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OK
2. OK
3. OK but no explanation
4. OK
5. OK
6. OK
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9. OK
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12.

I.

Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the
adjoining Lot B. Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of
Lot B. Since Socorro was allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that
supported the adjoining property, Segunda caused the annotation of an adverse claim
against 50 sq. m. on Lot A’s Transfer Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a legal
easement.
(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, a legal easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. According to Article 684 of the
Civil Code, no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. In the given case, an
easement of lateral and subjacent support exists in the property of Soccoro in favor of the
property of Segunda.
In the case of Castro v. Monsod, (G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011) in which the situation
of the properties of the two landowners were similar to that in the given problem, the
Supreme Court held that an easement existed in favor of the property of higher elevation,
because it was the owner of the said property which sued to have the easement recognized.
Such finding, however, does not mean that no similar easement exists in favor of the
property of lower elevation, since Article 684 does not make a distinction as to the elevation
of the property.
(b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of
the servient estate proper? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land Castro v. Monsod,
641 SCRA 486, Feruary 2, 2011). Segunda is not claiming ownership over the property of
Socorro. She only wanted a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement. According
to the Supreme Court in the cited case, an annotation of the existence of the lateral and
subjacent support is no longer necessary, because it exists whether or not it is annotated or
registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the
property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.

II.

Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way through his property, because Tyler
already has an adequate outlet to the public highway through his Riley's lot. One of the requisites for a
compulsory grant of right of way is that the estate of the claimant of a right of way must be isolated and
without adequate outlet to a public highway. The true standard for the grant of compulsory right of way
is "adequacy" of outlet going to a public highway and not the convenience of the dominant estate. In
the case at bar, there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway. Even if said outlet be inconvenient, the need to open up another legal easement or servitude is
entirely unjustified (Article 649, NCC; Dichosa Jr. V. Marcos, G.R. No. 180282, April II, 2011; Coslabella
Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991)

III.

Relova v. Lavarez 9 Phil. 149 FACTS: Relova owned a parcel of riceland in Laguna, supplied with water
thru a dam in Lavarez’s neighboring estate. It was proved that Relova had thus been supplied with water
for over 30 years. One day, Lavarez destroyed the dam, preventing the supply of water to Relova’s land.
Was Lavarez’s action proper? HELD: No

IV.

Art 616 page 653

V.

Ronquillo, et al. v. Roco, et al. L-10619, Feb. 28, 1958 FACTS: Ronquillo and a few others alleged that
they had been in the continuous use of a passage way traversing the land of Roco in going to a street
and the market place of Naga City from their residential land and back for more than 20 years. In 1953,
however, Roco started constructing a Chapel in the middle of said passageway. Moreover, Roco also
fenced the way with barbed wire, thus closing it. Issue: Could the easement be acquired by prescription?
HELD: No, because the use of the easement is dicontinuous, since the passage way could be used only at
intervals. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE J.B.L. REYES: No, because of the discontinuous nature of
the easement. The essence of the servidumbre de paso lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross
the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is a
limitation on the servient owner’s rights of ownership because it restricts his right to exclude others
from the property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosses or passes
over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner’s right of exclusion is perfect
and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and uninterruptedly crossing the
servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of a discontinuous nature.
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (Art. 423), and to enjoy a right is to
exercise it, it follows that the possession (enjoyment or exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and
discontinuous, and it can not be acquired by acquisitive prescription because prescription requires that
the possession be continuous or uninterrupted. The case of Mun. of Dumagas v. Bishop of Jaro (34 Phil.
541) does not constitute authority to hold that the easement of right of way is acquirable by
prescription because the ratio decidendi in said case lies in the application of Art. 567 of the Code of
1889, pursuant to which “when an estate is acquired by purchase, exchange, or partition is enclosed by
other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, the latter shall be obliged to grant a right of way
without indemnity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary” and the word “prescription” used in
the said decision was used not in the sense of adverse possession for 10 or 30 years, but in the sense of
“immemorial usage” that under the law anterior to the Code of 1889 was one of the ways in which the
servitude of right of way could be acquired.

VI.

Amor v. Florentino 74 Phil. 404 FACTS: Maria Florentino, owner of a house and a warehouse gave in her
will the house (and its lot) to Gabriel Florentino, and the warehouse and (its lot) to Encarnacion
Florentino. The house had 4 windows, receiving light from the land on which the warehouse was
situated. When Maria died, nothing was done about the windows, and Encarnacion did not make any
objection. In 1911, Encarnacion sold her warehouse and lot to Severino Amor, who then destroyed the
warehouse, and built a two-storey house. Since the construction obstructed the view, Gabriel Florentino
objected. Issue: Did Gabriel’s house acquire the easement of light and view? HELD:

Yes, because upon Maria’s death, Encarnacion did not object to the continued existence of the windows.
The existence of this apparent sign under Art. 624 is equivalent to title, that is, it is as if there is an
implied contract between the two new owners that the easement should be constituted, since no
objection had been made to the continued existence of the windows. The easement of light and view
and with it, that of altius non tollendi (non-building of a higher structure) was constituted at the time of
the death of the original owner of both properties.

IX.

Art 632

Ongsiako, et al. v. Ongsiako, et al. L-7510, Mar. 30, 1957 FACTS: From time immemorial before the
partition of the Hacienda Esperanza, the water coming from the portion of the estate assigned to
plaintiffs had been fl owing regularly and without artifi cial obstruction towards the other areas of that
same hacienda subsequently assigned to the defendants, as a result of the partition in 1929. However,
the defendants, violating this legal easement in favor of the plaintiffs, constructed in 1937 dikes that
obstructed the natural fl ow of excess water from plaintiff’s higher tenement. Plaintiff sued for the
destruction of the dikes. The action was fi led in 1951. Issue: May the dikes be demolished? HELD: No
more, because the legal easement sought to be enforced had already been extinguished by non-user,
and the action is therefore barred by prescription.