characteristics to facilitate the effective use of the weapon system. Frontal, overhead, flank, and
rear protection provide increased survivability and protection as well. For crew-served weapons that create a
backblast, overhead and rear protection must be considered for effective employment of the weapon while
minimizing the risk of injury to the operator (see figure 4-3).

4-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

Figure 4-3. Position with firing platforms

4-15. As with individual fighting positions, personnel are responsible for constructing their crew-served
weapons fighting positions. These positions must be tailored to the operating characteristics and requirements
of the weapon that occupies the position. Weapon crews (and their leaders) must thoroughly understand and
apply the descriptions and procedures for constructing fighting positions (found in the manuals listed in table
4-2) and camouflage and concealment of fighting positions (found in chapter 6). In addition, see
ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B for information about crew-served weapons positions in urban
terrain.
Table 4-2. References for crew-served weapons fighting positions
Weapon Reference
Javelin TC 3-22.37
TOW ATP 3-21.11, FM 3-22.34, and MCRP 3-01F.1
ATP 3-21.8, MCTP 3-01C, TC 3-21.75, TC 3-22.19,
Machine gun
TC 3-22.240, and TC 3-22.50.
Mortar ATTP 3-21.90/MCWP 3-15.2
Legend:
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
FM field manual
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
TC training circular
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

4-16. When engineer support for fighting positions is available, supported commanders often give higher
priority to the supporting construction of fighting positions for crew-served weapons than to individual
fighting positions. As with individual fighting positions, available engineer support should be used to assist
with the most time-consuming, labor-intensive tasks or tasks requiring special equipment or expertise.
Engineer support to crew-served weapons fighting positions typically involves the same types of tasks used
to support individual fighting positions—digging, cutting, and clearing. Characteristics and planning factors
for crew-served fighting positions are presented in table 4-3, page 4-8.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-7

Chapter 4

Table 4-3. Characteristics of crew-served weapons fighting positions

Protection Provided
Estimated Estimated
Type of Construction BHL/HMEE Direct Indirect-fire Indirect-fire
Position Time1 Dig Time2 Small- Blast and Blast and Nuclear
(Man-Hours) (Minutes) Caliber Fragmentation Fragmentation Weapons4
Fire (Near Miss)3 (Direct Hit)
Medium artillery
no closer than
Javelin 12.7
4.0 7/5.5 30 feet–no None Fair
position mm
overhead
protection
Medium artillery
Dismounted no closer than
12.7
TOW missile 11.0 5/2.5 30 feet–no None Fair
mm
position overhead
protection
Medium artillery
no closer than
Machine gun 12.7
7.0 15/10 30 feet–no None Fair
position mm
overhead
protection
Machine gun
Medium artillery
position with 12.7
12.0 NA no closer than None Good
1 ½ feet mm
30 feet
OHC
Medium artillery
17.5 (stage 1) no closer than
Mortar 12.7
14.0 13 (stage 2–3) 30 feet–no None Fair
position mm
30.5 (all stages) overhead
protection
Notes.
Source: Data from TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A.
Chemical protection is assumed because of individual protective masks and clothing.
A dash indicates no data.
1 Estimated construction time assumes the use of hand tools to prepare the position.

2 Equipment dig rates are for planning purposes only and only account for digging the position—not equipment

preparation, movement, or maintenance times. Times may vary, depending on soil type, time of operations, or
operator experience. Refer to unit tactical standard operating procedures for accurate dig rates for unit
equipment and operator experience. Calculations were based on real hours and 66 BCY excavation capacity for
HMEE or BHL from table 4-5, page 4-15, and rounded up to the nearest half minute.
3 Shell sizes are— Light Medium
Mortar 82 mm 120 mm
Artillery 105 mm 152 mm
4 Nuclear protection ratings are poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent.

Legend:
BCY banked cubic yard
BHL backhoe loader
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator
mm millimeter
OHC overhead cover
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

4-8 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

BUNKERS AND TOWERS

4-17. Base camps generally require fighting positions in the forms of bunkers and towers. These are generally
constructed aboveground using timber, sandbags, soil-filled containers, prefabricated concrete, or other
specific items that are available through the supply system. These positions are employed to support
perimeter security, the security of key sites (such as enemy prisoner-of-war compounds), and ECPs. A
deliberate defense may also involve the construction of more elaborate bunkers that may hold up to a squad
of Soldiers/Marines.
4-18. Bunkers are larger fighting positions constructed for squad (or potentially larger) size units that are
required to remain in defensive positions for a long period of time. They are built aboveground or
belowground and are usually made of reinforced concrete, but they can be designed and constructed with a
variety of materials. Because of the extensive engineer effort required to build bunkers, they are usually
constructed when preparing strong points or protecting vital facilities, such as base camps. If time permits,
bunkers are connected to other fighting or supply positions by tunnels. The prefabrication of bunker
assemblies affords rapid construction and flexibility of placement. Bunkers offer excellent protection against
direct- and indirect-fire effects and, if properly constructed with the appropriate collective protection
equipment, can provide protection against chemical and biological agents.
4-19. The positions described below) are designed for use by two or more individuals armed with rifles or
machine guns. Although these positions are beyond the construction capabilities of nonengineer troops,
certain construction phases can be accomplished with little or no engineer assistance. For example, while
engineer assistance may be necessary to build steel frames and cut timbers for the roof of a structure; the
excavation, assembly, and installation are all within the capabilities of most units. Adequate support for OHC
is extremely important. The support system should be strong enough to safely support the roof and soil
material and survive the effects of weapon detonations. GTA 90-01-011,
TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, and the Joint Construction Management System (JCMS) provide additional
designs, information, construction techniques, and bills of material.

SOIL-FILLED CONTAINER FIGHTING POSITIONS

4-20. Soil-filled container positions can be quickly constructed, and they provide a high degree of
survivability. They are most commonly used aboveground, but the soil-filled container provides increased
benefits when partially buried. Soil-filled containers are available through normal supply channels and, when
employed correctly, provide a high degree of protection against blast and fragmentation. When using soil-
filled containers, personnel must ensure that proper OHC frames are used in the construction to prevent cave-
ins from occurring. Some preparation may be required for the base of the position if the foundation soil is
unsuitable or if longer-term emplacement is anticipated. GTA 90-01-011 shows several designs (including
bills of materials; estimates of equipment, personnel, and time requirements; and construction steps) using
soil-filled containers for the construction of fighting positions, observation posts, and bunkers.

WOOD- OR STEEL-FRAME FIGHTING POSITION

4-21. The wood-frame or steel-frame fighting position consists of prefabricated timber or steel-frame support
elements that support a timber or concrete roof. The position is useful as a two-person fighting or observation
position in areas where the position can be dug into the ground. See appendix D for information on roof
design.

CORRUGATED METAL WALL BUNKERS

4-22. A bunker made from corrugated metal walls is very useful in areas where digging is not possible or
practical. With 4-foot earth-filled walls and 2-foot OHC, this position defeats direct fire and blasts or
fragments from near-miss mortar and artillery ammunition. The upper portion of the bunker is left open for
maximum visibility in all directions.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-9

Chapter 4

PLYWOOD PERIMETER BUNKER

4-23. A plywood perimeter bunker is used as an aboveground protected observation post. The bunker has a
post foundation, or it can be constructed on the ground. Another option is to build the wood bunker on top of
one or two stacked CONEX boxes. Walls of this bunker need to be earth-filled or otherwise hardened to resist
the applicable threat.

VEHICLE FIGHTING POSITIONS

4-24. Vehicle fighting positions include fighting and protective positions for major weapons systems
vehicles and their support equipment. Initially, vehicles use the natural cover and concealment in hide
positions to increase survivability. As time, assets, and the situation permit, positions are prepared using
engineer support. Priority is given to those vehicles containing essential critical equipment or supplies.
Drivers and crews should also use these fighting positions for individual protection.
4-25. Berms and revetments positioned at the front of or around major weapons systems provide improved
protection from direct fire and from blast and fragments of indirect-fire artillery, mortar, and rocket shells.
At its base, a berm has a thickness of at least 8 feet. Further, the berm or revetment functions as a standoff
barrier for impact-detonating, direct-fire HEAT and antitank guided missile projectiles. It should cause the
fuzes to activate, thereby increasing survivability for the protected vehicles. If the expected enemy uses
kinetic energy direct-fire armor-piercing or hypervelocity projectiles, it is impossible to construct berms thick
enough for protection. To protect against these projectiles, prepare deep-cut, hull defilade, or turret defilade
positions. Construct fighting and protective positions that are no larger than operationally necessary.
4-26. Success on the battlefield requires maneuver between hide and fighting positions when the main gun
is not engaging enemy targets. The maximum use of wadis or draws, reversed slope hills, and natural
concealment is required to conceal fighting vehicles maneuvering among fighting positions. When a major
weapon system fires its main gun, the vehicle and gun may make a concealed maneuver to another position
before firing again. If the major weapon system immediately reappears in the old position, the enemy will
know where to fire the next round. Table 4-4 provides a summary of the dimensions of the hasty and
deliberate vehicle positions previously discussed (see the respective vehicle operator manuals for more
detailed vehicle dimensions). It also contains construction planning factors for vehicle fighting positions.
4-27. With an increase in coalition operations, United States (U.S.) forces are training and partnering with
other nations. If constructing vehicle positions for coalition vehicles, conduct planning estimates by using
similarly sized U.S. vehicle planning factors. The leader of the blade asset digging the fighting position
verifies the position usability by having the occupying vehicle, or an identical vehicle, proof the fighting
position before moving on to construct the next position. Chapter 6 provides information about the
camouflage and concealment of fighting positions.

4-10 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

Table 4-4. Dimensions of vehicle positions

Equipment
Position Dimension (feet)2 Team Equipment Minimum
Hours4, 6 Berm
Vehicle Types Hours4, 6
Thickness at
D7 Dozer/M9 D6K Base (feet)5
Length Width Depth3
ACE/MCT
Stryker vehicle (all variants)
32 19 9 1.6 2.2 8
with slat armor
M113 series carrier 22 14 6 0.6 0.8 8
Hasty1

M577 CP vehicle 22 14 9 0.8 1.3 8

M106 and M125 mortar
22 16 7 0.7 1.1 8
carrier
AAV with armor kit 33 19 11 2.0 3.1 8
LAV with armor kit 27 15 9 1.7 2.6 8
Hull Defilade
M113 series carrier 22 14 6 0.6 0.8 NA
M577 CP vehicle 22 14 9 0.8 1.3 NA
Deliberate

M106 and M125

22 16 7 0.7 1.1 NA
mortar carrier
M2 and M3 fighting
26 16 7 0.8 1.2 NA
vehicle
M1 main battle tank 32 18 5.5 0.9 1.1 NA
AAV with armor kit 33 19 11 2.0 3.1 NA
LAV with armor kit 27 15 9 1.7 2.6 NA
Access Route Each access route between positions or hide locations must have the same
width as the hull defilade. Clearing times are planned using TM 3-34.85/MCRP
3-17A 1. Production time is determined by calculating the volume of soil needed
to be moved (in cubic yards) and dividing by 100 bank cubic yards per 0.75
hour.
Hide Location Hide locations are made using natural terrain and concealment. Ground
clearing times are planned with the use of TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. The
minimum width of the hide location is the same as the deliberate hull defilade.
Deliberate

The hide position depth requirement is calculated by increasing the depth given
in the deliberate turret defilade position by 15 percent.
Turret Defilade
Stryker vehicle (all variants)
32 19 9 1.6 2.3 NA
with slat armor
M113 series carrier 22 14 7.5 0.7 1.0 NA
M2 and M3 fighting vehicle 26 16 10 1.2 1.9 NA
M1 main battle tank 32 18 9 1.5 2.1 NA
AAV with armor kit 33 19 13 2.3 3.8 NA
LAV with armor kit 27 15 12 2.3 4.0 NA

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-11

Chapter 4

Table 4-4. Dimensions of vehicle positions (continued)

1 Hasty positions for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles not recommended.
2 Position dimensions provide an approximate 3-foot clearance around the vehicle for movement and
maintenance and do not include access ramps.
3 Total depth includes berm height. Depths are approximate and need adjustment for surrounding terrain and

fields of fire.
4 This column provides rules of thumb, which are useful (in the absence of actual production rate data) as a

starting point to estimate the time required to prepare fighting positions. These equipment hours are based on
a production rate of 100 bank cubic yards per 0.75 hour. Divide construction time by 0.85 for rocky or hard soil
or closed hatch operations (M9). The use of natural terrain features reduces construction time. See
TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-40D.9 for more information about estimating production rates.
5 Berms are not recommended for hull and turret defilade positions.

6 Divide by .75 for an average operator in daylight conditions or night operations of an excellent operator.

Divide by .56 for an average operator in night conditions. See TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-17.7I for additional
information.
Legend:
AAV assault amphibious vehicle
ACE armored combat earthmover
CP command post
LAV light armored vehicle
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCT medium crawler tractor
NA not applicable
TM technical manual

HASTY POSITIONS
4-28. Hasty fighting positions for combat vehicles take advantage of natural terrain features or are prepared
with a minimum of construction effort. A frontal berm, constructed as high as practical without interfering
with the vehicle’s weapon systems, shields from frontal attack and provides limited concealment if properly
camouflaged. Protection is improved if the position is made deeper and the berm is extended around the
vehicle sides. Because of the false sense of security against kinetic energy and hypervelocity projectiles
provided by berms, hasty vehicle fighting positions with berms are not recommended for tanks, infantry
fighting vehicles, or Stryker mobile gun systems. Hasty fighting positions do offer protection from HEAT
projectiles and provide limited concealment if properly camouflaged. As the tactical situation permits, hasty
positions for combat vehicles are improved to deliberate positions.

DELIBERATE POSITIONS
4-29. Deliberate fighting positions are required to protect a vehicle from kinetic energy and hypervelocity
projectiles. Deliberate vehicle fighting positions are holes in the ground that provide cover and concealment,
reducing the target signature. The position is constructed in four parts: hull defilade, turret defilade, hide
location, and concealed access ramp or route. Positions formed by natural terrain are best because of easy
modification; however, if preparation is necessary, extensive engineer support is required. Each position is
camouflaged with natural vegetation or a camouflage net, and the spoil is flattened out or hauled away.
Fighting positions for fighting vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Stryker mobile gun systems)
are planned as deliberate positions. The maneuver commander directs engineer earthmoving assets to
construct the following types of fighting positions:
 Hull defilade. This position leaves the vehicle turret aboveground, allowing for the observation
and engagement of targets.
 Turret defilade. The entire vehicle is below ground level. A hull defilade position is required in
front of the vehicle to allow it to move forward and elevate in the position to engage targets.

4-12 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

 Hide location. The hide location allows the vehicle to be concealed away from the fighting
position and includes overhead concealment, when possible.
 Concealed access ramp or route. A concealed route (natural or constructed) allows the vehicle
to move from its hide position to its fighting positions.
4-30. When developing deliberate positions, the construction of hide locations and a concealed route between
positions is only carried out when time and engineer assets are available. When limited time is available,
engineer assets should be prioritized to concentrate on hull and turret defilade positions. Once the
commander’s priorities are complete, hide positions and concealed routes can begin. The ramps and
concealed routes should require only partial clearing and leveling with engineer equipment because natural
concealed routes and hide positions are used. In terrain where natural concealed routes and hide positions are
not available, commanders must consider employing organic obscuration equipment when vehicles are
occupying primary fighting positions or repositioning. Artillery or mortar-delivered smoke and smoke
generators may provide this obscuration. The use of smoke may be a double-edged sword because it alerts
the enemy to activity that may be occurring. Figure 4-4 and figure 4-5, page 4-14, depict what a fully
developed deliberate vehicle fighting position might look like.
4-31. The terrain, the type of soil, and the water table influence the construction of vehicle fighting positions.
In many cases, the depth of soil to bedrock or to the water table prevents or hinders the construction of
positions. This concern may impact a specific vehicle position or an entire unit BP. Commanders must
sometimes consider the competing requirements of vehicle positions against the ability to excavate the
desired fighting positions. For units remaining in place for extended periods of time, measures must be taken
to prevent or mitigate erosion and drainage problems.

Figure 4-4. Hull defilade M1 tank position

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-13

Chapter 4

Figure 4-5. Fully developed deliberate fighting position

MARKING AND PROOFING

4-32. When fighting positions are planned, it is extremely important to mark the positions for recognition
during day and night and understand when and how the positions will be occupied. This maximizes the time
available for construction and ensures that the fighting positions meet the intent of the maneuver commander.
Maneuver and vehicle commanders mark the position and are then available when engineer assets begin
digging.
4-33. The vehicle commander is responsible for proofing the position with his vehicle for proper depth and
line of sight before releasing engineer assets to move to the next position. The vehicle commander or his
representative must remain present during the construction of the fighting position. Once the leader is
satisfied that the position meets standards and he can properly engage his sector, the engineer assets are
released for their next prioritized mission. It is the maneuver unit commander’s responsibility to ensure that
fighting positions are correctly sited, and it is the engineer commander’s responsibility to enforce
construction standards.

COMPANY AND BATTALION BATTLE POSITIONS

4-34. The creation of company and battalion size BPs involves the construction of numerous fighting and
protective positions to meet the commander’s intent for those particular sites. That intent links to the
defensive plan (see FM 3-90-1). Although engineers prioritize the engineer effort within the commander’s
guidance and construct fighting positions to standard, the maneuver unit sites each position and develops the
BP. The maneuver unit should designate a representative (typically the unit senior noncommissioned officer
[Army]/senior staff noncommissioned officer [Marine Corps] or executive officer) as the on-site point of
contact to guide the execution of the required engineer support. Because of the amount of time required,
engineers must begin digging as soon as possible and usually concurrently with the planning process. There
are five kinds of BPs: primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strong point. All BPs require
survivability and countermobility support, but the creation of a strong point requires significant time,
resources, and engineer effort. See FM 3-90-1 for more information.

4-14 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

EXCAVATION CAPABILITY PLANNING FACTORS

4-35. The basic excavation capabilities of the most likely survivability equipment supporting a
BCT/regimental combat team are shown in table 4-5. These planning factors may be further influenced by
the condition of the soil, terrain, weather, and weather-related effects; maintenance of the vehicles; personnel
availability; and other potential significant influences on their performance. One key variable is operator
experience. Inexperienced operators or limited visibility adds significant time requirements for planning
fighting positions. Planners must always factor in operator experience when planning survivability positions.

Table 4-5. Excavation capabilities of selected survivability equipment

Excavator Capability
Equipment (cubic yards per hour)
Banked Material Loose Material
Armored combat earthmover, M9 138 172
Scoop loader, 2.5 cubic yard 125 156
Tractor, full tracked, D3 50 60
Tractor, full tracked, D5 (Army)/MC1150 (Marine Corps) 150 170
D6K Light Tracked Bulldozer (Marine Corps) 143 204
Tractor, full tracked, D7 (Army)/MCT (Marine Corps) 165 211
HYEX 207 220
TRAM, 624K 125 156
DUECE D6 160 170
HMEE 66 66
BHL 30 40
Utility tractor 30 40
Note.
Rates are based on work performed in clayey sandy soil with an operator efficiency of 0.83, a 50-minute work hour, and
excavated soil being spread or dumped in the immediate vicinity of the excavation site.
Legend:
BHL backhoe loader
DUECE deployable universal combat earthmover
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator
HYEX hydraulic excavator
MCT medium crawler tractor
TRAM tractor, rubber-tired, articulated-steering, multipurpose

4-36. These capability estimates can be used to estimate the time required to excavate for various fighting
and protective positions in the event that other tables do not include the information necessary for a specific
vehicle or situation. In that event, it is necessary to estimate the size of the position required, the amount of
material to be moved, and the type of equipment used. NTRP 4-04.2.5/TM 3-34.42/AFPAM 32-1020/MCRP
3-17.7F provides additional information on estimated earthwork. Use TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-17.7I (which
provides estimated production rates, characteristics, operation techniques, and soil considerations for
earthmoving equipment) as a guide to selecting the most economical and effective equipment based on the
situation.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-15

Chapter 4

ARTILLERY POSITIONS
4-37. The same principles that apply to hasty individual and crew-served weapons positions also apply to
artillery positions when time, materials, and engineer equipment are limited. As time, materials, and engineer
equipment permit, artillery positions are improved with firing platforms and berm or revetment positions.

ARTILLERY-FIRING PLATFORM
4-38. Artillery-firing platforms for towed or self-propelled artillery weapons are necessary on soft ground
to preclude weapon relaying after each round is fired. The platform distributes the loads over a larger area
with no significant settlement and is flexible, level, and strong enough to withstand the turning and movement
of self-propelled weapons. The platform allows firing in all directions. Trail logs are anchored outside the
platform for towed weapons. For self-propelled weapons, the recoil spades are set in compacted, solid
material or in a layer of crushed rock around the platform. These positions provide limited protection with
the use of a berm or revetment.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SITE

4-39. Air defense artillery protects friendly forces and critical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and
surveillance. They are vulnerable to aerial, direct, and indirect fire attack. Constructed hardstands permit
survivability of emplaced launching systems by using three-sided earth berms while protecting personnel and
equipment from launcher backblast. Position dimensions also permit launcher reloading activities without
exposing the launcher to threats. See figure 4-6 for an example of a Patriot launcher station position.

Figure 4-6 Patriot launcher station protective and backblast berms

4-16 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

BERM OR REVETMENT POSITIONS

4-40. A berm or revetment position for field artillery provides improved protection from near-miss, indirect-
fire weapons effects and small-caliber direct fire. The berm is constructed with material removed from the
excavation and is built low enough to allow direct howitzer fire. It is usually necessary to stabilize the berm
to prevent deterioration caused by muzzle blast. The position is camouflaged with natural vegetation or
camouflage netting. Table 4-6 gives dimensions of positions for field artillery vehicles. Shelter construction
is necessary to provide adequate protection for the firing crew, fire direction center, and CP. Separate shelters
are necessary to contain an artillery section basic load of projectiles, fuzes, and propelling charges. If time
allows, firing positions, CPs, and fire direction centers are connected by trenches. See chapter 6 for
information about camouflage and concealment of survivability positions.
Table 4-6. Dimensions of field artillery vehicle positions
Dimension (feet)1 Other Information
Equip-
ment
Team Minimum
Vehicle Type Hours3 Berm
Dimension Depth/ Berm
Length (D7 Thickness Remarks
Width Height2,4
Dozer/ at Base
M9 (feet)
ACE/
MCT)
12 inches
120-mm 106 inches 82 inches (0.30 meters)/ 0.5
8 –
ERSS (M327) (2.7 meters) (2.1 meters) 9 inches hour
(0.23 meters)
Position
24 to 30 is circular
With tube in firing inches (0.61
position: 20 feet 9 with a
to 0.76 radius of
105-mm inches (6.32 meters) meters) (at 0 18 feet
towed 70 inches mils, bottom (5.49
1 hour 8
howitzer With tube in firing (1.78 meters) of muzzle meters)
(M119A2/A3) position and traversing brake is 34 to allow
handspike: 26 feet 1 inches [0.86 6400 mil
inch (7.95 meters) meters] off the traverse.
surface)

Position
is circular
Firing position: 424 with a
inches (10.83 meters) radius
(center traverse) 18 to 24 between
inches (0.46 240 and
to 0.61 348
Firing position: 420
155-mm 146 1/2 inches meters0 (at 0 inches
inches (10.21 meters) 8
towed (3.72 meters) mils, bottom 1.5 (6.10 to
(maximum traverse) (2.4
howitzer of muzzle hours 8.84
meters)
(M777) brake is 20 meters)
Firing position with inches [0.51 for 6,400
FAST traversing bar: meters] off the mil
420 inches (10.21 surface) traverse.
meters) (center Howitzer
traverse) pivots on
the left
wheel.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-17

Chapter 4

Table 4-6. Dimensions of field artillery vehicle positions (continued)

Dimension (feet)1 Other Information
Equip-
ment
Team Minimum
Vehicle Type Depth/ Berm
Dimension Hours3
Length Berm Thickness Remarks
Width (D7
Height2,4 at Base
Dozer/
(feet)
M9 ACE/
MCT)
63.5
inches
(1.61 Vehicle
meters) to remains
top of still and
Overall width deck the turret
155-mm (with baskets traverses
howitzer, self- forward): 154 121
Overall length (with inches (3.9
propelled baskets to rear): 423 inches Consider
(M109A6) and meters) (3.07 tiered
inches (10.7 meters)
M992A2 field Overall width meters) to – – positions,
artillery Overall length (with (with baskets top of
baskets forward): 392 if the
ammunition to rear): 128 turret situation
support inches (9.9 meters) inches (3.3 dictates,
vehicle meters) 143.1 and time
inches and
(3.64 blade
meters) to assets
top of permit.
machine
gun
72.5 Position
inches should
(1.84 be
meters) to circular
top of with a
deck 454 inch
(11.53
134.5 meter)
Overall width inches radius.
155-mm (with baskets (3.42 Only 800
howitzer self- Overall length (with to rear): 124 meters) mils left
propelled baskets to rear): 382 inches (3.1 to top of and right
(M109A7) inches (9.7 meters) meters) turret traverse.
M992A3 Field Beyond
Artillery Overall length (with Overall width 156.6 that
Ammunition baskets forward): 375 (with baskets inches howitzer
Support inches (9.5 meters) (3.9 must
forward): 154
Vehicle inches (3.9 meters) to pivot
meters) top of steer.
machine
gun Consider
tiered
191.25 positions,
inches if the
(4.86 situation
meters) dictates,
inches to and time

4-18 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

top of and
CROWS blade
(Note assets
M992A3 permit.
is 195.7
inches
[4.97
meters])
Patriot
launching Patriot
station, 100 foot support
guided 11 feet
100 foot interior with interior with systems
missile, semi- with 3 4.5
147 foot exterior berm 194 foot 47 feet use
trailer foot wide hours5
length exterior berm similar
mounted crown
length size
(M901/M902/ positions
M903)
Notes.
A dash indicates no data.
1
Position dimensions provide an approximate 3-foot clearance around the vehicle for movement and maintenance and do not
include ramps.
2
Total depth includes berm height.
3
Production rate is 100 bank cubic yards per 0.75 hour. Divide the construction time by 0.85 for rocky or hard soil, night
conditions, or closed-hatch operations (M9). The use of natural terrain features reduces construction time.
4
Depths are approximate and require adjustment for surrounding terrain and fields of fire.
5
Production rate is 600 loose cubic yards per hour with a 75 foot dozing distance, an average operator and a medium
dozer/dozer team with a universal or straight blade.

Legend:
ACE armored combat earthmover
ERSS Expeditionary Fire Support Center
MCT medium crawler tractor
mm millimeter

4-41. Emplacements for towed artillery systems are routinely constructed to increase weapons systems
survivability. These weapons systems are not as mobile as self-propelled systems and require increased
survivability measures. Emplacements for towed systems must provide maximum flexibility in the delivery
of fire and protect the weapon and crew against the effects of enemy fire. Those positions designed to allow
the towed systems to be used in a defensive direct-fire role have adjusted berm heights that allow firing at 0
mils elevation.
4-42. Trail logs may be necessary to overcome the weapons recoil while still providing the ability to traverse
the artillery piece. Trail logs are commonly constructed in a complete circle to allow the howitzer to pivot
360 degrees. In semipermanent installations, wooden decking may be placed on the floor of the emplacement
to assist in drainage and when traversing the howitzer. Protective positions with OHC are provided for the
personnel ready position and ammunition shelters (see figure 4-7, page 4-20, and figure 4-8, page 4-21).

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-19

Chapter 4

Legend:
cm centimeter
ft foot
in inch
m meter

Figure 4-7. Towed howitzer emplacement (105-millimeter and 155-millimeter howitzer) layout

4-20 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Fighting Positions

Legend:
cm centimeter
ft foot
m meter
mm millimeter

Figure 4-8. Towed howitzer completed emplacement

(105-millimeter and 155-millimeter howitzer)
4-43. Modern, self-propelled howitzers are designed to shoot during short halts. The ability to shoot and then
quickly reposition provides increased survivability for the weapons systems. Self-propelled howitzers may
be positioned on base camps to provide fire support to the local commander’s AO. Figure 4-9, page 4-22,
portrays a protected firing emplacement for self-propelled howitzers used in this role.
4-44. When positions for self-propelled artillery systems are prepared, a sloped ramp is built to facilitate
vehicle entry into and exit from the emplacement. Although the hull of the howitzer is protected, leaders must
ensure that berms and revetments are not constructed to a height that prohibits the howitzer from depressing
to the minimum elevation. This would prevent the weapons system from being used in the direct-fire role.
Barrel stops may be used, if necessary, to prevent fire into adjacent units. In temperate or tropical
environments, provisions must be made for drainage inside the emplacement.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 4-21

Chapter 4

Legend:
BF board foot gal gallon in inch
cm centimeter HE high explosives kg kilogram
cu cubic ICM improved lb pound
d penny conventional m meter
ea each munitions WP white
ft foot ILLUM illumination phosphorus
yd yard

Figure 4-9. Emplacement for 155-millimeter howitzer, self-propelled (M109 series)

(semipermanent installation)

4-22 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Chapter 5
Protective Positions
This chapter describes some general protection considerations for various sites and the
associated protective positions that may be located within an AO. A protective position
is one that has been specifically modified and enhanced to repel or minimize enemy
weapons effects against personnel, equipment, and facilities. Engineer planners
coordinate with the commander and other staff elements to develop the mission-
specific protection criteria during the orders planning sequence and by maintaining the
engineer running estimate. See GTA 90-01-011 for supporting information. This
chapter focuses on protective positions for vehicles, equipment, and personnel. Chapter
7 provides additional considerations for other critical assets. For information on the
camouflage and concealment of protective positions, see chapter 6.

VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE POSITIONS

5-1. Vehicle protective positions are constructed for vehicles and weapons systems that are not directly
engaged in providing fires against the enemy. These positions normally require extensive engineer assets and
construction materials to build. Unless separate OHC is constructed, these positions do not provide blast
protection from indirect-fire superquick, contact or delay-fuze shells. However, these positions do provide
medium artillery shell fragmentation protection from near-miss bursts greater than 5 feet from the position
and from direct-fire HEAT projectiles that are 120 millimeters or less.
5-2. A certain degree of protection can be obtained by using the terrain, such as draws, reverse slopes, and
urban terrain. These may provide protection by enhancing camouflage and concealment and providing
protection against blast and fragmentation. Constructed vehicle protective positions include berms,
revetments, and deep cut positions. These positions should be high enough to achieve the desired level of
protection, be large enough to accommodate the vehicle with work space around it, allow easy access, and
account for drainage. Deep cut positions may include cuts in hillsides or excavations that allow the vehicle
to be positioned below ground level.
5-3. Table 5-1 provides dimensions for protective positions for AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radar systems.
GTA 90-01-011 provides design information for protective positions with OHC for heavy expanded mobility
tactical trucks and palletized load systems. The design uses soil-filled containers and may be adapted for
other vehicles.
Table 5-1. Dimensions of protective positions for radar systems
Dimension Feet Other Information
Minimum
Depth Berm Platform, Ramp Berm
Dimension
Vehicle Type Length Height Height/Width/ Thickness
Width (feet) (feet) Entrance, Exit Slope at Base
(feet)
AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar
Shelter/
17 ft, 6 in 15 ft, 4 in 14 8 NA 3
HMMWV
Generator 22 ft 15 ft, 4 in 14 8 NA 3
8 to 10 ft/15 ft, 4 in/
Antenna Array 15 ft, 4 in 15 ft, 4 in 4 4 3
30 to 35 degrees

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Chapter 5

Table 5-1. Dimensions of protective positions for radar systems (continued)

Dimension Feet Other Information
Minimum
Berm Platform, Ramp Berm
Dimension Depth
Vehicle Type Length Height Height/Width/Entrance, Thickness
Width (feet) 1
(feet) 1 Exit Slope at Base
(feet)
AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Radar
Shelter/
17 ft, 6 in 15 ft, 4 in 14 8 NA 3
HMMWV
Prime Mover and
Reconnaissance 22 ft 20 ft 14 8 NA 3
Vehicle
Generator 17 ft, 6 in 16 ft 14 8 NA 3
Antenna Array 16 ft 16 ft 0 6 NA 3
AN/TPQ-50 Radar Set
M1152A1 16 ft 7 ft 2 in 6 ft 6 ft
NA 3
HMMWV (4.9 m) (2.2 m) (1.8 m) (1.8 m)
AN/TPQ-53 Radar Set
8 ft (2.5 m)
(outriggers
AN/TPY-3 Target 26 ft 11 in collapsed) 9 ft 9 in 9 ft 9 in
Acquisition NA 3
Subsystem (8.2 m) 16 ft (5 m) (3 m) (3 m)
(outriggers
extended)
AN/VPC-95 23 ft 2 in 6 ft 6 ft
Communications 8 ft (2.5 m) NA 3
System (7.1 m) (2.9 m) (2.9 m)

Legend:
ft foot
HMMWV high mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle
in inch
m meters
NA not applicable
Notes:
1 Depth and berm height combined for AN/TPQ-50, and TPQ-53 systems must total more than the top of the

mounting vehicle.

OBSERVATION POSTS AND PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

5-4. Shelters are primarily constructed to protect personnel, equipment, and supplies from enemy action
and the weather. Shelters differ from fighting positions because there are usually no provisions for firing
weapons from them. However, they are often constructed to supplement fighting positions. Observation posts
must also allow personnel to have clear observation of their assigned sector. As a result, the techniques
employed for fighting positions, bunkers, and towers (discussed in chapter 4) and for protective shelters
(discussed below) can be used to create effective observation posts, but they may require modification to
adapt to the requirement for observation.
5-5. When available, natural shelters (caves, mines, tunnels) are used instead of constructed shelters. Caves,
mines, tunnels, or storage bunkers used for extended periods should be checked for environmental health
hazards that may impact Soldier/Marine health, including ammunition residue, HAZMAT, and potential
disease-spreading vectors. Consult engineers to determine the suitability of caves and tunnels. The best
shelter is usually one that provides the most protection but requires the least amount of effort to construct.

5-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Protective Positions

Support troops; troops at a temporary halt due to inclement weather; and units in bivouacs, AAs, and rest
areas frequently prepare shelters. Construct these shelters with as much OHC as possible. Disperse them, and
limit them to a maximum capacity of about 25 personnel. Supply shelters are of any size, depending on
location, time, and materials available. Large shelters require additional camouflaged entrances and exits.

SOIL-FILLED CONTAINER SHELTERS AND OBSERVATION POSTS

5-6. Soil-filled containers can be used to build effective shelters and observation posts. GTA 90-01-011
provides design and construction information for several such structures, including an aboveground, 20-foot
military van personnel bunker, a small observation post, and a large observation post. Soil-filled container
observation posts are built directly on the ground or on raised structures to provide protected observation in
all directions. They have an increased level of survivability over plywood perimeter bunkers but require
additional engineer effort.

METAL CULVERT SHELTER

5-7. A metal culvert shelter (see figure 5-1) can be quickly constructed aboveground and is intended for
use in areas where personnel are billeted or work in conventional nonprotected buildings but need additional
survivability in case of attack. They may be placed outside high troop concentration areas, such as dining
facilities, billeting, or CPs. The shelter is 6 feet high and consists of two rows of 55-gallon drums with a
4-foot span between rows. A 2- by 4-inch stud, measuring 4 inches higher than the drums, is placed inside
each drum. The drums are filled with soil. A 2- by 8-inch top plate is connected to the studs lengthwise
through the bunker. Six-foot corrugated pipe halves are bolted to the plate and covered with soil and
sandbags, creating a 2-foot layer. Ends of the position are protected by soil bin walls, soil-filled drums, or
other materials. This shelter provides protection against mortars and small-caliber, direct-fire weapons.

Figure 5-1. Metal culvert shelter

METAL SHIPPING CONTAINER SHELTER

5-8. Large metal shipping containers (such as CONEXs) can be used to make effective shelters. These box-
shaped containers are 8-foot wide, 8.5-foot high, and 20-foot tall and can be converted into protective CPs,
communications shelters, troop shelters, or aid stations (see figure 5-2, page 5-4). The shelter can be
constructed aboveground, but it is most effective when constructed belowground, properly reinforced, and
covered with soil and sandbags. When constructing this type of buried shelter, it is critical that the CONEX

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Chapter 5

roof and walls be reinforced to support the weight of the additional load from soil or sandbags (see figure
5-3). The container corners are the primary load-bearing points and are stronger than the roof; therefore, just
inverting it may not allow enough support for OHC.

Figure 5-2. Belowground metal shipping container shelter

Figure 5-3. Metal container reinforcement assembly

TIMBER FRAME SHELTERS

5-9. Timber frame shelters are constructed from raw materials or prefabricated sets. They are designed to
provide protection from direct-fire weapons and indirect-fire fragmentation. These structures are most

5-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Protective Positions

effective when constructed belowground, but they do not provide adequate protection against direct hits from
indirect-fire weapons. Properly constructed OHC shields against contact burst weapons up to 82-millimeter
mortars. Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, pages 5-5 through 5-6, depict three examples of timber frame shelters.

Figure 5-4. Timber post buried shelter

Figure 5-5. Modular timber frame shelter

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 5-5

Chapter 5

Figure 5-6. Timber frame buried shelter

REHABILITATION AND UPGRADE OF EXISTING STRUCTURES

5-10. When occupying existing structures and buildings in the AO, several measures may be taken to
increase the survivability of personnel and equipment. Below are proven techniques that harden permanent
buildings. Many techniques previously discussed remain applicable, although the sequence of
implementation may change depending on the situation and availability of resources. Commanders should
consider these survivability techniques to help determine the priority of emplacement or implementation.
Techniques that increase the hardening of structures include—
 Establishing standoff from the occupied structure.
 Ditching and berming to mitigate blast effects.
 Establishing fighting positions and protective bunkers for personnel.
 Establishing ECPs.
 Covering doors and windows with screens or plywood to prevent observation inside the structure
and limit the entrance of munitions. When glass windows or doors must remain uncovered, they
should be protected with an approved reflective fragment retention film to minimize casualties
from flying glass.
 Applying blast protection fabrics and materials to interior walls to mitigate masonry wall
fragmentation (such as corrugated metal or geotextile fabric retrofits).
 Constructing predetonation roof and screens.

ACTIVE HARDENING MEASURES

5-11. Active hardening measures are those measures that involve a person or machine taking some action to
open, move, lower, or raise a device such as a gate, cable-beam barrier, bollard, or vehicle providing
protection from VBIED attack.

PASSIVE HARDENING MEASURES

5-12. Passive hardening measures are measures that remain static. These measures are effective without
movement. They reduce speed and channel traffic, increase standoff, and mitigate blast effects of possible
threats. Berms, ditches, concrete walls, and jersey barriers are examples of passive hardening measures. Other
types of passive measures include serpentine roadways and other speed-reduction devices.

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Chapter 6
Camouflage and Concealment
When existing concealment is insufficient, military forces can alter the physical
environment to provide or improve concealment for personnel and physical assets.
Similarly, they can employ camouflage to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy.
Camouflage and concealment are operational security measures used to protect
friendly forces and activities from threat detection in support of MILDEC. Camouflage
and concealment focus on providing protection from observation and surveillance.
This chapter describes types of sensors and principles and considerations for mitigating
them. It also provides various techniques for altering the physical environment that can
be employed for providing or improving camouflage and concealment.

THREAT OVERVIEW
6-1. Threat forces and elements employ a variety of sensors to detect and identify U.S. personnel,
equipment, and supporting installations. Sensors may be visual, near-infrared, infrared, ultraviolet (UV),
acoustic, or multispectral/hyperspectral. They may be employed by dismounted personnel or ground-, air-,
or space-mounted platforms. Such platforms are often capable of supporting multiple sensors. Friendly troops
rarely know all the specific sensor systems or combinations of systems that an enemy employs. Although
protection priorities should be based on which sensors an enemy is known to be using, friendly troops should
understand and seek to protect against all known threat surveillance systems. This section provides an
overview of the various types of sensors, while the rest of this chapter focuses on mitigation techniques that
involve altering the physical environment.

DATA COLLECTION
6-2. An enemy collects information about U.S. forces for two basic reasons—target acquisition and
intelligence production. Enemy weapons systems often have sensors that locate and identify targets at long
ranges in precise detail. Personnel and units should take actions to hinder the enemy target-acquisition
process. These actions include all practical camouflage and concealment activities expected to reduce the
identification of personnel, units, and facilities.
6-3. An enemy uses sensor systems to locate and identify large Army/Marine Corps formations and
headquarters and to predict their future activities. Enemy detection of support area activities, such as logistics
centers and communications nodes, may also reveal friendly intentions.
6-4. An enemy uses tactical reconnaissance to provide additional information on U.S. forces dispositions
and the terrain in which they will be operating. Enemy tactical reconnaissance also attempts to identify targets
for later attack by long-range artillery, rockets, aircraft, and ground forces.

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Chapter 6

SENSOR SYSTEMS
6-5. An enemy uses many different types of electronic surveillance equipment. Sensor systems are
classified according to the part of the EMS in which they operate. An enemy uses detection sensors that
operate in one of the following two modes:
 Active. Active sensors emit energy that reflects from targets and is recaptured by the emitting or
other nearby sensor, indicating the presence of a target. This provides a more precise location or
measurement with respect to the target. Examples of active sensors are searchlights and radar.
 Passive. Passive sensors do not emit energy; they collect energy, which may indicate the presence
of a target. Examples of passive sensors are the human eye, night vision devices, infrared imaging
devices, acoustic sensors, and photographic devices.

Visual Sensors
6-6. Visual sensors work in the parts of the EMS that are visible to the human eye. Enemy soldiers’ eyes
are the principle sensors on a battlefield. They may be aided by binoculars, telescopic sights, and image
intensifiers. Civilian populations, enemy agents, reconnaissance teams, and patrols are visual sensor systems
from the enemy’s intelligence viewpoint. Three types of enemy visual sensors are—
 Image intensifiers. Image intensifiers are passive night observation devices. They amplify the
low-level light that is present on even the darkest nights. These devices are used for surveillance
and as weapon sights on small arms and vehicles. Airborne platforms are also capable of
supporting image intensifiers.
 Low-light television. Low-light television combines image intensification with television
technology, and it is usually mounted on airborne platforms.
 Aerial reconnaissance, remote sensing, and imagery. Aerial photography, satellite imagery, and
video imagery allow image analysts to record and study visual information. These analysts then
produce target nomination lists that are, in effect, priority lists of targets in a given target scene.
Since analysts often need to make subjective determinations of the identity and/or importance of
a given target, the ranking of targets provides the defender with an opportunity to use camouflage
and concealment to impact an enemy target-prioritization process. Video systems allow
transmission of visual images to the ground while the manned aircraft, satellite, or UAS is still in
flight.

Near-Infrared Sensors
6-7. Near-infrared sensors operate at a greater wavelength but smaller frequency than visible light
wavelength of the EMS. Near-infrared energy reflects well from live vegetation but reflects better from dead
vegetation and most man-made materials. Near-infrared sensors, such as sights and periscopes, allow the
human eye to detect targets based on differences in their reflection of near-infrared energy. Near-infrared
sensors are partially blocked by fog, mist, and smoke operations, although not as completely as visual sensors.
Enemy combat vehicles use active near-infrared sensors that employ searchlights, scopes, and sights; but
these sensors are rapidly being replaced with image intensifiers and thermal gun sights.

Infrared Sensors
6-8. Infrared sensors detect the contrasts in heat energy that targets radiate on the battlefield and display
the contrasts as different colors or shades. Because longer-wavelength infrared radiation is more susceptible
to atmospheric absorption than near-infrared radiation, infrared sensors are less affected by typical
concentrations of fog or conventional smoke.

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Camouflage and Concealment

6-9. Differences in thermal mass and surface properties (reflectivity) of man-made and natural materials
result in target-to-background contrasts. These contrast levels change dramatically over a daily cycle. For
example, operating vehicles and generators, heated buildings and tents, and personnel are usually hotter than
their backgrounds. Also, equipment exposed to direct sunlight appears hotter than most natural backgrounds.
However, if equipment is treated with special emissivity coatings, it might appear cooler than its background
at night. Military equipment—particularly metallic equipment—generally heats up and cools off more
quickly than its background.
6-10. Sophisticated, passive infrared sensors (such as the forward-looking infrared system) can be mounted
on aircraft. Forward-looking infrared sensors provide aircrews and enemy ground forces with real-time
infrared imagery that is displayed on video monitors.
6-11. Reconnaissance aircraft often employ special infrared cameras to record temperature differences.
However, due to film processing, these systems are subject to time delays in obtaining the data. Newer
versions of this sensor produce non-film-based images.

Ultraviolet Sensors
6-12. UV refers to the part of the EMS with wavelengths shorter than visible light, but longer than X-rays.
UV sensors are more important in snow-covered areas because snow reflects UV energy well, while white
paints and man-made objects do not reflect UV energy very well. Photographic devices with simple UV
filters highlight military targets as dark areas against snow-covered backgrounds. These backgrounds require
specially designed camouflage that provides a high UV reflectance.

Radar
6-13. Radar uses high-frequency radio waves to penetrate atmospheric impediments (fog, mist, smoke).
Radar works by transmitting a very strong burst of radio waves and then receiving and processing the
reflected waves. In general, metal objects reflect radar waves well, while radar waves are weakly reflected
by, or pass through, most other objects. The shape and size of a metal object determine the strength of the
reflected signal. A large, metal object generally reflects more signal than a small object. Therefore, large,
metal objects can be detected from greater distances. The method by which the received radio wave is
processed determines the type of radar. Radar systems commonly used against ground forces on the
battlefield include—
 Ground moving target indicators. When an EM wave hits a moving target, the wave is reflected
and changes frequency. The faster the target moves, the larger the changes in frequency. The
simplest and most common battlefield radar detects this frequency change. Threat forces use
ground moving target indicators (GMTIs) for target acquisition. More sophisticated
developmental radar systems, which are comparable to the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System, use airborne surveillance platforms that downlink captured data to ground station modules
in near real time. Enemy ground-based operators are then able to manipulate the data, gain
heightened situational information, and forward the information to enemy command and control
nodes to enhance tactical decisionmaking.
 Imaging radar. Imaging radar receivers and processors are so sensitive that an image of the
detected target is displayed on a scope. Imaging radar, such as a side-looking airborne radar, is
generally used on airborne or space-borne platforms. An imaging radar typically does not provide
the same resolution as the forward-looking infrared systems and is less likely to be used for
terminal target acquisition.
 Countermortar and counterbattery radar. Countermortar and counterbattery radar usually
transmit two beams of energy that sweep above the horizon. An artillery or mortar round or a
rocket passing through the beams reflects two signals that are received and plotted to determine
the origin of the round.

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Chapter 6

Acoustic Sensors
6-14. An acoustic wave sensor is a device that measures sound levels. When an acoustic wave travels through
or along the surface of a material, it is affected by the different properties of that material. Any changes to
the characteristics of this path affect the wave velocity, amplitude, or both. These characteristics are translated
into a digital signal that can be used to locate targets. The three predominant types of acoustical detection
systems are—
 The human ear. Although the human ear is an effective acoustic sensor, visual confirmation is
usually preferred.
 Flash-sound ranging. Flash-sound ranging is used against artillery. Light travels faster than
sound, so enemy sound-ranging teams can determine the distance to a gun tube by accurately
measuring the time between seeing a muzzle flash and hearing the sound. If the sound is detected
by two or more teams, analysts plot the ranges using automated data-processing computers. The
target is located where the plots intersect.
 Ground-based microphone array. Ground-based microphone array systems allow listeners to
record acoustic signatures and accurately triangulate their positions.

Radio Sensors
6-15. Threat forces make a great effort to search for, detect, and locate the sources of U.S. radio
communications. They use various direction-finding techniques to locate opposing emitters. Once an emitter
is detected, an enemy can intercept the transmissions, jam or target the emitter for destruction, or take various
other electronic warfare actions. See FM 2-0 and MCWP 2-10 for more information on radio sensors.

Multispectral and Hyperspectral Imagery Sensors

6-16. Each object or material has a unique spectral signature, often in the portions of the EMS that are not
visible to the human eye. Multispectral and hyperspectral imagery capabilities simultaneously collect data in
different portions (both visible and nonvisible) of the EMS as described below:
 Multispectral. Multispectral imagery capabilities split the EMS into several distinct bands (less
than 100). A multispectral imagery sensor simultaneously collects two or more sets of information
in different portions of the EMS, which are then registered on the same format.
 Hyperspectral. Instead of splitting the EMS into several (less than 100) distinct bands,
hyperspectral imagery capabilities split it into hundreds of bands. Unlike the current multispectral
systems, hyperspectral imagery systems collect data continuously across the spectrum. The ability
to distinguish between substances based on their reflectance is greatly enhanced with a greater
number of bands.

Note. See ATP 3-11.50 for more information about sensors and the use of obscurants as
countermeasures against them.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT VERSUS THREAT SENSORS

6-17. Target acquisition can be accomplished by a variety of sensors that operate throughout the EMS. This
poses a challenge in camouflage and concealment planning and employment—determining which enemy
sensor(s) the camouflage and concealment activities should be designed to defeat. Unfortunately, no single
answer is correct for all situations. Unit commanders without specific guidance from higher echelons assess
their tactical situation and plan camouflage and concealment activities accordingly. If intelligence data
indicate that an enemy will use visual sensors for reconnaissance and target acquisition, then visual
countermeasures must be employed. For infrared or radar sensors, countermeasures that are effective in those
spectra must be employed. If a multispectral or hyperspectral threat is anticipated, camouflage and
concealment activities are conducted to protect a unit in its most vulnerable EM bandwidths. Very few
available camouflage materials or techniques provide complete broadband protection.

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Camouflage and Concealment

PRINCIPLES
6-18. To remain a viable force on the battlefield, units must understand the principles of camouflage and
concealment. To design and effectively integrate camouflage and concealment activities, personnel must
constantly consider an enemy’s point of view. (What will it see? What characteristics will its sensors detect?)
Placing a low priority on camouflage and concealment activities because of time constraints, minimal
resources, or inconvenience could result in mission failure and the unnecessary loss of life. Appendix F
contains more information on other camouflage considerations.
6-19. The primary goal of camouflage and concealment activities is to avoid enemy detection; however, this
is not always feasible. In some cases, camouflage and concealment activities may succeed by merely
preventing an enemy from identifying a target. Simply avoiding identification is often sufficient to increase
survivability. The principles described in this section have proven effective for avoiding detection and
identification.

IDENTIFY THE THREAT

6-20. Obtain as much information as possible about an enemy surveillance capability. IPB should—
 Include the sensors that an enemy may use in a particular AO.
 Determine the environmental impact on enemy surveillance capabilities, including but not limited
to mission variables of terrain, weather, time, and civil considerations.
 Include information on enemy tactical employment of the sensors and most likely COA, if
possible.
 Assess the impact of enemy surveillance potential on the target under consideration. This
assessment varies with the relative positions of the sensor and the target on the battlefield, the role
of the target, and the physical characteristics of the sensor and the target.

AVOID DETECTION BY ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE

6-21. Sophisticated sensors often have narrow fields of view. Furthermore, sensors can be very expensive
and are unlikely to be deployed in such numbers as to enable coverage of the entire battlefield at all times.
Sophisticated sensors are most likely to be deployed in those areas where an enemy suspects that friendly
targets are deployed. The enemy may suspect that an area contains targets because of detection by less
sophisticated, wider-coverage sensors or because of tactical analysis. Therefore, an important aspect of
remaining undetected is to avoid detection by routine enemy surveillance.
6-22. Many sensors operate as well at night as they do during the day. Therefore, darkness does not provide
effective protection from surveillance. Passive sensors are very difficult to detect, so assume that they are
being used at night. Do not allow antidetection efforts to lapse during the hours of darkness. For example,
conceal spoil while excavating a fighting position, even at night. Certain types of obscurants also defeat night
vision devices.

TAKE COUNTERMEASURES
6-23. In some cases, it might be appropriate to take action against identified enemy sensors. The ability to
deploy countermeasures depends on a number of factors: the effective range of friendly weapons, the distance
to enemy sensors, and the relative cost in resources versus the benefits of preventing enemy use of the sensor.
An additional factor to consider is that the countermeasure may provide an enemy with an indication of
friendly intentions.

EMPLOY REALISTIC CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES

6-24. The more closely a target resembles its background, the more difficult it is for an enemy to distinguish
between the two. Adhering to this fundamental principle of camouflage and concealment requires awareness
of the surroundings, proper camouflage and concealment skills, and the ability to identify target EM
signatures detected by enemy sensors.

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Chapter 6

Visual Sensors
6-25. The most plentiful, reliable, and timely enemy sensors are visual. Therefore, effective camouflage and
concealment techniques in the visual portion of the EMS are extremely important. Something that cannot be
seen is often difficult to detect, identify, and target. Field uniforms, standard camouflage screening paint
patterns, ULCANS, and battlefield obscurants provide effective camouflage and concealment against visual
sensors. Full-coverage camouflage and concealment help to avoid visual detection by the enemy. When time
is short, apply camouflage and concealment first to protect the target from the most likely direction of
attack—then treat the remainder of the target as time allows.

Near-Infrared Sensors
6-26. Near-infrared sights are effective at shorter ranges (typically up to 900 meters [984 yards]) than enemy
main guns. While red filters help preserve night vision, they cannot prevent near-infrared sensors from
detecting light from long distances. Therefore, careful light discipline is an important countermeasure to near-
infrared sensors and visual sensors (such as image intensifiers). ULCANS, battlefield obscurants, standard
camouflage screening paint patterns, and certain uniforms are designed to help defeat near-infrared sensors.

Infrared Sensors
6-27. Natural materials and terrain shield heat sources from infrared sensors and break up the shape of cold
and warm military targets viewed on infrared sensors. Do not raise vehicle hoods to break windshield glare
because this exposes a hot spot for infrared detection. Even if the infrared system is capable of locating a
target, the identity of the target can still be disguised. Avoid building unnecessary fires. Use vehicle heaters
only when necessary. ULCANSs, infrared-defeating obscurants, chemical-resistant paints, and certain
uniforms are designed to help break up infrared signatures, but they do not defeat infrared sensors.

Ultraviolet Sensors
6-28. Enemy use of UV sensors poses a significant threat in snow-covered areas. Winter paint patterns, the
arctic-style LCSS, and terrain masking are critical means for defending against these sensors. Any kind of
smoke defeats UV sensors. Field-expedient countermeasures, such as constructing snow walls, also provide
a means of defeating UV sensors.

Radar
6-29. Enemies use GMTI, imaging, countermortar, and counterbattery radar. Mission dictates the appropriate
defense, while techniques depend on the equipment available.
6-30. GMTI radar is a threat to ground forces near a battle area. Radar-reflecting metal on uniforms has been
reduced, and helmets and body armor are now radar-transparent. Plastic canteens are standard issue, and
buttons and other nonmetal fasteners have replaced metal snaps on most field uniforms to minimize their
vulnerability to detection by GMTI radar.
6-31. Personnel carry metal objects (ammunition, magazines, weapons) to accomplish the mission, and most
radar can detect these items. Therefore, movement discipline is very important. Moving by covered routes
(terrain masking) prevents radar detection. Slow, deliberate movements across areas exposed to radar
coverage helps avoid detection by GMTI radar.
6-32. Vehicles are large, radar-reflecting targets; and a skilled GMTI operator can identify vehicle type.
Moving vehicles can be detected by GMTI radar from 20 kilometers (12.43 miles), but traveling by covered
routes helps protect against surveillance.

6-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Camouflage and Concealment

6-33. Imaging radar generates two-dimensional images of landscapes and land features. Concealing vehicles
behind earth, masonry walls, or dense foliage effectively screens them from imaging radar. Light foliage may
provide complete visual concealment; however, it is sometimes totally transparent to imaging radar. When
properly deployed, the ULCANS effectively scatters the beam of imaging radar. Because of the level of
resolution, imaging radar is generally insufficient to detect individual personnel. See appendix F for more
information.
6-34. Radar is subject to overload. It is very effective and accurate when tracking single rounds; however, it
cannot accurately process data on multiple (four or more) rounds that are fired simultaneously. Chaff may
also be effective against countermortar and counterbattery radar if it is placed near the radar.

Acoustic Sensors
6-35. Noise discipline defeats detection by the human ear. Pyrotechnics or loudspeakers can screen noise,
cover inherently noisy activities, and confuse sound interpretation. However, they may also attract
attention—revealing that something is going on—similar to the use of smoke.
6-36. It is possible to confuse an enemy by screening flashes or sounds. Explosives or pyrotechnics, fired a
few hundred meters from a battery position within a second of firing artillery, effectively confuse sound-
ranging teams. Coordinating fire with adjacent batteries (within 2 seconds) can also confuse enemy sound-
ranging teams.

Radio Sensors
6-37. The best ways to prevent an enemy from locating radio transmitters is to minimize transmissions,
protect transmissions from enemy interception, and practice good radiotelephone-operator procedures.
Preplanning message traffic, transmitting as quickly as possible, and using alternate communication means
when possible ensure that transmissions are minimized. To prevent the enemy from intercepting radio
communications, change the radio frequencies and use low-power transmissions, terrain masking, or
directional or short-range antennas.

MINIMIZE MOVEMENT
6-38. Movement attracts enemy attention and produces a number of signatures (tracks, noise, hot spots, dust).
In operations that inherently involve movement (such as offensive tasks), plan, discipline, and manage
movement so that signatures are reduced as much as possible.

USE DECOYS
6-39. A decoy as an imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon which is intended to deceive
enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation (JP 3-13.4). Effective decoy use confuses an enemy
and can divert enemy resources into reporting or engaging false targets. An enemy who mistakenly identifies
decoys as real targets is less inclined to search harder for the actual, well-hidden targets. The keys to
convincing an enemy that the decoy is the real target are—
 Decoy fidelity (realism), which refers to how closely the multispectral decoy signature represents
the target signature.
 Deployment location, which refers to whether or not a decoy is deployed so that the enemy
recognizes it as typical for that target type. For example, a decoy tank is not properly located if it
is placed in the middle of a lake.
6-40. A high-fidelity decoy in a plausible location often fools an enemy into believing that it has acquired
the real target. However, deploying low-fidelity decoys carries an associated risk. If an enemy observes a
decoy and immediately recognizes it as such, it searches harder for the real target because decoys are
generally deployed in the same vicinity as the real targets. Deploy plausible, high-fidelity decoys that are
specifically designed to draw enemy fire away from real targets that closely represent the multispectral
signatures of the real targets. Properly deployed decoys have been proven in operational employment and
experimental field tests to be among the most effective items for camouflage and concealment.

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Chapter 6

AVOID OPERATIONAL PATTERNS

6-41. An enemy can often detect and identify different types of units or operations by analyzing the signature
patterns that accompany their activities. For example, an offensive is usually preceded by the forward
movement of engineer obstacle reduction assets, POL, and ammunition. Such movements are very difficult
to conceal; therefore, as an alternative, the pattern of resupply can be modified. An enemy recognizes
repetitive use of the same camouflage and concealment techniques.

APPLY RECOGNITION FACTORS

6-42. To camouflage effectively, continuously consider the threat viewpoint. Prevent patterns in
antidetection countermeasures by applying the following recognition factors to tactical situations. These
factors describe a target’s contrast with its background. If possible, collect multispectral imagery to determine
which friendly target signatures are detectable to enemy sensors.

Reflectance
6-43. Reflectance is the amount of energy returned from a target’s surface compared to the energy striking
the surface. Reflectance is generally described in the following three ways, according to the part of the EMS
in which the reflection occurs:
 Visual reflectance. Visual reflectance is characterized by the color of a target. Color contrast can
be important, particularly at close ranges and in homogeneous background environments, such as
snow or desert terrain. The longer the range, the less important color becomes. At very long ranges,
colors tend to merge into a uniform tone. Also, the human eye cannot discriminate color in poor
light.
 Temperature reflectance. Temperature reflectance is the thermal energy reflected by a target
(except when the thermal energy of a target is self-generated, as in the case of a hot engine).
Infrared imaging sensors measure and detect differences in temperature-reflectance levels (known
as thermal contrast).
 Radar-signal reflectance. Radar-signal reflectance is the part of the incoming radio waves that
is reflected by a target. Radar sensors detect differences in a target’s reflected radar return and that
of the background. Since metal is an efficient radio-wave reflector and metals are still an integral
part of military equipment, radar return is an important reflectance factor.

Shape
6-44. Natural background is random, and most military equipment has regular features with hard, angular
lines. Even an erected camouflage net takes on a shape with straight-line edges or smooth curves between
support points. An enemy can easily see silhouetted targets, and its sensors can detect targets against any
background unless their shape is disguised or disrupted. Size, which is implicitly related to shape, can also
distinguish a target from its background.

Shadow
6-45. Shadow can be divided into the following two types:
 Cast shadow. A cast shadow is a silhouette of an object projected against its background. It is the
more familiar type of shadow and can be highly conspicuous. In desert environments, a shadow
cast by a target can be more conspicuous than the target itself.
 Contained shadow. A contained shadow is the dark pool that forms in a permanently shaded area.
Examples are the shadows under the track guards of an armored fighting vehicle, inside a slit
trench, inside an open cupola, or under a vehicle. Contained shadows show up much darker than
their surroundings and are easily detected by an enemy.

Movement
6-46. Movement always attracts attention against a stationary background. Slow, regular movement is
usually less obvious than fast, erratic movement.

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Camouflage and Concealment

Noise
6-47. Noise and acoustic signatures produced by military activities and equipment are recognizable to the
enemy. The pitch, loudness, and tone of sounds can be used to identify the nature, origin, and exact location
of their sources.

Texture
6-48. A rough surface appears darker than a smooth surface, even if both surfaces are the same color. For
example, vehicle tracks change the texture of the ground by leaving clearly visible track marks. This is
particularly true in undisturbed or homogeneous environments, such as a desert or virgin snow, where vehicle
tracks are highly detectable. In extreme cases, the texture of glass or other very smooth surfaces causes a
shine that acts as a beacon. Under normal conditions, very smooth surfaces stand out from the background.
Therefore, eliminating shine must be a high priority in camouflage and concealment.

Patterns
6-49. Rows of vehicles and stacks of war materiel create equipment patterns that are easier to detect than
random patterns of dispersed equipment. Equipment patterns should be managed to use the surroundings for
vehicle and equipment dispersal. However, equipment dispersal should not be implemented in such a way
that it reduces the unit ability to accomplish a mission.
6-50. Equipment paint patterns often differ considerably from background patterns. The critical relationships
that determine the contrast between a piece of equipment and its background are the distance between the
observer and the equipment and the distance between the equipment and its background. Because these
distances usually vary, it is difficult to paint equipment with a pattern that always allows it to blend with its
background. As such, no single pattern is prescribed for all situations. Field observations provide the best
match between equipment and background.
6-51. The overall terrain pattern and the signatures produced by military activity on the terrain are important
recognition factors. If the unit is to remain unnoticed, it must match the signatures produced by stationary
equipment, trucks, and other activities with the terrain pattern. Careful attention must also be paid to vehicle
tracks and their effect on the local terrain during unit ingress, occupation, and egress.

CONSIDER AVOIDANCE IN SITE SELECTION

6-52. Site selection is extremely important because the location of personnel and equipment can eliminate
or reduce recognition factors. If a tank is positioned so that it faces probable enemy sensor locations, the
thermal signature from its hot engine compartment should be minimized. If a vehicle is positioned under
foliage, the exhaust disperses and cools as it rises, reducing its thermal signature and blending it more closely
with the background. Placing equipment in defilade positions prevents detection by ground-mounted radar.
Many factors govern site selection and should be addressed in a composite fashion.
6-53. The mission is the most important factor in site selection. A particular site may be excellent from a
camouflage and concealment standpoint, but the site is useful only if the mission is accomplished. If a site is
so obvious that the enemy acquires and engages a target before mission accomplishment, the site was poorly
selected from the beginning. Survivability operations are a part of most missions, so commanders must first
evaluate the worthiness of a site with respect to mission accomplishment and then consider camouflage and
concealment.
6-54. Dispersion requirements dictate the size of a site. A site has limited usefulness if it does not permit
enough dispersal for survivability and effective operations.

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Chapter 6

6-55. Every type of terrain—even a flat desert—has a discernible pattern. Terrain features can blur or conceal
the signatures of military activity. By using terrain features, camouflage and concealment effectiveness can
be enhanced without relying on additional materials. The primary factor to consider is whether using the site
disturbs the terrain pattern enough to attract enemy attention. The goal is not to disturb the terrain pattern at
all. Any change in an existing terrain pattern indicates the presence of activity. Terrain patterns have
distinctive characteristics that are necessary to preserve. The five general terrain patterns are—
 Agricultural. Agricultural terrain has a checkerboard pattern when viewed from aircraft. This is
a result of the different types of crops and vegetation found on most farms.
 Urban. Urban terrain is characterized by uniform rows of housing with interwoven streets and
interspersed trees and shrubs.
 Wooded. Woodlands are characterized by natural, irregular features without geometric patterns.
 Barren. Barren terrain presents an uneven, irregular work of nature without defined patterns.
Desert environments are examples of barren terrain.
 Arctic. Arctic terrain is characterized by snow and ice coverage.

USE CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT DISCIPLINE

6-56. Camouflage and concealment discipline avoids activities that change the appearance of an area or
reveal the presence of military equipment. Camouflage and concealment discipline is a continuous necessity
that applies to every Soldier/Marine. If the prescribed visual and audio routines of camouflage and
concealment discipline are not observed, the entire camouflage and concealment effort may fail. Vehicle
tracks, spoil, and debris are the most common signs of military activity. Their presence can negate efforts of
proper placement and concealment. Units and personnel must continually reassess and improve their
camouflage and concealment.
6-57. Camouflage and concealment discipline denies an enemy the indications of unit location or activities
by minimizing disturbances to a target area. To help maintain unit viability, a unit must integrate all available
camouflage and concealment means into a cohesive plan. Camouflage and concealment discipline involves
regulating light, heat, noise, spoil, trash, and movement. Successful camouflage and concealment discipline
depends largely on the actions of individual personnel. Some of these actions may not be easy on a
Soldier/Marine, but failure to observe camouflage and concealment discipline could defeat the camouflage
and concealment efforts of an entire unit and possibly impact unit survivability and mission success.
6-58. SOPs that prescribe camouflage and concealment procedures aid in enforcing camouflage and
concealment discipline, and they should—
 List specific responsibilities for enforcing established camouflage and concealment
countermeasures and discipline.
 Detail procedures for individual and unit conduct in AAs or other situations that may apply to the
specific unit.
6-59. Units should have frequent camouflage and concealment battle drills. Camouflage and concealment
discipline is a continuous requirement that calls for strong leadership, which produces a disciplined
camouflage and concealment consciousness throughout the entire unit. Appendix E contains additional
guidance for incorporating camouflage and concealment considerations into a unit SOP.

Light and Heat Discipline

6-60. Though important at all times, light and heat discipline is crucial at night. As long as visual observation
remains a primary reconnaissance method, concealing light signatures remains an important camouflage and
concealment countermeasure. Lights that are not blacked out at night can be observed at great distances. For
example, the human eye can detect campfires from a distance of 8 kilometers (4.97 miles) and vehicle lights
from 20 kilometers (12.43 miles). Threat surveillance can also be used to detect heat from engines, stoves,
and heaters from great distances. When moving at night, vehicles in the forward combat area should use
ground guides and blackout lights. When the use of heat sources is unavoidable, use terrain masking, exhaust
baffling, and other techniques to minimize thermal signatures of fires and stoves.

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Camouflage and Concealment

Noise
6-61. Individuals should avoid or minimize actions that produce noise. For example, muffle generators by
using shields or terrain masking or place them in defilade positions. Communications personnel should
operate equipment at the lowest possible level that allows them to be heard and understood. Depending on
the terrain and atmospheric conditions, noise can travel great distances and reveal a unit position to an enemy.

Spoil
6-62. The prompt and complete policing of debris and spoil is an essential camouflage and concealment
consideration. Proper spoil discipline removes a key signature of a unit’s current or past presence in an area.

Track
6-63. Vehicle tracks are clearly visible from the air, particularly in selected terrain. Therefore, track and
movement discipline is essential. Use existing roads and tracks as much as possible. When using new paths,
ensure that they fit into the existing terrain pattern. Minimize, plan, and coordinate movement; and take full
advantage of cover and dead space.

TECHNIQUES
6-64. Camouflage and concealment are essential parts of tactical operations. Integrate them into mission
variables analyses for consideration during the IPB process at all echelons. Camouflage and concealment are
primary considerations when planning for survivability. The skillful use of camouflage and concealment
techniques is necessary if a unit is to conceal itself and survive. A general knowledge of camouflage and
concealment methods and techniques also allows friendly troops to better recognize camouflage and
concealment when the enemy uses them. Table 6-1 lists the five general techniques of employing camouflage
and concealment—hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying.
Table 6-1. Camouflage and concealment techniques

Sensor Systems
Techniques
Optical Thermal Radar
Chaff
Earth cover Earth cover
Earth cover
Earth embankments Earth embankments
Earth embankments
Vegetation Vegetation
Hiding Vegetation
ULCANS ULCANS
Nets
Screens Screens
Radar-absorbing material
Obscurants Obscurants
ULCANS
Thermal paint
Paint Foam
Vegetation
Foam Air conditioning/heating
ULCANS
Lights Vegetation
Blending Radar-absorbing material
Vegetation ULCANS
Reshaping
ULCANS Textured mats
Textured mats
Textured mats Water
Insulation

Reshaping
Reshaping
Disguising Paint Corner reflectors
Paint
ULCANS

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Chapter 6

Table 6-1. Camouflage and concealment techniques (continued)

Sensor Systems
Techniques
Optical Thermal Radar

Camouflage sails
False operating surface
Pyrotechnics
Smudge pots Flares Chaff
Disrupting
Balloons Obscurants Corner reflectors
Strobe lights
Tracer simulators
Obscurants

Decoy target (pneumatic or Decoy target

Decoy target
rigid structures) Flares
Decoying Corner reflectors
Lights Air conditioning/heating
Signal generators
Obscurants Obscurants
Legend:
ULCANS Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net System

HIDING
6-65. The hiding technique screens a target from enemy sensors. The target is undetected because a barrier
hides it from a sensor’s view. Every effort should be made to hide all operations; this includes using
conditions of limited visibility for movement and terrain masking. Examples of hiding include—
 Concealing mines/munitions and their dispensers (except deployed scatterable mines).
 Placing vehicles beneath tree canopies.
 Placing equipment in defilade positions.
 Covering vehicles and equipment with nets.
 Hiding roads and obstacles with linear screens.
 Using battlefield obscurants, such as smoke.

BLENDING
6-66. The blending technique alters target appearance so that it appears to become a part of the background.
Generally, it involves arranging or applying camouflage material on, over, and/or around a target to reduce
its contrast with the background. Characteristics to consider when blending include the terrain patterns in the
vicinity and the target size, shape, texture, color, EM signature, and background. Blending can also be
accomplished by terrain mottling, which involves scarring the earth with bulldozers to create darker areas on
which to place equipment for better blending with the background. (Ensure that mottled areas are irregularly
shaped and at least twice the size of the equipment being concealed. Place the equipment off center in the
mottled area, and drape it with camouflage nets. Dig two to three times as many scars as pieces of equipment
being concealed. Doing this prevents the mere presence of mottled areas from giving away a unit location.)

DISGUISING
6-67. The disguising technique applies materials on a target to mislead the enemy as to its true identity.
Disguising changes a target appearance so that it resembles something of lesser or greater significance. For
example, a missile launcher might be disguised to resemble a cargo truck, or a large building might be
disguised to resemble two small buildings.

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Camouflage and Concealment

DISRUPTING
6-68. The disrupting technique alters or eliminates regular patterns and target characteristics. Disrupting
techniques include pattern painting, deploying camouflage nets over selected portions of a target, and using
shape disrupters (such as camouflage sails) to eliminate regular target patterns.

DECOYING
6-69. The decoying technique deploys a false or simulated target within a target scene or in a position where
the enemy might conclude that it has found the correct target. Decoys generally draw fire away from real
targets. Depending on their fidelity and deployment, decoys greatly enhance survivability.

NATURAL CONDITIONS
6-70. Properly using terrain and weather is a first priority when employing camouflage and concealment.
Cover provided by the terrain and by conditions of limited visibility is often enough to conceal units. The
effective use of natural conditions minimizes the resources and the time devoted to camouflage and
concealment. The terrain concealment properties are determined by the number and quality of natural screens,
terrain patterns, and the type and size of targets.

FORESTS
6-71. Forests generally provide the best type of natural screen against optical reconnaissance, especially if
the crowns of the trees are wide enough to prevent aerial observation of the ground. Forests with undergrowth
also hinder ground observation. Deciduous (leafing) forests are not as effective during the months when trees
are bare, while coniferous (evergreen) forests preserve their concealment properties all year. When possible,
unit movements should be made along roads and gaps that are covered by tree crowns. Shade should be used
to conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel from aerial observation.

OPEN TERRAIN
6-72. Limited visibility is an especially important concealment tool when conducting operations in open
terrain. However, the threat conducts reconnaissance with a combination of night-surveillance devices, radar,
infrared sensors, and terrain illumination. When crossing open terrain during limited visibility, consider
supplementing concealment with smoke—if the risk of attracting the attention is acceptable.

DEAD SPACE
6-73. Units should not locate or move along the topographic crests of hills or other locations where they are
silhouetted against the sky. They should use reverse slopes of hills, ravines, embankments, and other terrain
features as screens to avoid detection by ground-mounted sensors. IPB concealment and terrain overlays
should identify areas of dead space. If overlays are not available, use the line-of-sight method to identify
areas of dead space. See TC 3-25.26 for more details.

WEATHER
6-74. Conditions of limited visibility (fog, rain, snowfall) hamper reconnaissance by optical sensors. Dense
fog is impervious to visible sensors and some thermal sensors, making many threat night-surveillance devices
unusable. Dense fog and clouds are impenetrable to thermal sensors (infrared). Rain, snow, and other types
of precipitation hinder optical, thermal, and radar sensors.

SMOKE
6-75. Smoke is an effective camouflage and concealment tool when used by itself or with other camouflage
and concealment tools. It can change the dynamics of a battle by blocking or degrading the spectral bands
that an enemy target-acquisition and weapons systems use, including optical and thermal bands. See
ATP 3-11.50 for more information on planning smoke operations.

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Chapter 6

6-76. Commanders must be able to evaluate natural conditions in their area to effectively direct unit
concealment. They must know the terrain and weather conditions before mission execution. In addition to
IPB terrain overlays, weather reports, and topographic maps, commanders should use aerial photographs,
reconnaissance information, and information gathered from local inhabitants to determine the natural
concealment properties of the terrain.

MATERIALS
6-77. Using natural conditions and materials is the first priority for camouflage and concealment, but using
man-made materials can greatly enhance camouflage and concealment efforts. Available materials include
pattern-painted equipment, ULCANS, vegetation, expedient paint, radar-absorbing paint, radar-absorbing
material, battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt), decoys, and false operating surfaces. See
appendix F for information on acquiring camouflage and concealment materials through the supply system.

PATTERN PAINT
6-78. Pattern-painted equipment blends well with the background and can be hidden from optical sensors
better than equipment painted with a solid, subdued color. Pattern-painted equipment enhances antidetection
by reducing shape, shadow, and color signatures. Improved paints also help avoid detection by reducing
target reflectance levels in the visible and infrared portions of the EMS. The result is an item of equipment
that blends better with its background when viewed by threat sensors. While a patterned paint scheme is most
effective in static positions, it also tends to disrupt aim points on a moving target.

CAMOUFLAGE NETS
6-79. The ULCANS is the standard Army/Marine Corps camouflage net currently available, and it can be
ordered through normal unit supply channels (see appendix F). The ULCANS reduces a vehicle’s visual,
near-infrared, and radar signatures. Stainless steel fibers in the ULCANS material absorb some of the radar
signal and reflect most of the remaining signal in all directions. The result is a small percentage of signal
return to the radar for detection. The radar-scattering capabilities of the ULCANS are effective only if there
is at least 2 feet of space between the ULCANS and the camouflaged equipment and if the ULCANS
completely covers the equipment. Do not place a radar-scattering net over a radar antenna, because it
interferes with transmission. The ULCANS is also available in a radar-transparent model. Do not mix radar-
scattering with radar-transparent ULCANS, or radar antenna may not work properly. See
TM 5-1080-250-12&P for more information.
6-80. The different ULCANS color patterns are desert and woodland, each with a radar-scattering or radar-
transparent model. For arctic environments, units must still use the LCSS until ULCANS becomes available
in an arctic pattern. Each side of each ULCANS/LCSS has a slightly different pattern to allow for seasonal
variations. Both the ULCANS and LCSS use modular construction that allows the coverage of various sizes
of equipment. Appendix F discusses the required components and the instructions for assembling
ULCANS/LCSS structures for different sizes of equipment.

VEGETATION
6-81. Use branches and vines to temporarily conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel. Attach vegetation
to equipment with camouflage foliage brackets, spring clips, or expedient means (such as plastic tie-wraps).
Use other foliage to complete the camouflage or to supplement natural-growing vegetation. Also use cut
foliage to augment other artificial camouflage and concealment materials, such as branches placed on an
ULCANS to break up its outline. Be careful when placing green vegetation, because the underside of leaves
presents a lighter tone in photographs. Replace cut foliage often, because it wilts and changes color rapidly.
During training exercises, ensure that cutting vegetation and foliage does not adversely affect the natural
environment. Coordinate with local authorities.

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Camouflage and Concealment

6-82. Living vegetation can be obtained in most environments, and its color and texture make it a good
blending agent. However, foliage requires careful maintenance to keep the material fresh and in good
condition. If branches are not placed in their proper growing positions, they may reveal friendly positions to
enemy observers. Cutting large amounts of branches can also reveal friendly positions, so cut all vegetation
away from target areas.
6-83. Living vegetation presents a chlorophyll response at certain near-infrared wavelengths. As cut
vegetation wilts, it loses color and its near-infrared blending properties, which are related to the chlorophyll
response. Replace cut vegetation regularly, because over time it becomes a detection cue rather than an
effective concealment technique.
6-84. Use dead vegetation (dried grass, hay, straw, branches) for texturing. It provides good blending
qualities if the surrounding background vegetation is also dead. Dead vegetation is usually readily available
and requires little maintenance; however, it is flammable. Due to the absence of chlorophyll response, dead
vegetation offers little camouflage and concealment against near-infrared sensors and hyperspectral sensors
operating in the infrared regions.
6-85. When selecting foliage for camouflage and concealment, consider the following:
 Coniferous vegetation is preferred to deciduous vegetation because it maintains a valid chlorophyll
response longer after being cut.
 Foliage cut during periods of high humidity (at night, during a rainstorm, or when there is fog or
heavy dew) wilts more slowly.
 Foliage with leaves that feel tough to the fingers and branches with large leaves are preferred
because they stay fresher longer.
 Branches that grow in direct sunlight are tougher and stay fresher longer.
 Branches that are free of disease and insects do not wilt as rapidly.

NONSTANDARD MATERIALS
6-86. While standard-issue camouflage materials (ULCANS) exhibit an artificial chlorophyll response at
selected near-infrared wavelengths, nonstandard materials (sheets, tarps) are not likely to exhibit such a
response. Therefore, they do not blend well with standard camouflage and concealment material or natural
vegetation. Use nonstandard materials only as camouflage and concealment treatments against visual threat
sensors, not against near-infrared or hyperspectral threat sensors.

EXPEDIENT PAINT
6-87. Use earth, sand, and gravel to change or add color, provide a coarse texture, simulate cleared spots or
blast marks, and create shapes and shadows. Mud makes an excellent field-expedient paint for toning down
bright, shiny objects (glass, bayonets, watches). Add clay (in mud form) of various colors to motor oil to
produce a field-expedient paint. Table 6-2, page 6-16, provides instructions on how to mix soil-based
expedient paints. Use surface soils to mimic natural surface color and reflectivity.

CAUTION
Expedient paint containing motor oil should be used with extreme
caution due to possible health and environmental hazards.

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Chapter 6

Table 6-2. Expedient paints

Paint Materials Mixing Color Finish

Earth, soap, water, Mix soot with paraffin, add to a solution of 8

soot, paraffin gallons of water and 2 bars of soap (roughly 8 Dark gray Flat, lusterless
ounces), and stir in earth.

Oil, clay, water, Mix 2 gallons of water with 1 gallon of oil and Glossy on
Depends on
gasoline, earth ¼ to ½ gallon of clay, add earth, and thin with metal, otherwise
earth colors
gasoline or water. dull

Oil, clay, soap, water, Mix 1½ bars of soap with 3 gallons of water, Glossy on
Depends on
earth add 1 gallon of oil, stir in 1 gallon of clay, and metal, otherwise
earth colors
add earth for color. dull

Note.
Use canned milk or powdered eggs to increase the binding properties of field-expedient paints.

RADAR-ABSORBING MATERIAL
6-88. Radar-absorbing material was designed for placement on valuable military equipment. It absorbs radar
signals that are transmitted in selected threat wave bands and reduces the perceived radar cross section of the
treated equipment. Radar-absorbing material is expensive compared to other camouflage and concealment
techniques and is not yet widely available. Radar-absorbing paint offers the same radar cross section
reduction benefits as other radar-absorbing materials, and it is also expensive.

BATTLEFIELD BY-PRODUCTS
6-89. Battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt) can be used to formulate expedient camouflage
and concealment countermeasures. For example, use plywood and 2 x 4s to erect expedient target decoys, or
use dirt to construct concealment berms.

DECOYS
6-90. Decoys as part of a deception plan are very effective camouflage and concealment tools. The proper
use of decoys provides alternate targets against which an enemy expends ammunition, possibly revealing its
position in the process. Decoys also enhance friendly survivability and deceive an enemy about the number
and location of friendly weapons, troops, and equipment.

Employment Rationale
6-91. Decoys are used to attract enemy attention for a variety of tactical purposes. Their main use is to draw
enemy fire away from critical assets. Decoys are generally expendable, and they—
 Can be elaborate or simple. Their design depends on several factors, such as the target to be
decoyed, a unit’s tactical situation, available resources, and the time available to a unit for
camouflage and concealment employment.
 Can be preconstructed or made from field-expedient materials. Except for a few select types,
preconstructed decoys are not widely available. A typical Army/Marine Corps unit can construct
effective, realistic decoys to replicate key equipment and features through imaginative planning
and a working knowledge of the EM signatures emitted by the unit.

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6-92. Proper decoy employment serves a number of tactical purposes, including—

 Increasing the survivability of key unit equipment and personnel.
 Deceiving the enemy about the strength, disposition, and intentions of friendly forces.
 Drawing enemy fire, which reveals its positions.
 Encouraging the enemy to expend munitions on relatively low-value targets (decoys).

Employment Considerations
6-93. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are—
 Location. Logically placing decoys greatly enhances their plausibility. Decoys are usually placed
near enough to the real target to convince an enemy that it has found the target. However, a decoy
must be far enough away to prevent collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws
enemy fire. Proper spacing between a decoy and a target depends on the size of the target, the
expected enemy target-acquisition sensors, and the type of munitions directed against the target.
 Fidelity (realism). Decoys must be constructed according to a friendly unit SOP and must include
target features that an enemy recognizes. The most effective decoys are those that closely resemble
the real target in terms of EM signatures. Completely replicating the signatures of some targets,
particularly large and complex targets, can be very difficult. Therefore, decoy construction should
address the EM spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable. The seven recognition
factors that allow enemy sensors to detect a target are conversely important for decoys. When
evaluating decoy fidelity, the decoy should be recognizable in the same ways as the real target,
only more so. Try to make the decoy slightly more conspicuous than the real target.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFENSIVE TASKS

6-94. Camouflage and concealment countermeasures implemented during offensive tasks attempt to deceive
the enemy or prevent it from discovering friendly locations, actions, and intentions or to support a deception
plan that may selectively acquire information to support that deception plan. Successful camouflage and
concealment contribute to achieving the element of surprise and reduce subsequent personnel and equipment
losses. This section addresses considerations for employing camouflage and concealment during offensive
tasks. Selected defensive considerations may also apply. See JP 3-13.4 for additional information on
MILDEC operations.

PREPARATIONS
6-95. The main camouflage and concealment concern in preparing for offensive tasks is the masking of
tactical unit deployment. Camouflage and concealment should also be linked to any deception plan that may
be part of the operation. While camouflage and concealment are the primary means of masking offensive
operations, deceptive activities often achieve, or support, the broader goals of the deception plan.

Signatures
6-96. Offensive tasks create signatures that are detectable to an enemy. Analyzing these signatures may alert
the enemy to the nature of an offensive operation (such as planning and location). Commanders at all levels
should monitor operational signatures and strive to conceal them from enemy surveillance. These signatures
include—
 Increases in scouting and reconnaissance activity.
 The preparation of traffic routes.
 Forward movement of supplies and ammunition.
 Obstacle-breaching activities.
 The preparation and occupation of AAs.
 The preparation and occupation of forward artillery positions.

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 Increases in radio communications.

 Changes to the types of equipment within an area.

Assembly Areas
6-97. Prepare AAs during limited visibility. The signatures that their preparations produced should then be
suppressed and indications of their activities should be removed upon mission completion.
6-98. Designate AAs on terrain with natural screens and a developed network of roads and paths. Thick
forests and small towns and villages often provide the best locations. If natural screens are unavailable, use
spotty sectors of the terrain or previously occupied locations. Place equipment on spots of matching color,
and take maximum advantage of artificial camouflage and concealment materials.
6-99. Designate concealed routes for movement into and out of an area. Mask noise by practicing good noise
discipline. For instance, tracked movements can be muffled by the thunder of artillery fire, the noise of low-
flying aircraft, or the transmission of sounds from broadcast sets.
6-100. Position vehicles to take full advantage of the natural concealment properties of the terrain, and
cover the vehicles with camouflage nets. Apply paint and cut vegetation to vehicles to enhance camouflage
and concealment at AAs and during battle. When using vegetation for this type of camouflage and
concealment treatment, do not cut it from areas close to vehicles. AAs are particularly vulnerable to aerial
detection. Strictly enforce track, movement, and radio discipline. Remove track marks by covering or
sweeping them with branches to eliminate or reduce their signature.
6-101. While at an AA, personnel should apply individual camouflage and concealment. Applying
camouflage face paint and cut vegetation enhances camouflage and concealment during all phases of an
operation.

Decoys
6-102. An enemy may interpret decoy construction as an effort to reinforce a defensive position. Employing
and marking false obstacles and building bunkers and positions can conceal offensive preparations and give
the enemy the impression that defenses are being improved. If necessary, conduct engineer preparation
activities on a wide front so that the area and direction of the main attack are not revealed.

MOVEMENT
6-103. Move troops, ammunition, supplies, and engineer breaching equipment forward at night or during
times of limited visibility. Although the enemy use of radar and infrared aerial reconnaissance hinders
operations at night, darkness remains a significant concealment tool. Select routes that take full advantage of
the terrain screening properties. Commanders must understand how to combine darkness and terrain-
concealing properties to conceal troop and supply movements.
6-104. When conducting a march, convoy commanders must strictly enforce blackout requirements and the
order of march. Guidelines concerning lighting, march orders, and other requirements are usually published
in SOPs or operation orders. Required lighting conditions vary depending on the type of movement (convoy
versus single vehicle) and the unit location within the AO. Inspect each vehicle blackout device for proper
operation.
6-105. Enemy aerial reconnaissance usually focuses on open and difficult, but passable, route sectors. When
on a march, vehicles should pass these types of sectors at the highest possible speeds. If prolonged delays
result from encountering an unexpected obstacle, halt the column and disperse into the nearest natural
screens. During a movement, if a vehicle breaks down and cannot be immediately recovered, push it off the
road and conceal it until it can be recovered.
6-106. When conducting a march during good visibility, consider movement by infiltration (single or small
groups of vehicles released at different intervals). Movement in stages, from one natural screen to the next,
further minimizes possible detection. Use obscurant screens at critical crossings and choke points. While
these do not necessarily conceal an event, they do support obscuration and reduce enemy targeting
acquisition.

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6-107. During brief stops, quickly disperse vehicles under tree crowns or other concealment along the sides
of the road. Strictly enforce camouflage and concealment discipline. Watch for glare from vehicle
windshields, headlights, or reflectors, and remedy the situation if this does occur. Try to control troop
movement on the road or in other open areas. Conduct reconnaissance to select areas for long halts. The
reconnaissance party should select areas that are large enough to allow sufficient camouflage, concealment,
and dispersion. The quartering party should predetermine vehicle placement, develop a vehicle circulation
plan, and guide vehicles into suitable and concealed locations. The first priority, however, is to move vehicles
off the road as quickly as possible, even at the expense of initial dispersion. Use camouflage nets and natural
vegetation to enhance concealment, and carefully conceal dug-in positions.
6-108. Traffic controllers have a crucial role in enforcing convoy camouflage and concealment.
Commanders should issue precise instructions for traffic controllers to stop passing vehicles and have the
drivers correct the slightest violation of camouflage and concealment discipline. Convoy commanders are
responsible for the convoy camouflage and concealment discipline. For information about traffic operations,
see ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8.
6-109. Pass through friendly obstacles at night, in fog, or under other conditions of poor visibility. Also,
selectively use smoke (or other obscurant) screens because these poor-visibility conditions do not protect
against many types of threat sensors. Lay smoke on a wide front several times before actually executing the
passage of lines. Doing this helps deceive an enemy about the time and the specific point of an attack. Conceal
lanes through obstacles from enemy view to affect targeting capabilities.

OFFENSIVE BATTLE
6-110. Units should adapt to the terrain during a battle. Deploying behind natural vegetation, terrain
features, or man-made structures maximizes concealment from enemy observation and provides cover from
some direct and indirect systems. Make optimum use of concealed routes, hollows, gullies, and other terrain
features that are dead-space areas to enemy observation and firing positions. A trade-off, however, often
exists in terms of a slower rate of movement when using these types of routes. In a tactical sense, slower
movement may actually support a more rapid tempo of operations.
6-111. Movement techniques that emphasize fire and maneuver help limit enemy observation and targeting
accuracy. Avoid dusty terrain because clouds of dust alert enemies to the presence of friendly units. However,
if the enemy is aware of a unit presence, dust can be an effective means of obscuring unit intentions and
obscuring enemy targeting in the same fashion as smoke. When natural cover and concealment are
unavailable or impractical, the coordinated employment of obscurants, suppressive fires, speed, and natural
limited-visibility conditions minimize exposure, avoid enemy kill zones, and limit the effectiveness of enemy
EAs. However, offensive tasks under these conditions present unique challenges to training and the mission
command/command and control warfighting function because dust and smoke affect all participants.
6-112. Breaching operations require concealing the unit that is conducting the breach. Use conditions of
poor visibility, and plan the use of obscurants and suppressive fires to screen breaching operations.
6-113. Deliberate gap crossings are another type of breach that is uniquely difficult and potentially
hazardous. Plan the coordinated use of terrain masking, obscurants, decoys, and deceptive operations to
ensure successful crossings. See ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8 for additional information about gap crossings.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEFENSIVE TASKS

6-114. Successful camouflage and concealment during defensive tasks requires a strong emphasis on
OPSEC. Proper OPSEC denies an enemy information about friendly-force defensive preparations.
Particularly important is the counter reconnaissance battle, where defensive forces seek to blind an enemy
by eliminating its reconnaissance forces. The winner of this preliminary battle is often the winner of the main
battle. By virtue of their inherent role in counter efforts, camouflage and concealment activities play an
important role in both battles. This section addresses considerations for employing camouflage and
concealment during defensive tasks. Some of the considerations for offensive tasks may also apply.

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PREPARATIONS
6-115. The purpose of camouflage and concealment activities during defensive preparations is to mask key
or sensitive activities. The successful camouflage and concealment of these preparations leads to an enemy
force that is blinded or deceived and therefore more easily influenced to attack the strengths of the defense.
These key activities include—
 Preparing survivability positions (primary, alternate, and subsequent) and constructing obstacles
(wire obstacles, tank ditches, abatis).
 Preparing reserve and counterattack forces locations and routes (potentially concealed).
 Establishing critical CPs.

Signatures
6-116. A number of signatures may indicate the intentions of friendly defensive preparations, and enemies
analyze these signatures to determine the defensive plan. Specific signatures that could reveal defensive plans
include—
 Working on survivability positions.
 Emplacing or constructing tactical obstacles.
 Moving different types of combat materiel into prepared positions.
 Preparing routes and facilities.
 Constructing strong points or hardened artillery positions.
 Conducting rehearsals.

Counterattack and Reserve Forces

6-117. Due to the similarity of missions, the concerns for concealing counterattack and reserve forces are
similar to those of maneuver forces engaged in offensive tasks. The previous section discusses considerations
about AAs, troop and supply movements, passages of lines, and deception operations. This information is
also useful as a guide when planning camouflage and concealment actions for a counterattack.

Planning
6-118. Proper planning is essential to minimize or avoid threat detection and prevent successful enemy
analysis of the engineer efforts that are integral to defensive preparations. Engineer equipment creates
significant signatures, so minimize its use to a level that is commensurate with available time and manpower.
Disperse engineer equipment that is not required at the job site. Complete as much work as possible without
using heavy equipment, and allow heavy equipment on site only when necessary. Engineers should minimize
their time on site by conducting thorough, extensive planning and preparation. Additional signatures
include—
 Supplies, personnel, and vehicles arriving to, and departing from, the unit area.
 Survivability positions being constructed or routes being prepared.
 Smoke and heat emanating from kitchens, fires, or stoves.
 Communications facilities being operated.
 Educational and training exercises being conducted.

Movement
6-119. Reserve forces should move along preplanned concealed routes. They should also move and occupy
selected locations at night or during other conditions of limited visibility. Quartering parties should preselect
individual positions and guide vehicles and personnel to assigned locations. Light, noise, and track discipline
are essential; but they are difficult to control during this phase. The quartering party should also develop a
traffic-flow plan that minimizes vehicle and troop movement to and from the unit area.
6-120. Arriving units should immediately begin to conceal their positions. Commanders should detail the
priorities for camouflage and concealment activities in the operation order, based on their assessment of
which signatures present the greatest opportunity for threat detection.

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Assembly Areas
6-121. While AA actions are similar to those of counterattack and reserve positions, the subsequent
positions are more likely to be occupied longer. Therefore, camouflage and concealment needs are more
extensive and extended for counterattack and reserve forces. In fact, their camouflage and concealment
operations are often indistinguishable from those of support units.
6-122. Counterattack and reserve forces awaiting employment should capitalize on the time available to
conduct rehearsals. While essential, these activities are prone to detection by enemy sensors. Therefore,
observe camouflage and concealment discipline at all times and locations. Rehearsals may even support the
deception plan.

Placement And Dispersal

6-123. Site selection is crucial when concealing engineer effort. The proper placement and dispersal of
equipment and operations are essential. Use natural screens (terrain masking) or urban areas to provide
concealment for counterattack and reserve forces. When using forests as natural screens, carefully consider
factors such as the height and density of vegetation, the amount and darkness of shadows cast by the screen,
and the appropriateness of the particular screen for the season. The condition and quality of natural screens
have a decisive effect on the capability to conceal units. Commanders should evaluate natural screens during
engineer reconnaissance missions and conduct the missions on a timely, extensive basis.
6-124. The probability of detection increases considerably when survivability positions are prepared.
Detection is easier due to the increased size of the targets to be concealed, the contrasting upturned soil, and
the difficulty of concealing survivability efforts. Despite these considerations, the enhanced protection
afforded by survivability positions usually dictates their use. To minimize the probability of detection,
employ a combination of natural screens overhead nets and dispersion to conceal construction sites.

Camouflage Nets
6-125. Use ULCANS to conceal vehicles, tents, shelters, and equipment. Use vegetation to further disrupt
the outline of the target rather than completely hide it. Ensure that vegetation is not removed from a single
location in the immediate area because it could leave a signature for threat detection. Gather vegetation
sparingly from as many remote areas as possible. This technique allows the immediate area to remain
relatively undisturbed.

Stoves And Fires

6-126. Strictly control the use of stoves and fires because they produce visual and thermal signatures
detectable to threat sensors. If fires are necessary, permit them only during daylight hours and place them in
dead ground or under dense foliage. Use nets and other expedient thermal screens to dissipate rising heat and
reduce the thermal signature of the fire.

Camouflage and Concealment Discipline

6-127. Strict camouflage and concealment discipline allows the continued concealment of a unit position.
The longer a unit stays in one location, the harder it is for it to maintain camouflage and concealment
discipline. Extended encampments require constant command attention to camouflage and concealment
discipline. The evacuation of an area also requires camouflage and concealment discipline to ensure that
evidence (trash, vehicle tracks) is not left for enemy detection.

SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS AND OBSTACLES

6-128. Survivability positions include fighting positions, protective positions (shelters), and trench-work
connections. Such positions are usually constructed of earth and logs but may also be composed of man-
made building materials, such as concrete.

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Placement
6-129. Properly occupying positions and placing obstacles are critical camouflage and concealment
considerations. When possible, place obstacles, and construct and occupy positions out of the direct view of
threat forces (such as a reverse-slope defense) at night or under conditions of limited visibility.

Backgrounds
6-130. Select backgrounds that do not silhouette positions and obstacles or provide color contrast. Use
shadows to hinder enemy detection efforts. If possible, place positions and obstacles under OHC, trees, or
bushes or in another dark area of the terrain. This technique prevents the disruption of terrain lines and hinders
aerial detection. However, camouflage and concealment activities should not hinder the integration of
obstacles with fires.
6-131. When using the natural concealment properties of the terrain, avoid isolated features that draw
enemy attention. Do not construct positions directly on or near other clearly defined terrain features (tree
lines, hedgerows, hillcrests). Offsetting positions into tree lines or below hill crests avoids silhouetting
against the background and counters enemy fire.

Natural Materials
6-132. Use natural materials to supplement artificial materials. Before constructing positions and obstacles,
remove and save natural materials (turf, leaves, humus) for use in restoring the natural appearance of the
terrain for deception purposes. During excavation, collect spoil in carrying devices for careful disposal. When
preparing survivability positions and obstacles,—
 Avoid disturbing the natural look of surroundings. Use camouflage nets and natural vegetation to
further distort the outline of a position, to hide the bottom of an open position or trench, and to
mask spoil used as a parapet. To further avoid detection, replace natural materials regularly or
when they wilt or change color.
 Consider the effect of backblasts from rocket launchers, missile systems, and AT weapons.
Construct a concealed open space to the position’s rear to accommodate backblasts. A backblast
area should not contain material that readily burns or generates large dust signatures.
 Use natural materials to help conceal machine-gun emplacements. Machine guns are priority
targets, and concealing them is an essential combat task. Although camouflage and concealment
are important, placement is the primary factor in concealing machine guns.
 Place mortars in defilade positions. Proper placement, coupled with the use of artificial and natural
camouflage and concealment materials, provides the maximum possible concealment. Also
consider removable overhead concealment.
 Use decoy positions and phony obstacles to draw enemy attention away from actual survivability
positions and traces of obstacle preparation. Decoys serve the additional function of drawing
enemy fire, allowing easier targeting of enemy weapons systems.

DEFENSIVE BATTLE
6-133. Camouflage and concealment activities during the defensive battle are essentially the same as for
the offensive battle. While a majority of the battle is normally fought from prepared, concealed positions,
defensive forces still maneuver to prevent enemy breakthroughs or to counterattack. When maneuvering,
units should—
 Adapt to the terrain.
 Make optimum use of concealed routes.
 Preselect and improve concealed routes to provide defensive forces with a maneuver advantage.
 Make optimum use of low-visibility conditions.
 Plan battlefield obscuration operations, as appropriate, to provide additional concealment for
maneuvering forces.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF

CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASKS
6-134. The threat of a terrorist attack faces all military forces, including those conducting stability tasks or
DSCA. In addition, forces conducting stability or DSCA tasks may also simultaneously conduct offensive or
defensive tasks (or both) in the same AO. As a result, camouflage and concealment must not be ignored
during stability or DSCA tasks. Camouflage and concealment during such tasks draw from the considerations
for both offensive and defensive tasks but typically draw more heavily from the considerations associated
with defensive tasks. Stability or DSCA tasks may involve a higher number of relatively fixed sites (such as
base camps), which are addressed below.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT PLANNING

6-135. No single solution exists for enhancing the survivability of critical assets with camouflage and
concealment (except for large-area smoke screens). The characteristics of many such targets are unique and
require the creative application of camouflage and concealment principles and techniques. Therefore, the
guidelines for camouflage and concealment presented in this section are not intended to impose a regimen
that must be followed at all costs. Rather, the suggestions presented suggest a logical sequence that has proven
successful over time. In fact, the steps outlined below often lead to creative camouflage and concealment
solutions simply because they allow designers to consider the many options, benefits, and pitfalls of
camouflage and concealment employment. No camouflage and concealment plan is wrong if it achieves the
intended signature-management goals and does not impair mission accomplishment.

PLANS
6-136. Commanders should develop their unit camouflage and concealment plan based on an awareness, if
not a comprehensive assessment, of the detectable EM signatures emitted by forces in the AO. They should
evaluate these signatures by considering the expected intelligence of the enemy surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities (airborne and ground-based), knowledge of the target area, and weapons-on-
target capability.

OBJECTIVE
6-137. A camouflage and concealment plan increases survivability within the limits of available resources.
Planners must systematically determine which features of a given asset are conspicuous, why those features
are conspicuous, and how camouflage and concealment principles and techniques best eliminate or reduce
signatures. Camouflage and concealment should decrease the effectiveness of enemy attacks by interfering
with its target-acquisition process, which in turn, increases survivability.

PLANNING STEPS
6-138. The steps outlined below provide guidance for designing camouflage and concealment plans for
critical assets. The detailed planning approach is applicable in any situation where camouflage and
concealment employment is necessary, but more so when the plans include critical assets.
 Step 1. Identify the threat. Identify the principal threat sensors, weapon-delivery platforms, and
likely directions of attack.
 Step 2. Identify critical assets. Include those that are critical from an operational standpoint and
those that may provide reference points (cues) for an attack on more lucrative targets.
 Step 3. Evaluate critical assets. Once the critical assets are identified, focus efforts on identifying
the features of each asset that might be conspicuous to enemy sensors. Consider multispectral
(visual, thermal, near-infrared, and radar) signatures in this assessment. The recognition factors
are an excellent framework for conducting this assessment. Include a review of area maps, site
plans, photographs, and aerial images. Look at the assets from the enemy point of view.
 Step 4. Quantify signatures. Quantify the multispectral signatures that are emitted by critical
assets. Base the quantification on actual surveys using facsimiles of threat sensors when possible.

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Specify the EM wavelengths in which critical assets are most vulnerable, and develop signature-
management priorities.
 Step 5. Establish camouflage and concealment goals. Establish specific camouflage and
concealment goals for critical assets. These goals should indicate the signature reduction or
increase desired and the resources available for camouflage and concealment implementation.
Base these goals on the results of steps 1 through 4. Change the camouflage and concealment goals
as planning progresses, and reiterate them accordingly.
 Step 6. Select materials and techniques. Select camouflage and concealment materials and
techniques that best accomplish signature management goals within logistical, maintenance, and
resource constraints. Expedient, off-the-shelf materials and battlefield by-products are not
identified in this manual, but they are always options for camouflage and concealment materials.
 Step 7. Organize the plan. Develop a camouflage and concealment plan that matches goals with
available materials, time and manpower constraints, and operational considerations. If the goals
are unobtainable, repeat steps 5 and 6 until a manageable plan is developed.
 Step 8. Execute the plan. Once a feasible camouflage and concealment plan is developed, execute
it. Store temporary or expedient materials in an inconspicuous location. Conduct deployment
training on a schedule that denies enemy intelligence teams the opportunity to identify
countermeasures or develop methods to defeat the camouflage and concealment.
 Step 9. Evaluate the camouflage and concealment. The final step in camouflage and concealment
planning is to evaluate the deployed camouflage and concealment materials and techniques.
Again, attempt to look at the situation from an enemy point of view. Important questions to ask in
this evaluation include the following:
 Do camouflage and concealment activities increase the survivability of critical assets?
 Do deployed camouflage and concealment materials and techniques meet the signature
management goals outlined in the plan?
 Are deployed camouflage and concealment materials and techniques operationally
compatible with the treated asset(s)?
 Are camouflage and concealment materials and techniques maintainable within manpower
and resource constraints?

FIXED ASSETS
6-139. Fixed (or relatively fixed) assets such as base camps, airfields, some CPs, warehouses, roadways,
pipelines, railways, and other line of communications facilities provide scarce, nearly irreplaceable functional
support to ground maneuver forces. The threat to these facilities is both ground-based and aerial. The
camouflage and concealment techniques for the two threat types do not necessarily change, but the defender
must be aware of the overall implications of his camouflage and concealment plan.

GROUND ATTACKS
6-140. Ground attacks (enemy offensives, terrorist attacks, and enemy special-force incursions) against
fixed assets require constant operational awareness by the defenders. While most camouflage and
concealment techniques are conceptually designed to defend against an aerial attack, these same techniques
can affect the target-acquisition capabilities of enemy ground forces to the benefit of the defender. Standard
camouflage screening paint patterns, ULCANS, and natural vegetation provide camouflage and concealment
against a ground attack.
6-141. Camouflage and concealment discipline regarding light, noise, and spoil involves prudent
operational procedures that friendly troops should observe in any tactical situation, particularly in the
presence of hostile ground forces.

AERIAL ATTACKS
6-142. Fixed assets are susceptible to aerial attacks because of their long residence time and immobility.
However, fighter-bomber and helicopter aircrews face unique target-acquisition problems due to the

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relatively short time available to locate, identify, and lock onto targets. Fighter-bombers typically travel at
high speeds, even during weapons delivery. This means that attacking aircrews have limited search time once
they reach the target area. Helicopters travel at slower speeds but generally encounter similar time-on-target
limitations. Because of lower flying altitudes and slower speeds, helicopters are more vulnerable to ground
defenses.
6-143. UAS vary in size, speed, operating altitudes and capabilities. Threat forces could outfit UAS
platforms with a variety of electro-optical or infrared optics, radar, electronic sensors, targeting payloads, or
air to surface weapon payloads. Most threat tactical UAS fly at low altitudes and are slow and small. This
makes smaller UAS difficult to detect or counter with integrated air and missile defense while larger UAS
may more closely resemble manned aircraft in size and operating parameters. (See ATP 3-01.81.) In all
cases, proper camouflage and concealment can increase aircrew search time, thereby reducing available time
to identify, designate, and attack targets. The longer an aircrew is forced to search for a target in a defended
area, the more vulnerable the aircraft becomes to counterattack.

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
6-144. The location and configuration of most fixed assets are well known. Camouflage and concealment
techniques that protect against sophisticated surveillance sensor systems, particularly satellite-based systems,
can be costly in terms of manpower, materials, and time. Steps can be taken to reduce the enemy detection
of relocatable assets, but fixed assets are difficult to conceal from sensors due to the relatively long residence
time of fixed versus relocatable assets. Unless the construction process for a given fixed asset was conducted
secretly, defenders can safely assume that enemy sensors have previously detected and catalogued its
location. Defenders can further assume that attacking forces have intelligence data leading them to the general
area of the fixed asset. Therefore, camouflage and concealment design efforts should focus on the
multispectral defeat or impairment of the local target-acquisition process of the enemy.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT TECHNIQUES

6-145. Selected camouflage and concealment techniques should capitalize on terrain features that are
favorable to the defender and on the short time available for attacking aircrews to acquire targets. Use
artificial and natural means to camouflage the asset. Where time and resources allow, deploy alternative
targets (decoys) to draw the attention of the attacking aircrews away from the fixed asset.
6-146. Comprehensive camouflage and concealment designs and techniques for fixed assets can be costly,
yet field tests have shown that simple, expedient techniques can be effective. Fixed assets should be supplied
with artificial camouflage and concealment materials, and camouflage and concealment principles should be
used to increase their survivability.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
6-147. While standard camouflage and concealment materials are designed to enhance fixed asset
survivability, they have practical limitations that are not easily overcome. Materials applied directly to a fixed
asset may achieve the signature management goals stated in the camouflage and concealment plan. However,
if other features in the vicinity are not treated accordingly, the asset may be well hidden but remain
completely vulnerable.
6-148. For example, if there are three weapons storage area igloos are in a row, and the middle igloo is
treated with camouflage materials, while the other two are not, then the middle igloo remains vulnerable. The
enemy knows that three igloos exist and will probably locate the middle one no matter how well the
camouflage and concealment plan is designed. However, if all three igloos are treated with camouflage and
concealment materials and three decoy igloos are placed away from them, the treated igloos’ survivability
increases.
6-149. Furthermore, if a man-made object (traffic surface) or a natural feature (tree line) is close to the
igloos, attacking forces use these cues to proceed to the target area, even if all three igloos are treated with
camouflage and concealment materials. Remember, a target is part of an overall target scene, and an attacker

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must interpret the scene. Do not make his task easy. Camouflage and concealment plans that treat only the
fixed asset and ignore other cues (man-made or natural) within the target scene are insufficient.

RELOCATABLE ASSETS
6-150. Examples of valuable relocatable assets include CPs, theater missile defense units (Patriot and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries), refuel-on-the-move sites, and forward arming and refueling
points (FARPs). These assets are critical to offensive and defensive tasks, and their protection should receive
a high priority.

MOBILITY, CAMOUFLAGE, AND CONCEALMENT

6-151. Mobility, camouflage, and concealment enhance the survivability of relocatable assets. A
camouflage and concealment plan must include the techniques for units to rapidly deploy and continuously
conduct mobile operations. The camouflage and concealment techniques available to mobile assets are
basically the same as those available to fixed assets, and the principles of camouflage and concealment still
apply. However, the mission of relocatable assets differs from that of fixed assets, so camouflage and
concealment execution also differs.
6-152. Relocatable assets remain in the same location from a few hours to several weeks, depending on the
tactical situation. Camouflage and concealment techniques must be planned accordingly. If a unit is at a
location for a few hours, it should employ expedient camouflage and concealment techniques. If a unit is at
a location for several days, it should employ robust camouflage and concealment plans. The resources that a
unit expends on camouflage and concealment execution must be weighed against the length of time that it
remains in the same location. As camouflage and concealment plans increase in complexity, subsequent
assembly and teardown time also increases.

BUILT-IN CAPABILITIES
6-153. Camouflage and concealment should be built into systems to the maximum extent possible.
Supplemental camouflage and concealment is usually necessary and should be designed to enhance the built-
in camouflage and concealment. Apply the same rules for avoiding detection and the same considerations
regarding the recognition factors that are discussed above. The camouflage and concealment planning steps
outlined above also apply.

THE GENEVA EMBLEM AND CAMOUFLAGE OF MEDICAL

FACILITIES
6-154. North Atlantic Treaty Organization STANAG 2931 provides for camouflage of Geneva Convention
protection symbols (Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal) on medical facilities where the lack of
camouflage could compromise tactical operations. Such an order is considered temporary and must be
rescinded as soon as the tactical situation permits. This STANAG requires signatories to display the
appropriate Geneva Convention protection symbol (for the U.S. military, this is typically a red cross on a
white background) (see figure 6-1) on medical facilities to help identify and protect the sick and wounded.
STANAG 2931 defines medical facilities as medical units, medical vehicles, and medical aircraft on the
ground. Camouflaging large, permanent medical facilities exceeds the guidelines of STANAG 2931.

Figure 6-1. Geneva Convention protection symbols

(left: Red Cross; middle: Red Crescent; right: Red Crystal)

6-26 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Chapter 7
Critical Assets
Certain assets should be protected because they are of such extraordinary importance
that their loss or degradation would have a significant and debilitating effect on
operations or the mission. Although the list of such assets (the protection prioritization
list) varies in each situation, it typically includes such things as weapon systems, CPs,
logistics sites, aviation sites, and base camps. The techniques addressed in previous
chapters focus on providing or improving cover, camouflage, and concealment for
personnel and various weapon systems. This chapter provides cover, camouflage, and
concealment considerations for some other typical critical assets—CPs, logistics sites,
aviation sites, and base camps. For information about the development,
recommendation, and for approval of the protection prioritization list, see ADRP 3-37.

COMMAND POSTS
7-1. CPs contain vital systems for the mission command/command and control warfighting function. They
also provide military leaders with the capability to make timely decisions, communicate those decisions to
subordinate units, and monitor the execution of these decisions. Several factors affect CP survivability such
as—dispersion, mobility, redundancy, size, signatures (electromagnetic, visual, radar, infrared, and so forth),
camouflage, and concealment. Additional factors (such as cover and concealment or shielding by terrain
features or urban structures) also exist. Earth berms, sandbags, soil-filled containers, and concrete barriers
can provide protection. CPs may also use existing hardened facilities or other constructed shelters. When
available, supporting engineer units most commonly use berms to increase CP survivability. Berms can be
quickly constructed and provide excellent survivability enhancement to CPs, especially as initial measures.
For more information on command posts see ATP 6-0.5.

DISPERSION
7-2. Dispersing CPs, equipment, and personnel enhances unit survivability against direct and indirect fire
threats. Commanders place minimum resources forward and keep more elaborate facilities back. This makes
it harder for enemies to find and attack them.

MOBILITY
7-3. CP mobility is important, especially at lower echelons during combat operations. Lower-echelon CPs
and those employed forward in the combat zone may need to move quickly and often. Both small size and
careful planning enables rapid and effective CP displacement.

SIZE
7-4. A CPs size affects both mobility and survivability. Large CPs may increase capacity and facilitate face-
to-face coordination. Their size makes them vulnerable to multiple acquisitions and attack. Smaller CPs while
easier to protect, often lack capacity to control operations effectively.

REDUNDANCY
7-5. Reducing CP size cuts signature and enhances mobility. However, some personnel and equipment
redundancy is required for continuous operations. In operations, personnel and equipment are lost or fail
under stress. Having the right amount of redundancy allows CPs to continue to operate effectively when
this happens.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 7-1

Chapter 7

SIGNATURES
7-6. Since World War II, the size and complexity of CPs have increased dramatically. CP signatures have
correspondingly increased from a physical and communications perspective (more types of antennas and
transmission modes at a wider range of frequencies). As a result, the enemy has more signatures available to
detect and target CPs for attack. CPs require excellent camouflage and concealment to survive on the
battlefield.
7-7. CPs are frequently located near road or rail junctions or, potentially, along an LOC. They often require
new access and egress routes. Consider the following regarding camouflage and concealment for CPs:
 Vehicle traffic. When evaluating EM signatures emitted by CPs, consider concentrations of
vehicles, signs of heavy traffic (characteristic wear and track marks), and air traffic as issues that
must be addressed. Park vehicles and aircraft a significant distance from CPs.
 Antennas. Antennas and their electronic emissions and numerous support towers are common to
most CPs. Paint antennas and support equipment with nonconductive green, black, or brown paint
if the surfaces are shiny. If tactically feasible, use remote antennas to reduce the vulnerability of
the radio system to collateral damage.
 Security emplacements. Security measures (barbed wire, barriers, security and dismount points,
and other types of emplacements) can indicate CP operations. Barbed wire exhibits a measurable
radar cross section at radar frequencies. Ensure that barbed wire and concertina wire follow natural
terrain lines and are concealed as much as possible to reduce their signatures.
7-8. Power generators and other heat sources produce signatures that enemy surveillance and
target acquisition sensors can detect. Place heat-producing equipment and other thermal sources in defilade
positions, within structures or under natural cover. Heat diffusers, which tone down and vent vehicle exhaust
away from the threat direction, are an expedient means of thermal signature reduction.
7-9. Defensive positions often create scarred earth signatures and detectable patterns due to earth
excavation. While of obvious value to CP survivability, defensive position signatures need to be mitigated
and requirements reduced through the use of natural cover and concealment.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

7-10. Camouflage and concealment improve OPSEC and increase survivability by minimizing the
observable size and EM signatures of CPs. CP camouflage and concealment require reconnaissance,
planning, discipline, security, and maintenance. Carefully controlled traffic plans decrease the possibility of
disturbing natural cover and creating new, observable paths. Decoys may be a highly effective means of
confusing the enemy target acquisition process, particularly against airborne sensors. Against ground threats,
the same general rules of camouflage and concealment discipline apply. However, reconnaissance and
heightened security patrols enhance camouflage and concealment efforts by denying access to vantage points
from which a CP can be observed.

SITES
7-11. Although CPs may change sites every 24 hours, they may also be occupied for a longer period than
larger AAs. CP site selection is crucial; therefore, units should—
 Consider the needs of supporting an extended occupation while minimizing changes to natural
terrain patterns. When constructing defensive positions, minimize earth scarring as much as
possible. If scarred earth is unavoidable, cut vegetation, use toned-down agents (paint), and apply
camouflage nets to help conceal scarred areas.
 Use existing roads and trails. In some cases, locations along a line of communications may be
useful to hide traffic going to and from a CP. If a site requires the construction of roads or trails,
make maximum use of natural concealment and existing terrain. The fewer new lines required, the
better the CP blends in, leaving natural features relatively unchanged.
 Never locate a CP at a road junction. Road junctions are high-priority targets for enemy forces and
are easily detectable.

7-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Critical Assets

 Locate a CP in an existing civilian structure, if possible. This simplifies hiding military activity.
However, choose a structure in an area where a sufficient number of buildings with similar EM
signatures can mask its location and provide a solution to control and reduce/mask traffic flow.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
7-12. By strictly complying with proper radio, telephone, and digital communications procedures, the
opportunities for an enemy to detect friendly telecommunications activities are minimized. Consider the
following:
 When possible, place antennas in locations that permit the use of natural supports (trees for
dipoles). As a rule of thumb, place antennas a minimum of one wavelength away from surrounding
structures or other antennas.

Note. One wavelength is typically 40 meters (131.23 feet) for low frequencies and 1 meter (3.28
feet) for very high frequencies.

 Move antennas as often as possible within operational constraints.

 Use directional antennas when possible. If using nondirectional antennas, employ proper
terrain-masking techniques to defeat the radio direction-finding efforts of the threat.
 Use existing telephone lines as much as possible. Newly laid wire creates a readily observable
signature that can reveal a CP location. Communications wire and cable should follow natural
terrain lines and be concealed in the best way possible.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT DISCIPLINE

7-13. Maintain camouflage and concealment discipline after occupying a site. Establish and use designated
foot paths to, from, and within a CP area. If a unit occupies a site for more than 24 hours, consider periodically
rerouting foot paths to avoid detectable patterns. Conceal security and dismount points and other individual
emplacements, and make paths to the CP inconspicuous. Enforce proper disposal procedures for trash and
spoil. Rigidly enforce light and noise discipline. Enhance the realism of a decoy CP by making it appear
operational. Allow camouflage and concealment discipline to be lax in the decoy CP, thus making it a more
conspicuous target than the real CP.

LOGISTICS SITES
7-14. General supply items should be protected as time and materials permit. Supplies can be stored in the
open, in tents, in military vans, or belowground (as required by the type of material). Aboveground and
belowground storage measures may be protected by various combinations of berms, revetments, and OHC.
Additional measures to protect HAZMAT and hazardous wastes should be considered to prevent possible
adverse health effects to personnel and to prevent environmental damage, such as groundwater
contamination. Ensure that firefighting equipment is available as needed to protect against fire and HAZMAT
spills. See ATP 3-34.5/MCRP 4-11.B and TM 3-34.56/MCIP 4-11.01 for HAZMAT/waste storage and
protection requirements.
7-15. The various activities involved in food, water, decontamination, clothing exchange, and bath points
require protection for customers and operating personnel. Equipment (such as power sources [generators])
requires protection from indirect-fire fragmentation and direct fire. Operating personnel need both individual
fighting positions and protective positions. Many shelter designs may be adapted for aboveground use in
decontamination operations, clothing exchanges, or bath points.

SUPPLY AND WATER POINTS

7-16. Supply and water points are relatively immobile and the object of the enemy’s most sophisticated
sensors. Using camouflage and concealment is an effective means to improve survivability.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 7-3

Chapter 7

Camouflage and Concealment

7-17. Many camouflage and concealment methods associated with AAs and CPs also apply to supply and
storage areas, but with additional requirements. Large amounts of equipment and supplies are quickly brought
into tactical areas and delivered to supply points located as close to the forward line of own troops as possible.
Supplies must be quickly unloaded and concealed, while supply points remain open and accessible for
distribution. Under these conditions, multiple supply points are generally easier to camouflage than single,
large ones. Decoy supply and water points can also confuse threat targeting efforts.
7-18. Take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Configure logistics layouts to conform
to the local ground pattern. Creativity can play a role in this effort. The following guidance enhances
concealment of military operations:
 Avoid establishing regular (square or rectangular) perimeter shapes for an area.
 Select locations where concealed access and egress routes are already established and easily
controlled.
 Use roads with existing overhead concealment if new access routes are needed. Use overhead nets
to conceal access over short, open areas.
 Control movement into and out of the supply area.
 Mix and disperse supply point stocks to the maximum extent possible. This not only avoids
providing a pattern of stockpile shapes, but also prevents the easy destruction of one entire
commodity.
 Space stocks irregularly (in length and depth) to avoid recognizable patterns. Stack supplies as
low as possible to avoid shadows. Dig supplies in if resources allow. In digging operations,
disperse the spoil so as not to produce large piles of earth.
 Cover stocks with nets and other materials that blend with background patterns and signatures.
Flattops (large, horizontal camouflage and concealment nets) are effective for concealing
supply point activities when resources allow for their construction and when supply points are not
too large. Dunnage from supply points provides excellent material for expedient decoys.

Traffic Control
7-19. Ensure that vehicles cause minimal changes to the natural terrain as a result of movement into, within,
and out of the area. Provide concealment and control of vehicles waiting to draw supplies. Rigidly practice
and enforce camouflage and concealment discipline and OPSEC. Debris control could be a problem, so it
requires constant attention. Military police can be used to support this effort by controlling traffic and
enforcing the discipline of movement. See ATP 3-39.10 for more information about military police support
to traffic control.

Water Points
7-20. Camouflage and concealment for water points includes the following additional considerations:
 Spillage. Water spillage can have positive and negative effects on unit camouflage and
concealment posture. Standing pools of water reflect light that is visible to observers. Pools can
also act as forward scatterers of radar waves, resulting in conspicuous black-hole returns on radar
screens. Therefore, minimize water spillage and provide adequate drainage for runoff. On the other
hand, dispersed water can be used to reduce the thermal signatures of large, horizontal surfaces.
However, use this technique sparingly and in such a way that pools do not form.
 Equipment. Use adequate natural and artificial concealment for personnel, storage tanks, and
specialized pumping and purification equipment. Conceal water point equipment to eliminate
shine from damp surfaces. Conceal shine by placing canvas covers on bladders, using camouflage
nets, and placing foliage on and around bladders. This also distorts the normal shape of the
bladders.
 Scheduling. Enhance camouflage and concealment discipline at water points by establishing and
strictly enforcing a supply schedule for units. The lack of or violation of a supply schedule
produces a concentration of waiting vehicles that is difficult to conceal.

7-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Critical Assets

AMMUNITION
7-21. Areas used to handle and store ammunition must be protected against hostile fire, accidents, and the
elements. These areas include those adjacent to fighting positions and storage areas in the field or on base
camps. Several types of bunker designs, including buried military vans, aboveground military vans (with
earth cover or revetments), concrete, and soil-filled containers are suitable to protect ammunition. Smaller
quantities stored at fighting positions may be kept in pits or in positions within walls and revetments.
Provisions must be made to integrate drainage and proper ventilation. Ensure that ammunition, fuzes, and
ignition systems are separately stored off the ground as required by ammunition type. It is also essential to
maintain firefighting equipment and to take appropriate measures to secure ammunition against theft. When
possible, store ammunition away from key infrastructure, CPs, fuel, and personnel housing areas. For
additional information, see ATP 4-35.1.

PETROLEUM SITES
7-22. Class III POL products are vital for maneuver units conducting offensive tasks. Tanker trucks at fuel
supply points are protected by natural berms, deep-cut protective positions, or constructed berms. OHC is
impractical for short periods of occupancy, but maximum use is made of camouflage nets and natural terrain
concealment. When it is expected that supply vehicles will occupy particular locations for longer periods,
OHC is essential to maximize the protection level.
7-23. Bulk fuel sites also require protection. Berms and revetments are emplaced around fuel bladders to
provide limited protection against blast and fragmentation and to contain spills and fires. Pumping equipment
and hoses should also be protected against enemy attack and accidents when possible. Fire protection
equipment is essential to mitigate damage caused by fire and HAZMAT. Drainage must be incorporated in
the design to prevent water from collecting in the enclosed areas, and protection must be included to prevent
environmental damage.

MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES

7-24. The amount of equipment emplaced at a medical treatment facility varies from mission to mission. The
design and construction of shelters with adequate OHC is mandatory so that medical care and treatment is
not interrupted by hostile action. Enemy activity may hinder the prompt evacuation of patients from the
medical company; thus, adequate shelter for both holding and treating patients becomes paramount. For
planning purposes, consider shelters for protecting personnel on litters or folding cots. Consider smaller
shelters for surgery, X-ray, laboratory, dental, and triage functions. Deliberate shelters are generally well
suited to these activities. Medical companies provide protection to organic personnel by constructing fighting
positions and, when the situation permits, shelters for sleeping and other activities. Vehicle protective
positions may be used to provide cover for ambulances and other vehicles. Camouflage or conceal helicopter
landing sites when they are not actively in use.
7-25. Battalion aid stations may operate from a vehicle situated behind natural terrain cover. As time and
resources permit, this site is improved with OHC and berms, allowing vehicle access and egress. The battalion
aid station has no patient-holding capability; however, if patient evacuation is not possible, it is imperative
that patients be effectively sheltered from enemy activity.

AVIATION SITES
7-26. Airfield survivability considerations include protecting critical aircraft parking ramps, runways, and
maintenance facilities. This includes providing for berms and revetments, bunkers, and protective shelters
for personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment. Perimeter security features emphasize standoff fences and
barriers. In addition, the use of ECPs at airfield entrances is recommended. See appendix A for further
discussion of ECPs. Revetments and berms that use a variety of materials substantially increase aircraft
survivability. The use of revetments to protect individual aircraft is extremely effective. When using
revetments, it is important to ensure proper distances between revetment walls to allow adequate space for
aircraft operations (maintenance, fueling, arming) and the repositioning of aircraft using a tug or other towing
device. Distances between revetment walls must be increased significantly if aircraft are required to take off
or land inside the revetment area. Measures for facility hardening may also be implemented to protect critical

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 7-5

Chapter 7

airfield infrastructure. See MCRP 3-40D.2/NTRP 4-04.2.10-2/AFMAN 32-8013-2 or TM 3-34.48-2 for

additional information about revetments for aviation sites.
7-27. Soil-filled container revetments are one of the most effective methods to protect aircraft while on the
ground. OHC may not be practical for rotary-wing aircraft because mission variables may require these
aircraft to take off and land from protected positions. Concealment may be a better option.
GTA 90-01-011 provides details and examples of soil-filled container revetments for various aircraft,
including bills of material and the recommended equipment and personnel to construct the revetment.
7-28. Aviation sites are among the most important of all critical assets. Aviation sites are typically comprised
of several parts that make up the whole, including tactical assembly areas (TAAs), aviation maintenance
areas, forward operations bases, and FARPs. The positioning of these elements with respect to each other is
dynamic and often depends on the existing tactical situation. In the following discussion, an aviation site is
assumed to contain a TAA, an aviation maintenance area, and a FARP collocated. While these elements are
not always collocated, the camouflage and concealment techniques for individual elements do not greatly
differ based on positioning. Untreated aviation sites are detectable in most threat sensor wavelengths.
Aviation sites may include the following:
 TAAs. TAAs are typically parking areas for helicopters. Helicopters are highly conspicuous
targets because of their awkward shape, distinctive thermal signatures, and large radar cross
section. An enemy expends a lot of time and energy attempting to locate TAAs. Once it finds
them, it aggressively directs offensive actions against them.
 Aviation maintenance areas. The most conspicuous features of aviation maintenance areas are
the large, transportable maintenance shelters. These shelters are highly visible and indicate the
presence of helicopters to an enemy. Aviation maintenance areas are large to allow for the ground
handling of aircraft. Traffic patterns around aviation maintenance areas are also strong visual cues
to the enemy. Maintenance assets, including aviation shop sets, have characteristically distinct
multispectral cues.
 FARPs. A FARP provides POL and ammunition support to aviation sites and other tactical units.
A FARP consists of fuel bladders, trucks, fueling apparatuses, and bulk ammunition. Due to safety
requirements, FARP elements are dispersed as much as possible within terrain and operational
constraints. Each element is detectable with multispectral radar. In a FARP,—
 Fuel bladders contain petroleum liquids, for which thermal mass is a strong infrared cue
relative to the background. Bladders are often bermed and visible earth scarring is necessary
to construct the berms.
 Large, heavy, expanded-mobility tactical trucks are conspicuous in all wavelengths.
 Fueling areas are generally arranged in such a way that the fueling apparatus (hoses, pumps)
are aligned in an open area for safe and easy access. The linear deployment of these hoses is
a strong visual cue, and their dark color usually contrasts with the background. The dark hoses
experience solar loading, and the POL liquids within the hoses can provide a thermal cue.
 Equipment. Palletized ammunition and support equipment accompany aviation sites. Such
equipment is often stacked in regular, detectable patterns.
 Aircraft. Aircraft create large dust plumes when deployed to unpaved areas. Such plumes are
distinct visual cues and indicate the presence of rotary-wing aircraft to an enemy. Other
considerations for aircraft camouflage and concealment include the following:
 Parked aircraft. Camouflage nets, berms, stacked equipment, and revetments can effectively
conceal parked aircraft. Vertical screens constructed from camouflage nets help conceal
parked aircraft, particularly against ground-based threats. However, camouflage and
concealment techniques for rapid-response aircraft must not impair operational requirements,
which means that obtrusive, permanent camouflage and concealment techniques are generally
not an option. Also, foreign-object damage is a critical concern for aviation assets.
Camouflage and concealment for parked aircraft depend on the expected ground time between
flights. The commanding officer must approve all aircraft camouflage and concealment
techniques before implementation.

7-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Critical Assets

 Aircraft refueling. Aircraft refueling positions, particularly fuel hoses, should be dispersed
and arrayed in a nonlinear configuration. The hoses can be concealed at periodic locations
with cut vegetation or a light earth/sod covering to reduce visual and thermal signatures.
 Defensive positions. The construction of defensive positions can create detectable areas of scarred
earth.
 Camouflage and concealment. Aviation sites are extremely valuable targets; therefore, try to
prevent their initial detection by an enemy.
 Vehicles. Large vehicles can be effectively concealed with camouflage nets. Also, properly
placing these vehicles to use terrain features and indigenous vegetation increases their
survivability. Expedient vehicle decoys provide an enemy with alternate targets, and proper
camouflage and concealment discipline is essential.
 Dunnage. Quickly conceal dunnage to minimize the evidence of aviation sites.
 Dust. To avoid dust, park aircraft in grassy areas or where the earth is hard-packed. If such areas
are unavailable, disperse water on the area to minimize dust plumes. However, water-soaked earth
can also be an infrared detection cue, so use this option sparingly and, if possible, at night. Several
chemical dust palliatives are available that provide excellent dust control for aviation areas.
 Construction. When constructing defensive positions, minimize disturbances to the surrounding
area. Cover scarred earth with cut vegetation, camouflage nets, or toned-down agents.

Note. See ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7, MCRP 3-40D.2/NTRP 4-04.2.10-2/AFMAN 32-8013-2,

and TM 3-34.48-2 for additional information on engineering support to aviation sites.

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Chapter 8
Special Environments
Survivability operations may be conducted in jungles, mountainous areas, deserts, cold
regions, and urban areas. Each environment presents its own challenges requiring
specialized knowledge, skills, techniques, and equipment. The fundamentals of
providing cover, camouflage, and concealment do not change between environments;
however, the guidelines for their application do. This chapter describes several special
environments; their effects on survivability operations; thoughtful, creative, and
unique camouflage and concealment techniques; and some special considerations for
operating within them.

JUNGLES
8-1. Jungles are humid, tropical areas with a dense growth of trees and vegetation. Visibility is typically
less than 100 feet, and areas are sparsely populated. Because mounted infantry and armor operations are
limited in jungle areas, individual and crew-served weapons fighting position construction and use receive
additional emphasis. While jungle vegetation provides excellent concealment from air and ground
observation, fields of fire are difficult to establish. Vegetation does not provide adequate cover from small-
caliber direct fire and artillery indirect-fire fragments. Adequate cover is available in the form of natural
ravines and gullies produced by erosion from the typically high rainfall amounts in the area. FM 90-5
provides more information on fighting positions and camouflage and concealment in jungle environments.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COVER

8-2. The few natural or locally procurable materials that are available in jungle areas are usually limited to
camouflage use, although certain trees may be suitable for survivability construction. Survivability
construction materials are typically transported to these areas and are required to be weather- and rot-
resistant. When shelters are constructed in jungles, primary consideration is given to drainage provisions.
Because of high amounts of rainfall and poor soil drainage, positions are built to allow for good, natural
drainage routes. Survivability construction—including that used to protect storage areas, CPs, and
infrastructure—must include planning for drainage. This not only prevents flooded positions, but it also
prevents the accumulation of contaminants. Other considerations are high water tables, dense undergrowth,
and tree roots, which often require aboveground-level protective construction.
8-3. The construction of individual and vehicle protective and fighting positions is limited by the water
table and high rainfall amounts. Vehicle positions are generally constructed aboveground, using earth berms
and sandbag or soil-filled container construction techniques. Where groundwater is high or where there is a
low-pressure resistance soil, a swamp bed (see FM 3-05.70 and MCRP 8-10B.7) can be used as a fighting
position platform. This platform provides a floating base or floor, where wet or low-pressure-resistance soil
precludes standing or sitting.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

8-4. The color of jungle terrain primarily consists of greens and browns, but shadows and growth also mean
that black is a key color. The density of vegetation and the time of day cause variances in colors. While no
set color or combination of colors matches all jungles, generalities are more easily used than in deserts.
Patches of uniform color in the jungle are significantly less conspicuous than those in deserts.

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Chapter 8

Topography
8-5. Jungle terrain has many features, although at a distance, many of the features may not stand out.
Remember that the terrain underneath the vegetation is not completely flat and may include significant bodies
of water or marshland.

Shadows
8-6. The jungle typically provides for deep shadows, and triple canopy may nearly exclude the penetration
of sunlight. The draping of camouflage nets is still necessary on the edges of the jungle or at breaks in the
foliage. Because of the natural vegetation, smaller sections of camouflage nets are of greater value than in
more open terrain.

Placement
8-7. Proper placement and shadow disruption remain effective techniques. Optimize the natural cover and
concealment to reduce shadows and silhouettes and to take advantage of terrain masking. Although virtually
unimportant in portions of the jungle, the movement of assets as the sun changes position may still be required
to remain in the shadows.

Terrain Mottling
8-8. Terrain mottling may be an effective technique on the edges of the jungle or in clearing areas within
larger jungle areas. See chapter 6 for information about terrain mottling.

Movement Discipline
8-9. Movement discipline remains important in jungle terrain. Vegetation moved near its base may still
sway at its tip and give away locations. The density of foliage may make it necessary to cut through portions.
Fresh cuts may become apparent to observers. Straight-line movement may be virtually impossible in some
portions of a jungle. The chopping or cutting of vegetation produces an audible signature, especially if the
cutting devices are mechanical. The dispersion of birds and other animals may also provide a visible and
audible signature of movement in the jungle.

Noise and Light Discipline

8-10. Noise and light discipline remain important in the jungle, although many sounds are muted by the
vegetation. Cutting noises and the movement of displaced birds and other creatures provide audible and visual
alerts to movement.

MOUNTAINOUS AREAS
8-11. Characteristics of mountain ranges include rugged, poorly trafficable terrain; steep slopes; and altitudes
greater than 488 meters (1,600 feet). Irregular mountainous terrain provides numerous places for cover and
concealment. Because of rocky ground, it is difficult and often impossible to dig below ground positions;
therefore, boulders and loose rocks are used in aboveground construction. Irregular fields of fire and dead
spaces are considered when designing and locating fighting positions in mountainous areas. ATP 3-90.97,
MCTP 12-10A, and TC 3-97.61 provide additional information on fighting positions and camouflage and
concealment in mountainous areas.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COVER

8-12. Reverse-slope defensive positions are well-suited to mountainous terrain. Units may easily locate
mutually supporting positions and mass fires onto the crest, while the terrain provides numerous natural
obstacles. Direct-fire weapon positions in mountainous areas may be at a disadvantage because restricted
frontal views inhibit engaging the enemy at maximum weapon range. Enemy forces topping the crest may
also be able to shoot down on top of fighting positions. Indirect-fire weapon positions are better protected
from direct and indirect fire when they are located behind steep slopes and ridges.

8-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

8-13. Another important design consideration in mountainous terrain is the requirement for substantial OHC.
The adverse effects of artillery bursts above a protective position are greatly enhanced by rock and gravel
displacement or avalanche. Construction materials used for structural and shielding components are most
often indigenous rocks, boulders, and rocky soil. Rock formations are often used as structural wall
components without modification. Conventional tools are inadequate for preparing individual and crew-
served weapons fighting positions in rocky terrain. Engineers assist with light equipment and tools (such as
pneumatic jackhammers) delivered to mountainous areas by helicopter. Explosives and demolitions can be
used for positions requiring rock and boulder removal.
8-14. In areas with rocky soil or gravel, wire cages or gabions are used as building blocks in protective walls,
structural walls, and fighting positions. Gabions are constructed of lumber, plywood, wire fence, or any
suitable material that forms a stackable container for soil or gravel. The two-person mountain shelter is
basically a hole 2.1 meters x 1.0 meters x 1.0 meters (7 feet long x 3.5 feet wide x 3.5 feet deep). The hole is
covered with 15- to 20-centimeter- (6- to 8-inch-) diameter logs with evergreen branches, a shelter half, or
local material such as topsoil, leaves, snow, and twigs placed on top. The floor is usually covered with
evergreen twigs, a shelter half, or other expedient material. Entrances can be provided at both ends, or a fire
pit can be dug at one end for a small fire or stove. A low earth berm can also be built around the position to
provide more cover for the occupants.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

8-15. Positions must be camouflaged to blend with the surrounding terrain to prevent aerial detection. The
color of mountainous terrain varies across the spectrum of color, depending on the minerals in the soil,
whether tree or other vegetation is covered, and the time of day. No single color or combination of colors
matches all mountainous terrain.

Topography
8-16. Mountainous terrain (including plateaus) is extremely varied. These features may resemble a high
desert terrain. Mountainous terrain may also receive rapidly changing weather with frequent periods of high
wind, rain, snow, sleet, hail, and fog.

Shadows
8-17. The closer a target is to the ground, the smaller its shadow; and a small shadow is easier to conceal
from aerial observation. The proper draping of camouflage nets alters or disrupts the regular, sharp-edged
shadows of military targets and allows target shadows to appear more like natural shadows. When
supplemented by artificial materials, natural shadows cast by folds of the ground can be used for camouflage
and concealment. The best solution to the shadow problem in mountainous terrain is to blend in with the
natural shadows and use overhead concealment or cover for terrain masking. Remember that shadows may
shift dramatically during the daylight hours. Park vehicles in a way that minimizes their broadside exposure
to the sun.

Placement
8-18. Place assets in gullies, folds, ravines, overhangs, and other natural cover and concealment areas to
reduce shadows and silhouettes and to take advantage of terrain masking. Less dispersion is typically
necessary in these locations than in desert terrain or other relatively flat areas. Move assets as the sun changes
position to keep equipment in the shadows.
8-19. Some special considerations for weapons placement are needed in mountainous terrain. An accurate
determination of ranges can be difficult. Like observation, fields of fire are excellent at long ranges. However,
dead space at short ranges can be a problem. When weapons cannot be positioned so that direct fire can cover
dead space, obstacles or indirect fire must be used.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-3

Chapter 8

Terrain Mottling
8-20. The scarring techniques associated with terrain mottling may work in select situations, but these
techniques are less likely to be useful when they are not used in desert areas. See chapter 6 for information
about terrain mottling.

Movement Discipline
8-21. Movement discipline is especially important in mountainous terrain. Irregular surfaces make
movement less fluid, potentially loosen stone and other materials that fall, and produce audible and visual
signatures. Dust and diesel plumes may also be highlighted against the backdrop terrain, and shine or
reflection may be problematic because they can be seen from extended distances. Shade optical devices (such
as binoculars and gun sights) when using them.

Noise and Light Discipline

8-22. Noise and light discipline are particularly important in mountainous terrain because sound and light
can be detected from a greater distance. Sounds caused by falling objects may echo and appear to last for a
longer time. The techniques for reducing these signatures remain the same as for other environments. Starting
all vehicle and equipment engines simultaneously is a technique that can be used to confuse enemy acoustical
surveillance efforts.

DESERTS
8-23. Deserts are extensive, arid, and treeless; suffer from a severe lack of precipitation; and possess extreme
daily temperature fluctuations. The terrain is sandy with boulder-strewn areas, mountains, dunes,
deeply-eroded valleys, areas of rock and shale, and salt marshes. Effective natural barriers are found in steep-
slope rock formations. Wadis and other dried-up drainage features are used extensively for protective position
placement. If using dry drainage features, remain aware of the risks of flash flooding. FM 90-3/MCTP 12-
10D provides additional information on fighting positions and camouflage and concealment in deserts.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COVER

8-24. Designers of fighting and protective positions in desert areas must consider the lack of available natural
cover and concealment. The only minimal cover available is through the use of terrain masking; therefore,
positions are often completed above ground. Mountain and plateau deserts have rocky soil, or surface chalk
soil, which makes digging difficult. In these areas, rocks and boulders are used for cover. Most often, berms
used in desert fighting or protective positions are undesirable because of probable enemy detection in the flat
desert terrain. Deep-cut positions are also difficult to construct in soft, sandy areas because of wall instability
during excavations. Revetments are almost always required unless excavations are very wide and have gently
sloping sides of 45 degrees or less. Designing OHC is also important because nuclear explosions have
increased fallout due to easily displaced sandy soil.
8-25. Indigenous materials are usually used in desert position construction. However, prefabricated
structures and revetments for excavations are ideal. Although excavation may be relatively easy (depending
on the soil type), additional care must be taken to prevent sandy soil from caving into fighting positions and
survivability construction must include adequate surface area and compaction of the bearing surface for posts
and beams. In addition, the open terrain, persistent winds, and the type of soil may require frequent
maintenance of earth berms to correct wind and water erosion issues. Metal culvert revetments are quickly
emplaced in easily excavated sand. Sandbags, sand-filled ammunition boxes, and soil-filled containers are
also used for containing backsliding soil. Therefore, camouflage and concealment, as well as light and noise
discipline, are important considerations during position construction. Target acquisition and observation are
relatively easy in desert terrain.

8-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

CAUTION
Any fighting position can easily collapse and crush or bury the personnel
within if not constructed properly. The instability of sandy soils makes
positions constructed in such soil especially prone to this hazard. It is
critical that positions are built according to established guidelines
outlined in this Army techniques publication, GTA 05-08-001, and TM 3-
34.85/MCRP 3-17A.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

8-26. The color of desert terrain varies from pink to blue, depending on the minerals in the soil and the time
of day. No color or combination of colors matches all deserts. Patches of uniform color in the desert are
usually 10 times larger than those in wooded areas. These conditions have led to the development of a neutral,
monotone tan as the best desert camouflage paint color. Desert regions may also produce dust storms, which
may effectively conceal friendly and enemy forces and restrict movement and maneuver.

Topography
8-27. Although desert terrain may appear featureless, it is not completely flat. In some ways, desert terrain
resembles unplowed fields; barren, rocky areas; grasslands; and steppes.

Shadows
8-28. The closer a target is to the ground, the smaller its shadow; and a small shadow is easier to conceal
from aerial observation. The proper draping of camouflage nets alters or disrupts the regular, sharp-edged
shadows of military targets and allows target shadows to appear more like natural shadows. When
supplemented by artificial materials, natural shadows cast by folds of the ground can be used for camouflage
and concealment purposes. The best solution to the shadow problem in desert terrain is to dig in and use
overhead concealment or cover. Otherwise, park vehicles in a way that minimizes their broadside exposure
to the sun.

Placement
8-29. Proper placement and shadow disruption remain effective techniques. Place assets in low areas to
reduce their shadows and silhouettes and to take advantage of terrain masking. More dispersion is necessary
in desert terrain than in wooded areas. Move assets as the sun changes position to keep equipment in shadows.

Terrain Mottling
8-30. Use terrain mottling when the ground offers little opportunity for concealment. See chapter 6 for
information about terrain mottling.

Movement Discipline
8-31. Movement discipline is especially important in the desert. Desert terrain is uniform and fragile, making
it easily disturbed by vehicle tracks. Vehicle movement also produces dust and diesel plumes that are easily
detectable in the desert. When movement is necessary, move along the shortest route and on the hardest
ground. Shine is a particularly acute desert problem due to the long, uninterrupted hours of sunlight. To deal
with this problem, cover or remove reflective surfaces. Use matte camouflage paint or expedient paints (see
table 6-2, page 6-16) to dull the gloss finish of a vehicle. Shade optical devices (binoculars, gun sights) when
using them.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-5

Chapter 8

Noise and Light Discipline

8-32. Noise and light discipline are particularly important in desert terrain because sound and light can be
detected at greater distances on clear desert nights. The techniques for reducing these signatures remain the
same as for other environments. Be aware that thermal sensors, while not as effective during the day, have
an ideal operating environment during cold desert nights. Simultaneously starting all vehicle and equipment
engines is a technique that can be used to confuse enemy acoustical surveillance efforts.

COLD REGIONS
8-33. Cold regions of the world are characterized by deep snow, permafrost, seasonally frozen ground, frozen
lakes and rivers, glaciers, and long periods of extremely cold temperatures. ATP 3-90.97 provides detailed
information on the considerations associated with arctic and cold region operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COVER

8-34. Digging in frozen or semifrozen ground is difficult with equipment and virtually impossible for
personnel using only standard entrenching tools. When possible, design positions to take advantage of
belowground cover. Dig positions as deep as possible, then build up. Fighting and protective position
construction on snow or frozen ground takes up to twice as long as construction on unfrozen ground. In areas
with permafrost, personnel may need to build fighting positions aboveground unless they have engineer
support.
8-35. Positions used in cold regions are affected by wind and the possibility of thaw during warming periods.
An unexpected thaw causes a severe drop in the soil strength, which creates mud and drainage problems.
Carefully locate positions near bodies of water (such as lakes or rivers) to prevent flooding damage during
the spring melt season. Wind protection greatly decreases the effects of cold weather on personnel and
equipment. The following areas offer good wind protection:
 Densely wooded areas.
 Groups of vegetation; small blocks of trees or shrubs.
 The lee side of terrain elevations. The protected zone extends horizontally up to three times the
height of the terrain elevation.
 Terrain depressions.

8-36. The three basic construction materials available in cold-region terrain are snow, ice, and frozen soil.
Positions are more effective when constructed with these materials in conjunction with timber, stone, or other
locally-available materials.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

8-37. Units must take additional care in cold environments. During operations in cold environments, units
must consider the amount of snow covering the terrain, proper placement, movement discipline, and thermal
signatures.

Snow-Covered Areas
8-38. When the main background is white, apply white paint or whitewash over the permanent camouflage
paint pattern. The amount of paint should be based on the percentage of snow coverage on the ground as
follows:
 If the snow covers less than 15 percent of the background, do not change the camouflage paint
pattern.
 If the snow cover is 15 to 85 percent of the background, substitute white for green in the
camouflage paint pattern.
 If the snow cover is more than 85 percent of the background, paint the vehicles and equipment
completely white.

8-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

Placement
8-39. A blanket of snow often eliminates much of the ground pattern, causing natural textures and colors to
disappear. Blending under these conditions is difficult. However, snow-covered terrain is rarely completely
white, so use the dark features of the landscape. Place equipment in roadways, in streambeds, under trees,
under bushes, in shadows, and in ground folds. Standard uniforms and personal equipment contrast with the
snow background, so use camouflage and concealment to reduce these easily-recognized signatures.

Movement Discipline
8-40. Concealing tracks is a major problem in snow-covered environments. Movement should follow wind-
swept drift lines (which cast shadows) as much as possible. Vehicle drivers should avoid sharp turns and
follow existing track marks. Wipe out short lengths of track marks by trampling them with snowshoes or by
brushing them out.

Thermal Signatures
8-41. Snow-covered environments provide excellent conditions for the thermal and UV sensors of a threat.
While personnel can hide from UV sensors if the UV reflectivity of their clothing matches the surroundings,
an infrared sensor is impossible to jam, penetrates camouflage, and provides good resolution day or night.
Natural materials and terrain obscure heat sources and break up shapes from infrared sensors, while winter
camouflage paint patterns, arctic LCSSs, smoke, and terrain masking are techniques for countering UV
sensors. Terrain masking remains the best solution to counter both thermal and UV sensors.

SNOW
8-42. Dry snow is less suitable for expedient construction than wet snow because it does not pack as well.
Snow piled at road edges after clearing equipment has passed becomes denser and begins to harden within
hours after disturbance, even at very low temperatures. Snow compacted artificially, by the wind, and after a
brief thaw is even more suitable for expedient shelters and protective structures. A uniform snow cover with
a minimum thickness of 10 inches is sufficient for shelter from the weather and for revetment construction.
Cut uniform size blocks (typically 20.3 x 30.5 x 40.6 centimeters [8 x 12 x 16 inches]), depending on the
degree of hardness and density) from the snow pack with shovels, long knives (machetes), or carpenter saws.
The best practices for constructing cold-weather shelters are those adopted from the natives of polar regions.
8-43. The systematic overlapping block-over-seam method ensures stable construction. Caulking seams with
loose snow ensures snug, draft-free structures and increases their longevity. Snow positions are built during
freezing or thawing if the thaw is not so long or intense that significant snow melt conditions occur. Mild
thaw of temperatures 1 or 2 degrees above freezing are more favorable than below-freezing temperatures,
because snow conglomerates readily and assumes any shape without disintegration. Below-freezing
temperatures are also necessary for snow construction to achieve solid freezing and strength. If water is
available at low temperatures, expedient protective structures are built by wetting down snow and using
shovels to shape it into desired forms. For information on snow shelters and other cold-region shelters, see
FM 3-05.70, MCRP 8-10B.7, and TC 21-3.

ICE
8-44. The initial projectile-stopping capability of ice is better than snow or frozen soil; however, under
sustained fire, ice rapidly cracks and collapses. Ice structures are built in the following three ways:
 Layer-by-layer freezing by adding water. This method produces the strongest ice but, compared
to the other two methods, is more time consuming. Form protective surfaces by spraying water in
a fine mist on a structure or fabric. The most favorable conditions for this method include -10 to -
15 degrees Celsius and moderate wind. About 5.0 to 7.6 centimeters (2 to 3 inches) of ice are
formed per day between these temperatures (0.5 centimeters [0.2-inch] of ice per degree below 0).
 Freezing ice fragments into layers by adding water. This method is very effective and the most
frequently used for building ice structures. Prepare about 1-inch-thick ice fragments on nearby
plots or on the nearest river or water reservoir. The fragments are packed as densely as possible

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-7

Chapter 8

into a layer 20.3 to 30.5 centimeters (8 to 12 inches) thick. Then, spray water over the layers of
ice fragments. Crushing the ice fragments weakens the ice construction. If the weather is favorable
(-10 to -15 degrees Celsius with wind), a 40.6- to 60.9-centimeter (16- to 24-inch) -thick ice layer
is usually frozen in a day.
 Laying ice blocks. This method is the quickest, but it requires assets to transport the blocks from
the nearest river or water reservoir to the site. Ice blocks, laid and overlapped like bricks, are of
equal thickness and uniform size. To achieve good layer adhesion, lightly spray the preceding
layer with water before placing a new layer. Each new layer of blocks freezes onto the preceding
layer before additional layers are placed.

FROZEN SOIL
8-45. While ice has a better initial projectile-stopping capability, frozen soil is three to five times stronger
than ice and increases in strength with lower temperatures. Frozen soil has much better resistance to impact
and explosion than to steadily-acting loads—an especially valuable feature for position construction
purposes. Construction using frozen soil is performed as follows:
 Prepare blocks of frozen soil from a mixture of water and aggregate (icecrete).
 Lay the prepared blocks of frozen soil.
 Freeze the blocks of frozen soil together in layers.

8-46. Unfrozen soil from beneath the frozen layer is sometimes used to construct a position quickly before
the soil freezes. Material made of gravel-sand-silt aggregate mixed with water to a consistency similar to
Portland cement concrete is also suitable for constructing positions. After freezing, the material has the
properties of concrete. The construction methods used are analogous to those using ice.

Belowground Positions
8-47. When the frost layer is 0.3 meters (1 foot) or less, fighting positions are usually constructed below
ground. Snow packed 2.4 to 2.7 meters (8 to 9 feet) provides protection from sustained direct fire from small-
caliber weapons up to and including the 14.5-millimeter machine gun. When possible, use unfrozen
excavated soil to form berms about 0.6 meters (2 feet) thick, and place snow on the soil for camouflage and
extra protection. For added frontal protection, reinforce the interior snow with a log revetment at least 7.6
centimeters (3 inches) in diameter. Reinforce the outer surface with small branches to initiate bullet tumble
upon impact. Bullets slow down very rapidly in snow after they begin to tumble. The wall of logs directly in
front of the position safely absorbs the slowed tumbling bullet.
8-48. Construct OHC with 0.9 meters (3 feet) of packed snow placed atop a layer of 6-inch-diameter logs.
This protection is adequate to stop indirect-fire fragmentation. Place a layer of small, 5.1-centimeter (2-inch)
diameter logs atop the packed snow to detonate quick-fuzed shells before they become imbedded in the snow.
Figure 8-1 shows belowground fighting positions in snow.

8-8 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

Figure 8-1. Belowground fighting position in snow

Aboveground Positions
8-49. If the soil is frozen to a significant depth, personnel equipped with only standard entrenching tools and
axes will have difficulty digging fighting positions. Under these conditions (below the tree line), snow and
wood are often the only natural materials available to construct fighting positions. Dig the fighting position
at least 50.8 centimeters (20 inches) deep, up to chest height, depending on snow conditions. Ideally,
sandbags are used to revet the interior walls for added protection and to prevent cave-ins. If sandbags are not
available, construct a lattice framework using small branches; or if time permits, build a wall of
7.6-centimeter (3-inch) logs. Build OHC, frontal protection, and side and rear berms by employing the same
techniques described in chapter 4.
8-50. It is approximately 10 times faster to build aboveground snow positions than to dig in frozen ground
to obtain the same degree of protection. Excavate fighting and protective positions constructed in cold regions
by employing combined methods using hand tools, excavation equipment, and explosives. Heavy equipment
use is limited by traction and maneuverability. Explosives are an expedient method, but larger quantities are
required than those used in normal soil. See TM 3-34.82/MCRP 3-17.7L for information on using explosives
to excavate fighting positions and considerations for use in ice and permafrost.

SPECIAL COLD-REGION POSITIONS

8-51. Construct a platform of plywood or timber to the rear of the frontal protection to provide a solid base
from which to employ the guns. OHC is usually offset from the firing position because of the difficulty of
digging both the firing and protective positions together in the snow. The protective position should have at
least 0.9 meters (3 feet) of packed snow as cover. The fighting position should have snow packed 2.4 meters
to 2.74 meters (8 to 9 feet) thick for frontal, and at least 0.6 meters (2 feet) thick for side protection (figure
8-2, page 8-10). Use sandbags to revet the interior walls for added protection and to prevent cave-ins.
However, packed snow, rocks, 10.1-centimeter (4-inch) diameter logs, or ammunition cans filled with snow
are sometimes used to complete the frontal and overhead protection and the side and rear berms. Figure 8-2
also shows dismounted tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW); Javelin; and machine gun
positions in snow.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-9

Chapter 8

Figure 8-2. Dismounted antitank and machine gun positions in snow

8-52. Construct positions for individuals by placing packed snow on either side of a tree and extending the
snow berm 2.4 to 2.7 meters (8 to 9 feet) to the front, as shown in figure 8-3. Construct the side and rear
berms of a continuous snow mound a minimum of 0.6 meters (2 feet) wide and high enough to protect the
Soldier’s/Marine’s head.

Figure 8-3. Individual fighting position in snow

8-10 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

8-53. In deep snow, revetments for trenches and weapon positions are required unless the snow is well
packed and frozen. In snow too shallow to permit the required depth of excavation, snow walls are usually
constructed. The walls are made of compacted snow, revetted, and at least 1.9 meters (6.5 feet) thick. Figure
8-4 shows a snow trench with a wood revetment. Table 8-1 contains snow wall construction requirements.

Figure 8-4. Snow trench with wood revetment

Table 8-1. Snow wall construction for protection from grenades, small-caliber fire, and
HEAT projectiles

Snow Density Muzzle Required

Penetration (feet)
(pounds per Projectiles Velocity Minimum
cubic foot) (feet per second) Thickness (feet)
Grenade
18.0–25.0 NA 2.0 3.0
fragmentation (HE)
11.2–13.0 5.56 mm 3,250 3.8 4.4
17.4–23.7 5.56 mm 3,250 2.3 2.6
11.2–13.1 7.62 mm 2,750 13.0 15.0
17.4–23.7 7.62 mm 2,750 5.2 6.0
25.5–28.7 7.62 mm 2,750 5.0 5.8
19.9–24.9 12.7 mm 2,910 6.4 7.4
28.1–31.2 70-mm HEAT 900 14.0 17.5
31.2–34.9 70-mm HEAT 900 8.7–10.0 13.0
27.5–34.9 90-mm HEAT 700 9.5–11.2 14.5
Notes.
1. These materials degrade under sustained fire. Penetrations given for 12.7 mm or smaller are for sustained fire (30
continuous firings into a 1- by 1-foot area).
2. Penetration characteristics of former Warsaw Pact ammunitions do not differ significantly from U.S. counterparts.
3. Figure given for HEAT weapons is for former Soviet PRG-7 (70 mm) and U.S. M67 (90 mm) fired into machine-packed
snow.
4. HE grenades produce small, high-velocity fragments that stop in about 2 feet of packed snow. Effective protection from
direct fire is independent of the delivery method, including newer machine guns like the former Soviet AGS-17 (30 mm)
or U.S. MK 19/M75 (40 mm). Only armor-penetrating rounds are effective.
Legend:
HE high explosives
HEAT high explosives antitank
mm millimeter
U.S. United States

URBAN AREAS
8-54. Survivability of forces operating in urban areas depends on the leader’s ability to locate adequate
fighting and protective positions from the many apparent covered and concealed areas available. Fighting

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-11

Chapter 8

and protective positions range from hasty positions formed from piles of rubble to deliberate positions located
inside urban structures. Urban structures are the most advantageous locations for individual fighting
positions. ATTP 3-06.11, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, and, MCRP 12-10B.1 contain detailed and thorough
information on fighting positions and camouflage and concealment in urban terrain. This section provides
additional considerations not addressed in those manuals.
8-55. ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B describe urban environments as including urban airspace,
supersurface (tops of buildings), surface (ground, street, and water level), and subsurface (underwater and
subterranean) areas; and it emphasizes the importance of considering exterior and interior space. It describes
buildings using five interrelated aspects that characterize all buildings—function, size, height, materials, and
construction methods—and two additional aspects that determine the interior layout of a building (exterior
openings and floor plans).
8-56. Some multistory buildings are vulnerable to what is known as progressive collapse. Progressive
collapse occurs when a building component that supports other components fails, leading to the supported
components failing as well. The potential result is the collapse of large portions of buildings, as in the collapse
of a house of cards. Newer construction practices in western countries have made progressive collapse a rare
event. However before occupying a multistory structure, consult with an experienced structural engineer to
evaluate it for progressive collapse risk.
8-57. Structural or load-bearing walls serve as part of the framing system of a building. This type of
construction is common in other parts of the world and in smaller buildings. Because of the load-bearing
nature of exterior walls, such collapses are more common in these buildings. Consequently, where there are
framed buildings available to be used for shelter or protection, consider using them rather than buildings with
stacked walls. See ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B for more information about stacked walls.

URBAN STRUCTURES
8-58. Leaders use the characteristics of buildings (listed in paragraph 8-55 and described in ATTP 3-06.11
and ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B) to evaluate them for protective soundness. The evaluation is based on
available troop protection and weapon position employment requirements for cover, concealment, and routes
of escape. Table 8-2 summarizes building characteristics fulfilling survivability requirements for troop
protection.
Table 8-2. Survivability requirements for troops in urban buildings
Requirements Building Characteristics

1. Proportion of walls to windows.

2. Wall composition and thickness.
Cover
3. Interior wall and partition composition and thickness.
4. Stair and elevator modules.

1. Proportion of walls to windows.

2. Venting pattern.
Concealment
3. Floor plan (horizontal and vertical).
4. Stair and elevator modules (framed high-rise buildings).

1. Floor plan (horizontal and vertical).

Escape
2. Stair and elevator modules.

8-12 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

Cover
8-59. The extent of building cover depends on the proportion of walls to windows. It is necessary to know
the proportion of nonwindowed wall space that might serve as protection. Buildings with structural walls,
with a high proportion of walls to windows, afford more substantial cover than framed buildings that have a
lower proportion of wall to window space and (usually) light-clad walls.
8-60. The composition and thickness of exterior and interior walls also have a significant effect on cover
assessment. Buildings with structural walls usually have strong weight-bearing walls that provide more cover
than the typically light-clad walls of framed buildings. However, interior walls of the older, heavy-clad,
framed buildings are stronger than those of the new, light-clad, framed buildings. Cover within these light-
clad, framed buildings is very slight except in and behind their stair and elevator modules, which are usually
constructed of reinforced concrete. Familiarity with the location, dimension, and form of these modules is
vital when assessing cover possibilities.

Concealment
8-61. Concealment considerations involve some of the same elements of building construction, but
knowledge of the venting (window) pattern and floor plan is added.
8-62. These patterns vary with the type of building construction and function. Older, heavy-clad, framed
buildings (such as office buildings) frequently have as full a venting pattern as possible, while hotels have
only one window per room. In the newer, light-clad, framed buildings, windows are sometimes used as a
non-load-bearing curtain wall. If the windows are all broken, no concealment possibilities exist. Another
aspect of concealment—undetected movement within the building—depends on a knowledge of the floor
plan and the traffic pattern within the building on each floor and from floor to floor.

Escape
8-63. In planning for escape routes, consider the floor plan, traffic patterns, and the relationships between
building exits. Possibilities range from small buildings with front street exits (posing unacceptable risks) to
high-rise structures that have exits on several floors (above and below ground level) and connect with other
buildings.

Fighting Positions
8-64. Building characteristics for fighting positions for individuals, machine guns, and AT and antiaircraft
weapons are summarized in table 8-3.
Table 8-3. Building characteristics for fighting positions in urban buildings

Requirements Building Characteristics

1. Wall compositions and thickness of upper floors.

Individual Positions 2. Roof composition and thickness.
3. Floor and ceiling composition and thickness.

1. Wall composition and thickness.

Machine Gun Positions
2. Local terrain.
1. Wall composition and thickness.
2. Room dimensions and volume.
3. Function-related interior furnishings and so forth.
4. Fields of fire (relative position of building).
Antitank Weapon Positions
5. Arming distance.
6. LOS.
7. Clear area and volume sufficient for weapon’s backblast and
overpressure.

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Chapter 8

Table 8-3. Building characteristics for fighting positions in urban buildings (continued)
Requirements Building Characteristics
1. Roof composition and thickness.
Antiaircraft Weapon Positions 2. Floor plan (horizontal and vertical).
3. LOS.
Legend:
LOS line of sight

Individual Fighting Positions

8-65. An upper floor area of a multistoried building generally provides sufficient fields of fire, although
corner windows can usually encompass more area. Protection from the possibility of return fire from the
streets requires that personnel know the composition and thickness of the outer wall of the building. Load-
bearing walls generally offer more protection than the typically light-clad walls of framed buildings.
However, the relatively thin walls of a low-brick building (only two bricks thick or 20.3 centimeters [8
inches]) are sometimes less effective than a 38.1-centimeter (15-inch) thick, non-load-bearing, light-clad wall
of a high-rise framed structure.
8-66. Individual personnel are also concerned about the amount of overhead protection available. Therefore,
personnel need to know about the properties of roof, floor, and ceiling materials. These materials vary with
the type of building construction. In brick buildings, the material for the ceiling of the top floor is far lighter
than that for the next floor down that performs as both ceiling and floor, and thus is capable of holding up
the live load of the room.

Machine Gun Positions

8-67. Machine guns are usually located on the ground floor to achieve grazing fire. In brick buildings, the
lower floors have the thickest walls, and thus the greatest degree of cover. In frame buildings, walls are the
same thickness on every floor, and thus the ground floor provides no advantage. Another consideration is the
nature of the local terrain. Should a building selected for a machine gun position lie over the crest of a hill,
grazing fire is sometimes not possible from a ground floor. In such cases, depending on the slope angle of
the area, grazing fire is achieved only from a higher floor.

Antitank Weapon Positions

8-68. The positioning of AT weapons within buildings demands consideration of the critical need for cover.
Buildings with fairly thick walls have rooms that are too small to permit the firing of heavy AT weapons
such as the TOW. Therefore, only light AT weapons (such as the AT4) are fired from inside buildings. When
AT weapons are fired, backblast is present and minimum room size must be adhered to, as shown in table
8-4.
Table 8-4. Minimum floor sizes for firing weapons in enclosed areas
Minimum Floor Size
Weapons
Frame Masonry
Javelin 12 ft by 15 ft (3.65 m by 4.57 m) 12 ft by 15 ft (3.65 m by 4.57 m)
Minimum of 4 ½ ft (1.37 m) to back
AT4 7 ft by 12 ft (2.13 m by 3.65 m)
wall
Legend:
ft feet
m meters

8-14 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Special Environments

WARNING
Due to the size of the primary danger area, the hazards of launch
motor blast, high noise levels, overpressure, and debris, the TOW
should not be fired from buildings or bunkers or within 100 meters
(328 feet) of a vertical or nearly vertical backstop. See
FM 3-22.34 and MCRP 3-01F.1.

WARNING
The M3 Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System is
intended for free field use and is restricted from being fired when
significant reflective surfaces (other than the ground, such as
walls, vehicles, and structures) are closer than 10 meters (32.81
feet) from the firing position. Firing this system when reflective
surfaces are closer than 10 meters (32.81 feet) will result in blast
overpressure reflecting back at the firing position, which can cause
blast-related injury to the gun crew and/or nearby support
elements. No significant reflective surfaces (other than the ground)
should be located within the back-blast area.

8-69. When weapons are fired in enclosed areas in structures, the following conditions are required:
 The area must have a ceiling at least 2.13 meters (7 feet) high. Minimum floor sizes by weapon
and type of construction are shown in table 8-4.
 About 1.9 square meters (20 square feet) of ventilation is necessary to the rear of the weapons. An
open door normally provides adequate ventilation.
 Small, loose objects and window/door glass are removed from the firing area.
 Combustible material is removed from behind the weapon. Curtains and overstuffed furniture out
of the blast area are usually left in place to help absorb sound.
 For antitank guided missiles, vertical clearances between the bottom of the launch tube and the
wall opening are 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) for TOW, and 30.48 centimeters (12 inches) for
Javelin. Given a requirement for rotation and a wide field of fire, light-clad framed buildings may
need to be selected to account for backblast.
 Occupants must be forward of the rear of the weapon and wear helmets and earplugs.

Antiaircraft Weapon Positions

8-70. The deployment of antiaircraft weapons is a consideration of building characteristics. An ideal type of
building for such deployment is a modern parking garage with rooftop parking. It offers sufficient cover and
a circulation pattern favoring weapons carried on light vehicles. It also frequently offers good LOS.

Other Planning Considerations

8-71. Fighting and protective positions located inside urban buildings sometimes require upgrade or
reinforcement. Before planning building modifications, consider the—
 Availability of materials, such as fill for sandbags.
 Transportability of materials up stairwells and into attics.
 Structural limitations of attics and upper-level floors (dead-load limitations).

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 8-15

Chapter 8

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

8-72. Urbanization is reducing the amount of open, natural terrain throughout the world. Therefore, modern
military units must be able to apply effective urban camouflage and concealment. Many of the camouflage
and concealment techniques used in natural terrain are effective in urban areas.

Planning
8-73. Planning for operations in urban areas presents unique difficulties. Tactical maps do not show
man-made features in enough detail to support tactical operations. Therefore, they must be supplemented
with aerial photographs and local city maps. Local government and military organizations are key sources of
information that can support tactical and camouflage and concealment operations. They can provide diagrams
of underground facilities, large-scale city maps, and civil-defense or air-raid shelter locations.

Selecting a Site
8-74. The physical characteristics of urban areas enhance camouflage and concealment efforts. The dense
physical structure of these areas generates clutter (an abundance of EM signatures in a given area) that
increases the difficulty of identifying specific targets. Urban clutter greatly reduces the effectiveness of threat
surveillance sensors, particularly in the infrared and radar wavelengths. Therefore, urban terrain provides an
excellent background for concealing CPs, reserves, logistics complexes, or combat forces. The inherent
clutter in urban terrain generally makes visual cues the most important consideration in an urban camouflage
and concealment plan.
8-75. The regular pattern of urban terrain; the diverse colors and contrast; and the large, enclosed structures
offer enhanced concealment opportunities. Established, hardened road surfaces effectively mask vehicle
tracks. Depending on the nature of the operation, numerous civilian personnel and vehicles may be present
and may serve as clutter. This confuses the enemy and reduces its ability to distinguish between military
targets and the civilian population. Underground structures (sewers, subways) are excellent means of
concealing movement and critical assets.
8-76. When augmented by artificial means, man-made structures provide symmetrical shapes that provide
ready-made camouflage and concealment. The camouflage and concealment for fighting positions are
especially important because of the reduced identification and engagement ranges (100 meters [328 feet] or
less) typical of urban fighting. Limit or conceal movement and shine. These signatures provide the best
opportunity for successful threat surveillance in urban terrain. The careful placement of equipment and
fighting positions remains important to provide visual camouflage and concealment and to avoid detection
by contrast (thermal sensors detecting personnel and equipment silhouetted against colder buildings or other
large, flat surfaces).

Establishing Fighting Positions

8-77. The fundamental camouflage and concealment rule is to maintain the natural look of an area as much
as possible. Buildings with large, thick walls and few narrow windows provide the best concealment. When
selecting a position inside a building, personnel should—
 Avoid lighted areas around windows.
 Stand in shadows when observing or firing weapons through windows.
 Select positions with covered and concealed access and egress routes (breaches in buildings,
underground systems and trenches).
 Develop decoy positions to enhance camouflage and concealment operations.

Placing Vehicles
8-78. Hide vehicles in large structures, if possible, and use local materials to help blend vehicles with the
background environment. Paint vehicles and equipment a solid, dull, dark color. If this is not feasible, use
expedient paints to subdue the lighter, sand-colored portions of the standard camouflage screening paint
patterns. When placing vehicles outdoors, use shadows for concealment. Move vehicles during limited
visibility or screen them with smoke.

8-16 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Appendix A
Entry Control Points
VBIEDs and suicide attacks (which can produce large numbers of casualties) are
common tactics used against base camps and other sites. Therefore, it is important to
design and emplace facilities that detect or deter these methods of attack, especially at
the entrance to base camps and critical infrastructure locations. Properly designed
ECPs protect the facility and personnel occupying the ECP while allowing for
organized and efficient traffic flow. A well-organized ECP minimizes confusion and
allows the rapid flow of vehicles and personnel while minimizing the threat of attack.
This appendix provides a brief overview of ECP design. See
GTA 90-01-011, GTA 90-01-018, and UFC 4-022-01 for additional construction
guidelines.

SITE SELECTION CRITERIA

A-1. The development of a new ECP and improvements of existing ECPs begin with an evaluation of the—
 Anticipated traffic volume.
 Interface with the surrounding road network.
 Threat environment.
 Terrain available to accommodate design features.
 Availability, quantity, and proficiency of local national security guards.

VEHICLE TRAFFIC
A-2. Vehicles entering and exiting the ECP must be controlled with simple features and clear instructions.
ECP design (adequate turning dimensions, barrier employment, procedures required to meet security
requirements) should accommodate the largest vehicle class requiring entry into the base camp. Space
permitting, ECPs should have multiple lanes for separating oversized vehicles, military vehicles, and
commercial vehicles. Separation of those vehicles recognizes size differences, barrier placement, search
requirements (risk), and the overarching need to meet throughput requirements while maintaining security.

PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC
A-3. ECP design should direct pedestrian traffic to a specified walkway that is separate from vehicular
traffic. The separation of vehicle and pedestrian traffic affords a control measure to mitigate the effects of a
VBIED attack. Pedestrian walkways should be designed to allow the continuous surveillance of pedestrians
transiting the ECP.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
A-4. Design should be driven by the observance of the eight ECP operational principles described in
GTA 90-01-018. This enables ECP personnel to maintain appropriate traffic throughput and adequate
security. Those principles are—
 Security. Effective security design enables control over individuals, objects, and activities to
prevent unauthorized access into, and enemy attacks against, the base camp. Security design
should include provisions for multiple overwatch positions, EAs, and the employment of random
antiterrorism measures.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C A-1

Appendix A

 Early warning. ECP design should enhance early warning by incorporating compliance measures
and sensors to provide indications of potential threat activity.
 Standoff. ECP design should maximize standoff by—
 Incorporating the placement of barriers.
 Slowing, restricting, and metering/controlling the advance of individuals and vehicles.
 Increasing the time available to observe and assess a potential threat.
 Providing multiple opportunities for the threat to display compliance or noncompliance.
 Providing physical protection to ECP personnel and host nation security forces.
 Identification. ECP design should create compliance measures to assist in identifying and
discriminating between authorized and unauthorized individuals.
 Segregation. ECP design should physically separate different types of traffic. When possible, the
design should separate military vehicles, types/classes of civilian vehicles, and pedestrian traffic.
 Mitigation. ECP design should incorporate materials and technologies to reduce the effectiveness
of enemy tactics used to observe, plan, and execute attacks. Designs should—
 Limit the ability of the enemy to observe ECP operations.
 Reduce or neutralize the effects of explosions.
 Reduce or limit personnel exposure by compartmentalizing areas.
 Include adequate physical protection for each Soldier/Marine operating the ECP.
 Capacity. ECP design should facilitate efficient throughput while maintaining adequate security.
Speed bumps, serpentines, turnstiles, or other control measures should be used in designs,
materials, and technologies to control the speed of vehicles and pedestrians moving through the
ECP. However, this should be done in a way that does not increase the vulnerability of individuals
waiting to enter the ECP.
 Simplicity. Simplicity of design permits ECP leadership and personnel to execute complex tasks,
especially during high-stress escalation of force incidents and attacks. A simple design should
incorporate—
 Standoff.
 A detailed obstacle plan.
 Overwatch positions and EAs.
 Clear and unambiguous directions for personnel transiting the ECP.
 Redundancy in power, critical communications, and sensor systems.

OPERATIONAL ZONES AND PHASES

A-5. The ECP should be divided into three functional zones (approach, primary response, and access control
and secondary response), each having specific purposes and functions. Those zones correspond to the
operational phases outlined in GTA 90-01-018 and depicted in figure A-1. Furthermore, design should
incorporate a defense-in-depth concept establishing primary and alternate fighting positions for ECP
personnel. The zones and phases are designed to provide ECP personnel with references for distance and
time.

A-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Entry Control Points

Figure A-1. Operational phases for ECPs

APPROACH ZONE
A-6. As individuals and vehicles depart the public road network and enter the military controlled area
outside the base camp, they enter the approach zone, which is the beginning of the ECP defense-in-depth
concept. The principal purposes of the approach zone are to provide standoff and early warning to control
incoming traffic. The approach zone design should include obstacles and compliance measures to—
 Separate different types of traffic.
 Restrict speed and movement.
 Protect vehicles and personnel inside the zone from external dangers.
 Protect individuals and vehicles from friendly fire.
 Provide audio and visual warnings to alert approaching individuals.

PRIMARY RESPONSE ZONE

A-7. The primary response zone is designed as the ECP EA for escalating force. ECP design for the primary
response zone should enable—
 The integration of protective obstacles to improve survivability for all personnel.
 The emplacement of obstacles to block vehicles and prevent entry.
 Direct fire from overwatching crew-served weapons.
 The continuous assessment of potential threats.

ACCESS CONTROL AND SECONDARY RESPONSE ZONE

A-8. Design of the access control and secondary response zone includes fighting positions, vehicle and
personnel inspection areas, and an access validation area. The design should ensure that the infrastructure
can support the appropriate amount of throughput and enable—
 Detailed searches.
 Access validation.
 Escalation of force.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C A-3

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Appendix B
Reachback Tools
This appendix highlights some of the support resources for personnel performing
survivability operations. These resources include the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE), the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), the Air
Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), the United States Army Engineer School
(USAES), the Army Facilities Component System (AFCS), the Simplified
Survivability Assessment (SSA), and the Antiterrorism Planner. This type of reachback
capability is one of the characteristics of field force engineering (FFE). See FM 3-34
and MCWP 3-34 for further information.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

B-1. The USACE is the direct reporting unit of the Army and is assigned the responsibility to execute Army
and DOD military construction, real estate acquisition, and national infrastructure development through the
civil works program. Most USACE assets are part of the generating force (see DA Pamphlet 25-30), but
select elements are part of the operational Army.
B-2. USACE has aligned its divisions with (and assigned liaison officers to) combatant and Army
commanders to enable access to USACE resources to support engagement strategies and wartime operations.
The USACE mission supports the following five major functions:
 Military support—provides engineering and contingency support for unified land operations.
 Disasters—responds to and supports recovery from local, national, and global disasters.
 Infrastructure—acquires, builds, and sustains critical facilities for military installations, theater
support facilities, and public works.
 Environment—restores, manages, and enhances local and regional ecosystems.
 Water resources development—balances requirements between water resources development and
the environment.
B-3. USACE support provides for technical and contract engineering support, integrating its organic
capabilities with those of other Services and other sources of engineering-related reachback support. Whether
providing construction contract and design support in the AO or outside of the contingency area, USACE
can obtain necessary data, research, and specialized expertise not present in theater through reachback
capabilities using tele-engineering when necessary. Tele-engineering is the communications architecture that
facilitates reachback when the existing communications infrastructure does not support it. Tele-engineering
is under the proponency of USACE and is inherent in FFE. Tele-engineering can provide valuable support
for planning survivability missions.
B-4. USACE is the primary proponent of FFE and related generating force support that enable engineer
support to the operational Army. FFE is the application of the Engineer Regiment capabilities from the three
engineer disciplines (but primarily general engineering) through reachback and forward presence. It enables
generating force engineer support to deployed operating forces and is provided by technically specialized
personnel and assets (deployed and participating through reachback) or through operational force engineer
personnel linked to reachback capabilities. The FFE concept is applicable in joint and multinational
operations to provide technical engineer solutions that can be implemented faster and with a smaller footprint.
The United States Air Force and the United States Navy have similar capabilities; the Air Force uses its Geo-
Reach program, while the Navy and Marine Corps have the capability to conduct engineer reconnaissance
with reachback to the NAVFAC.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C B-1

Appendix B

B-5. USACE supports FFE by training, equipping, and maintaining specialized deployable FFE teams that
execute the USACE mission in the AO. FFE teams are usually subordinate to the senior engineer commander
in the AO and provide additional military and civilian engineering expertise that can support survivability
missions. USACE also provides support through nondeployable teams that can be accessed by reachback.
These teams, whether deployed or supporting via tele-engineering, can provide valuable assistance in the
planning and design of survivability measures. See FM 3-34 and Engineer Pamphlet 500-1-2 for additional
information about FFE teams.

PROTECTIVE DESIGN CENTER

B-6. The Protective Design Center (PDC) provides information, criteria, and programming tools for U.S.
government agencies related to force protection and protective design. The PDC provides engineering design
and support services to the Army, DOD, and other U.S. government agencies for permanent and expedient
applications to protect assets against criminal, terrorist, conventional, nuclear, and special-weapon threats.
Agencies can receive assistance from the PDC on the following:
 Security engineering and protective design.
 Physical security surveys.
 Terrorist act damage assessment.
 CBRN protection.
 Aircraft and critical operation shelter design.
 Camouflage, concealment, and deception.
 Munition storage.
 EM Pulse Protection.

B-7. Units requesting PDC assistance can acquire additional information at the PDC Web site.

ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER

B-8. USACE operates the ERDC, a comprehensive network of laboratories and centers of expertise.
Research projects include facilities, airfields and pavements, protective structures, sustainment engineering,
environmental quality, installation restoration (cleanup), compliance and conservation, regulatory functions,
flood control, navigation, recreation, hydropower, topography, mapping, geospatial data, winter climatic
conditions, oceanography, environmental impacts, and information technology. ERDC developed (and is the
point of contact for) the SSA program and the Antiterrorism Planner (see below).

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS REACHBACK OPERATIONS CENTER

B-9. The UROC at the ERDC provides a reachback engineering capability to support contingencies across
the full operational and natural disaster spectrum. The UROC rapidly leverages USACE extensive resources
to deployed forces or those requiring specialized assistance. Common topics of requests for information
(RFIs) include—
 Bridge assessment.
 Airfield design and repair.
 Dam breach and hydrology analysis.
 Trafficability (on- or off-road).
 Geophysical environment analysis.
 Climate information and analysis.
 Force protection/survivability.
 Bomb damage assessment.
 Critical infrastructure assessment.
 Base camp development.
 Engineering, master planning, and facilities.
 Construction and mapping.

B-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Reachback Tools

Description
B-10. The UROC enables DOD personnel deployed worldwide to talk directly with experts in the United
States when an engineering problem in the field needs quick resolution. Deployed forces can be linked to
subject matter experts within the government, private industry, or academia to obtain solutions to complex
field problems. The UROC can be contacted at 1-877-ARMY-ENG or 601-634-2439; Defense Switched
Network (DSN) 312-446-2439; or e-mail: <uroc@[Link]> (secure e-mail:
<uroc@[Link]>). The UROC Web site is <[Link] (secure Web site:
<[Link]

Reachback Engineer Data Integration

B-11. The Reachback Engineer Data Integration (REDi) portal, located on the UROC Web site, provides a
common database; a robust user interface; and fully integrated mapping tools for receiving, managing,
tracking and archiving data and engineering reachback support conducted through the UROC. The UROC
REDi portal allows deployed forces to submit RFIs, receive updates, track the status of RFIs, search the
historical RFI database, and request support for other UROC capabilities such as reachback equipment,
training, and video teleconference support. REDi is also used by the UROC staff as a tool for managing and
documenting support for UROC customers and supported elements. The REDi portal also contains a force
protection portal that can be very helpful during the planning and execution of survivability operations.
MCWP 3-34 describes how MAGTF engineers may use the UROC REDi portal.

Force Protection Web site

B-12. The ERDC Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory developed and maintains the USACE/ERDC Force
Protection Web site as a repository for protection-related information of interest to the warfighter. A variety
of products, news, and information pertaining to operations and research and development are available on
the portal. ERDC-developed force protection products such as the Barrier Damage Assessment Module, the
Deployed Force–Risk Management Tool, the Fixed Site–Risk Management Tool, GTA 90-01-011, GTA 90-
01-034, and the Joint Antiterrorism Guide can also be accessed here. The portal is available as a component
of the REDi site. The portal can also be accessed directly at <[Link] A common
access card is required for portal access.

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND

B-13. NAVFAC contingency engineering provides a reachback capability through the Atlantic and Pacific
offices of the NAVFAC. NAVFAC forwards RFIs to the appropriate supporting organization or SME. Please
contact the NAVFAC Web site. The NAVFAC reachback contact information portal can also be accessed
directly at <[Link] A common access card and single sign-on account are needed for
portal access.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND THE ENVIRONMENT
B-14. The AFCEC operates a reachback center that provides rapid response to questions from civil engineers
in the field worldwide. The AFCEC reachback center is dedicated to assisting DOD civil engineers in the
execution of their mission across the full operational spectrum. View the AFCEC Web site at
<[Link] The AFCEC reachback center can also be reached by phone
at 16-850-283-6995 (toll-free 1-888-232-3721) or DSN 312-523-6995. E-mail requests can be sent to
<[Link]@[Link]>.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C B-3

Appendix B

SERVICE ENGINEER SCHOOLS

B-15. In the Army, the Engineer Doctrine Section of the MSCoE CDID manages engineer doctrine within
the Training and Doctrine Command Doctrine development cycle. As part of this process, USAES assesses
plans and develops, produces, and disseminates engineer doctrine that is synchronized with allied,
multinational, joint, multi-Service, and combined arms doctrine. USAES supports the development of
nonengineer doctrinal products by providing subject matter expertise for review and coordination. USAES
also supports the Engineer Regiment by managing the Center for Engineer Lessons Learned and providing
information and analysis as needed.
B-16. The Marine Corps Engineer School provides reachback for Marine Corps engineers and operating
forces. The school provides engineers with doctrinal, educational, historical, and technical support. Marine
Corps units can conduct engineer reconnaissance with reachback to the NAVFAC and USACE.

TECHNICAL ENGINEERING TOOLS

B-17. Units have several technical tools at their disposal to aid in the design and analysis of structures from
a protection and survivability aspect. This equipment may aid in communicating back to continental United
States-based resources or could be downloaded onto existing systems before deployment or while in theater.
Other tools (such as Engineering Field Planning, Reconnaissance, Surveying, and Sketching Set [ENFIRE])
are primarily used for reconnaissance, but retain SSA tools.

TELE-ENGINEERING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

B-18. The tele-engineering communication equipment provides reachback capability using off-the-shelf
satellite communications equipment with added security encryption. video teleconferences and data transfers
can be conducted from remote sites, where normal communications are unavailable.
B-19. The Tele-engineering Communications Equipment–Deployable (TCE-D) is a satellite-based
communications system that allows data exchanges and video teleconferences (see figure B-1). TCE-D also
provides phone, Internet, and e-mail access. The TCE-D is ruggedized for field use and consists of a laptop
computer, encryption device, external handheld camera, and miscellaneous components. The system is
capable of Integrated Services Digital Network- and internet protocol-based video conferencing. The
TCE-D connects through a satellite terminal and uses auto-switching power supplies to operate on both 110-
and 220-volt alternating-current power. The system can also be operated solely with vehicle battery power.
The Tele-engineering Communications Equipment–Fixed (TCE-F) is the office or conference room variant.
Contact the UROC (see appendix B) for more information about TCE-D and TCE-F.

Figure B-1. TCE-D

B-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Reachback Tools

IT KNOWS EVERYTHING GEOSPATIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL

B-20. The It Knows Everything (IKE)/Geospatial Assessment Tool for Engineering Reachback (GATER) is
a legacy data suite. The IKE/GATER links the user through a desktop conduit application to a data repository
at UROC and an online geographic information system mapping capability. Users can extract geographic
features and generate reports. The IKE/GATER device has been replaced with the Infrastructure
Reconnaissance Information System, which now uses the synchronization process for passing data collection
updates and software upgrades back to end users. The Infrastructure Reconnaissance Information System
focuses primarily on infrastructure assessment but may be used for similar geographic reports (such as the
IKE/GATER). Contact the UROC (see appendix B) for more information about the IKE/GATER application
or the Infrastructure Reconnaissance Information System.

BROADBAND GLOBAL AREA NETWORK

B-21. The Broadband Global Area Network terminal is a portable, robust satellite terminal that
simultaneously transmits voice and broadband data (see figure B-2). The TCE-D and Broadband Global Area
Network are typically combined to enable tele-engineering satellite communications.

Figure B-2. Broadband Global Area Network terminal

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C B-5

Appendix B

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEYING INSTRUMENT SET

B-22. The Reconnaissance and Surveying Instrument Set, commonly referred to as ENFIRE, is a digital tool
set used by engineers for executing combat and construction reconnaissance and surveys. ENFIRE is
primarily used for reconnaissance; however, it also contains an SSA tool for determining bunker shelter
requirements (see figure B-3).

Legend:
CD compact disc
DAGR Defense Advanced GPS Receiver
DVD digital versatile disc
PC personal computer
USB universal serial bus

Figure B-3. ENFIRE components

ARMY FACILITIES COMPONENTS SYSTEM

B-23. The AFCS provides support to engineers and DOD mission partners worldwide. AFCS is used for
planning, designing, and managing contingency construction missions in a theater of operations and for
emergency construction support during disaster relief operations. The AFCS design data repository currently
contains numerous facility designs, component designs, and drawings. Some of the designs include base
camps, barracks, latrines, containerized housing units, roads, administrative facilities, hospitals, power
facilities, petroleum storage and distribution facilities, and ammunition storage facilities. AFCS is available
through the REDi Web site.

JOINT CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

B-24. The JCMS Desktop application is used to develop contingency project plans based on Army and Naval
Facility designs. JCMS Desktop provides project planning, design drawings, project management
capabilities, and report generation. The facility designs provided in JCMS incorporate techniques to use
engineering materials to enable construction crews to satisfy the latest antiterrorism and force protection
standards. JCMS Desktop is installed on a desktop or laptop computer. Users can request the latest software
by submitting a NEW JCMS SOFTWARE REQUEST chosen from the SOFTWARE SUPPORT tab of the
AFCS REDi portal.

B-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Reachback Tools

Note. JCMS Desktop training is available from the TRAINING tab of the AFCS REDi portal SSA.

SIMPLIFIED SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT

B-25. The SSA is an ERDC-developed software tool application that provides engineers and planners with a
suite of tools and information on the design, construction, and planning of survivability positions. It is
preloaded onto laptops in the ENFIRE reconnaissance kit and can also be loaded onto desktop computers.
The SSA provides a database of survivability positions, including asset requirements, construction time
estimates, drawings, pictures, and construction guidance. These positions expand on the material in this
manual and include additional material for positions designed by ERDC.
B-26. The SSA also features a planning module for estimating construction times for a detailed plan of
survivability positions grouped by mission and task and based on a set of equipment assets. The estimates
include factors for night work, soil type, downtime, refueling, and crew size. Users can specify priorities and
easily set up alternate plans by selecting or deselecting different combinations of tasks and assets.
B-27. The hand-calculation method of designing OHC is replaced by a simple wizard format. Users can
choose from four design modes to determine the stringer length, spacing, soil depth, or level of protection,
depending on the other inputs.
B-28. The SSA CD comes bundled with the latest Windows® version of the conventional weapons effects
software tool for quickly assessing weapons effects. Users can estimate the air blast pressure at a given
distance from a weapon detonation or calculate the explosive weight for given crater dimensions. Other
calculations available include fragment and projectile penetration, ground shock, internal air blast, and loads
on structures. For more information regarding SSA, contact the UROC.

ANTITERRORISM PLANNER
B-29. The Antiterrorism Planner® software provides leaders and planners with a way to analyze and evaluate
protection capabilities in relation to different threats. By combining analysis, estimation, and evaluation, the
Antiterrorism Planner allows leaders to better assess survivability methods.

PURPOSE
B-30. The Antiterrorism Planner is a software tool based on threat, mission, and site considerations and is
designed to assist commanders in planning, implementing, and evaluating protective measures; expediting
structure designs; and providing the standoff guidance required for antiterrorism/survivability.

CAPABILITIES
B-31. The Antiterrorism Planner provides the user with a computerized analysis tool for evaluating critical
assets in terrorist threat scenarios based on aggressors, tactics, and weapons systems. The threat conditions
dictate a number of security measures from this manual that the user must consider and possibly employ.
These measures are cumulative from the lowest to the highest threat level and are presented in the
Antiterrorism Planner in a concise format. Emphasis has been placed on the evaluation of structural
components, windows, personnel, and other limited critical assets. Structural components are defined for
frames, walls, and roofs from common construction materials. Damage to the building components is
calculated using algorithms from the Facility and Component Explosive Damage Assessment Program, with
the user providing the distance of the explosive charge from the building.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C B-7

Appendix B

B-32. The Antiterrorism Planner can also provide the required standoff for a given explosive charge. After
the appropriate standoff is determined, based on the expected explosive size and an acceptable level of
building damage, the Antiterrorism Planner provides protective barrier information and a vehicle velocity
calculator to aid in barrier and obstacle selection. Extensive information is available on various types of
obstacles and protective barriers, and the information source is referenced. In addition, the Antiterrorism
Planner provides a basis for the design and analysis of wall and window retrofits. The capability is available
to view facility or site images, locate assets on the site image, and show building damage in two- and three-
dimensional graphical formats. Blast walls can be placed in front of structures, and the resulting damage to
a protected building is then calculated. Glass hazard calculations have been incorporated, along with user-
defined pressure-impulse curves to give engineers more flexibility in evaluating structures.
B-33. The Antiterrorism Planner contains algorithms to estimate injuries and fatalities to occupants of
structures to provide terrorist attack consequences for the antiterrorism program. The Antiterrorism Planner
can be obtained by contacting the UROC (see appendix B).

B-8 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Appendix C
Example Survivability Capabilities and Tracking Tools
The ability to communicate capabilities to a supported commander is critical for the
commander’s decisionmaking process. Capabilities are analyzed and assessed at each
phase of an operation, from planning through execution. Most capabilities are analyzed
and presented to the maneuver commander as part of the engineer running estimate,
which is a living document. As changes occur within the engineer structure (task
organization, equipment availability due to maintenance) or to other conditions that
may affect the estimate (such as timeline changes or weather), the capabilities
assessment must also change. Determining a method to communicate these capabilities
to the maneuver commander in a fashion that is meaningful or useful is critical. This
appendix provides a sample that engineers can use to plan and communicate
survivability capabilities while supporting operations. The sample may be modified to
fit the type or size of the engineer unit supporting the maneuver force. This appendix
also provides several techniques/tools used throughout the Army/Marine Corps to
assist the engineer in tracking progress and keeping the commander and staff abreast
of that progress. These examples (focused on survivability tasks) can be modified to
fit any size or type of engineer unit and are intended to keep leaders informed. These
tracking tools may be updated at predetermined time intervals and passed to the
engineer staff officer and supported commanders to keep them informed about the
status and progress of the engineer work effort. When provided with this information,
the commander possesses the flexibility to shift priorities to meet changing
requirements and adjust to changing situations while optimizing the use of time and
the available survivability capabilities.

ENGINEER CAPABILITIES CARD

C-1. The example capabilities card is focused on survivability effort potential. Normally, survivability
requirements compete against mobility and countermobility requirements. This tool tracks the current status
and potential capabilities for employment against the commander’s survivability priorities. The following
paragraphs provide a discussion about how to track engineer (and other selected maneuver support)
performance while executing essential tasks for M/CM/S and other tasks.
C-2. Figure C-1, page C-2, provides an example format to track survivability efforts in a BCT/regimental
combat team. It can also be tailored to other echelons. This provides the engineer with a quick reference
when discussing capabilities. It contains the most common pieces of equipment used in survivability
preparation and the most common materials available to harden facilities or vehicles. Users may adjust this
format to fit individual needs or add items not currently on the card. This format also assists the user in
tracking maintenance availability for survivability resources.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C C-1

Appendix C

Legend:
ACE armored combat earthmover NMC not mission capable
DEUCE deployable universal combat SEE small emplacement excavator
earthmover SSL skid steer loader
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator TDP turret defilade position
HYEX hydraulic excavator

Figure C-1. Example survivability capabilities matrix

USING COMMANDER’S CARDS

C-3. Commander’s cards provide quick, detailed information regarding engineer effort to the commander.
Because the commander’s time is limited, these cards should be easy to understand and provide accurate
information. The engineer staff officer should portray effort available in comparison to effort executed. He
should avoid providing commanders with raw data, such as materials or blade hours. Instead, the engineer
staff officer should consider providing numbers of positions or meters of berm available within the time
allowed when discussing capabilities.

THE COMMANDER’S CARD CARTOON

C-4. Cartoons are a common method used to plan and track survivability effort. They are normally made
using a hand-drawn representation of the AO or a photocopied map sheet segment. Either method provides
the commander a pictorial representation of the terrain, with a table portraying planned versus executed
survivability effort. Several copies of this can be made, and the staff engineer can update each with changes.
After the card is updated, the engineer can exchange the most recent card with the commander, providing the
commander with the most current survivability status (see figure C-2).

C-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Example Survivability Capabilities and Tracking Tools

Legend:
BCT brigade combat team
CAB combined-arms battalion
CM countermobility
COMP completed
EXEC/PLAN executed/planned
FIST-V fire support team vehicle
hr hour
MTR mortar
OB blocking obstacle
OF fixing obstacle
OT turning obstacle
SURV survivability
VOL volcano

Figure C-2. Example commander’s card used to track M/CM/S effort in cartoon

COMMANDER’S CARDS
C-5. Commander’s cards comprise another technique used to keep the commander informed. Commander’s
cards are used as a graphic survivability tracking tool that compares survivability effort planned to
survivability effort executed over time. This method is effective because it quickly provides the commander
with information on the status in a constrained timeline and supports maintaining a running estimate. Again,
this tool allows the commander to change priorities and make decisions regarding the survivability effort.
These cards can combine M/CM/S information in the combat environment or focus solely on the survivability
effort. The examples in figures C-3 and C-4, page C-4, are intended primarily for use at the battalion and
BCT/regimental combat team levels.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C C-3

Appendix C

Figure C-3. Example commander’s card used to track countermobility and survivability effort

Figure C-4. Example commander’s card to track survivability effort

C-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Example Survivability Capabilities and Tracking Tools

C-6. Commander’s cards in table form are also common. These provide raw numbers for the commander
but have no pictorial representation of the terrain. They are effective in communicating available resources
to the commander. This type of card is more commonly used in engineer headquarters to track and report
material available (see figure C-5).

Legend:
BCT brigade combat team
CBT VEH combat vehicle
FIST-V fire support team vehicle
HMEE high-mobility engineer excavator
indiv individual
MOPMS modular pack mine system
std standard
TF task force
V volcano

Figure C-5. Example commander’s card to track countermobility and survivability

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C C-5

This page intentionally left blank.
Appendix D
Bunker and Shelter Roof Design
This appendix provides designs, procedures, and tabular data for roof cover systems
used to defeat a contact burst HE projectile. It describes a simplified procedure for
using wood as the material for a standard stringer roof. A more detailed procedure is
provided for using other materials (such as steel). The calculations are lengthy, but they
are basically simple. The two example problems in this appendix were worked with a
handheld calculator, and the complete digital display is listed. This listing enables a
complete step-by-step following without the slight numerical variation caused by
rounding. In reality, rounding each result to three significant digits does not
significantly alter the outcome. See Technical Report N-76-7 for the empirical data
upon which these procedures are primarily based. See UFC 3-340-01 or contact the
UROC (see appendix B) for additional information or assistance with roof design for
hardened structures.

BASIC ROOF DESIGN

D-1. The standard stringer roof design is shown in figure D-1. The roof design discussed here is for a simple
stringer roof of single-ply or laminated sheathing covered with earth.

Figure D-1. Basic roof design for a simple stringer roof

DESIGN DATA REQUIREMENTS

D-2. The following data is required to complete the design:
 Soil parameters.
 Available stringer materials, dimensions, and orientation (stringer characteristics).
 Size (in millimeters) and type of round (superquick or contact burst) that the roof must defeat.
 Depth of soil cover.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-1

Appendix D

SOIL PARAMETERS
D-3. Two soil parameters are needed in the design procedure—unit weight and soil-impulse-to-structure
transmission coefficient. Soil unit weight must be determined at the time and place of design. Both the soil
type and its water content affect the unit weight. Soil unit weight is usually 80 to 140 pounds per cubic foot.
The transmission coefficient can be taken from table D-1. The transmission coefficients in table
D-1 are from limited HE tests and show the variability of soil structure response. Higher soil density and
moisture content increase the impulse load on the structure. For example, damp, compacted, cohesive cover
material should not be used because it does not attenuate the blast shock wave as well as dry, loosely placed
sand. Gravel is not recommended for cover material because the blast creates secondary missiles of gravel.
Table D-1. Transmission coefficients for different soil types
Transmission
Material Soil Type
Coefficient (C)1
SP Loose, clean, white mason sand 260–700
SP Loose, tan, pit-run sand 60–475
SP Loose, red, pit-run gravelly sand 75–320
SP Bagged, pit-run sand 130–140
GP Washed gravel, rounded 120
ML Loose, sandy silt 125–275
ML Compacted, sandy silt 350
Notes.
For additional information on soil types, see TM 3-34.43/MCRP 3-17.7H/NAVFAC MO 330/AFH 32-1034.
1
Because the impulse response characteristics of the various earth materials and the transfer of blast shock from the cover
material to the structural roof system are so varied and dependent on many factors (such as density, moisture content,
cohesiveness, porosity, grain size, and distribution), the larger transmission coefficient for a given material and soil type
should be used to provide a more conservative design. For example, use a transmission coefficient of 700 for SP (loose,
clean, white mason sand).
Legend:
GP gravel, poorly graded
ML silt, low plasticity
SP sand, poorly graded

STRINGER CHARACTERISTICS
D-4. Values for several stringer characteristics must be used in the design procedure: the moment of inertia,
section modulus, modulus of elasticity, and maximum dynamic flexural stress. For wood stringers, these
values are given in figure D-2, table D-2, and table D-3.

Figure D-2. Axis orientation, timber

D-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-2. Moment of inertia and section modulus for different timber sizes
X-X Axis Y-Y Axis
Nominal Size Actual Size Moment of Section Moment of Section
(inches) (inches) Inertia (I) Modulus (S) Inertia (I) Modulus (S)
(inches4) (inches3) (inches4) (inches3)
2 by 4 1 ½ by 3 ½ 5.36 3.06 0.98 1.31
2 by 6 1 ½ by 5 ½ 20.80 7.56 1.55 2.06
2 by 8 1 ½ by 7 ¼ 47.64 13.14 2.04 2.72
2 by 12 1 ½ by 11 ¼ 177.98 31.64 3.16 4.22
4 by 4 3 ½ by 3 ½ 12.51 7.15 12.51 7.15
4 by 6 3 ½ by 5 ½ 48.53 17.65 19.65 11.23
4 by 8 3 ½ by 7 ¼ 111.15 30.66 25.90 14.80
6 by 6 5 ½ by 5 ½ 76.26 27.73 76.26 27.73
6 by 12 5 ½ by 11 ½ 697.07 121.23 159.44 57.98
6 by 14 5 ½ by 13 ½ 1,127.67 167.06 187.17 68.06
8 by 8 7 ½ by 7 ½ 263.67 70.31 263.67 70.31
10 by 10 9 ½ by 9 ½ 678.76 142.90 678.76 142.90
Note.
Axis orientation is as shown in figure D-2.
Legend:
I moment of inertia
S section modulus

Table D-3. Modulus of elasticity and maximum dynamic flexural stress for different timber
species
Maximum Dynamic Flexural
Modulus of Elasticity (E) (106
Timber Species Stress (FS) (pounds per square
pounds per square inch)
inch)
Cedar 1.10 2,200
Douglas fir 1.76 4,000
White fir 1.21 2,200
Eastern hemlock 1.21 2,600
Western hemlock 1.54 3,200
Larch 1.76 4,600
Southern pine 1.76 6,000
Ponderosa pine 1.10 1,800
Redwood 1.32 3,400
Spruce 1.10 2,900
Legend:
E modulus of elasticity
FS flexural stress

D-5. For steel stringers, the values for inertia and section modulus are given in table D-4, page D-4, and
figure D-3, page D-4. For steel stringers, use modulus of elasticity = 29 and maximum dynamic flexural
stress = 50,000. Additional structural design data is available in the appendixes of TM 3-34.22/
MCRP3-17.7B.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-3

Appendix D

Table D-4. Moment of inertia and section modulus for different steel wide flange members
X-X Axis Y-Y Axis
Nominal Size Moment of Inertia Section Modulus Moment of Inertia Section Modulus
(inches) (I) (inches4) (S) (inches3) (I) (inches4) (S) (inches3)
36 by 16 ½ 14,988.4 835.5 870.9 105.7
36 by 12 9, 012.1 502.9 250.9 41.8
33 by 11 ½ 6,699.0 404.8 201.4 35.0
30 by 15 7,891.5 528.2 550.1 73.4
30 by 10 ½ 4,461.0 299.2 135.1 25.8
27 by 10 3,266.7 242.8 115.1 23.0
24 by 12 2,987.3 248.9 203.5 33.9
24 by 9 2,096.4 175.4 76.5 17.0
21 by 8 ¼ 1,326.8 126.4 53.1 12.9
18 by 7 ½ 800.6 89.0 37.2 9.9
16 by 7 446.3 56.3 22.1 6.3
14 by 6 ¾ 289.6 41.8 17.5 5.2
12 by 12 533.4 88.0 174.6 29.1
12 by 6 ½ 204.1 34.1 16.6 5.1
10 by 10 272.9 54.6 93.0 18.6
10 by 5 ¾ 106.3 21.5 9.7 3.4
8 by 8 109.7 27.4 37.0 9.2
8 by 6 ½ 82.5 20.8 18.2 5.6
8 by 5 ½ 56.4 14.1 6.7 2.6
6 by 6 53.5 16.8 17.1 5.6
4 by 4 11.3 5.45 3.76 1.85
Note.
Axis orientation is as shown in figure D-3.
Legend:
I moment of inertia
S section modulus

Figure D-3. Axis orientation, steel, wide-flange members

D-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

D-6. Table D-5 provides the thickness of wood sheathing for a given span length and thickness of earth
cover. Longer spans and thicker earth cover require a greater thickness of wood sheathing.

Table D-5. Maximum span of dimensioned wood roof sheathing for earth cover
Thickness of Earth Span Length (feet)
Cover (feet) 2½ 3 3½ 4 5 6
(Based on Material
Thickness Required Wood Thickness (inches)
for Shielding)
1½ 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 2 3
2½ 1 2 2 2 2 3
3 2 2 2 2 3 3
3½ 2 2 2 2 3 3
4 2 2 2 2 3 4

D-7. Table D-6 provides information on the maximum center-to-center stringer spacing, based on stringer
size and earth cover. The greater the thickness of the earth cover, the smaller the stringer-to-stringer spacing
for a given stinger dimension. Note that at certain points on the table, the required stringer size increases to
2 inches by 6 inches (minimum).

Table D-6. Maximum span of wood stringer roof support for earth cover
Span Length (feet)
Thickness of Earth
2½ 3 3½ 4 5 6
Cover (feet)
Center-to-Center Spacing (inches)
1½ 40 30 22 16 10 18*
2 33 22 16 12 8/20* 14*
2½ 27 18 12 10 16* 10*
3 22 14 10 8/20* 14* 8*
3½ 18 12 8/24* 18* 12* 8*
4 16 10 8/20* 10* 10* 7*
Note.
Stringers are 2 inches by 4 inches (or a minimum 5-inch-diameter round timber) except those marked by an asterisk
(*), which are 2 inches by 6 inches (or a minimum 7-inch-diameter round timber).

D-8. Table D-7, page D-6, pertains to steel pickets and landing mats for roof supports (for fragment
shielding only). When roof structures are designed to defeat contact bursts of HE projectiles, substantial
additional roof protection is required.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-5

Appendix D

Table D-7. Maximum span of steel picket roof supports for sandbag layers
Span Length (feet)
Number of Sandbag Layers 3 6 9
Center-to-Center Spacing (inches)
Single-Picket Beams1
2 7 7 6
5 6 5 4
10 4 4 3
15 4 3 2
20 3 3 2
Double-Picket Beams2
2 7 7 7
5 7 7 7
10 7 6 5
15 7 5 4
20 6 5 4
Notes.
Use in conjunction with steel landing mat sheathing.
1
Used with open side down.
2
Two pickets are welded together every 6 inches along the span to form box beams.

DESIGN PROCEDURES
D-9. The two basic procedures in bunker and shelter roof design are—
 Simplified design.
 Detailed design.

SIMPLIFIED DESIGN PROCEDURE

D-10. When designing wood stringer-supported roofs to defeat contact bursts of certain-sized munitions, the
simplified design procedure can be used. Use table D-8 which lists solutions calculated by the detailed design
procedure. In the table, locate the stringer data, cover data, and munitions type projected for contact burst to
determine center-to-center stringer spacing.

D-6 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-8. Center-to-center spacing for wood supporting soil cover to defeat contact bursts
Nominal Center-to-Center Stringer Spacing (h) (inches), for Cited Span Length (l)
Depth of
Stringer (feet)
Soil (d)
Size
(feet) 2 4 6 8 10
(inches)
For Defeat of 82-millimeter Contact Burst
2.0 3 4 4 4 3
2 by 4 3.0 18 12 8 5 3
4.0 18 14 7 4 3
2.0 4 7 8 8 6
2 by 6 3.0 18 18 16 12 8
4.0 18 18 18 11 7
2.0 7 10 10 9 7
4 by 4 3.0 18 18 18 12 8
4.0 18 18 18 10 7
1.5 4 5 7 8 8
4 by 8 2.0 14 18 18 18 18
3.0 18 18 18 18 18
For Defeat of 120- and 122-millimeter Contact Bursts
2.0 – – – – –
3.0 – – – – –
4 by 8 4.0 3.5 4 5 5 6
5.0 12 12 12 11 10
6.0 18 18 18 16 12
2.0 – – – – –
3.0 – – – – –
6 by 6 4.0 – – 5.5 6 6
5.0 14 14 13 12 10
6.0 18 18 18 16 12
2.0 – – – – –
3.0 – – – – –
6 by 8
4.0 5.5 6 8 9 10
5.0 18 18 18 18 17
2.0 – – – – –
3.0 – – – – –
8 by 8
4.0 7.5 9 11 12 13
5.0 18 18 18 18 18
For Defeat of 152-millimeter Contact Burst
4.0 – – – – 3.5
5.0 6 6 7 7 7
4 by 8
6.0 17 16 14 12 10
7.0 18 18 18 15 11
4.0 – – – – –
5.0 7 8 8 8 7
6 by 6
6.0 18 18 15 12 10
7.0 18 18 18 15 11

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-7

Appendix D

Table D-8. Center-to-center spacing for wood supporting soil cover to defeat contact bursts
(continued)
Nominal Center-to-Center Stringer Spacing (h) (inches), for Cited Span Length (l)
Depth of
Stringer (feet)
Soil (d)
Size
(feet) 2 4 6 8 10
(inches)
3.0 – – – – –
4.0 – – – – 6
6 by 8
5.0 10 11 12 12 12
6.0 18 18 18 18 17
3.0 – – – – –
4.0 – – – – 8
8 by 8
5.0 14 15 16 17 16
6.0 18 18 18 18 18
Notes.
1. The maximum beam spacing listed in the table is 18 inches. This is to preclude further design for roof material placed
over the stringers to hold the earth cover. A maximum of 1-inch wood or plywood should be used over stringers to support
the earth cover for 82-millimeter bursts; 2-inch wood should be used for 120-, 122-, and 152-millimeter bursts.
2. A dash indicates no data.
Legend:
d depth of soil
h center-to-center stringer spacing
l cited span length

D-11. Complete other elements of the design using the layout in figure D-1 on page D-1. If logs are to be
used for stringers, use table D-9 to convert from dimensional timber to round timber.
Table D-9. Converting dimensional timber to round timber
Round Timber (inches)
Timber (inches)
(excluding bark)
4 by 4 5
6 by 6 7
6 by 8 8
8 by 8 10
8 by 10 11
10 by 10 12
10 by 12 13
12 by 12 14
Note.
Sizes given are nominal and not rough-cut timber.

DETAILED DESIGN PROCEDURE

D-12. Figure D-4 shows the design calculations that are used to develop the 29-line data in the mathematical
process (see table D-10, page D-10) used to compute the information required to create a standard stringer
roof design. This process was used to select the material listed in table D-8. A roof is designed using the
process described in the remainder of this appendix. The design steps are as follows:
 Step 1. Use the design equations from figure D-4 or the applied 29-line mathematical process in
table D-10 to compute the largest half-buried trinitrotoluene (TNT) charge that the earth-covered
roof can safely withstand.

D-8 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

 Step 2. Use the charge equivalency in table D-11, page D-11, to find the approximate size of the
superquick or contact burst round that the half-buried TNT charge is equal to.
 Step 3. Complete the roof structure drawings and the bill of materials.
D-13. Use the equations in figure D-4, applying the applicable values for the geometry, material, and soil
properties to design the roof stringers. Alternatively, use the procedure in table D-10.

Figure D-4. Roof stringer design equation

D-14. Table D-10 provides the calculation method for evaluating the largest half-buried line charge weight
that a standard stringer roof can withstand. Use figure D-5, page D-13, and figure D-6, page D-14, as required
in completing the table.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-9

Appendix D

Table D-10. Standard stringer roof procedure (contact burst rounds)

Line Procedure and Result
1 Enter the unit weight of the soil (pounds per cubic foot) as determined on-site.
2 Enter the proposed depth of soil cover (feet).
Enter the S value (inches3):
3 if wood, from table D-2, page D-3.
if steel, from table D-4, page D-4.
4 Enter the stringer spacing (inches).
Enter the FS value (psi):
5 if wood, from table D-3, page D-3.
if steel, enter 50,000.
6 Enter the stringer span length (feet).
7 Multiply line 1 by line 4, enter result.
8 Multiply line 7 by line 2, enter result.
9A Multiply line 8 by line 6, enter result.
9B Multiply line 9A by line 6, enter result.
9C Divide line 9B by 8, enter result.
9D Divide line 9C by line 3, enter result.
9E Divide line 9D by line 5, enter result.
If the line 9E result is greater than 0 but less than 1.0, go to line 10.
If line 9E is greater than 1.0, the roof system is overloaded. Then do at least one
of the following, and recompute from line 1:
9F a. Decrease stringer spacing.
b. Decrease span length.
c. Use a material with a higher S or FS value.
d. Decrease soil cover.
Enter side A of figure D-5, page D-14, with the line 9E value, find the side B
value, and enter result:
10
if wood, use μ = 1 curve.
if steel, use μ = 10 curve.
Enter the E value (106 psi):
11 if wood, from table D-3.
if steel, enter 29.
Enter the I value (inches4):
12A if wood, from table D-2.
if steel, from table D-4.
12B Multiply line 9A by 0.08333, enter result.
12C Multiply line 12B by 0.64, enter result.
12D Divide line 12C by line 9E, enter result.
13 Multiply line 9A by 0.0001078, enter result.
14A Multiply line 12A by line 11, enter result.
14B Multiply line 6 by line 6, enter result.
14C Multiply line 14B by line 6, enter result.
14D Divide line 14A by line 14C, enter result.
14E Multiply line 14D by 28,472.22, enter result.
15 Divide line 14E by line 13, enter result.
16 Take the square root of line 15, enter result.

D-10 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-10. Standard stringer roof procedure (contact burst rounds) (continued)
Line Procedure and Result
17 Divide line 12D by line 16, enter result.
18 Multiply line 10 by line 17, enter result.
19 Divide line 2 by line 6, enter result.
20 Multiply line 19 by line 19, enter result.
21A Take the square root of line 19, enter result.
21B Multiply line 21A by line 20, enter result.
22 Divide 0.6666667 by line 21B, enter result.
23A Multiply line 20 by 4, enter result.
23B Add 1 to line 23A, enter result.
24 Divide 4 by line 23B, enter result.
25A Take the square root of line 24, enter result.
25B Take the square root of line 25A, enter result.
25C Multiply line 25B by line 24, enter result.
26 Add line 25C to line 22, enter result.
27 Choose a C value from table D-1, page D-2, enter result.
28A Multiply 61.32 by line 18, enter result.
28B Take the square root of line 14C, enter result.
28C Multiply line 28A by line 28B, enter result.
28D Multiply line 27 by line 4, enter result.
28E Multiply line 28D by line 26, enter result.
28F Divide line 28C by line 28E, enter result.
Raise line 28F to the 0.8571 power (or use the graph in figure D-6, page D-15),
29
enter result.
Legend:
C value transmission coefficient
E value modulus of elasticity
FS value maximum dynamic flexural stress
I value inertia
psi pounds per square inch
S value section modulus

Table D-11. Charge equivalency table

Half-Buried TNT
Round Nomenclature
Charge Weight (pounds)
United States Gun and Howitzer Cannons
75-millimeter gun cannon 1.5
76-millimeter gun cannon 2.0
90-millimeter gun cannon 3.2
120-millimeter gun cannon 10.6
175-millimeter gun cannon 42.2
105-millimeter howitzer cannon 7.7
155-millimeter howitzer cannon 15.34
8-inch howitzer cannon 37.1

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-11

Appendix D

Table D-11. Charge equivalency table (continued)

Half-Buried TNT
Round Nomenclature
Charge Weight (pounds)
United States Mortars
81-millimeter 2.9
4.2-inch 8.1
(Former) Soviet
57-millimeter fragmentation 0.5
57-millimeter fragmentation-tracer 0.4
76-millimeter HE 1.8
76-millimeter fragmentation 1.1
82-millimeter fragmentation 1.0
85-millimeter fragmentation 1.7
100-millimeter HE 4.8
107-millimeter fragmentation HE 5.4
120-millimeter HE 8.6
(Former) Soviet (continued)
122-millimeter HE 10.7
130-millimeter fragmentation HE1 10.2
140-millimeter fragmentation HE 8.1
152-millimeter fragmentation HE 14.3
160-millimeter HE 16.3
People’s Republic of China
57-millimeter HE 0.5
60-millimeter HE2 4.6
70-millimeter HE 1.6
75-millimeter HE 2.2
81-millimeter HE 1.3
82-millimeter fragmentation 1.1
102-millimeter HE 2.8
105-millimeter HE 5.3
107-millimeter 3.0
120-millimeter HE 6.3
Czechoslovakian,82-millimeter fragmentation 1.3
Czechoslovakian, 85-millimeter fragmentation 1.7
Czechoslovakian, 100-millimeter HE 3.5
Czechoslovakian, 120-millimeter HE 4.5
Czechoslovakian, 130-millimeter HE 5.2
North Korean, 82-millimeter fragmentation 1.2
Polish, 122-millimeter fragmentation 7.4
Yugoslavian, 76-millimeter HE 1.6
Yugoslavian, 82-millimeter HE 1.1
Yugoslavian, 120-millimeter HE 6.9
Finnish, 160-millimeter HE 9.3
French, 105-millimeter HE plastic 7.1

D-12 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-11. Charge equivalency table (continued)

Round Nomenclature Half-Buried TNT
Charge Weight (pounds)
French, 120-millimeter HE3 9.7
French, 155-millimeter HE 17.5
Israeli, 81-millimeter HE 4.9
Israeli, 88-millimeter HE 1.9
Italian, 81-millimeter HE 4.9
Notes.
1
Content of some rounds unknown.
2
High capacity.
3
Heavy.
Legend:
HE high explosives
TNT trinitrotoluene

Figure D-5. Comparison graph for stringer relationships

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-13

Appendix D

Figure D-6. Quick-check chart for roof capability

D-15. The value on line 29 (see table D-10, page D-10) is the largest half-buried charge in pounds of TNT
that the roof can withstand. Table D-11, page D-11, provides an equivalency of various weapon rounds to a
half-buried charge weight of TNT. Enter this value in table D-11 to find the round having an equivalent
charge weight equal to or less than the value on line 29. Alternatively, if the threat charge weight (which the
unit intelligence officer should be able to provide) is known, compare the equivalent charge weight from
table D-10 (line 29) to the threat charge weight. If the charge weight from table D-10 is equal to or greater
than the threat charge weight, the roof stringer design is adequate. If it is smaller than the threat charge
weight, the roof stringers are underdesigned and either larger stringers must be used or the spacing must be
decreased. Note that once the stringer spacing is established, the sheathing thickness must be established
using table D-5, page D-5.

EXAMPLES USING THE DETAILED DESIGN PROCEDURE

D-16. The following examples illustrate how the detailed design procedure works in real-world applications.
One example shows an existing wood stringer roof, while the next shows how to design a steel stringer roof
with available materials.

ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING WOOD STRINGER ROOF

D-17. Preexisting protective or fighting positions with wood stringer roofs require an appropriate assessment
for the level of protection the position provides.

D-14 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Problem
D-18. Given existing defensive positions with wood stringer roofs as shown in figure D-7, determine how
much protection these types of positions give against the contact burst of an HE round.

Figure D-7. Existing wood stringer roof example

D-19. The first value in table D-12, page D-16, is obtained by estimating that the 16-inch-deep soil cover
(sand) weighs 100 pounds per cubic foot. Note that the roof is made of 4- by 4-foot stringers, laid side-by-
side over a span of 88.75 inches. See table D-12 for more information on the remainder of the calculations.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-15

Appendix D

Table D-12. Example wood stringer roof procedure

Line Function Result
1 The soil unit weight (pounds per cubic foot) is 100
2 The depth of soil cover (feet) is 16 in+12 in = 1.33
3 From table D-2, page D-3, the S value (inches3) for 4 by 4s is 7.15
Since the 4 by 4s are laid side by side, the stringer spacing (inches) is equal to
4 3.5
their actual width or 3.5 inches
5 From table D-3, page D-3, the FS value (psi) for southern pine is 6,000
88.75 in ÷ 12 in =
6 The stringer span length (feet) is
7.4
7 Line 1 x line 4 = 100 x 3.5 = 350
8 Line 7 x line 2 = 350 x 1.33 = 465.5
9A Line 8 x line 6 = 465.5 x 7.4 = 3,444.7
9B Line 9A x line 6 = 3,444.7 x 7.4 = 25,490.78
9C Line 9B ÷ 8 = 25,490.78 ÷ 8 = 3,186.35
9D Line 9C ÷ line 3 = 3,186.35 ÷ 7.15 = 445.64
9E Line 9D ÷ line 5 = 445.64 ÷ 6,000 = 0.0743
Line 9E value 0.0743 is greater than 0 and less than 1.0, therefore proceed to
9F n/a
line 10.
10 From figure D-5, page D-13, using the μ = 1 curve, the line 10 value is 0.93
11 From table D-3, the E value (106 psi) for southern pine is 1.76
12A From table D-2, the I value (inches4) for 4 by 4s is 12.51
12B Line 9A x 0.08333 = 3,444.7 x 0.08333 = 287.05
12C Line 12B x 0.64 = 287.05 x 0.64 = 183.71
12D Line 12C ÷ line 9E = 183.71 ÷ 0.0743 = 2,472.6
13 Line 9A x 0.0001078 = 3,444.7 x 0.0001078 = 0.371
14A Line 12A x line 11 = 12.51 x 1.76 = 22.0176
14B Line 6 x line 6 = 7.4 x 7.4 = 54.76
14C Line 14B x line 6 = 54.76 x 7.4 = 405.22
14D Line 14A ÷ line 14C = 22.0176 ÷ 405.22 = 0.05433
14E Line 14D x 28,472.22 = 0.05433 x 28,472.22 = 1,547.02
15 Line 14E ÷ line 13 = 1,547.02 ÷ 0.371 = 4,169.87
16 The square root of line 15 = √4169.87 = 64.57
17 Line 12D ÷ line 16 = 2,472.6 ÷ 64.57 = 38.29
18 Line 10 x line 17 = 38.29 x 0.93 = 35.61
19 Line 2 ÷ line 6 = 1.33 ÷ 7.4 = 0.1797
20 Line 19 x line 19 = 0.1797 x 0.1797 = 0.0323
21A The square root of line 19 = √0.1797 = 0.4239
21B Line 21A x line 20 = 0.4239 x 0.0323 = 0.0137
22 0.6666667 ÷ line 21B = 0.6666667 ÷ 0.0137 = 48.69
23A Line 20 x 4 = 0.0323 x 4 = 0.1292
23B 1 + line 23A = 1 + 0.1292 = 1.1292
24 4 ÷ line 23 B = 4 ÷ 1.1292 = 3.5423
25A The square root of line 24 = √3.5423 = 1.8821

D-16 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-12. Example wood stringer roof procedure (continued)

Line Function Result
25B The square root of line 25A = √1.8821 = 1.3719
25C Line 25B x line 24 = 1.3719 x 3.5423 = 4.86
26 Line 25 C + line 22 = 4.86 + 48.69 = 53.55
27 From table D-1,page D-2, the C value chosen for bagged pit run sand is 140
28A 61.32 x line 18 = 61.32 x 35.61 = 2,183.61
28B The square root of line 14C = √405.22 = 20.13
28C Line 28A x line 28B = 2,183.61 x 20.13 = 43,955.97
28D Line 27 x line 4 = 140 x 3.5 = 490
28E Line 28D x line 26 = 490 x 53.55 = 26,239.5
28F Line 28C ÷ Line 28E = 43,955.97 ÷ 26,239.5 = 1.675
Enter the line 28F value (1.68) in figure D-6, page D-14, and read the TNT
29 1.56
charge weights (pounds).
Or, as an alternative method, raise 1.68 to the 0.8571 power.
Legend:
C value transmission coefficient
E value modulus of elasticity
FS value maximum dynamic flexural stress
I value inertia
in inch
psi pounds per square inch
S value section modulus
TNT trinitrotoluene

Solution
D-20. Consequently, the largest TNT charge that the roof can withstand is 1.56 pounds. Entering this value
in table D-11, page D-11, find that the roof will withstand a contact burst explosion of up to an
82-millimeter fragmentation round (only 1.0-pound charge size) excluding the 76-millimeter HE round
(1.8-pound charge site).

STEEL STRINGER ROOF

D-21. Preexisting protective or fighting positions with steel stringer roofs require an appropriate assessment
for the level of protection the position provides.

Problem
D-22. The 276th Infantry Battalion will occupy the positions described in the previous example for an
extended period of time. The commander has ordered the 1st Platoon of A/52d Engineers to construct a CP.
This structure must have at least 10 feet by 12 feet of floor space and be capable of defeating a contact burst
of a former Soviet Union 152-millimeter round. The S-2 reports that 13 undamaged, 8-inch- by 6 1/2-inch-
wide flange beams have been found. They are long enough to span 10 feet and can be salvaged from the
remains of a nearby demolished railroad bridge.
D-23. Use the salvaged beams as stringers to design a roof for the CP. Plan to place five of the stringers on
36-inch centers, and cover them with a 4- by 4-foot wood deck. Use the same bagged sand as described in
the first example. Begin design by assuming that the soil cover will be 3 feet deep. See table D-13, page
D-18, for more information on the calculation.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-17

Appendix D

Table D-13. Example steel stringer roof procedure

Line Function Result
1 The soil unit weight (pounds per cubic foot) is 100
2 The assumed depth of soil cover (feet) is 3
3 From table D-4, page D-4, the S value (inches3) for the 8 by 6 ½ steel is 20.8
4 The stringer spacing (inches) is 36
5 For steel stringers, the FS value (psi) is 50,000
6 The stringer span length (feet) is 10
7 Line 1 x line 4 = 100 x 36 = 3,600
8 Line 7 x line 2 = 3,600 x 3 = 10,800
9A Line 8 x line 6 = 10,800 x 10 = 108,000
9B Line 9A x line 6 = 108,000 x 10 = 1,080,000
9C Line 9B ÷ 8 = 1,080,000 ÷ 8 = 135,000
9D Line 9C ÷ line 3 = 135,000 ÷ 20.8 = 6,490.38
9E Line 9D ÷ line 5 = 6,490.38 ÷ 50,000 = 0.1298
9F Line 9E value 0.1298 is greater than 0 and less than 1.0, therefore proceed to line 10. n/a
From figure D-5, page D-1e, using the μ = 10 curve, the line 10 value is (see example in
10 4.05
figure D-5)
11 For steel stringers the E value (106 psi) is 29
12A From table D-4, the I value (inches4) for the 8 by 6 ½ inch steel is 02.5
12B Line 9A x 0.08333 = 108,000 x 0.08333 = 8,999.64
12C Line 12B x 0.640 = 8,999.64 x 0.64 = 5,759.77
12D Line 12C ÷ line 9E = 5,759.77 ÷ 0.1298 = 44,374.19
13 Line 9A x 0.0001078 = 108,000 x 0.0001078 = 11.64
14A Line 12A x line 11 = 82.5 x 29 = 2,102.5
14B Line 6 x line 6 = 10 x 10 = 100
14C Line 14B x line 6 = 100 x 10 = 1,000
14D Line 14A ÷ line 14 C = 2,392.5 ÷ 1,000 = 2.39
14E Line 14D x 28,472.22 = 2.39 x 28,472.22 = 68,048.61
15 Line 14E ÷ line 13 = 68,048.61 ÷ 11.64 = 5,846.10
16 The square root of line 15 = √5,846.10 = 75.56
17 Line 12D ÷ line 16 = 44,374.19 ÷ 76.46 = 580.36
18 Line 10 x line 17 = 4.05 x 580.36 = 2,350.46
19 Line 2 ÷ line 6 = 3 ÷ 10 = 0.3
20 Line 19 x line 19 = 0.3 x 0.3 0.09
21A The square root of line 19 = √0.3 = 0.5477
21B Line 21A x line 20 = 0.5477 x 0.09 = 0.0493
22 0.6666667 ÷ line 21B = 0.6666667 ÷ 0.0493 = 13.52
23A Line 20 x 4 = .09 x 4 = 0.36
23B 1 + line 23A = 1 + 0.36 = 1.36
24 4 ÷ line 23B = 4 ÷ 1.36 2.94
25A The square root of line 24 = √2.94 = 1.71
25B The square root of line 25A = √1.71 = 1.31
25C Line 25B x line 24 = 1.31 x 2.94 = 3.85

D-18 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Bunker and Shelter Roof Design

Table D-13. Example steel stringer roof procedure (continued)

Line Function Result
26 Line 25C + line 22 = 3.85 + 13.52 = 17.37
27 From table D-1, page D-2, the C value chosen for the bagged pit run sand is 140
28A 61.32 x line 18 = 61.32 x 2,350.46 = 144,130.21
28B The square root of line 14C = √1,000 = 31.62
4,557,397.
28C Line 28A x line 28B = 144,130.21 x 31.62 =
24
28D Line 27 x line 4 = 140 x 36 = 5,040
28E Line 28D x line 26 = 5,040 x 17.37 = 87,544.80
28F Line 28C ÷ line 28 E = 4,557,397.24 ÷ 87,544.80 = 52.06
Enter the line 28F value (52.06) into figure D-6, page D-14, and read the TNT charge
29 29.6
weight (pounds).
Or, as an alternate method, raise 52.06 to the 0.8571 power.
Legend:
C value transmission coefficient
E value modulus of elasticity
FS value maximum dynamic flexural stress
I value inertia
psi pounds per square inch
S value section modulus
TNT trinitrotoluene

Solution
D-24. Consequently, the largest TNT charge that the stringers can withstand is 29.6 pounds. Use the
procedure again in a manner similar to that in previous examples to evaluate the 4- by 4-foot wood deck.
Find a line 29 value of 29.64. Enter the largest of these values (29.6) into table D-11, page D-11, and find
that the roof will withstand a contact burst explosion of up to one 160-millimeter HE round (only 16.3-pound
charge size). The designed roof will be capable of defeating a contact burst of a former Soviet Union
152-millimeter round.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C D-19

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Appendix E
Survivability Standard Operating Procedures Guidelines
SOPs are critical to battlefield success. Commanders should establish survivability
guidelines in SOPs and ensure that personnel are familiar with them. SOPs provide
guidelines that help reduce the time required to perform routine tasks. Commanders
can achieve these ends by defining the responsibilities, identifying the expected tasks,
and providing supervisors with a memory aid when planning or inspecting. SOPs
(coupled with battle drills [appendix F]) provide units with guidance on how to execute
anticipated battlefield tasks. Constructing and improving fighting and protective
positions and constructing or employing camouflage and concealment should be
routine tasks for all units.

CONTENT
E-1. The following considerations may be included in a unit SOP:
 A review of survivability fundamentals.
 Priorities of work for camouflage, concealment, and fighting and protective positions.
 Individual and unit basic loads of tools, equipment, and supplies for camouflage, concealment,
and fighting and protective positions (including who carries them, where or how they are carried,
and who allocates and controls them).
 Unit tracking tools/commander’s cards for survivability operations.
 Memory aids for supervisors, which should include an inspection checklist and a chart of an enemy
sensor systems with possible countermeasures. See figure E-1, page E-2, for a sample camouflage
and concealment checklist. See GTAs 05-08-001 and 07-06-001 for checklists on cover.
 Guidelines on camouflage and concealment discipline to provide uniformity among subunits.
 Procedures for blackout, the quartering party, unit movement, and the deployment area.
 Appropriate camouflage and concealment postures in operation orders for different missions.

COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES
E-2. Commanders ensure that each Soldier/Marine has the required quantities of serviceable uniforms and
that these uniforms are properly maintained to protect infrared screening properties. Supply personnel
forecast, request, and store adequate quantities of expendable supplies for camouflage and concealment
(paint, makeup, and repair kits) and for survivability positions (stakes, pickets, and sandbags). Commanders
ensure that authorized quantities of camouflage and concealment screens (ULCANS), support systems
(including repair kits and spare parts), and tools for the construction of survivability positions are on hand
and maintained in a clean, serviceable condition.

FRATRICIDE
E-3. Since warfare often results in the loss of life from fratricide, the unit SOP should include ways to
reduce fratricide. Commanders consider ways for friendly units to identify each other on the battlefield.
Fratricide compels commanders to consider the effect that camouflage and concealment and deception
operations have on the necessity of being recognized by friendly troops.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C E-1

Appendix E

Figure E-1. Sample camouflage and concealment checklist

E-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Survivability Standing Operating Procedures Guidelines

Figure E-1. Sample camouflage and concealment checklist (continued)

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C E-3

Appendix E

Legend:
AA assembly area
CP command post
LOC line of communications
SOP standard operating procedures
ULCANS Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net Systems

Figure E-1. Sample camouflage and concealment checklist (continued)

E-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Appendix F
Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net Systems and Individual
Camouflage Considerations
This appendix provides other camouflage considerations and information. It addresses
the ULCANS, individual camouflage and concealment, standard camouflage
materials, and the camouflage of medical facilities.

ULTRA-LIGHTWEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE-NET SYSTEMS

F-1. The ULCANS is a modular system that consists of a hexagonal screen, a rhombic-shaped screen, a
screen carrying case, and a repair kit. The ULCANS support system consists of a carrying case, a stake bag,
anchor stakes, support poles, and shape disrupters. Any number of screens can be joined to cover a designated
target or area.
F-2. The ULCANS protects targets in four different ways. It—
 Casts patterned shadows that break up the characteristic outlines of a target.
 Scatters radar returns (except when radar-transparent nets are used).
 Traps target heat and allows it to disperse.
 Simulates color and shadow patterns that are commonly found in a particular region.

Note. The section on standard camouflage materials includes ordering information for ULCANS.

F-3. See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, TM 5-1080-200-13&P, and TM 5-1080-250-12&P for more

information on camouflage—
 Characteristics and capabilities.
 Erecting procedures.
 Maintenance.
 Procedures for determining the number of modules needed for camouflaging a given area.
 Common vehicle dimensions.

SUPPLEMENTAL CAMOUFLAGE
F-4. ULCANS are often employed in conjunction with supplemental camouflage because nets alone do not
make assets invisible to threat multispectral sensors. Use other camouflage and concealment techniques to
achieve effective concealment. Cover or remove reflective surfaces (mirrors, windshields, lights). Also
ensure that the target shadow is disrupted or disguised. Use native vegetation because placing a target in
dense foliage provides natural concealment and a smoother transition between the edges of the camouflage
net and the target background. Cover exposed edges of the net with dirt or cut vegetation to enhance the
transition.

TRAINING
F-5. Units should develop and practice battle drills that cover the requirements and procedures for erecting
nets over assigned equipment. Table F-1, page F-2, shows an example battle drill for the crew of an infantry
fighting vehicle.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C F-1

Appendix F

Table F-1. Example battle drill

Standards:
• Complete camouflage net setup drills within 20 minutes.
• Complete camouflage net teardown drills within 15 minutes.

Personnel Required: Three crew members.

Equipment Required: Two modules or the following items:

• Nets, hexagonal, 2 each.
• Nets, rhombic, 2 each.
• Pole sections, 24 each.
• Stakes, 36 each.
• Disrupters, 12 each.

Stowage Location: The camouflage net is strapped to the right side of the trim vane.

Setup Drill:
• The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the camouflage net from the trim vane and place it on
top of the vehicle.
• The driver removes poles and stakes from the bag and places them around the vehicle.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the vehicle antenna, position the net on top of the
vehicle, and roll the net off the sides of the vehicle.
• The driver stakes the net around the vehicle.
• The driver and the assistant gunner assemble poles and spreaders and then erect the net.
• The gunner inspects the camouflage from a distance.
• The crew adjusts the camouflage as necessary.

Teardown Drill:
• The driver and the assistant gunner take down and disassemble poles and spreaders.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner unstake the net and roll it to the top of the vehicle.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner complete rolling the net on top of the vehicle and replace the
vehicle antenna.
• The driver stores the net on the trim vane.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner store poles, spreaders, and stakes on the trim vane.

Notes.
1. Preassemble the nets before placing them on the vehicle.
2. Supplement camouflage nets by properly placing vehicles and using natural vegetation.

INDIVIDUAL CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

F-6. Personnel are responsible for camouflaging themselves, their equipment, and their positions.
Camouflage and concealment reduces the probability of an enemy placing aimed fire on a Soldier/Marine.

MATERIALS
F-7. Use natural and artificial materials for camouflage and concealment. Natural camouflage and
concealment include defilade, grass, bushes, trees, and shadows. Artificial camouflage and concealment for
personnel includes certain uniforms, camouflage nets, skin paint, and natural materials removed from their
original positions. To be effective, artificial camouflage and concealment must blend with the natural
background.

F-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net Systems and Individual Camouflage Considerations

DISCIPLINE
F-8. Noise, movement, and light discipline contribute to individual camouflage and concealment as follows:
 Noise discipline muffles and eliminates sounds made by personnel and their equipment.
 Movement discipline minimizes movement within and between positions and limits movement to
routes that cannot be readily observed by an enemy.
 Light discipline controls the use of lights at night. Avoid open fires, do not smoke tobacco in the
open, and do not walk around with a lit flashlight.

DISPERSAL
F-9. Dispersal is the deliberate deployment of personnel and equipment over a wide area. It is a key
individual survival technique. Dispersal creates a smaller target mass for enemy sensors and weapons
systems. Proper dispersal reduces casualties and losses in the event of an attack and also makes enemy
detection efforts more difficult.

CONSIDERATIONS
F-10. Personnel should have a detailed understanding of the recognition factors described in chapter 6. While
all of these factors remain important when applying individual camouflage and concealment, the following
factors are critical:
 Movement. Movement draws attention, whether it involves vehicles on the road or individuals
walking around positions. The naked eye, infrared, and radar sensors can detect movement.
Minimize movement while in the open and remember that darkness does not prevent observation
by an enemy equipped with modern sensors. When movement is necessary, slow, smooth
movement attracts less attention than quick, irregular movement.
 Shape. Use camouflage and concealment materials to break up the shapes and shadows of
positions and equipment. Stay in the shadows when possible, especially when moving, because
shadows can visually mask objects. When conducting operations close to an enemy, disguise or
distort helmet and body shapes with artificial camouflage and concealment materials to make it
more difficult for an enemy to recognize them.
 Shine and light. Shine can also attract attention. Pay particular attention to light reflecting from
smooth or polished surfaces (mess kits, mirrors, eyeglasses, watches, windshields, and starched
uniforms). Plastic map cases, dust goggles worn on top of a helmet, and clear plastic garbage bags
also reflect light. Cover these items or remove them from exposed areas. Vehicle headlights,
taillights, and safety reflectors not only reflect light but also reflect laser energy used in weapon
systems. Cover this equipment when the vehicle is not in operation. Although they are designed
to protect Soldiers’/Marines’ night vision, red filters on vehicle dome lights and flashlights are
extremely sensitive to detection by night vision devices. The red dome light of a tank, reflecting
off the walls and out through the sight and vision blocks, can be seen with a night vision device
from 4 kilometers (2.5 miles). Red-lensed flashlights and lit cigarettes and pipes are equally
observable. To reduce the chances of detection, replace red filters with blue-green filters, and
practice strict light discipline. Use measures to prevent shine at night because moonlight and
starlight can be reflected as easily as sunlight.
 Color. The contrast of skin, uniforms, and equipment against a background helps an enemy detect
opposing forces. Individual camouflage and concealment should blend with the surroundings or,
at a minimum, objects must not contrast with the background. Ideally, blend colors with the
background or hide objects with contrasting colors.
F-11. Disguise is an effective means of camouflage, especially for isolated personnel. During evasion
recovery operations, isolated personnel may use civilian clothing to disguise themselves. However, they may
not commit belligerent acts while using a disguise, and they must retain their military identification card as
proof of status. Additionally, protected emblems (such as Red Cross or Red Crescent) may not be used for
purposes of evasion and escape. See ATP 3-50.3/MCRP 3-02H/NTTP 3-50.3/AFTTP 3-2.26 and JP 3-50 for
additional information on evasion and personnel recovery operations.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C F-3

Appendix F

Note. See TC 18-32 for additional concealment considerations for snipers.

EMPLOYMENT
F-12. Study nearby terrain and vegetation before applying camouflage and concealment to personnel,
equipment, or fighting positions. During reconnaissance, analyze the terrain in conjunction with the
camouflage and concealment considerations listed above and then apply camouflage and concealment
materials that best blend with the area. Change camouflage and concealment as required when moving from
one area to another.

Skin
F-13. Exposed skin reflects light and may draw attention. Even very dark skin, because of natural oils,
reflects light. Camouflage paint sticks cover these oils and help blend skin with the background. Avoid using
oils or insect repellent to soften the paint stick, because doing so makes the skin shiny and defeats the purpose
of camouflage paint. Personnel applying camouflage paint should work in pairs and help each other. Self-
application may leave gaps, such as behind the ears. Use the following techniques:
 Paint high, shiny areas (forehead, cheekbones, nose, ears, and chin) with a dark color.
 Paint low, shadow areas with a light color.
 Paint exposed skin (back of neck, arms, and hands) with an irregular pattern.

F-14. When camouflage paint sticks are unavailable, use field expedients (burnt cork, bark, charcoal,
lampblack, mud). Mud contains bacteria, some of which is harmful and may cause disease or infection, so
consider mud as the last resource for individual camouflage field-expedient paint.

Uniforms
F-15. Many uniforms have a camouflage pattern, but they often require additional camouflage, especially in
operations that occur close to the enemy. Attach leaves, grass, small branches, or pieces of ULCANS to
uniforms and helmets. These items help distort the shape of a Soldier/Marine, and they blend with the natural
background. Some uniforms provide visual and near-infrared camouflage and concealment. Do not starch
these uniforms because starching counters the infrared properties of the dyes. Replace excessively faded and
worn uniforms because they lose their camouflage and concealment effectiveness as they are worn.

Equipment
F-16. Inspect personal equipment to ensure that shiny items are covered or removed. Take corrective action
on items that rattle or make other noises when moved or worn. Personnel who are assigned equipment, such
as vehicles or generators, should be knowledgeable of appropriate camouflage techniques (see chapter 6).

Individual Fighting Positions

Note. Review the procedures for camouflaging positions in chapter 6, which include
considerations for camouflaging individual positions.

F-17. While building a fighting position, camouflage it and carefully dispose of earth spoil. Remember that
too much camouflage and concealment material applied to a position can actually have a reverse effect and
disclose the position to the enemy. Obtain camouflage and concealment materials from a dispersed area to
avoid drawing attention to the position by the stripped area around it.
F-18. Camouflage a position as it is being built. To avoid disclosing a fighting position, never—
 Leave shiny or light-colored objects exposed.
 Remove shirts while in the open.
 Use fires.
 Leave tracks or other signs of movement.

F-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net Systems and Individual Camouflage Considerations

 Look up when aircraft fly overhead. (One of the most obvious features on aerial photography is
the upturned faces of personnel.)
F-19. When camouflage and concealment are complete, inspect the position from an enemy viewpoint, if
possible. Check camouflage and concealment periodically to ensure that they remain natural-looking and that
they conceal the position. When camouflage and concealment materials become ineffective, change or
improve them.

STANDARD CAMOUFLAGE MATERIALS

F-20. Standard camouflage items available to personnel are ordered through normal
unit procurement channels. Information and assistance can be obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency
Customer Information Service, Battle Creek, Michigan, DSN 661-7766 or commercial
1-877-352-2255 or (269) 961-7766, or via e-mail at dlacontactcenter@[Link]. See
<[Link] for additional information.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C F-5

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Glossary
The glossary list acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-37.34/
MCTR 3-34C is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent
publication for other terms is listed in parenthesis after the definition. Approved Marine
Corps acronyms, terms, and definitions can be found in MCRP 1-10.2, Marine Corps
Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA assembly area
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFCEC Air Force Civil Engineer Center
AFCS Army Facilities Component System
AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (interservice)
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
AT antitank
ATP Army techniques publication
attn attention
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BCT brigade combat team
BP battle position
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDID Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate
COA course of action
CODDD Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division
CONEX container express
CP command post
DA Department of the Army
DC District of Columbia
DOD Department of Defense
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
DSN Defense Switched Network
EA engagement area
ECP entry control point
EH explosive hazard
EM electromagnetic
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
ENFIRE Engineering Field Planning, Reconnaissance, Surveying, and Sketching Set

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C Glossary-1

Glossary

ERDC U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center

FARP forward arming and refueling point
FFE field force engineering
FM field manual
GATER Geospatial Assessment Tool for Engineering Reachback
GMTI ground moving target indicator
GTA graphic training aid
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HE high explosives
HEAT high-explosives antitank
IED improvised explosive device
IKE It Knows Everything
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield (Army)/intelligence preparation of
the battlespace (Marine Corps)
JCMS Joint Construction Management System
JEEP joint entry control point and escalation of force procedures
JFOB Joint Forward Operations Base
JP joint publication
LCSS Lightweight Camouflage Screen System
M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability (joint adds and/or)
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication
MCIP Marine Corps interim publication
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time
available
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time
available and civil considerations (Army)
MILDEC military deception
MO Missouri
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
MPS Modular Protective System
MSCoE Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command
No. number
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OHC overhead cover
OPSEC operations security
PDC Protective Design Center
POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Glossary-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

Glossary

REDi Reachback Engineer Data Integration

RFI request for information
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
SOP standard operating procedures
SSA Simplified Survivability Assessment
STANAG standardization agreement
TAA tactical assembly area
TC training circular
TCE-D Tele-engineering Communications Equipment–Deployable
TCE-F Tele-engineering Communications Equipment–Fixed
TM technical manual
TNT trinitrotoluene
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UFC Unified Facilities Criteria
ULCANS Ultra-lightweight Camouflage-Net System
UROC United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center
U.S. United States
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAES United States Army Engineer School
USAF United States Air Force
UV ultraviolet
UXO unexploded ordnance
VA Virgina
VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

SECTION II – TERMS
*survivability
(Army/Marine Corps) A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or
withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary
mission.
*survivability operations
(Army/Marine Corps) those protection activities that alter the physical environment by providing or
improving cover, camouflage, and concealment.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C Glossary-3

This page intentionally left blank.
References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. March 2018.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 16 November 2016.
MCRP 1-10.2. Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12
February 2018.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT
Most joint publications are available online at <[Link]/doctrine/new_pubs/[Link]>.
JP 3-11. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
4 October 2013.
JP 3-13.3 Operations Security. 6 January 2016.
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 14 February 2017.
JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 6 September 2016.
JP 3-15.1. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. 9 January 2012.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 6 January 2016.
JP 3-42. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 9 September 2016.
JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 2 October 2015.

ARMY
Most Army publications are available online at <[Link]>.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
AR 530-1. Operations Security. 26 September 2014.
ATP 3-01.81. Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. 13 April 2017.
ATP 3-11.50. Battlefield Obscuration. 15 May 2014.
ATP 3-21.8. Infantry Platoon and Squad. 12 April 2016.
ATP 3-21.11. SBCT Infantry Rifle Company. 4 February 2016.
ATP 3-36. Electronic Warfare Techniques. 16 December 2014.
ATP 3-39.10. Police Operations. 26 January 2015.
ATP 3-90.37. Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. 29 July 2014.
ATP 3-90.97. Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations. 29 April 2016.
ATP 4-35.1. Ammunition and Explosives Handler Safety Techniques. 8 November 2016.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C References-1

References

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-0.5. Command Post Organization and Operations. 1 March 2017
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
DA Pamphlet 25-30. Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms. 14 July 2009.
FM 2-0. Intelligence Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 3-05.70. Survival. 17 May 2002.
FM 3-13. Information Operations. 6 December 2016.
FM 3-22.34. TOW Weapon System. 28 November 2003.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2014.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 90-5. Jungle Operations. 16 August 1982.
GTA 05-08-001. Survivability Positions. 1 August 1993.
GTA 07-06-001. Fighting Position Construction–Infantry Reference Card. 1 January 1994.
GTA 90-01-011. Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Protection Handbook. October 2011.
GTA 90-01-018. Joint Entry Control Point & Escalation of Force Procedures (JEEP) Handbook, First
Edition. December 2009. Web site <[Link]
ws/view/[Link]/120503F7-BB55-4709-99CC-F2DD99E2FF57-1300785650409/GTA90-
[Link]>, accessed 16 March 2018.
GTA 90-01-034. Small-Base Entry Control Point Guide: A Practical Guide: A Practical Guide for the
Small-Base Leader, First Edition. April 2012. Web site <[Link]
ws/view/[Link]/7C0A24D8-9BC4-45CA-A356-215C9FE43332-
1333982642552/[Link]>, accessed 16 March 2018.
TC 3-21.75. The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills. 13 August 2013.
TC 3-22.19. Grenade Machine Gun MK 19 MOD 3. 10 May 2017.
TC 3-22.37. Javelin–Close Combat Missile System, Medium. 13 August 2013.
TC 3-22.50. Heavy Machine Gun M2 Series. 19 May 2017.
TC 3-22.240. Medium Machine Gun. 28 April 2017.
TC 3-25.26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 15 November 2013.
TC 3-97.61. Military Mountaineering. 26 July 2012.
TC 18-32. Special Forces Sniper Training and Employment. 10 August 2017.
TC 21-3. Soldier’s Handbook for Individual Operations and Survival in Cold-Weather Areas.
17 March 1986.
TM 3-34.48-2. Theater of Operations: Roads, Airfields, and Heliports—Airfield and Heliport Design.
29 February 2016.
TM 5-1080-200-13&P. Lightweight Camouflage Screen Systems and Support Systems. 29 January
1987.
TM 5-1080-250-12&P. Ultralightweight Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) Woodland R/S
AN/USQ-150 (NSN 1080-01-457-2956) (EIC: N/A) Woodland R/T AN/USQ-160 (NSN
1080-01-475-0697) (EIC: N/A), Desert R/S AN/USQ-159 (NSN 1080-01-475-0696) (EIC:
N/A) Desert R/T AN/USQ-158 (NSN 1080-01-475-0694) (EIC: (N/A). 1 January 2003.

MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

Most Marine Corps publications are available online at <[Link] or
<[Link]
MCDP 1-0. Marine Corps Operations. 9 August 2011.

References-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

References

MCO 3500.27C. Risk Management. 26 November 2014.

MCRP 3-01F.1. TOW Weapon System. 1 November 2003.
MCRP 3-10A.3. Marine Rifle Squad. 1 December 1991.
MCRP 3-32.2. MTTP for MILDEC Operations. 13 December 2013.
MCRP 8-10B.7. Survival. 1 June 1992.
MCRP 12-10B.1. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). 1 April 1998.
MCTP 3-01C. Machine Guns and Machine Gunnery. 1 August 1996.
MCTP 10-10B. MTTP for an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). 9 September 2014.
MCTP 12-10A. Mountain Warfare Operations. 1 February 2014.
MCWP 2-10. Intelligence Operations. 10 September 2003.
MCWP 3-34. Engineering Operations. 14 February 2000.
MCWP 5-10. Marine Corps Planning Process. 1 August 2010.

MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.
ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B. Urban Operations. 7 December 2017.
ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense. 13 May 2016.
ATP 3-34.5/MCRP 4-11B. Environmental Considerations. 10 August 2015.
ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D. Countering Explosive Hazards. 21 January 2016.
ATP 3-34.40/MCWP 3-17.7. General Engineering. 25 February 2015.
ATP 3-50.3/MCRP 3-02H/NTTP 3-50.3/AFTTP 3-2.26. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery. 11 September 2012.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8). Combined Arms Mobility. 8 March 2016.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.
ATP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17-2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Explosive Ordnance. 15 July 2015.
ATTP 3-21.90/MCWP 3-15.2. Tactical Employment of Mortars. 4 April 2011.
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 1 July 2011.
FM 90-3/MCTP 12-10D. Desert Operations. 24 August 1993.
MCRP 3-40D.2/NTRP 4-04.2.10-2/AFMAN 32-8013-2. Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and
Heliports in the Theater of Operations—Airfield and Heliport Design. 6 August 1994.
MCRP 10-10E.9/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Decontamination Operations.
4 April 2006.
NTRP 4-04.2.5/TM 3-34.42/AFPAM 32-1020/MCRP 3-17.7F. Construction Project Management.
1 December 2012. Web site <[Link]
04.2.5,%20Construction%20Project%20Management/NTRP_4-[Link]>, accessed 8
March 2018.
TM 3-34.22/MCRP 3-17.7B. Military Nonstandard Fixed Bridging. 17 October 2013.
TM 3-34.43/MCRP 3-17.7H/NAVFAC MO 330/AFH 32-1034. Materials Testing. 3 April 2015.
TM 3-34.56/MCIP 4-11.01. Waste Management for Deployed Forces. 19 July 2013.
TM 3-34.62/MCRP 3-17.7I. Earthmoving Operations. 29 June 2012.
TM 3-34.82/MCRP 3-17.7L. Explosives and Demolitions. 7 March 2016.
TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. Engineer Field Data. 17 October 2013.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C References-3

References

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
22 USC. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
<[Link]
e&edition=prelim&granuleId=USC-prelim-title22-front>, accessed on 8 March 2018.

DODM 5205.02M. DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual. 3 November 2008. Web site
<[Link] accessed 27 March 2018.
Engineer Pamphlet 500-1-2. Field Force Engineering—United States Army Corps of Engineers
Support to Full Spectrum Operations. 1 August 2010.
<[Link]
-[Link]?ver=2013-08-22-090239-343>, accessed on 8 March 2018.
Fed-Std-376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government.
27 January 1993. <[Link]
[Link]>, accessed on 8 March 2018.
Joint Antiterrorism Guide. Web site <[Link]
[Link]/sites/jfp/Portal/FixedSite/[Link]>, accessed 10 April 2018.
MI-HDBK-419A. Military Handbook Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic Equipments
and Facilities, Volume 1 of 2 Volumes Basic Theory. 29 December 1987.
<[Link] accessed on 8
March 2018.
STANAG 2931. Orders for the Camouflage of Protective Medical Emblems on Land in Tactical
Operations, Edition 4. 19 January 2018. Web site
<[Link] accessed 19 April
2018.
Technical Report N-76-7. Design of Earth-Covered Structures to Defeat Contact Burst Rounds.
June 1976. <[Link]
7#!/search/document?ho=t&l=en&q=Technical%20Report%20N-76-
7&id=FETCHMERGED-erdc_reports_504582>, accessed on 8 March 2018.
UFC 3-340-01. Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects
(FOUO). 30 June 2002. <[Link]
accessed on 8 March 2018.
UFC 4-010-01. DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. 9 February 2012.
<[Link] accessed on 8 March
2018.
UFC 4-020-01. DOD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual. 11 September 2008.
<[Link] accessed on 8 March
2018.
UFC 4-022-01. Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points. 27 July 2017.
<[Link] accessed on 8 May 2017.

PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at
<[Link] >.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

WEB SITES
AFCEC Web site, <[Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.

References-4 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

References

Army Knowledge Online, Training and Doctrine Publications Web site,

<[Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.
Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates Web site,
<[Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.
DOD Web site for DOD Forms: <[Link] accessed on8
March 2018.
NAVFAC Web site, <[Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.
PDC Web site, <[Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.
USACE/ERDC Force Protection Web site. [Link]
accessed on 8 March 2018.
UROC Web site. [Link] accessed on 8 March 2018.

RECOMMENDED READINGS
Air Force Handbook 10-222, Volume 14. Civil Engineer Guide to Fighting Positions, Shelters,
Obstacles, and Revetments. 1 August 2008. Web site <[Link]
[Link]/#/?view=search&keyword=afh10-
222&isObsolete=false&modID=449&tabID=71>, accessed 16 March 2018.
Army Facilities Components System REDi Web Portal Fact Sheet. February 2015.
<[Link] accessed 8 March 2018.
ATP 4-10/MCRP 4-11H/NTTP 4-09.1/AFMAN 10-409-O. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Operational Contract Support. 18 February 2016.
GTA 90-01-028. Entry Control Point System of Systems (ECP-B, NIIS, ECP-CS) Concept of
Operations & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 15 June 2011.
MCIP 10-10Ci. MAGTF Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations. 24 January 2011.

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C References-5

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Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
111, 6-110, 6-70, 5-9, 5-1, 4- fighting positions. 8-49, 8-47,
A
42, 4-29, 4-24, 4-22, 4-19, 4- 8-11, 5-10, 5-4, 4-32, 4-17,
artillery positions. 4-38 12, 4-8, 4-3, 3-60, 3-53, 3- 4-1, 1-21, 1-6
assured mobility. 1-13 47, 3-43, 3-40, 3-38, 3-33, 3- crew-served weapons. 4-14
aviation sites. 7-28 1, 1-8, 1-15 deliberate. 4-29, 4-13
earth. 3-34 hasty. 4-28, 4-12
B flank. 4-3 individual. F-17, 8-65, 8-54,
battle positions. 4-34 frontal. 4-3 8-52, 4-8
natural. 4-3 vehicle. 4-24
berms. 8-51, 8-49, 8-47, 8-25, overhead. 4-3
8-24, 8-14, 8-3, 7-23, 7-22, rear. 4-3 frozen soil. 8-45
7-1, 4-40, 4-28, 4-25, 3-56 soil. 4-9 G
bunkers. 5-7, 4-23, 4-22, 4-18 critical assets. B-31, 8-75, 7- general engineering. B-4, 1-16
C 28, 6-138, 6-135, 6-91, 2-23
geospatial engineering. 1-27
camouflage. F-20, F-13, F-4, 8- D geospatial engineers. 1-18
47, 8-2, 6-154, 6-86, 6-66, 6- deception. 6-132, 6-122, 6-117,
12, 1-11, 1-1 H
6-94
camouflage and concealment. hardening measures. 5-11
decoys. 8-77, 7-28, 7-18, 7-13,
F-19, F-12, F-8, F-6, E-2, 8- 7-10, 6-145, 6-132, 6-102, 6- hide location. 4-29
74, 8-72, 8-38, 8-26, 8-15, 8- 91, 6-90, 6-77, 6-69, 6-39, 1- hostile actions. 1-2
4, 6-153, 6-145, 6-138, 6- 4
136, 6-132, 6-127, 6-120, 6- hull defilade. 4-29
114, 6-107, 6-95, 6-90, 6-86, defense. 1-20 hybrid threats. 1-8
6-85, 6-70, 6-64, 6-53, 6-49, defense support of civil
6-40, 6-24, 6-17, 6-6, 6-2, 1- authorities. 6-134, 1-24 I
17, 1-10, 1-3 defensive task. 6-134, 6-114 ice. 8-50, 8-44, 6-55
camouflage nets. F-4, 8-28, 8- direct fire. 3-24, 3-2 indirect fire. 3-26, 3-8
17, 8-6, 6-125, 6-107, 6-100, information systems shielding.
6-79, 6-44, 4-40, 4-29 E 3-37
chemical, biological, earth walls. 3-58, 3-57, 3-56, 3- integration. A-7, 6-130, 2-15, 2-
radiological, and nuclear. 1- 52 13
2, 1-16, 1-11 engineer commander. 2-3
combat engineering. 1-27 L
engineer disciplines. B-4, 1-27
combat engineers. B-25 logistics sites. 7-14
Engineer Regiment. B-15, B-4
combat power. 1-27 engineer staff officer. C-3, 2- M
combined arms. 2-19, 2-14, 2-3 20, 2-15, 2-4, 2-3 maneuver commanders. 4-32
command posts. 7-1 entry control points. A-7, A-4, Marine Corps Planning
commander's cards. C-6, C-5, A-1, 3-29 Process. 2-14
C-3 environmental conditions. 1-15, military deception
compartmentalization. 3-36 1-11, 1-7, 1-2 definition. 1-14
concealment. F-4, 8-75, 8-61, explosive hazards. 3-29, 3-12 military decisionmaking
8-1, 7-18, 7-11, 6-132, 6- F process. 2-14
123, 6-111, 6-103, 6-100, 6- minefields. 6-116, 6-102
89, 6-83, 6-70, 6-33, 4-28, 4- facilities. C-2, B-32, B-23, B-8,
B-2, 8-73, 7-26, 7-1, 6-154, mission analysis. 2-15, 1-12
26, 3-55, 1-18, 1-12, 1-15
6-139, 5-7, 4-18, 3-63, 3-57, mission command. 8-2, 7-21,
countermobility. C-1, 4-34, 1- 3-36, 3-33, 3-29, 3-23, 3-13, 7-1, 6-139, 6-111, 6-13, 2-23
20 2-24, 1-25, 1-18, 1-17, 1-8, mission variables. 2-28, 2-16
cover. D-6, B-27, 8-68, 8-59, 8- 1-3
51, 8-48, 8-24, 8-17, 8-7, 8- mitigation. A-4, 3-31
field force engineering
1, 7-24, 7-22, 7-18, 7-14, 6- definition. B-4 mobility. C-1, 7-1, 6-151, 1-13

16 April 2018 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C Index-1

Index

O recognition factors. 6-138, 6- standoff. B-30, 3-35

obscuration. 6-106, 4-30, 1-16 93, 6-51, 6-42 survivability. C-1, B-25, 8-58,
observation posts. 5-6, 5-4, 4- reconnaissance. F-12, 6-103, 6-128, 2-19, 1-7
23, 4-20 6-71, 6-60, 6-6, 6-4 definition. 1-2
obstacles. B-32, A-7, A-6, 6- revetments. 8-53, 8-24, 7-26, survivability operations. 2-22,
132, 6-129, 6-115, 6-105, 6- 7-21, 4-40, 4-25, 3-60, 3-58, 2-1, 1-26
96, 6-65, 6-41, 1-13 3-57 areas of. 1-8
roof design. D-12, D-9, D-1 definition. 1-1
offense. 4-2 enablers of. 1-13
offensive. 6-41 running estimate. C-5, 2-25, 2-
16, 2-15, 2-14 T
offensive task. 6-134, 6-111, 6-
94, 6-38 S terrain. 8-30, 8-20, 8-8, 6-130,
6-110, 6-98, 6-72, 6-65, 6-
operational environment. 1-13 screens. 6-123, 6-105, 6-98, 3- 60, 6-55, 6-51, 4-2, 1-12, 1-
operational patterns. 6-41 66, 3-65, 3-64, 3-25 1, 1-15, 1-11
operational variables. 2-28 sensor systems threats. 6-20, 6-17, 6-1, 1-21,
acoustic. 6-14 1-7
operations process. 2-12 hyperspectral. 6-16
infrared. 6-8 towers. 4-17
P
multispectral. 6-16 tracking tools. 2-29
patterns. 6-80, 6-78, 6-70, 6-
near-infrared. 6-7 turret defilade. 4-29
66, 6-63, 6-55, 6-49
radar. 6-13
planning factors. 4-35 radio. 6-15 U
predetonation. 3-66, 3-64, 3- ultraviolet. 6-12 United States Army Corps of
63, 3-62 visual. 6-6 Engineers. B-8, B-1
problem framing. 2-15, 1-12 sensors. 6-6, 6-5
V
protection. 8-66, 8-58, 8-57, 8- shelters. 8-42, 8-14, 7-24, 5-9,
5-8, 5-5, 5-4, 4-40 vehicle protective positions. 7-
51, 8-49, 8-47, 8-35, 7-23, 7-
24, 5-1
14, 7-1, 6-150, 6-124, 6-22, site selection. A-1, 6-123, 6-52
6-17, 6-1, 5-10, 5-7, 5-1, 4- W
situational understanding
38, 4-24, 4-18, 4-12, 4-10, 4-
definition. 1-14 warfighting functions. 1-4
3, 4-1, 3-52, 3-47, 3-43, 3-
snow. 8-53, 8-52, 8-47, 8-42, mission
40, 3-39, 3-31, 3-26, 2-13, 1-
8-33, 6-55, 6-28, 6-12 command/command and
27, 1-15, 1-2, 1-15
control. 1-21
protection cell. 2-12 soil bin walls. 3-59
mission
protective positions. 8-24, 7-24, soil-filled containers. 5-6, 4-20, command/command and
7-22, 3-50, 3-33, 2-24, 1-21, 3-49 control warfighting
1-17, 1-7 special environments function. 1-17
protective walls. 3-55 cold regions. 8-33 protection/force protection.
deserts. 8-23 1-4, 1-2
R jungles. 8-1 weapons effects. B-28, 3-25, 3-
range of military operations. 3- mountainous areas. 8-11 23, 3-1
12, 2-2 urban areas. 8-54
weather. 6-74, 1-15
reachback. B-5, B-3, 3-53, 3-27 standard operating procedure.
E-1

Index-2 ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C 16 April 2018

ATP 3-37.34
16 April 2018

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1810004

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media
only (EMO).
PCN 147 000026 00 PIN 103346−000