41st AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit AIAA 2005-3793

10 - 13 July 2005, Tucson, Arizona

41st AIAA Joint Propulsion Conference, 11-13 July 2005, Tucson, AZ AIAA 2005-3793

Solid Rocket Failures in World Space Launches

I-Shih Chang* and Edmardo Joe Tomei**

The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California 90245

Review results on world space launches since the inception of the space age in 1957 are presented. The success
rates of solid rocket motors and liquid rocket engines used in the space launch vehicles from different coun-
tries of the world during the past 25 years are compared. The failure causes and vulnerable areas for failed
U.S. space launch vehicles using solid rockets are identified and discussed. The results contain some of the
lessons learned. The objectives of the study are to 1) provide information on the past space-related mission
failures; 2) identify the failure causes for space launch vehicles using solid rockets; 3) define vulnerable areas
of launch vehicles using solid rockets; and 4) assess measures taken and processes needed to reduce risks in
solid rocket operations. It is hoped that the information contained in the paper will help in mitigating future
space launch failures.

1. Introduction Today’s space launch systems employ both liquid-propel-

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lant rockets (liquid rockets) and solid-propellant rockets (solid

The space age began with the USSR launch of the first ar- rockets) to deliver payloads into orbit. Liquid rockets are com-
tificial satellite using a liquid-propellant Sputnik (SL-1) ve- plex and have a relatively recent applications history. The
hicle on October 4, 1957. At present, nine countries or con- liquid rocket was first launched successfully by Professor
sortia—the United States, the Commonwealth of Indepen- Robert Goddard (Ref. 1) of the U.S. in March 1926, fired in
dent States (CIS, formerly USSR), the European consortium, anger as a military weapon (V-2) by the Germans (Ref. 2) in
China, Japan, India, Israel, Brazil, and North Korea—pos- September 1944, and utilized to deliver an artificial satellite
sess space launch systems, demonstrate space launch capa- into orbit by the USSR in October 1957. In contrast, solid
bility, or conduct space launch operations. Many current ma- rockets are simple and have been used as propulsive devices
jor space launch systems are based on early ballistic-missile in fireworks, in lifesaving and whaling operations, and as
technology, which allowed for a rapid transition but a less military weapons for many centuries. Solid rockets have been
than optimum system. The design of these space launch sys- used in the U.S. since the start of the space program, even
tems left much room for improvement, as demonstrated by though CIS/USSR was mainly concerned with the use of liq-
launch failures of the past. uid rockets. The first U.S. space launch vehicle, the Vanguard,
used Grand Central Rocket 133-KS-2800 solid rocket motor
Financially, much is at stake in any kind of space launch. A for the 3rd-stage propulsion sub-system (Ref. 3). The first
small launch vehicle, such as the U.S. Pegasus, costs about successful U.S. space launch in February 1958 utilized clus-
$15 million, but a versatile, partially reusable launch vehicle, ters of small rocket motors for the 2nd- and 3rd-stage propul-
such as the U.S. space shuttle, costs well over $1 billion. A sion sub-systems of the Jupiter C (Juno I) launch vehicle.
small experimental satellite can be purchased for a few mil- This study updates previous work on the review of world space
lion dollars, but an advanced communications satellite, clas- launches and investigations of space launch failures (Refs. 4-
sified military spy satellite, or sophisticated civilian scien- 11). The emphasis of the study will be on the failure causes
tific satellite may cost more than $1 billion. Furthermore, the of solid rockets in space launches.
possible monetary loss calculated for a launch failure does
not include the expense, time, and effort spent during the re- 2. Worldwide Space Launches
covery period or the cost of the damage to national prestige.
Analysis of space launch failures is critical to a national space A space launch failure is an unsuccessful attempt to place a
program’s future success. A systematic look at worldwide payload into its intended orbit. This definition includes all
launch successes as well as failures, including scrutiny of catastrophic launch mishaps involving launch vehicle destruc-
various launch vehicle subsystems, can shed light on precise tion or explosion, significant reduction in payload service life,
areas that might be at the root of many problems. This type of and extensive effort or substantial cost for mission recovery.
study can also help suggest what actions to take to address It also includes the failure of the upper stage of a launch ve-
those problems. hicle, up to and including spacecraft separation on orbit. How-
ever, this definition does not include the failure of an upper
stage released from the U.S. space shuttle or of an upper stage,
* Distinguished Engineer, Vehicle Systems Division which is an integral part of the spacecraft. The U.S. space
** Chief Engineer, Space Launch Operations shuttle is both a launch vehicle and a space vehicle. An upper
stage released from the space shuttle in orbit is not consid-
Copyright © 2005 by The Aerospace Corporation. Published by the ered a launch vehicle. Similarly, the catastrophic failure of
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. with permission. the orbiter Columbia on its return-to-Earth flight in January

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Copyright © 2005 by . Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission.
AIAA 2005-3793

2003 is considered a spacecraft failure and not a launch fail- There were 13 successes and 6 failures in the Indian space
ure. launches in 1979-2004 as shown in Table 7. For national de-
fense needs Israel continues its active role in space launches,
Figures 1 and 2 show the total number and success rate of despite the failures in 1998 and 2004. There were 4 successes
the space launches for every space-faring nation of the world and 2 failures for Israeli space launches in 1988-2004 as shown
(Refs. 12-20). Between 1957 and 2004, 4,704 space launches in Table 7. Two Brazilian satellite launch attempts failed in
were conducted worldwide, including 2,909 launches by the 1997 and 1999. North Korea claimed to have successfully
CIS/USSR, 1,422 by the U.S., 168 by Europe, 93 by China, launched a small Kwangmyongsong-1 satellite into orbit by
69 by Japan, 19 by India, 6 by Israel, 2 by Brazil, 1 by N. a TPD-1 vehicle in 1998. But other countries have received
Korea, 12 by France, 2 by the U.K., and 1 by Australia. Table no signal from it, and the launch is considered a failure. France
1 gives yearly launch successes and failures from 1957 (10 successes and 2 failures) and the United Kingdom (1 suc-
through 2004. Of the 4,704 space launches conducted world- cess and 1 failure) independently conducted space launches
wide in 1957-2004, 404 launches failed. The success rate was over 30 years ago. Currently France and the U.K. participate
91.4 percent with an associated loss or significant service- in the ESA space launch programs. Table 7 also shows that
life reduction of more than 480 satellites (some launches in- Australia launched a small Sparta (SPecial Anti-missile Re-
cluded multiple payloads). search Tests, Australia) vehicle in 1967, which was a modi-
fied U.S. Redstone rocket. Today Australia does not have its
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Table 2 shows the success rates for the U.S. launch ve- own space launch system.
hicles. There were 1,257 successes and 165 failures in the
U.S. space launches in 1957-2004 with an associated loss or 3. Space Launch Failure Causes
significantly reduced service life of more than 200 satellites.
Most of the U.S. space launch failures (101 out of the 165) Space launch failure is usually attributed to problems asso-
occurred during the first 10 years of space exploration (1957– ciated with a subsystem, such as propulsion, avionics, sepa-
1966). Table 3 shows the success rate for the CIS/USSR launch ration/staging, electrical, or structures of a vehicle system. In
vehicles. There were 2,721 successes and 188 failures in the some cases failure is ascribed to problems in another area
CIS/USSR space launches in 1957-2004. The CIS/USSR has altogether (e.g., launch-pad, ground power umbilical, ground
carried out more space launches than all other countries com- flight control, lightning strike), or to unknown causes (usu-
bined and experienced an impressive number of space ally when subsystem failure information is not available).
launches and a strong launch success rate in the past. How-
ever, the number and success rate of space launches in recent Launch vehicle failures have been investigated, and launch
years have declined, mainly because of domestic financial failure causes in the United States (Ref. 4) have been found
problems. From 1996 to 1999, for example, the U.S. con- to include fuel leaks (resulting from welding defects, tank
ducted more space launches than the CIS/USSR for the first and feed-line damage, etc.), payload separation failures (from
time in 30 years. In 2000-2004 there were 6 failures with the incorrect wiring, defective switches, etc.), engine failure (the
CIS/USSR launch vehicles, comparing to only 1 failure with result of insufficient brazing in the combustion chamber), and
the U.S. launchers. loss of vehicle control (because of lightning, damaged wires
that caused shorts, and control-system design deficiencies).
The failures of the European Europa vehicle were reminis- In Europe and China (Refs. 5-6), launch failure causes in-
cent of the early U.S. launch failures. After terminating the cluded engine failures (from combustion instability,
Europa program, Europe spent many years developing the turbopump malfunction, hydrogen injector valve leak, helium
Ariane launch system, which has been very successful. There pressurization circuit leak, clogged fuel lines, hydrogen con-
were 154 successes and 14 failures in the European space trol valve leak, etc.), loss of vehicle control because of a bro-
launches in 1968-2004 as shown in Table 4. From 1991 to ken wire in rate gyro circuit, loss of vehicle guidance be-
1996, the Chinese space launch record was marred by five cause of software design errors, and payload fairing struc-
failures. The two recent failures in 2002 and 2003 involved tural damage because of strong wind aloft and wind shear.
the solid-propellant KT-1 launch system. There were 80 suc-
cesses and 13 failures in the Chinese space launches in 1970- Statistics show that among the causes of failure for world-
2004 as shown in Table 5. The Japanese H-II and the up- wide space launches in the twenty-five year period between
graded H-IIA launch systems suffered three launch failures 1980 to 2004 propulsion subsystem problems predominated
in 1998-2003. Japan’s other eight launch failures involved as shown in Table 8. That particular subsystem appears to be
solid rockets. There were 58 successes and 11 failures in the the Achilles’ heel of launch vehicles. Seventy-six of the 129
Japanese space launches in 1966-2004 as shown in Table 6. worldwide launch failures in 1980-2004 were failures of the
propulsion subsystem. Sixteen of the 31 U.S. failures and 36
Several satellites have plunged into Bengal Bay since of the 65 CIS/USSR failures in 1980-2004 were failures of
India’s space program began in 1979. Since 1998 India has the propulsion subsystem.
had a streak of successful space launches, and it acquired
geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) launch capability in 2001. The propulsion subsystem, the heaviest and largest sub-

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AIAA 2005-3793

system of a launch vehicle, consists of components that pro- Sequence of Events:

duce, direct, or control changes in launch vehicle position or The $1.5 billion STS Challenger with its seven-member
attitude. Its many elements include different stages of main crew and $117 million payload was launched at cold tem-
components of rocket motors, liquid engines, and thrusters; perature. A puff of black smoke was observed emerging
combustion chamber; nozzle; propellant (both solid and liq- from the aft joint of one of the booster motors at 0.6 sec
uid); propellant storage; thrust vector actuator and gimbal after solid rocket motor (SRM) ignition. At 68 sec a large
mechanism; fuel and propulsion control components; feed white hot plume emerged from the booster motor. The ve-
lines; control valves; turbopumps; igniters; motor and engine hicle exploded at 73 sec into the flight at an altitude 47,000
insulation. Similar components are also used as separation ft (14,326 m) and 8 mi. (12.9 km) downrange, while trav-
mechanisms in the separation/staging subsystem. eling at 1,800 fps (548.6 m/sec). The designed, nominal
burn time for the SRM is 120 sec.
Propulsion subsystem failures can be divided into failures
in solid rockets (SRs) and liquid rockets (LRs). Out of the 76 Failure Cause:
propulsion failures in 1980-2004, 16 were SR failures and 60 The launch management waived the temperature-dependent
were LR failures. There were 574 launches with SRs and 2,257 launch commit criteria and launched the STS Challenger
launches with LRs. Therefore, the success rate is 97.2% for at an ambient temperature of 38 oF (3.3 oC) instead of the
SRs and 97.3% for LRs. The success rate for SRs and LRs in 53 oF (11.7 oC) derived from the previous temperature ex-
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the twenty-five year period in 1980-2004 was the same! This perience of the STS program. The wind blowing from the
statistical result essentially settles the ongoing argument that west moved around the super-cold external tank and chilled
LRs are more reliable than SRs or vice versa. The sum of the the downstream motor surface temperature to 8 oF (-13.3
o
number of launches with SRs (574) and with LRs (2,257) is C) before launch. The rubber O-rings in the motor case
greater than the total number of worldwide space launches joint lost their resiliency in the cold temperature. The com-
2,418 in 1980-2004, because some launchers use both SRs bustion flame leaked through the O-rings and case joint
and LRs in the propulsion subsystem for the same launch. and impinged on the motor aft attach struts and the exter-
nal tank. Failure of the aft struts caused the aft end of the
Out of the 16 SR failures in 1980-2004, 6 were U.S. launch- motor to move outward and forced the nose of the SRM
ers and 10 were non-U.S. launchers. The U.S. solid-propel- into the upper portion of the external tank. The explosion
lant launch systems include Taurus, Conestoga, Athena, ensued at 73 sec after ignition (Refs. 21-23).
Minotaur, Pegasus, and Scout. The U.S. liquid-propellant
launch systems include Titan II, Titan IIIA, Titan IIIB, Atlas Corrective Action:
(except Atlas IIAS, V 4xx, V 5xx), Delta IV M, and Delta IV • Incorporate a capture feature arm at the joint to limit joint
H. Launch systems having both LRs and SRs include STS, gap opening.
Thor, all other Titans, Atlases, and Deltas not mentioned pre- • Add a third O-ring and J-seal thermal barrier for improved
viously in the period of 1980-2004. The success rate is slightly thermal protection.
higher for SRs (98.6%) than that for LRs (97.95) in the U.S. • Widen O-ring groove to improve O-ring pressure actua-
space launches from 1980 to 2004 as shown in Table 9. The 6 tion capability.
SR failure causes for the U.S. space launches are listed in • Add joint heater/weather seal to maintain O-ring resil-
Table 10, and the 10 SR failure causes for non-U.S. launches iency and a clean joint.
are listed in Table 11. The following section provides descrip- • Adopt strict launch commit weather criteria.
tions of the 6 U.S. SR failure causes and corrective actions.
Titan 34D-9
4. Description of the U.S. Solid Rocket Failures
failure date: 1986-04-18
STS-Challenger launch site: Western Range
payload: unannounced
failure date: 1986-01-28 failed subsys: propulsion
launch site: Eastern Range failure time: 8.7 sec
payload: TDRS-2
failed subsys: propulsion Failure Description:
failure time: 73 sec The Titan 34D-9 vehicle exploded and its payload was de-
stroyed at 8.7 sec after lift-off when the vehicle was at 800
Failure Description: ft (244 m) above the launch pad. Major damage occurred
The STS Challenger exploded at 73 sec into flight. All seven to the launch complex.
crew members were killed in one of the worst accidents in
U.S. space program history. Sequence of Events:
At 8.5 sec into the flight a 12-ft (3.66-m) diameter ball of
fire erupted from the side of one of the vehicle’s two SRMs.

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AIAA 2005-3793

At 8.7 sec the SRM exploded, and the vehicle and its pay- case burn-through at 101.2 sec (Refs. 4, 26).
load were automatically destroyed at 800 ft (244 m) above
the launch pad. Debris was scattered around the launch Corrective Action:
complex. The designed, nominal, burn time for the Titan • Define the hardware acceptance criteria and qualification
34D SRM is 105 sec. program for the SRM segments.
• Improve manufacturing process for SRM segments to
Failure Cause: avoid restrictor repair.
Motor case insulation unbonded in one of the vehicle’s two • Remove all repaired segments from flight inventory.
SRMs, and the butt joint between the segments opened • Allow no repaired segments in the future flights.
under the ignition pressure. The combustion flame directly
heated the steel case wall, and burn-through of the motor Athena I
case occurred at 8.7 sec after ignition (Refs. 24-25).
failure date: 1995-08-15
Corrective Action: launch site: Western Range
• Tighten hardware quality control (material, dimension, payload: GEMstar-1
tolerance). failed subsys: propulsion
• Improve manufacturing environment and process. failure time: 80 sec
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• Ensure insulation-to-case bondline integrity (visual, x-

ray, ultrasonic, proof test). Failure Description:
• Revise SRM segment assembly procedure. The Athena-1 launch vehicle pitched out of control start-
ing at 80 sec and was destroyed by range safety officers at
Titan IVA-11 160 sec into flight.

failure date: 1993-08-02 Sequence of Events:

launch site: Western Range The pressure transducers started to drift and provide erro-
payload: unannounced neous data at 50 sec during the 1st-stage motor (Castor 120)
failed subsys: propulsion firing. At 80 sec into flight, the thrust vector actuation (TVA)
failure time: 101.2 sec mechanism malfunctioned and vehicle pitch-up occurred
at about 41 mi. (66 km) altitude. All pressure measurements
Failure Description: failed at 86 sec. The vehicle continued to pitch out of con-
The Titan IV vehicle and its payload were destroyed by trol during the 2nd-stage (Orbus 21D motor) firing and was
Range Safety seconds after one of the SRMs exploded at destroyed by Range Safety at 160 sec into flight at 92 mi.
101.2 sec into flight. (148 km) altitude and 333 mi. (536 km) downrange.

Sequence of Events: Failure Cause:

During the SRMs’ burn, video imagery showed that a light- The TVA mechanism malfunction was the result of an er-
colored ring enveloped and quickly expanded from the Ti- roneous feedback signal caused by reduction of electrical
tan IVA-11 vehicle. The puff of the doughnut-shaped ring resistance in cables, due to overheating of the cables by the
was immediately followed by an explosion of one of the recirculation flame in the Castor 120 nozzle base region.
SRMs at 101.2 sec into flight, while the vehicle was begin- The flame was produced by the ignition of TVA hydraulic
ning to pitch over to a more horizontal attitude as it accel- oil dumped overboard at the nozzle exit plane. The Athena
erated downrange to place its payload in a polar orbit. Range I’s inertial measurement unit (IMU) (ring laser gyros and
Safety issued destruct commands after the explosion oc- accelerometers) also malfunctioned during the flight be-
curred at 90 mi. (145 km) downrange at an altitude of cause of electrical arcing within the unit’s high voltage
110,000 ft (33,528 m). The designed, nominal, burn time power supply (Refs. 27-29).
of the SRM is 127 sec.
Corrective Action:
Failure Cause: • Re-route vent tube for safe oil expulsion.
The propellant in one of the Titan IVA-11 solid rocket seg- • Improve thermal protection for cables and TVA compo-
ments was cut approximately 0.25-in. (0.625-cm) deep and nents in nozzle base region.
extended 34 in. (86.36 cm) in the radial direction from the • Improve IMU design to withstand high-altitude electrical
bore during the restrictor repair. The repair was more ex- discharge.
tensive than had ever been attempted on such a motor seg-
ment. At motor ignition the face of the cut was pressurized Delta II 7925 (241)
and open, allowing flame to propagate along the cut. This
flame propagation along the cut resulted in early exposure failure date: 1997-01-17
of the SRM sidewall insulation and eventually the motor launch site: Eastern Range

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payload: GPS IIR-1 in failure to achieve the required orbital injection velocity.
failed subsys: propulsion The payload including Orbview-4, QuikToms, SBD (Spe-
failure time: 12.6 sec cial Bus Design), and Celestis burial canisters fell into the
Indian Ocean.
Failure Description:
One of the nine SRMs failed shortly after lift-off. The Delta Failure Cause:
II (model 7925, flight 241) vehicle exploded at about 1,500 A stuck steering mechanism is believed to be the cause for
ft (457 m) altitude, and the GPS IIR-1 payload was de- the launch failure. The problem seems to be in the 2nd-
stroyed. The flaming debris caused some property damage stage thrust vector control actuator. The actuator drive shaft
near the launch site. appeared to bind or seize up for approximately five sec at
2nd-stage ignition, likely because of contamination in yaw
Sequence of Events: actuator fill solenoid control valve. Contamination was self-
At 7.2 sec photographic data showed a linear indication on generated within valve during assembly and operation be-
the side of one of the six ground-ignited Graphite Epoxy cause of design defect (Refs. 32-33).
Motors (GEMs). At 12.6 sec the motor exploded which trig-
gered the vehicle auto destruct system to destroy the 1st Corrective Action:
stage. Range Safety sent a command to destroy the remain- • Use a new TVC system without the actuator fill solenoid
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ing vehicle and payload at 22.3 sec. control valve.

• Review the robustness of TVC system acceptance test-
Failure Cause: ing.
The hoop fibers in the outer five composite layers of the • Improve vendor oversight procedures.
motor case were damaged. Under the combustion pressure • Improve procedures for addressing flight and ground test
loading during launch, the damaged and weakened outer anomalies.
layers cracked axially beginning at 51 in. (130 cm) from
its aft end at 7.23 sec and extending to the forward end of 5. Analysis and Discussions
the motor at 12.30 sec. At 12.60 sec the internal composite
layers and insulation ruptured, and the motor exploded at A simple analysis can be performed from the data obtained
1,025 psi (70.67 bar) pressure (Refs. 30-31). from failure investigations. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the SR
failures in the U.S. and Non-U.S. space launches by element,
Corrective Action: component, and root cause from 1980 to 2004. The four un-
• Inspect ultrasonically all motors to detect any critical knowns in Figs. 4 and 5 are for the Shavit 1, TPD-1, and two
delaminations or damage that might have been introduced KT-1s. The data for the Shavit 1 failure in 1998 is still con-
during manufacturing, proof test, or handling. sidered classified information by the Israeli space agency, even
• Revise vent system and procedures to eliminate possible though it is quite open with another Shavit 1 failure (separa-
adverse pressure loading on the motor case during the tion) in 2004. The Chinese government has not been vocal
draining process after hydro-proof test. about any launch failures since the beginning of its space pro-
gram. The N. Korean government has never admitted that the
Taurus T-6 TPD-1 failed in the launch attempt of 1998.

failure date: 2001-09-21 As illustrated in Fig. 3, it is interesting to notice that most

launch site: Western Range of the U.S. SR failures are strap-on boosters (stage 0), and
payload: Orbview-4, QuikTOMS, SBD, Celestis-4 the Non-U.S. SR failures spreaded more evenly into differ-
failed subsys: propulsion ent stages, indicating that the U.S. strap-on motors are more
failure time: 83 sec susceptible to failures than those in the core vehicle. The three
SR boosters (STS Challenger, Titan 34-D9, and Titan IVA-
Failure Description: 11) that failed are the largest flight motors in the world. Large
The Taurus T6 (model 2110) vehicle failed to achieve the segmented motors are harder to handle, process, and fabri-
required orbital injection velocity and to deliver payload cate than small monolithic ones and, hence, are more prone
to orbit. to defects. Testing of a large motor is difficult and costly.
Moreover, not too many facilities are environmentally and
Sequence of Events: operationally qualified for a large motor test. Therefore, the
The Taurus flight was normal until after 1st-stage separa- number of full-scale tests is usually very limited for a large
tion at 83 sec into the flight when the vehicle control was motor. Subscale tests are relied upon for providing important
lost and an uncontrolled tumbling maneuver occurred. The motor characteristics, which could deviate considerably from
tumbling maneuver was halted when the autopilot regained the true characteristics of a large motor. Post-test inspection,
control of the vehicle at 91 sec. But the loss of effective evaluation, and analysis of large motors are also complex,
momentum during the uncontrolled vehicle tumble resulted laborious, and time consuming. Defects in design, process-

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AIAA 2005-3793

ing, or workmanship of large motors can be hidden and not testing, and operations.
uncovered during motor development and qualification pro-
grams (Ref. 34). More booster solid rocket motors are used In the design phase of a new solid-propellant vehicle, it is
per launch in the Delta II 7925 vehicle than other launch ve- important to apply current analysis techniques to ensure fast,
hicles resulting in increased work load and, hence, risks in accurate, and low-cost modeling of precise configurations
processing the motors. The motor case of the Delta II 7925 prior to hardware fabrication to reduce risk.
boosters is made of composite material and is more suscep-
tible to damage. Handling and inspection procedures require In the fabrication phase of a motor, stringent control of raw
more attention for the composite motor case than prior steel materials, components, and semi-finished products ought to
motor case. be practiced. Propellant should be cast in a vacuum, if pos-
sible, to reduce the number and size of internal voids. Detec-
An SR usually contains aft skirt, attach assembly, external tion of defects in solid propellant and in bond-lines between
insulation, heat shield, instrumentation, nose cone, ordnance propellant and insulation and between nozzle insulators and
& destruct, raceway, staging rockets, electrical harness, joints, supporting structures needs to be performed before motor
TVC assembly (or system), ignition assembly (or system), assembly. Only fully-qualified and defect-free components
loaded case (propellant, case insulation, and motor case), and should be used in the vehicle.
nozzle assembly. Figure 4 depicts the components involved
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in the SR failures. The three loaded case failures (Titan 34- In the testing phase, it is important for a design to be vali-
D9, Titan IVA-11, and Delta II 7925) in the U.S. space dated by subjecting components to severe thermal and pres-
launches can also be attributed to size, number, and difficulty sure load for tolerance to fabrication and operating environ-
effects mentioned previously. There were two SR nozzle fail- ment variances. SRs need to be tested under conditions that
ures for the Non-U.S. launch vehicles, but none for the U.S. simulate an actual launch (test as you fly), and the results of
launch vehicles. Although there were 3 SR nozzle failures, testing during the development and qualification phase should
namely the IUS SRM-2 and two Start-48 motors launched be analyzed, and measures taken to improve product reliabil-
from the Space Shuttle in 1983 and 1984, respectively, and 1 ity.
Star-37S motor integrated with the spacecraft DMSP F-10
and launched from an Atlas E vehicle in 1990 as discussed in When the system is operational, it is important to limit space
Ref. 35, they were considered either transfer vehicle or space launch operation to the design environment and flight expe-
vehicle failures. rience. Pre-launch procedures and launch processes should
be simplified to reduce contamination and damage in han-
Figure 5 shows that design deficiency is the primary root dling and processing.
cause of the SR failures in space launches. All the 4 unknown
failure causes in Fig. 5 could also be rooted in design defi- 6. Conclusions
ciency, which is the main failure root cause for all new ve-
hicles using SRs. Failures caused by process error or poor This paper reviewed the success rate of all the space launch
workmanship are usually associated with matured vehicles. systems since the inception of the space age. The propulsion
and non-propulsion subsystem failures for the past 25 years
Available launch-failure data reveal much about patterns are identified. Lessons learned from recent solid rocket fail-
in the possible causes of failure. Many failure causes fall into ures are discussed. It is hoped that the information contained
the category of human error: poor workmanship, judgment, in this paper will be of some help in mitigating launch fail-
or launch-management decisions. Some failures are the re- ures in the future.
sult of defective parts. Failure can have its root in any phase
of launch vehicle development—difficulties have been noted Acknowledgments
in inadequate designs and component tests; in improper han-
dling in manufacturing and repair processes; and in insuffi- This work was supported by the U.S. Air Force Space and
cient pre-launch checkouts. Many past failures could have Missile Systems Center under Contract No. FA8802-04-C-
been prevented if rigorous mission assurance measures had 0001.
been taken.

Information gathered from the SR failure studies of past

space launches indicates that following certain work prac-
tices could greatly enhance the reliability of solid-propellant
launch vehicle systems. Of primary importance is the need to
review and implement all lessons learned from past failure
studies to avoid failure recurrences. It is necessary to incor-
porate the preventive measures learned from the past failures
into all aspects of system development—design, fabrication,

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1 Goddard, Esther C. and G. Edward Pendray, Editors, The supplementary data through 1983), Unmanned Space
Activities, Part 3, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Papers of Robert H. Goddard, Vol. 1, McGraw-Hill, New York,
Transportation, U.S. Senate, May 1985.
1970.
19 Johnson, N. L., Soviet Space Programs 1980-1985, Science
2Neufeld, M. J., The Rocket and the Reich, Harvard
and Technology Series, Vol. 66, American Astronautical
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.
Society Publication, San Diego, CA, 1987, pp. 197-239.
3 Green, C. M. and M. Lomask, Vanguard-A History, NASA
20
McDowell, Jonathan, Jonathan's Space Report, http://
SP-4202, The NASA Historical Series, NASA Headquarters,
www.planet4589.org/space/jsr/jsr.html.
Washington D.C., 1970, pp. 206-212.
21 Rogers, W. P., Report to the President by the Presidential
4Chang, I-Shih, "Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Catastrophic Failures," AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., June 6, 1986,
Rockets, Vol. 33, No. 2, March-April 1996, pp. 198-205.
pp. 19-81.
5Chang, I-Shih, S. Toda, and S. Kibe, “Chinese Space 22 McCool, A. A., and W. L. Ray, "Space Shuttle Solid Rocket
Launch Failures,” ISTS paper 2000-g-08, 22nd International
Motor Program, Lessons Learned," AIAA paper 91-2291, June
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Symposium on Space Technology and Science, Morioka,

1991.
Japan, May 31, 2000.
23 Avia.Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 16, Feb. 3;
6Chang, I-Shih, S. Toda, and S. Kibe, “European Space
p.22, Feb. 24, 1986.
Launch Failures,” AIAA paper 2000-3574, 36th AIAA Joint
Propulsion Conference. Huntsville, AL, July 17-19, 2000. 24 Allman, R. M., "Titan 34D-9 Failure Investigation and

7 Recovery," 11th Annual AAS Guidance and Control

Chang, I-Shih, “Overview of World Space Launches,”
Conference, American Astronautical Society, Paper No. 88-
AIAA Journal of Propulsion and Power, Vol. 16, No. 5,
005, 30 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1988.
September-October 2000.
25 Avia.Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 16, Apr. 28;
8 Chang,I-Shih, "World Space Launch Failures - Executive
p. 24, May 5, 1986.
Summary," Aerospace Report No. TOR-99 (1413)-1, January
2000. 26 Avia. Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 22, Aug. 9;

9 Chang, I-Shih, "SRM Failures in World Space Launches," p. 26, Aug. 23; p. 92, Sep. 20, 1993.
Proceedings of the Solid Rocket Motor Failure Investigation 27 Aerospace Daily, Vol. 176, No. 52, p. 431, Dec. 18, 1995.
Workshop, 34th AIAA Joint Propulsion Conference, Cleveland, 28 Avia. Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 18, Aug. 21,
Ohio, 13 July 1998.
1995.
10 Tomei, E. J. and I-S. Chang, "Historical Survey of the U.S.
29 Space News, Army Times Pub., Springfield, VA, Sep. 18-
Small Launch Vehicle Failures," Final Report to ATK Thiokol,
24; No. 13-6; Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 1995.
31 March 2005.
30 Avia. Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 30, Jan. 27,
11 Chang, I-Shih, "Space Launch Vehicle Reliability,"
1997.
Crosslink, The Aerospace Corporation magazine of advances
in aerospace technology, June 2005. 31 Ndefo, E. D., "Delta II GE Failure Investigation (D241/

12
GPS IIR-1)," Proceedings of the Solid Rocket Motor Failure
Thompson, T. D., Space Log 1957-1996, TRW Inc.,
Investigation Workshop, 34th AIAA Joint Propulsion
Redondo Beach, CA, July 1997.
Conference, Cleveland, Ohio, 13 July 1998.
13 Isakowitz, S. J., J. P. Hopkins, and J. B. Hopkins, Jr.,
32 Avia. Week & Space Tech., New York, NY, p. 44, Oct. 1,
International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 4th-
2001.
edition, AIAA Publications, Washington, D.C., 2004.
33 Ray, Justin, “Investigators Find Problem that Doomed
14Anon., NASA Pocket Statistics, NASA Headquarters,
Taurus Launch,” Spaceflight Now, http://spaceflightnow.com/
Washington D.C., January 1996.
taurus/t6/011107update.html, Nov. 7, 2001.
15 Caceres, M. A., "World Space Systems Briefing," TEAL
34AIAA Conference on Large Solid Rocket Motors,
Group Corp., Fairfax, VA, June 1997.
Monterey, CA, 4-6 October 1994.
16Baker, N. L., Soviet Space Log 1957-1967, Space 35Patel, N. and I-S. Chang, "U.S. Solid Rocket Nozzle
Publications, Inc., Washington D.C., February 1968.
Anomalies," AIAA paper 2000-3575, 36th AIAA Joint
17 Matson, W. R., Editor, Cosmonautics, A Colorful History, Propulsion Conference, Huntsville, AL, 17-19 July 2000.
Cosmos Books, Washington D.C., 1994, pp. 1-20.

7
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Table 1 World Space Launches (1957-2004)

U.S. CIS/USSR Europe China Japan India Israel Brazil N.Korea France U.K. Australia Total
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1957 0 1 2 0 2 1 1957
1958 5 18 1 4 6 22 1958
1959 11 8 3 1 14 9 1959
1960 16 13 5 6 21 19 1960
1961 22 19 6 3 28 22 1961
1962 48 11 20 2 68 13 1962
1963 37 9 17 7 54 16 1963
1964 56 8 30 6 86 14 1964
1965 61 9 48 6 1 0 110 15 1965
1966 72 5 43 11 0 2 1 0 116 18 1966
1967 58 3 67 8 0 1 2 0 1 0 128 12 1967
1968 43 5 74 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 117 14 1968
1969 38 3 69 15 0 1 0 1 0 0 107 20 1969
1970 28 2 81 7 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 113 12 1970
1971 31 4 83 9 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 119 15 1971
1972 31 2 74 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 106 7 1972
1973 23 2 86 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 109 8 1973
1974 23 2 81 4 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 105 8 1974
1975 27 4 89 4 0 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 124 8 1975
1976 24 2 98 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 125 6 1976
1977 23 3 98 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 123 7 1977
1978 32 1 87 4 0 0 1 0 3 0 123 5 1978

8
1979 16 0 87 3 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 106 5 1979
1980 12 3 87 3 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 102 7 1980
1981 18 1 97 3 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 121 5 1981
1982 18 0 100 8 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 120 9 1982
1983 22 0 97 3 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 126 3 1983
1984 21 1 97 1 4 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 127 3 1984
1985 17 1 97 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 120 6 1985
1986 6 3 91 5 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 103 9 1986
1987 8 1 95 3 2 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 110 5 1987
1988 11 1 90 5 7 0 4 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 115 7 1988
1989 18 0 74 1 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 101 1 1989
1990 26 1 74 5 5 1 5 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 114 7 1990
1991 17 2 59 2 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 86 5 1991
1992 28 1 54 1 7 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 94 3 1992
1993 23 2 46 2 7 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 78 5 1993
1994 26 1 48 1 6 2 5 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 89 4 1994
1995 26 4 31 2 11 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 72 8 1995
1996 32 1 23 4 10 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 69 8 1996
1997 37 1 27 2 12 0 6 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 84 5 1997
1998 34 2 24 1 11 0 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 76 6 1998
1999 27 4 28 2 10 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 70 8 1999
2000 28 0 36 3 12 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 4 2000
2001 21 1 25 0 7 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 2 2001
2002 17 0 24 2 11 1 4 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 61 4 2002
2003 23 0 24 0 4 0 6 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 2 2003
2004 16 0 25 1 3 0 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 53 2 2004
Total 1,257 165 2,722 187 154 14 80 13 58 11 13 6 4 2 0 2 0 1 10 2 1 1 1 0 4,300 404 Total
AIAA 2005-3793
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Table 2 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1957-2004) - U.S.

STS Titan Atlas Delta* Taurus Athena Minotaur Pegasus Saturn Thor** Conestoga Scout Juno*** Vanguard NOTS-SLV Total

year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1957 0 1 0 1 1957
1958 1 0 0 3 3 4 1 5 0 6 5 18 1958
1959 0 1 7 3 2 2 2 2 11 8 1959
1960 1 4 2 1 12 6 0 1 1 1 16 13 1960
1961 4 7 3 0 13 7 1 3 1 2 22 19 1961
1962 11 5 9 0 25 4 3 2 48 11 1962
1963 9 1 7 0 17 5 4 3 37 9 1963
1964 2 1 15 3 4 1 3 0 25 2 7 1 56 8 1964
1965 8 2 14 5 7 1 3 0 24 1 5 0 61 9 1965
1966 10 1 31 2 8 0 1 0 14 2 8 0 72 5 1966
1967 9 1 14 0 12 0 1 0 16 0 6 2 58 3 1967
1968 10 0 6 2 7 1 3 1 12 1 5 0 43 5 1968
1969 8 0 5 0 9 2 4 0 11 0 1 1 38 3 1969
1970 6 1 2 1 7 0 1 0 9 0 3 0 28 2 1970
1971 8 0 4 2 4 1 2 0 8 1 5 0 31 4 1971
1972 7 2 6 0 7 0 2 0 4 0 5 0 31 2 1972
1973 8 1 4 0 5 1 4 0 1 0 1 0 23 2 1973
1974 7 1 2 0 6 1 0 0 2 0 6 0 23 2 1974
1975 8 1 3 2 12 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 27 4 1975
1976 8 1 4 0 9 0 1 1 2 0 24 2 1976
1977 7 0 6 1 8 2 1 0 1 0 23 3 1977
1978 6 1 14 0 10 0 1 0 1 0 32 1 1978
1979 5 0 4 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 16 0 1979

9
1980 3 0 6 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 12 3 1980
1981 2 0 5 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 1 0 18 1 1981
1982 3 0 5 0 3 0 7 0 0 0 18 0 1982
1983 4 0 3 0 6 0 8 0 1 0 22 0 1983
1984 5 0 7 0 4 1 4 0 1 0 21 1 1984
1985 9 0 1 1 5 0 0 0 2 0 17 1 1985
1986 1 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 1 0 6 3 1986
1987 0 0 3 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 8 1 1987
1988 2 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 4 0 11 1 1988
1989 5 0 4 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 18 0 1989
1990 6 0 4 1 3 0 11 0 1 0 1 0 26 1 1990
1991 6 0 2 0 3 1 5 0 0 1 1 0 17 2 1991
1992 8 0 3 0 4 1 11 0 0 0 2 0 28 1 1992
1993 7 0 1 1 5 1 7 0 2 0 1 0 23 2 1993
1994 7 0 5 0 7 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 26 1 1994
1995 7 0 4 0 12 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 26 4 1995
1996 7 0 4 0 7 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 32 1 1996
1997 8 0 5 0 8 0 10 1 0 0 1 0 5 0 37 1 1997
1998 5 0 2 1 6 0 12 1 2 0 1 0 6 0 34 2 1998
1999 3 0 3 2 5 0 10 1 1 0 2 1 3 0 27 4 1999
2000 5 0 3 0 8 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 28 0 2000
2001 6 0 3 0 4 0 7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 21 1 2001
2002 5 0 2 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 17 0 2002
2003 1 0 4 0 5 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 23 0 2003
2004 0 0 1 0 6 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 2004
Total 112 1 196 21 285 44 294 16 6 1 5 2 2 0 31 4 25 1 205 37 0 1 86 14 7 9 3 8 0 6 1,257 165 Total

* Includes TAD (Thrust-Augmented Delta) ** Includes TAT (Thrust-Augmented Thor), LTTAT (Long Tank Thrust-Augmented Thor), and Thorad (Thrust-Augmented*** Includes Juno-1 and Juno-II
AIAA 2005-3793
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Table 3 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1957-2004) - CIS/USSR

Proton Zenit Soyuz* Molniya Dnepr Tsiklon Rokot Strela Kosmos Start Shtil-1 N-1 Energia Vostok** Polyot Sputnik B-1
SL-9,12,13 SL-16 SL-4 SL-6 SL-10,11,14 SL-8 SL-18 SL-15 SL-17 SL-3 SL-5 SL-1, 2 SL-7 Total
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1957 2 0 2 0 1957
1958 0 3 1 1 1 4 1958
1959 3 1 3 1 1959
1960 0 2 5 4 5 6 1960
1961 2 0 4 1 0 2 6 3 1961
1962 6 0 7 1 7 1 20 2 1962
1963 1 0 3 1 8 2 1 0 4 4 17 7 1963
1964 5 0 4 4 1 1 12 0 1 0 7 1 30 6 1964
1965 2 0 13 0 11 1 0 1 6 0 9 1 7 3 48 6 1965
1966 1 1 15 2 8 1 2 3 0 1 11 1 6 2 43 11 1966
1967 2 2 21 3 7 0 11 1 5 2 8 0 13 0 67 8 1967
1968 4 1 34 0 4 2 7 2 7 2 2 0 16 1 74 8 1968
1969 2 9 37 0 4 0 4 1 6 1 0 2 2 1 14 1 69 15 1969
1970 4 2 31 1 7 0 6 0 10 2 0 0 5 0 18 2 81 7 1970
1971 6 0 32 4 3 0 6 0 19 1 0 1 5 0 12 3 83 9 1971
1972 1 1 31 1 11 0 1 0 13 1 0 1 5 0 12 1 74 5 1972
1973 7 0 40 1 10 0 1 1 15 2 3 0 10 0 86 4 1973
1974 6 0 36 3 7 0 3 0 17 0 6 0 6 1 81 4 1974
1975 4 1 40 1 12 0 4 0 18 2 6 0 5 0 89 4 1975
1976 5 0 38 1 10 1 8 0 28 0 5 0 4 0 98 2 1976
1977 4 1 37 2 10 0 10 0 28 1 7 0 2 0 98 4 1977
1978 4 4 45 0 9 0 3 0 21 0 5 0 87 4 1978
1979 6 1 45 2 7 0 3 0 18 0 8 0 87 3 1979

10
1980 5 0 45 0 10 2 5 0 16 0 6 1 87 3 1980
1981 7 0 41 1 13 1 12 1 18 0 6 0 97 3 1981
1982 8 2 43 2 10 1 12 0 22 3 5 0 100 8 1982
1983 12 0 42 1 10 1 7 0 22 1 4 0 97 3 1983
1984 13 0 0 0 44 0 11 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 1 1984
1985 10 0 1 3 40 0 16 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 97 4 1985
1986 8 2 2 0 36 1 13 1 0 0 16 1 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 5 1986
1987 11 2 5 0 43 1 4 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 95 3 1987
1988 11 2 2 0 42 3 11 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 90 5 1988
1989 11 0 0 0 38 0 6 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 1 1989
1990 10 1 1 1 30 2 11 1 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 5 1990
1991 9 0 0 1 24 0 5 0 0 0 9 0 USSR 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 59 2 1991
1992 8 0 2 1 24 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 CIS 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 1 1992
1993 5 1 2 0 16 1 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 46 2 1993
1994 13 0 4 0 15 0 3 0 7 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 48 1 1994
1995 7 0 1 0 12 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 31 2 1995
1996 6 2 1 0 7 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 23 4 1996
1997 8 1 0 1 10 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 27 2 1997
1998 7 0 2 1 8 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 24 1 1998
1999 7 2 3 0 12 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 2 1999
2000 14 0 4 1 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 36 3 2000
2001 6 0 3 0 9 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 25 0 2001
2002 8 1 1 0 6 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 24 2 2002
2003 5 0 3 0 8 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 2003
2004 8 0 4 0 7 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 24 2 2004
Total 275 39 41 9 1,116 37 296 19 4 0 242 16 6 0 1 0 433 0 5 1 1 0 0 4 2 0 151 16 2 0 3 1 143 22 2,721 188 Total

*Includes Voskhod space launch vehicle (293 successes, 13 failures) in 1963-1976 **Includes Luna space launch vehicle (3 successes, 5 failures) in 1958-1960.
AIAA 2005-3793
AIAA 2005-3793

Table 4 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1968-2004) - Europe

Ariane-5ECA Ariane-5G Ariane-44L -44LP -42L -44P -42P -40 Ariane-3 Ariane-2 Ariane-1 Europa-II Europa-I Total
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1965 1965
1966 1966
1967 1967
1968 0 1 0 1 1968
1969 0 1 0 1 1969
1970 0 1 0 1 1970
1971 0 1 0 1 1971
1972 0 0 1972
1973 0 0 1973
1974 0 0 1974
1975 0 0 1975
1976 0 0 1976
1977 0 0 1977
1978 0 0 1978
1979 1 0 1 0 1979
1980 0 1 0 1 1980
1981 2 0 2 0 1981
1982 0 1 0 1 1982
1983 2 0 2 0 1983
1984 2 0 2 0 4 0 1984
1985 2 1 1 0 3 1 1985
1986 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 1986
1987 1 0 1 0 2 0 1987
1988 2 0 3 0 2 0 7 0 1988
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1989 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 7 0 1989
1990 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 1990
1991 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 1991
1992 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 7 0 1992
1993 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 7 0 1993
1994 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 2 1994
1995 1 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 11 0 1995
1996 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 10 1 1996
1997 1 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 1997
1998 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 11 0 1998
1999 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 10 0 1999
2000 4 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 2000
2001 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 2001
2002 0 1 3 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 1 2002
2003 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2003
2004 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2004
Total 0 1 17 2 39 1 25 1 13 0 15 0 14 1 7 0 10 1 5 1 9 2 0 1 0 3 154 14 Total

Table 5 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1970-2004) - China

CZ-3B CZ-2F CZ-2E CZ-3A CZ-4B CZ-4A CZ-3 CZ-2D CZ-2C/SD CZ-2C KT-1 CZ-2 FB-1 CZ-1 Total
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1965 1965
1966 1966
1967 1967
1968 1968
1969 1969
1970 1 0 1 0 1970
1971 1 0 1 0 1971
1972 0 0 1972
1973 0 1 0 1 1973
1974 0 1 0 1 0 2 1974
1975 1 0 2 0 3 0 1975
1976 1 0 1 1 2 1 1976
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 1977
1978 1 0 0 0 1 0 1978
1979 0 1 0 1 1979
1980 0 0 0 0 1980
1981 1 0 1 0 1981
1982 1 0 1 0 1982
1983 1 0 1 0 1983
1984 1 1 1 0 2 1 1984
1985 0 0 1 0 1 0 1985
1986 1 0 1 0 2 0 1986
1987 0 0 2 0 2 0 1987
1988 1 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 1988
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1989
1990 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 5 0 1990
1991 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1991
1992 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1992
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1993
1994 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1994
1995 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1995
1996 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 1996
1997 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 0 1997
1998 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 0 1998
1999 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1999
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2000
2001 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2001
2002 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 2002
2003 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 1 2003
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 8 0 2004
Total 4 1 5 0 5 2 9 0 8 0 2 0 10 3 5 0 9 0 14 0 0 2 3 1 4 4 2 0 80 13 Total

11
AIAA 2005-3793

Table 6 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1966-2004) - Japan

H-IIA Mu-5 H-II H-I N-II N-I Mu-3S-II Mu-3S Mu-3H Mu-3C Mu-4S Lambda-4S Total
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1965 1965
1966 0 2 0 2 1966
1967 0 1 0 1 1967
1968 0 0 0 0 1968
1969 0 1 0 1 1969
1970 0 1 1 0 1 1 1970
1971 2 0 2 0 1971
1972 1 0 1 0 1972
1973 0 0 1973
1974 1 0 1 0 1974
1975 1 0 1 0 2 0 1975
1976 1 0 0 1 1 1 1976
1977 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1977
1978 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 1978
1979 1 0 1 0 2 0 1979
1980 1 0 1 0 2 0 1980
1981 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 1981
1982 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1982
1983 2 0 1 0 3 0 1983
1984 2 0 1 0 3 0 1984
1985 0 0 2 0 2 0 1985
1986 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1986
1987 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 1987
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1988 2 0 0 0 2 0 1988
1989 1 0 1 0 2 0 1989
1990 2 0 1 0 3 0 1990
1991 1 0 1 0 2 0 1991
1992 1 0 0 0 1 0 1992
1993 1 0 1 0 1993
1994 2 0 0 0 2 0 1994
1995 1 0 0 1 1 1 1995
1996 1 0 1 0 1996
1997 1 0 1 0 2 0 1997
1998 1 0 0 1 1 1 1998
1999 0 0 0 1 0 1 1999
2000 0 1 0 0 0 1 2000
2001 1 0 0 0 1 0 2001
2002 3 0 0 0 3 0 2002
2003 1 1 1 0 2 1 2003
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004
Total 5 1 3 1 5 2 9 0 8 0 7 0 7 1 4 0 3 0 3 1 3 1 1 4 58 11 Total

Table 7 Launch Vehicle Success Rate (1965-2004) - Other

INDIA ISRAEL BRAZIL N. KOREA FRANCE U.K. AUSTRALIA

GSLV PSLV ASLV SLV-3 Total Shavit VLS Tae Po Dong-1 Diamant-BP4 Diamant-B Diamant-A Black Arrow Sparta
year s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f s f year
1965 1 0 1965
1966 1 0 1966
1967 2 0 1 0 1967
1968 1968
1969 1969
1970 2 0 0 1 1970
1971 1 1 1 0 1971
1972 0 0 1972
1973 0 1 1973
1974 0 0 1974
1975 2 0 1 0 1975
1976 1976
1977 1977
1978 1978
1979 0 1 0 1 1979
1980 1 0 1 0 1980
1981 0 1 0 1 1981
1982 0 0 0 0 1982
1983 1 0 1 0 1983
1984 0 0 1984
1985 0 0 1985
1986 0 0 1986
1987 0 1 0 1 1987
1988 0 1 0 1 1 0 1988
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 1989
1990 0 0 0 0 1 0 1990
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 1991
1992 1 0 1 0 0 0 1992
1993 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1993
1994 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1994
1995 0 0 0 0 1 0 1995
1996 1 0 1 0 0 0 1996
1997 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1997
1998 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1998
1999 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1999
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000
2001 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001
2002 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2002
2003 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003
2004 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2004
Total 3 0 6 2 2 2 2 2 13 6 4 2 0 2 0 1 2 0 4 2 4 0 1 1 1 0 Total

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AIAA 2005-3793

Table 8 Propulsion vs Non-Propulsion Subsystem Failures For World Space Launches (1980-2004)

Propulsion Non-propulsion Total

Solid Rocket Liquid Rocket
succ fail 25 yrs succ fail 25 yrs succ fail 25 yrs succ fail 25 yrs
U.S. 412 6 98.6 % 471 10 97.9 % 548 15 97.3 % 532 31 94.5 %
CIS/USSR 5 1 83.3 % 1,463 35 97.7 % 1,508 29 98.1 % 1,472 65 95.8 %
Europe 81 0 100.0 % 153 9 94.4 % 162 1 99.4 % 153 10 93.9 %
China 0 2 0.0 % 72 3 96.0 % 77 3 96.3 % 72 8 90.0 %
Japan 43 2 95.6 % 29 2 93.5 % 47 1 97.9 % 43 5 89.6 %
India 13 1 92.9 % 9 1 90.0 % 15 3 83.3 % 13 5 72.2 %
Israel 4 1 80.0 % 5 1 83.3 % 4 2 66.7 %
Brazil 0 2 0.0 % 2 0 100.0 % 0 2 0.0 %
N. Korea 0 1 0.0 % 0 0 1 0 100.0 % 0 1 0.0 %
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Total 558 16 97.2 % 2,197 60 97.3 % 2,365 53 97.8 % 2,289 129 94.7 %

Table 9 Propulsion vs Non-Propulsion Subsystem Failures For U.S. Space Launches (1980-2004)

Propulsion Non-propulsion Total

Solid Rocket Liquid Rocket
year succ fail succ fail succ fail succ fail
1980 5 0 12 2 14 1 12 3
1981 11 0 17 1 19 0 18 1
1982 14 0 18 0 18 0 18 0
1983 14 0 21 0 22 0 22 0
1984 15 0 20 1 22 0 21 1
1985 11 0 15 1 18 0 17 1
1986 3 2 5 0 8 1 6 3
1987 5 0 7 0 8 1 8 1
1988 8 0 7 1 12 0 11 1
1989 16 0 18 0 18 0 18 0
1990 23 0 24 0 26 1 26 1
1991 14 0 16 1 18 1 17 2
1992 23 0 26 1 29 0 28 1
1993 18 1 20 1 25 0 23 2
1994 19 0 22 0 26 1 26 1
1995 18 1 25 0 27 3 26 4
1996 26 0 28 0 32 1 32 1
1997 33 1 31 0 38 0 37 1
1998 29 0 25 0 34 2 34 2
1999 24 0 21 1 28 3 27 4
2000 22 0 23 0 28 0 28 0
2001 20 1 20 0 22 0 21 1
2002 12 0 16 0 17 0 17 0
2003 15 0 19 0 23 0 23 0
2004 14 0 15 0 16 0 16 0
Total 412 6 471 10 548 15 532 31
25 yrs 98.6 % 97.9 % 97.3 % 94.5 %

Table 10 Solid Rocket Failures in U.S. Space Launches (1980-2004)

No. Date Vehicle Failure Cause

1 1986-01-28 STS-Challenger Hot gas leaked through SRM joint in cold weather.
2 1986-04-18 Titan 34D-9 Motor case burnthrough due to case insulation debond.
3 1993-08-02 Titan IVA-11 Motor case burnthrough due to flame propagation into a propellant cut.
4 1995-08-15 Athena I 1st-stage SRM TVA cables overheating and navigation system malfunction.
5 1997-01-17 Delta II 7925 (241) SRM failure due to preflight damage to the composite motor case.
6 2001-09-21 Taurus T-6 2nd stage TVC failed to respond correctly because of contamination in actuator valve.

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Table 11 Solid Rocket Failures in Non-U.S. Space Launches (1980-2004)

No. Date Vehicle Country Failure Cause

1 1987-03-24 ASLV India 1st-stage failed to ignite after strap-on booster burn-out.
2 1995-03-28 SL-18 (Start) CIS/USSR Thrust temination activated by electric arcing during 4th-stage motor burn.
3 1997-11-02 VLS Brazil One of the four strap-on boosters failed to ignite.
4 1998-01-22 Shavit 1 Israel 2nd-stage motor experienced early thrust termination.
5 1998-08-31 Tae Po Dong-1 N. Korea Low performance in 3rd-stage motor.
6 1999-12-11 VLS Brazil 2nd-stage motor case burnthrough due to propellant/insulaiton debond.
7 2000-02-10 M-5 Japan Hot gas leaked and damaged attitude control system due to 1st-stage nozzle failure.
8 2002-09-15 KT-1 China 2nd-stage motor failed.
9 2003-09-16 KT-1 China 4th-stage motor failed to ignite.
10 2003-11-29 H-IIA 2024 Japan Hot gas leaked from one of the strap-on motors and damaged its separation system.
Downloaded by Stanford University on October 6, 2012 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.2005-3793

Fig. 1 Number of Space Launches (1957-2004)

Fig. 2 Success Rate of Space Launches (1957-2004)

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AIAA 2005-3793

10

9
Non-U.S.
8
U.S.

Number of Failures
7

0
Strap-On Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Element
Downloaded by Stanford University on October 6, 2012 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.2005-3793

Fig. 3 Solid Rocket Failures by Element (1980-2004)

10

9
Non-U.S.
8
U.S.
Number of Failures

0
Loaded Case TVC Nozzle Ignition Joints Electrical Unknown
Component
Fig. 4 Solid Rocket Failures by Component (1980-2004)

10

9
Non-U.S.
8
U.S.
Number of Failures

0
Design Process Workmanship Unknown
Root Cause
Fig. 5 Solid Rocket Failures by Root Cause (1980-2004)

15