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From the Editor

With the Cold War's end, long-suppressed ethnic differences, religious fundamentalism, nationalistic
feelings and border disputes are erupting into violence. These conflicts confront US leaders with the
dilemma of deciding whether military forces should be called upon to help keep, or even make, the
peace, and whether to act alone or as part of a coalition.

The US Army is increasingly being tasked to monitor cease-fires and facilitate humanitarian
assistance. Participants in these operations must understand that in such missions, military
technology or the direct application of massed military power does not shape these
operations-political and sociological dynamics do.

Fundamentally, peace operations are not an end in themselves-the end is the political resolution of
the underlying problems. Military force provides the means to create conditions conducive to
political and diplomatic settlement. With stability as the military objective, settlement, not victory, is
the measure of success.

Second, participants must consider that applying the principles of war, the most critical of which are
objective, unity of command and security, is difficult but not impossible. The objective is not to
defeat an enemy but rather to ensure the safe delivery of aid and maintenance of stable conditions
despite the presence of potentially hostile factions. At the same time, commanders must ensure the
security of the force. The emphasis is on negotiation, persuasion and conflict control. Additionally,
US Army forces will constitute only part of the effort. Other likely participants include other US
government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs), private international relief organizations and
coalition/UN military forces.

In this issue's Peacekeeping Lessons Learned section, contributors explore how to think, train and
plan for peace operations. In the lead article, Colonel Charles H. Swannack Jr. and Lieutenant
Colonel David R. Gray discuss how task force leaders must develop an awareness of and sensitivity
to the relationship between national policies and tactical execution. Negotiation skills, knowledge of
foreign cultures and ability to relate to NGOs are a must. The authors conclude that preparatory
collective training for peace operations can be superimposed over existing tactics, techniques and
procedures and mission-essential task list elements. Related articles address other important peace
operations considerations such as risk assessment, force protection, UN observer missions, arms
management, force structure and training.

In "Beaten by the Bugs . . . ," co-authors retired Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau and Major
William A. Jorgensen profile the recent Soviet experience in Afghanistan as an example of a modern
army hampered by poor field sanitation and disease prevention measures. Clearly, Soviet
commanders failed to adequately "protect" their troops. During future deployments in conjunction
with allies or UN forces, US Army medical professionals may have to provide medical support to
other nations' forces whose experience in disease prevention differs from ours.

In our Force Projection section's lead article, Major General Leon LaPorte and Major MaryAnn
Cummings highlight the 1st Cavalry Division's deployment to Kuwait as demonstrating the deterrent
effect of fully-loaded armored vehicles manned by rapidly deployed, trained and ready US soldiers.
Other contributors point out possible flaws in the heavy division redesign proposal to eliminate the
engineer brigade headquarters. The final section article recounts the 1st Infantry Division

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(Mechanized) development of a process to plan and execute a synchronized information campaign in

the complex operational environment of Bosnia.

This issue also includes the second installment of CGSC Notes, which appears inside the back cover.
The US Army Command and General Staff College faculty and staff are involved in many
simulation, doctrine and learning initiatives that will affect the way our Army thinks and trains far
into the future. CGSC Notes previews these initiatives for the Army at large.

And finally, the 1997 Military Review Index beginning on page 82 offers a handy reference of article
titles, authors and subjects.

LJH

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CGSC NEWS

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL). US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, is
being revised and scheduled for approval and release in 1998. This revised FM focuses on the
"leader of character and competence" who acts to achieve leadership excellence by providing
purpose, direction and motivation. Leadership excellence prescribes how well the leader
accomplishes the mission in the short term and how reasonably he improves the organization in the
long term. The new focus on character and leadership excellence highlights the tremendous moral
responsibility Army leaders have to those they lead as well as to the public they serve.

Leadership excellence is part of an extended discussion in the manual about the ideal character
desired in soldiers and Department of the Army civilian (DAC) employees. Because people come
into the Army with different types of character, they must "sign up" and subscribe to the Army's
values. The focus of this revision is not a reaction to recent sexual misconduct incidents in the Army
or its sister services, but rather a character development initiative begun several years ago. The
revision was directed in March 1995 by then Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lieutenant General
Theodore G. Stroup Jr. on behalf of then Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan. Their
intent was to ensure that Army leadership doctrine would continue to have relevance into the 21st
century. Leadership excellence can be achieved by developing core principles of leadership to
provide the basis for leadership and leader development for the precommissioning sources and the
rest of the Army. The core principles would also be used as an evaluative tool for the Officer
Evaluation Report's front side. These same core principles would also form the basis for training
support packages and lesson plans relating to leadership, as well as provide the essential components
for the revision of FM 100-1, The Army. The purpose for leadership doctrine revision is to provide
three key ingredients:

• A comprehensive, adaptable leadership manual for the 21st century that appropriately
addresses the US Army, both Active and Reserve Components, composed of commissioned
officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted soldiers and DACs.
• Leadership doctrine based on the latest, most appropriate leadership theories.
• Leadership doctrine that enables leaders to meet mission requirements during times of peace
and while conducting operations.

For the first time, DACs are included in the manual's scope. It is a Total Army leadership doctrine.
The new manual will be larger than the current FM 22-100 because it includes information from the
six publications it supersedes:

• FM 22-9, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations.

• FM 22-100, Military Leadership.
• FM 22-101, Leadership Counseling.
• FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development.
• FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels.
• DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership.

The current leadership doctrine genesis was an Army pamphlet titled Leadership printed in 1948.

The first leadership FM was created in 1951. There have been several updates, the latest in 1990. The

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new FM 22-100 will be available for viewing in spring 1998 on the World Wide Web. CAL also
hosts an electronic discussion forum, Army Leader XXI, aimed at defining and better understanding
future Army leadership requirements. Discussions often generate ideas that directly contribute to
ongoing leadership initiatives. Assembled in the forum are soldiers of all ranks and components,
noted academicians specializing in organizational behavior and psychology, corporate leaders and
prominent leadership consultants-all interested in sharing in a better understanding of Army
leadership. Recent discussion topics have addressed:

• Defining the Quintessential Leadership Trait (August 1997).

• Creativity: Essential For Army Leaders? (September 1997).
• Leader Traits in the Army After Next (October 1997).
• Leader Selection (November 1997).
• Reserve Component (RC): Employment Friction & Negotiation in Practice (December 1997).
• Leadership Roles in the Army After Next (January 1998).

To join the Army Leader XXI forum, send an E-mail message stating: "subscribe ARMY LEADER
XXI (your name)" to <[email protected]>. You must send the E-mail from your own computer.
If you do not receive a welcome note within 48 hours, contact Lieutenant Colonel Steve Jones at
(913) 758-3209 or <[email protected]>.

RC Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) enrollment is down for Fiscal Year 1998 (FY
98). Records indicate that only 22 percent of Reserve Component captains eligible for promotion
have completed CAS3 and only 44 percent have enrolled in Phase 1. This downturn may be a result
of a misconception that there is no requirement to complete CAS3 for promotion to major. Army
Reserve Chief Major General Max Baratz stated on 17 September 1997 that the FY 97 waiver for the
CAS3 majors board was a temporary suspension, and the CAS3 requirement remains a prerequisite
for entry into the resident or nonresident Command General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) for all
future boards. Enrollment information is available on the CAS3 homepage at
<www-cgsc.army.mil/cas3/index.htm> or call (913) 684-2113 for more information.

The Combat Studies Institute's (CSI's) overarching mission is to conduct research on historical
topics pertinent to current Army doctrinal concerns and publish the research results in various
formats. On 13 June 1997, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander Lieutenant General
Montgomery C. Meigs directed CSI to assume responsibility for the CAC historian's office and to
document CAC's most important activities. Additionally, CSI conducts battlefield staff rides and
serves as the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's point of contact for information and
assistance with battlefield staff rides.

In October, CSI conducted a 3-hour Historical Warfighting Exercise (HWE) for the 1997 Brigadier
General Training Conference. HWE seminars, co-chaired by CSI historians and six lieutenant
generals, employed the 1942 and 1943 Buna Campaign as a venue for the exploration of timeless
issues associated with senior-level leadership. Staff rides remain an integral part of the US Army
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) resident curriculum and a key component of CSI's
Historical Outreach Program. Besides providing CGSC course-related staff rides to the famous
battlefields at Chickamauga, Gettysburg, Little Big Horn, Vicksburg and Antietam, CSI continues to
provide training for organizations throughout the Army and joint communities.

In other outreach missions, CSI is working with the US Army Cadet Command to redesign the
Reserve Officers' Training Corps Officer Foundation Standards 1 Military History Course. This

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initiative will update course content and incorporate technological enhancements and distance
learning techniques. In November 1997, CSI historians began working with the US Army Field
Manual 100-5, Operations, drafting team to enrich the capstone doctrinal manual's text with
carefully integrated historical illustrations to provide a "real world" operations sensing.

The Center For Army Tactics (CTAC) has embarked on several initiatives designed to provide
state-of-the-art instruction to CGSC students and better prepare them for tomorrow's battlefields.
While quality instruction and critical thinking remain the hallmark of CTAC's charter, simulations,
distance learning and integrating digitization into the classroom and courseware provide effective
teaching tools in use today.

Decisive Action, an in-house simulation designed by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lunsford, allows
instructors to "fight" staff group tactical plans and provide immediate student feedback. The pilot
program produced promising results. CTAC expects to release Decisive Action Armywide next
summer. Watch for further information on CTAC's homepage at
<www-cgsc.army.mil/ctac/index.htm>.

To provide access to branch subject-matter experts at a reasonable cost, CTAC is working with the
US Army Signal Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, to discover how best to use distant learning. CTAC
has also developed a CD ROM to teach basic map symbology and is working on other projects for
classroom use. The CTAC homepage will soon offer a versatile forum for distance learning efforts.

CTAC is also striving to digitize classrooms and courseware. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Davis is
spearheading the integration of the Maneuver Control System into the classroom. Favorable pilot
program results are facilitating efforts to integrate full Army Battle Command System (ABCS)
capabilities into future classrooms.

The Acquisition Graduate Degree Program (AGDP), a fully funded 18-month combined CGSOC and
master's degree program began 7 January 1998 with 13 students participating in this pilot program.
AGDP is a cooperative effort between CGSC and the Army Acquisition Corps to reduce the cost in
both dollars and time for completion of an acquisition-related master's degree. AGDP students will
earn 9 to 12 semester hours transferred from CGSOC toward their Master's degree. The students will
complete the remaining 18 to 24 degree semester hours through Webster University during a period
of full-time study at Fort Leavenworth from 7 June through 21 December 1998. The 18-month
combined CGSOC/AGDP program will yield first-year savings of over $100,000 compared to the
average Advanced Civil Schooling master's degree program.

For CGSOC Academic Year (AY) 1998/99 and beyond, the Army Acquisition Corps plans to
fully-fund a minimum of 15 officers per year in the program. Officers from the sister services and
other Army branches will be invited to participate at their own expense.

The Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DLRO) will be offering several new courses
for resident CGSOC students beginning March 1998. In cooperation with the Army Logistics
Management College (ALMC) at Fort Lee, Virginia, DLRO will offer the Support Operations
Officer's Course to a select group of 15 students. ALMC will furnish all course and instructional
material, and the course certifies the graduate with an entry on his/her Officer Records Brief.
Beginning AY 1998/99, the course will be opened to all combat service support (CSS) students who
have completed the Phase I ALMC correspondence program. This initiative will reduce the
temporary duty/travel costs currently associated with having ALMC instructors present the course at
Fort Leavenworth at the CGSOC AY's conclusion. For more information, contact Major Mike

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Wooten at DSN 552-4404 or E-mail <[email protected]>.

Also in March 1998, Building Combat Power in a Theater of Operations will be offered to
selected students. The course will focus on deployment and reception, staging, onward movement
and integration (RSOI) operations needed to rapidly build combat power in a commander in chief's
(CINC's) theater. Designed primarily for US CSS students, this course will provide an understanding
of how RSOI operations must be planned and coordinated to ensure a seamless transition across the
levels of war. Because it is critical to the success of the CINC's war planning efforts, this subject has
wide applicability across all US service components as well as allied forces. For more information,
contact Major Mike Schiller at DSN 552-2577 or E-mail <[email protected]> or visit
the DLRO homepage at <www-cgsc.army.mil/dlro/index.htm>.

PRAIRIE WARRIOR 1998 (PW 98), the annual capstone training for CGSOC students, is scheduled
for 11 to 16 May 1998. PW exercises corps and division operations at the operational and tactical
levels of war. Objectives emphasize joint multinational force employment and information
operations. CGSOC, and Air University students at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, apply
decision making and leadership to plan, execute and sustain a combined joint task force in a Pacific
Rim scenario. ABCS in a digitized division can help integrate non-digitized units. An air operations
center (AOC) at Hurlburt Field, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, links to an AOC Forward (Fwd) at
Fort Leavenworth to exercise emerging US Air Force doctrine. A US Army Reserve Theater Support
Command (TSC) at Fort Lee links with a TSC (Fwd) to coordinate echelon above corps logistics.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom incorporate students from their command and staff
colleges and operational units. Joint Training Confederation and SPECTRUM simulations create a
complex exercise environment while the Battle Command Training Program methodology assesses
student performance. PW 98 spotlights an educational charter to produce trained and ready officers
for today's and tomorrow's Army.

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Peace Enforcement Operations

by Colonel Charles H. Swannack Jr., US Army, and Lieutenant

Colonel David R. Gray, US Army

Reacting to a growing number of regional conflicts and humanitarian concerns, the Clinton
administration unveiled a revised national security strategy in July 1994 to meet the challenges of the
"new world order." The neo-Wilsonian strategy of enlargement calls for the worldwide expansion
of democratic institutions and human rights. Prevention of conflict's root causes and the pursuit of
international partnerships to promote collective security are the new strategy's twin pillars and
promote the use of multilateral peace operations, a combination of prevention and partnership, to
reestablish peace and stability in strife-torn areas.1 Peace operations, despite their benign-sounding
title, rely on military force as an integral means to achieve policy goals.

Peace operations interject politically neutral military forces into contested areas to assist in resolving
conflicts. From a military perspective, peace operations take two forms: peacekeeping (PK) and
peace enforcement (PE). Undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties, PK missions
are noncombat operations that help implement the terms of an existing truce settlement.
Peacekeepers do not use force except in self-defense. PE operations are perhaps more difficult, but
they best suit the warmaking orientation of most conventional forces. Framed by politically sensitive
rules of engagement (ROE), PE involves the threat or use of armed intervention to compel hostile
belligerents to comply with international sanctions or resolutions. Military forces engaged in PE
must conduct a wide range of missions from nonviolent shows of force to deliberate attacks while
operating within established ROE.2

Last summer, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [ID (L)] 2d "Warrior" Brigade had a unique
opportunity to practice its PE skills during Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk,
Louisiana, Rotation 9-94. JRTC's realistic scenario replicated deploying a combined and joint task
force (JTF) into an operational area similar to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia, where ethnic strife,
civil war and competing insurgencies have caused untold human misery. Acting under the authority
of a UN mandate, TF Warrior's PE mission was to separate belligerents, clear a buffer zone, aid in
humanitarian assistance (HA) and set the conditions for a relief in place by UN PK forces. Using
evolving doctrinal frameworks as a guide, 2d Brigade adapted its operations to actual tactical
conditions, successfully completing all assigned missions.3 Although the rotation highlighted many
issues for further doctrinal study, the brigade's effectiveness was directly dependent upon its ability
to translate broad political guidance into measurable military objectives which helped:

• Implement a viable plan to separate the belligerents.

• Enforce the buffer zone.
• Assist nongovernment agencies with their HA efforts.
• Integrate a positive public affairs-media campaign to influence the populace.

A Challenging Political-Military Framework

The training scenario involved an international border dispute based on historical and ethnic claims

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between two countries on the fictional island of Aragon. After a fierce civil war, Province of Acadia
citizens had declared their independence from the mother country of Cortina. The Cortinian
government eventually recognized the split as legitimate but disputed Acadia's claims to certain
border regions. To reinforce their own claims, both sides postured heavily armed forces along the
border and threatened further hostilities. The belligerents requested UN intervention and mediation
to break the impasse. Acadia and Cortina mutually agreed to a cease-fire and accepted the creation of
a UN-supervised buffer zone along the disputed areas. However, besides the belligerents' regular
military forces, a bewildering array of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), insurgents and civilian
refugees further convoluted the tactical environment within the proposed buffer zone.

The terrorist actions and hit-and-run tactics of two major insurgent groups, the Acadian Freedom
Fighters (AFF) and the Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF), represented a particularly troublesome
threat to the peace process. Capable of influencing world opinion within a moment's time, various
media organizations maintained a constant presence and readiness to publicize any newsworthy
incidents-even if it meant sabotaging peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, the situation facing TF
Warrior in the Aragon heartland represented a confusing mixture of actors whose contradictory
activities complicated clear-cut decision making and military action.

Italian soldiers search a

man suspected of setting
fires in a Sarajevo
suburb, March 1996.

As in most real-world
peace operations, a UN
mandate provided the
legal authority and
framework for future PE
efforts in Aragon. The
basis of the UN strategy,
as described in Mandate
3161, was to rely on a
mixture of restraint,
coercion and, if
necessary, compellence to
entice the belligerents to
peacefully resolve their
differences. Toward that
end, the mandate's
military clauses outlined five essential PE tasks and defined the ROE. Besides enforcing the
cease-fire's terms, UN peace enforcers were to remove all belligerent military forces from the buffer
zone, assist in clearing mines and conducting mine-awareness training, coordinate the release and
exchange of prisoners of war and aid HA. Further refined by the JTF commander, ROE governed the
use of force. Despite their allowance for the inherent right of self-defense, the ROE constrained the
application of combat power in certain instances.

The tactical environment's nature caused TF members to adopt a new, and for many, an unfamiliar
psychological mind-set. Unlike combat operations, which prize audacity and aggressiveness, PE
requires soldiers to be more circumspect and discerning of their immediate environment to avoid

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injuring noncombatants and escalating the level of violence. If the UN strategy proved successful,
"Tropic Lightning" soldiers would function more as a police force than as warriors. Before deploying
to Aragon, the TF adjusted its training program to address peace operation-peculiar skills, reinforce
disciplined ROE application and build soldiers' confidence in their ability to operate under diverse
circumstances.

The upcoming operation's constabulary nature caused slight modifications to the TF's established
training program. Having thoroughly analyzed the mission's particulars, subordinate units found that
they were able to integrate many PE tasks within their existing mission-essential task lists (METLs).
At the small-unit level, emphasis remained on expert execution of battle drills. Each infantry
battalion conducted PE lane training for its squads and platoons, focusing on such unfamiliar drills as
establishing a checkpoint and cordon and search operations. In each scenario, soldiers and their
leaders had to react to the needs of civilian refugees as well as respond to tricky questions from
media representatives.4 During "orders days," battalion and brigade staffs analyzed PE scenarios and
practiced the deliberate decision-making process. A TF-level field training exercise, characterized by
conventional offensive and defensive tactics, capped off six months' preparation for the Aragon
mission.

PE Operations Logic
Successful PE operations require seizure of the physical and moral high ground within the contested
area. However, before the actual commitment of combat forces, commanders must identify the
operation's center of gravity (COG).5 The belligerents clearly derive their diplomatic negotiating
position and military freedom of action by occupying disputed areas within the buffer zone.
Controlling the buffer zone and its surrounding area is the key to separating the belligerents, stopping
hostilities and equalizing negotiating leverage. Interposition of UN-backed military forces acts as
both a physical and psychological barrier in preventing belligerents from resuming fighting. The
threat of retaliatory military strikes further serves as a potent incentive for opposing sides to begin
serious negotiations.

Like keys that unlock a barred door, both terrain- and force-oriented decisive points open the way to
PE's operational COG.6 Withdrawal of all belligerents, disarmament of paramilitary forces, relief of
checkpoints by UN forces and protection of civilians are critical to buffer zone establishment. The
tactical situation at the time of the military intervention, available combat forces and the
infrastructure's condition will determine whether it is possible to seize all decisive points
simultaneously or sequentially. Limited helicopter sorties, the distance from the initial staging base
to objective areas and the need to secure a flight landing strip (FLS) as a lodgment area dictated that
TF Warrior sequence its initial assaults against terrain-oriented decisive points. Once the lodgment
was secure and contact made with belligerent checkpoints, Warrior combat elements could then
concentrate against the "flesh and blood" decisive points.

Commanders must tailor their level of efforts against specific force-oriented decisive points. AFF
and CLF insurgent group activities became an irritating distraction because their actions could easily
sabotage both military and HA, which intensified pressure on each belligerent's forces to stay in the
buffer zone to protect their nationals. Once the JTF declared the insurgents "hostile," TF soldiers
employed active search and attack operations to destroy them. Thus, while small in number, the
insurgents' activities had broader political implications for gaining overall buffer zone control,
necessitating a robust TF response. The insurgents' actions can have an almost magnetic quality in
attracting friendly combat counterresponses. However, command-ers must stay attuned to the

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mission's principal focus-buffer zone occupation between two hostile belligerent forces-or risk
frittering away combat power against secondary targets.

Translating these abstract operational concepts into practical "effectiveness" measures can prove to
be especially challenging. The 25th ID (L) staff developed several useful guidelines to help the TF
measure its progress. Each subordinate element used a series of indicators such as cease-fire
violations, hostile contacts with friendly forces and civilian refugee flow to construct a battlefield
picture as illustrated by Figure 1. As they tracked the event flow, units assigned a status rating to
each subcategory. Besides its qualities as an analytical tool, the matrix further refined the mission's
broad nature into more understandable and manageable subtasks.

These conceptual and practical "road maps" guided the brigade TF in developing its tactical
approaches. In occupying a position between the belligerents and placing primary reliance on air
lines of communication, the brigade's buffer zone entry and occupation resembled an airborne
operation. Before inserting conventional military forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted
a site survey and exploited all intelligence sources for information about the area of operation (AO).
SOF then provided the TF with their findings. Introducing conventional forces into the AO generally
involves phasing TF elements into the buffer zone. Following the insertion of combat units, the TF
established and expanded a lodgment before attempting to separate the belligerents, occupy the
buffer zone's length and width and eventually establish the conditions for a withdrawal. By accepting
voluntary encirclement throughout the operation, peace enforcers place themselves in a precarious
tactical position between hostile forces.7

By coordinating their actions through Mixed Military Working Groups (MMWGs), TFs can reduce
their initial vulnerability. Representatives from the UN, each belligerent and the TF commander met
in a neutral setting to discuss a range of issues. The driving force behind the MMWGs was to
develop mutual trust and cooperation among all parties through negotiation and liaison. Most
important, MMWGs provided a useful tool to hold belligerents to their cease-fire commitments and
any other national political agreements.

During the training rotation, the brigade participated in four MMWG meetings and used them as a
forum to coordinate a variety of issues, including:

• The insertion of friendly forces.

• Routine use of nonrestricted air space.
• Withdrawal time tables.

Another method of reducing risk was to swiftly mass TF combat elements against the decisive
points. This also enhanced force protection. As they entered the AO, friendly forces concentrated
against the buffer zone's critical terrain, establishing initial defensive positions and preventing
belligerent interference with entry operations. Securing FLSs, controlling main supply routes (MSRs)
and establishing a lodgment constituted the first phase of the operation, which was quickly followed
by expansion into the buffer zone as the TF's combat power was built. Lacking control of key terrain
stripped the enemy of tactical advantages. Rapid massing of forces on terrain-oriented decisive
points and speed of execution minimized the TF's own tactical handicaps. It was the TF commander's
responsibility to coordinate these actions with the belligerent factions at the MMWG meetings to
minimize potential violent confrontations.

Consistent with these concepts, TF Warrior's PE operations began with two battalion-size air

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assaults into its AO. TF Regular (4-22 IN) seized the FLS while TF Gimlet (1-21 IN) air-assaulted
directly into the buffer zone to begin relief of checkpoints. Team Chuck, a balanced mechanized
infantry company team formed around Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, attacked
down the TF's MSR to clear mines and provide route security for subsequent ground convoys. With
the FLS secured by N+3, the rest of TF Warrior began airland operations to establish and then
expand a lodgment. TF Golden Dragon (1-14 IN) swiftly marshaled its lead units, then moved
overland by foot and vehicle to assume a sector astride both sides of the buffer zone on the brigade's
western flank. As combat power accrued, the battalion TFs moved to relieve belligerent checkpoints
in the buffer zone.

Checkpoint operations and belligerent withdrawal followed the guidelines from a carefully scripted
checklist. Relief of belligerent checkpoints required centralized planning and coordination by the TF
staffs but decentralized execution by small-unit leaders. At a MMWG meeting, all sides agreed to the
exact format for the checkpoint relief. Sergeants, lieutenants and captains then negotiated with their
belligerent counterparts to take control of these terrain-oriented decisive points. Neither the
Cortin-ians nor the Acadians would abandon their positions until they were assured that the peace
enforcers had enough combat power to protect the civilian nationals in the area. Once relieved, the
belligerents moved out of the buffer area. Tracking withdrawing belligerents was an extremely
difficult but critical task. On some occasions, belligerents would not willingly comply with
instructions to leave their checkpoints. In such instances, the TF commander had to invoke several
preconceived and coordinated actions to compel the belligerents to comply.

TF Warrior developed a series of graduated military power escalations to deal with noncomplying
belligerents. The TF's "escalation ladder," depicted in Figure 2, aimed to establish a deterrent
situation by communicating a threat backed by sufficient combat power and the UN's legal
authority.8 Each deterrent action must be, and was, applied impartially and consistently. A test of
psychological willpower, each threat's credibility is directly proportional to aggressive
follow-through actions. But such a strategy carries inherent risks and dangers. A model that applies
graduated application of force risks becoming stereotyped. Belligerents may decide to test the peace
enforcers to discover which activities will elicit a response and which will not. Each step in
separating the belligerents then becomes an act of high-pressure, tension-producing brinkmanship. If
belligerents refuse to leave, and the JTF commander approves the use of actual combat force, the TF
reaches a point of no return. Peace enforcers are unlikely to regain the belligerents' trust once blood
has been shed in combat. After combat actions have been initiated, TFs must then be prepared to
apply overwhelming force to separate belligerents or remove them from the buffer zone. Such
actions carry larger political implications.

The TF tested its escalation model against both belligerents at JRTC. The lower series of the ladder's
graduated responses worked well enough to entice the Cortinians to leave TF Regular's sector. But
in TF Gimlet's AO, the Acadians refused to leave two checkpoints and had to be evicted forcibly.
This led to a breakdown in negotiations. TF Warrior then adopted a defensive posture against a
possible Acadian attack. Reverting to conventional military operations, they repelled an Acadian
combined arms attack; then counterattacked to drive the reluctant belligerent completely out of the
buffer zone and adjoining control zones. Combat operations were, however, only one part of the
brigade's equation for conducting successful PE operations.

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Marines in Haiti
prepare to deploy to
roadblock sites from
Cap Haitain, October
1993.

PE Operations'
Moral
Dimensions
The success of peace
operations depends on
rapid deployment of
combat forces, the
creation of a buf-fer zone
and the occupation of the
moral and psychological high ground. As an instrument of policy, the TF must integrate certain
facets into its operational game plan to gain the local inhabitants' trust and confidence while
sustaining US domestic support. All TF actions must be perceived as neutral, altruistic and
supporting the peace process. Forging a partnership with civilian agencies to aid in HA efforts and
conducting a positive public affairs (PA) campaign provide two key means to capture the moral
initiative in PE operations.

Civilian governmental, NGOs and private volunteer agencies (PVAs) will often precede military
forces into crisis areas when UN peace operations take place. Many of these agencies will have
established a close rapport with the belligerents and their local nationals in the AO. These agencies'
efforts often represent the only hope to hungry, battered civilians in war-torn areas. In establishing its
own role as benefactor, the TF must form a close civil-military partnership with these agencies,
which will help ensure unity of effort and implementation of effective HA programs.

The first step in synchronizing HA efforts requires civilian and military components to reach a
common appreciation of each others' capabilities, which should lead to a greater degree of mutual
respect. The TF relied on both personal contacts and improvised organizational responses in
developing a common perspective with civilian counterparts. Exhibiting a friendly but dignified
approach, soldiers and their leaders met, coordinated and cooperated with civilian NGOs and PVAs
as they helped conflict victims throughout the AO. To conduct continuous liaison with civilian
officials in the towns of Carnis and Jetertown, the TF formed "Team Village," an ad hoc grouping of
civil affairs, counterintelligence, chaplaincy and preventive medicine personnel. A brigade
coordination cell-composed of the 225th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) commander, 2d Brigade
assistant S3 and S5-conducted daily meetings with NGOs at Carnis to discuss logistic, operations
and security concerns. The TF assisted the NGOs with their relief efforts in several key areas. Most
important, 25th ID (L) elements provided route security and protection to "Food for the Hungry"
convoys as they delivered much-needed supplies to the villages. Company B, 65th Engineers,
conducted security patrols to protect a Cortinian refugee camp and improved the health conditions
inside the compound by constructing field latrines and a shower point. Food, water and medical
supplies provided by the 225th FSB sustained the displaced persons within the camp until outside
support reached them.

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In addition to HA, the TF also employed a positive informational campaign to gain further legitimacy
for its actions and reinforce the UN mandate's legality. Both the media and products from an attached
psychological operations (PSYOP) detachment proved useful in influencing belligerents' and local
inhabitants' behavior. The TF welcomed the media and provided them with open access to all
command levels. Command members answered reporters' questions to the best of their ability and
generally avoided speculation about areas outside their responsibility. Reporters observed the TF's
tactical and HA successes, as well as mistakes in judgment that resulted in friendly casualties.
Working with, rather than against, the media added to the TF's credibility, resulting in more accurate
and objective tactical situation portrayals. In real-world interventions, positive reports reinforce
popular support for PE operations.

PSYOP worked in tandem with news media broadcasts to marshal popular support while also
pressuring the belligerents to come to an agreement. Employing both propaganda and direct
psychological activities to the TF's advantage, the 24th PSYOP Detachment targeted the villages as
their main effort.9 The PSYOP teams helped convince the villagers that US troops were there as
peacemakers, not foreign conquerors-a very important distinction in gaining public acceptance. The
detachment also worked hard to undermine, confuse and demoralize hostile forces. When the
Acadians refused to leave the buffer zone, an overt propaganda campaign succeeded in labeling them
as obstructionists to the peace process, which allowed stronger measures to enforce UN provisions.
Thus, well-integrated PA and PSYOPS campaigns can assist peace enforcers in gaining public
acceptance and moral authority while denying the same to hostile parties.

PE Insights
Military PE missions are extremely demanding. Peace enforcers must enter into dangerous, chaotic
environments where they are subject to the intense scrutiny of international public opinion and
enemy bullets. Every soldier's actions, good or bad, carry significant political consequences. Success
depends on several variables. Acting under a UN mandate's broad political guidance, military
commanders must develop plans with measurable military objectives that focus efforts against the
belligerents' COG. PE also has physical and moral dimensions. Once the belligerents are physically
separated and the buffer zone established, peace enforcers earn further moral support for their efforts
by aiding NGOs with HA. Military forces can help win the local populace's support and sustain their
own nation's public will by integrating a positive PA-media campaign into their operations. Thus, the
complexities of a PE environment require versatile combat forces led by military leaders possessing
wide-ranging intellectual flexibility.

TF Warrior's experiences at the soldier, leader and unit levels highlighted several relevant points for
future Army PE missions. Hallmarks of today's Army, soldier discipline and skills remain essential
ingredients in both wartime and peace operations. Leaders-at all levels-must develop a greater
awareness and sensitivity to the relationship between national policies and tactical execution.
Negotiation skills, knowledge of foreign cultures and ability to relate to NGOs are a must.
Institutional schooling and self-study represent the mandatory first steps in this educational process.
Unit training and professional assignments will then provide practical experiences in skills
development. Units assigned PE duties must focus some of their collective training on constabulary
tasks, such as setting up roadblocks and checkpoints, patrolling in urban areas and aiding civilian
refugees. Most of these tasks can be superimposed over existing drills, tactics, techniques and
procedures and METL tasks. Others will require ad hoc responses and ingenuity.

The Army's participation in peace operations and operations other than war will likely remain high in

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the short term. While maintaining primary focus on warfighting capabilities, brigade TFs performing
PE duties must make certain intellectual adjustments to adapt to this convoluted military
environment. The realistic conditions posed by JRTC Rotation 9-94 provided TF Warrior members
with the mental preparation and practical experience necessary to perform future PE operations.MR

1. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], July 1994). Anthony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping,"
The New York Times (6 February 1994), B-1, also discusses the US policies and role in peace
operations.
2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 13-7; and
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other than War, Volume IV, Peace Operations (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 1-2.
3. FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 October 1992); FM
100-20, Military Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 December 1990);
Commandant, US Army Infantry School (USAIS), White Paper: The Application of Peace
Enforcement [PE] at Brigade and Battalion (Fort Benning, GA: GPO, 31 August 1993); and various
techniques, tactics and procedures packets provided by USAIS mobile training teams.
4. For examples of the task force's (TF's) PE lane training see Donna Miles, "Learning to Wage
Peace," Soldiers (October 1994), 37-39.
5. According to Carl von Clausewitz, the center of gravity (COG) is "the hub of all power and
movement on which everything depends" and that "point against which all our energies should be
directed." A COG, therefore, represents a belligerent's principal source of strength that supplies
freedom of action, fighting power and will. Correct COG identification is important in military
operations because "only by constantly seeking out the center of [a belligerent's] power, by daring all
to win all, will one really defeat the enemy." For further discussion, see Carl von Clausewitz, On
War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard; eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986),
596-97, and FM 100-5, 6-7.
6. FM 100-5 defines decisive points as "a point, usually geographical in nature, that, when retained,
provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points could also
include other physical elements such as enemy formations, command post and communication
nodes. Glossary-2.
7. A fundamental assumption of peace operations is that the belligerents will honor their political
commitments. However, commanders must be prepared to protect their forces during a worst-case
scenario. In retrospect, especially in light of the Rangers' encirclement battle in Mogadishu, Somalia,
prudence dictates that TF elements should be familiar with and practice breakout from encirclements
during their train-up periods.
8. Deterrence involves the prevention from action by fear of consequence. Largely targeting an
opponent's psychological state of mind, deterrence involves a threat backed by credible means and
the willpower to carry out the threat's sanctions.
9. Propaganda involves the "selling" of ideas, information or rumors through a variety of
communication methods to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviors of target audiences
to conform to US interests. Besides media manipulation, direct psychological operations (PSYOP),
such as military alerts, troop movements, rallies, medical and agricultural programs, reduce enemy
prestige while increasing that of US forces. See 25th Infantry Division (Light) Pamphlet 33-1,
Psychological Operations Handbook (3 May 1993), 2-3. For excellent scholarly discussions of
PSYOP's usefulness as a tool in military operations, coercive diplomacy, limited war scenarios and
political warfare, see Carnes Lord and Frank B. Barnett, eds., Political Warfare and Psychological
Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 45-66, 77-102, 145-60.

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Colonel Charles H. Swannack Jr. is assistant division commander for Operations, 82d Airborne
Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy
(USMA) and an M.S. from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is a graduate of the National War
College and the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in a variety
of command and staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS), Hawaii and the
Caribbean, to include chief of staff, 25th Infantry Division (Light) (ID [L]) and US Army Hawaii,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; commander 2d Brigade, 25th ID (L), Schofield Barracks;
politico-military planner and chief, Caribbean Basin Branch, Western Hemisphere Division, J5,
Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.; and commander, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry
Division, Fort Ord, California.

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Gray is operations officer, Joint Operations, CENTCOM Division,
Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Western Illinois University and an M.A. and
Ph.D. from Ohio State University. He is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in a variety of
command and staff positions in CONUS and Hawaii, to include brigade S3, 2d Brigade, 25th ID (L),
Schofield Barracks; G3 Training, 25th ID (L), Schofield Barracks; and assistant professor,
Department of History, USMA, West Point, New York.

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Assessing Force Protection

Risk
by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Ward, US Army, Retired

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position
of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or
agency.-Editor

Force protection (FP) is one of the most misused terms in planning for and employing military
forces today. It is used in such forms as generic combatant commanders' intention statements in the
context of guidance to their staffs, a descriptor and title for security and preventive medicine
programs and, most recently, as a synonym for antiterrorism. In fact, some pundits allege that the
Department of Defense (DOD) has taken an operational- level task and turned it into a program as a
protective measure for careers rather than enforcing what is already available in joint doctrine. In
reality, DOD has refocused its efforts and increased FP emphasis, making it a key consideration at
every echelon of command to include DOD agencies, commanders in chief areas of responsibility
and major installations worldwide. The DOD Force Protection Program was established to increase
all DOD personnel and family members' awareness of the threat of terrorism, take appropriate
measures to prevent terrorist attacks and mitigate terrorism's effects in the event preventive measures
are unsuccessful.

Accordingly, FP is more than defining "who does what." Leaders must assess what risk the force has
to be protected against. By developing a formal, standardized risk-assessment process, we can help
leaders avoid the Herculean task of implementing all recommendations in the Downing Assessment
Task Force Report. Much of the time, senior leaders forget that field commanders have constraints
and restraints under which they must accomplish their functional missions. It would be nice if
commanders could just focus on FP issues, but the reality is they have a mission to accomplish with
fewer resources. The challenge is to identify the critical risks, assess them, apply resources and
controls, raise the need for additional assets and controls to a higher authority or accept the risk.
However, the first task is to define what FP is all about and then develop a standardized, consistent
risk-assessment methodology for the entire force.

What is Force Protection?

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) defines the operational task of protection as conserving "the
force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. This activity
includes counteractions taken against enemy forces making friendly forces' (including operational
formations and personnel) systems and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike and destroy.
This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, space, land, sea and special operations
forces; bases; and lines of communication from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated
enemy air, ground and sea attack; natural occurrences; and terrorist attack. This task also pertains to
protection of operational-level forces, systems and civil infrastructure of friendly nations and groups
in military operations other than war."

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As the UJTL points out, this definition is not all- inclusive. Other tasks associated with protecting
the force such as rules of engagement, preventive medicine and dispersion, to name just a few, can
be found under other operational activities. What becomes clear is that FP is more than security, and
the process to accomplish the task successfully requires proactive, deliberate action. It is a process
that entails the planning for and application of military assets to minimize the effects of hazards and
hostile activities that can impair friendly force effectiveness.

A Marine
guards the
site of a
car bomb
detonation
in the US
sector of
the

international peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 1982. The bombing

escalated over the next year with the US Embassy destroyed on 18 April 1983. Finally, on the
night of 23 October 1983, 281 US Marines and French paratroopers were killed in similar
attacks.

Battle rhythm. The commander's ability to apply assets to offset a perceived threat or hazard
becomes more constrained as the available force structure shifts from a force designed to counter the
worst-case adversary to a more economical and tailored force. In essence, DOD demands that
commanders perform more missions with fewer resources. This emerging reality creates the
requirement for the military, as it has in industry, to develop and implement more efficient and
effective methods for planning and applying assets to reduce hazards without creating additional
bureaucratic layers that impair operations. Success in this endeavor entails incorporating battle
rhythm into each unit in a training manner that gives, takes and analyzes information to aid in the
decision-making process.

Working group. Developing an effective FP process must include the entire spectrum of expertise
available to the commander, because decisions have significant consequences on the force. Unit
commanders and their staffs must look beyond intuition and use a systematic approach to assessing
force threats and risks. In addition, there must be an efficient and effective process to identify and
apply appropriate countermeasures when applying available assets. Staff members must develop

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methods to identify capabilities shortfalls, mitigate risk and recommend solutions that elevate
deficiencies to a higher authority if they cannot resolve the dilemma internally. By creating a FP
Working Group (FPWG), staffs formed from organic and external personnel resources can
continuously analyze and assess hazards and risks to the force. This process maintains a heightened
and more comprehensive focus for applying FP assets without creating another bureaucratic layer.
The FPWG is the commander's continuous risk and hazard mitigation conduit.

The FPWG Process

Continuous risk mitigation requires a systematic approach for both efficiency and effectiveness.
Therefore, the FPWG process should be familiar to all and facilitated by the operations staff. Since
the operations staff has tasking authority and a greater awareness of day-to-day operations, it can
ensure that the FPWG follows a process based on guidance from the commander and focuses its
efforts on key functions, activities, events or locations to identify and apply countermeasures to both
known and perceived risk. I recommend the following process.

Receipt of commander's guidance. It is essential that the FPWG focus its efforts. The commander
uses a formal process such as daily or weekly staff updates in which he identifies critical items as
requiring FP review. Guidance is focused on specific events, activities or locations so the FPWG can
orient its efforts. There must be a "time window" established by the FPWG for it to focus on. The
potential events spectrum is too broad as it is, without establishing specific time limitations in which
to focus its efforts. Of course exceptions exist, such as having a commander continuously assess a
fixed item, location or facility.

Identifying hazards and threats. The FPWG now begins the risk analysis process. It identifies
hazards and threats to the force for the focus items provided in the commander's guidance. FPWG
members then take these focus items and perform a risk assessment from their area of expertise.
Effectively performing this task in a decentralized mode requires that the unit adapt a
risk-assessment method which provides a consistent definition to the risk level. What determines
high, medium and low risk? Units must have some consistent, reliable system to define risk. After
completing the risk analysis, the FPWG must identify appropriate controls to mitigate identified risk.
Because the risk decision is made at command levels, the controls should not be limited.
Identification of all significant risks and appropriate countermeasures for each focus item is the
outcome.

Plan control application. When the FPWG meets again, members bring their analysis of the
previous meeting's focus items. Using a method similar to battle synchronization, the FPWG leader
begins a collective risk-management analysis. The FPWG now analyzes all the risks versus
associated controls and countermeasures for estimated effectiveness and a revised assessment.
Inherent in this process is balancing resources (controls) and their applications. Because reality limits
the number of controls available, the FPWG must determine where they will have the greatest payoff
in mitigating risk. The FPWG then plans for control application in detail, preferably using a
synchronization matrix as a management tool. The FPWG also tasks units or agencies with a "no
later than date/time" for implementing controls and countermeasures. This is very important to
ensure that risk mitigation is actually accomplished. In addition, tracking task completion should be
an FPWG agenda item as follows:

• Execution. Responsible parties execute controls and countermeasures and the events take

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place.
• Assessment. During and after the event, the FPWG monitors control and countermeasure
effectiveness and possible impact on task accomplishment.

Commander's guidance. The FPWG brings those risk items that have not been controlled through
the risk-management process to the commander's attention for a risk decision. At this point, the
commander has three choices:

• Accept the risk.

• Raise the decision to a higher level.
• Obtain the assets to mitigate the risk.

The commander's dilemma is weighing the cost of controls and countermeasures versus accepting
risk. The FPWG needs to be aware of this and provide the commander with the requisite information
he needs to make a decision. The FPWG then receives further guidance and focus items from the
commander to continue the risk-management process.

Units are usually adept at FP or identifying and compensating for risk during the military
decision-making process. It is FP sustainment that presents the real challenge and poses greatest risk
to the force. By incorporating a systematic approach and risk management into the daily staff
process, FP can be applied to antiterrorism programs, security, air operations, natural occurrences,
events linked to contingency operations and any event or location analysis. An FPWG provides the
commander with a formal means to apply assets in an effort to mitigate risk based on command
priorities and guidance. It also ensures that critical focus items are analyzed by a process involving
the entire staff. MR

1. The risk assessment process is addressed in both Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction
2000.16, DOD Combatting Terrorism Program Standards, 21 July 1997, and Joint Publication (JP)
3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures For Antiterrorism, June 1993. The Joint Staff has
oversight responsibility to monitor and verify Downing Assessment Task Force Report
recommendations. To date, only one recommendation has not been implemented. The new JP 3-07.2
is scheduled for publication and release in January 1998. The new Army Regulation (AR) 525-13,
Army Antiterrorism and Force Protection Program, is scheduled for publication and release in
spring 1998.

2. The 1998 AR 525-13 will clearly define the roles and duties of force protection (FP)
committees/working groups. The regulation will emphasize FP's intelligence aspects and discuss its
threat-based characteristics.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Ward, US Army, Retired, is the curriculum specialist, Golf Course
Superintendents Association of America, Lawrence, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Saint
Bonaventure University and an M.Ed. from Oklahoma University and is a graduate of the Armed
Forces Staff College and the US Army Command and General Staff College. He held command and
staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Korea, to include operational force
protection chief, Operations Group Delta, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; headquarters development officer, Policy Division, Headquarters Allied Forces, Central
Europe, NATO; S3, 5th Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas; Stinger
systems manager, Combat Developments, Fort Bliss; and operations officer, Battle Simulations

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Directorate, Fort Leavenworth.

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UN Observer Mission in
Georgia
by Captain Gregory R. Sarafian, US Army

Implied in Marxist doctrine is the no- tion that if two neighbors are of different back- grounds-ethnic
or otherwise-but have enough food to eat and a means to live comfortably, they will coexist
peacefully. In a utopian world, unaffected by those base emotions and urges which might
collectively-and euphemistically-be termed "man's frailties," this might be true. However, what
recent history has convincingly shown us is that power or threat of force is far more effective at
keeping disparate neighbors from each other's throat. The former Yugoslavia is a good example of
this.

The former Soviet Union also has many conflicts among the scores of ethnic groupings. The
Transcaucasian region is replete with such occurrences. South Ossetia, Chechnya,
Nagorno-Karabakh; these names are synonymous with ethnic-based political and, in the case of the
latter two, large-scale military struggles over the past several years. It was in this greater region,
northwest Georgia, that I deployed for almost six months, serving in the UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) in 1995.

The northwest region of Georgia, sharing a northern border with the Russian Federation, a western
border with the Black Sea and extending southeast to the Inguri River, is known as Abkhazia. The
indigenous Abkhaz, ethnically, are "a member of the North Caucasian family of peoples."1 They are
ethnic cousins to Cossacks, Chechens and other Caucasian groups. During Soviet times, this region
was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Georgia. In the 1930s, Joseph Stalin, an ethnic
Georgian, initiated the settlement of many Georgians to this area, diluting the population of ethnic
Abkhaz. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Abkhaz separatists began to push for an
independent Abkhazia. At this time, they made up only 18 percent of the region's total population,
whereas Georgians constituted 47 percent. Other well-represented ethnic groups in this region
included Russians and Armenians. In July 1992, through a resolution by the Supreme Soviet of the
"Republic of Abkhazia," the reinstitution of an old constitution, drafted in 1925, was enacted.
Chapter 2, Article 5, specified that Abkhazia is "a sovereign state which implements its state power
all over its territory independently and irrespective of any other power."2 In August, fighting broke
out between Georgian and Abkhaz forces. Initially, the Georgians advanced quickly toward the
Russian border. Eventually, though, the Abkhaz, having received arms from Russia and aided by
numerous other Caucasian fighters, rolled back Georgian forces to the Inguri River, which
approximates the current cease-fire

US Policy Toward the Conflict

The US government has not recognized Abkhazia as a sovereign state. Therefore, no American
citizen may have his passport stamped with the "official state seal" of Abkhazia. This policy is in
keeping with an original precept under which UNOMIG was formed: that the UN would recognize
the territorial integrity of Georgia. All observers in UNOMIG carry Abkhaz diplomatic identity

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cards. This action is not indicative of any passive acknowledgment of Abkhaz state legitimacy.
Rather, it is to expedite unhindered travel throughout the mission area.

On 14 May 1994, representatives from both sides in this conflict signed documentation in Moscow
agreeing to a cease-fire and separation of forces. UNOMIG's mandate, in accordance with the
Moscow agreement, consisted of the following tasks:

• Monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the agreement on a cease-fire and
separation of forces.
• Observe the operation of the Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping forces
(CISPKF) within the implementation agreement's framework.
• Verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or
reenter the security zone (SZ) and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not
reintroduced in the SZ or the restricted weapons zone.
• Monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the SZ and the

restricted weapons zone in cooperation with the CISPKF as appropriate.

• Monitor troop withdrawals of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places
beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia.
• Regularly patrol the Kodori Valley.
• Investigate, at the request of either party of the CISPKF or on its own initiative, reported or
alleged agreement violations and to attempt or resolve or contribute to the resolution of such
incidents.
• Regularly report to the Secretary General within its mandate, in particular on the

implementation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments.

• Maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CISPKF
and, by its presence in the area, contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly
return of refugees and displaced persons.3

The SZ is an area encompassing 12 kilometers (km) of ground on either side of the cease-fire line.
This boundary lies generally along the Inguri River, diverging from the river at two points. No
military personnel from either side may enter the SZ.

The Heavy Weapon Restricted Zone (HWRZ) is an area encompassing 24 km of ground on either
side of the cease-fire line. Although military personnel from either side may occupy this zone, no
weapon systems whose size exceeds specified limits may remain. For example, no indirect weapon
system of a size greater than 82mm may be arrayed in this zone. On either side of the HWRZ lies a
Heavy Weapons Storage Site (HWSS), at which systems not allowed in the HWRZ are kept.

UNOMIG operates in three operational sectors, based out of the Abkhazian cities of Sukhumi and
Gali and the Georgian city of Zugdidi. Within each sector are several UN team site bases (TSBs),
decentralized cells of UN military observers (UNMOs). The Gali and Zugdidi sectors straddle the
cease-fire line and represent the center of gravity of the mission's operational activity. An
administrative/civilian staff headquarters is located in Pitsunda, Abkhazia, just south of the Russian
border. Finally, UNOMIG operates a liaison office in the capital, Tbilisi. Click here for map.

Peacekeeping Forces
Item b of UNOMIG's mandate makes reference to the CISPKF. Although multinational in name, the

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CISPKF is almost entirely a Russian military force. CISPKF battalions are arrayed on either side of
the Inguri River and have set up numerous check points within the SZ. Some CISPKF battalions
come from Russian units garrisoned in Georgia. Also represented in the mission is a battalion from
Russia's 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), Totskoye Division, which has trained specifically to
conduct PK tasks, participating in several combined exercises with US military units.

Initially, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali had proposed to send an international

contingent of peacekeepers, having no more than 30 percent Russian forces. That this did not come
to pass is indicative of the Russian government's concern for this important region. In the Soviet era,
this Black Sea coastal area was highly prized for its strategic location and available recreational
activities. The continued preservation of Russian military bases in this region, the fact that the
preconflict population included a large and influential Russian contingent and a projected oil pipeline
which will transport oil from Caspian Sea deposits through this region, has led to contemporary
Russian foreign policy that applies great attention to this area.

UNMOs. The official title given to all officers serving in UNOMIG is UNMO. It is important to note
the term observer and the absence of the term peacekeeper in this title. As stipulated in UN
regulations, no UNMO is authorized to carry arms. Implied, therefore, is the necessity for the
UNMOs to develop a good working relationship between UNOMIG and the CISPKF. In an
emergency, the CISPKF represent the only protection for the UNMOs.

Observers in this mission number about 140, representing approximately 25 countries. Included in
this mission are nations quite experienced at UN work-Denmark and Sweden-and nations relatively
new to the PK ranks-Albania and Cuba. The skills deemed necessary for a UNMO position include
map reading, vehicle recognition and radio procedures, tasks common to most armed forces.
However, in addition to these prerequisites are several more critical skills, including a working
knowledge of the English language. During my tour with UNOMIG, I witnessed a tremendous
disparity among UNMOs in competency in these skills.

UNOMIG
personnel
answering
questions
from

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representatives of a local village.

Conduct of Duties
Item h of the mission's mandate makes reference to reporting. This is the most powerful tool at the
observers' disposal. Each day, a report of the day's activities and observations is sent to UN
headquarters in New York. Any violations of the mandate result in immediate official protest. The
UNMO at the scene of the violation will make an initial protest. It will soon be followed in formal,
written form. Clearly, information collection is one of the most critical, mission-essential tasks in
UNOMIG. The primary means by which this is accomplished is patrolling.

Every day, from each sector and TSB headquarters, teams consisting of two UNMOs and one UN
interpreter conduct mounted patrols. Often, a designated UN civilian interpreter is not available and
a UNMO must double as interpreter. The addition of several UNMOs from Eastern Europe has
ensured that a large percentage of observers will be proficient in Russian-a language spoken by both
factions. The objectives, duration, route and general conduct of these patrols varies. UNMOs serving
in operations and military information officer positions determine, through an expected staff
planning procedure, these patrol elements. Weekly patrol plans are always subject to change, due to
fluctuating requirements driven by observed activity; the plans are working documents only. Joint
patrols, during which a UN vehicle, usually a Jeep Cherokee or Land Rover, moves in concert with a
Russian BMP or BTR, are most often conducted at night. Unfortunately, lack of fuel on the Russian
side sometimes prevents them from accommodating every UN joint patrol request.

The patrols collect information largely through two methods: observation of all aspects of the
environment and interaction with non-UN personnel. When examining the operations area, the
UNMO must patiently attempt to discern not only any unusual or noteworthy details, but any
changes since the last observation period. Often, it will pay dividends to remain in place at one point
for an extended period of time. It is through focused, continued and active observation that subtle
changes in the environment can be more readily noted. Along the Inguri River, there are many
crossing points where activity is concentrated. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) regularly move
from one side of the cease-fire line to the other. At such critical, consistently visited areas, patrol
members may adopt a pattern of observation, during which they continually observe from the same
vantage point. However, by observing a familiar area from a new, previously unused position, key
elements of the area, heretofore unnoticed, may become apparent. Moreover, those aspects which
had already been noticed may offer new insights.

Although much information obtained from the local population is invariably based on rumor, enough
hard data is eventually gleaned to more than compensate the patrol for time spent in this endeavor.
Of course, the very action of speaking with members of the local population, even if virtually no
information is obtained, is beneficial in itself. Information, if it is of a sensitive nature, is not so
easily passed among strangers as among acquaintances. The initial bonds which patrol members
build with subjects will lead to easier information transfer later. Therefore, an attempt was made to
assign UNMOs to repeated patrols in particular sectors. This allows the observer to more readily
discern subtle aspects of the area, as well as develop stronger ties with the local population.

Refugees and IDPs

Paragraph i of UNOMIG's mandate refers to refugees and IDPs in the mission area. During the

conflict's course, more than 250,000 persons were uprooted from their homes. The majority escaped

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to the southeast to relatives' homes, Tbilisi hotels or refugee camps on the Georgian side of the SZ.
The prewar Gali region population was over 90-percent non-Abkhaz. The majority of these people
escaped to the south. People who crossed the Inguri River to the Georgian side are formally referred
to as IDPs, not refugees. This logically follows from the aforementioned UN precept on Georgian
territorial integrity. Those who escaped north to Russia, or to another country, are refugees, because
they crossed a recognized international border.

Whether labeled "refugee" or "IDP," this transient population played a major role in UNMO and
CISPKF operations. First and foremost, the many young, unemployed males who fill the IDP ranks
are prime candidates for recruitment into partisan or organized crime groups. Many have fought in
the war and have rudimentary knowledge of small arms systems and the normal workings of a
military structure. Add to these traits the ubiquitous hatred in this region, and you have the most
important qualifications for service in such armed groups. Similar situations arose in 1950s Algeria
and 1970s Northern Ireland, during which large groups of unemployed, hate-filled youths supplied
local armed belligerents with manpower.

Second is the major role which refugees/IDPs play concerning information collection. Many
different individuals and groups conduct liaison, formally or informally, with IDPs. Whether the
contact is a scheduled meeting with the refugee committee chairman of a makeshift refugee camp, or
a casual conversation with several young males, this contact continues. Therefore, as a source of
information for patrols, the IDPs represent a tremendous potential. In one refugee camp, a large
percentage of the able-bodied male population worked for a particular partisan leader whose
activities affected a large portion of the SZ. Fostering good relations with the camp's leaders resulted
in a continuous flow of data concerning this group.

A blown bridge along

the only
northwest-southeast
road.

The political effect of

refugees/IDPs
represents a third
contributing factor to
their major role in the
mission. IDPs who
have moved southeast
to Tbilisi have voiced
their opinions to the
government to quickly
resolve the situation
and effect full
repatriation. Many
refugees who went

north to Russia were ethnic Russians. The quality of life of Russians who lived in prewar Abkhazia

was very good. This rich Black Sea coastal area was frequented by the Soviet elite. The Soviet KGB

operated a large hotel in Pitsunda, just south of the Russian border, which now houses UNOMIG's

administrative/civilian staff. These Russian refugees are an influential group with obvious desires to

reclaim lost land and area holdings.

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Other Organizations
In postconflict zones where stability operations are being conducted, observers and peacekeepers
alike will encounter various international nongovernment organizations (NGOs). This region is
replete with NGO representatives. It is incumbent upon UNMOs to establish relations with these
organizations. They are often a tremendous source of information, given their exhaustive contact
with local inhabitants and refugees/IDPs. Furthermore, as a matter of protocol and decorum from one
internationally based organization to another, UNMOs have an obligation to lend support, whenever
situationally appropriate, to such agencies. NGOs operating in the mission area where I served
included:

• International Committee of the Red Cross (IC-RC): Is the international body that, among other
roles, disseminates information on the law of land warfare. In the mission area, it is primarily
involved with investigating the condition of prisoners. A powerful tool the ICRC uses to gain
access to prisoners is the Red Cross Message (RCM). If a relative of a captive approaches a
local ICRC headquarters and files a report, ICRC can create a RCM. However, UNMOs
cannot initiate this process. The completed RCM is enough to persuade captors to admit ICRC
representatives.
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-HCR): This organization works to effect the
repatriation of refugees/IDPs. Relatively early in UNOMIG's history, in preparation for an
expected mass repatriation of IDPs, this organization arranged for vast quantities of wood and
other building supplies to be stored in warehouses in Sochi, Russia, within an hour of the
northern border.
• International Federation of the Red Cross (Fed. RC): This organization, drawing its members
from the various national-level Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations, primarily
distributes food aid. Fed. RC officers visit large refugee camps and distribute set amounts of
wheat flour, rice and peas to each inhabitant.
• Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF): The French division of "Doctors Without Borders," this
organization distributes medicine to hospitals or local dispensaries. As a rule, it does not
distribute aid to individuals. MSF, in conjunction with the local UNOMIG TSB, staged a
vaccination operation for local children in an area devoid of any medicine or clinics.

Feed the Children (FTC): This organization provides food for children up to age 5. FTC
vehicles venture into all areas, to include refugee camps, on a regular basis. In the mission
area, FTC was admired by the majority of the local population, due to its members' strong,
unfailing efforts.

ICRC tasks committee officers with educating military observers and peacekeepers about the role
and capabilities of the ICRC, as well as the differences between it and the Fed. RC. Having been
briefed by an ICRC officer whose sole task was dissemination of this information, I strongly
recommend attending such a lecture. Given the important role that NGOs play in such operations, it
is critical that UNMOs and peacekeepers alike take every opportunity to increase their knowledge of
all aspects of these organizations. In UNOMIG it was especially important, as locals needing
assistance from a particular NGO will invariably make contact with a UN patrol first. UNMOs must
know precisely which NGO should receive this request.

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Armed Groups
A UNMO vehicle
(note the flag at rear)
next to a bus
destroyed by a
partisan attack in the
Security Zone.

A major implied task

of UNOMIG is to
collect data on and
degrade the
operational ability of
various armed groups.
This supports the
specified task "to
contribute to
conditions conducive
to the safe and orderly
return of refugees and
displaced persons." This implied task might seem difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish given the
lack of arms. It is feasible, though, as the UNMOs' reporting puts political pressure on both sides of
the conflict. This indirect pressure influences power brokers on each side to quell the activities of
such groups. Furthermore, a more direct form of pressure is available for the UNMOs through the
heavily armed CISPKF. If patrols learn that a particular armed group is operating in a certain area, a
joint patrol dispatched to that area exerts "direct" pressure.

Partisan groups must, like any standard military unit, receive logistic support to continue to operate.
It is partly from this inherent need that the relationship between the partisan groups and organized
crime springs. Criminal operations involving the illegal movement of various commodities and
goods will often be conducted by armed group members. Here, the tenuous distinction between
criminal and partisan group begins to blur. In the mission area, several notorious organized crime
figures also served as partisan or militia leaders.

Organized crime thrives under the chaotic conditions of a lost infrastructure. The status quo is what
every local wants to change in the mission area-to return to normal, relatively comfortable times.
Conversely, organized crime elements hold no such desire. Their ability to make a profit will only be
degraded if a competent, uncorrupted and adequately armed police force is put into place. Before the
conflict began, a pervasive organized criminal structure already existed in this region. The
assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze before the 1995 elections, widely
suspected to have been carried out by Makhedrioni, an extensive political party/criminal syndicate,
was perhaps the most publicized example. Such groups took advantage of the ensuing chaos
following the war.

Infrastructure
As expected in conflict zones, all infrastructure elements in the mission area were severely damaged

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from combatant action and disrepair. Since state and collective farms are not operating, farm animals
(pigs and cows) are seen everywhere. Due to the lack of available jobs, many families subsist on
livestock and produce from gardens tended at the home. One of the only major economic efforts that
continue is an informally run agricultural exporting drive to Russia. Locals in the SZ sell hazel nuts
or mandarins to entrepreneurs who drive to the northern border. There, they either sell these
commodities or continue across the border to Sochi, Russia. Here, the same choice awaits: to sell in
Sochi, or to attempt a move further to the north, potentially to Moscow. Each successive stage is
characterized by an accompanying increase in price of agricultural commodities.

Transportation availability, both public and private, was similarly affected by the conflict, most
notably in the Abkhaz half of the SZ. The extreme physical efforts by locals to overcome
infrastructural deficiencies were nothing less than phenomenal. Elderly women are often seen
carrying tremendous weights of food, bought in a Zugdidi market, as they return to the Abkhaz side
of the SZ. Often, they are forced to cross the Inguri River on precariously built foot bridges, some
joining two sides of a destroyed bridge or railway. It is truly a resolute effort to survive.

Although no military personnel may enter the SZ, armed militia (police forces) operate legally
throughout this region. The CISPKF assumes responsibility for the general authorization of weapons
used by these forces. The CISPKF headquarters issues signed, numbered weapon permits that must
be carried by armed militia members. Although this seems to be an efficient method of providing and
controlling needed arms for the forces that will supposedly contribute to stability in the region, this
system is fraught with problems. The manner in which the permits are distributed offers the
organized criminal elements opportunities to illegally procure these permits for their own "security
details." Further, the militias' ability to maintain order is negligible. Lack of training, logistic support
and trust by the local population all contribute to their ineffectiveness.

UNMO duties involve a wide range of skills, often encompassing much more than what is written in
an official duty description. Nothing can wholly prepare a UNMO for a situation when he is
suddenly surrounded by hundreds of malnourished IDPs, all devoid of patience and all demanding
answers to unanswerable questions. The subtle, legal distinctions among the many international
organizations found in such postconflict zones are lost on a local population which only understands
one notion: the UNMO is foreign, he is in uniform and he must bring help.

A prospective observer can prepare himself, insofar as standard military skills, before arrival in a
mission. With regard to learning some of the unique skills involved in UNMO duty, though, as well
as becoming familiar with possible mission scenarios, attendance at a specialized UNMO school is
critical. A UNMO school in Finland offers a three-week course taught in English. The instructors
have observer experience and the school, which has operated for 25 years, enjoys a fine reputation. A
similar instruction course is offered in Switzerland.

American military personnel are assets to UN observer missions. We are operationally sound, we are
accustomed to hard work and we are native English speakers. The US military must look to countries
with lesser military might, but more recent UN experience, to gain insight into UNMO preparation
methods. Given the state of world affairs, the possibilities for service in such missions will likely
increase. A structured, comprehensive UNMO preparation system is not an extravagance, but a
necessity.MR

1. Igor Marykhuba, About the Abkhazians and Abkhazia (Sukhumi, 1993), 42.
2. Sezai Babakush and Liudmila Sagaria, Abkhazia: Information Bulletin (Sukhumi: Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, 1993), 4.

3. Department of Peace Keeping Operations, Notes on UMOMIG (New York: United Nations
Secretariat, 1994), 1-2.

Captain Gregory R. Sarafian is battalion liaison officer, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery
Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an
M.S.A. from Central Michigan University. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions
in the Continental United States and Europe, to include assistant fire support coordinator, Fire
Support Element for Division Main Command Post, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bamberg,
Germany; UN military observer, UN Observer Mission in Georgia, Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Russia; and targeting officer, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, Bamberg.

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Swords Into Plowshares: Postconflict Arms

Management
by Lieutenant Colonel James J. Carafano, US Army
The term implementing force appears in this article 14 times. For brevity, we use the acronym IF.
Readers should understand that IF is not an approved acronym.-Editor

US arms management operations since World War II involved actions conducted after the cessation
of hostilities to limit, reduce, abolish, neutralize or destroy weapons and equipment of real or
potential military value. While most US efforts in arms management occurred as part of military
force demobilization, Americans have participated in many missions whose objectives varied from
the complete elimination of weapons, equipment, organizations and industrial infrastructure to
limiting the presence of specific types of weapons in an area of operations (AO). An analysis of the
common challenges and issues forces faced in planning, preparing and executing arms management
reveals consistently important trends and lessons learned relevant to future operations.

American military experience suggests there are three distinct types of arms management
distinguished by the objectives, constraints and conditions under which operations are conducted.

A force that has achieved decisive victory initiates disarmament. An operation's objective is to
destroy the defeated enemy's capability to wage war. The victor imposes conditions. The US
occupation of Germany, Austria and Japan after World War II and postconflict activities during
Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause are examples of such operations.

Under treaty implementation, parties agree to limit, reduce or eliminate arms as part of an overall
political settlement. They are usually established by protocols (UN resolutions) and serve to limit
weapon systems from specified areas (no-fly zones). Arms management serves primarily as a
confidence-building measure to reinforce and supplement a negotiated peace. In these operations,
arms managers are bound strictly by the conditions treaties and protocols establish. Objectives could
range from demobilizing forces to limiting weapons from specified areas. Examples of US
operations include Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor and US participation in UN
peacekeeping (PK) missions in Cambodia.

Actions during ongoing conflicts employ coercive action to disarm or restrict warring factions in an
operational environment that lacks area-wide security or complete political settlement. The objective
is to provide security as a precursor to humanitarian relief efforts and peace negotiations. The
implementing force's (IF's) capabilities largely determine these operations' scope. Objectives often
change rapidly and frequently and vary to accommodate the unique circumstances of different zones
within the AO. Arguably, the Korean War and Vietnam could be classified as "actions during
ongoing conflicts." The US-led UN Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia is another example.

Successful operations consist of four phases that should be considered as a basic framework for
planning, preparing and executing arms management. The US military's experience demonstrates
that each phase of arms management includes a number of essential specified tasks that must be
completed.

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3Phase I: Prepare an Area for Arms Management

This phase includes all activities related to planning and preparation.

Planning. Planning is the most essential task in the operation's initial phase. In April 1944, in the
European Theater during World War II, the United States completed its first draft study of
disarmament requirements. Nearly a year before V-E Day, the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) produced a comprehensive plan to address the entire theater's needs.

SHAEF's guidance is particularly instructive since disarming German forces proved to be an

extremely complex challenge.1 Complicating SHAEF's challenge was the operation's immense scope
and the multiple military commands involved. To further muddle the problem, SHEAF found it
impossible to predict exactly what the conflict's end state would look like when the disarmament
process began. For example, initial planning for Austria assumed US and British forces from Italy
would occupy the country. As a result, the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theater
(SACMED) had primary responsibility for planning. In fact, the Russians liberated much of Austria,
and the first US forces entered the country from Germany. Despite this turmoil and uncertainty,
SHAEF maintained a fundamental planning principle that there had to be consistent disarmament
guidelines among all participating forces to ensure the operation's efficiency, protect the troops
involved and sustain the occupation force's legitimacy.

SHEAF addressed the uncertainties of postwar occupation by maintaining flexibility in the planning
process. In particular, US forces stressed the use of liaison teams and staff exchanges to effect
coordination. Planning groups were frequently transferred between commands so when missions had
to be shifted, the gaining headquarters could make use of the advance planning done by other staffs.

In contrast, more recent US operations provide illustrative instances of how insufficient planning
hampers arms management. The first US forces participating in Operation Restore Hope received
inadequate implementing guidance. Initially, inconsistency in setting and applying guidelines
impeded humanitarian relief operations. Civilian aid vehicles traveling between sectors encountered
different rules regarding the right to be accompanied by their own armed guards. In some sectors,
humanitarian aid convoys passed unchallenged; in others, they were stopped and the guards
disarmed. Problems persisted until UNITAF issued a standard weapons policy in both English and
Somali.2

Operations constraints. In addition to setting guidelines, planners must consider the extent of
in-country aid available. Shortages of personnel to implement arms management is a consistent
theme in US operations. Most US disarmament efforts were conducted during the final phase of
larger operations as the bulk of US forces were preparing to redeploy from the theater. As a result,
manpower frequently proved the most significant IF constraint.

The amount of assistance available from local governments and authorities significantly affected
how arms management was conducted. Plans must realistically assess the resources available to
conduct arms management and plan accordingly. In Japan after World War II, the United States had
relatively few troops available for the task. Occupation forces used existing local governments and
agencies to implement the demobilization of Japanese home forces. This process proved orderly and
efficient, compensating for inadequate US military manpower available.3

While Japan's occupation offered a case study in the most ideal disarmament conditions, Somali

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UNITAF operations offer an illustration of the least desirable situation. Planners recognized the
difficulty of imposing disarmament in a country lacking a supporting infrastructure. Also, Somalia
had no legal and penal institutions, and the IF had no capability to provide these services or to
impose security throughout the operational area. As a result, though the negotiated settlement
envisioned disarmament, UNITAF adjusted its objectives to fit its capabilities. US forces limited
arms management to preventing interference in humanitarian relief operations and ensuring weapons
were not present in areas occupied by UN troops. In practice this plan worked well, reducing
tensions, facilitating humanitarian relief operations and minimizing the risk of casualties.4

Collecting intelligence. Intelligence collection is a critical part of preparing for arms management.
During US missions, the process of intelligence gathering was conducted in the same manner as
more traditional military operations. In each case, commanders began by determining their critical
information requirements.

In some cases, intelligence gathering proved problematic. Planners had to allow for considerations
such as political ramifications, coalition partners' input, regional history and specific rules of
engagement. Intelligence collection during peace enforcement (PE) operations was often perceived
as a threat by belligerents or a source of IF bias. To address this issue, one postoperations analysis
suggests forming a "verification and information cell."5 The cell would include representatives of all
factions and forces. It would allow for information exchange to build confidence, alleviate suspicion,
address rumors and permit all sides to explain their positions and views.

Constituting forces. The preparation phase includes constituting forces for managing arms. In past
US operations, regimental- and later brigade-size units were normally assigned responsibility for the
primary tasks of disarming forces and limiting or excluding weapons from specified areas.

As the operation progressed and scope or complexity of activities grew, US forces employed special
staffs and organizations to manage these operations. In the European Theater after World War II,
plans called for employing demobilization staff groups and mobile teams to supplement existing
military staffs and evaluate operations effectiveness. SHAEF also established a special G4 (logistics)
staff section to issue disposal instructions, record the quantity, location and disposal of arms and
address any problems in the process.6

In almost every instance, US forces conducted arms management as part of a multinational force.
Many difficulties they encountered were consistent with problems experienced in other types of
multinational operations.7 Postoperation surveys of recent US efforts indicate the most significant
challenges for arms management were:

• Language differences.
• Lack of common operational terms/doctrine.
• Differing work ethics.
• Varying national force objectives.
• Lack of training.

Planning and preparation for arms management should seek to mitigate these factors as much as
possible through the employment of liaisons, additional training, rehearsals and issuing
comprehensive standardized operating procedures.

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A Marine
patrol moves
cautiously
down a
war-damaged
thorough-fare
in Mogadishu,
Somalia,
March 1993.

Environmental issues. One aspect of disarmament that past demobilization organizations did not
address was environmental concerns. Environmental issues complicate the challenge of arms
management for commanders. Modern weapons offer the potential to introduce a range of
environmental problems. In addition to the threats associated with chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons, many modern arms and munitions contain heavy metals and other potential environmental
contamination sources. While all US forces since World War II contained staffs familiar with
handling chemical, biological and later nuclear weapons, they did not have expertise in
environmental issues related to the management, storage or destruction of weapons and equipment.
As modern forces become more sensitive to potential environmental hazards, staffs dealing with
arms management may require augmentation to provide expertise in this area.

Information management. Establishing a plan for distributing information proved to be a consistently

important task in all operations. The IF disseminates procedures for civilians and belligerent forces
to follow. Techniques employed by US forces rely heavily on civil affairs and psychological warfare
units. Means to disseminate information include leaflets, placards, proclamations, radio broadcasts
and loudspeaker announcements.

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Japanese guards at the

Imperial Palace accept
cigarettes from a 1st
Cavalry Division
soldier, Tokyo,
September 1945.

Public affairs (PA) was

also a key information
plan component,
particularly for
distributing force
objectives through the
media.8 PA objectives
include:

• Explaining arms
management
procedures,
regulations, rules
and laws.
• Building support for arms management.
• Demonstrating IF commitment to complete the mission.
• Correcting biases in the media or propaganda.
• Keeping the population informed.
• Stimulating the incoming flow of information.
• Building trust.

To effectively communicate the arms management message, PA and media management activities
must be integrated into initial operational planning and maximized throughout each phase of the
operation.

3Phase II: Conduct Overt Military Action in Zone

During this phase, the IF must demonstrate the capability to conduct operations in its zone before
attempting to manage arms. More important, the force must clearly show it can protect itself. Force
protection is an important concern, even in operations conducted in a defeated enemy's presence.
In Austria following the German forces' surrender after World War II, US forces reported many acts
of sabotage, including ambushes, explosions and cutting of communications wire. Moreover, before
the war's end, the Germans had begun training covert forces called "Werewolves" to continue armed
guerrilla action. While this German plan never came to fruition, US forces were inundated with
rumors and reports of guerrilla forces operating in-theater for months after the surrender.9

Weapons embargoes and blockades. Equally important to arms management is controlling the
flow of weapons into the AO. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operations,
conducted in 1992 and 1993, and supported by a small US contingent, showed the futility of
conducting arms management in an AO without controlled borders. In Cambodia, warring factions
turned in old or inoperative weapons, then replenished their stocks by importing new equipment

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across the country's unsecured borders. As a result, disarmament procedures failed to reduce the
presence of weapons in the country.10

Observation and traffic control. Another key activity during Phase II is to establish observation
and traffic control points in critical AO zones. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) required
for these tasks, such as manning checkpoints and roadblocks and conducting patrols, are common to
most PE operations. US forces participating in Joint Endeavor and other recent PE operations have
refined many TTPs these actions require. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, has documented these TTPs and lessons learned. They can be accessed on the Internet at
<http:// call.army.mil:1100/call.html>.

3Phase III: Limit Weapons Employment or

Disarm Forces and Destroy Weapons
Most disarmament operations conducted by US forces were organized around the use of two sites: a
transition site, where equipment and weapons were collected, and a cantonment site, where weapons
were stored and secured until disposal. Transition site selection is a major tactical decision. The first
priority is locating sites in safe, secure areas. There are other important concerns. After World War
II, the 1st Infantry Division found that to limit opportunities for sabotage, sites should not be near
sensitive installations such as ammunition dumps or command, control and communication
facilities.11 PK forces in Somalia concluded it was prudent to ensure transition sites were separated
from cantonment sites where weapons were stored. This was necessary to reduce temptation for
disarmed forces to attempt to seize weapons back.12 In most operations, IF personnel found they had
to provide at least temporary food, lodging and medical care for disarmed troops. As a result, it was
critical for the transition site to be in areas that had ready access to water, transportation routes and
logistic infrastructure.

Transition site operations. At the transition site, weapons were received, inventoried and secured.
Frequently, the sites were set up near disarming units so equipment could be quickly inventoried and
inspected. This also allowed the IF to search for hidden or unreported weapons.

Inventory and accounting proved to be key disarmament process aspects. It was essential for the IF to
have an audit trail of all weapons and equipment to ensure verification and compliance of
disarmament directives, reduce theft, eliminate war trophy pilferage and provide intelligence.

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Berliners receive US
Military Government proclamations explaining a complex currency reform in areas under
American, British and French control, June 1948.

Intelligence collection at the transition site was also an important part of site operations, providing
critical intelligence indicators for measuring the progress of operations. For instance, when UNTAC
forces in Cambodia observed the poor quality of arms turned over by the factions, they were able to
estimate the quality and numbers of weapons still in the countryside. Their analysis clearly showed
the disarmament program was not succeeding.13

Cantonment site selection and security. In US operations, once weapons were successfully
secured, they were usually moved to cantonment sites. These were frequently located near US
ammunition supply points and transportation and logistic facilities. Collocation allowed for more
efficient sharing of technical personnel, materiel-handling equipment, transportation and storage and
security facilities.

The greatest challenge in managing cantonment sites was security. Theft and pilfering of war
trophies were the most bothersome concerns. Security proved extremely manpower-intensive; troops
were required for guard duty, roving patrols, traffic control, curfew enforcement, observation posts
and reaction forces.

Since most US disarmament operations occurred while US forces were redeploying, the requirement
to guard cantonment facilities further strained available resources. To help alleviate this problem,
recent operations have explored-with some success-the use of remote sensors, video cameras and
other surveillance equipment to reduce the personnel burden for security forces.14

Weapons reduction techniques. In addition to systematic force disarmament at transition and

cantonment sites, US operations have employed other techniques to reduce illegal arms in the AO.
Amnesty programs, in particular, appear to be a useful adjunct to systematic disarmament. US forces
have also experimented with weapons "buy-back" programs. US operations suggest the following

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activities are key to successfully implementing a weapons buy-back program.

• Operations should be preceded by an extensive public information effort explaining the

program's parameters.

• Adequate security must be provided in and around buy-back sites.

• Weapons turned in should be accepted under an impartial, "no questions asked" policy.
• Weapons should be immediately destroyed or secured.
• Weapons should be reclaimed at competitive prices-not too much above black market value.

Analysis also indicates that supplementary weapons reduction techniques have little long-term
impact on arms management. However, they have demonstrated positive short-term results and are
productive when combined with other implementation security and confidence-building measures.15

Destruction of materiel. Destruction procedures for weapons, munitions and equipment have been
limited only by the IF's imagination and resources. A common technique employed after World War
II was dumping materiel in the ocean. During Japan's demobilization, arms and munitions were
dumped in 300 to 600 feet of water. Items were also burned, blown up, cut up and crushed.16

3Phase Iv:

Postoperation Activities

This phase's primary objective is to ensure compliance and verify operations success. During this
phase, IFs conduct patrols, raids and counterintelligence operations in search of hidden or
unauthorized weapons. Weapons searches include disarmed military forces, as well as civilians and
IF personnel-anyone who may have been involved in black market activity, looting or war-trophy
collecting.

Verification inspections and searches often constitute major operations in themselves. For example,
on 21 July 1945, 136,000 US forces in Germany conducted Operation Tallyho. In 36 hours, troops
screened and searched 6 million civilians and soldiers for contraband weapons. US troops found that
weapons caches were well hidden and often ingeniously concealed. In one instance, guns were found
buried in a grave marked "two unknown German soldiers."17 US operations suggest that the most
important factors in conducting successful searches were effective operations security and surprise.

Administrative support. Changes in policy, as well as legal issues regarding property confiscation,
theft and black market activity, complicate the verification process. In every operation US forces
conducted, administrative staffs were required to handle ancillary legal, criminal and civil issues. An
analysis of past US efforts indicates that the fundamentals described in US Army Field Manual
100-23, Peace Operations, remain valid for arms management.18 In addition, three other factors
are critical to success:

• Arms management is an intensely "political" process, not a discreet management or

administrative problem. The operation's objective must be consistent with overall security and
political settlement objectives.
• Advance planning is essential. Operations must be fully integrated with other PK efforts. The
IF must have a thorough understanding of its capabilities and constraints, as well as firm
situation estimates in the AO.

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• Adequate logistic support and manpower is a prerequisite for the implementation of any
attempt to disarm or demobilize forces.

While each US arms management operation is unique, all share common factors in planning,
pre-paration and execution. US forces have clearly demonstrated that a well-planned, phased and
adequately resourced operation oriented on unambiguous, relevant and obtainable objectives, can
make important contributions in the fight for peace. In addition, both the concepts and conduct of
these operations suggest basic guidelines to help successfully implement future arms management
tasks.MR

1. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Subject: Disposal of Surrendered

Enemy War Materiel (7 July 1944), RG331, SHAEF, Assistant to the General Staff G4 Division,
Post-Hostilities Planning Section, Box 221, NARA. This study eventually became incorporated into
ECLIPSE, the overall plan for the surrender of Germany published in outline form on 10 November
1944; Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History (CMH), 1975), 163.
2. Clement Abide, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia (New York: United Nations,
1995), 79.
3. Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1 supplement (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1966), 117-22, 126.
4. John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 94-95, 105.
5. Andrei Raevsky, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Aspects of Psychological and Intelligence
(New York: United Nations, 1996), 24.
6. Disposal of Surrendered Enemy War Materiel.
7. See surveys in Abide, Somalia; Jianwei Wang, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia
(New York: United Nations, 1996); Barbara Ekwall-Vebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, Managing Arms
in Peace Processes: Bosnia (New York: United Nations, 1996).
8. Raevsky, Aspects, 3.
9. Headquarters, US Forces Austria, Intelligence Summary #7, (RG 260 US Forces Austria, US
Allied Command Section, Historical Files, Box 6, NARA, 14 July 1945).
10. Wang, Cambodia, 73-74.
11. ECLIPSE Pamphlet #4, Control and Administration of German Forces, Third Draft
(Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, RG 331 Allied and Occupational Headquarters WWII, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Staff, G4 Division Plans, 1943-1945, Box 221,
NARA, 7 May 1945).
12. Abide, Somalia, 81.
13. Wang, Cambodia, 73-74.
14. Abide, Somalia, 186.
15. Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization After Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1966), 34.
16. Reports of General MacArthur, 135-36.
17. Disarmament and Disbandment of the German Armed Forces, Occupation Forces in Europe
Series, 1945-46 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947),
File 8-3.1 CA7, CMH; The First Year of Occupation (Frankfurt-am-Main, Office of the Chief
Historian, 1947), 125-35, File 8-3.1 CA1 V2, CMH.
18. Bruce R. Pirne and William E. Simons, Soldiers for Peace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

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Lieutenant Colonel James J. Carafano is a speech writer for US Army Chief of Staff, Washington,
DC. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. from Georgetown and is a
graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in a variety of
command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, to include being head of
Military Studies, Center of Military History, Washington, DC; action officer, Task Force 2000, Fort
Sill, Oklahoma; S3, 5th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment, Schweinfurt, Germany; and S3,
DIVARTY, 3d Infantry Division, Würzburg, Germany. His article "Officership: 1966-1971"
appeared in the January 1989 issue of Military Review.

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Posthostilities Training

Major Dominic J. Caraccilo

If you rehearse nothing else, rehearse actions on the objective.

-Dictum taught to most combat arms platoon leaders and

company commanders at the US Army service schools.

Numerous methods have been discussed recently about training forces for peacekeeping (PK) and
operations other than war (OOTW). An acknowledged problem surrounding this task is the
reluctance of forces tasked to support PK operations (PKOs) under UN auspices to sacrifice a portion
of their indispensable and safeguarded training time. Given today's fiscal environment, who would
claim that his force has ample time to conduct training not even mentioned on his mission-essential
task list (METL)? Yet the reality is that leaders are sacrificing essential training time to conduct
such mundane tasks as manning checkpoints and practicing convoy protection procedures.

US forces are increasingly being called upon to provide elements, if not entire units, to various PKOs
around the world. The two major theater wars contingency outlined as our national military strategy
in the Quadrennial Defense Review will likely remain a major strategy focus for some time. Thus,
commanders must accept the responsibility and commit the necessary resources to properly train
their soldiers to conduct PKOs and other operations short of war. Short of restructuring the forces or
redesignating large parts of the Army into military police elements, the current force structure must
integrate OOTW-type training in a smart, advantageous manner.1

Ironically, commanders can meet their units' combat training requirements and still train to some
proficiency on OOTW tasks their units will most likely perform the next time they deploy. My
premise is that this training already exists in conventional training schedules. Therefore, given
current METL requirements, commanders should not need to change their organizations' structure or
training approach to meet both conventional and OOTW mission proficiency.

Posthostilities Training
Posthostilities training-the actions that occur after the actions on the objective-equate to PK
activities. These activities are the actions that are often ignored by combat commanders. The casualty
evacuations (CASEVAC) exercises, the integration of civil-military and psychological operations to
assist re-establishing order in the area of operations immediately after combat operations cease and
the humanitarian relief efforts required to bring stability to the region are all examples of activities a
force should be called upon to perform after conventional fighting ceases. However, these are the
activities that inherently get "blown off" during unit training, whether at a combat training center
(CTC) or at home station.

Recently, the Army has improved its efforts in conducting "actions on the objective" training.
Arguably, a majority of combat training consisted of "taking the hill," followed immediately by
ENDEX (end of exercise). The Army has moved beyond that mentality by adopting and embracing
doctrine and the after-action review process. Commanders at all levels are determined to train their

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units to standard in all METL tasks, including evacuating casualties and conducting a deliberate
defense of the objective after it is seized. To do this effectively, units must properly train for
posthostilities missions to gain an honest level of proficiency in OOTW tasks. The Army should
incorporate posthostilities training into all of its major training exercises.

A typical scenario might be: "Conduct an attack on Hill XX in order to destroy enemy forces in
sector and seize terrain. The desired end state is to capture and control Hill XX. However, the
political end state may be to restore peace to the area after hostilities.2 If this becomes the actual end
state, then a conventional force must be prepared to conduct PKOs immediately following hostilities.
At the CTCs, many forces conduct "attacking Hill XX" operations during their rotations. To make
their operations complete, they should incorporate posthostilities training in scenario-driven
operations plans that include civil unrest and humanitarian relief requirements, among others.
Incorporating such training is always a concern, because additional training is time- and
resource-intensive. Nonetheless, the benefits derived far outweigh the difficulties associated with
including this type of training. After all, a successful CTC rotation is a good indicator of how well a
unit completes its METL tasks. By incorporating posthostilities training into typical rotations, units
can also become proficient in OOTW requirements.

As doctrine begins incorporating PKO-type training requirements and the appropriate performance
standards, METL and tactics, techniques and procedures will follow. Since the majority of
deployments in the next few years will likely be associated with PK or peace enforcement operations,
units must train for posthostilities as an extension of actions on the objective. By so doing, they will
ensure their preparedness for conducting conventional combat operations as well as PK and other
operations. MR

1. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-1, US Army Operational
Concept; Army Tactical Concept (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, Headquarters,
TRADOC, 20 June 1980) supports a structuring approach that leads to a more modular and tailorable
Army to meet future requirements. The "inferred" part of this plan indicates that the forces will be
more focused on particular missions such as battle against complex, adaptive forces;
armor-mechanized forces; infantry-based forces; and operations other than war (OOTW), as opposed
to dictating that all perform conventional and OOTW missions.

2. Clausewitzian theory indicates that the military is nothing more than an extension of policy.
Therefore, with the advent of more OOTW operations, our Armed Forces cannot ignore an
operation's political objectives.

Major Dominic J. Caraccilo is operations officer, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st
Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy
(USMA), an M.S. from Cornell University and an M.A. from the Naval War College. He has held a
variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Saudi Arabia,
to include assistant professor, USMA; company commander, Headquarters Company 2d Brigade,
82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Saudi Arabia; company commander, 1st
Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg; and S4, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
Regiment, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Mainz, Germany. His article "Measuring Military
Success" appeared in the July-August 1995 issue of Military Review.

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Beaten by the Bugs: The

Soviet-Afghan War Experience
by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, and
Major William A. Jorgensen, US Army Reserve

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position
of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or
agency.-Editor

The US Army has an excellent record of disease prevention, field sanitation and disease control.
However, since the United States belongs to several multinational alliances, the Army will support
allies whose disease prevention record is not as good. The recent Soviet experience in Afghanistan is
an example of a modern force which was seriously hampered by disease and poor field sanitation,
further stressing the commander's role in protecting the force.

Recent US Army deployments have been relatively disease free, thanks to Army medical
professionals' efforts, a solid inoculation program, high standards of field sanitation and small-unit
leadership.1 As the Army prepares for future deployments in conjunction with allies or UN forces,
US Army medical professionals could find themselves providing medical support to the other
nations' forces whose experience in field sanitation and disease prevention differs from ours. In this
situation, our medical team needs to prepare to fight epidemics rather than isolated cases.2

Throughout history, armies and disease have been constant companions. Death from disease often
exceeded battlefield deaths. Typhus, plague, cholera, typhoid and dysentery have decided more
campaigns than the great generals of history. In the Crimean War (1853 to 1856), the English and
French combined forces against Russia. The French de-ployed 309,000 men into the theater: of these,
some 200,000 were hospitalized-50,000 for wounds and 150,000 from disease.3 English and Russian
experience was similar.

Modern medicine and inoculations have significantly decreased wartime deaths due to disease, but
disease continues to sap the strength of modern armies. Some armies do a better job of practicing
preventative medicine than others. As the Soviet army learned in Afghanistan, strong preventive
medicine and field sanitation programs are essential for maintaining forces in foreign climates.4

For the first six years of the war, the Soviet press barely mentioned the war. When they did, it was in
terms of happy Soviet soldiers building hospitals and orphanages. The Soviet combat role was not
mentioned, nor was the fact that the Soviets filled more hospitals and orphanages then they
constructed. When General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policy was implemented in the
Soviet Un-ion, the true casualty picture slowly began to emerge. Of the 620,000 Soviets who served
in Afghanistan,

14,453 were killed or died from wounds, accidents or disease-a modest 2.33 percent of the total who
served. However, the rate of hospitalization during Afghanistan service was remarkable. The

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469,685 personnel hospitalized represented almost 76 percent of those who served. Of these, 53,753
(11.44 percent) were wounded or injured. Fully 415,932 (88.56 percent) were hospitalized for
serious diseases. In other words, 67 percent of those who served in Afghanistan required
hospitalization for a serious illness. These illnesses included 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis
and 31,080 cases of typhoid fever.5 The remaining 269,544 cases were split between plague, malaria,
cholera, diphtheria, meningitis, heart disease, shigellosis (infectious dysentery), amoebic dysentery,
rheumatism, heat stroke, pneumonia, typhus and paratyphus.6

The medical problems confronting the Soviet army in Afghanistan were markedly different from
those threatening the World War II Red army. Figure 1 below outlines those differences.7

The figure shows a dramatic increase in hospi-talization for infectious disease and noncombat
injuries-a result of deployment to a foreign climate where there are new strains of disease and the
increased number of Soviet army motorized vehicles in Afghanistan. The chart shows modest
hospitalization increases for bones, joints and muscles, as well as skin and subdermal tissue. Most
other categories show a decrease, probably due to conscript age differences: Soviet Afghanistan
combatants were younger; the World War II Soviet army included many middle-aged men. Figure 2
shows the breakdown of infectious diseases in Afghanistan by type.8

Infectious Hepatitis
Despite Soviet preventive medicine teams' best efforts, hospitals, vector control teams and water
purification units were never able to control the spread of infectious disease. The main reasons for
the high rate of disease among Soviet troops were lack of sufficient clean drinking water supplies; no
enforcement of basic field sanitation practices (a historic Soviet problem, partly due to their lack of a
professional noncommissioned officer [NCO] corps); failure of cooks to wash their hands after
defecation; in-festations of lice and rodents; poor diet; and failure to provide soldiers with clean
uniforms and underwear on a regular basis.

The Soviet 40th Army was the primary force in Afghanistan. In addition, Soviet KGB and Ministry
of Internal Security (MVD) forces served in Afghanistan along with Soviet advisers to the Afghan
army and a Soviet civilian work force that supported the Soviet army.9 As Figure 2 illustrates, the
Soviet 40th Army had a serious problem with disease prevention. In fact, over one-quarter of the
troop strength might be unavailable due to disease. Between October and December 1981, the entire
5th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) was rendered combat ineffective when more than 3,000 of its
men were simultaneously stricken with hepatitis. The sick included the division commander, most of
his staff and two of four regimental commanders.10 Every year, 33 percent of the entire 40th Army
was stricken with some form of serious infectious disease.11

The major causes of hepatitis are viruses and alcohol and drug abuse. Vaccines can protect personnel
from hepatitis B, and troops going to Afghanistan received this vaccination. There are no vaccines
against hepatitis A and hepatitis nonA-nonB. Hepatitis A accounted for 95 percent of hepatitis
infections among Soviet soldiers. The remaining 5 percent was from hepatitis nonA-nonB.12
Hepatitis is a highly infectious disease and is spread by the fecal-oral route, normally from failing to
wash one's hands or drink clean water. The incubation period in Afghanistan was normally 37 days,
and recovery took six to eight weeks with relapses.

The combat tour was 18 months for conscripts and two years for officers. First-year soldiers were 2.5
times more likely to contract hepatitis A than second-year soldiers. The greatest number of hepatitis

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cases were contracted in the fall and winter.13 Epidemiologic analysis showed the following results:

• 31 to 74 percent of infectious hepatitis cases were contracted in base camp.

• 13 to 45 percent were contracted in the field.
• 8 to 15 percent were contracted in outposts.
• 5 to 14 percent were contracted while on convoy duty.14

This analysis is surprising, because one would expect that the best sanitation prophylaxis would be in
the base camps. Instead, most of the hepatitis was contracted where it could have been best
prevented.

Upper Respiratory Disease

Pneumonia and bronchitis were serious problems for the Soviet 40th Army, especially during the
first four years of the war. Figure 3 depicts the various types of upper respiratory disease by
percentage from 1982 to 1984.15

Servicemen contracted acute pneumonia throughout the year, but the majority (65 percent) of the
more serious and contagious cases occurred in the fall and winter, compared to 35 percent in the
spring and summer. Approximately 10 percent of the cases initially diagnosed as acute respiratory
infection were actually typhoid fever. Additionally, 82 percent of the soldiers contracted acute
pneumonia during their first year of service, compared to only 18 percent the second year.16
Hospitalization time, by percentage, required for pneumonia follows:17

• 1 to 2 days, 42
• 3 to 4 days, 24
• 5 to 7 days, 22
• 8 to 10 days, 4
• Over 10 days, 8

Statistics show that 6 percent of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan who developed pneumonia also had a
digestive tract illness; and 30 percent of these were 10 to 15 percent below ideal body weight. The
possibility of troops in Afghanistan contracting a severe or grave case of pneumonia was twice as
high as Soviet soldiers serving elsewhere. Incidents of bron-chial pneumonia in Afghanistan were
also double the armywide average.18 Physicians had difficulty making the correct diagnosis, since
the laboratory results and patients' symptoms varied so widely from the usual results and symptoms.
This created a delay in starting the correct treatment and in returning soldiers to duty.19

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A Soviet soldier with a can of cold soup. The

Soviet field ration of canned food did not
provide a balanced diet, and weakened the
body's resistance to disease.

Lessons Learned
In Afghanistan, most combat units were spread out
in small outposts where hot meals and clean water
were not available. Initially, the Soviet soldiers in
isolated outposts ate nothing but dry rations.20 The
lack of regularly prepared, balanced meals
weakened soldiers' resistance to disease, since their
dry rations failed to provide proper nutritional
requirements over time. Additionally, the
accumulation of ration cans and other trash
provided breeding grounds for rats and disease. As
the war progressed, an effort was made to serve
everyone a hot meal and tea for breakfast and
dinner. Isolated units still had dry rations for lunch.
To get hot meals to some troops, the Soviets
developed air-droppable containers.

Hot meals proved to be a mixed blessing, since a

primary source of infection was the cooks. Cooks
had lice, intestinal pathogens and little officer
supervision. In fact, cooks' personal hygiene was no better, and sometimes worse, than the rest of the
Soviet soldiers. The Soviets recognized this and began inspecting the cooks and conducting monthly
medical examinations. Laboratory findings of pathogenic intestinal bacteria among cooks were
staggering. It only took a few sick cooks to keep the hospital sick bays filled. The Soviets were never
able to keep all their cooks clean and sanitary.21

Physical conditioning and acclimatization is very important in disease prevention. Eventually, most
soldiers trained for six months in mountain warfare schools before arriving in Afghanistan. Physical
conditioning was stressed, as was field craft, first aid and field sanitation. However, physical training
in the Soviet Union did not fully prepare soldiers for the rugged realities of field duty in Afghanistan.
The average field combat load in Afghanistan was 70.5 pounds. Despite the rigorous physical
conditioning program, soldiers were unable to routinely carry that much weight at high altitudes. The
Soviets eventually developed special lightweight field gear, but they never produced enough for all
their field units. Troops were rapidly debilitated by the harsh field conditions, which left them more
prone to disease.

Rats, lice and mosquitos were a constant problem. Garbage was not quickly policed up and properly
disposed of. Garbage dumps were often collocated with camps and base camps. Stagnant pools of
water were not drained or treated for mosquito larvae. Troops were dusted with DDT, but since
clothing and bedding were seldom washed or exchanged, lice were a constant feature of life for the
40th Army. Typhus and malaria were two consequences of inadequate vector control.

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Underfed Soviet
troops supplemented
their diet locally-and
met a whole host of
new germs and
viruses for which
their immune
systems were no
protection.

The water in
Afghanistan has a high
bacteria level. Despite
warnings and training,
Soviet troops often
drank untreated water.
This was often due to
failures in the Soviet
logistic system to
provide clean water to
troops at remote
locations. Sometimes, Soviet soldiers drank untreated water because they did not like the taste of
treated water and had grown up drinking water from all sources without apparent ill effects. The
untreated water often carried typhus and amoebic dysentery. The Soviets began issuing boiled water
treated with pantocides to their soldiers, and water purification points were set up at mess halls.
Cisterns were installed to store purified water, and large garrisons built pumping stations with
chlorination units.22 Despite these efforts, the Soviets were unable to guarantee adequate supplies of
clean water to their forces or ensure that troops drank it.

Basic field sanitation remained a Soviet problem throughout the war. Although field latrines were
dug and flush latrines were installed in base camps, Soviet soldiers often did not bother to use them
and relieved themselves close to the living and dining areas. The troops often did not wash their
hands after relieving themselves. Troops could shower (or visit the steam bath) weekly at base
camps, but seldom bathed in the field, resulting in hepatitis, shigellosis and other diseases.

The Soviets underestimated the amount of medical support necessary to support the 40th Army. They
were well equipped to handle the wounded, but they were unprepared to deal with large numbers of
sick soldiers. To relieve overcrowded hospitals, large numbers of their sick and wounded were
evacuated to military hospitals in the Soviet Union and in Warsaw Pact countries. They also
established an infectious disease hospital at Bagram, Afghanistan, with a rehabilitation center annex
for recovering infectious-disease patients. The Bagram Rehabilitation Center consisted of a
command element, eight companies, a medical station and a supply element. Each company had six
combat arms officers and six warrant officers to administer the program and control the patients. The
rehabilitation program included medical treatment, a 2-hour rest after dinner, five meals a day,
therapeutic physical training, vitamin therapy, psychotherapy and occupational therapy. Patients were
discharged after full recovery.23 Despite these efforts, the Soviet medical establishment was
hard-pressed to deal with the patient load resulting from disease.

After the war, the Soviets (and then the Russians) studied the US Army deployment to the Persian

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Gulf for Operation Desert Storm. Among the disease prevention measures taken by the Americans
which impressed the Russians were the supply of 80 liters of water per person per day, the wide use
of bottled water, the ration heating units on US tanks and personnel carriers, the meal ready-to-eat
(MRE) ration, the issue desert chocolate bar that can withstand 150-degree Fahrenheit without
melting and the issue field clothing and load-bearing equipment.24

In 1994, Russian military doctors recommended the following measures be taken when deploying
troops to other regions:25

Getting clean water to soldiers in the field

was a problem.

• Conduct a rate of personnel illness

forecast, taking into account the particular

environmental factors that will affect

soldiers, and then coordinate logistic,

engineer and medical support to deal with

these potential problems.

• Immunize personnel well in advance of

deployments and train them on field

sanitation practices for the new region.

• Perform advance reconnaissances of water

sources and conduct laboratory analyses

of water quality.

• Seize and protect water sources.

• Establish a system to deliver clean water

to field sites and maintain water stores on

site.

• Routinely repurify any piped water from

local city systems.

• Provide units and soldiers with water

purification tablets or filters.

• Establish reserves of bottled water.

• Plan for the early delivery of water

purification systems, such as filtration

systems, boilers and water storage

bladders.

• Stock clean water reserves for raiding parties, combat operations, security outposts and
guards.
• Train soldiers how to maintain drinking water purity and operate water purification

equipment.

• Plan and conduct environmental protection measures; ensure troops use field latrines and
dispose of garbage properly; ensure troops bathe regularly; and ensure latrines and garbage
dumps are disinfected regularly.
• Ensure troops receive regular hot meals and do not subsist on canned/packaged food for
extended periods.
• Supply battalions and companies with enough mermite-type containers to keep food hot until
it is delivered.

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• Issue multivitamins to troops immediately when redeployment orders are received.

• Supply enough equipment to each mess to store at least 20 liters of water, including 16 liters
of hot water, per person per day.
• Provide adequate sites for personnel to wash their mess kits.
• Monitor prepared food portions to ensure that soldiers receive their full ration.26
• Routinely issue clean underwear and bedding.
• Build a steam bath for every battalion, separate company or platoon.
• Enforce scheduled troop bathing.
• Regularly inspect for lice and disinfect when necessary.
• Disinfect the site within 3 hours whenever soldiers with infectious diseases are discovered.
• Immediately isolate soldiers with infectious disease and hospitalize them within 24 hours.
• Maintain sufficient contingency stocks of immunuglobulins, vaccines, anatoxins and
antibiotics to protect all personnel prior to deployment, while deploying, during combat and
during convalescence.

The Soviet army in the field was never a particularly clean army. However, in a European peacetime
environment, this was not much of a problem. Most of the soldiers had natural immunities to many
of the local diseases, and the command never had to pay a price for sick soldiers. Soldiers were
cheap and plentiful. This was not the case in Afghanistan where every soldier was necessary and in
short supply. The Soviet 40th Army began to pay the price for years of neglect and poor field craft
and hygiene. The Soviets were unable to logistically support the large army they felt they needed to
successfully prosecute the war in Afghanistan. Their inability to effectively control infectious disease
drastically cut into their present-for-duty strength. Accordingly, combat units were often
understrength by a third of their authorized strength, resulting in two-company battalions and
two-battalion regiments due to disease and other problems.

One reason the Soviets could not control infectious disease was their lack of a professional NCO
corps. Soviet NCOs were conscripts who had attended a special six-month course. They had no
moral or actual power over their fellow soldiers. The business of discipline, inspection and enforcing
standards fell on the platoon leader-a junior lieutenant. He personally had to ensure that all his troops
were lice-free, washed their hands, drank clean water, disposed of their trash properly, prepared food
correctly and dug and used latrines. He was also responsible for maintenance, training and combat.
Without NCOs, the lieutenant was unable to accomplish all his duties correctly, resulting in lack of
adequate field sanitation.

The Soviets received brutal lessons in Afghanistan on the importance of diet, physical conditioning,
pure water, field sanitation, vector control and adequate medical support. Yet, the heir to the Soviet
army-the Russian army-has not learned these lessons or taken them to heart. In 1988, Soviet soldiers
were rushed into Armenia to provide earthquake relief. Their poor food and lack of field sanitation
and clean clothing resulted in mass illnesses that required "rescuing many of the rescuers." In 1989,
the Soviet Kostroma Airborne Regiment, the Akhalkalaki Motorized Rifle Regiment and the
Kutaisi Air Assault Brigade moved into Tbilisi, Georgia, to put down rioting. The troops had one
or no changes of underwear for an extended tour.27

In 1992, the Russian 14th Army fought in Tirasapol, Moldova. Only the brevity of the combat
prevented a serious outbreak of disease from a lack of clean water for drinking and cooking. In 1992,
the Russian 201st MRD deployed to the border between Afghanistan and Tadjikistan to help guard
the border of this newly independent republic against the mujahidin. In the rush to get forces
forward to the border, the command again neglected to establish sanitary mess halls and field mess

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facilities and to provide adequate, pure water for drinking and washing. As a result, viral hepatitis,
intestinal infections and malaria mowed down the 201st MRD and filled hospital wards with entire
squads and gun crews.28 Reports from Chechnya indicate that disease is again a limiting factor in
the number of troops the Russians can deploy.

In recent years, the US Army has had an excellent record of disease prevention, field sanitation and
disease control. However, as the United States conducts foreign policy by membership in
multinational alliances, the chances increase that the US Army will have allies whose record in field
sanitation and disease prevention is similar to the Soviets. US Army medical professionals could find
themselves providing medical support to these allied forces. If so, the US Army medical community
will need to prepare to fight epidemics, not isolated cases.MR

1. The overall health of US Armed Forces in Somalia was excellent. The endemic diseases in
Somalia were high, yet the weekly rate of disease and nonbattle injuries was approximately 11.5
percent, with a 0.5 percent hospitalization rate. Expected medical problems with diarrhea and heat
injuries were minimal. Only 72 cases of Malaria were recorded. This excellent health record can be
attributed to food and water control, command emphasis on heat injury prevention, aggressive field
sanitation, a program for protecting personnel from mosquitos and disease surveillance, rapid
diagnosis and early treatment. US Army Medical Department Archives, Somalia-Operation Restore
Hope D +70 (Summary), http://139.232.160.63/lessons/Archived/11002139.htm.
2. This article is an adaption of "Medical Support in Counter-Guerrilla War: Epidemiologic Lessons
Learned in the Soviet-Afghan War," U.S. Army Medical Department Journal (March-April
1995).
3. Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1934), 165.
4. The Soviet Afghanistan invasion on 25 December 1979, thrust Soviet ground forces into the
middle of a civil war to fight a guerrilla enemy on some of the roughest terrain on earth. Their vain
attempt to prop up an unpopular Marxist regime ended with complete withdrawal by 15 February
1989. Discontent with the Soviet leadership's handling of the Afghanistan War was a major cause
leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, the fighting continues but no longer
between Afghan communists and Afghan Muslims. Now, the various Afghan resistance groups are
fighting one another for control of this dry, mountainous South Asian land.
5. G.F. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti snyat [The secret seal is removed] (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1993), 401-5. In the original, the figures are given as 415,932 hospitalized for disease, including
115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis, 31,080 cases of typhoid fever and 140,665 cases of other
disease. This leaves 128,889 cases or 39.99 percent of the total unaccounted for. We added the
128,889 to the 140,665 figure.
6. V.S. Perepelkin, V.F. Korol'kov, V.F. Kolkov, V.A. Mandrik and P.N. Ogarkov, "Uroki bor'by s
kishechnymi infektsiyami v period voyny v Afganistane" [Lessons in the struggle with intestinal
infections during the war in Afghanistan], Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal [Military medical
journal, hereafter VMZ] (July 1991), 27-31.
7. V.T. Ivashkin, "Opyt organizatsii meditsinskoy pomoshchi bol'nym 40-i armii v Afganistane" [The
experience of the medical care to the sick servicemen of the 40th Army in Afghanistan], VMZ
(November 1992), 13.
8. Perepelkin, 28. What is missing from Figure 2 is typhoid fever. According to official statistics,
typhoid fever accounted for 7.47 percent of infectious cases, yet it is not reflected in this figure. It is
probably included in the upper respiratory category.
9. KGB was the Committee for Government Security. Their duties included intelligence,
counterintelligence, prison camp administration and border guards. They also fielded a potent field

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force. The KGB role in Afghanistan was supporting the Afghan equivalent-the KHAD-and manning
border guard posts within Afghanistan. The Ministry of Internal Security (MVD) was a large armed
force that ran prison camps, provided crowd control and antiriot forces and performed rear-area
security in wartime. The Soviets advised the Afghan Combat Police-the Sarandoy.
10. Boris V. Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent [Limited contingent] (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1994), 275. Figure 2 only shows hospitalized personnel with hepatitis, so those confined
to quarters with the disease are not shown. The 5th Motorized Rifle Division, roughly one-fifth of
the Soviet 40th Army's total strength, exceeded the annual rate for hepatitis in two months. Thus, the
official statistics, although staggering, are on the low side.
11. E.A. Nechaev, "Meditsinskaya reabilitatsiya uchastnikov voyn i lokal'nykh vooruzhennykh
konfliktov" [Medical rehabilitation of veterans of wars and local conflicts], VMZ (February 1994), 5.
12. Perepelkin, 29.
13. V.F. Korol'kov, P.I. Ogarkov, and V.A. Mandrik, "Profilaktika kishechnykh antroponozov sredi
lichnogo sostava" [Prophylaxis of intestinal anthroponoses in servicemen], VMZ (April-May 1992),
73.
14. Perepelkin, 29.
15. V.V. Zakurdaev, "Kharakter patologii organov dykhaniya u voennoclyzhashchikh v usloviyak
Afganistana" [Traits of respiratory system pathology in servicemen in Afghanistan], VMZ (June
1992), 39.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid, 40.
20. Dry rations are similar to the old US Army C ration. There were three types of dry rations: a can
of meat, crackers or toast, jam and a tea bag; two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal; or a can of meat
and a can of vegetables or fruit.
21. Perepelkin, 30.
22. I. Konyshev and A. Grib, "Opyt, kotoryy nichemu ne uchit" [Experience which teaches nothing],
Armeyskiy sbornik [Army assembly] (August 1994), 36.
23. Y.V. Nemytin and V.V. Boldyrev, "Organizatsiya reabilitatsii infektsionnykh bol'nykh pri
mnogokratnoy peregruzke gospitaley" [Rehabilitation management of infectious patients in
overcrowded hospitals], VMZ (April-May 1992), 38-39.
24. Ibid, 38.
25. Ibid, 39.
26. Theft and resale of soldiers' food has a long history in the Russian and Soviet armies.
27. The Soviet (and Russian) army issues three sets of underwear per soldier. Theoretically, the
soldier wears one set, one set is held in regimental stores and one set is at the division laundry point.
Underwear is supposed to be changed once a week, but due to shortages, losses and breakdowns in
the supply system, the soldier often wears his single set of underwear for months at a time. The
situation with uniforms is not much better. The soldier has one field/work uniform and pair of boots.
He wears these continually for six months. When he washes his uniform, he wears it damp the next
day.
28. Konyshev, 36-37.

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military
Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El
Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and
General Staff College (CGSC), the US Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and

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the US Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental
United States (CONUS), Europe and Vietnam, including deputy director, Center for Army Tactics,
and chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, CGSC; political and economic adviser, Headquarters,
Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow. His
article "Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock" appeared in the May-June 1997 issue of
Military Review.

Major William A. Jorgensen, US Army Reserve, is assistant professor of Clinical Medicine, State
University of New York College of Health Sciences, Syracuse, New York. He received a B.S. from
Saint Bonaventure University and a D.O. from the University of Health Sciences College of
Osteopathic Medicine. After completing his family medicine residency at Womack Army Hospital,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he served as the Primary Care and Community Medicine department
chief at Munson Army Community Hospital, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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Prompt Deterrence: The Army

in Kuwait
by Major General Leon J. LaPorte, US Army, and
Major MaryAnn B. Cummings, US Army
Iraqi armored forces maneuver toward the Kuwaiti border. Air defense systems are
activated. Aircraft begin violating the UN-imposed no-fly zone over southern Iraq.
Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian military forces go on high-alert status. International
news agencies report increased tension and possible terrorist activities within the
region. US embassies in the region issue travel advisories and warnings to
Americans. In short, peace and stability within the Persian Gulf region are
threatened.

In the summer of 1990, this scenario eventually led to war between coalition forces and Iraq.
However, when these conditions were repeated in the fall of 1995 and 1996, Iraqi forces quickly
retreated, redeployed back to their garrisons and the Hussein government complied with restrictions
imposed at the Persian Gulf War's end. What accounts for the difference? What achieved such
effective deterrence this time? Was it diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions? The simple
answer: it was an armored brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division (Cav Div), Fort Hood, Texas,
backed by other joint team members, poised 25 kilometers south of Iraq's border and ready to fight in
September 1996.

Within six short days of being alerted, the 1st Cav Div deployed 3,000 trained and ready soldiers to
man fully loaded MlAl tanks, M2A2 infantry fighting vehicles, 155mm self-propelled Paladin
howitzers, multiple-launch rocket systems and Bradley Stinger air defense systems, along with the
requisite supply, maintenance and medical support structure into Kuwait. The US Army, supported
by US Air Force strategic deployment assets, resolved a potential crisis quietly and restored the
peace by the most compelling influence our nation has always possessed-American soldiers on the
ground, well led, trained, equipped and ready to fight.

The strategic significance of moving 3,000 "First Team" troopers 9,000 miles from Fort Hood should
not be underestimated. "America lives up to its commitments and stands by its friends. The 1st Cav
Div is the unit that's just put the iron into that commitment," said US Ambassador to Kuwait Ryan
Clark Crocker. Nor can the emotional value of the prompt arrival of a combat-ready, heavily armored
and modernized force be ignored. "There's a lot of Kuwaitis who will sleep better tonight knowing
the 1st Cavalry Division is here," said Crocker.

Implementing Force Projection Strategy

Such a capability was unimaginable six years ago. In fact, the contrast is astounding. When Iraq
invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, the same armored brigade took almost six weeks to deploy to
Saudi Arabia by air and sea, integrate soldiers with equipment and ammunition, deploy to tactical

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assembly areas and stand ready for combat. This deployment transformation signifies that our Army
has become the capability of choice to impose the will of our nation and create the deterrent effect
required by our post-Cold War national military strategy (NMS)-a strategy of force projection.

Reducing the time to put a powerful, combined arms brigade in northern Kuwait in six days instead
of six weeks required extraordinary change and investment. The Army changed its doctrine, training
strategy and combat training centers and invested in standard deployment containers and air, rail and
sea force-projection platforms. Equally important, Army leaders pre-positioned equipment in
strategically important theaters-both on the ground and at sea. And despite the drawdown, the Army
invested in recruiting, retaining the best soldiers America has ever had.

Due to NMS changes, US forces have expected and maintained an increased operations tempo in
military exercises and overseas commitments. Regional conflicts and threats to our vital interests
have provided opportunities to demonstrate the Army's power-projection capability. The two 1st Cav
Div deployments are examples of this unique ability to respond to Iraqi aggression. But deployments
like this do not happen overnight. Commitment to warfighting readiness at all echelons is critical to
maintaining an unparalleled deterrent capability. Nationally, resourcing the force in personnel,
equipment and facilities remains vitally important and is at the forefront of defense issues. Retaining
and accessing top-quality soldiers is our Army's true edge over other forces. American soldiers are
tactically and technically proficient and able to operate technologically advanced weapon systems.
Smart, innovative and dedicated soldiers are America's prompt deterrent edge.

Investments over the past 10 years have paid large dividends in force modernization, providing our
nation with the most lethal fighting force in the world today. The latest Abrams main battle tank, the
M1A2, is unmatched. Joined by the improved Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Paladin howitzers
and enhanced communications, intelligence and support capability, US combined arms teams send a
powerful global deterrent message.

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1st Cavalry Division soldiers load duffel bags and

personal equipment for transport to tactical
assembly areas 25 kilometers south of the Iraqi
border.

Investments in large installations across the United

States created power-projection platforms, leveraging
technological advances while reducing base operations.
Under III Corps command, the 1st Cav Div moves
personnel and equipment via air from Robert Gray
Army Airfield, which can handle C-5 aircraft and all
commercial airliners. Beaumont, Texas, within 5 hours
driving time, provides port facilities capable of loading
the division's equipment, vehicles and weapon systems
on fast sealift ships bound for worldwide deployments.
For sea movements and training rotations at the
National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin,
California, Fort Hood's rail system can transport the
division's equipment anywhere in the United States.

III Corps maintains essential facilities for quickly

projecting overwhelming combat power to a threatened
area. Soldier processing stations, medical and dental clinics, clothing and equipment issue points and
legal assistance centers are critical for 1st Cav Div troops to upload aircraft within hours of being
alerted.

To quickly and efficiently move this force, procedures, training tasks and even containers
transporting logistics and equipment had to be standardized. Adopting common-use containers,
adaptable for any aircraft, eased the last-minute preparations to accommodate available space.

Pegasus Strike
At the division level, warfighting readiness is the daily focus and includes many factors affecting the
military force. Leaders must balance increasing demands on their soldiers: individual-, crew- and
unit-level training; equipment maintenance, meeting family commitments and developing leaders.

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Division leaders welcome 1st Brigade Combat Team

task force soldiers to Kuwait in September 1996 in
response to Iraqi "saber rattling."

Given the potential for worldwide deployment, the 1st

Cav Div established an operational paradigm, dubbed
Pegasus Strike, to standardize procedures. Pegasus
Strike, a doctrinally based concept, integrates the
division mission and mission-essential task list (METL)
with probable contingency operations. It specifically
addresses tasks associated with all phases of moving a
force from home station to a theater of operations.
Organized in five phases, Pegasus Strike creates a
common situational awareness for all division leaders
and soldiers, establishing where they are in the process
and what needs to be done as follows:

• Pegasus Point deals with mobilization and

deployment, and includes tasks affiliated with

receiving Reserve or other nondivisional forces

into Fort Hood to augment 1st Brigade Combat

Team (BCT) task forces (TFs).

• Pegasus Landing identifies requirements within the theater of operations, specifically

reception, staging, onward movement and integration, including drawing pre-positioned
equipment and liaison with other forces.
• Pegasus Fury is the division's tactical guidelines for conducting combat operations.
• Pegasus Calm outlines postconflict operations.
• Pegasus Recoil defines redeployment and demobilization requirements.

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During training exercises in Kuwait, soldiers built

live-fire ranges and established maneuver lanes
across hundreds of miles of open desert. This
environment, unlike any in the United States,
afforded a heavily armored force the space needed to
conduct brigade-size combined arms operations.

Lessons learned from previous deployments and

exercises are routinely incorporated into the Pegasus
Strike model to reflect the most efficient and effective
operating procedures. Pegasus Strike is used within
the 1st BCT for all deployments, whether it is 2,500
soldiers to NTC or a battalion TF of 1,200 to Kuwait.
The procedures remain the same-only the plane tickets
change.

Standardized procedures for contingency forces cannot

be overemphasized. When the 1st Cav Div received the
call for an additional 3,000 soldiers for Kuwait, the 1st
BCT was at Fort Irwin conducting live-fire and
maneuver operations against the specially trained
opposing force. Division soldiers providing wartime
logistic, security, signal and fire support accompanied the infantry, armor and artillery to practice in
peacetime the methods employed in war.

Continuing force modernization efforts, the 2d Brigade was at Fort Hood preparing MlAl Abrams
tanks for turn-in prior to receiving the upgraded M1A2s. Additionally, the 4th Aviation Brigade led
the division's role in a deployment readiness exercise involving the loading of railcars for movement
to Beaumont. A company's worth of equipment was inspected, moved by rail and uploaded onto a
ship at the port. The brigade also flew Apache helicopters to Beaumont to be "shrink-wrapped" and
loaded aboard ship.

While awaiting the final order to deploy, the 3d Brigade continued its scheduled training, including a
division motor pool realignment maximizing maintenance facilities. Continuing training was
indicative of the command emphasis on warfighting preparedness. When soldiers are assigned to the
1st BCT, they receive medical, dental, legal and logistic "check-ups," validating their short-notice
deployability. Consequently, last-minute "readiness processing" is minimized.

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Aggressive, realistic training develops soldiers who are confident in themselves, their
equipment and their leaders.

Within hours of the division receiving the movement order to Kuwait, the initial flights departed
Robert Gray Army Airfield. Upon arrival in Kuwait, leaders and soldiers were briefed, drew
equipment, loaded ammunition and moved into the Kuwaiti desert within 25 kilometers of the Iraqi
border. From aircraft "wheels down" until the soldiers arrived in their training positions, only 6 hours
had elapsed. Subsequent flights followed similar procedures, arriving in the desert within hours after
touchdown at Kuwaiti International airport.

Practice Makes Perfect

More recently, the 1st Cav Div continued setting records in force projection. TFs arrived in Kuwait,
following Pegasus Strike procedures, further reducing time from touchdown to training area
arrival. Continually participating in exercises and training rotations away from home station gives
the division trained, ready leaders and soldiers. Current reassignment policies, professional
development courses and soldier taskings overseas create a turbulent personnel population. Frequent
training opportunities drastically reduce the impact of personnel turbulence.

With the NMS reliance on power projection for any possible contingency, the importance of these
exercises cannot be overstated. As soldiers and leaders board aircraft bound for Kuwait, you can see
in their eyes the confidence they have in themselves, their equipment and their leaders. You can only
get that from aggressive training in realistic environments and frequent opportunities. Confident
soldiers are successful on the battlefield.

The 1st Cav Div maximizes every event to challenge leaders and soldiers in realistic scenarios. We

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use NTC rotations to replicate likely contingency operations conditions. Recently, during respective
training rotations, the 1st and 2d Brigades deployed to Fort Irwin with a limited number of railcars.
The specific number correlated to available space on aircraft in potential real-world contingencies.
This forced leaders to decide which assets to deploy from home station and which assets could be
drawn from stocks at NTC.

Decisions requiring flexibility and initiative are common when military forces respond to
contingency operations. Force protection measures, intelligence-gathering capabilities and basic
life-support systems for soldiers in the harshest conditions are just a few of the challenges leaders
face in environments far from home base. Leaders must have visibility on pre-positioned warfighting
stocks, both afloat with the merchant marine and in host nation (HN) warehouses in operational
theaters. Consequently, the division monitors the maintenance and availability data of all
pre-positioned contingency equipment.

During exercises in Kuwait, commanders determined training schedules, built live-fire ranges and
established maneuver lanes across hundreds of miles of open desert. This environment, unlike any in
the United States, afforded a heavily armored force the space needed to conduct brigade-size
combined arms operations.

The combination of dedicated facilities, Pegasus Strike and, most important, routine training
exercises in Kuwait, Korea and NTC, were at the heart of 1st BCT's success in twice deploying
brigade combat teams on short notice to Kuwait. Those factors are the building blocks for the Army
to continue to be the most modern, lethal force in the world.

Promoting stability and thwarting aggression are key to our NMS. The Army's contribution to that
strategy, the ability to quickly and decisively place on-the-ground combat fire and maneuver power,
is unparalleled in history. Just as impressive is the Army's flexibility to conduct operations across the
continuum-from rapid deployment and power projection through decisive combat and defense
cooperation and security assistance.

Engagement Operations
Those military activities overseas which fall short of armed conflict and provide benefits beyond just
demonstrating our national commitment and deterrent capability are termed engagement
operations. By training with other nations, all participating military forces get better. US soldiers
improve because they are trained on specific mission-related tasks in a possible contingency theater
of operation. They are also training side-by-side with forces likely to form a coalition within the
region. Other nations' forces improve because of the increased training opportunities, the exposure to
other tactics and technologies and a chance to train with their likely coalition partners. An enhanced
deterrent posture of the HN's military, which contributes to overall regional stability, is also a
significant, yet sometimes overlooked, by-product of these events. We must acknowledge these
critical strategy changes and continue to build for the future. Engagement operations also help
influence the international environment in a manner consistent with broader US political and
economic interests.

Today's Army leaders and soldiers possess the training, equipment and readiness to demonstrate our
nation's resolve. It was manifested in the 1st Cav Div's performance in Kuwait-prompt deterrence
was a reality. However, this capability only exists as long as we dedicate the resources and the
commitment to maintain it. Nothing deters an aggressor more than facing fully loaded armored

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vehicles manned by trained and ready US soldiers. This capability, however, is a fragile commodity.
Without the full complement of resources, prompt deterrence will fade into history. We know this
and, most important, so do the nations of the world-friend and foe.MR

Major General Leon J. LaPorte is commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He received
a B.A. from the University of Rhode Island and an M.S. from the University of California. He is also
a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Army War College.
He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States,
including commander, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; chief of staff, III Corps and
Fort Hood; commander, 3d Brigade, Fort Hood; and chief of staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood.
His article "Terrain Visualization," coauthored with Colonel David F. Melcher appeared in the
September-October 1997 issue of Military Review.

Major MaryAnn B. Cummings is public affairs officer (PAO), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. She
received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.M.A.S. from CGSC. She has served in a
variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, to include
provost marshal, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; PAO, Fort McClellan, Alabama; chief instructor, Law
Enforcement Training, US Army Military Police (MP) School, Fort McClellan; and commander,
59th MP Company, Pirmasens, Germany.

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Restructuring the Engineer

Initiative
by Brigadier General Richard E. Coleman, US Army Reserve;
Colonel David F. Melcher, US Army; Colonel Robert L. Shirron,
US Army; and Colonel Gilbert L. Van Sickle, US Army Reserve
The single greatest improvement in the heavy division in the past ten years has been the addition of
an Engineer Brigade that gives the appropriate level of command and control for engineer forces
across the battlefield.1

-US Army Retired General Richard E. Cavazos, March 1997

The Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI) in the late 1980s created an engineer brigade headquarters
with three mechanized combat engineer battalions in a heavy division. This was a return to a concept
that had been battle tested many times in our history. Engineers fought in engineer brigades during
World War II, Korea and the Persian Gulf War, where the ERI was validated. Our NATO allies have
also adopted similar organizations for engineer command and control (C2), some with even greater
division engineer capability.2 Today's heavy division is a mobility-oriented force focused on speed,
lethality and seizure of the initiative to defeat the enemy's center of gravity. Mobility is the key
word, and the maneuver commander gets mobility two ways: from the engineer battalion habitually
associated with the brigade combat team (BCT); and by augmentation from engineers at division,
corps and echelons above corps, which are normally under the control of the division engineer
brigade headquarters.

2d Infantry Division
maneuver elements
cross the Namhan
River on a bridge
constructed by the
50th Engineers during
TEAM SPIRIT 93.

Over the past five years,

National Training
Center (Fort Irwin,
California) rotations
have shown that the ERI
concept improves
training relationships
and integration of
engineer battalions into
the BCT. It is clearly the
way to fight because it enhances training, teamwork and cohesion. The same principle applies to the

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linkage between the division and its engineer brigade headquarters. This was illustrated again during
the Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercises commonly known as warfighters.
In March 1997, the 1st Cavalry Division (Cav Div) executed a warfighter exercise set in a Korean
scenario. With over 8,000 engineers spread throughout the division's battlespace, this training
exercise validated the present ERI structure as a highly effective C2 means for engineers across the
battlefield and provided the commander with appropriate expertise and advice to fight and win in an
extremely challenging theater of operations.

However, as the Army moves toward Force XXI, the division redesign proposes to eliminate the
engineer brigade headquarters from the heavy division. This concept was tested November 1997 in a
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (ID[M]) Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). This
article's purpose is to describe current ERI benefits that were tested in a recent 1st Cav Div
WARFIGHTER Exercise, to highlight potential problems with the Force XXI redesign and to propose a
new structure that might retain the best features of both while continuing to provide appropriate
levels of C2 for maneuver support functions.

ERI Engineer Brigade

Exercises continually demonstrate the requirement for a habitually associated division engineer C2
headquarters. The focus on greater fidelity of terrain analysis and increased mobility in warfare
demands a C2 organization for engineers that trains and interacts with division leaders and units
throughout the year. That C2 node is the ERI engineer brigade headquarters, a 57-person
organization that is the lowest overhead brigade-level headquarters in the division. Engineer
success during lst Cav's warfighter in March 1997 was based on engineers' ability to influence every
aspect of the battlefield, including C2, mobility along main supply routes (MSRs), terrain
visualization, mobility and breaching support to maneuver elements and river-crossing operations.
Engineer representation in every division command post (CP) was the key to this ability.
Furthermore, engineer liaison officers (LNOs) were attached to the division artillery (DIVARTY),
aviation brigade and air defense artillery battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs). Although these
LNOs were "taken out of hide" by the engineer brigade, they produced excellent engineer staff
planning for task-organized engineer assets, particularly in the area of key asset survivability. The
division-level engineer headquarters consisted of the division engineer brigade headquarters,
manning a TOC, tactical command post (TAC) and armored division equivalent (ADE).

The division was augmented by the 937th Engineer Group, consisting of a robust contingent of corps
engineers from the 420th Engineer Brigade (Corps). The force was tailored to enable the division to
sustain momentum as the corps main effort. Other corps units were operating immediately to the rear
of the division, maintaining MSRs and lines of communication (LOC) into the division. The total
engineer force under division control consisted of eight engineer battalions and 17 separate
companies-more than 8,000 soldiers total-operating throughout the entire sector's depth. This effort's
synchronization was complex, getting engineers to the critical place at the critical time and ensuring
efforts in the division's rear area were supporting the fight at the forward line of own troops (FLOT)
and ensuring that the corps engineer effort behind the division was directed to the division objective.
This difficult task required an experienced senior engineer who was close to the division
commander's decision-making process and capable of orchestrating the multiple echelons of engineer
activity in the division area.

During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, the engineer brigade commander
and staff proved invaluable in developing terrain visualization products to allow the division

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commander to "see the terrain" and its potential impacts on both friendly and enemy forces. At each
step of the decision-making process, engineer brigade terrain visualization products were considered
when templating enemy artillery positions, planning logistic flow, anticipating movement rates and
positioning key weapon systems. These products were also pushed to brigade level and below to
allow maneuver commanders to better visualize their battlespace.

Tracking, reporting, communicating and coordinating with this large engineer force fell to the ADE
cell. This was an extremely difficult task, requiring the addition of four officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) simply to keep up with current operations and deep planning.
They could not have performed this task without the engineer brigade providing the C2 and
decision-making functions.

The division of responsibility for the engineer C2 functions supporting the division fight was critical
to the engineer effort's success. The ADE provided engineer input to deep operations and future
planning, the brigade S3 conducted current operations decision making from the engineer TAC and
the brigade executive officer (XO) executed battle tracking and support operations from the engineer
TOC. These support operations consisted of interfacing with the G1, G4 and Division Support
Command (DISCOM) for replacement personnel and equipment, with terrain analysis by the
engineer brigade S2 section to assist ADE future planning.

The engineer brigade command group synchronized all aspects of engineering that occurred during
the warfighter. The commander provided additional interface between the division commander and
the corps engineers as well as to subordinate engineer battalion commanders, ensuring the division
commander's intent was understood and supported by all. Interaction by the engineer brigade
commander is absolutely vital in defensive preparations to ensure that subordinate commanders'
obstacle belts and groups are synchronized to meet the division commander's intent in the overall
fight. Leadership interface also was extremely important during the preparation phase for multiple
river-crossing operations. The brigade commander was able to exert additional influence with the
corps engineers in obtaining additional river-crossing assets and in synchronizing river-crossing
rehearsal and execution.

Based on regions where we are likely to fight, we can expect to perform multiple river-crossing
operations. It is no secret that an engineer brigade headquarters or group headquarters is a likely
candidate to perform the duties of crossing force headquarters. Part of this requires establishing
effective engineer C2 in the crossing area-on the ground. This also requires task organizing the
appropriate mix of engineers for each of the river-crossing forces. These and other vital functions can
only be handled by engineer C2 mechanisms with the manpower and experience to concurrently run
multiple division C2 nodes and river-crossing cells.

The brigade commander synchronizes the efforts of engineers distributed across the entire battlefield.
The engineer group commander focuses on the division's rear area, which includes survivability for
high-payoff targets and MSR maintenance and construction. The division engineer brigade
commander focuses on the main battle area. Commanders could then maintain flexibility to move to
the point of the engineer main effort or to point of decision making while C2 nodes executed the
routine tracking, planning and decision making required at the engineer TOC and the division TAC,
main and rear CPs.

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During the 17th

annual TEAM SPIRIT
training exercise,
several river crossings
were conducted on the
Han and Namhan
rivers. With several
thousand engineers
operating in theater,
com-mand and control
of engineer assets was
a distinct challenge for
the Engineer Brigade
commander.

Force XXI
Redesign
The newly proposed "F" table of organization and equipment (TOE) for engineers in heavy divisions
drastically changes the C2 arrangements just described by removing the 57-soldier engineer brigade
headquarters and replacing it with a 29-soldier element, that is essentially an augmented ADE cell at
division level, led by an engineer lieutenant colonel who has not yet commanded a battalion. The
senior engineer will most likely be the colonel engineer commander from a corps engineer group,
which has not habitually trained with the division. The group commander will have to quickly learn
the operating procedures of the division and understand the tactical standing operating procedure.
More important, the group commander will have to build a relationship with the division commander
and his staff, maneuver commanders and all engineer battalion commanders that will be assigned to
the division prior to operations. This is a dilemma the group commander associates with the 4th ID
(M)'s upcoming AWE.

The issue is C2 with emphasis on command. The proposed engineer support organization in heavy
divisions is inadequate to support the C2 requirements of the large numbers of battalions and
separate companies that will be task organized to support a heavy division. A division engineer staff
officer is not a commander but an adviser to the commander. A commander is required to set
priorities for engineer-specific activities, as well as have accessibility to the division commander,
maneuver commanders and engineer battalion commanders.

During the 1st Cav Div Warfighter Exercise in March 1997, the engineer brigade commander was
responsible for eight engineer battalions and 17 separate companies. The engineer brigade was also
augment-ed with an engineer group to provide added control for the large number of engineer
elements. While the division engineer still had responsibility for engineer operations throughout the
entire division battlespace, the group commander focused primarily on the division rear and MSRs
for-ward to the ever-advancing engineer work line. This relationship worked very well, with the
division engineer focusing primarily on the deep and close fights, and the group commander focusing
on the rear fight.

The assumption that a newly arrived engineer group can provide adequate engineer C2 to a division
preparing to conduct combat operations does not pass the "common sense test" any more than if we

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assumed an incoming corps artillery brigade could replace the organic DIVARTY in the heavy
division. In peacetime, a corps engineer group may not even have C2 over engineer battalions. Often,
the engineer group has garrison command requirements and manages ordnance companies, adjutant
general detachments, military police (MP) companies, flight detachments or transportation
companies, which often precludes training on warfighting missions. The engineer brigade
headquarters assigned to the division brings a number of critical functions to the fight. The brigade
XO and S4 achieve tremendous economies of scale in maintenance and supply issues surrounding a
diversified and aging fleet of M60 armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs), armored combat
earthmovers (ACEs), mine clearing line charges (MICLICs) and small emplacement excavators
(SEEs). The brigade S2 works with division to augment the division's intelligence about engineers as
well as augment the battalions' ability to conduct any type of IPB. Currently, there is no
battalion-level military intelligence capability beyond the S2/S3 officers and NCOs. Additionally, the
brigade S3 standardizes training and operating procedures among the three division engineer
battalions. This is an enormously important task that the division-level lieutenant colonel engineer
will not be able to handle and a task that an engineer group headquarters cannot influence until the
task organization occurs. By then, it is far too late.

There are two other reasons this proposed arrangement is infeasible. First, in certain theaters,
engineer units are programmed for augmentation to the division, but an engineer group is not.
Examples might include Southwest Asia, peacekeeping operations or humanitarian relief missions.
In these types of operations, without an engineer group, who will have C2 of these engineer assets,
which will operate primarily at division level? The answer is that they could easily be controlled and
commanded by the engineer brigade commander already in the force. This was made perfectly clear
by the Army's Bosnia experience where the 1st Armored Division Engineer Brigade commander
commanded and controlled thousands of engineer forces that were task organized to the division
without an engineer group. Without the organic engineer brigade headquarters, these key assets
would have been ill-utilized.

Second, common communications and force modernization equipment are key to C2 for a
rapid-deployment heavy division and its engineer headquarters. An organic engineer brigade
headquarters is equipped with the same communications equipment and force modernization
measures as the maneuver elements in the division. The engineer group that arrives to provide the
heavy division commander the C2 effort may very well arrive with inadequate communications
equipment that must now be used to establish a relationship with a commander it can not even talk
to. Before we should consider the engineer group as the primary headquarters for division C2, the
Army would have to make a huge modernization effort for its engineer groups supporting the 1st Cav
Div and 3d ID, the Army's rapid-deployment heavy forces.

A Proposal
We need not regress as a branch to pre-ERI days. If it is time to "restructure the initiative," let us
replace the engineer brigade with a maneuver support brigade (MSB), commanded by an engineer
colonel. This brigade, organic to a heavy division and similar in size to the current ERI brigade,
would consist of three engineer battalions, one chemical company and one MP company.

An MSB made up of engineers, MP and chemical branches is not a new concept. These branches
make up the mobility/survivability battlefield operating system and have common battlefield goals
and missions. In fact, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is presently
establishing the Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where engineer,

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chemical and MP branch training will be consolidated. These branches have a natural synergy,
because engineers and MPs synchronize efforts to maintain mobility along MSRs and both are key
players in river crossings as well as breaching operations. Personnel and equipment decontamination
combines chemical branch expertise with engineer branch assets to prepare and clean up established
decontamination sites and monitor main and alternate supply routes. Smoke operations are also
closely synchronized with engineer assets during breaching operations. These three Army branches
are critical on today's battlefield and these assets' synchronization can best be served by a single C2
structure at brigade level. Further, this proposed brigade promotes relationship building prior to
hitting the ground when time is critical. Its role would be to provide the same engineer C2 functions
as the current engineer brigade, but it would also synchronize other combat multipliers' efforts in the
organization within all the division's C2 nodes. Since most soldiers and assets in the MSB will be
engineers, the brigade commander should also be an engineer.

Soldiers from the 50th

Engineer Bridge
Company release the
interior bay of an
assault floating bridge
during a river crossing
exercise.

Let us not forget the

myriad of other
real-world contingency
missions that the MSB
headquarters may be
called upon to lead in
the future. The 1st Cav
Div Engineer Brigade
functions as the
reception, staging,
onward movement and integration (RSOI) headquarters. This was successfully demonstrated in
Exercise Foal Eagle, when the brigade headquarters deployed to Korea to support the RSOI of an
armored brigade headquarters and balanced task force into the Korean theater. This could be
accomplished when and if the division deploys to draw pre-positioned equipment from Army War
Reserves. An MSB would be ideal for this mission due to its organic MP assets. Additionally, the
MSB headquarters would be able to deploy to conduct independent operations for other
contingencies such as fire-fighting missions in the western United States, disaster relief operations,
drug enforcement missions for Joint Task Force-6 in Texas, assisting nations in various commander
in chief (CINC) areas of interest, combating terrorism and peacekeeping operations similar to the US
effort in Bosnia.

It is axiomatic that C2 of maneuver support elements is a vital component of future division design.
An MSB headquarters commanded by an engineer colonel will standardize operations among the
engineer, chemical and MP assets that support the BCT, as well as provide additional C2-specifically
command-required by the division during peacetime training and wartime operations. The brigade
commander's overall leadership transcends the warfighting aspects of the mission: he and his staff
possess the knowledge and experience to determine unique requirements beyond the capabilities of a
mere planning staff and to provide the level of advice and expertise to the division commander that

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will be essential for success on fast-paced future battlefields. This cannot be accomplished well
enough with a staff engineer element, or quickly enough by introducing an engineer group
headquarters when wartime mission execution is imminent. If modifications are deemed necessary to
the division engineer brigade, then the formation of an MSB capable of bringing all the systems
required for mobility, countermobility and survivability on the battlefield together under one
command makes good sense for the future Army.MR

1. This remark was made by US Army retired GEN Richard E. Cavazos, Battle Command Training
Program senior controller, to corps and division engineers during the engineer brigade briefing to
senior observer/controllers during the 1st Cav Div's Warfighter Exercise in March 1997.
2. According to MAJ Allan Dennis, British exchange officer and assistant division engineer for the
3d Infantry Division, this is also true of the British army, which has four combat engineer battalions
in a division equivalent with a full colonel division engineer to advise the commanding general.

Brigadier General Richard E. Coleman, US Army Reserve (USAR), is commander, 420th Engineer
Brigade, Bryan, Texas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy (USMA) and an M.S. from
Mississippi State University. He is a graduate of the Army War College and the US Army Command
and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the
Continental United States (CONUS), to include commandant, 3390th USAR School, Jackson,
Mississippi; commander, 926th Engineer Group, Montgomery, Alabama; executive officer (XO),
40th Ordnance Group, Jackson; commander, 365th Supply and Service Battalion, Jackson;
topographic staff officer, 412th Engineer Command, Vicksburg, Mississippi; assistant inspector
general 412th Engineer Command, Vicksburg; and troop operations officer, 412th Engineer
Command, Vicksburg.

Colonel David F. Melcher is commander, Engineer Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Cav Div), Fort
Hood, Texas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy (USMA), an M.B.A. from Harvard
Business School and an M.P.A. from Shippensburg University. He is also a graduate of CGSC, the
Army War College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He has served in a variety of
command and staff positions in CONUS and Alaska, including regimental tactical officer, USMA,
West Point, New York; commander, 6th Engineer Battalion, 6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort
Wainwright, Alaska; special assistant to Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, DC; XO, 13th
Engineer Battalion, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California. His article "Terrain
Visualization," coauthored with Major General Leon J. LaPorte, appeared in the
September-October 1997 issue of Military Review.

Colonel Robert L. Shirron is director, Public Works Business Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
He received a B.S. from Henderson State University and an M.S. from the University of Missouri at
Rolla. He is a graduate of the National War College and CGSC. He has served in a variety of
command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe, to include commander, 937th Engineer Group,
Fort Riley, Kansas; staff engineer, US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; commander, 588th
Engineer Battalion, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and S3, 20th Engineer Brigade, Fort Bragg.

Colonel Gilbert L. Van Sickle, US Army Reserve, is assistant III Corps Engineer, 1st Cav Div, Fort
Hood. He received a B.A. from Western Illinois University and he is a CGSC graduate. He has
served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, the Middle East and Korea, to
include commander, 478th Engineer Battalion, Fort Thomas, Kentucky; chief, Construction and
Facilities Division, Third US Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia; deputy Support Command Engineer,
US Army Forces Central Command, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; and engineer operations officer, Third

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US Army, Fort McPherson.

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Information Operations in
Bosnia
by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan, US Army, Retired,
and Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, US Army

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or
agency.-Editor

The Army's ability to use information to dominate

future battles will give the United States a new key to victory, I believe, for years, if not for generations

to come.1

-Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

Even before taking his division to Bosnia-Herzegovina in November 1996, then Major General
Montgomery C. Meigs, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) (1st ID [M]) commander, knew that
information operations (IO) would play a key role in supporting the peacekeeping (PK) mission. An
experienced field commander, Meigs was well aware of the extremely complex issues that made
Bosnia-Herzegovina a volatile area. His mission was one of the most challenging assignments a military
commander can face-use nonlethal means, if possible, to ensure that three rival ethnic groups-the Serbs,
Bosnians and Croats-continue to comply with the Dayton Peace Accords' (DPA) terms, a peace
agreement they did not fully support.

In October 1996, one month before deploying to Bosnia, Meigs asked the Land Information Warfare
Activity (LIWA) to help him develop and implement an information campaign for his area of operations.
The LIWA was established by the Department of the Army in 1995 to assist land component
commanders plan, coordinate and execute IO in joint and multinational environments.2 To perform this
mission, the LIWA maintains a personnel cadre proficient in IO. Although they routinely participate in
warfighter exercises and advanced warfighting experiments, this would be their first multinational PK
mission.

Just before Thanksgiving 1996, the LIWA sent an IO field support team (FST) to the 1st ID (M)
(Forward) headquarters in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The team worked with Meigs and his staff to
implement the first information campaign supporting a multinational PK force since the publication of
US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations. This article describes the planning
process used and discusses several important lessons learned.

The Operational Environment

Bosnia-Herzegovina has a long and turbulent history. Originally part of the Roman Empire, the area was
conquered by the Ottoman Turks and administered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These historical

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events are largely responsible for the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats adopting different religions and
developing distinct cultural backgrounds.

*When Yugoslavia disintegrated in June 1991, Serb Republic president Slobodan Miloshevich tried to
consolidate Serb territory as depicted in Figure 1. A civil war erupted. During the next four years, the
warring factions committed numerous human rights violations. This included mass killings and murder,
systematic rape, torture and other heinous crimes against humanity.3 Figure 1 illustrates the
"parcellization" of the former Yugoslavian Republic since 1991. Click for Fig 1.

In October 1995, the warring factions agreed to a cease-fire. Three months later, the presidents of
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia signed the DPA in Paris, France. Although the fighting subsided, the former
warring factions continued to mount aggressive information campaigns using disinformation, distorted
or incomplete reporting, manipulation of national and international media, public statements and
accusations, intimidation and orchestrated media events. In fact, former Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry said "Bosnia may very well be the toughest security policy issue we face today. Under Tito it was
said that Yugoslavia consisted of seven neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three
religions, two alphabets and one country."4

Mission analysis. After studying the situation, Meigs identified several high-priority "problem sets" for
his staff to focus on. The first dealt with disputed territorial issues that could easily lead to armed
conflict. These included the Brcko Arbitration Decision and the resettlement of Doboj and the Sapna
Thumb Region. The second consisted of significant issues directly related to mission success. These
included displaced persons and refugee evacuees, municipal elections, enforcement of law and order and
economic development. The commander also identified force protection as critical to overall mission
success, due to the inherent dangers of operating in this perilous environment and the potential negative
impact that an incident could have on US public opinion.

Members of the Land Information Warfare Agency FST prepare the 1st ID (M)'s information
operations annex.

Commander's intent. Next, the division commander defined his information campaign strategy. First,
he wanted to use every means at his disposal to convey information to desired audiences, such as local
politicians, military and police leaders and the general public. Second, he wanted to shape audience
behavior by influencing known pressure points. A key to this effort was emphasizing to entity military
leaders that the frequency of weapons storage site inspections is closely tied to their cooperation and
continued compliance with the DPA.

Several imperatives guided the implementation of this strategy:

Respond quickly to propaganda and disinformation.

Leverage the truth and stress peaceful cooperation.
Hold public officials accountable for their actions.

Preemptive planning process. The 1st ID (M) developed the innovative preemptive planning process
illustrated in Figure 2 to shape the battlespace. The division built a process to engage deep targets using
a mix of capabilities such as maneuver, fire support, intelligence, public affairs (PA), civil affairs (CA),
and psychological operations (PSYOP). Since the preemptive planning process included the major IO
elements, it generally mirrored the methodology described in FM 100-6, Chapter 6. Click for fig 2.

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IO plan or annex. One of the first steps was to prepare the IO Annex to the Task Force (TF) Eagle
operations order. This document served as the cornerstone for all 1st ID (M) IO activity. The annex
included data on all three ethnic groups, as well as information regarding the friendly IO mission,
commander's intent, IO goals and objectives, IO capabilities, tasks and responsibilities and risk
assessment. Separate appendixes were prepared for each problem set identified by the division
commander. Figure 3 shows the 1st ID (M) IO Annex structure. Click for fig 3.

Staff functions. The 1st ID (M) (Forward) staff was fully operational when the LIWA FST arrived in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most staff elements performing IO functions acted autonomously. To synchronize
their efforts, the 1st ID (M) chief of staff (CofS) asked the LIWA FST to manage the division's IO
program. Although doctrine gives the G3 primary staff responsibility for IO, the 1st ID (M) CofS
assumed this task because IO spanned several different staff functions. While working for the CofS, the
LIWA FST frequently interfaced with the G2 and G3 to maintain both intelligence and operations
situational awareness. They also interfaced with staff elements not normally found at division level, to
include a political adviser (POLAD) and the Joint Military Commission (JMC). Figure 4 shows the
division's key IO players and their primary functions. Click for fig 4.

Commander's decision support group (DSG). The 1st ID (M) established a DSG to advise the
commander on operational issues. Although not designed specifically for IO, the DSG reviewed IO
problem sets, established IO goals and objectives, identified critical information requirements, instituted
planning timelines and issued specific planning guidance. DSG sessions provided an excellent
opportunity for the commander and his senior advisers to exchange ideas. The 1st ID (M) DSG was
composed of the division commander, assistant division commander, CofS, 2d Brigade commander
(who commanded both US battalion-size TFs in the US sector), G2 and G3, senior JMC member, Staff
Judge Advocate, POLAD and division engineer. The 1st ID (M) DSG normally met twice each week.

Public Affairs, CPIC, PSYOP and the Land Information Warfare Agency FST all worked

together on the information campaign.

The division commander designated a particular problem set for further investigation prior to convening
the DSG. Generally, he made his selection from the list mentioned earlier. However, in some instances
he asked the DSG to examine an entirely new issue, such as resettlement in the Gajevi area.

Intelligence assessment. Armed with the division commander's preliminary guidance and intent, and
input from the DSG, the G2 completed an all-source intelligence assessment. During this task, he
directed the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), National Intelligence Support Team and others to
identify and rank likely "threat" courses of action (COA), trigger/decision points, critical events' timing,
expected threat reaction to friendly or third-party actions, candidate target audiences and decision makers
and "pressure points" to influence audience behavior. Maintaining a close working relationship with the
G2 and ACE enabled the LIWA FST to keep the division IO Annex synchronized with current
intelligence.

Battle staff planning. Following the intelligence assessment, the G3 convened a division battle staff
meeting. The battle staff reviewed how the division's battlefield operating systems (BOS) could
influence the situation. The 1st ID (M) developed a synchronization matrix (SM) to capture this
information. Across the matrix's top were anticipated threat actions, trigger points and G2-identified
timelines. Down the left side was a column listing the BOS. The battle staff completed the SM by
describing how each BOS element should respond to entity actions identified by the G2. The G3 and
LIWA FST used the SM to deconflict and synchronize IO activity. Since it listed tasks and

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responsibilities over time, the completed SM served as an excellent outline for the preparation of the
operations plan or order.

Information themes. A significant division information campaign aspect was the presentation of
truthful information to counter disinformation disseminated by some local media. As Figure 5 depicts,
the development and subsequent dissemination of information themes required the active participation of
the CofS, G3, G2, PSYOP, PA officer (PAO), Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC), POLAD,
JMC and others. The LIWA FST sent all candidate themes to the division commander for his personal
approval. Click for fig 5.

IO means. The 1st ID (M) had several mediums with which to convey information to target audiences,
including PSYOP radio messages, handbills, loudspeaker broadcasts, magazine and newspaper articles;
CPIC press conferences, press releases, PA media announcements, live TV and radio interviews; the 1st
ID (M) Internet homepage; CA contact; POLAD meetings; JMC-sponsored bilateral meetings; and
participation during International Housing Committee meetings. The division made an effort to develop
new methods to convey information to target audiences. For example, the LIWA FST helped the
division establish a contract with a local radio station to air prerecorded messages. Over time, the 1st ID
(M) PSYOP element made similar arrangements with 24 local radio stations.

Implementation matrix (IM). The 1st ID (M) developed an IO IM to further refine IO planning. The
IM provided specific information about each event listed on the SM to include timing, purpose,
audience(s), information theme(s), responsible element(s) and expected response. The LIWA FST used
this information to update the division commander and staff. In addition to keeping the commander
informed, these briefings gave him the opportunity to ask questions, issue guidance and obtain feedback.

Needless to say, the information campaign developed for the division commander's priority problem sets
was highly complex and represented a 22-day period surrounding a critical event. Multiple IO means
were used to convey approved information themes to IO audiences.

Feedback. The final step in the IO process is feedback, and involved collecting and assessing responses
to friendly IO. As FM 100-6 points out, "The challenge of information battle damage assessment is to be
able to assess the effects of our efforts without the benefit of physical confirmation. The effects may well
be trends, activities, and patterns in future adversary actions."5 The division used CA, PSYOP, special
operations and intelligence teams, as well as maneuver elements, to survey the local population's
perceptions and attitudes. The division also received feedback from other sources such as local
newspapers, radio/television broadcasts and the Internet. IO activity was adjusted based upon survey
results. Additionally, the 1st ID (M) and LIWA FST developed the following IO worksheets and
matrixes to guide the process described above:

Pressure Point Identification Worksheet (PPIW)-The PPIW provides the IO planner with a systematic
method of identifying ways to influence target audiences.

IO Planning Worksheet (PW)-The IO planner uses the PW to determine how and when to influence each
pressure point.

SM-The SM shows how various BOS can influence priority IO audiences. The SM is used to deconflict
and synchronize IO activity. In Bosnia, the G3 and LIWA FST used the SM to reduce conflicts involving
execution, targets and timing.

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IO implementation worksheet-This worksheet is used to record additional information about each IO

event found on the SM. In addition to identifying the attack "subsystem," the worksheet identifies the
specific information themes that will be used for each IO audience.

IO IM-The IM chronologically lists all IO executions for each IO function. Information from the IM is
carried forward to the optional IO implementation graphic (IG).

IO IG-This graphic portrays scheduled IO activity during a specific time period.

Lessons Learned
A key component of any operation is capturing lessons learned. The balance of this article will briefly
discuss several IO lessons we learned during our tour of duty with TF Eagle.

Maintain the commander's personal involvement. The commander's personal involvement is

extremely important. Fortunately, Meigs was a strong proponent of IO use. He recognized its
contribution to mission success and noted on several occasions that it provided him one of the few
means to influence the situation. He continuously challenged his staff to find better ways to use
information as a force multiplier. His staff responded by developing new IO tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) capabilities.

Ensure PA and PSYOP work together. Current IO doctrine stipulates that "a separation between PA
and PSYOP functions must be preserved to maintain the credibility of PA spokespersons and
products."6 In Bosnia, the CPIC, PAO and PSYOP worked together to identify potential opportunities,
map strategy and deconflict information products. Although guided by different policy and processes,
they shared several common tasks in countering propaganda and disinformation. Even though they
worked closely on many matters, they still maintained their independence.

Consider assigning the CofS overall IO staff responsibility. Current doctrine gives the G3 overall
staff responsibility for IO.7 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 1st ID (M) CofS controlled the division's IO
effort. This worked well because IO tasks routinely crossed staff boundaries. Doctrine writers should
examine this arrangement and determine if a permanent change to Army IO doctrine is warranted.

Streamline PSYOP product approval process. In particular, the PSYOP TF should issue operational
guidelines, not exercise release authority, over every product. The division commander should have local
release authority for PSYOP products, as long as he or she operates with-in established guidelines. This
would maximize flexibility and enable the commander to react faster to adversary propaganda and
disinformation. In a related issue, the division PSYOP support element should be provided with, or have
ready access to print and audiovisual production capabilities.

Obtain demographic studies of operational area. These studies are an essential element for
preparation of the battlefield and should focus on cultural information that includes population biases,
perceptions, predispositions, relevant public issues, key decision makers, decision-making processes,
media capabilities, population educational levels and reliance on the media for information. Army IO
doctrine must recognize the importance of IO battlefield preparation by establishing related tasks,
responsibilities, methodologies and formats.

Document and disseminate IO TTPs. Initially, the lack of IO TTPs forced the 1st ID (M) to use a trial
and error approach to IO planning. This was overcome by developing new TTPs. The Army should

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exploit the lessons learned in Bosnia by documenting and disseminating new IO TTPs. This information
can be spread by mobile training teams, participation during exercises, instruction at Army service
schools and changes to FM 100-6.

Seek predictive intelligence. Predictive intelligence initiates the wargaming and identification of
possible COA. One of the most significant contributions that intelligence can make is to accurately
predict future events. Although this is an extremely difficult task, predictive intelligence gives the
division the lead time necessary to develop possible COA and identify IO products. The division
commander insisted that his G2 provide him with predictive intelligence on likely entity COA. The G2's
predictions enabled the staff to anticipate key events and develop corresponding plans and operations.

Exploit Internet capabilities. Access to the Internet enabled the LIWA FST to gather information from
a variety of sources, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned, UN, US Army Europe,
Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe, World Bank and US State Department. The team
monitored dozens of Internet web sites and newsgroups for information on Bosnia. This provided
biographic data on key leaders, cultural and demographic information, maps, diagrams and historical
reports. It also enabled the LIWA FST to monitor adversary propaganda and disinformation.

Expand FM 100-6's IO plan format. First, the IO plan should identify psychological factors such as
biases, predispositions and perceptions that affect the opponent's decision-making process. The plan
should also list IO audiences, friendly IO goals and objectives, friendly IO resources and capabilities,
problem sets, information themes and a risk assessment.

Find ways to maintain contact with the local population while continuing to protect the force.
Contact with the local population is an important way to communicate information and obtain feedback
about their opinions and attitudes. While CA and PSYOP teams regularly interface with the population,
most soldiers, due to the force protection requirements, seldom deal with the local population. This
curtails personal contact, an important IO resource. The US Information Agency observed this after a
recent public opinion survey. A post-survey assessment stated ". . . it was very clear from the survey that
the more stabilization force (SFOR) contingents got to meet the local people, the more support they
enjoyed."8 Commanders must evaluate potential risks and exploit every opportunity to safely interact
with the local population.

Learn to operate in a multinational environment. Military units from several nations compose TF
Eagle. Some of these units understand IO principles and concepts, while others do not. To ensure
maximum participation, the LIWA FST worked with representatives from each foreign military unit.
The purpose was to solicit their cooperation, provide necessary training and synchronize their efforts.
Their work appears to be paying dividends. Recently, the Nordic/Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade-composed
of soldiers from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland and Sweden-began conducting biweekly radio
shows and press conferences. They even designated an IO staff officer to coordinate all brigade IO
activity. He is responsible for coordinating PSYOP and CA in the NORDPOL sector, as well as
providing feedback to the LIWA FST. The Russian brigade is helping to arrange PSYOP broadcasts in
its sector. The Turkish brigade, which has been heavily involved with humanitarian operations, is just
now realizing the value of IO as a means of capitalizing on its efforts. "We are doing lots of things with
the population, but have not gotten the word out on what we are doing, nor have we made the world
aware of our efforts."9

Since Vietnam, Army leaders have faced a broad spectrum of military contingencies, ranging from a
conventional conflict in the Middle East, to PK and stabilization operations in Grenada, Panama, Haiti,

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Somalia and Bosnia. In each case, IO played a significant role.

In August 1996, the Army published FM 100-6, the Army's capstone doctrine for IO. This event signaled
the Army's recognition that IO is a major contributor to military operations at all levels. This doctrine
serves as the foundation for the development of new IO TTPs and training.

The 1st ID (M) and the LIWA applied the new doctrine in Bosnia. With strong leadership, hard work
and innovation by the staff, they developed a process that enabled 1st ID (M) to plan and execute a
synchronized information campaign in one of the world's most complex operational environments.MR

1. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's remarks made during a visit to the Advanced Warfighting
Experiment, quoted by Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) GEN Dennis J. Reimer in his E-mail message,
Subject: CSA Random Thoughts While Running 11 Apr 97, sent 14 April 1997.
2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, August 1996), 6-7.
3. Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the 100th Landon Lecture Series,
Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 9 March 1995.
4. US Department of State, Bosnia Fact Sheet: Human Rights Abuses in the Balkans, updated and
released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 11 December 1995
5. FM 100-6, 4-7.
6. Ibid., 6-7
7. Ibid., 6-6 and 6-7.
8. US Information Agency paper: Analysis of US Information Agency Research Report-Public Opinion
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume IV: One Year of Peace, February 1997.
9. Comment made by a Turkish staff officer to a member of the Land Information Warfare Activity field
support team on 28 April 1997.

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Shanahan, US Army, Retired, is senior associate, Sytek Inc., Land
Information Warfare Activity, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He received a B.A. from Widener University and is
a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He held a variety of command and
staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS), Korea and Europe, to include senior project
officer, Information Warfare Program, Headquarters, Department of the Army; chief, Technical Support
Division, US Army Field Support Center, Fort Meade, Maryland; strategic intelligence officer, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; intelligence officer, 2d Infantry Division, South Korea; branch
chief, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force, Washington, DC; and branch chief, 766th Military
Intelligence Detachment, Berlin, Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers is information operations liaison officer, Land Information
Warfare Activity, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. He
received a B.S. and M.Ed. from North Georgia College, and he is a graduate of the US Army Command
and General Staff College. He has served in a variety of CONUS command and staff positions to include
operations officer, Land Information Warfare Activity, Fort Belvoir; special operations liaison officer,
Joint Staff J2, Pentagon; battalion S3, 303d Military Intelligence Brigade (MI Bde), Fort Hood, Texas;
and assistant brigade S3, 504th MI Bde, Fort Hood.

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Managing the Drawdown's Human Side

Major A. Christopher St. Jean, US Army
In 1991, the US Army initiated a drawdown that brought the force to its lowest level since before the
Korean War. This massive armed forces reduction was the first time in US history our nation had to
reduce its All-Volunteer Force (AVF). This article examines the rationale and goals behind the
drawdown, comparing it to corporate America's downsizing experience, but it does not declare the
drawdown's success or failure. Rather, it examines the drawdown's "human dimensions" and identifies
potential readiness concerns that merit additional thought and discussion.

The Elusive Peace Dividend

Two major factors necessitated the US Army's drawdown:

The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Agreement, which reduced the threat of European warfare
after the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Alliance broke up.
Substantial US political pressure to reduce the national debt and balance the budget, in part,
through a "peace dividend" from decreased military spending.

Since the United States no longer faced a massive Cold War threat, it no longer needed the same
numbers of troops. Reducing troop levels would also eliminate the need for facilities and Reserve
Component (RC) forces. Elim-inating RC and other support forces would allow consolidation of
remaining forces, further reducing the need for some military installations in the United States and
abroad. The logic was sound and the means used to initiate these savings were well thought out from a
political and financial viewpoint.1

An area where the drawdown process was not clearly thought out centers on the "human element" and its
effect on military readiness. Although senior leaders expressed concern about the drawdown's human
impact on readiness and have adopted fair and compassionate mechanisms to achieve person- nel cuts,
they have not openly ex- amined the drawdown's short- and long- term effects on current or future
military readiness. In this regard, private sector businesses have much to offer in the form of lessons
learned during recent corporate downsizing.

The Drawdown'sHuman Element

The human element's effect on military readiness is difficult to quantify. It is far easier to assess end
strength, maintenance rates and operations tempo (OPTEMPO) than it is to measure a soldier's morale or
commitment to the nation's causes. This task is even more difficult in a command climate where leaders
do not accept criticism lightly. Also, ever-changing priorities, based on fluid world events, are constantly
demanding senior leaders' attention. It is understandable why the Army has given this area such little
emphasis. To date, there are few studies addressing a drawdown's effects on those who still serve and the
feedback from those who do not.

Research supports the premise that the private sector has done a much better job at downsizing. Given

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the obvious difference between the military and private sectors, the AVF could benefit from the business
community's downsizing studies and experiences.

Other than increased profits, corporate downsizing and military drawdown goals are remarkably similar.
In fact, the similarities of managing the US Army or a large corporation form the basic premise for the
book Hope is Not a Method, by former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan.2

Each organization seeks to recruit and retain high-quality people, modernize operations to maximize
productivity, maintain a technological edge over the competition and reduce costs by eliminating
inefficiencies and bloated payrolls.3 Since 1989, the corporate world has adopted an approach of
eliminating employees who are unnecessary to a newly restructured organization. In 1993 alone,
corporations announced 615,186 layoffs, and the numbers have steadily increased throughout the
1990s.4

Lessons Learned
By eliminating positions, organizations can achieve substantial savings in salaries, benefits and related
overhead costs. However, business world results are mixed. In many cases, business labor force cuts
have reduced productivity and failed to achieve forecasted savings. In a 1993 survey by Wyatt Company
consultants, 531 companies were asked if they had achieved the expectations intended by personnel cuts.
The results were less than expected. Of the companies surveyed:

58 percent hoped to achieve higher productivity; only 34 percent did.

61 percent wished to improve their company's customer service; only 33 percent did.5

If downsizing's end results are increased productivity and high-quality personnel retention, studies show
it was ineffective for businesses in more than 50 percent of those surveyed.

As corporate America identified, a key reason for failing to achieve objectives was that inadequate
attention to personal impact created serious emotional fallout among those fired, as well as the
"survivors retained." In many cases, the fallout compromised the very productivity the organizations
hoped to achieve. While receiving fewer resources to achieve expanding company goals-or in the Army's
case, ever-increasing numbers and types of missions-managers and Army leaders are bombarded with
greater demands. Continual pressure to produce, in an environment of increasing requirements and
decreasing operating budgets, travel allowances and expense accounts, becomes substantially more
stressful. UNUM, the largest US private disability insurance policies provider, reported an increase in
the number of claims processed from 7.8 percent in 1989 to 10.2 percent in 1993.6

Stress and uncertainty take their toll. Psychologists report a trend of "burned-out bosses" worn down
by increased production demands and the stress of telling employees their services are no longer
required. One major communications company's human resource department reported an increase in
managers' absenteeism and alcoholism. The final emotional assault for many middle managers is when
they lose their own jobs. The managers who were most directly involved in initial personnel layoff
initiatives in the 1980s accounted for the largest growing newly unemployed population as recently as
1994. One of every 20 employees is a mid-level manager, yet they represented one of every five workers
being laid off.7 To date, the Army has lost at least 25 percent of the officer corps through drawdown
under various separation incentive programs.8

For corporate America, downsizing has taken an emotional toll on individuals needing to revitalize their

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companies. Because of the Army's inexperience in this area, the emotional impact of job losses on its
leaders is not yet clear. However, it is reasonable to assume that leaders are susceptible to the same
problems experienced by their corporate peers.

The greatest emotional toll is experienced by people who have been let go. For many, it is often
unexpected. Depression, anger and a sense of betrayal may follow the separation. Most workers believe
if you work hard for the company-or in soldiers' cases, serve your nation well-you will be rewarded with
indefinite employment, not separation programs designed to reduce personnel rolls. Often, dismissal is
not related to any major performance deficiency. Rather, layoffs are related to a lack of desired skills,
new automation or technology and, in the Army's case, a change in the national security strategy's
direction and legislatively mandated budgetary requirements.

Challenges. Under such circumstances, cynicism rises and loyalty is one of the first intangibles to be
destroyed. Lost loyalty's impact is hard to quantify, but for future Army recruiting efforts, it is worth
careful consideration. For example, marketers have long known that one dissatisfied soldier will
generally relate a negative opinion of his experience to at least 13 other peo-ple. Given this ratio, the loss
of more than 300,000 people from the Army since 1991 has the potential to directly influence over four
million Americans.

Recruiting will become increasingly more difficult now that recruits need to be replaced on a
one-for-one basis. For Fiscal Year 1997 (FY 97) that equated to a need for 90,000 new soldiers.
First-quarter FY 97 recruiting reports were not promising. Recruit quality has dropped significantly, with
only 88 percent having high school diplomas. To counter this trend, the Army has added an additional
500 recruiters, doubled its recruiting budget to $24 million, increased its college incentives and
reintroduced enlistment bonuses ranging from $1,000 to $8,000.9 For the Army, loyalty could have a
major impact on future recruiting efforts in terms of time, money and quality prospects.

The Survivors
Private studies have found several changes in the employee characteristics of a major downsizing's
survivors. After downsizing, 80 percent of managers reported that remaining employee morale dropped
significantly.10 For large organizations, American Management Association statistics indicate that
morale will not improve anytime soon-two-thirds of corporations that downsize will repeat the process
again during the next year.11 Downsizing is usually not a one-time shot. This has certainly been the case
for the US Army over the past six years. In fact, there is talk of continuing the drawdown through the
year 1999.12

In addition to low morale, survivors try to maintain low profiles, show less initiative, become more
cautious and take fewer risks. These characteristics can frustrate an already austere operating structure as
well as hurt critically important research and development (R&D) efforts.

Often, employees do not want to be associated with cost-generating operations such as R&D programs
and tend to shy away from suggesting ideas that may result in additional personnel losses to the
organization. Yet, innovative ideas and a healthy R&D program are vitally important to maximizing
existing resources and staying technologically competitive. In the Army, this attitude has come to be
known as the "zero defects" mentality. Such a mind-set is clearly counterproductive to Army values and
objectives.

Understanding what motivates survivors to perform and implementing programs to reenergize them is

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critical to an organization's long-term success. Survivors have a valuable understanding of the

organization and a level of knowledge and experience that would take time and resources to develop in
new employees. For the Army, mid-level leaders cannot simply be replaced by hiring more capable
managers from some outside organization. For organizations such as the Army that need to innovate
rapidly, survivors are the key to achieving success.

The message from the private sector is clear: organizations that do not carefully consider the impact of
downsizing policies on their people must expect reduced loyalty, a decreased productivity level from
survivors, increased recruiting costs, a tarnished public image and increased health-care costs because of
stress-related personal problems. These results are causing private sector organizations to reexamine
both current and future downsizing plans.

The Army's major drawdown policy weakness is its failure to examine the human impact on the total
force. The Army's research assets, such as the Army Research Institute and the Inspector General Office,
can track problems. Once the Army has studied problem areas, the findings should be widely publicized
and the results openly and honestly discussed at all levels. Several significant issues to address follow:

Consistency. There is a perceived inconsistency that when Department of Defense (DOD) leaders talk
about taking care of soldiers and their families, their actions appear contrary to their message. For
example, in 1992, DOD planned to offer only the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI). Congress
advocated an alternative separation package-the Special Separation Benefit (SSB) option.13 It is also
critical that the Army examine, then address, the perception that funding newer, more "high-tech"
weaponry is more im-portant than funding soldier-related issues-as witnessed by the steady decline of
Morale, Welfare and Recreation activities.

Perceptions and broken contracts. Another significant problem is the perceived breach of faith
between soldiers and their contracts with the Army. During a time of ever-increasing OPTEMPO,
military benefits continue to erode. Changes have been made after soldiers have already agreed on and
signed contracts. There are many examples of contracts being waived and rules being changed to meet
reduction quotas or to recognize savings by paring benefits. Examples range from not bringing
individuals onto active duty as promised, releasing individuals from active duty obligations, shortening
retention control points (RCPs) and the increasing use of military manpower to compensate for the loss
of base contractor support, resulting in soldiers performing details other than those related to the military
occupational specialty they enlisted to learn. The Army has broken with what was a traditionally valued
and prestigious source of pride and job security by announcing that for the first time in its history,
Regular Army officers are also being considered for separation and reduction in force.14 As contract
rules change, what makes a successful Army career is constantly being redefined by those who remain.
At the same time, incentives for new recruits to make the Army a career are being reduced significantly.

False perceptions. Contrary to popular belief, soldiers happily accepting voluntary separation options is
untrue. In an AVF, soldiers given the opportunity would most likely choose to stay. Also, under certain
conditions, soldiers who accept separation incentives and join Reserve Components forfeit some
benefits. In a recent National Guard Journal article, Lieutenant Colonel David M. Fielder said, "In a
volunteer Army, almost every officer and NCO who is forced to leave is a dedicated career professional
whose personal contract with the Army has been terminated. This will be hard on both family members
and the soldiers involved and have a negative effect on the overall morale of the force."15 The Army
must identify the human issues by capturing the emotional feedback drawdown generates from separated
individuals and survivors who still serve.

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Restructuring in Downsizing's Wake

No two organizations address downsizing challenges the same. Successful companies such as
Hewlett-Packard, Raychem, Xerox and Honeywell follow common principles and practices. For these
companies, it has meant a restructuring that has emphasized:

Decentralized management.
Large R&D investments.
Trimming back unnecessary office space.
Early notification of employees identified for layoffs.
Providing top-quality outplace-ment services.
Divesting businesses unrelated to company strengths, which for the Army could be interpreted as
avoiding missions unrelated to our strengths or national security goals.
Educational programs for managers explaining the forces driving change and the rationale for
adopting the programs chosen to meet those changes.
Increased survivor training programs that concentrate on downsizing's emotional impact.

In my opinion, the Army has successfully handled all these areas, except the last three. These are the
weaknesses the Army needs to study. If the same problems facing the business community are confirmed
by Army military and civilian leaders, they must act aggressively to educate our soldiers and their family
members and address their concerns openly and in good faith.

So the questions remain: How similar are we to our corporate brethren? Is the Army threatened by the
same human and emotional issues impacting the private sector? If so, what lessons can we learn from
industry's experience to successfully meet the challenges the Army faces?

Until we more closely evaluate and understand drawdown's human impact on soldiers and their families,
we cannot assess the level of effectiveness or damage our current policies might have on future force
readiness. This issue's importance is summed up by Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer:
"How do you tell someone who joined the Army because they wanted to be part of all this that suddenly
we don't need them anymore? We're talking about human emotions here, as well as families. So we're
fighting hard to be fair and take care of our people."16 The human dimension is truly an area we cannot
afford to neglect. MR

1. James L. Binder, "Interview with Army Secretary Stone: Vital to Army That Reductions Be

Managed," Army Magazine (February 1990), 14-18.

2. COL Jerry D. Morelock, "An Army Manual for Civilian Business," Military Review (March-April
1997), 96.
3. Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Army Takes the Brunt of '91 Budget Cuts," Army Magazine (March 1990), 14-20.

4. John A. Byrne, "The Pain of Downsizing," Business Week (9 May 1994), 60-68.
5. Robert B. Reich, "Of Butchers and Bakers," Vital Speeches of the Day (8 October 1993), 100-102.
6. Lee Smith, "Burned Out Bosses," Fortune (25 July 1994), 44-52.
7. Ibid.
8. Jim Tice and Bernard Adelsberger, "16 Months and Counting," Army Times (15 May 1995), 12-14.
9. Andrew Compart, "As Recruiting Goals Increase, Quality of New Soldiers Drops," Army Times (24
February 1997), 4.
10. San Diego Union (26 September 1993), Section B 1-3.

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11. Ronald Henkoff, "Getting Beyond Downsizing," Fortune (10 January 1994), 58-64.
12. Jim Tice, "No Involuntary Outs in Officer Drawdown," Army Times (24 July 1995), 3.
13. Rick Maze, "Early Outs May Take Incentive Now or Later," Army Times (18 November 1991), 4.
14. Bernard Adelsberger, "RIF Board Set," Army Times (13 January 1992), 3.
15. LTC David M. Fielder, "Drawing Down the Total Army," National Guard Journal (April 1992),
42-44.
16. James Kitfield, "Dennis J. Reimer: Focusing on the Drawdown," Government Executive Magazine
(March 1993), 53.

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Logistics: The Past is Prologue

by Eric A. Orsini
In the plethora of initiatives on efficiencies, some favorite buzz words are two-level maintenance,
outsourcing to original manufacturers and just-in-time inventory. The judgment is that the
infrastructure is bloated, systems are archaic and we are living in the past. These charges are not coming
from battle-hardened commanders but from industry representatives, think tanks and academia. We
"loggies" are con-stantly berated by business community neophytes to look "outside the box." The
problem is some of us dinosaurs have "been there-done that" and learned a lesson or two.

I am reminded of a 1950s Center of Military History study to gather lessons learned about World War II
German tank maintenance. European Command selected a German general, who commanded an armor
regiment on the Russian front and who later was a Panzer corps and a Panzer army chief of staff, to head
the study. The German army had developed the blitzkrieg, where a highly mobile tank force would
crush the enemy's static line along paths of least resistance, allowing the infantry to seize and hold
terrain. The Germans also had an 88-millimeter armor-piercing round, STUKA dive bombers and silent
U-2 submarines. The German military was the high-tech force of the 1940s.

The German force was best exemplified by the Panzer units that engulfed most of Europe in a matter of
weeks. The units had their own efficiency programs, and one of their initiatives was two-level
maintenance combined with just-in-time inventory. They developed a centralized system in which only
minor repairs would be performed in the field. Tanks that sustained more serious damage were to be
returned to the original manufacturer in Germany.

During the Polish campaign in September 1939, the system, field-tested under combat conditions,
worked well with few difficulties. However, the campaign was of short duration, there was little
effective resistance and little if any combat damage. The French campaign from May to June 1940 also
went reasonably well except that just-in-time inventory was augmented with a spare parts depot in
northern France, and the number of organic maintenance personnel was increased. The Balkan
campaign, also of short duration, convinced the Germans that the two-level maintenance system was a
success and should be implemented.

For the Russian campaign, the Germans intended to apply a slightly modified, but essentially identical,
system of tank maintenance. Most of the tank repairs were still to be performed in Germany. However,
each of the three army groups in the Russian Theater was to have a spare-parts depot that stored critical
parts, thereby tailoring an approach between just-in-time and just-in-case. Also, improved maintenance
vehicles, recovery vehicles and better shop equipment were issued to the maintenance units in the field.
No further planning was considered necessary. Both military and political leaders assumed military

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operations would reach their climax in autumn 1941 and that most of the armored forces would return to
Germany before winter. Forces remaining in the Russian Theater were to be withdrawn from action and
refurbished in suitable areas during the winter months.

Once the Russian campaign began, the need for tank maintenance installations and the demand for spare
parts also increased. German tank losses in Russia were far heavier than during preceding campaigns.
For the first time, large numbers of tanks were put out of action by enemy fire and mines. With
operations occurring over great distances under unusual conditions, such as extreme heat and dust in
summer and sub-zero temperatures in winter, the tanks' mechanical operation was greatly affected,
resulting in an unexpectedly high attrition rate. Tank maintenance services were handicapped because
only the larger towns contained buildings that provided even minimum shop and billeting facilities.
Despite strenuous efforts, maintenance personnel could not cope with the ever-increasing volume of
repair work.

The German army's requirements for supplies-particularly ammunition, fuel and medical
supplies-exceeded all expectations. Inadequate road and rail nets, plus an inadequate logistics
infrastructure, made it impossible to support the rapidly advancing armor columns. Since the Germans
captured little rolling stock, they had to convert railroad tracks from the wide Russian gage to standard
European gage. Moreover, the Russians demolished most railroad bridges and locomotive maintenance
shops during their withdrawal. The unsatisfactory rail transportation situation had a disastrous effect on
the tank maintenance system at a time when the number of disabled tanks reached an all-time high.
Obviously, the two-level system of maintenance was no longer practical, and major changes had to be
introduced without delay.

Given the lack of trained organic maintenance specialists and the absence of a transportation and supply
infrastructure, such a comprehensive reorganization program could not materialize overnight. It was not
until late 1942 that a new system became operational-and it was only marginally effective because new
problems developed.

The Tiger tank, the German answer to the Russian T-34, was rushed into action in autumn 1942. Within
a short time almost all the new tanks were sidelined because of parts shortages. The Germans had failed
to anticipate the high failure rate and had not made provision for sufficient parts.

A similar mistake with even farther reaching consequences occurred with the introduction of the new
Panther tanks. In a desperate attempt to speed up production, the Ministry of Armaments had ordered
mass production of the new model before it had been properly tested. Early in 1943, the first Panther
tanks arrived in the Russian Theater and were immediately committed. Almost at once major defects in
design and production, particularly of the steering and control mechanisms, were discovered. The result
was that all 325 Panther tanks were returned to Germany for complete rebuilding. To perform the
necessary work, a special tank-rebuild plant was established near Ber-lin. However, by the time the
initial deficiencies had been corrected, the engine proved to be inadequate. It was not until autumn 1943
that a fully satisfactory engine became available. Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that
most of the Panther tanks shipped to Russia arrived without sufficient spare parts. Many Panthers were
lost because of the shortage of some elementary spare part or because they could not be repaired in time.

The Center of Military History, with its German Report Series, provides a couple of lessons learned. For
example, prepare for the worst-case scenario and do not shortchange logistics. Wars are won or lost
depending on the degree of support. Factor in supportability of new systems up front. Though the initial
cost may seem high, doing so will save operation and support (O&S) costs after fielding. Mandate

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supportability equal with cost, schedule and performance. Continuing supportability as a subset of
performance exacerbates the O&S problem.

For those who would attribute these comments as the product of a Cold War warrior (which is true),
remember the Department of Defense's core competencies-to organize, train and equip primarily for
prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. We all agree that we must take advantage
of the best business practices, maximize efficiency, minimize redundancy and seek the best value. But
let us not veer too far off base and overly skew our projections on experience in Grenada, Panama, the
Persian Gulf, Haiti or Bosnia-all of which were of short duration, produced few casualties and caused
minimum combat damage. War plans must anticipate the worst case-a lesson the German general staff
learned too late. In Supplying War, Martin van Creveld wrote: "Among the many thousands of books
that have been written about Hitler's Russian adventure, there is probably not one that does not, at some
point, attribute the Wehrmacht's failure, in part at least, to logistic factors."

History is replete with military failures because of logistic inadequacies-Hannibal's crossing of the Alps,
Rommel's African campaign, Patton's drive to Hammelburg. Surely we are forewarned. In the 1500s,
Niccolo Machiavelli stated: "Whoever has not taken proper care to furnish himself with a sufficient
supply of provisions and ammunition bids fair to be vanquished without striking a stroke." Or, to put it
another way: "An alligator with no tail ain't nothing but a jaw full of worthless teeth." MR

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Outsourcing At DOD: All It's Cracking People Up To Be?

by J. Michael Brower
Outsourcing and its handmaiden privatization (O&P) are the twin stars of cost savings at the Department
of Defense (DOD). Since Congress has indicated that it will not consider further Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) rounds until the end of the Clinton administration, infrastructure costs will continue to
demand an ample share of future budgets. Consequently, savings will be sought first by personnel cuts,
second by O&P and, as a final resort, through program trimming. Both the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and new congressional legislation call for further emphasis on O&P as a means to streamline,
reengineer and, above all, save scarce DOD dollars. But exactly what makes O&P so financially
attractive and managerially desirable? From whence comes the lion's share of the "savings" in most O&P
projects? In the last analysis, both DOD personnel cuts and O&P gore the same cash cow-internal labor
costs. While certainly not the only source for savings, reducing payroll is the most readily quantified
O&P "benefit." And that is what makes it such a controversial-and potentially profitable tactic.

Outsourcing is the movement of work-but often not the transfer of accountability or oversight-to an
outside provider. Privatization is outsourcing writ large-the government farms out the function and
often the wherewithal to do it, getting out of a business more logically performed by the private sector.
Privatization is essentially a reaction to the nationalization and government regulation of the late 1960s
and 1970s and finds inspiration in the post-1979 conservative policies of Britain's former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, the modern privatization paradigm's architect.1 The concept of privatization though,
is not new, and can be traced back to some of Adam Smith's writings in 1762.2 The "moniker" of
contracting out may change, but the concept remains the same.

About 40 percent of the biggest companies in the United States have outsourced at least one major piece
of their operation.3 American companies outsource more than $100 billion a year with average cost
savings of 10 to 15 percent, while the federal government spent around $114 billion on outsourcing

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during 1995 but lacked the mechanisms such as activity-based costing (ABC) models for calculating
actual savings.4

One of the principal feeding grounds for O&P recommended by the QDR and other studies concerns DOD
information technology (IT). In a recent IT-related survey, the Outsourcing Institute found that
controlling internal costs was the dominant motivation to outsource. Nevertheless, statistics from the
Computer Economics 1997 report and consultants for Coopers & Lybrand found cost savings from
outsourcing to be much lower than expected, usually only in the 10 to 20 percent range.5

In August 1996, Coopers & Lybrand consultants found that DOD would save $1.25 billion over 10 years
by reducing its data centers from 16 to six and outsourcing more functions they perform internally.6
Substantial portions of estimated savings would come from reduced labor expenses. While there are
other cost-saving techniques and strategies, including velocity management, process reengineering and
use of tech-nology, none register cost reductions in the ledgers faster than payroll cuts.

While the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76, A Performance of Commercial
Activities, calls for private versus public competitions and cost-benefit analyses before important
computer functions are outsourced, barring legislation to the contrary, outsourcing IT and other
"support" functions will continue apace at DOD. "Anything not involved in warfighting should be
outsourced," intoned Emmett Paige, DOD's former assistant secretary of defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence, in a recent interview. Paige warned those who do pursue outsourcing
IT projects to "expect Congress to defend their constituencies."7

Despite the enthusiasm to outsource, the great fear remains that government computer functions will
become hostage to the vicissitudes of the marketplace-for example, labor strikes and cost overruns. Also,
the loss of in-house capability and loyalty is usually the price of O&P savings.

In some unfortunate cases, contractors bid low for outsourced work claiming substantial savings,
government employees are surplused or "RIFed" (reduction in force), then the contractor runs up the bill
once the indigenous labor source is shuffled off or absorbed. And soon, according to a recent article in
the Christian Science Monitor, to afford "cutting-edge weapons systems," civilians must be dropped
from DOD roles at a rate the likes of which we have never seen.8 Uncle Sam has nowhere else to go
now that the "in-housers" have been benched in the name of savings and efficiencies. In another recent
case, Texas Republican Governor George W. Bush announced he can save 40 percent of overall state
government costs, reducing the state budget as much as $120 million, by outsourcing welfare
information systems work.9 Much of the savings will be derived by reducing the labor force.

As writer Kathleen Melymuka reminds us in her article "KABOOM," the outsourcing "siren song" has
run many companies aground, and one must be on guard during contract negotiations.10 In the most
unfortunate cases, the outsourcer bids exceptionally low to be awarded the contract, obtains exclusive
rights to control an entire IT department, then sticks the host organization with cost overruns after the
indigenous labor force is absorbed or otherwise no longer available. Earlier this year, in a major
outsourcing flop for IT giant Unisys Corporation, unanticipated "labor-intensiveness" caused early
termination of a contract to manage the health-care program for Florida's 215,000 state employees.
Worth $86 million over four years, the contract cited labor savings as the main financial motivation for
this outsourcing venture. A Unisys spokesman admitted that the contract was "an aberration, an
aggressive move" and one that proved a bridge too far.11

According to a Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study "Achieving an Innovative Support Structure

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for 21st Century Military Superiority," of the 2.5 million military and civilian employees current
receiving tax-base creating paychecks, more than 600,000 military personnel (40 percent of the active
force) and almost 900,000 civilians are in support roles. Support and infrastructure costs consumed
more than 55 percent of the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD budget. The primary cost driver is labor and the
associated costs. Since O&P initiatives deliver most of their rather modest savings through reduced labor
expenses, O&P can be virtually equated with personnel reductions. Given the postponement of BRAC
cuts and sustainment of modernization plans, the overriding majority of savings must logically come
from lowering personnel-related expenses through cuts, privatization or outsourcing. The human cost of
these actions has yet to be assessed. MR

1. John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1988), 1.
2. Roger L. Kemp, (Ed.), Privatization: The Provision of Public Services by the Private Sector
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1991), 7.
3. Thomas Hoffman, "Users Say Move Quickly When Outsourcing Your Personnel," Computerworld
(17 March 1997), 77.
4. Tom Lowry, "Outsourcing Expected to Increase," USA Today (25 March 1996), B1.
5. Deborah Asbrand, "Outsourcing Your Maintenance Migraines," Datamation (June 1997), 50.
6. Government Computer News (31 March 1997), 42.
7. Kevin Power, "Feds, Get Used to Outsourcing," Government Computer News (16 June 1977), 70.
8. Christina Nifong, "Next Big Defense-Cut Target: Civilians," Christian Science Monitor (12
August 1997), 1.
9. Thomas Hoffman, "Texas May Outsource Welfare IS," Computerworld (17 March 1997), 14.
10. Computerworld (17 March 1997), 82.
11. Bruce Caldwell, "Outsourcing Buyer Beware," Information Week (16 June 1997), 144.

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Base Realignment and Closure: A Historical Perspective

LTC Michael F. Huebner, USA (Ret)
US military downsizing has impacted the entire nation. The threatened closure of local bases seems an
experience unique to nearby residents. But comparable events in the late 19th century and early 20th
century put such occurrences into historical context.

At the Civil War's end, the Union Army numbered over one million men. Within one year, the Army
mustered less than 45 thousand officers and soldiers in six cavalry regiments, five artillery regiments and
19 infantry regiments. Most of the artillery was dispersed, in battery-size detachments, in coastal
fortresses. Three cavalry regiments were in the South or along the Mexican border, two were on the
Trans-Mississippi plains and one was split between Tennessee and Washington, D. C. Nine infantry
regiments were on occupation duty in the South. Two were on the Pacific Coast, one in the Southwest,
one near the Great Lakes, three on the Great Plains and three on the East Coast.1

In 1866, Army reorganization established 10 cavalry regiments and 45 smaller infantry regiments. In
1867, Congress authorized regiments serving "in the West" to be manned at full strength, employing six
cavalry regiments and eight infantry regiments. The March 1869 reorganization reduced the number of
infantry regiments to 25, 19 of which were in Texas or elsewhere in "Indian country." Almost all the
cavalry was in Texas, on the plains or on the Pacific Coast.2

Few, if any, complete regiments were ever stationed at a single location. The 1867 Army Adjutant
General's report showed six companies from the 10th Cavalry and the 3d and 38th Infantry at Fort Riley,
Kansas; 12 companies from the 2d Cavalry and the 4th and 18th Infantry at Fort Laramie, Wyoming
Territory; and six companies from the 3d Cavalry and the 5th and 37th Infantry at Fort Union, New
Mexico Territory.

Reconstruction duty necessitated somewhat greater concentration in the South, requiring 13 companies
from the 5th Cavalry, 5th Artillery and the 11th and 29th Infantry occupying Richmond, Virginia; seven
companies from the 5th Cavalry and the 16th and 33d Infantry in Atlanta, Georgia; and 13 companies
from the 1st Artillery and the 1st and 39th Infantry garrisoned in New Orleans, Louisiana. But most
posts, camps and forts consisted of one or two companies. Few installations were large enough to house
a full regiment.3

As reconstruction duties abated, more Army units deployed west, but expanding frontier settlements and
increasing Indian hostilities required even greater dispersion of already thinly stretched regiments. By
1872, 1st Cavalry companies were spread from Arizona Territory, California and Nevada to Oregon and
the Pacific Northwest. The 2d and 3d Cavalry were in Wyoming Territory, Montana Territory and
Nebraska, with the 8th Cavalry in New Mexico and Colorado Territories. The 4th and 9th Cavalry were
in Texas, the 5th in Arizona Territory and the 10th in the Indian Territories (Oklahoma). The infantry
regiments not on duty in the South were equally dispersed. For example, 8th Infantry companies were in
Wyoming, Utah and Dakota Territories. The 12th Infantry was located at posts in Nevada, California and
Arizona and Idaho Territories. The 25th Infantry's companies served throughout Texas and the Indian
Territories.4

Even with Reconstruction's end in 1877, the Indian Wars, labor unrest and border incursions by Mexican
bandits added to the Army's demands. In his 1878 annual report, Commanding General of the Army
William Tecumseh Sherman noted that all or part of eight of 10 cavalry regiments and 18 of 25 in-fantry

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regiments were in the West. Maintaining those regiments at anything near their authorized strength
meant stripping units stationed elsewhere. The frontier service's harsh conditions prescribed the
reassignment of regiments every few years. This policy was almost impossible to implement given
congressionally mandated strength ceilings and demands on the Army. But Sherman recognized that the
Indian Wars would soon be over. An Army organized and dispersed as a frontier constabulary was not
necessarily the Army the nation needed. Sherman called for the Army's concentration in regimental-size
garrisons.5

The Army's secondary mission-suppression of labor strife and internal disturbances-reinforced the need
for the Army's concentration near railroads and selected urban areas. The state militias' poor showing
during the 1877 railroad strikes required the Regular Army's deployment on many occasions. But riot
control was a distasteful, unpopular duty. For an Army too-long isolated in frontier garrisons, conflict
with workers, from the same social and ethnic classes as enlisted soldiers, only exacerbated a growing
sense of isolation from the civilian community.6

Secretary of War Alexander Ramsey echoed Sherman's sentiments in his 1880 annual report to
Congress. He called for abandoning many small posts no longer serving a purpose and concentrating
regiments near the nation's borders and at major rail junctions. Sherman, with Commander of the
Division of the Missouri Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, had already recognized railroads as the key
to Army concentration and strategic deployment. They argued that the many small garrisons throughout
the West were costly and inefficient and that the Army incurred added expenses when concentrating a
force in response to threatened or actual Indian hostilities or labor unrest. By using railroads, all or part
of a regiment could be transported where needed, eliminating the need for several isolated installations.
Permanent regimental garrisons at key railroad centers would be more efficient and economical and
would enhance training, discipline and morale.7

In 1881, Sherman and Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln identified 190 distinct military posts and
called for the sale, disposal or outright abandonment of those no longer required. The 1881 annual report
also revealed how much of the Army was by then in the West. The Division of the Pacific-the
Departments of Arizona, California and the Columbia-contained all or parts of the 1st and 6th Cavalry;
the 4th Artillery; and the 2d, 8th, 12th and 21st Infantry. Most of the rest of the Army was in the
Division of the Missouri. The 2d and 7th Cavalry and the 3d, 5th, 7th, 11th, 17th, 18th and 25th Infantry
regiments were in the Department of the Dakotas (Minnesota and the Dakota and Montana Territories).
The 4th and 9th Cavalry; part of the 2d Artillery; and the 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 23d and 24th Infantry
were stationed throughout the Department of the Missouri (the states and territories of Illinois, Missouri,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado and New Mexico). The Department of the Platte (Iowa, Nebraska,
Wyoming and Utah) had most of the 3d and 5th Cavalry and the 4th, 6th and 9th Infantry. The
Department of Texas contained the 8th and 10th Cavalry and the 1st, 20th and 22d Infantry. Only the
10th Infantry and the remaining artillery were in the Departments of the East and South in the Division
of the Atlantic.8

Regimental returns for 1882 (indicating regimental headquarters, although seldom the entire regiment)
confirmed this dispersion: 1st Cavalry, Fort Walla Walla, Washington Territory; 2d Cavalry, Fort
Custer, Montana Territory; 4th Cavalry, Fort Bayard, New Mexico Territory; 8th Cavalry, Fort Clark,
Texas; 9th Cavalry, Fort Riley, Kansas; 2d Infantry, Fort Coeur d'Alene, Idaho Territory; 5th Infantry,
Fort Keogh, Montana Territory; 6th Infantry, Fort Douglas, Utah Territory; 9th Infantry, Fort D.A.
Russell, Wyoming Territory; 16th Infantry, Fort Concho, Texas; 20th Infantry, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; 21st Infantry, Vancouver Barracks, Washington Territory; and 24th Infantry, Fort Supply, Indian
Territory. Most of these sites eventually passed into history-footnotes in the frontier Army's chronicles,

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fading memories in the minds of old soldiers or a set of ruins seeming to echo with long-gone bugle
calls.9

Sheridan became commanding general of the Army after Sherman's November 1883 retirement.
Sherman's 1884 annual report claimed the end of the active Indian Wars, thus suggesting the Army was
in search of a new mission. For most in the Army, the Indian Wars had been a necessary, if somewhat
unrewarding, task. With that task supposedly completed, Army leaders turned their attention to what
they felt was the Army's real mission-defense of the Continental United States (CONUS) against foreign
invasion. Even though Sheridan admitted an invasion by a foreign power was only a remote possibility,
this initial effort at "threat analysis" helped define the Army's mission and established parameters for the
subsequent debate over Army organization and concentration.10

By 1885, the Army had obtained some relief by closing a number of obsolete posts. The 1885 annual
report listed 119 active Army installations and 38 "ungarrisoned posts." Of the 119, 49 were manned by
two companies or less, 35 had four companies and 21 were garrisoned by six companies. Only 14 were
large enough for more than six companies. This dispersion made realistic tactical training difficult. The
secretary and the commanding general argued that concentration in a few larger installations would
enhance training, improve discipline and morale and provide economy of scale in supply purchase and
distribution. It was also suggested that concentrating the Army near major population centers would
restore contact between the Army and the public, thus enhancing understanding. Access to churches,
schools and civilization's amenities was seen as a positive benefit that might help improve the common
soldier's character. Some ar-gued that cities might be willing to donate land for military installations in
exchange for the business opportunities that would follow. By 1889, 28 more posts had been abandoned
and another 10 or 12 were on the list for future closure.11

The Battle of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in December 1890, marked the true end of the Indian Wars,
but it required parts of six cavalry regiments and seven infantry regiments, along with a battery of the 1st
Artillery, to quell the last Native American resistance. The secretary of war observed that this mission's
end meant that conditions no longer existed for which the Army was organized. But border incidents
with Mexico between July and December 1892, required commitment of 3d and 7th Cavalry and 18th
Infantry elements. In 1893 and 1894, labor strife again required the Regular Army's deployment to
protect government property and the mail. Minor Indian disturbances, border security and labor unrest
still shaped the Army's mission and distribution.12

The 1892 annual report identified 96 installations, only 33 of which were east of the Mississippi. Five
were considered adequate to serve as "regimental posts," although several others were also deemed large
enough. By 1894, the number of active installations was down to 80, with 16 garrisoned by a full
regiment or more. Ten of the 25 infantry regiments' companies were all at one station, but 23 posts still
had only one or two companies, and another 22 were manned by seven companies or less. The secretary
of war noted that one-half of the field artillery, two-thirds of the infantry and nine-tenths of the cavalry
were still west of the Mississippi. The 1896 report showed 77 active bases with 20 garrisoned by full
regiments. Again, the secretary urged Congress to authorize unneeded posts' closure. But Congress
needed something more to be convinced of the value of Army concentration and closure of obsolete
bases.13 That something was war with Spain in 1898.

Because the Caribbean became the principal theater of war, most of the Army concentrated at sites in the
Southeastern United States-Tampa, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; New Orleans, Louisiana, and
Chickamauga Park, Georgia. Units from as far away as Idaho and Washington had to make their way to
mobilization points. Only the 14th and 15th Infantry remained in the West.

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The Philippine expeditionary force, on the other hand, deployed out of San Francisco. The force
contained parts of the 14th and 15th Infantry along with volunteer units from the western states' militia.
The subsequent Philippine Insurrection, lasting until 1903, placed additional burdens on the Army and
reinforced the need to consolidate units in the United States. By 1900, 292 of the Regular Army's 530
company-size units were in the Philippines, along with all but eight of the 312 companies of US
Volunteers, organized in 1899 to replace wartime volunteers from the state militias that were required by
law to demobilize immediately at the end of hostilities. The Army could no longer afford the luxury of
manning isolated posts with one or two companies.14

The war with Spain and the guerrilla war in the Philippines revealed a number of organizational
weaknesses but also presented the Army with new missions and new justifications for reform. Led by
Secretary of War Elihu Root, advocates of military reform espoused "progressive" tenets of
organizational efficiency, economy, professionalism, centralized planning and scientific management.
The General Staff and the War College came out of that reform movement. There also was new
emphasis on mobilization planning, tactical reorganization, military reform and peacetime training
maneuvers; revised thinking on national defense; and a growing debate over military preparedness. The
reformers sought nothing less than the transition of a 19th-century Army to one for the 20th century. But
for the Army, still basking in Civil War glory, shaped by decades of frontier constabulary duty and only
recently awakened to modern warfare's realities, that transition was not without difficulty.15

By the 20th century's second decade, the Civil War generation-Sherman, Sheridan, John Schofield and
Nelson Miles-had passed on. Officers such as Leonard Wood, Hugh Scott, William Carter and John
Pershing, men who had served at isolated company posts in the latter years of the Indian-fighting Army,
recognized, along with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and others, that Army reorganization and
redistribution was essential to prepare for the 20th century.16

The first real test came in early 1911. Civil war in Mexico raised concerns over American citizens' safety
in that country. Border violations and arms smuggling threatened to involve the United States. On 6
March 1911, President William Howard Taft ordered the War Department to mobilize a "maneuver
division" near San Antonio, Texas, along with separate brigades near San Diego, California, and
Galveston, Texas, to prepare for any military eventuality while striving to preserve neutrality. Such a
force's mobilization required much of the CONUS "Mobile Army's" infantry and cavalry regiments and
field artillery batteries. The War Department sent hundreds of telegrams to units as far away as Fort D.A.
Russell and Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Although some units arrived at San Antonio by 10 March, most
did not reach Texas until 20 March or later. Some did not get there for several weeks. The Galveston and
San Diego brigades had to be formed out of coastal artillery batteries reconfigured into provisional
infantry companies and regiments.17

Francisco Madero's assumption of power in Mexico in May ended much of the justification for
mobilization. The provisional brigades disbanded in early July and the "maneuver division" demobilized
in August. Perceptions of the effectiveness and value of the mobilization varied. One side benefit was
the opportunity for the fledgling Army Air Corps' five airplanes, three balloons and six trained pilots to
get practical experience in aerial reconnaissance. But Army Chief of Staff General Wood claimed the
mobilization only "demonstrated conclusively our helplessness to meet with trained troops any sudden
emergency." He enumerated the delays in moving dispersed forces to Texas and cited poor coordination
with railroads as a contributing factor. He was not alone in pointing out the Army's costly and inefficient
dispersal in small, isolated garrisons, most far from the areas of greatest potential threat.18

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The semiofficial Infantry Journal was less restrained in its criticism. A May-June 1911 editorial minced
no words: "It is a pitiable thing to rejoice at a display of our own weakness, but the concentration in
Texas has been such a pitiable display of that weakness. . . ." When the New York Evening Post took
the Infantry Journal to task for being so negative, editor Major George Shelton responded with a
scathing letter: "[S]uch system as we have . . . has no true connection with war or the employment of
armies for military purposes." Shelton argued that it was not wrong for those in the Army to admit to the
truth and bring that truth before the public and Congress, whose Army it was.19

Tensions between the United States and Mexico continued into 1912, requiring four cavalry regiments to
deploy along the border, with subsequent reinforcement by two more cavalry and three infantry
regiments. While the requirement for cavalry helped diffuse congressional sentiment for reducing the
mounted Army, the need to maintain a significant portion of the Army along the border confirmed
continuing calls for force concentration.20

In late 1911, Congress requested the secretary of war submit a detailed report concerning the Mobile
Army's CONUS distribution. Congress asked the secretary to identify obsolete posts, posts sited for
purely local reasons or because of the Indian Wars and posts best suited for the nation's future strategic
defense. Congress also demanded detailed construction and maintenance costs over the previous 10
years, a report of actions taken or proposed by the War Department "to prevent unnecessary expenditures
and impairment of efficiency caused by ill-advised location and construction of posts and inefficient
distribution of the Mobile Army" and reasons why the War Department had been unsuccessful in
pursuing those actions. They also asked for the Department's intentions, with respect to specific
legislation, to put an end to "the present extravagant distribution of the Army." Finally, Congress wanted
the secretary to identify posts abandoned over the previous 10 years, the costs involved and estimated
annual savings that would result from an "efficient and economical distribution of the mobile Army."21

Stimson responded on 25 January 1912. Of the 49 installations housing mobile Army elements, he
identified 14 that had been established in response to Indian troubles: Fort Apache, Arizona; Boise
Barracks, Idaho; Fort Clark; Fort D.A. Russell; Fort Douglas; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort
Leavenworth; Fort Mackenzie, Wyoming; Fort Meade, South Dakota; Fort Missoula, Montana; Fort
Riley; Fort Robinson, Nebraska; Fort Sill, Indian Territory; and Fort Snelling. While admitting that the
original reasons for establishing these posts no longer existed, he suggested that several might be
retained based on new criteria the General Staff developed: sufficient space for combined arms training;
sited for rapid concentration on the northern or southern borders or either seaboard; sited to optimize use
of the Regular Army to support peacetime training and wartime mobilization of the National Guard and
any wartime volunteer forces; and economy of administration. To satisfy these criteria, the General Staff
called for concentrating the Army into eight of nine tactical groups (of brigade or division size) to cover
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the interior.22

Stimson noted that many of the posts to be abandoned, while no longer having military value, had great
value as real estate. He proposed sale of the excess property to help refund the initial investment and
finance unit relocation. He referenced a War College study that estimated annual savings of over $5
million through concentration of the Mobile Army in eight installations, a savings that would pay
relocation costs even without realizing anything from real estate sales. Stimson suggested that closure of
bases and concentration could be accomplished at relatively little added expense.

With regard to the specifics Congress requested, Stimson proposed retaining the following installations
as strategic concentration sites for at least brigade-size elements; Fort Porter, New York; Fort

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Ogelthorpe, Tennessee; Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Fort Lawton, Washington;
Vancouver Barracks; and the Presidios of San Francisco and Monterey, California. He suggested that
one or more additional sites could be chosen from among Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Columbus
Barracks, Ohio; Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Fort Des Moines, Iowa; Fort Crook, Nebraska; Fort Omaha,
Nebraska; Forts Leavenworth, Riley and Snelling; and Jefferson Barracks, Missouri.

Four other posts did not meet General Staff criteria, but Stimson urged their retention: Fort Sill, as a
school of artillery and musketry; Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Huachuca, for border security; and Fort
Myer, Washington, D.C., for ceremonial and escort duties. He identified the 13 posts that had been
abandoned since 1901 and another 18 that "should be abandoned as soon as suitable provision can be
made elsewhere for their garrisons." These included Fort Apache; Boise Barracks; Fort Clark; Fort
George Wright, Washington; Fort Lincoln, North Dakota; Fort McIntosh, Texas; and Fort Yellowstone,
Wyoming. Another seven posts, including Forts Robinson, Douglas and D.A. Russell, were listed as not
providing "a full measure of military effectiveness" with recommendation for closure when
concentration sites were fully established.

Stimson noted that eight new installations had been established since 1901 at a cost slightly over $6.5
million, along with construction, facility expansion and maintenance costs of over $30 million at 41
other installations over the same period. Over half of that amount was spent at only six posts: Forts
Russell, Leavenworth, Mackenzie, Riley, Sam Houston and Snelling. But much of that expense, he
explained, was to house troops returning from the Philippines. He also reminded Congress that before
the General Staff's creation in 1903, there was no central body charged with setting Army priorities as a
whole. As such, each post commander's priority was to make his installation the best-"an attractive home
for the Army by every means available." The large amounts spent on many bases became an argument
against their abandonment.

Stimson agreed with critics that the Army had to share some of the blame for failing to close many
obsolete bases. But he also placed blame on local communities and political influences for the existing
state of Army dispersion. He reminded Congress that in 1901, Root had appointed a board of general
officers to consider the Army's more efficient concentration. Even before the board met, the War
Department had been inundated with letters from private citizens, boards of trade, city councils, mayors,
governors and members of Congress protesting abandonment of certain posts, urging expansion of
others and even lobbying for creation of new ones. Justifications included everything from "[T]here are
40,000 Indians near this point!" to "[This is] a beautiful site with 17 railroads radiating in every
direction." As a result of this pressure and at Congress' direction, a number of posts were established or
expanded: Forts Benjamin Harrison, Des Moines and Seward, Alaska; the Presidio of Monterey; and
Whipple Barracks, Arizona. Stimson protested that local concerns of businessmen, politicians and
ordinary citizens often took precedence over national military necessity.

Stimson discussed the evolution since the late 19th century in the Army's distribution and concentration.
He suggested the war with Spain had interrupted that evolution. But 20th-century military requirements
now forced the Army to reconsider that process in light of strategic requirements, new tactical doctrine,
economic efficiency and scientific planning. Abandoning obsolete posts would obviously bring
opposition from local communities and political leaders. An increase in the Army budget might be
necessary to effect force relocation. And, recovering costs from real estate sales might take time.
Nonetheless, Stimson urged Congress to support the proposed base closures and Army concentration.

Between February and April 1912, The Independent ran a series of articles titled "What Is the Matter
with Our Army?" Written by senior officers and leading advocates of military reform, the articles

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presented a frank discussion of Army weaknesses and possible solutions. Much of what Stimson had
given to Congress was reiterated in a style somewhat more appropriate for the general public. Stimson;
Wood; Brigadier General W.W. Wotherspoon, president of the War College; Brigadier General Clarence
Edwards, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department; Brigadier General Robert Evans
of the Militia Bureau; Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Liggett of the General Staff; and the Infantry
Journal's Shelton used the opportunity to urge tactical reorganization, force concentration and siting of
installations based on strategic requirements, economy and military efficiency. Stimson wrote the series'
summary article, emphasizing the need for "sufficient public sentiment and popular interest to overcome
the selfish opposition of the localities which now profit out of the dispersion of the Army."23

Release of a 1912 War College paper, "A Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United
States," added ammunition for the War Department. The report was a detailed analysis of the nation's
military requirements based on the existing Army establishment and future expansion. After subtracting
the forces required for overseas garrisons, the report proposed a tactical reorganization and concentration
consistent with Stimson's recommendations to Congress.24

However, events outside the country soon altered the debate's scope. Resurgence of the Mexican civil
war resulted in the 2d Division's mobilization at Galveston and Texas City in February 1913. In early
1914, the deployment of a brigade-size expeditionary force to Vera Cruz, Mexico, brought the United
States and Mexico closer to war and demonstrated the difficulties of mobilizing a force for overseas
service. Those difficulties took on a new urgency with the outbreak of war in Europe in August. Military
preparedness became the new political battleground.25

On the night of 8-9 March 1916, forces loyal to Mexican revolutionary General Francisco "Pancho"
Villa launched an attack on Columbus, New Mexico. The ensuing Punitive Expedition, led by Brigadier
General John Pershing, required a significant portion of the Regular Army and the subsequent National
Guard mobilization under the auspices of the 1916 National Defense Act. But by 1917, American
military involvement in Europe seemed imminent. The debate over closing or retaining a few isolated
posts left over from the Indian Wars seemed anachronistic in an era of machineguns, poison gas,
submarines and airplanes.26

With the US declaration of war against Germany in April 1917, some isolated posts slated for closure
were reborn as mobilization centers and divisional training camps. Names out of the frontier past-Fort
Douglas; Fort Logan, Montana; Fort Huachuca; Fort Riley; Fort Snelling-took on new meaning for a
new generation of American soldiers. New posts, many bearing names reminiscent of the frontier
Army-Camps Custer, Cody, Sheridan and Sherman-became the birthplaces of divisions that would fight
at Chateau-Thierry, Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. Some installations would remain a part of the
US military landscape throughout the rest of the century-through another world war and the half-century
Cold War-only to become the targets of the 1980s' and 1990s' base realignment and closure debates.27

We seem to have come full circle. Arguments used in 1912 in trying to transform a 19th-century Army
into a 20th century one have a surprisingly familiar ring as we seek to transform the 20th-century Army
into one for the next century. The base closure process, then and now, was and is imperfect; it seeks to
balance local interests with national military requirements. Throughout US history, rapid military
demobilization and reduction followed almost immediately after cessation of hostilities. What is perhaps
unique about the most recent period is the retention of a wartime military establishment for almost half a
century following the end of World War II and throughout the Cold War. But, as the nation seeks to
resolve the issues of military reduction and base closure in the context of the Cold War's end, past
debates are worthy reminders of history's continuity and the past's legacies. MR

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1. War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1880-1901), ser. III, vol. V, 127-30; War
Department Annual Reports, 1865 (Washington, DC: GPO), 50-52.
2. War Department Annual Reports, 1866, 3-4; War Department Annual Reports, 1867, 416, 420-27;
War Department Annual Reports, 1869, 1, 23-25.
3. War Department Annual Reports, 1867, 436-73.
4. War Department Annual Reports, 1872, 20-33.
5. War Department Annual Reports, 1877, iii-vi, xiii-xiv; War Department Annual Reports,
1878, 3-7.
6. Barton Hacker, "The United States Army as a National Police Force: The Federal Policing of Labor
Disputes, 1877-1898," Military Affairs (April 1969), 255-64; CPT William Blow, "Use of Troops in
Riots," Journal of the Military Services Institution (July 1899), 45-57. For contrasting views of the
isolation of the 19th-century Army, see Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967; revised edition, 1984), chapter 12; John Gates, "The
Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19th Century," Parameters
September 1980), 32-45.
7. War Department Annual Reports, 1880, v-vi, 4-5, 52-57.
8. War Department Annual Reports, 1881, 35-36, 63-71.
9. War Department Annual Reports, 1882, 51.
10. War Department Annual Reports, 1884, 47-49; Jerry Cooper, "The Army's Search for a Mission,
1865-1898," Kenneth Hagen and William Roberts, (ed.), Against All Enemies (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1986).
11. War Department Annual Reports, 1885, 109; War Department Annual Reports, 1891, 16; War
Department Annual Reports, 1892, 5-6.
12. War Department Annual Reports, 1891, 147-48; War Department Annual Reports, 1893, 5-6,
140-45; War Department Annual Reports, 1894, 4, 57-59; MAJ Winthrop Alexander, "Ten Years of
Riot Duty," Journal of the Military Services Institution (July 1896), 1-62; LT Alonzo Gray, "Uses of
Cavalry in Time of Riots," Journal of the Military Services Institution (July 1896), 108-12.
13. War Department Annual Reports, 1892, 5-6; War Department Annual Reports, 1894, 10; War
Department Annual Reports, 1896, 5.
14. War Department Annual Reports, 1898, 265-66; War Department Annual Reports, 1899, 3-4;
War Department Annual Reports, 1900, 30; Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1902), vol. 1, 7-11; vol. 2, 635, 644, 622 and 680; Graham Cosmas, An Army
for Empire (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971); James Abrahamson, American Arms
for a New Century (New York: The Free Press, 1981).
15. War Department Annual Reports, 1899, 44-46; Weigley, "The Elihu Root Reforms and the
Progressive Era," in Command and Commanders in Modern Military History (Proceedings of the
Second Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 1968);
Peter Karsten, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the Twentieth Century," Karsten,
(ed.), The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

16. For representative new leadership views of this era, see Jack Lane, Armed Progressive: General
Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); Frank Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and
Times of John J. Pershing (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1977). For
contemporary views of the Army's readiness, see "Truth-Where Does the Army Stand?" Infantry Journal
(July-August 1911), 83-93; H.L. Clotworthy, "The United States Army: Our Dismembered Fighting
Units," The World's Work (February 1911), 13987-14000; "The United States Army: The Cost of
Unpreparedness," The World's Work (March 1911), 14122-128; John Bigelow, "If the United States

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Should Go to War," Atlantic Monthly (June 1911), 833-44.

17. War Department Annual Reports, 1911, vol. 1, 7-8, 13-14, 24, 238-42; MG William Carter, "The
Border Patrol," The Outlook (23 December 1911), 973-78.
18. War Department Annual Reports, 1911, vol. 1, 13, 156-57, 267, 431-34 and 739. For contemporary
views of border mobilization, see William Philpott Jr., "A Stake-Town in Seventy Hours," The
Independent (16 March 1911), 1038-43; "With the Army in Texas," The Outlook (1 April 1911), 726-29.

19. "Our Unhappy Soldiers," Infantry Journal (July-August 1911), 124.

20.War Department Annual Reports, 1912, vol. 1, 7-8, 13-14, 431; vol. 3, 57-63.
21. The congressional tasking is reprinted in War Department Annual Reports, 1912, vol. 1, 156.
22. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "Distribution of the Mobile Army of the United States," War
Department Annual Reports, 1912, vol. 1, 157-76.
23. Chief of Staff GEN Leonard Wood, "What Is the Matter with Our Army: It Lacks Concentration,"
The Independent (8 February 1912), 301-4; BG W.W. Wotherspoon, "What Is the Matter with Our
Army: It Is Needlessly Expensive," The Independent (15 February 1912), 338-44; BG Clarence
Edwards, "What Is the Matter with Our Army: It Lacks Organization," The Independent (22 February
1912), 408-11; LTC Hunter Liggett, "What Is the Matter with Our Army: Its Alienation from the
People," The Independent (29 February 1912), 460-64; MAJ George Shelton, "What Is the Matter with
Our Army: Its Piecemeal Development and Divided Control," The Independent (21 March 1912),
619-23; BG Robert Evans, "What Is the Matter with Our Army: The National Failure to Realize Its
Purpose," The Independent (11 April 1912), 777-80; Stimson, "What Is the Matter with Our Army?"
The Independent (18 April 1912), 827-28.
24. US Army War College, Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1912).
25. Clarence Clendenen, Blood on the Border (New York: Macmillan, 1969); John Eisenhower,
Intervention! (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); Robert Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson
and the Occupation of Vera Cruz (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1962); Jack Sweetman,
The Landing at Vera Cruz (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1968); John Finnegan,
Against the Specter of a Dragon (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974).
26. Vandiver, Clendenen and Eisenhower.
27. Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army,
1775-1945 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 251, 278, 281.

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DISASTER ON GREEN RAMP: The Army's Response by Mary Ellen Condon-Rall. 145 pages.
Center of Military History, Washington, DC. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.) 1996. $8.00.

If ever a book was destined for use throughout the military, this is it. Mary Ellen Condon-Rall has
produced a book that will become standard fare for precommand and command sergeant major courses,
family support groups (FSGs), garrison planning and unit readiness.

At 2:10 p.m., 23 March 1994, a disabled Air Force F-16 crashed into the "Green Ramp" at Pope Air
Force Base, North Carolina, slamming into a fully fueled C-141. The resulting fireball engulfed Army
paratroopers preparing for the day's training missions. Within minutes, 130 soldiers were suffering from
burns and other injuries; 11 died before reaching Womack Army Medical Center at nearby Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.

Amid the tragedy were examples of great courage, appropriate contingency planning and superb crisis
management. There were also shortfalls, some vital and some minor, that caused introspection and
planning improvements. This book describes how units, health care facilities, garrisons and civilian
communities worked together to deal with the disaster. This gripping account holds the reader's attention
from the first paragraph to the last.

This book is logically written. Its chapters chronologically address the accident, initial medical and
civilian response, care for the severely burned, the sustained response and it addresses implications for
future crises. Throughout the book, the reader cannot help but think about his own current and future
assignments.

Family support group leaders will find this book particularly useful. Although commanders and leaders
are usually trained to deal with crises, spouses who volunteer to organize and lead unit FSGs are not.
This book is a primer for FSG leaders and can help them prepare for a serious unit or individual crisis.
Garrison command groups, health care leaders and public affairs officers will all benefit from this work.
I recommend each of them give a copy to his or her counterpart in the local civilian community.

Condon-Rall clearly states that "a professional response to crisis is no accident." The response at Green
Ramp and many locations throughout Fort Bragg and Fort Sam Houston validates that proposition. Get a
personal copy, read and share it, understand its message and heed its lessons.

LTC David A. Rubenstein, USA,

US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania

THE NIGHTINGALE'S SONG by Robert Timberg. 544 pages. Simon & Schuster, New York. 1995.
$27.50.

This fascinating book has more than just one story to tell. Basically, the book is about five US Naval
Academy graduates who served in the Navy, Marine Corps or government offices from the 1950s to the
1980s. They include Admiral John Poindexter and Arizona Senator John McCain-class of 1958, former

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National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane-class of 1959, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and
Secretary of the Navy James Webb-class of 1968.

The book's title is a metaphor for the period reviewed. Robert Timberg, himself an Annapolis graduate,
listened to Barbara Feldon give a speech in 1966 at a Labor Department symposium when she was the
Screen Actors' Guild president. "Did you know," Feldon asked, "that a nightingale will never sing its
song if it doesn't hear it first? If it hears robins and wrens, it will never croak a note. But the moment it
hears any part of a nightingale song, it bursts into extraordinary music, sophisticated, elaborate music, as
though it had known it all the time."

In this book, President Ronald Reagan is the nightingale, and these five men are waiting to hear his song.
As Timberg puts it, "In curious ways, the nightingale song played into the lives of all five men. For
McFarlane, North and Poindexter, it gave them back their voices. For Webb and McCain, it provided
mood music."

Timberg joined the Marine Corps after graduation. He later served as the Baltimore Sun's White House
correspondent during the Reagan years.

Timberg's story is engrossing, even though the events it portrays are fading into the mists of history.
What is current and relevant is these five men's devel-opment, not so much from the Vietnam experience
but from their Naval Academy education and how it contributed to their roles in history. In a time when
service academies' relevance is being questioned, it is interesting and instructive to study these men's
respective careers. Each is different; each is controversial.

This book is difficult to put down, but it raises more questions than it an-swers. However, it is powerful
and responsible.

LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA,

Retired, Clifton, Virginia

SECRET ARMY, SECRET WAR: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam by
Sedgwick D. Tourison. 389 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1995. $29.95.

This book is one of the first in a special warfare series from the Naval Institute Press. The author spent
eight years in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam as a US Army linguist and intelligence analyst.
From 1983 to 1988, he served in the Defense Intelligence Agency's special office for prisoners of war
(POWs)/missing in action (MIA) affairs and became the chief analyst. In November 1991, he joined the
Senate Select Committee's staff on POW/MIA affairs and was a major contributor to its final 1993
report.

In Secret Army, Secret War, Tourison focuses on Operation Tiger, a series of little-known covert
operations conducted against North Vietnam in the early days of US involvement in Southeast Asia.
Beginning in 1961, the CIA began infiltrating small teams of South Vietnamese undercover agents into
North Vietnam. These teams were a mix of South Vietnamese army officers and civilians, many of
whom originally came from North Vietnam and knew the terrain and dialects. The teams slipped into
North Vietnam by night on junks, sampans and speedboats; parachuted in with help from the South
Vietnamese air force; or were dropped into Laos by the CIA from Air America planes and walked into
the war zone.

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Strong evidence suggests these operations were compromised from the beginning, and by 1964, the
Pentagon was certain team members had been killed, captured or "turned" to work for North Vietnam. A
new effort, dubbed Operation Plan 34-Alpha, was launched as part of a shadowy covert action force
known as the Studies and Observation Group, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV-SOG).
These operations were no more successful than the initial efforts, and by 1968, some 500 agents had
been lost in North Vietnam. US officials told their families the men were dead, and nothing was done to
find them, yet 20 years later more than 300 of the agents were released from North Vietnamese prisons,
exposing the dark secret of the abandoned commandos.

Using recently declassified government files and personal interviews with the commandos and CIA and
SOG participants, Tourison examines the tragically flawed operation from two perspectives. He first
demonstrates how these operations were continued, although the CIA and SOG were fully aware the
operations were compromised. Tourison charges that these ill-fated operations may have helped trigger
the war. He asserts that an attack by 34-Alpha commandos occurred on two islands in the Gulf of
Tonkin two days before the North Vietnamese attack on the destroyer USS Maddox on 2 August 1964.
Thus, these covert operations played a seminal role in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and subsequent US
involvement in South Vietnam.

Tourison also focuses on the commandos' stories, both during their captivity and after their release. They
were abandoned by the CIA and shunned by the United States after their release. Shortly after the
commandos were captured, US officials decided it was too expensive to continue paying the men's wives
and families the $2,000 per year promised in their contracts. The United States declared these men dead
and stopped payments. To make matters worse, after their release, government officials prevented the
commandos from entering the United States, label-ing their stories as "not credible" and charging that
the missions they described had "never existed."

The commandos were released after nearly 30 years of harsh and debilitating imprisonment only to find
that the country they fought for had ceased to exist; that their employer, the United States, had left the
region; and that communication with the United States was virtually nonexistent.

This is a controversial book. Not all readers versed on operations in South Vietnam will agree with the
author's arguments and conclusions, particularly his assertions about the role of Operation Plan
34-Alpha in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Nevertheless, the book is well worth reading, because
Tourison, unlike most who have written about Vietnam, is fluent in Vietnamese and bases his book on
first-person interviews with the surviving South Vietnamese participants. This is not a pretty story, either
in the discussion of the mission failures or in the telling of how the commandos were abandoned, but it
is a story that should be told. Tourison provides a valuable addition to the historiography of the war.

LTC James H. Willbanks, USA,

Retired, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

ATLAS OF THE SIOUX WARS compiled by William G. Robertson, Jerald E. Brown, William M.
Camprey and Scott R. McMeen. 64 pages. Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996. No charge.

Written in the style of the West Point Atlas of the American Wars and designed to rectify the

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omission of Indian Wars, this slim volume provides a wealth of information on the struggle between the
US Army and the Sioux Nation. After briefly considering the 1862 and 1866 campaigns, the Atlas
details the 1876 Great Sioux War, most famous for the Battle of the Little Bighorn River-"Custer's last
stand." However, the book does not neglect Major General George Crook's and Major General Nelson
Appleton Miles' campaigns.

The book highlights the great mystery surrounding Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer's battle
in light of John S. Gray's conclusions in Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876.
Unfortunately, the Atlas was completed before Richard A. Fox's Archaeology, History and
Custer's Last Battle: The Little Bighorn Re-examined, was published. Fox's findings radically
change the battle's historical perspective. However, over-all, the Atlas is an excellent introduction to
this period of American military history and is a useful companion for the serious student.

LTC James J. Dunphy, USAR,

Fairfax, Virginia

DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL: The Japanese-American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II

by Page Smith. 476 pages. Simon & Schuster Inc., New York. 1995. $27.50.

On 2 March 1942, just three months after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, West Coast residents were
in turmoil over an expected invasion and viewed people of oriental background with fear and suspicion.

Lieutenant General John DeWitt, Commander, Western Defense Command, went on what some called a
"witch hunt" to find all Japanese-Americans and move them to camps throughout the United States. A
test of wills erupted between DeWitt and US Attorney General Francis Biddle, who was fanatically
determined to prevent encroachment on Japanese-Americans' civil rights. However, after President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, DeWitt had the authority to intern more than
110,000 Japanese-Americans.

With a narration different from that in other accounts, author Page Smith offers a fresh perspective of
this tragic story. Beginning with a detailed and comprehensive history of Japan, from its ancient roots
through the time Japanese immigrants began entering US territory, Smith makes a commendable attempt
to give a background on the evolution of the Japanese mentality, sociology and psyche, often summed up
as Yamato Damashii-the Japanese spirit.

Using new archival research and moving testimonies from personal interviews with survivors, Smith
describes the experiences of ordinary people placed in extraordinary circumstances. The reader can
easily imagine what the men, women and children felt during those sad times, which drastically and
permanently affected the lives of so many innocent Americans.

The one positive thing that came from the internment was the rapid assimilation of Japanese-Americans
into American culture, breaking down the traditional immigrant social structure. With the exception of a
small group from the older immigrant generation, most Japanese-Americans wanted to be considered
loyal US citizens.

This book is well written and, for the most part, reads like a novel, compelling the reader onward. Smith
has writ-ten one of the most comprehensive treatments of the internment camp tragedy yet published. I
strongly recommend this book as one of the best available sources for understanding the historical,

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societal and political implications of the internment camp decision.

MAJ Alexander A. Cox, USA,

XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

SHARING SECRETS WITH STALIN: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945 by Bradley
F. Smith. 307 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1996. $35.00.

While most people are familiar with World War II's Lend-Lease Program, few are aware that Great
Britain and the United States exchanged intelligence with the Soviet Union. Bradley F. Smith, an
experienced writer and history instructor, states that the Allies began exchanging information about
Germany and Japan after Germany's Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Using archive and recently released
materials, Smith portrays these exchanges as fluctuating for a°·¯viewed the United States as an emerging
power with the economic strength to produce enough to share.

The book revolves around OBs and wireless intercepts-the "Y" services. The Allies were hesitant to
share what they acquired from the airwaves for fear of disclosing too much. The Soviets pushed for more
"Y" materials; the British and Americans pushed for more OB information. The United States openly
shared information gained via the airwaves in the Pacific, but the Soviets were not interested in that
theater until the European situation eased. The author also examines the pressure to open a second front
as it affected the passing of intelligence. The book does not fully explore the issue of Siberian bases, a
pet project of the then US Army Air Corps.

Smith's main problem is how to make repetition interesting. He drags out the constant ups and downs of
Allied cooperation. He adds some interest by giving a few details about the individuals involved in
British and US intelligence missions, but he passes quickly over the lack of cooperation between the US
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Soviet intelligence. That story is left for others to tell.
Communist International members and their fellow travelers were involved in the OSS. A review of the
information they were giving to the Soviets explains why the Soviets were reluctant to exchange
information with other Allies. When you already have the information, you do not need to cooperate to
get it. The author could have explored a wealth of other matters as well.

The book teaches two lessons: those who have valuable information get greater cooperation; and one
must be persistent. That is, do not be too generous in working with allies unless previous cooperation
exists, and in time, situations change and cooperation may flow where it once was blocked.

Peter C. Unsinger, San Jose State

University, San Jose, California

GUERRILLA WARFARE: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook by

Anthony James Joes. 320 pages. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1996. $89.50.

Seldom does a title so accurately reflect a book as this one. Anthony James Joes, professor of
international relations at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia has written a valuable, if madden-ingly
flawed, "first-look" reference source for those interested in the history of guerrilla warfare and
insurgency.

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The first section, "History and Analysis," provides competent short narratives of 40 guerrilla struggles,
ranging from the American Revolution through the bloody insurgency in East Timor. The subsequent
10-page analysis is probably the best short treatment available of successful counterinsurgency
principles. However, from this high point the book plummets.

The biographical sketches of insurgents and counterinsurgency leaders are too short to be truly useful.
For exam-ple, Ronald Reagan only merits 71 words, and the Iran-Contra affair is not even mentioned.
The sketches are not cross-referenced or supported by suggestions for further reading and are marred by
egregious errors-General Creighton Abrams, commander of US Forces in Vietnam and Army chief of
staff, suffers the indignity of having his name misspelled ("Abrahms") at least five times. Joes rebounds
in the annotated bibliography, where he gives a comprehensive and usefully organized list of the most
important guerrilla warfare books. However, it is hard to imagine anyone paying $100 for Joes' book,
which does not have a single graph, chart or map-inexcusable in a survey book. The four-page index is
also inadequate.

When researching a phenomenon that has stymied conventional armies since Roman times, consult Joes'
Guerrilla Warfare in the library or get former US Marine Captain Robert B. Asprey's recently revised
War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Asprey's book, available for $40, is well
illustrated with maps and written in a lively and engaging style.

We have not seen the end of unconventional warfare, and defeating it is not our Army's strength.
Reading War in the Shadows will help us understand and, hopefully, begin to solve the difficult
problems guerrilla warfare continues to present.

CPT John Nagl, USA, Oxford

University, Oxford, England

THE SECRET WAR FOR THE UNION: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil
War by Edwin C. Fishel. 640 pages. Houghton Mifflin, New York. 1996. $35.00.

Since the American Civil War ended, many authors have tried to tell the military intelligence, or secret
operations, part of the story. Until now, no publication has gained credibility as anything more than the
dubious memoirs of someone attempting to gain notoriety as a major contributor to the cause. Edwin C.
Fishel's book attempts to correct this deficiency.

Fishel, a career intelligence professional, spent 40 years researching Civil War intelligence operations
and uncovered new information. He describes the actions of spies, scouts, signalmen, balloonists and
others involved in supplying information as he relates how commanders used military intelligence to
make tactical decisions.

Fishel attacks three Civil War myths. Was General George B. McClellan really duped into believing he
was massively outnumbered in the Peninsula and later at Antietam? Through an exhaustive study of
McClellan's and chief intelligence officer Alan Pinkerton's papers, Fishel found that Pinkerton-with
McClellan's knowledge and approval-purposely inflated enemy strength estimates. Although the two
agreed enemy estimates must be "made large," the estimates fell short of McClellan's preconceived
ideas, so he inflated them even more before forwarding them to his military and political superiors,
thus-the first myth.

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The second myth surrounds General "Fighting Joe" Hooker conducting an undetected 55-mile forced
march from the front at Fredericksburg to the Confederate rear at Chancellorsville. Rather than amazing
luck, a bogus message and a nearly perfect knowledge of enemy dispositions allowed Hooker to cause
Lee to split his army. This shows why good intelligence alone cannot win battles. If it could,
Chancellorsville would have been a resounding Union success.

The final myth the author examines is that Gettysburg was an accidental meeting of the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Fishel contends it directly resulted from intelligence that
persuaded Major General George G. Meade to acquiesce to his subordinate generals' desires to fight at
Gettysburg.

In addition to these three main themes, Fishel discusses several side issues concerning military and
civilian personnel who played intelligence roles during the war. In essence, this book corrects the
intelligence record and, for the first time, chronicles the actions of some of the Union's unsung heroes.

However, caution is in order. Despite its subtitle, The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil
War, it is far from a complete story. The book's scope is necessarily restricted. It only covers the first
Bull Run through Gettysburg in the Eastern Theater-an all-encompassing book would take volumes.
Although this shortcoming does not subtract from the book's overall quality, it is something the reader
should know. Also, because little information exists from the Confederate perspective, the book has a
definite Union slant. To fully appreciate the author's points, the reader should be knowledgeable about
the battles covered. The maps are helpful to the reader.

This is an important book for Civil War enthusiasts, because it clearly shows the
intelligence-decision-action sequence at work. Fishel's work will cause controversy among Civil War
intelligence scholars because of the new information it offers. Many historians will likely rethink some
common Civil War beliefs.

The book is not a simple story of battles won or lost by good or bad intelligence. It is much more. As the
author writes, "A simple equation between intelligence success and battlefield success cannot be made."
If one could make connections between intelligence and battle outcomes, no book would be necessary. I
only hope that other books on Civil War intelligence follow this one. After 130 years, it is time.

SGM James H. Clifford, USA,

63d Ordnance Battalion (EOD),
Fort Dix, New Jersey

THE HISTORY OF THE 7TH SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION, PRINZ EUGEN by Otto Kumm. 281
pages. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc., Winnipeg, Canada. 1995. No price available.

This little book is one of a series of previously published Wehrmacht divisional histories now translated
and published in English. The series will ultimately include more than two dozen such histories.

Otto Kumm, a Prinz Eugen Division commander, gives a first-person narrative of the unit's experiences.
Published as a recollection with help from old soldiers of the Prinz Eugen Kameraden (reunion group),
the book is a fascinating account from the division's formation in 1942 to its capture on 15 May 1945.
The epilogue gives an account of the troops' two years in captivity.

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Kumm begins his history by explaining Germany's connection to the Balkans, which began with the
Ottoman Empire's 14th century European invasion. Although the Turks' struggle with the Europeans
ebbed and flowed until the early 20th century, they reached their high-water mark near Vienna in 1529.
From that point, Germanic soldiers took on the defense burden. Using German, Croatian and Slavic
troops, the Habsburg Empire established a military frontier on the confrontation line. This detail is
important to Kumm in establishing the rationale for how the division formed in Bosnia from "Volk
Deutsch" Croats and Muslim Bosnians.

The division waged most of its campaigns in Bosnia with Bosnian troops against other Bosnians-chiefly
Serbian Chetniks or Marshal Tito's partisans. In short, the Prinz Eugen Division fought guerrillas. In
some ways, the campaigns are chilling precursors of the present-day Bosnian situation. The Prinz Eugen
Division fought in northeast Bosnia, near Tuzla; attacked and seized Srebenica; and fought along the
Drina. In the ultimate irony for those of us who have served in Bosnia, the Prinz Eugen Division
withdrew across the Sava River at Brod, where US units now cross to return to Germany.

Kumm's pride in his unit and its exploits is evident throughout the book and adds zest to his meticulous
account of how the unit was formed, trained and equipped. However, his battle narratives are more
tantalizing than satisfying because they read like after-action reports. The narratives are laconic and give
little detail or sense of the tensions that must have existed. As with every soldier of every army that ever
served in Bosnia, Kumm is far more descriptive of Bosnia's difficult conditions. Summers are hot as
hell, and winters are cold as charity. Bosnian geography also makes for uncomfortable campaigning.
Kumm is voluble in his recollection of Bosnia's rugged mountains and marshy river valleys. The Prinz
Eugen Division also fought on the Adriatic Coast and the more rugged Montenegro terrain.

Kumm casts a human face on Yugoslavia's bitter fighting. He argues that part of the difficulty of fighting
in Yugoslavia was that the partisans and Chetniks would not adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Kumm
asserts that the Prinz Eugen's behavior was acceptable and cites a court-martial of some German troops
involved in reprisals. Whether or not Kumm's postwar recollections of the division's conduct are
accurate, his spirited defense of the troops' conduct makes interesting reading.

The history of the 7th SS Mountain Division and the others fills a valuable gap in English World War II
records. Kumm loved his division-that alone makes his book worthwhile. The difficulty of forming and
training a division in an active theater of war is interesting and is a useful reminder that training can and
must continue, even in an active theater.

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,

Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMMANDING THE RED ARMY'S SHERMAN TANKS by Dmitriy Loza, translated by James F.
Gebhardt. 173 pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE. 1996. $25.00.

James Gebhardt's translation of Dmitriy Loza's unpublished memoir helps fill in some blanks about the
fighting on World War II's Eastern Front. Through the Lend-Lease Program, the United States provided
the Soviet Union with Sherman tanks and other combat equipment. During the Cold War, Soviet
military literature barely acknowledged this, and when it did, the acknowledgment was usually
accompanied by disparaging remarks about the equipment's performance. Russian historians now claim
the Soviet Union would not have survived its war against Germany without Allied help. Thus, it is no

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wonder that Loza's book was not published until now.

While all translations suffer crossing the language barrier, Gebhardt's is natural, crisp and fluent and
fully captures the style of Red Army memoirs written over the past 50 years. Individual anecdotes blend
official and general historical operational overviews with splices of socialist realism. Loza's post-Soviet
version allows some admission of human error and candor not seen in previously censored publications.
For example, he reveals his tankers concealed from Soviet authorities the bottles of whiskey US factory
workers hid in the tank guns for Red Army soldiers. Loza also testifies he commanded his unit to drive
through minefields to save time in the attack, following Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov's
orders.

Loza's military personnel records were stamped inomarochnik, which translates roughly as foreign
vehicle specialist. Except for one month in a Soviet T-34, he spent all his time at the front in
foreign-made tanks, primarily the Sherman and the British Matilda. He fought with Shermans from
mid-1943 through August 1945 as part of the 6th Guard Tank Army in Ukraine, Romania, Hungary,
Austria, Czechoslovakia and Manchuria.

Loza writes that although the Sherman's track suspension system was quieter than the T-34's, the
Sherman's tracks acted like sled runners on icy roads. The tank's high center of gravity also made it easy
to overturn. The So-viets overcame these liabilities with makeshift cleats and training. The Sherman tank
was better than German tanks and the T-34 at moving in soft, muddy terrain; thus, Sherman-supplied
units received more difficult terrain axes of advance. According to Loza, because its front armor was
thinner than that on German tanks, one Sherman tank would frontally engage German tanks while the
others moved around for flank shots. Red Army operational commanders also routinely stripped
Sherman gyrocompasses and gave them to T-34 units.

This book is filled with situations and solutions useful to tactical commanders. Gebhardt's commendable
and quiet work provides useful insight into Red Army operations for Western military readers. It is an
excellent addition to the military professional's library on armored warfare on the Eastern Front.

COL Richard N. Armstrong, USA,

Retired, Copperas Cove, Texas

THE DEVIL KNOWS HOW TO RIDE: The True Story of William Clarke Quantrill and His
Confederate Raiders by Edward E. Leslie. 534 pages. Random House Inc., New York. 1996. $30.00.

The story of guerrilla warfare on the western border during the American Civil War has long been a
partisan argument, with the belligerents attempting to show their detractors' faults.

Confederate guerrilla and Union Jayhawker supporters have vilified the men who rode as warriors for
the other side. Author Edward Leslie takes a more objective look at William Clarke Quantrill's part of
this irregular war in Kansas and Missouri.

Leslie's biography gives Quantrill a personality and, though the detractors of this man so often
demonized in Civil War history will not agree, identifies many of the problems that made the border
such a violent maelstrom. Leslie succeeds in providing the most objective examination to date of the
violence in Missouri and Kansas. He looks at the men who became guerrillas and Jayhawkers and

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searches for the causes of their violent natures and actions. He gives an amazingly balanced portrayal of
these shadowy warriors, avoiding the partisan traps of his predecessors. Leslie deftly identifies the
thorny problems involved in this personal type of war-fare. This study differs from most books about
Quantrill in that it follows the guerrilla chieftain after his departure from the Missouri border, providing
the best account yet of Quantrill's final days in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

This is a well-written, and well-researched book. Unfortunately for Civil War scholars, Leslie's method
of documenting his voluminous research is not exact, leaving considerable room for questions about
where he got his information. Despite this minor flaw, the book is an important study of irregular
warfare during the Civil War.

LTC Jim Martin, USA, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WHEN TITANS CLASHED: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler by David Glantz and Jonathan
House. 380 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995. $29.95.

When Americans talk of Allied operations during World War II, they are usually only referring to the
United States and Great Britain and label General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the architect of victory. The
Cold War's hostilities make us forget the Russians' enormous struggle on the Eastern Front, fought on a
land scale comparable to half the US mainland and resulting in more than 11 million German casualties
and up to 30 million Soviet fatalities. US reliance on captured German documents and the memoirs of
senior German officers distort the picture even more.

Based on unprecedented access to Soviet archives, authors David Glantz and Jonathan House have
crafted a meticulous study of strategic- and operational-level warfare on the Eastern Front. Glantz, one
of the foremost historians on Soviet World War II operations, and House divide their study into four
parts. The first part encompasses the doctrinal experimentation period and includes trial combat in
Poland and the Far East and domestic crises leading to the outbreak of war in June 1941. The second
part, from June 1941 to November 1942, included the period when the Red Army, decimated by purges
and in transition with no coherent organization or effective weapons, fell back but held at the gates of
Moscow and Stalingrad. The third part details the period of war, November 1942 to December 1943,
when the Red Army learned from its mistakes, developed effective organization, doctrine and weapons
and found effective, if not brilliant, military commanders. The fourth part details the period from January
1944 to May 1945, when the Soviets annihilated the Wehrmacht with sophisticated and coordinated
multifront operations that employed tailored forces and extensive deception operations.

This book is tight, well written and is an accurate survey of major as well as often-overlooked operations
and examines Soviet institutional and organizational innovations. Its primary value may be in the
research detailed in extensive endnotes.

Just as much of our US Civil War legacy was shaped by Southern historians, many of our attitudes about
World War II have been molded by German accounts. However, Glantz and House do not present the
"Soviet view." They provide an analysis of German and Soviet strengths and weaknesses and relate the
two countries' operations to Allied operations elsewhere. They also refute Soviet complaints about the
delayed Second Front and praise US contributions to the Soviet war effort through the Lend-Lease
Program and the strategic bombing campaign.

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The book suffers at times from its spartan commentary. As in earlier books, Glantz favors the "Joe
Friday" school of writing: "Just the facts, ma'am." The reader can get lost in order of battle listings.
Commanders never evolve into human beings, because no anecdotal reminiscences bring them to life.
Editing is spotty to the point of irritation. "Rasputitsa," "rasputitza" and "rasputiza" are seemingly minor
errors, but they do cause that nagging thought, "If that is not accurate, what else is questionable?" It is
difficult enough for the nonspecialist to grasp at first that I.V. Stalin is the Stalin (commonly known as
Joseph Stalin) much less when he is referred to as I.S. Stalin. The extensive maps are not easy to follow,
either. These are minor complaints, however. This is a major work of scholarship and should be on the
bookshelf of anyone interested in World War II or Soviet history. When Titans Clashed provides an
excellent one-volume introduction to this warfare arena and sets the stage for the interested reader to
delve into Glantz's specialized studies.

LTC Diane L. Smith, USA,

US Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

THE KEY TO THE BULGE: THE BATTLE FOR LOSHEIMERGRABEN by Stephen M.

Rusiecki. 224 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1996. $55.00.

From the growing pile of books about the Battle of the Bulge, Steven M. Rusiecki's story emerges as a
well-crafted and incisive history of the re-markable battle between Americans and Germans from 16 to
17 December 1944 at the Losheimergraben Crossroads in the Ardennes. The crossroads and its customs
houses sat along the Belgium-Germany border, astride the designated avenue of approach for the 6th
Panzer Army's spearhead attack unit, Kampfgruppe Peiper.

The US 394th Infantry Regiment, 99th Infantry Division, was tasked with defending a wide front of
thick woods, hills, ravines and small clusters of villages, including Losheimergraben. Because it was
viewed as a quiet "ghost front" not in danger of significant enemy action, the Ardennes was considered
to be the perfect place to gradually condition inexperienced and untested GIs. However, Adolf Hitler had
other ideas, and it became the site of his greatest Western Front offensive, pitting three powerful panzer
and infantry armies against understrength US units.

Timing was crucial to the German plan to drive a wedge through the Allies and push all the way to
Antwerp. The Germans' secret buildup of combat power, startlingly effective deception plan and massive
artillery preparation caught the Americans by surprise. In-tending to seize Losheimergraben, German
panzergrenadiers and paratroopers led the attack against the 394th. The panzers' goal was to penetrate
deep into American rear areas.

The 394th and its attachments did not fold up and run away as expected. They stood their ground,
holding their defensive positions against overwhelming odds and delaying German forces for 36
hours-throwing the 6th Panzer Army's schedule completely off track. The 394th was finally overrun,
with high casualties on both sides. However, because the 6th Panzer Army was Germany's main effort,
the 36-hour delay at Losheimergraben was the key that led to the eventual failure of Hitler's last
offensive of the war.

Germans and Americans grappled in close combat and in miserable conditions during this infantry fight.
High command and insulated staffs contributed little. Captains, lieutenants, sergeants and privates on

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both sides led their men from the front and inspired heroism. Rusiecki gives a balanced picture of the
battle from German and American perspectives and creates a fascinating glimpse of small units in
desperate action. His research is thorough and noteworthy, and his narrative soars with excitement and
tension.

This is a superb first effort for the author. The book is a tribute to both armies' courage, determination
and discipline. Although overpriced, the book is well supplemented with maps, photos, notes, index,
bibliography, glossary, orders of battle and other appendixes and is a suitable companion to Michael
Reynolds' The Devil's Adjutant.

COL William D. Bushnell, USMC,

Retired, Sebascodegan Island, Maine

STUDIES IN BATTLE COMMAND by the US Army Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Staff College. 175 pages. The Leavenworth Press, Leavenworth, KS. 1995. No charge.

This book's 24 essays, which analyze historic combat engagements and military leaders, are worthy of
every soldier's study. The preface, written by Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Director Colonel Jerry D.
Morelock, states that the essays' unifying theme is "provided by the direct or indirect application . . . of
the battle command competencies" to each case. These competencies include: seeing the enemy, seeing
yourself, visualizing the battlefield and seeing the future.

Written by the CSI faculty, the essays discuss leaders and battles ranging from Gustavus Adolphus in the
17th century to Vietnam's Hamburger Hill. Morelock says the essays "include examples of brilliant
success and dismal failure. Most of all, they offer today's military professionals perspective and insight
into the essence of their calling: command and leadership."

The essays delve into many obscure battles. For example, only real history buffs are familiar with
Australian Lieutenant General Sir John Monash's actions at Hamel, France, during World War I.
Officers aspiring to higher command could use him as an example. The same is true of Brigadier
General Norman D. Cota at Omaha Beach on D-Day. The actions of Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer in
the Dominican Republic in 1965 and 1966 provide many lessons in operations similar to those in
Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.

Many of the unsuccessful battles examined are from earlier days. Although equipment, operations and
tactics are primitive or rudimentary by today's standards, the principles remain the same. Two chapters
on George Armstrong Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn give an excellent example of the
application-or lack of application-of sound military principles.

LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA, Retired Clifton, Virginia

CUSTER: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer by Jeffry D. Wert. 462 pages. Simon
& Schuster Inc., New York. 1996. $27.50.

George Armstrong Custer's colorful, flamboyant, controversial lifestyle has made him a pop culture
legend. Discussions about him are rarely indifferent-everyone seems to have an opinion. Custer is seen
as either a brilliant tactical leader or a publicity-seeking fool. Even his mentor and most public

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supporter, Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, blamed Custer's "imprudence" for the massacre of the 7th
Cavalry on the Little Big Horn River. However, such assessments are unduly simplified. Jeffry Wert's
book shows "Autie" Custer had more depth than the two-dimensional character we get from textbooks,
television and movies.

Written like a historical novel, this book is fun and fascinating. Rather than stringing together a series of
out-of-context facts to prove a premise, Wert takes the more difficult approach of presenting
well-documented facts from primary sources and often cites double or triple references, then encourages
readers to draw their own conclusions. The 20-page bibliography is impressive. Also, the author weaves
his voluminous research into the text without distracting the reader with expansive references. The work
is in the book, where it should be.

Books about Custer generally divide his life into his Civil War combat leadership phase and his
post-Civil War years as an Indian fighter on the northern plains. However, Custer depicts the general's
entire life as an elaborate tapestry woven from all the elements of the man's history, personality and
passions. Wert addresses Custer's controversial political and not-so-private life head on, recognizing it as
a key part of what made him so fascinating. Finally, the book examines in great detail the only other
thing as important to Custer as his love of the Army and leading soldiers-his wife, Libbie.

Custer's critics seized on his alleged infidelity, trying to diminish him further. Wert's research, including
many detailed and frank letters between Custer and his wife, greatly supports the idea that Custer was
totally devoted to her.

Custer craved public recognition and acclaim. In the political Army of the mid-19th century, he was a
master at using the press to further his own cause. But with limelight came public scrutiny. His ravenous
craving for recognition clouded his judgment, resulting in the tarnishment of the brilliant episodes of his
combat leadership.

Wert portrays Custer with care and fairness. However, despite his faults, he was a gifted cavalry officer
and brilliant commander who lived his life with passion. This book reads like a good novel. But it can
also be used for further study of the US Army and the cavalry. Wert's research and bibliography make
Custer a book worth owning.

LTC Richard D. Newton, USAF,

6th Special Operations Squadron,
Hurlburt Field, Florida

HAZARDOUS DUTY by David H. Hackworth. 328 galley pages. William Morrow & Co., New York.
1996. $25.00.

According to author David Hackworth, the military consists of only two types of people: the "perfumed
princes"-usually at the senior level-and the "warriors"-those who are outspoken and politically incorrect
and, therefore, rarely rise to the top of the military hierarchy. Hackworth stresses that the US Armed
Forces still have it wrong; the military-industrial-congressional-co mplex President Dwight D.
Eisenhower warned the American public about is entrenched and producing high-technology weapons
that are immensely expensive and of marginal battlefield value; the "grunt"-soldier, sailor, airman,

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marine-is not only poorly led but is misused in politically driven misadventures called operations other
than war (OOTW); senior-level officials in the Pentagon fail to give appropriate military advice and cave
in to political leaders who do not begin to grasp military power's utility.

In a nutshell, this summarizes Hazardous Duty and the common themes that run throughout this
critique of post-Cold War US combat operations and OOTW. The thesis-that the military has it all
wrong-is a continuation of the theme in a 1989 book by the same author, About Face: The Odyssey of
an American Warrior.

Hazardous Duty focuses on today's post-Cold War period. US Armed Forces are frequently committed
to peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations while maintain-ing readiness so they can
deploy to areas where more significant combat operations could occur at any time. Hackworth addresses
Desert Storm; operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia; and looks at Korea during a period of
heightened alert. Inappropriately included is a chapter about Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael
Boorda's suicide along with Hackworth's own role in pursuing the story of Boorda wearing the "V"
device on ribbons.

This book seeks to tell the "real truth" about the state of the US military. Anecdotal information obtained
firsthand or through service member interviews is presented to get to the truth about "we versus
they"-the grunt or warrior versus the politically correct, the ticket punchers and the perfumed princes.
True, there are self-serving people in the Armed Forces; there are situations where grunts get the mud
and cold and rear echelon personnel get hot chow and heated facilities; where errors of judgment can
lead to greater hardship for the grunt, including injury or even death; there are times when a soldier's
immediate comfort is set aside for a ceremony or to present a professional image, but generalizing from
specific events, fiascos that should not have happened, to servicewide systemic or institutional shortfall
or fundamental fault is not getting to the "real truth."

Stories from this "reporter's notebook" are as old as the military. Shortfalls identified require vigilance
and institutional and individual leadership to minimize their impact. "Real truths" are not revealed here.
What is revealed are circumstances, situations, personal proclivities and varied perspectives-not
necessarily failure to provide leadership or properly equip and care for soldiers. At the same time,
Hackworth reveals that US soldiers are "great young fighters" who represent "a spirited, well-trained,
professional army." He also insists that problems observed "came not from the bottom but from the top."
Evidently, Hackworth feels Army and other service leaders have had nothing to do with the quality of
the young people and the units called on to repeatedly deploy to Bosnia, Haiti or Somalia.

Not everything is perfect with the Armed Forces. New weapon systems do not always operate as
intended, and perhaps there is too much focus on technology and advanced weaponry. And, although
there are some bad leaders, bad policies and bad plans, this book is too sweeping in its criticism and
conclusions.

Defense policies, strategy, selection of weapon systems, overdependence on technology, deployment

decisions and leader and soldier shortcomings are all fair game. However, the author's broad,
encompassing criticism and his division of the Armed Forces into the good guys and the bad guys-who
do not care about the young soldier-is unwarranted. This seriously degrades the book as a source of
useful, reasoned, critical analysis of an institution vital to the nation's security.

COL James D. Blundell, USA,

Retired, Institute of Land Warfare,

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Arlington, Virginia

RELUCTANT WARRIOR: A True Story of Duty and Heroism in Vietnam

by Michael C. Hodgins. 329 pages. Fawcett Columbine, New York. 1996. $24.00.

First Lieutenant Michael Hodgins, an enlisted Marine who rose to the rank of sergeant before being
commissioned, served as a platoon leader in the First Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Division,
during the first six months of 1970. He then joined an elite six-man unit that provided "stingray" patrols
and platoon-size observation posts to "locate, interdict and destroy enemy forces, bases, logistical
installations, infiltration routes and LOCs [lines of communication]" in the northernmost I Corps sector
of South Vietnam. The mission was made more difficult by the concurrent withdrawal of US Armed
Forces from Vietnam and intense pressure to minimize casualties.

Reluctant Warrior is an excellent primer on small-unit leadership, the officer-noncommissioned

officer relationship, small-unit tactics and the nature of war in a nationbuilding context. The book is a
cross between James R. McDonough's Platoon Leader and E.D. Swinton's The Defense of
Duffer's Drift. It is the kind of book battalion commanders or Officer Basic Course instructors
should assign to new combat arms lieutenants.

From the best way to assume unit command, to training techniques and fire support planning,
Reluctant War-rior will get lieutenants-and their commanders-talking and thinking about the
fundamentals of the profession of arms.

Contemporary photographs, maps and reprints of Hodgin's actual patrol reports make the book good
source material for sand table exercises in a commander's office or classroom.

CPT John A. Nagl, USA, Oxford

University, Oxford, England

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Military Review Index

Adapting Doctrine to Knowledge-Based Warfare:

INSIGHTS; Maj Steven J. Mains, USA 93 Mar/Apr

African Rapid-Deployment Force, An;

Col McGill Alexander, South African Army 26 May/Jun

Age of the New Persuaders, The;

Lt Col Timothy L. Thomas, USA, Ret. 72 May/Jun

Air Mech Strike: Revolution in Maneuver Warfare;

Maj Charles A. Jarnot, USA 79 Mar/Apr

American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?, The;

Col Charles W. Brown, USA, and Charles C. Moskos Jr. 30 Jan/Feb

Army Basic Research Strategy; Thomas H. Killion 23 Mar/Apr

Army Manual for Civilian Business, An:

REVIEW ESSAY; Col Jerry D. Morelock, USA 96 Mar/Apr

Army and Society, The; Lt Col Frederic J. Brown, USA 14 Jan/Feb

ASEAN: Coming of Age; Col John B. Haseman, USA, Ret. 56 May/Jun

Assessing Force Protection Risk;

Lt Col Daniel Ward, USA, Ret. 11 Nov/Dec

Base Realignment and Closure: A Historical Perspective:

ALMANAC; Lt Col Michael F. Huebner, USA, Ret. 68 Nov/Dec

Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret. 42 May/Jun

Battle Command: Vision for Success;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 52 Mar/Apr

Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?;

Maj Deborah Reisweber, USA 49 Sep/Oct

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Beaten by the Bugs: The Soviet-Afghan War Experience;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and Maj

William A. Jorgensen, USAR, 30 Nov/Dec

"Bitter Lesson of Unpreparedness, The": ALMANAC;

Maj George C. Marshall Jr., USA 136 Jul/Aug

Border Patrol Enforcement Versus Militarization: REVIEW

ESSAY; Lt Col Geoffrey B. Demarest, USA 91 May/Jun

Building Military Relations in Africa;

Lt Col Karl E. Prinslow, USA 18 May/Jun

Careful Look at Defense Manpower, A;

Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., USA, Ret., and Curtis W. Tarr 23 Jan/Feb

Center for Army Lessons Learned: Winning in the

Information Age, The; Lt Gen L.D. Holder, USA, Ret.,

and Col Edward J. Fitzgerald, USA 123 Jul/Aug

Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future;

Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 108 Jul/Aug

Changing Security Environment, The; Graham H. Turbiville Jr.;

Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret.; and Jacob W. Kipp 5 May/Jun

CINC's View of Operational Art, A;

Gen Crosbie E. Saint, USA 115 Jan/Feb

Combined Air Operations in Bosnia;

Lt Col Frank J. Caravella, USA, Ret. 87 Jul/Aug

Command; Gen John W. Foss, USA 66 Jan/Feb

Concepts in International Peacekeeping; Col Andrei

Demurenko, Russian Army, and Alexander Nikitin 67 May/Jun

Confronting Terrorism: New War Form or Mission

Impossible?; Lt Col Stephen H. Gotowicki, USA 61 May/Jun

Confronting the RMA in Russia; Jacob W. Kipp 49 May/Jun

Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in

Unpreparedness, The; Congressman Ike Skelton 93 Jul/Aug

Counterinsurgency Paradox, The;

Sgt 1st Class John T. Broom, USA 42 Jul/Aug

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Decision Making-A Better Way;

Lt Col Gregory T. Banner, USA 53 Sep/Oct

Defining Military Strategy;

Col Arthur F. Lykke Jr., USA, Ret. 183 Jan/Feb

Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment:

A Necessity; Gen Robert W. RisCassi, USA 103 Jan/Feb

Educating and Training for Theater Warfare;

Col L.D. Holder, USA 87 Jan/Feb

End State Pitfalls-A Strategic Perspective;

INSIGHTS; James H. Anderson 93 Sep/Oct

Extending the Battlefield; Gen Donn A. Starry, USA 151 Jan/Feb

Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev, A;

Maj Raymond C. Finch III, USA 33 May/Jun

Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts:

INSIGHTS; Robert J. Bunker 90 Sep/Oct

Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver-US Army Operations

Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond;

Col Wayne A. Downing, USA 144 Jan/Feb

FM 100-5 and Information Age Warfare;

Maj John M. Spiszer, USA 15 Sep/Oct

FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986;

Gen William R. Richardson, USA 174 Jan/Feb

Force Protection Disparities; Lt Col Walter E. Kretchik, USA 73 Jul/Aug

Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of

Change; Gen Frederick M. Franks Jr., USA 178 Jan/Feb

Future of Mission Orders, The; Cpt Joseph S. McLamb, USA 71 Sep/Oct

General Headquarters Exercise Insights;

Lt Col John C. Dibert, USA 61 Mar/Apr

Historical Perspectives on Future War; Robert F. Baumann 40 Mar/Apr

How to Change an Army; Col Huba Wass de Czege, USA 162 Jan/Feb

Information Operations for the Ground Commander; Maj Gen

David L. Grange, USA, and Col James A. Kelley, USA 5 Mar/Apr

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Information Operations in Bosnia; Lt Col Stephen W.

Shanahan, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Garry J. Beavers, USA 53 Nov/Dec

Initiative: The Power Behind Intent;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 59 Sep/Oct

Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces;

Maj Robert C. Shaw, USA 37 Jul/Aug

Isolation of the Battlefield by Air Power;

Gen Henry H. Arnold, USA 131 Jan/Feb

JPME: Are We There Yet?; Congressman Ike Skelton 96 Jan/Feb

Knowledge-Based Warfare Implications;

Maj Steven J. Eden, USA 49 Mar/Apr

Leader Development and Command and Control;

Lt Gen Leonard P. Wishart III, USA 62 Jan/Feb

Leadership: A Return to Basics; Gen Edward C. Meyer, USA 58 Jan/Feb

Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environ­

ment and the Golden Rule; Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 47 Jan/Feb

Leadership, Versatility and All That Jazz;

Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, USA 52 Jan/Feb

Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,

The: ALMANAC; Christopher R. Gabel 98 Sep/Oct

Logistics: The Past is Prologue: INSIGHTS; Eric A. Orsini 65 Nov/Dec

Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in

Combined Operations; Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA 123 Jan/Feb

Managing the Drawdown's Human Side: INSIGHTS;

Maj A. Christopher St. Jean, USA 63 Nov/Dec

Meeting the Open-Source Acquisition and Exploitation

Challenge; Col Edward F. Dandar Jr., USAR, Ret. 30 Mar/Apr

Mexico's Other Insurgents; Graham H. Turbiville Jr. 81 May/Jun

Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies,

Patterns and Recurring Themes; Lawrence A. Yates 51 Jul/Aug

New FM 100-5: A Return to Operational Art, The;

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Maj Michael McCormick, USA 3 Sep/Oct

Notes on Leadership for the 1980s;

Maj Gen Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA 76 Jan/Feb

Nuclear Terrorism: Published Literature Since 1992:

BIBLIOGRAPHY; Timothy L. Sanz 139 Jul/Aug

On Perspective and the United States Army;

Lt Col Mark E. O'Neill, USA 117 Jul/Aug

Operation Rio: Taking Back the Streets;

Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret. 11 May/Jun

Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles,

New Realities; John T. Fishel 22 Jul/Aug

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control;

Robert F. Baumann 13 Jul/Aug

Operational Art's Origins; Bruce W. Menning 32 Sep/Oct

Optimizing Chaos on the Nonlinear Battlefield;

Maj Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA 26 Sep/Oct

Outsourcing at DOD: All It's Cracking People Up to Be?:

INSIGHTS; J. Michael Brower 67 Nov/Dec

Paying the Price for Versatility; Col Steven P. Schook, USA 19 Sep/Oct

Peace Enforcement Operations; Col Charles H. Swannack Jr.,

USA, and Lt Col David R. Gray, USA 3 Nov/Dec

People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine

Isn't Enough; Lt Col Douglas Scalard, USA 4 Jul/Aug

Political Dimension of Military Action or What Will Work

in the Post-Cold War World?, The: INSIGHTS;

Col Bruce B.G. Clarke, USA, Ret. 95 Sep/Oct

Posthostilities Training; Maj Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA 26 Nov/Dec

Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control;

Maj Jack Kammerer, USA 65 Sep/Oct

President's Responsibility, The; President Harry S. Truman 202 Jan/Feb

Prompt Deterrence: The Army in Kuwait; Maj Gen Leon J.

LaPorte, USA, and Maj MaryAnn B. Cummings, USA 39 Nov/Dec

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Restructuring the Engineer Initiative; Brig Gen Richard E.

Coleman, USAR; Col David F. Melcher, USA; Col Robert

L. Shirron, USA; and Col Gilbert L. Van Sickle, USAR 45 Nov/Dec

Rommel Myth, The; Col James R. Robinson, USAR 81 Sep/Oct

Roots of Bosnian Realities; George W. Gawrych 79 Jul/Aug

ROTC: An Academic Focus, Maj George A. Joulwan, USA 11 Jan/Feb

Selective Service-1948; Secretary of the Army

Kenneth C. Royall 7 Jan/Feb

Serving the People-The Need for Military Power; Gen Fred C.

Weyand, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Harry G. Summers Jr., USA 36 Jan/Feb

Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army;

William S. Lind 15 Jan/Feb

Some Thoughts on Leadership;

Maj Gen Alexander M. Patch, USA 71 Jan/Feb

Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force; Congressman

Richard B. Cheney and Maj Thomas N. Harvey, USA 197 Jan/Feb

Swords into Plowshares: Postconflict Arms Management;

Lt Col James J. Carafano, USA 22 Nov/Dec

Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics;

Col Stephen F. Garrett, USA 19 Mar/Apr

Task Force Eagle; Brig Gen Stanley F. Cherrie, USA 63 Jul/Aug

Task Force XXI: An Overview; Col Thomas R.

Goedkoop, USA, and Cpt Barry E. Venable, USA 68 Mar/Apr

Technology: Achilles' Heel or Strategic Vision?;

Maj Daniel S. Roper, USA 87 Mar/Apr

Terrain Visualization; Maj Gen Leon J. LaPorte, USA,

and Col David F. Melcher, USA 75 Sep/Oct

Third US Army: Preparing for the Future;

Lt Gen Steven L. Arnold, USA 13 Mar/Apr

Training and the Army of the 1990s;

Gen Carl E. Vuono, USA 79 Jan/Feb

Training: Preparation for Combat;

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Gen William R. Richardson, USA 84 Jan/Feb

UN Observer Mission in Georgia;

Cpt Gregory R. Sarafian, USA 14 Nov/Dec

US Army Command and General Staff College: A Changing

Institution, The: ALMANAC; Col William D. Bristow Jr.,

USA, and Lt Col Robert B. Kupiszewski, USA, Ret. 101 Sep/Oct

US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace:

INSIGHTS; Maj Charles J. McLaughlin, USA 129 Jul/Aug

USS Harlan County Affair, The;

Lt Cmdr Peter J.A. Riehm, USN 31 Jul/Aug

Values and the American Soldier;

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. 43 Jan/Feb

Western Defense Planning; Capt B.H. Liddell Hart,

British Army, Ret. 191 Jan/Feb

What Makes an Alliance Strong?: INSIGHTS;

Wallace J. Thies and Monica Podbielski 129 Jul/Aug

Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?; Steven Metz 187 Jan/Feb

Alexander, Col McGill; South African Army;

An African Rapid-Deployment Force 26 May/Jun

Anderson, James H.; End State Pitfalls-

A Strategic Perspective: INSIGHTS 93 Sep/Oct

Arnold, Gen Henry H.;

Isolation of the Battlefield by Air Power 131 Jan/Feb

Arnold, Lt Gen Steven L.;

Third US Army: Preparing for the Future 13 Mar/Apr

Banner, Lt Colonel Gregory T.;

Decision Making-A Better Way 53 Sep/Oct

Baumann, Robert F.; Historical Perspectives on Future War 40 Mar/Apr

Baumann, Robert F.;

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control 13 Jul/Aug

Beavers, Lt Col Garry J.; Information Operations in Bosnia 53 Nov/Dec

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Bristow, Col William D. Jr.; The US Army Command and General

Staff College: A Changing Institution: ALMANAC 101 Sep/Oct

Broom, Sgt 1st Class John T.; The Counterinsurgency Paradox 42 Jul/Aug

Brower, J. Michael; Outsourcing at DOD: All It's Cracking

People Up to Be?: INSIGHTS 67 Nov/Dec

Brown, Col Charles W.; The American

Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight? 30 Jan/Feb

Brown, Lt Col Frederic J.; The Army and Society 14 Jan/Feb

Bunker, Robert, J.; Failed-State Operational

Environment Concepts: INSIGHTS 90 Sep/Oct

Caraccilo, Maj Dominic J.; Posthostilities Training 26 Nov/Dec

Carafano, Lt Col James J.; Swords into Plowshares:

Postconflict Arms Management 22 Nov/Dec

Caravella, Lt Col Frank J., Ret.; Combined Air

Operations in Bosnia 87 Jul/Aug

Cheney, Congressman Richard B.;

Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force 197 Jan/Feb

Cherrie, BG Stanley F.; Task Force Eagle 63 Jul/Aug

Clarke, Col Bruce B.G., Ret.; The Political Dimension

of Military Action or What Will Work in the

Post-Cold War World: INSIGHTS 95 Sep/Oct

Coleman, Brig Gen Richard E., USAR;

Restructuring the Engineer Initiative 45 Nov/Dec

Cummings, Maj MaryAnn B.;

Prompt Deterrence: The Army in Kuwait 39 Nov/Dec

Dandar, Col Edward F. Jr., USAR, Ret.; Meeting the

Open-Source Acquisition and Exploitation Challenge 30 Mar/Apr

Demarest, Lt Col Geoffrey B.; Border Patrol Enforcement

Versus Militarization: REVIEW ESSAY 91 May/Jun

Demurenko, Col Andrei, Russian Army; Concepts in

International Peacekeeping 67 May/Jun

Devers, Gen Jacob L.; Major Problems Confronting

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a Theater Commander in Combined Operations 123 Jan/Feb

Dibert, Lt Col John C.;

General Headquarters Exercise Insights 61 Mar/Apr

Downing, Col Wayne A.; Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver-

US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the

1980s and Beyond 144 Jan/Feb

Echevarria, Maj Antulio J. II; Optimizing Chaos on

the Nonlinear Battlefield 26 Sep/Oct

Eden, Maj Steven J.; Knowledge-Based Warfare Implications 49 Mar/Apr

Finch, Maj Raymond C. III; A Face of Future Battle:

Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev 33 May/Jun

Fishel, John T.; Operation Uphold Democracy:

Old Principles, New Realities 22 Jul/Aug

Fitzgerald, Col Edward J.; The Center for Army

Lessons Learned: Winning in the Information Age 123 Jul/Aug

Foss, Gen John W.; Command 66 Jan/Feb

Franks, Gen Frederick M. Jr.; Full-Dimensional Operations:

A Doctrine for an Era of Change 178 Jan/Feb

Gable, Christopher R.; The Leavenworth Staff College:

A Historical Overview: ALMANAC 98 Sep/Oct

Garrett, Col Stephen F.; Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics 19 Mar/Apr

Gawrych, George W.; Roots of Bosnian Realities 79 Jul/Aug

Goedkoop, Col Thomas R.; Task Force XXI: An Overview 68 Mar/Apr

Gotowicki, Lt Col Stephen H.; Confronting Terrorism:

New War Form or Mission Impossible? 61 May/Jun

Grange, Maj Gen David L.; Information Operations

for the Ground Commander 5 Mar/Apr

Grau, Lt Col Lester W., Ret.; Bashing the

Laser Range Finder With a Rock 32 May/Jun

Grau, Lt Col Lester W., Ret.; Beaten by the Bugs:

The Soviet-Afghan War Experience 30 Nov/Dec

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Gray, Lt Col David R.; Peace Enforcement Operations 3 Nov/Dec

Hart, Capt B.H. Liddell, British Army, Ret.;

Western Defense Planning 191 Jan/Feb

Harvey, Maj Thomas N.; Strategic Underpinnings

of a Future Force 197 Jan/Feb

Haseman, Col John B., Ret.; ASEAN: Coming of Age 56 May/Jun

Holder, Lt Gen L.D., Ret.; The Center for Army Lessons

Learned: Winning in the Information Age 123 Jul/Aug

Holder, Col L.D.; Educating and Training for Theater Warfare 87 Jan/Feb

Huebner, Lt Col Michael F., Ret.; Base Realignment and

Closure: A Historical Perspective: ALMANAC 68 Nov/Dec

Jarnot, Maj Charles A.; Air Mech Strike: Revolution

in Maneuver Warfare 79 Mar/Apr

Jorgensen, Maj William A., USAR; Beaten by the Bugs:

The Soviet-Afghan War Experience 30 Nov/Dec

Joulwan, Maj George A.; ROTC: An Academic Focus 11 Jan/Feb

Kammerer, Maj Jack; Preserving Mission-Focused

Command and Control 65 Sep/Oct

Kelley, Col James A.; Information Operations for

the Ground Commander 5 Mar/Apr

Killion, Thomas H.; Army Basic Research Strategy 23 Mar/Apr

Kipp, Jacob W.; The Changing Security Environment 5 May/Jun

Kipp, Jacob W.; Confronting the RMA in Russia 49 May/Jun

Kretchik, Lt Col Walter E.; Force Protection Disparities 73 Jul/Aug

Kupiszewski, Lt Col Robert B., Ret.; The US Army

Command and General Staff College: A Changing

Institution: ALMANAC 101 Sep/Oct

LaPorte, Maj Gen Leon J.; Prompt Deterrence:

The Army in Kuwait 39 Nov/Dec

LaPorte, Maj Gen Leon J.; Terrain Visualization 75 Sep/Oct

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Leser, Lt Col Jeffrey W.S.; Battle Command:

Vision for Success 52 Mar/Apr

Leser, Lt Col Jeffrey W.S.; Initiative: The Power Behind Intent 59 Sep/Oct

Lind, William S.; Some Doctrinal Questions

for the United States Army 135 Jan/Feb

Lykke, Col Arthur F. Jr., Ret.; Defining Military Strategy 183 Jan/Feb

Mains, Maj Steven J.; Adapting Doctrine to

Knowledge-Based Warfare: INSIGHTS 93 Mar/Apr

Marsh, Secretary of the Army John O. Jr.;

Values and the American Soldier 43 Jan/Feb

Marshall, Maj George C. Jr.; "The Bitter Lesson

of Unpreparedness": ALMANAC 136 Jul/Aug

McCormick, Maj Michael; The New FM 100-5:

A Return to Operational Art 3 Sep/Oct

McLamb, Cpt Joseph S.; The Future of Mission Orders 71 Sep/Oct

McLaughlin, Maj Charles J.; US-Russian Cooperation

in IFOR: Partners for Peace: INSIGHTS 129 Jul/Aug

Melcher, Col David F.; Restructuring the Engineer Initiative 45 Nov/Dec

Melcher, Col David F.; Terrain Visualization 75 Sep/Oct

Mendel, Col William W., Ret.;

The Changing Security Environment 5 May/Jun

Mendel, Col William W., Ret.;

Operation Rio: Taking Back the Streets 11 May/Jun

Menning, Bruce W.; Operational Art's Origins 32 Sep/Oct

Metz, Steven; Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy? 187 Jan/Feb

Meyer, Gen Edward C.; Leadership: A Return to Basics 58 Jan/Feb

Morelock, Col Jerry D.; An Army Manual

for Civilian Business: REVIEW ESSAY 96 Mar/Apr

Moskos, Charles C. Jr.; The American

Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight? 30 Jan/Feb

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Nikitin, Alexander; Concepts in International Peacekeeping 67 May/Jun

O'Neill, Lt Col Mark E.;

On Perspective and the United States Army 117 Jul/Aug

Orsini, Eric A.; Logistics: The Past is Prologue: INSIGHTS 65 Nov/Dec

Palmer, Gen Bruce Jr., Ret.;

A Careful Look at Defense Manpower 23 Jan/Feb

Patch, Maj Gen Alexander M.; Some Thoughts on Leadership 71 Jan/Feb

Podbielski, Monica; What Makes

an Alliance Strong?: INSIGHTS 130 Jul/Aug

Prinslow, Lt Col Karl E.;

Building Military Relations in Africa 18 May/Jun

Reimer, Gen Dennis J.; Challenge and Change:

A Legacy for the Future 108 Jul/Aug

Reimer, Gen Dennis J.; Leadership for the 21st Century:

Empowerment, Environment and the Golden Rule 47 Jan/Feb

Reisweber, Maj Deborah; Battle Command:

Will We Have It When We Need It? 49 Sep/Oct

Richardson, Gen William R.;

FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986 174 Jan/Feb

Richardson, Gen William R.; Training: Preparation for Combat 84 Jan/Feb

Riehm, Lt Cmdr Peter J.A., USN;

The USS Harlan County Affair 31 Jul/Aug

RisCassi, Gen Robert W.; Doctrine for Joint Operations

in a Combined Environment: A Necessity 103 Jan/Feb

Robinson, Col James R.; The Rommel Myth 81 Sep/Oct

Roper, Maj Daniel S.;

Technology: Achilles' Heel or Strategic Vision? 87 Mar/Apr

Royall, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C.;

Selective Service-1948 7 Jan/Feb

Saint, Gen Crosbie E.; A CINC's View of Operational Art 115 Jan/Feb

Sanz, Timothy L.; Nuclear Terrorism:

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Published Literature since 1992: BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 Jul/Aug

Sarafian, Cpt Gregory R.; UN Observer Mission in Georgia 14 Nov/Dec

Scalard, Lt Col Douglas; People of Whom We

Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough 4 Jul/Aug

Schook, Col Steven P.; Paying the Price for Versatility 19 Sep/Oct

Shanahan, Lt Col Stephen W., Ret.;

Information Operations in Bosnia 53 Nov/Dec

Shaw, Maj Robert C.; Integrating Conventional

and Special Operations Forces 37 Jul/Aug

Shirron, Col Robert L.; Restructuring the Engineer Initiative 45 Nov/Dec

Skelton, Congressman Ike; The Constitutional Role

of Congress: Lessons in Unpreparedness 93 Jul/Aug

Skelton, Congressman Ike; JPME: Are We There Yet? 96 Jan/Feb

Spiszer, Maj John M.; FM 100-5 and Information Age Warfare 15 Sep/Oct

Starry, Gen Donn A.; Extending the Battlefield 151 Jan/Feb

St. Jean, Maj A. Christopher; Managing the

Drawdown's Human Side: INSIGHTS 63 Nov/Dec

Sullivan, Gen Gordon R.; Leadership, Versatility

and All That Jazz 52 Jan/Feb

Summers, Lt Col Harry G. Jr.; Serving the People-

The Need for Military Power 36 Jan/Feb

Swannack, Col Charles H. Jr; Peace Enforcement Operations 3 Nov/Dec

Tarr, Curtis W.; A Careful Look at Defense Manpower 23 Jan/Feb

Thies, Wallace J.; What Makes an Alliance Strong?:

INSIGHTS 130 Jul/Aug

Thomas, Lt Col Timothy L., Ret.;

The Age of the New Persuaders 72 May/June

Truman, President Harry S.; The President's Responsibility 202 Jan/Feb

Turbiville, Graham H. Jr.; The Changing Security Environment 5 May/Jun

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Turbiville, Graham H. Jr.; Mexico's Other Insurgents 81 May/Jun

Ulmer, Maj Gen Walter F. Jr.;

Notes on Leadership for the 1980s 76 Jan/Feb

Van Sickle, Col Gilbert L., USAR;

Restructuring the Engineer Initiative 45 Nov/Dec

Venable, Cpt Barry E.; Task Force XXI: An Overview 68 Mar/Apr

Vuono, Gen Carl E.; Training and the Army of the 1990s 79 Jan/Feb

Ward, Lt Col Daniel, Ret.; Assessing Force Protection Risk 11 Nov/Dec

Wass de Czege, Col Huba; How to Change an Army 162 Jan/Feb

Weyand, Gen Fred C., Ret.; Serving the People-

The Need for Military Power 36 Jan/Feb

Wishart, Lt Gen Leonard P. III; Leader Development

and Command and Control 62 Jan/Feb

Yates, Lawrence A.; Military Stability and Support

Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes 51 Jul/Aug

AirLand Battle

FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986;

Gen William R. Richardson, USA 174 Jan/Feb

Training: Preparation for Combat;

Gen William R. Richardson, USA 84 Jan/Feb

The Army and Society

American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?, The;

Col Charles W. Brown, USA, and Charles C. Moskos Jr. 30 Jan/Feb

Army and Society, The; Lt Col Frederic J. Brown, USA 14 Jan/Feb

Border Patrol Enforcement Versus Militarization:

REVIEW ESSAY; Lt Col Geoffrey B. Demarest, USA 91 May/Jun

Careful Look at Defense Manpower, A;

Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., USA, Ret., and Curtis W. Tarr 23 Jan/Feb

On Perspective and the United States Army;

Lt Col Mark E. O'Neill, USA 117 Jul/Aug

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People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine

Isn't Enough; Lt Col Douglas Scalard, USA 4 Jul/Aug

ROTC: An Academic Focus, Maj George A. Joulwan, USA 11 Jan/Feb

Selective Service-1948;

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall 7 Jan/Feb

Serving the People-The Need for Military Power; Gen Fred C.

Weyand, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Harry G. Summers Jr., USA 36 Jan/Feb

Values and the American Soldier;

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. 43 Jan/Feb

Air Operations

Air Mech Strike: Revolution in Maneuver Warfare;

Maj Charles A. Jarnot, USA 79 Mar/Apr

Combined Air Operations in Bosnia;

Lt Col Frank J. Caravella, USA, Ret. 87 Jul/Aug

Isolation of the Battlefield by Air Power;

Gen Henry H. Arnold, USA 131 Jan/Feb

Battle Command

Battle Command: Vision for Success;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 52 Mar/Apr

Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?;

Maj Deborah Reisweber, USA 49 Sep/Oct

Bosnia

Combined Air Operations in Bosnia;

Lt Col Frank J. Caravella, USA, Ret. 87 Jul/Aug

Force Protection Disparities; Lt Col Walter E. Kretchik, USA 73 Jul/Aug

Information Operations in Bosnia; Lt Col Stephen W.

Shanahan, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Garry J. Beavers, USA 53 Nov/Dec

Roots of Bosnian Realities; George W. Gawrych 79 Jul/Aug

Task Force Eagle; Brig Gen Stanley F. Cherrie, USA 63 Jul/Aug

Command

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Assessing Force Protection Risk;

Lt Col Daniel Ward, USA, Ret. 11 Nov/Dec

Battle Command: Vision for Success;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 52 Mar/Apr

Command; Gen John W. Foss, USA 66 Jan/Feb

Defense

Nuclear Terrorism: Published Literature Since 1992:

BIBLIOGRAPHY; Timothy L. Sanz 139 Jul/Aug

Western Defense Planning;

Capt B.H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Ret. 191 Jan/Feb

Doctrinal Development

Adapting Doctrine to Knowledge-Based Warfare:

INSIGHTS; Maj Steven J. Mains, USA 93 Mar/Apr

Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment:

A Necessity; Gen Robert W. RisCassi, USA 103 Jan/Feb

Extending the Battlefield; Gen Donn A. Starry, USA 151 Jan/Feb

Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver-US Army Operations

Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond;

Col Wayne A. Downing, USA 144 Jan/Feb

FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986;

Gen William R. Richardson, USA 174 Jan/Feb

Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era

of Change; Gen Frederick M. Franks Jr., USA 178 Jan/Feb

How to Change an Army; Col Huba Wass de Czege, USA 162 Jan/Feb

Restructuring the Engineer Initiative; Brig Gen Richard E.

Coleman, USAR; Col David F. Melcher, USA; Col Robert

L. Shirron, USA; and Col Gilbert L. Van Sickle, USAR 45 Nov/Dec

Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army;

William S. Lind 135 Jan/Feb

Education and Training

Educating and Training for Theater Warfare;

Col L.D. Holder, USA 87 Jan/Feb

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General Headquarters Exercise Insights;

Lt Col John C. Dibert, USA 61 Mar/Apr

JPME: Are We There Yet?; Congressman Ike Skelton 96 Jan/Feb

Leadership: A Return to Basics; Gen Edward C. Meyer, USA 58 Jan/Feb

Leadership, Versatility and All That Jazz;

Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, USA 52 Jan/Feb

Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,

The: ALMANAC; Christopher R. Gabel 98 Sep/Oct

Notes on Leadership for the 1980s;

Maj Gen Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA 76 Jan/Feb

ROTC: An Academic Focus, Maj George A. Joulwan, USA 11 Jan/Feb

Some Thoughts on Leadership;

Maj Gen Alexander M. Patch, USA 71 Jan/Feb

Training and the Army of the 1990s; Gen Carl E. Vuono, USA 79 Jan/Feb

Training: Preparation for Combat;

Gen William R. Richardson, USA 84 Jan/Feb

US Army Command and General Staff College: A Changing

Institution, The: ALMANAC; Col William D. Bristow Jr.,

USA, and Lt Col Robert B. Kupiszewski, USA, Ret. 101 Sep/Oct

Ethics and Values

Army and Society, The; Lt Col Frederic J. Brown, USA 14 Jan/Feb

Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment

and the Golden Rule; Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 47 Jan/Feb

On Perspective and the United States Army;

Lt Col Mark E. O'Neill, USA 117 Jul/Aug

Values and the American Soldier;

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. 43 Jan/Feb

FM 100-5

FM 100-5 and Information Age Warfare;

Maj John M. Spiszer, USA 15 Sep/Oct

New FM 100-5: A Return to Operational Art, The;

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Maj Michael McCormick, USA 3 Sep/Oct

Force Projection

Information Operations in Bosnia; Lt Col Stephen W.

Shanahan, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Garry J. Beavers, USA 53 Nov/Dec

Prompt Deterrence: The Army in Kuwait; Maj Gen Leon J.

LaPorte, USA, and Maj MaryAnn B. Cummings, USA 39 Nov/Dec

Restructuring the Engineer Initiative; Brig Gen Richard E.

Coleman, USAR; Col David F. Melcher, USA; Col Robert

L. Shirron, USA; and Col Gilbert L. Van Sickle, USAR 45 Nov/Dec

Third US Army: Preparing for the Future;

Lt Gen Steven L. Arnold, USA 13 Mar/Apr

Future Operations

Army Basic Research Strategy; Thomas H. Killion 23 Mar/Apr

Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future;

Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 108 Jul/Aug

Historical Perspectives on Future War; Robert F. Baumann 40 Mar/Apr

Information Operations for the Ground Commander; Maj Gen

David L. Grange, USA, and Col James A. Kelley, USA 5 Mar/Apr

Knowledge-Based Warfare Implications;

Maj Steven J. Eden, USA 49 Mar/Apr

Meeting the Open-Source Acquisition and Exploitation

Challenge; Col Edward F. Dandar Jr., USAR, Ret. 30 Mar/Apr

Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force; Congressman

Richard B. Cheney and Maj Thomas N. Harvey, USA 197 Jan/Feb

Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics;

Col Stephen F. Garrett, USA 19 Mar/Apr

Third US Army: Preparing for the Future;

Lt Gen Steven L. Arnold, USA 13 Mar/Apr

Training and the Army of the 1990s; Gen Carl E. Vuono, USA 79 Jan/Feb

Future Warfare

Air Mech Strike: Revolution in Maneuver Warfare;

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Maj Charles A. Jarnot, USA 79 Mar/Apr

Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret. 42 May/Jun

Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev,

A; Maj Raymond C. Finch III, USA 33 May/Jun

General Headquarters Exercise Insights;

Lt Col John C. Dibert, USA 61 Mar/Apr

Historical Perspectives on Future War; Robert F. Baumann 40 Mar/Apr

Serving the People-The Need for Military Power; Gen Fred C.

Weyand, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Harry G. Summers Jr., USA 36 Jan/Feb

Task Force XXI: An Overview; Col Thomas R.

Goedkoop, USA, and Cpt Barry E. Venable, USA 68 Mar/Apr

Technology: Achilles' Heel or Strategic Vision?;

Maj Daniel S. Roper, USA 87 Mar/Apr

Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?; Steven Metz 187 Jan/Feb

Haiti

Counterinsurgency Paradox, The;

Sgt 1st Class John T. Broom, USA 42 Jul/Aug

Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces;

Maj Robert C. Shaw, USA 37 Jul/Aug

Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies,

Patterns and Recurring Themes; Lawrence A. Yates 51 Jul/Aug

Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles,

New Realities; John T. Fishel 22 Jul/Aug

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control;

Robert F. Baumann 13 Jul/Aug

USS Harlan County Affair, The;

Lt Cmdr Peter J.A. Riehm, USN 31 Jul/Aug

History

Base Realignment and Closure: A Historical Perspective:

ALMANAC; Lt Col Michael Huebner, USA, Ret. 68 Nov/Dec

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"Bitter Lesson of Unpreparedness, The": ALMANAC;

Maj George C. Marshall Jr., USA 136 Jul/Aug

Counterinsurgency Paradox,

The; Sgt 1st Class John T. Broom, USA 42 Jul/Aug

Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,

The: ALMANAC; Christopher R. Gabel 98 Sep/Oct

Logistics: The Past is Prologue: INSIGHTS; Eric A. Orsini 65 Nov/Dec

Rommel Myth, The; Col James R. Robinson, USAR 81 Sep/Oct

Roots of Bosnian Realities; George W. Gawrych 79 Jul/Aug

Selective Service-1948;

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall 7 Jan/Feb

US Army Command and General Staff College: A Changing

Institution, The: ALMANAC; Col William D. Bristow Jr.,

USA, and Lt Col Robert B. Kupiszewski, USA, Ret. 101 Sep/Oct

Human Dimension

American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?, The;

Col Charles W. Brown, USA, and Charles C. Moskos Jr. 30 Jan/Feb

Base Realignment and Closure: A Historical Perspective:

ALMANAC; Lt Col Michael Huebner, USA, Ret. 68 Nov/Dec

Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in

Combined Operations; Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA 123 Jan/Feb

Managing the Drawdown's Human Side: INSIGHTS;

Maj A. Christopher St. Jean, USA 63 Nov/Dec

Outsourcing at DOD: All It's Cracking People Up to Be?:

INSIGHTS; J. Michael Brower 67 Nov/Dec

Information Operations

Adapting Doctrine to Knowledge-Based Warfare:

INSIGHTS; Maj Steven J. Mains, USA 93 Mar/Apr

Information Operations in Bosnia; Lt Col Stephen W.

Shanahan, USA, Ret., and Lt Col Garry J. Beavers, USA 53 Nov/Dec

International Affairs

Age of the New Persuaders,

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The; Lt Col Timothy L. Thomas, USA, Ret. 72 May/Jun

ASEAN: Coming of Age; Col John B. Haseman, USA, Ret. 56 May/Jun

Concepts in International Peacekeeping; Col Andrei

Demurenko, Russian Army, and Alexander Nikitin 67 May/Jun

Confronting Terrorism: New War Form or Mission

Impossible?; Lt Col Stephen H. Gotowicki, USA 61 May/Jun

End State Pitfalls-A Strategic Perspective: INSIGHTS;

James H. Anderson 93 Sep/Oct

Mexico's Other Insurgents; Graham H. Turbiville Jr. 81 May/Jun

People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine

Isn't Enough; Lt Col Douglas Scalard, USA 4 Jul/Aug

Political Dimension of Military Action or What Will

Work in the Post-Cold War World?, The: INSIGHTS;

Col Bruce B.G. Clarke, USA, Ret. 90 Sep/Oct

What Makes an Alliance Strong?: INSIGHTS;

Wallace J. Thies and Monica Podbielski 130 Jul/Aug

Leadership

Army Manual for Civilian Business, An:

REVIEW ESSAY; Col Jerry D. Morelock, USA 96 Mar/Apr

Careful Look at Defense Manpower, A;

Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., USA, Ret., and Curtis W. Tarr 23 Jan/Feb

Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future;

Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 108 Jul/Aug

CINC's View of Operational Art, A;

Gen Crosbie E. Saint, USA 115 Jan/Feb

Command; Gen John W. Foss, USA 66 Jan/Feb

Decision Making-A Better Way;

Lt Col Gregory T. Banner, USA 53 Sep/Oct

How to Change an Army; Col Huba Wass de Czege, USA 162 Jan/Feb

Information Operations for the Ground Commander; Maj Gen

David L. Grange, USA, and Col James A. Kelley, USA 5 Mar/Apr

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JPME: Are We There Yet?; Congressman Ike Skelton 96 Jan/Feb

Leader Development and Command and Control;

Lt Gen Leonard P. Wishart III, USA 62 Jan/Feb

Leadership: A Return to Basics; Gen Edward C. Meyer, USA 58 Jan/Feb

Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment

and the Golden Rule; Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA 47 Jan/Feb

Leadership, Versatility and All That Jazz;

Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, USA 52 Jan/Feb

Notes on Leadership for the 1980s;

Maj Gen Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA 76 Jan/Feb

President's Responsibility, The; President Harry S. Truman 202 Jan/Feb

Some Thoughts on Leadership;

Maj Gen Alexander M. Patch, USA 71 Jan/Feb

Lessons Learned

Army Manual for Civilian Business, An:

REVIEW ESSAY; Col Jerry D. Morelock, USA 96 Mar/Apr

"Bitter Lesson of Unpreparedness, The": ALMANAC;

Maj George C. Marshall Jr., USA 136 Jul/Aug

Center for Army Lessons Learned: Winning in the

Information Age, The; Lt Gen L.D. Holder, USA, Ret.,

and Col Edward J. Fitzgerald, USA 123 Jul/Aug

Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in

Unpreparedness, The; Congressman Ike Skelton 93 Jul/Aug

Force Protection Disparities; Lt Col Walter E. Kretchik, USA 73 Jul/Aug

Logistics

Logistics: The Past is Prologue: INSIGHTS; Eric A. Orsini 65 Nov/Dec

Outsourcing at DOD: All It's Cracking People

Up to Be?: INSIGHTS; J. Michael Brower 67 Nov/Dec

Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics;

Col Stephen F. Garrett, USA 19 Mar/Apr

Medical/Dental

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Beaten by the Bugs: The Soviet-Afghan War Experience;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and Maj William

A. Jorgensen, USAR 30 Nov/Dec

Operational Art

Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?;

Maj Deborah Reisweber, USA 49 Sep/Oct

CINC's View of Operational Art, A;

Gen Crosbie E. Saint, USA 115 Jan/Feb

Decision Making-A Better Way;

Lt Col Gregory T. Banner, USA 53 Sep/Oct

Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment:

A Necessity; Gen Robert W. RisCassi, USA 103 Jan/Feb

Educating and Training for Theater Warfare;

Col L.D. Holder, USA 87 Jan/Feb

Future of Mission Orders, The; Cpt Joseph S. McLamb, USA 71 Sep/Oct

Initiative: The Power Behind Intent;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 59 Sep/Oct

Isolation of the Battlefield by Air Power;

Gen Henry H. Arnold, USA 131 Jan/Feb

Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander

in Combined Operations; Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA 123 Jan/Feb

Operational Art's Origins; Bruce W. Menning 32 Sep/Oct

Optimizing Chaos on the Nonlinear Battlefield;

Maj Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA 26 Sep/Oct

Paying the Price for Versatility; Col Steven P. Schook, USA 19 Sep/Oct

Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control;

Maj Jack Kammerer, USA 65 Sep/Oct

Rommel Myth, The; Col James R. Robinson, USAR 81 Sep/Oct

Terrain Visualization; Maj Gen Leon J. LaPorte, USA,

and Col David F. Melcher, USA 75 Sep/Oct

What Makes an Alliance Strong?: INSIGHTS;

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Wallace J. Thies and Monica Podbielski 130 Jul/Aug

Operational Doctrine

Extending the Battlefield; Gen Donn A. Starry, USA 151 Jan/Feb

Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts:

INSIGHTS; Robert J. Bunker 90 Sep/Oct

FM 100-5 and Information Age Warfare;

Maj John M. Spiszer, USA 15 Sep/Oct

Future of Mission Orders, The; Cpt Joseph S. McLamb, USA 71 Sep/Oct

Initiative: The Power Behind Intent;

Lt Col Jeffrey W.S. Leser, USA 59 Sep/Oct

Managing the Drawdown's Human Side;

Maj A. Christopher St. Jean, USA 63 Nov/Dec

New FM 100-5: A Return to Operational Art, The;

Maj Michael McCormick, USA 3 Sep/Oct

Operational Art's Origins; Bruce W. Menning 32 Sep/Oct

Optimizing Chaos on the Nonlinear Battlefield;

Maj Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA 26 Sep/Oct

Paying the Price for Versatility; Col Steven P. Schook, USA 19 Sep/Oct

Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control;

Maj Jack Kammerer, USA 65 Sep/Oct

Terrain Visualization; Maj Gen Leon J. LaPorte, USA,

and Col David F. Melcher, USA 75 Sep/Oct

Operations

Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts:

INSIGHTS; Robert J. Bunker 90 Sep/Oct

Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces;

Maj Robert C. Shaw, USA 37 Jul/Aug

Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies,

Patterns and Recurring Themes; Lawrence A. Yates 51 Jul/Aug

Operation Rio: Taking Back the Streets;

Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret. 11 May/Jun

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Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles,

New Realities; John T. Fishel 22 Jul/Aug

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control;

Robert F. Baumann 13 Jul/Aug

Peace Enforcement Operations; Col Charles H. Swannack

Jr., USA, and Lt Col David R. Gray, USA 3 Nov/Dec

Political Dimension of Military Action or What Will

Work in the Post-Cold War World?, The: INSIGHTS;

Col Bruce B.G. Clarke, USA, Ret. 90 Sep/Oct

Posthostilities Training; Maj Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA 26 Nov/Dec

Prompt Deterrence: The Army in Kuwait; Maj Gen Leon

J. LaPorte, USA, and Maj MaryAnn B. Cummings, USA 39 Nov/Dec

Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army;

William S. Lind 135 Jan/Feb

Swords into Plowshares: Postconflict Arms Management;

Lt Col James J. Carafano, USA 22 Nov/Dec

Task Force Eagle; Brig Gen Stanley F. Cherrie, USA 63 Jul/Aug

Peacekeeping

African Rapid-Deployment Force, An;

Col McGill Alexander, South African Army 26 May/Jun

Age of the New Persuaders, The;

Lt Col Timothy L. Thomas, USA, Ret. 72 May/Jun

Assessing Force Protection Risk;

Lt Col Daniel Ward, USA, Ret. 11 Nov/Dec

Border Patrol Enforcement Versus Militarization:

REVIEW ESSAY; Lt Col Geoffrey B. Demarest, USA 91 May/Jun

Building Military Relations in Africa;

Lt Col Karl E. Prinslow, USA 18 May/Jun

Peace Enforcement Operations; Col Charles H. Swannack

Jr., USA, and Lt Col David R. Gray, USA 3 Nov/Dec

Posthostilities Training; Maj Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA 26 Nov/Dec

Swords into Plowshares: Postconflict Arms Management;

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Lt Col James J. Carafano, USA 22 Nov/Dec

UN Observer Mission in Georgia;

Cpt Gregory R. Sarafian, USA 14 Nov/Dec

USS Harlan County Affair, The;

Lt Cmdr Peter J.A. Riehm, USN 31 Jul/Aug

Russia

Beaten by the Bugs: The Soviet-Afghan War Experience;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and Maj William

A. Jorgensen, USAR 30 Nov/Dec

Concepts in International Peacekeeping; Col Andrei

Demurenko, Russian Army, and Alexander Nikitin 67 May/Jun

Confronting the RMA in Russia; Jacob W. Kipp 49 May/Jun

Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev, A;

Maj Raymond C. Finch III, USA 33 May/Jun

UN Observer Mission in Georgia;

Cpt Gregory R. Sarafian, USA 14 Nov/Dec

US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace:

INSIGHTS; Maj Charles J. McLaughlin, USA 129 Jul/Aug

Security

African Rapid-Deployment Force, An;

Col McGill Alexander, South African Army 26 May/Jun

ASEAN: Coming of Age; Col John B. Haseman, USA, Ret. 56 May/Jun

Building Military Relations in Africa;

Lt Col Karl E. Prinslow, USA 18 May/Jun

Changing Security Environment, The; Graham H. Turbiville

Jr.; Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret.; and Jacob W. Kipp 5 May/Jun

Confronting the RMA in Russia; Jacob W. Kipp 49 May/Jun

Defining Military Strategy;

Col Arthur F. Lykke Jr., USA, Ret. 183 Jan/Feb

Operation Rio: Taking Back the Streets;

Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret. 11 May/Jun

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US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace:

INSIGHTS; Maj Charles J. McLaughlin, USA 129 Jul/Aug

Strategy

Army Basic Research Strategy; Thomas H. Killion 23 Mar/Apr

Border Patrol Enforcement Versus Militarization:

REVIEW ESSAY; Lt Col Geoffrey B. Demarest, USA 91 May/Jun

Changing Security Environment, The; Graham H. Turbiville

Jr.; Col William W. Mendel, USA, Ret.; and Jacob W. Kipp 5 May/Jun

Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in

Unpreparedness, The; Congressman Ike Skelton 93 Jul/Aug

Defining Military Strategy; Col Arthur F. Lykke Jr., USA, Ret. 183 Jan/Feb

End State Pitfalls-A Strategic Perspective:

INSIGHTS; James H. Anderson 93 Sep/Oct

Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an

Era of Change; Gen Frederick M. Franks Jr., USA 178 Jan/Feb

Nuclear Terrorism: Published Literature Since 1992:

BIBLIOGRAPHY; Timothy L. Sanz 139 Jul/Aug

President's Responsibility, The; President Harry S. Truman 202 Jan/Feb

Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force; Congressman

Richard B. Cheney and Maj Thomas N. Harvey, USA 197 Jan/Feb

Western Defense Planning;

Capt B.H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Ret. 191 Jan/Feb

Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?; Steven Metz 187 Jan/Feb

Technology

Adapting Doctrine to Knowledge-Based Warfare:

INSIGHTS; Maj Steven J. Mains, USA 93 Mar/Apr

Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock;

Lt Col Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret. 42 May/Jun

Center for Army Lessons Learned: Winning in the

Information Age, The; Lt Gen L.D. Holder, USA, Ret.,

and Col Edward J. Fitzgerald, USA 123 Jul/Aug

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Leader Development and Command and Control;

Lt Gen Leonard P. Wishart III, USA 62 Jan/Feb

Meeting the Open-Source Acquisition and Exploitation

Challenge; Col Edward F. Dandar Jr., USAR, Ret. 30 Mar/Apr

Task Force XXI: An Overview; Col Thomas R. Goedkoop,

USA, and Cpt Barry E. Venable, USA 68 Mar/Apr

Technology: Achilles' Heel or Strategic Vision?;

Maj Daniel S. Roper, USA 87 Mar/Apr

Terrorism

Confronting Terrorism: New War Form or Mission

Impossible?; Lt Col Stephen H. Gotowicki, USA 61 May/Jun

Mexico's Other Insurgents; Graham H. Turbiville Jr. 81 May/Jun

Nuclear Terrorism: Published Literature Since 1992:

BIBLIOGRAPHY; Timothy L. Sanz 139 Jul/Aug

Warfare

Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver-US Army Operations

Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond;
Col Wayne A. Downing, USA 144 Jan/Feb

Knowledge-Based Warfare Implications;

Maj Steven J. Eden, USA 49 Mar/Apr

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