TC 7-9

INFANTRY LIVE-FIRE TRAINING

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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TC 7-9, C1

Change 1 Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 3 April 2014

Infantry Live-Fire Training

1. This transmittal sheet changes TC 7-9, dated Sep 1993, from an electronic media only (EMO)
product to both EMO and Book products. The new distribution number below has been assigned
to this publication. This transmittal page and blank pages inserted for printing purposes are the
only changes to this publication.

2. A star (*) marks the location of the new material.

3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff .
Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1405501

* DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 116047, requirements for TC 7-9.

PIN: 013649-001
This page intentionally left blank.
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PREFACE

This publication bridges the gap between individual and collective

marksmanship training. It addresses both fire and maneuver with
emphasis on LFXs for dismounted infantry. This publication is for use by
all leaders of infantry units and should be used in conjunction with
ARTEP 7-8-MTP and ARTEP 7-7J-MTP. It provides guidance and
examples to help the commander set up his own LFXs based on his unit’s
METL. It complements existing training manuals and assists commanders
in planning, executing, and evaluating LFXs. Some duplication occurs
among chapters. The intent is to allow junior leaders executing training to
read and copy only those chapters pertaining to them.
This publication focuses on training the trainer to conduct measurable and
realistic LFXs at buddy-team through platoon level. It also provides the
company, battalion, and brigade with a document that outlines the
resources available and their costs. It is not a sole-source document. (See
the references for a list of manuals to study before conducting an LFX.)
Leaders should always check Army and installation safety regulations, and
doctrine and training manuals before conducting an LFX.
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send
comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to
Commandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-OTT-T, Fort
Benning, GA 31905-5594.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do
not refer exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1

TRAINING STRATEGY

To be successful on the battlefield, the commander must know the

capabilities of his weapons and soldiers. He should use LFXs to train
under warlike conditions. This chapter discusses the Army’s
philosophy of LFXs; the live-fire training concept; how to develop a
training strategy; special terms used to discuss LFXs; and the cyclic,
progressive sustainment strategy needed to maintain a unit’s live-fire
skills. For a commander’s training strategy to be productive, he must
train the trainer. A review of this circular, classes and discussions, and
a TEWT provide a good start in training the trainer on the basics of
live fire. If unit leaders are not trained first, resources are wasted and
soldier death and injury occur.

1-1. ARMY PHILOSOPHY OF LIVE-FIRE EXERCISES

The Army’s philosophy of LFXs is to train to combat readiness, which
includes—
Establishing a commander’s maneuver area or box where the
leader can select the direction and method of fire and maneuver
based on METT-T.
Integrating all organic and nonorganic (direct and indirect)
weapons systems and personnel.
Exercising all combat-related activities (for example, casualty
collection and evacuation and combat service support) to include
platoon slice elements to support squad training and company
slice elements to support platoon training.
Using realistic targetry and return fire (MILES and simulators).

Everyone is responsible for safety during the LFX. Range control

supports the commander in the conduct of realistic live-fire exercises
unhampered by artificial safety restrictions. Their primary concern is that
no rounds exit the maneuver area, not the methods of fire integration and
maneuver within the box. Also, LFXs should combine Army training
doctrine and literature (Figure 1-1, page 1-2).

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1-2. CONCEPT
Live-fire training must be coupled with force-on-force training. Each
complements the other with different aspects of combat realism.
Conducting force-on-force training with MILES reinforces realistic actions
during LFXs. Live-fire training trains the unit in many areas. One of the
most important is marksmanship. Marksmanship encompasses the
employment and accuracy of all weapons and weapon systems; this
includes grenade marksmanship, machine gun marksmanship, antiarmor
marksmanship, and so forth.

1-3. TERMS
The following terms are used when discussing LFXs.
a. Static Firing Range. This range involves no movement once firing
begins. It is typically used for missions such as defend or conduct an
ambush (unless assault fire is used during the ambush). An example of a
static range is the individual qualification range.
b. Maneuver Range. This range involves fire and movement and may
be used for missions such as attack or movement to contact. An example
of a maneuver range is the multipurpose range complex (MPRC).

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c. Collective Marksmanship. Collective marksmanship refers to the

accuracy of multiple weapon systems by a group of two or more soldiers.
d. Maneuver Box. A maneuver box is a temporary or permanent
designated training area that allows units to approach an objective using
organic and nonorganic weapons systems in a live-fire scenario. This box
might use parts of the installation impact area for maneuver and or fire.
(See Appendix G for more information.)
e. Static Marksmanship. Static marksmanship involves no movement
after firing begins.
f. Mobile Marksmanship. Mobile marksmanship involves firing while
moving.

1-4. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Infantry units have different amounts and types of equipment and
personnel. All of these components must be included in a training
strategy.
a. Figures 1-2 through 1-5 show the components of the systems
addressed in this manual. These systems can be supplemented to match
any unit’s organization.

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b. At times the components of a system may vary—personnel

strengths rarely remain constant; specific weapons may be turned in for
maintenance. The key is for the unit commander to train and plan for
assigned systems and possible contingencies.

1-5. CYCLE SUSTAINMENT TRAINING STRATEGY

Every unit undergoes personnel turnover. In order to attain combat
proficiency and sustain it, units should plan progressive, sequential
training to develop their weapon crews, buddy teams, fire teams, squads,
and platoons. This sequential training is done in seven stages beginning
with individual training.
a. Individual training begins in initial-entry training (IET). This
training must be expanded and sustained in the unit. Stage 1 includes
individual sustainment training in the unit, which might cover weapons
maintenance and zero, static marksmanship (current qualification), and
mobile marksmanship (a concept where the soldier goes beyond current
qualification practices and learns to fire and move at the same time—for
example, quick fire and assault fire while moving forward in the offense, or
while breaking contact).
b. Collective marksmanship training consists of six stages: Stage 2,
Crew; Stage 3, Buddy Team; Stage 4, Fire Team; Stage 5, Squad; Stage 6,
Platoon; and Stage 7, Company and larger units. These stages might cover
these areas:
Weapons maintenance and zero/calibration (for crews).
Static marksmanship (defense, ambush).
Mobile marksmanship (attack, withdraw).
Command and control (movement and direction, rate, and
distribution of fires).
Integrated fires.
Supporting fires (artillery, mortars, and so forth).
Range determination and target identification.

c. Unit live-fire training follows a progressive, sequential cycle. These

cycles are similar for each stage. The unit can tailor training to its METL.
(1) Stage 1, Individual. The cycles in Stage 1 include:
Zero weapon.
Qualify with assigned weapon (rifle, pistol).
Familiarize with hand grenade and M203.
Perform advanced individual techniques (dry fire of combat
record fire): engage enemy with multiple systems (rifle, bayonet,
grenade); conduct mobile marksmanship (assault fire, quick fire,
and so on); and focus on individual movement techniques (IMT).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).

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(2) Stage 2, Crew. The cycles in Stage 2 include:

Qualify with assigned crew-served weapon.
Dry fire (engage enemy with multiple systems).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).
(3) Stage 3, Buddy Team. The cycles in Stage 3 include:
Dry fire (engage enemy with multiple systems).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).
Conduct LFX (fire and movement).

NOTE: This is the first coordinated movement exercise (fire and

movement). IMT and communication (to include arm-and-hand
signals) should be refined during this exercise.
(4) Stage 4, Fire Team. The cycles in Stage 4 include:
Dry fire (engage enemy with multiple systems).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).
Conduct LFX (optional, based on ammunition availability; can
be integrated with squad).
NOTE: This is the first step that requires command and control.
(5) Stage 5, Squad. The cycles in Stage 5 include:
Dry fire (engage enemy with multiple systems).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).
Conduct LFX. This squad exercise could also be combined with
the platoon LFX. With the introduction of maneuver, the
command and control process (by fire team and squad leaders)
complicates the exercise. Force-on-force training must precede
all LFXs at this level and higher.
(6) Stage 6, Platoon. The cycles in Stage 6 include:
Dry fire (engage enemy with multiple systems).
Rehearse (blanks/MILES).
Conduct LFX (combined with squad). Command and control by
fire team, squad, and platoon leaders is more difficult. In
addition, supporting fires must be integrated. This includes
infantry platoon organic and nonorganic systems like the Bradley
fighting vehicle, antiarmor systems, mortars, and artillery.
Indirect fires must be integrated at this level.
(7) Stage 7, Company and Larger Units. The cycles in Stage 7 are
similar to those in Stage 6 with increased emphasis on nonorganic and or
combined-arms systems.

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d. Sustainment training is always cyclic. In most units, personnel

turnover and the natural erosion of individual and collective skills requires
a plan for sustainment. The commander must constantly assess the
proficiency of his squads and platoons and retrain them in the needed
collective tasks.
e. Before any training is conducted that expends blank or live
ammunition, a dry-fire or walk-through exercise should be conducted.
This allows the unit to improve movement techniques, command and
control, safety, and many other areas before critical resources are used. If
units use manuals like ARTEP 7-8-DRILL as a guide, and follow the
crawl, walk, run concept (Chapter 2), they will get the maximum training
effect from their ammunition and will enhance safety.
f. The focus of training must go beyond rifle marksmanship and
include hand grenades, machine guns, and antiarmor missiles. Individuals
must undergo a sustainment program with all weapon systems they will
use in combat. This sustainment program is run by the unit, based on the
commander’s assessment. (See References for a list of training manuals.)

1-6. TRAINING BUILDING BLOCKS

In order to reach a training goal, units must first learn basic tasks. Each
task or group of tasks is a building block used to progress to a higher level
of training. Once a foundation is laid, the unit begins to build on it layer
by layer, until the final objective is achieved (Figure 1-6).

a. A training building block may consist of several individual tasks.

When individuals or units are proficient in all tasks, they are proficient in

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the training building block. Training aids can be used to help achieve
proficiency in each of the training blocks (Figure 1-7).

b. The unit commander must determine how much time and effort to
spend on each building block. Some blocks will require little effort to
obtain proficiency, while others will demand extensive time, resources,
planning, and personnel.
c. IET lays the foundation for basic qualification and familiarization of
individual weapons (M16 rifle, M203 grenade launcher, hand grenades,
and so on). It also teaches individuals and buddy teams fire and
movement. This short exposure to basic skills establishes the foundation
that units must build on to ensure a soldier’s confidence in himself, his
unit, and his leaders. The unit must reinforce and sustain these highly
perishable skills and expand them to prepare the unit for war. LFXs
should include the training a unit has completed to be combat ready.
(DA Pam 350-38 outlines training and qualification requirements.)

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CHAPTER 2

WEAPON PROFICIENCY TRAINING

Live-fire training can be the most realistic and stressful training a unit can
undergo in preparing for combat. It is a tactical exercise that combines
unit tactics with individual and collective marksmanship training. Since
the Army employs its weapons in combat to destroy enemy personnel and
equipment all units must be proficient in app/ying live fire to accomplish
their mission-essential task list (METL). Units need to continually train
collective marksmanship skills and the integration of multiple weapon
systems with tactical collective tasks. Trainers should be aware of the
variables that affect live-fire marksmanship (mission, target,
environmental conditions, and soldier and unit skills) and the procedures
necessary to conduct the LFX.

2-1. BACKGROUND
Past combat experiences have pointed out many collective marksmanship
lessons. Also, data from the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTC)
have pointed out marksmanship problem areas. A small portion of this
information is presented here.
a. In recent years, direct-fire proficiency in units has been declining.
Research by the US Army Engineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving
Ground provides the following data regarding enemy engagements:
Most engagements are at or less than 300 meters.
A desert environment allows some opportunities for over 300
meters (but, less than 400 meters).
Jungle or urban engagements occur at less than 100 meters.
Target exposure time is 3 to 5 seconds for under 200 meters and
5 to 7 seconds in excess of 200 meters.
Target detection time averages of 6 seconds make it difficult to
engage accurately.

In training, 3- to 5-second rushes and firing from the prone or supported

fighting position (static) are practiced. The US Army Human Engineering
Laboratory provides the following data about what happens in combat:
40 percent of those firing are fully exposed.
40 percent of those firing are behind cover.

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Most firing is executed from the standing or kneeling position

(Figures 2-1 and 2-2).
These figures are not surprising considering that soldiers may find
themselves in deep grass or thick vegetation while on the move. Falling
into the prone position may make them less of a target; however, to return
fire, soldiers may need to kneel or stand to see targets.

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b. Currently, the Army focuses its training and qualification on the

M16 rifle with the soldier in the supported fighting and prone positions.
While these positions may be good for a planned defense, they could be
totally useless in mobile offensive operations, such as a movement to
contact or an attack. The soldier has little control over the cover and
concealment that exists around and within the enemy’s position. He may
find himself in tall grass, behind a stone wall, or even in a building. At this
point he needs to know, and have experience in firing various weapons
from, the standing and kneeling positions and modifications of these
positions. (See FM 90-10 for more information on modified firing
positions.)
c. The three primary ways of directing fire with a rifle are to: aim
through the sights; hold the weapon in an underarm position and use
instinct, bullet strike, or tracers to direct the fire (assault fire); or bring the
rifle to the shoulder but look over the sights as the rifle is pointed in the
direction of the target (quick fire). Most weapon systems have a slightly
different manner of fire when employed in an emergency situation, when
seconds mean life or death.
d. Units need to evaluate how they train with all weapon systems. Do
they only train their soldiers to fire antiarmor weapons like the AT4 and
Javelin from the standing position? What difficulties arise if they also
trained them to fire from a prone or kneeling position? (Figures 2-3 and
2-4, page 2-4.)

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2-2. LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE TRAINING CONCEPTS

Conducting an LFX is not the same as "going to the rifle range." While
many units have made advances in this area, others must strive to train
with realism. Before an LFX, the unit leader ensures his personnel are
proficient in areas such as individual weapons knowledge and
qualification; range determination and target identification; and the basics
of fire control measures and movement techniques.
a. Focus. Each stage of live-fire training should cover static
marksmanship (defense, ambush) and mobile marksmanship (movement
to contact, attack, delay).
b. Objectives. Live-fire objectives include:
(1) Integrating all weapons systems (organic and attached) to include
small arms, hand grenades, antiarmor weapons, mortars, artillery,
helicopter gunships, and CAS.
(2) Avoiding a "range mentality." This means not using artificial safety
constraints, but using life-like targets; using realistic positioning of enemy
(with regard to terrain and OPFOR doctrine) and simulation of the sights,
sounds, and smells of battle; and hiding support activities (no nontactical
vehicles, ammunition points, and so on).
(3) Integrating nonorganic personnel (FO, snipers, and medic). Many
times these people are forgotten in training exercises, but they also need
training.
(4) Training fire commands and fire control measures.
(5) Training ammunition conservation.
(6) Providing marksmanship feedback.
c. Training Sequence. The crawl, walk, run concept should be used
when training for an LFX.
Crawl-dry fire (walk-through). This may or may not be
conducted on the LFX objective depending on METT-T, the
commanders training objectives, and his risk analysis. The
commander may approve the use of similar terrain instead.
Walk—MILES (blanks). A force-on-force exercise in this phase
of training is important to help prevent soldiers from performing
unrealistic actions in the LFX.
Run—LFX.

2-3. ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES (EXTERNAL)

Many variables affect the collective marksmanship of combat. One group
of variables are those that come from the nature of the engagement of the
threat (targets). These variables come from the mission to be performed,
the type and numbers of targets, and environmental conditions.
a. Soldier Mission. Soldiers will find themselves engaging the enemy in
one of two types of situations: static (defense, ambush) or moving (attack,

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movement to contact, delay). Each situation stresses different soldier and

unit skills.
(1) Static. The soldier must set up a position where he can engage the
threat. Clearing fields of fire, covering dead space, and preparing the
supported firing position itself are important.
(2) Moving. For missions of this type, the soldier may need to
concentrate on firing from the kneeling or standing position. The soldier
must be aware that his firing position location will be driven by an
uncontrollable tactical situation. He may also have to fire while moving
(quick fire and assault fire).
b. Target. Targets can take on many forms and have a variety of speeds
and directions of movement—all of which determines the method of
engagement.
(1) Quantity (single or multiple). The target quantity may decide the
weapon system used. If the target is a single enemy soldier, an M16 might
be preferred. If it is a well-prepared enemy platoon, artillery fire might be
more effective. While this decision could rest with the individual (rifle,
grenade, or bayonet), this is largely a command and control question for
the leader.
(2) Range. Target range affects the choice of weapon system used in
the engagement and the time fires are initiated. Against a tank, a soldier
might use a Javelin at 300 meters and a TOW at 2,000 meters.
(3) Movement (direction, speed, angle). Practice and experience are
needed to know how and when to adjust fire for moving targets,
depending on the angle to the target (frontal, flanking, oblique, enfilade).
(4) Type (area/point, personnel/equipment). The type of target drives
whether a unit uses a rifle or a machine gun, an M203, or a mortar
barrage.
c. Conditions. Battlefield conditions affect how the threat is engaged.
Integrating these variables into training is important.
(1) Day. This is the condition trained for most and may be the one
experienced least.
(2) Night (limited visibility, smoke, fog). Using a night vision device
(NVD) increases the number of tasks required to engage a target. For
instance, each time an NVD is attached to or detached from a weapon,
the weapon must be zeroed or time should be taken to verify the zero. In
addition, weapons should be laid into position to ensure fire into areas
where targets cannot be seen, yet are likely to appear. Targets may not be
seen due to limited visibility, limited illumination, or concealment
(including dead space).
(3) Weather (rain, snow, ice, cold, heat). Equipment should be kept dry.
The soldier should not be too warm or too cold. If the firer is too warm,
sweat may get into his eyes affecting his marksmanship. If too cold, he may

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have problems using his hands. Wearing gloves complicates firing

weapons.
(4) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical. An NBC environment places
additional difficulties on the marksman. He must engage targets with all
weapon systems while wearing the protective mask and equipment.
(5) Equipment. The enemy may employ laser weapons. Therefore,
soldiers may need special equipment (such as spectacles) to protect their
eyes. They may also have to use items such as body armor and thermal
sights. Also, proper reaction to weapon malfunctions must be trained.
(6) Safety. Force protection is needed in combat although it places
some restrictions on target engagements. Situational awareness is key.
However, separating range safety from combat safety (and eliminating
artificial range safety when possible) is important.
(7) Obstacles. Obstacles may require modification of learned individual
firing techniques. The MOUT environment, for instance, may require
instances of opposite shoulder firing(See FM 90-10- 1.) Obstacles also
complicate collective marksmanship and collective tasks. Friendly
obstacles must be integrated into the unit fire plan to be effective. Enemy
obstacles must be integrated into the battle plan. They will have to be
breached or bypassed. (Remember, the enemy will cover his obstacles by
fire also.)

2-4. SOLDIER SKILL VARIABLES (INTERNAL)

Other variables that affect collective marksmanship are in individual
soldier skills. These variables include the soldier’s ability to detect and
acquire the target and execute the engagement (based on marksmanship
fundamentals). The soldier’s skills in suppression and fire discipline also
affect the unit’s marksmanship.
a. Detection. Target detection involves finding the enemy using
indicators such as sound, movement, and identifiable shapes. Enemy
personnel are seldom visible except when assaulting. Most combat targets
can be detected by smoke, flash, dust, noise, or movement. This variable
will be affected by the illumination level and the distance, size, shape,
texture, and color of the target. Training (in techniques such as scanning)
and equipment (optical sights) assist the soldier in detection.
b. Acquisition. Target acquisition involves mentally marking the target
and determining the range.
c. Identification. Soldiers must be trained to identify the target. The
lack of this ability is the leading cause of fratricide.
d. Engagement. Target engagement involves four fundamentals (rifle):
steady position, aim, breathing, and trigger squeeze (FM 23-9). The
soldier must apply the fundamentals in all positions (supported fighting,
prone, kneeling, standing, modified) and under all conditions (night, NBC

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environment). He uses a variety of positions to fire effectively on a target.

Many times the available cover and weapon support are the same. For
example, a combat firing position may allow the handguard to rest directly
on sandbag support while the nonfiring hand holds the weapon at the
magazine well.
(1) Not only must the soldier know how to fire his weapon from
various positions, but he must also know when, and by what method, he is
to use it. For example, most combat fire will be directed at an area where
the enemy is suspected, but not seen. Visible targets can be engaged by
using nearby objects as reference points.
(2) Suppression is the act of making an enemy target ineffective.
Whether the target becomes immobilized, withdraws, or is destroyed is not
always important.
(a) Suppression requires sustained, accurate fire. It is NOT the act of
spraying rounds downrange. The amount of ammunition required to
supress a target varies with the target itself. For example, only one M16
round every minute may keep a sniper pinned down, whereas 10 rounds a
minute might be needed on an enemy fighting position or even 60 rounds
a minute along a woodline. The rate of fire should be controlled. If
suppression for long periods is necessary, ammunition could run out. This
would put maneuvering forces at risk, especially if all ammunition was
expended to suppress a bunker just as the maneuver element was
prepared to take it out through close assault.
(b) The return rate of fire and accuracy of fire from the enemy
position, along with the amount of firendly casualties, indicate if
suppressive fires are effective. Destroying the target is not always possible.
For example, when suppressing a bunker, fire should be aimed at its firing
ports. Sending rounds through the firing ports may keep the enemy laying
on the bunker floor, making that position ineffective.
(c) One problem with suppression is that when firing stops, the target
may become active again. Suppressive fire should be used for a specific
reason (to bypass a target or maneuver forces against it) to make
expenditure of ammunition worthwhile.
e. Fire Discipline. Fire must be precisely aimed, controlled, and
conserved to avoid wasting ammunition. Soldiers must follow the
commands of their fire-team leader and squad leader.

2-5. UNIT SKILL VARIABLES

A unit’s leadership also affects collective marksmanship. Command and
control might affect when, and with what weapons, a target is engaged.
The leader’s placement of his soldiers may affect their ability to see and
engage the target. The leader must consider fire control and fire control
measures that affect marksmanship. Additionally, a leader’s actions in

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preserving the force will influence how the soldiers shoot (for example,
has the soldier gotten enough rest).

When units go into battle, control is the most difficult but important factor
influencing the outcome. In large units, directives and orders can be issued
with limited interference during all phases of battle. However, in the
squad, platoon, and company, enemy action influences and often prevents
or restricts orders and signals.
a. Command and Control. Command and control is the exercise of
authority and direction over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a
mission. This process must distinguish, from the flood of information,
those items that will allow the leader to make timely decisions. Command
is the process of the leader converting that information into direction.
Control is the execution of that direction. Communication and training is
the bridge between command and control.
(1) Communication by the leader is usually by written and oral
commands (messenger, radio, and wire) or sound and visual signals
(whistles, bells, arm-and-hand signals, pyrotechnics, flags, lights, and
mirrors).
(2) In the heat of battle, attempts at all forms of communication can be
futile. Intensive training in the areas of SOPs and battle drills can reduce
the need for communications.
b. Fire Control. Improper fire control could result in the loss of
surprise, fratricide, engaging unimportant targets, or loss of superior
firepower, and initiative. Fire control (through the use of fire commands
and control measures) requires the ability to select and designate targets,
open fire at the desired time, adjust fire, regulate the rate of fire, shift
from one target to another, and cease fire.
(1) Fire control measures include sectors of fire, target engagement
priorities, engagement areas (EAs), target reference points (TRPs), phase
lines (PLs), boundaries, restrictive fire areas (RFAs), and restrictive fire
lines (RFLs). Fire control measures should be simple, easy to see, and
keyed to terrain features such as a house, tower, hilltop, enemy bunker,
river, road, or woodline. During any training exercise, these measures
should be evaluated. Fire control measures are an integral part of
LFXs—determining if targets are destroyed and suppressed with the
minimum expenditure of ammunition and time. (Appendix I provides a
detailed account of using various fire control measures.)
(2) Fire commands can be executed by the desired control measures.
They take the form of oral commands, arm-and-hand signals, prearranged
signals, personal contact, and SOPS. (Specific fire commands for various
weapon systems can be found in the appropriate field manual.) Figure 2-5
(page 2-10) shows an example of some fire commands.

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c. Preserving the Force. Unit leaders need to keep in mind the sleep
plan, speed of movement, and when to execute various maneuvers to
preserve the strength and mental clarity of the soldiers. SWA AARs
discuss the problem of initiating individual movement techniques and
other actions that left, soldiers exhausted before reaching objectives. This
is an age-old problem, and leaders need to think about this before and
during an LFX, as well as after the exercise to evaluate their decisions.

2-6. CONDUCT OF THE LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE

Many things must be considered in the execution of an LFX. This
paragraph highlights some of them.
a. Safety. Proper safety measures are critical when conducting an LFX.
However, excessive safety measures destroy realistic training and should
be avoided. Soldiers must understand that the safety measures practiced in
peace are the safety measures practiced in war. If artificial safety
restrictions are imposed, the soldiers must understand what the
restrictions are and why they are necessary.
b. Sequence of Events. Training should be conducted as if the unit were
going to war. For example, commanders will conduct some form of an
after-action review (AAR) after the battle. Movement, ammunition
distribution, sleep/rest plans, and feeding plans should all be conducted
tactically. The following is a simplified sequence of events:
Planning (to include transportation, ammunition, training/
operations plan).
Preparation (to include setup, briefings, orders).
Leader TEWT (fire team leader and up). TEWT may or may not
be conducted on the LFX objective depending on METT-T, the
commander’s training objectives, and his risk analysis. The
commander may approve the use of similar terrain instead.
Walk-through. This is a dry run concentrating on maneuver,
communications, command and control, and safety.
After-action review (IAW ARTEP standards).

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Rehearsal with MILES. This could be integrated into a tactical

exercise as a unit rehearsal before conducting the mission.
After-action review (IAW ARTEP standards).
Live-fire exercise.
AAR to include marksmanship assessment.

c. Mission and Range Selection. The commander decides what mission

to train and what type of range to use based on his METL and METT-T.
However, the following guidelines can be used to select the mission and
range.
(1) Missions. Usually, training missions and tasks are selected from the
appropriate ARTEP MTPs. Exceptions may be required to train
individual (and some collective) tasks at the buddy-team and fire-team
level. Examples of missions and tasks taken from current MTPs or
soldier’s manuals are provided in the following chapters for each level of
training. As training becomes more sophisticated at the squad and higher
levels, commanders are encouraged to sequence different missions and
tasks together into a situational training exercise (STX). (See appropriate
ARTEP MTPs for further guidance on STXs.)
(2) Ranges. Range availability is sometimes the determining factor in
range selection. Lane-type ranges should be used for buddy-team and
fire-team level exercises. A free-form maneuver box is best at the squad
and higher level. This manual provides examples of ranges that could be
used for conducting realistic LFXs from the buddy-team to the platoon
level. (TC 25-8 provides a listing of the various Army ranges from the
buddy team fire and movement range to the company/team MPRC.)
d. Range Focus. When setting up a range for an LFX, the unit should
strive for realistic conditions. The following should be considered:
(1) Targets should be placed in the same areas an enemy would
occupy—not in the middle of an open field. OPFOR doctrine should be
used. (This may require portable targetry to allow frequent target
reconfiguration.)
(2) For rehearsals, the OPFOR should be tailored to the size unit that
is being trained (squads attack OPs, platoons attack squads, and so on).
During force-on-force training, the OPFOR should have counter tasks
assigned IAW the ARTEP MTP.
(3) Targets should not be exposed for more than 3 to 5 seconds.
Targets that are hit should be killed (they should not pop up again). If
effective suppression is delivered, targets not hit should be lowered and
brought up again only if suppression stops. Soldiers must know that
suppression is effective, and they must get used to shifting firing positions
to acquire new targets.

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(4) Downrange feedback is necessary for an LFX to reinforce

marksmanship.
(5) Artificial safety requirements should be avoided. They reduce
realism and defeat the reason for the LFX.
(6) Individual training and rehearsals are conducted to allow a safe,
productive LFX.
e. Assessment. LFX standards should be IAW the appropriate
ARTEP MTPs and soldier’s manuals. Some of the standards are difficult
to measure in a live-fire context. For example, one of the ARTEP
7-8-MTP standards for the platoon/squad assault (7-3/4-1011) is: The
platoon kills, captures, or forces the withdrawal of 100 percent of the
enemy. To determine whether this standard has been met, the commander
must develop criteria that can be measured within the constraints of an
LFX. For example, to measure this standard, the commander could
decide that hitting 50 percent of the targets constitutes killing, capturing,
or driving away the enemy.

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CHAPTER 3
BUDDY-TEAM TRAINING

This chapter provides information for live-fire training at the

buddy-team level, culminating in an LFX. The LFX demonstrates to
the soldier and his chain of command that he has reached the highest
state of readiness possible to begin even more complex collective
live-fire training. Buddy-team training should take place at platoon
level. Examples of ranges and resources are provided to assist the unit
in the planning and preparation of training.

3-1. INTRODUCTION
Collective training begins at the buddy-team level. The buddy team is the
initial building block that lays the foundation for live fire by the maneuver
element—the squad, platoon, or company.
a. While the ultimate goal is to get the squad or platoon into a live-fire
maneuver box to simulate combat realism, soldiers must first have a basic
knowledge of individual movement techniques. They must also be
comfortable with firing and moving next to one another. To accomplish
this, the buddy-team live fire takes place in a controlled environment, as
opposed to a maneuver box. This is critical if the leader wants to focus
training on a limited number of collective live-fire tasks.
b. A small area is needed to setup lanes (two soldiers for each lane) to
conduct both offensive and defensive training. While offensive training will
occupy most of the training time, the defense should also be addressed.

3-2. OBJECTIVES
Training objectives vary based on the size of the element to be trained, the
unit’s experience, and the task to be trained (based on the unit’s METL).
The following example illustrates this point.

An infantry commander knows that his unit has minimal live-fire

experience. He decides that he wants to conduct a platoon LFX in a
maneuver box in six months. He first reinforces buddy-team fire and
movement on the installation’s fire and movement range. (Here his focus
is on live-fire safety, individual movement techniques, and marksmanship).
Next, he will train his fire teams on reinforcing the concepts of fire control,
fire discipline, and fire distribution through the use of fire commands on a

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known-distance range. Then the commander will train his squads in fire
control measures on an infantry squad battle course, integrating all
previous training. When he is satisfied that his personnel are prepared in
the basics of live fire, he will conduct a leader’s CPX to rehearse command
and control. Then he will conduct a squad or platoon LFX in a maneuver
box.
a. Training objectives at the buddy-team level in the offense are:
(1) Introduction of basic principles of coordinated movement with
other soldiers. However, the focus should be on individual movement
techniques (IMT).
(2) Communication (oral, arm-and-hand signals).
(3) Suppressive fire using weapons normally found at this level (rifle,
M203, hand grenades, and so on).
(4) Individual movement techniques to include standing, kneeling, and
modified marksmanship positions.
(5) Use of terrain.
(6) Target detection.
b. Training objectives at the buddy-team level in the defense are:
(1) Introduction of the basic principles of a coordinated defense
(integrated fires, sectors of fire, defensive positions, sector sketches, range
cards).
(2) Communication (oral, arm-and-hand signals).
(3) Suppressive fire using weapons normally found at this level (M16
rifles, M203 grenade launchers, hand grenades, and so on).
(4) Use of terrain.
(5) Target detection.

3-3. BUDDY-TEAM COLLECTIVE TASKS

This paragraph focuses on the sustainment and expansion of IMT
introduced in IET. Commanders should tailor collective tasks based on
the unit’s needs (METL). As the commander combines different collective
tasks and missions into an LFX, he must keep in mind that ammunition is
a primary constraint. (See paragraph 3-6. All ammunition data are based
on DA PAM 350-38.) Collective tasks should be performed in the crawl,
walk, and run sequence.
a. In the crawl phase, the buddy team is oriented to the terrain. As they
walk through the exercise, they are reminded of combat basics through
briefings, demonstrations, and AARs.
(1) For the defense, combat basics cover identifying sectors of fire,
clearing fields of fire, constructing fighting positions, and preparing range
cards.
(2) For the offense, the four buddy-team combat fundamentals (cover,
concealment, suppressive fires, and team work) and individual movement

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techniques (low crawl, high crawl, rushing, negotiating obstacles) are

discussed. The team leader should follow the moving buddy team
downrange giving the same fire commands that he would give in an LFX.
The result is multiechelon training—the leader exercises command and
control, and the soldier reinforces his individual tasks.
b. In the walk phase, the buddy team is challenged to demonstrate
their understanding of the concepts. Using MILES allows a force-on-force
exercise, which increases realism and helps identify weaknesses.
c. When successful in the walk phase, the buddy team moves to the run
phase (live fire). Again, the team uses MILES to increase training realism,
with the controller using the control gun to cause a "near miss" when the
soldier violates a movement principle, or a "kill" when the soldier commits
an unsafe act.

3-4. EXAMPLE BUDDY-TEAM DEFENSE (EXERCISE 1)

Each unit should develop a buddy-team LFX based upon its METL. The
following is an example of a buddy-team LFX for the defense.
a. Task, Conditions, and Standards.
TASK: Prepare fighting positions.
CONDITIONS: During daylight hours, on terrain that will allow
defensive positions to be prepared, given assigned weapons, 30
rounds of 5.56-mm ball (90 rounds for M249) and or 5 TP 40-mm
rounds for each weapon, real or practice grenades, MILES, LBE,
helmet, and 20 target silhouettes (presented in a sequence to
match OPFOR doctrine). The targets will be presented in groups
of 4 at 25 meters, 50 meters, 100 meters, 200 meters, and 300
meters within five minutes.
STANDARDS: Construct fighting positions (SMCT 071-326-5703)
to include identifying sectors of fire (use sector stakes) and clearing
fields of fire (SMCT 071-326-5703). If attacked, the buddy team
employs all weapon systems at the appropriate ranges (M16, M203,
and hand grenade).
NOTE: If terrain is not available to set up this exercise, a defense test
range may be used (Figure 3-l). The amount of ammunition and
the standards should be adjusted based upon the targetry setup.

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b. Exercise 1. The fire team leader briefs his buddy teams on the
tactical scenario. PVT Walker (M16) and PFC Thompson (M203) prepare
their sector sketch (range cards if crew-served weapon) and sector stakes,
and they begin digging their fighting positions. At a prescribed time, the
team leader gives them a warning of an impending enemy attack. PVT
Walker and PFC Thompson get into position and lock and load their
weapons. They then engage the enemy IAW their instructions.
(Engagement could take place when the enemy crosses a designated
phase line, or when an oral or visual signal is given by the team leader.)

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3-5. EXAMPLE BUDDY-TEAM OFFENSE (EXERCISE 2)

The following example is one option for a buddy-team LFX for the
offense. Other tasks can be taken either from the SMCT or from other
references.
a. Task, Conditions, and Standards.
TASK: Maneuver against sniper.
CONDITIONS: During daytime; given a fire and movement range
(Figure 3-2); and, as part of a notional squad, two soldiers with
assigned weapons and equipment, 45 rounds of 5.56-mm blank,
ball, or plastic ammunition (90 rounds for the M249), 5 rounds of
TP 40-mm for each M203, one smoke grenade for each soldier, and
MILES (optional).
STANDARDS: When engaged, the buddy team must initiate
suppressive fire, report the enemy’s location and the team’s plan of
action, and use proper individual movement techniques.

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b. Exercise 2. A buddy team is moving down a lane (as part of a

notional squad) followed by their team or squad leader. They have been
briefed by their team or squad leader on the situation. They are aware that
other buddy teams and fire teams are on their flanks. A shot rings out and
they are told they have just come under fire by a sniper (or other enemy
position) to their front. They take cover and determine where the shot
came from and how they will approach the enemy using the terrain. At this
point, the soldiers may or may not see the target. A sniper maybe some
distance away; the soldiers may have to move toward the enemy before
they can locate him. A pneumatic weapon can be used to provide realism
and cue soldiers to the enemy position. The fire team leader can control
the targetry during the exercise. Using proper movement techniques and
communication, the buddy team begins moving toward the enemy.
Soldiers may use oral commands, arm-and-hand signals, or other
prearranged signals IAW Army doctrine. When the enemy is located, one
of the soldiers states he is in a good position to fire. The team initiates
suppressive fire and continues downrange until the threat is eliminated, or
they are ordered to halt. During this exercise, the team leader may actively
communicate with the buddy team, giving them visual signals and fire
commands. (See Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1, task
number 071-326-0502 for the conditions and standards for moving under
direct fire.)

3-6. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support covers the amount and type of equipment and
ammunition needed for each phase of training at every level (Tables 3-1
through 3-5). Ammunition requirements are based on DA PAM 350-38.
Equipment requirements are based on various training documents.
a. MILES Rehearsal Ammunition Requirements. Most blank
ammunition for the rehearsal is drawn from the unit’s squad, platoon, or
company FTX allocations. Adding all blank allocations listed in this
manual (from buddy team to platoon) equals that ammunition allocated
for one FTX. Depending on how much the unit forecasts for other uses,
this amount can be adjusted as desired.
b. Live-Fire Ammunition Requirements. The ammunition type and
quantity comes from DA PAM 350-38. The unit can adjust these figures as
necessary. Pyrotechnics are also addressed in DA PAM 350-38.

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3-8
CHAPTER 4

FIRE-TEAM TRAINING

This chapter provides information for live-fire training at the fire-team

level, culminating in an LFX. Fire-team training should take place at
the platoon level. Examples of resource requirements are provided to
assist the unit in the planning and preparation of training.

Preparation for the LFX requires different levels of training by

different units. The commander may decide to develop special live-fire
training for his fire teams, or he may decide to eliminate fire-team
training in favor of more squad training. If he decides to strengthen the
fire team, several options are available. When training the fire team,
the fire-team leader normally participates in engaging targets. In
addition, he may sometimes relay fire commands and other
instructions from the squad leader to his team.

4-1. INTRODUCTION
A fire team is the smallest maneuver element that has command and
control. By incorporating the React to Contact and Break Contact battle
drills within a fire-team exercise, the unit can practice command and
control processes in addition to other training.
a. The fire team’s LFX integrates collective fires with collective
movement techniques. The soldier must focus on the collective group and
his fire-team leader’s interaction with the squad leader.
b. Seldom does a fire team execute a mission alone. However, training
the fire team in an LFX consisting of the basics in command and control is
critical in order to make squad and platoon live fires more efficient and
productive. By introducing fire control techniques (fire commands, fire
control measures, lifting and shifting fires, and fire discipline), unit leaders
lay the foundation for the LFX. The LFX should take place in a controlled
environment. This allows the leader to focus training on a limited number
of collective live-fire tasks.
c. A small area is needed to set up the LFX. A known-distance (KD)
range can be used to train fire teams. These fire teams can train
individually or as part of the squad. Offensive training (maneuver) will
occupy most of the training time.
NOTE: The defense will not be discussed here for the fire team.

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4-2. OBJECTIVES
Fire-team training has many objectives. Although some training objectives
may appear similar for each element, they are different. (For example,
training command and control at fire-team level is vastly different than at
battalion level.) Training objectives at fire-team level are:
Introduction of basic principles of coordinated movement with
other elements (fire teams).
Communication (continued reinforcement of oral
communication and arm-and-hand signals, and the addition of
visual signals).
Suppressive fire using weapons normally at this level (M16 rifle,
M203 grenade launcher, M249, hand grenades, and so on).
Use of terrain.
Target detection.
Target engagement (fire control).

4-3. FOCUS
Fire-team training should focus on positions, volume of fire, fire
distribution, application of fire, fire control, and fire discipline.
a. Positions. The fire team leader must ensure that individual positions
are properly spaced (based on terrain) and offer concealment and
protection for both the offense and defense. Usually the squad will have a
base soldier for the squad to form on. The following points should be
considered:
(1) Each soldier should have visual contact with the soldier on his left
and right.
(2) Positions should be properly aligned to cover their sectors, and
their fields of fire should interlock. The leader must ensure no one is in a
position where they may be accidentally shot.
b. Volume of Fire (Intensity). In combat, the volume of fire is usually
high at first (to gain fire superiority), then decreases to a lower level.
(1) Ammunition and magazines must be clean and serviceable.
(2) Rapid reloading is critical. This can be learned through SOPs and
rehearsals, and by having two or three tracer rounds as the last few rounds
in the magazine to warn the firer the magazine will soon be empty.
c. Fire Distribution. Fire distribution (Figure 4-1) is normally covered
by a unit SOP and supplemented as necessary by the team leader and the
squad leader. For example, the SOP may direct soldiers to fire at targets
to their front, or within a 20-degree arc from their position. The squad
leader may change that due to the situation and tell M203 gunners to fire
into dead space on the right flank, or tell the M249 gunners to fire at light

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vehicles, enemy machine guns, and so on. (This topic also should be
covered in platoon operations orders.)

d. Application of Fire. Fire can be applied as concentrated fire or

distributed fire. Concentrated fire is directed by the fire team at a point
target. Distributed fire is delivered in width and depth to cover an area in
which the enemy is known or suspected to be.
NOTE: This is a method of engaging targetry and should not be confused
with fire distribution, which controls and measures collective fires
on the threat array.
e. Fire Control. Fire control includes fire commands (alert, direction,
target description, range, method of fire) and fire control measures
(sectors of fire, engagement areas, TRPs, phase lines). (See Appendix I.)
Fire control can be executed by using oral signals, arm-and-hand signals,
prearranged signals, personal contact, and SOPs. Fire control allows the

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fire team to select and designate targets, open fire at the desired instant,
adjust fire, control rate of fire, shift to other targets, and cease fire.
f. Fire Discipline. Fire discipline means firing IAW SOPs and/or leader
instructions. Fire should be directed at known targets to conserve
ammunition for the duration of the battle.

4-4. TRAINING SEQUENCE

The normal training sequence is crawl, walk, and run.
a. In the crawl phase (dry fire), the fire team is oriented to the terrain.
As they walk through the exercise, they are reminded of combat basics
through briefings and demonstrations. Fire commands and fire control
measures are also discussed and rehearsed.
b. In the walk phase (rehearsal), the fire team is challenged to
demonstrate their understanding of the concepts. Using MILES allows a
force-on-force exercise, which increases realism and helps identify
weaknesses.
c. When successful in the walk phase, the team moves to the run phase
(live fire). Again, the fire team uses MILES to increase training realism.
The controller uses the control gun to cause a "near miss" when the soldier
violates a movement principle or a "kill" when he commits an unsafe act.

4-5. EXAMPLE RATTLE-BATTLE DRILL

(KNOWN-DISTANCE RANGE)
In a rattle-battle drill, two fire teams can train together or separately. They
should be supervised by a squad leader or senior NCO with a MILES
control gun. (This individual also controls commands to the target pits.)
Soldiers must keep in mind that this is fire-team training, not squad
training. The team leader directs his team; if present, the squad leader
observes, assists, and provides commands to the fire-team leader.
a. The commander decides to spend a minimum amount of time
training his fire teams in fire control before moving into squad live-fire
training. Before the day of training, all leaders complete a walk-through
(TEWT) on the range where the exercise will take place.
b. The unit draws weapons and MILES equipment, and is then
transported to a known-distance range. The fire teams are first briefed on
the rules of engagement, then they conduct a walk-through of the exercise.
Once the walk-through is complete, the fire teams collect their
ammunition, and two of them move up to the starting point.
c. As the first series of targets appear, the squad leader initiates the
exercise by giving the proper signal and by relaying fire commands to the
team leaders. The fire team may move as a unit or by buddy team
depending on the mission and the unit’s training objectives. (In Figure 4-2,
the fire team moves by buddy-team bounds.) One buddy team (Team 1)

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lays a base of fire while the other (Team 2) moves to the next fire point.
(This can be a marked location or a predesignated distance.)

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d. The next series of targets appear after Team 2 is in position. Team 2

engages the targets while Team 1 moves to the next firing point. This
continues as desired.

e. While the exercise is taking place, the other teams support range
requirements (target pits, ammunition breakdown, and so on) and
perform concurrent training. As each team finishes the LFX, the "squad
leader and platoon leader conduct an AAR focusing on training
goals—for example, fire control, fire discipline, fire distribution, and so on.
(See Chapter 5, paragraph 5-9 for more information about AARs.)

4-6. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support includes the amount and type of equipment and
ammunition available for each phase of live-fire training at fire-team
level—whether crawl (dry fire/walk-through), walk (rehearsal with
MILES), or run (live fire) (Tables 4-1 through 4-6). The ammunition
requirements are based on DA PAM 350-38. The equipment
requirements are based on various training documents. These

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requirements will be adjusted to the unit’s training objectives based on

METL and METT-T.
a. MILES Rehearsal Ammunition Requirements. Most blank
ammunition for the rehearsal is drawn from the unit’s squad, platoon, or
company FTX allocations. Adding all blank allocations listed in this
manual (from buddy team to platoon) equals that ammunition allocated
for one FTX. Depending on how much the unit forecasts for other uses,
this amount can be adjusted as desired.
b. Live-Fire Ammunition Requirements. The ammunition type and
quantity comes from DA PAM 350-38. The unit can adjust these figures as
necessary. The quantity of some ammunition can be increased by
integrating allocations for other training events as long as those training
events are addressed in the LFX. Pyrotechnics are also addressed in
DA PAM 350-38.

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CHAPTER 5
SQUAD TRAINING

This chapter provides information for training the infantry squad,

culminating in an LFX. Squad LFXs are normally resourced and
controlled by the company. Examples of resource requirements are
provided to assist the unit in its planning process.

The squad LFX is the culmination of all previous training. It

integrates planning rehearsals, MILES exercises, and all other
training the unit has conducted. The soldier's anticipation and morale
are intensified. The unit leadership must ensure that this is a realistic,
well-planned exercise.

5-1. INTRODUCTION
This is the first level of training that involves the unit. Here, ARTEP MTP
tasks are tied together and STXs are conducted. The maneuver box is
used instead of a structured range. The maneuver box concept allows the
subordinate leader to select his movement route and direction of
approach to an objective (within his assigned sector). It gives him a sense
of independence and freedom of action. It also reinforces the seriousness
of safety and control and is more realistic.

5-2. OBJECTIVES
Squad training has many objectives. These include:
Reinforcement of principles of command and control. (See
Chapter 2.)
- (1) Reinforcement of concepts of supporting fire, base of
fire, and synchronization of fires.
- (2) Reinforcement of concepts of starting, stopping, and
lifting and shifting fires.
- (3) Concentration on maneuver (to include security and
safety), fire control measures, and fire discipline.
Communication. (Communication is the linchpin of
synchronization.)
Weapon system integration using organic and nonorganic
weapons normally at this level (M16 rifles, M203 grenade
launchers, M249s, grenades, Claymores, and so on).

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Completion of a fire support plan. (This includes calling for and

adjusting indirect fire.)
Use of terrain.
Target identification, acquisition, and engagement (emphasis on
fratricide prevention).

5-3. FOCUS
Squad training should focus on positions, volume of fire, fire distribution,
application of fire, fire control, and fire discipline. (See Chapter 4,
paragraph 4-3 and Appendix I for more information.)
a. Positions. Squad leaders must ensure individual positions are
properly spaced, offer cover and concealment, and have interlocking fires
for both the offense and defense. The following points should be
considered:
(1) Each soldier should have visual contact with the soldier on his left
and right.
(2) Positions should be properly aligned to cover their sectors. No one
should be located in a position where he may be accidentally shot.
b. Volume of Fire (Intensity). In combat, the volume of fire is usually
high at first to gain fire superiority, then decreases to a lower level.
(1) Ammunition and magazines must be clean and serviceable.
(2) Rapid reloading is critical. This can be learned through SOPs and
rehearsals, and by having a tracer round as the last or next to last round in
the magazine to warn the firer the magazine is empty.
c. Fire Distribution. Fire distribution is normally covered by a unit
SOP and supplemented as necessary by the team leader and the squad
leader.
d. Application of Fire. Fire can be applied as concentrated fire or
distributed fire.
(1) Concentrated fire is directed at a point target.
(2) Distributed fire is delivered in width and depth to cover an area in
which the enemy is known or suspected to be.
NOTE: This is a method of engaging targetry and should not be confused
with fire distribution, which controls and measures collective fires
on the threat array.
e. Fire Control. Fire control includes fire commands (alert, direction,
target description, range, method of fire) and fire control measures
(sectors of fire, engagement areas, TRPs). It can be accomplished by using
oral signals, arm-and-hand signals, prearranged signals (to include
whistles, flares, and so on), personal contact, and SOPs. Fire control
allows the unit to select and designate targets, open fire at the desired

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instant, adjust fire, control the rate of fire, shift to other targets, and cease
fire (lift). (See Appendix I for more information.)
f. Fire Discipline. Fire discipline means firing IAW SOPs and or
leader instructions. Fire should be directed by the squad leader through
verbal commands and tracer fire.

5-4. PLANNING
Before any unit starts planning an LFX, leaders must determine the
individual and collective tasks to be incorporated into the exercise. They
base this on the unit commander’s assessment in conjunction with the
unit’s METL. Once the tasks have been identified, planning begins.
(Figure 5-1 shows an example of a squad training plan.) All planning must
include the following duties:
a. Assign a project officer.
b. Contact range control for a description of training areas and
regulations for conducting an LFX.
c. Develop a training plan that includes tasks to be trained, support
requirements (ammunition, transportation, training area/range
requirements, medics, other logistic considerations), and time/rotation
schedule. Use historical data and the experience of other units to gather
information to help in planning the exercise.
d. Develop the tactical plan. Incorporate a threat scenario that helps
the unit achieve its training goals. (ARTEP MTPs identify tasks for the
OPFOR to be evaluated.)
e. Develop the live-fire plan to include all SDZ overlays. (A scenario
that explains maneuver and where each contact will occur should be
organized chronologically, then submitted to range control.)
f. Reconnoiter terrain.
g. Conduct support training (OCs, MILES, safety, AAR).
h. Coordinate with outside agencies for training aids, controllers,
MILES equipment, and other logistical support needed.
NOTES: 1. MILES equipment is an effective training aid if it is zeroed.
Enough time should be allocated to properly zero MILES.

2. The MILES transmitter should be fastened as tightly as

possible to the barrel of the weapon. Empty cardboard boxes
(blank ammunition boxes) can be placed between the transmitter
and the barrel to ensure a tight fit.

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5-5. SETUP
All installations have different range regulations governing the conduct of
LFXs. Temporary impact areas for maneuver LFXs can be approved by
the commanding general (AR 635-63). For a squad, a recommended
maneuver box would be one that consists of a 5- by 2-kilometer box. This
allows the unit to employ its different weapon systems as long as they are
within the planned SDZs. Each weapon system’s limits in terms of azimuth
and distance must be considered. These limits are identified for each
weapon system at every point from which the weapon is fired. At any given
location in the maneuver box, left and right limits should exist that can be
expressed in degrees or roils. All leaders must understand these limits and
incorporate them into the TEWT and the walk-through or rehearsal
before the LFX is executed. (See Appendix G and AR 385-63 for more
detailed information on SDZs.)
a. Leaders must adjust scenarios based on range restrictions, terrain,
and training objectives. Every possible attempt should be made to

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incorporate all types of weapon systems at their maximum ranges. The

maneuver box size needed for a squad LFX varies based on mission. (For
example, a movement to contact normally requires more area than an
ambush.) When developing a live-fire area, leaders should plan for no
restrictions at first, then adjust as required to support the mission, keeping
it tactically sound.
b. Doctrine must support the target array. Leaders should use a
scenario to replicate threat dispositions. When planning the scenario,
leaders should consider the following:
(1) Enemy targets must engage the unit at the proper distance.
(2) Enemy targets must be located in proper relation to the rest of the
enemy positions.
(3) Enemy targets must be located in a realistic area using terrain (not
in an open field but behind a tree in a fighting position). For example, on a
movement to contact an observation post could be placed between 200 to
500 meters away from where the unit will be engaged, 200 meters in front
of the enemy squad it supports (which is part of a notional platoon), in
hasty fighting positions in a tree line.

5-6. EXECUTION OF THE LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE

The execution of a maneuver box LFX is much like any other training
exercise. Although live ammunition increases concern, experience breeds
confidence. While squad leaders do not normally participate in fires, they
frequently designate targets and control fires by using tracers as a method
of command and control of their fire teams.
a. Safety Briefing. A safety briefing should always be conducted before
the LFX. (A sample briefing is included in Appendix A.)
b. Risk Assessment. This is a leader’s (commander) responsibility. The
unit must be assessed to determine if a condition exists that will make the
LFX hazardous (lack of sleep, lack of experience with a
complex/dangerous task, and so on). (A sample risk assessment can be
reviewed in Appendix A.)
c. Leader Participation. The chain of command should always
participate when possible. This includes both command and logistic play.
In a squad exercise, the platoon leader can provide input and receive
reports through radio communications with his squad leaders. (This is how
it will be done in combat.) In the LFX, the platoon leader can direct action
as a teaching point or just allow the squad to maintain momentum. In
addition, the platoon leader strengthens his working relationship with his
squad leaders and gains a first-hand knowledge of his NCO’s experience
and capabilities. The platoon leader should not be an evaluator. (This
provides an opportunity for the squad to be observed subjectively as
opposed to objectively.)

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5-7. OBSERVER-CONTROLLERS
The OCs assist the unit in contributing to the realism of force-on-force and
LFXs by coordinating indirect fires, assessing casualties, and controlling
targetry. In addition, they assist the unit in the operation of MILES
equipment and in stopping unsafe acts. (See Appendix H.) OCs allow the
chain of command to focus on the battle without unrealistic or artificial
distractions. They are doctrinal experts who help the unit analyze its
performance through the use of an AAR. The personnel used in this
capacity must be of the highest quality. While they are used at Army
Training Centers and by divisions in large-scale exercises, OCs can be
provided for small-unit training by battalions and companies in
coordination with sister units. OCs should assist the unit, not evaluate it. If
OCs cannot be provided from external assets, the chain of command can
perform some of those functions (the company commander and first
sergeant for a platoon LFX). OCs are usually not used at the level,
however, they can be helpful if assets are available.

5-8. ASSESSMENT
Assessment is a major part of the LFX. It is based on MTP standards,
FMs 7-7 and 7-8, and marksmanship data. AARs should be used to discuss
tasks that need improvement. All soldiers should note problems and
successes, and discuss these in the AAR. (See Appendix J.)
a. Maintaining a positive environment is important for learning. The
LFX assessment is not a critique. Therefore, empirical data should be
used to merely assist in identifying general strengths and weaknesses, not
to pronounce pass or fail. The fact that variable conditions affect each
LFX differently should be remembered when compiling data. If a unit fails
to perform to standard, the LFX should be repeated.
b. MTPs should be used as the primary source of assessments.
Quantitative MTP standards may be difficult to measure in LFXs,
especially without target MILES shootback capability. As a whole, MTP
subtasks are much more subjective and easier to measure (go/no-go).
c. Field manuals also assist the leader in assessing his unit. They
sometimes offer alternative concepts and ideas in an approach to a tactical
problem. Field manuals also go into much more depth than an MTP and
can be used to assess problem areas.
d. Marksmanship data should be analyzed in every LFX. Fire control
measures, fire commands, fire discipline, suppression, lifting and shifting
fires, and fire distribution assist the leader in identifying potential
problems. Use of marksmanship data should be subjective. When using
multiple weapon systems, the OC may not always be able to tell what type
of projectile hit the target (grenade, AT4, M16 rounds, or M249 rounds).
Chapter 2 provides a list of variables that may affect collective

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marksmanship. This information should be assessed carefully. It should be

used to identify general strengths and weaknesses.
e. The chain of command should also conduct a separate, private
assessment and counseling of the unit leader. This assists the leader in
identifying his own strengths and weaknesses.
f. OCs, leaders, and the soldiers themselves are used in the assessment
process. Tools that can assist this process are video cameras, polaroid
cameras, sand tables, charts, diagrams, and other audio or visual aids.

5-9. AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS

The AAR is one of the most important aspects of training. It allows a
unit’s strengths and weaknesses to be discovered and discussed so training
goals can be set for the future. The AAR should be conducted at the
lowest levels so all soldiers have input and recognize their own strengths
and weaknesses. Therefore, training has legitimacy and the support of all
soldiers. The success of an AAR depends mostly on the conductor who
should be thoroughly trained and rehearsed in giving AARs, and should be
an expert in unit tactics. The AAR should not only concentrate on the
separate tasks and subtasks of the mission, but also on each battlefield
operating system (BOS) and the battle as a whole. (See FM 25-101.)

5-10. SQUAD MISSION

This paragraph presents an exercise scenario based on ARTEP MTP
missions and standards. The commander should change, add, or delete
missions based on his unit’s METL and METT-T.

MISSION: 1st SQD, 1st PLT, B CO, 2/22 INF conducts a movement to
contact NLT 102000 Jul 92 to reestablish contact with enemy forces along
Axis Blue.
a. Maneuver Box and Targetry. (See Appendix C.)
(1) Threat and friendly targets can be the standard one-dimensional
Army targets or three-dimensional life-size targets constructed of
plywood/pressboard with metal spring joints, clothed in OPFOR uniforms.
Targets are activated by an OC (or unit leader) using an electronic
transmitter. When a target is hit, a mechanism is activated causing the
target to drop to the ground. If the OC feels the target is suppressed
effectively, he may drop it. If suppression stops before maneuvering over
a specific area, the OC may raise the target at his discretion.
(2) Targetry is placed according to threat doctrine. It will engage the
friendly forces at the appropriate range with respect to the capabilities of
the enemy weapons and terrain.
(3) Pneumatic firing devices with MILES transmitters attached to a
vehicle windshield motor create a fan of return fire. This "fire" is

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supplemented by the controllers when soldiers commit an unsafe or

unrealistic act. All targetry equipment should be hardened as much as
possible to protect it from weapon systems employed in the LFX.
(4) For a movement to contact, the squad maneuver box should be
about 1,000 to 2,000 meters long and 1,000 meters wide. This does not
include an assembly area or the SDZs that merge into the impact area.
The size of the maneuver box can be adapted to the mission and terrain.
(An ambush or attack mission might require a box 1,000 meters long by
1,000 meters wide.)
b. Scenario.
(1) General situation. The battalion has seized key terrain within its
area of operations. Contact with enemy elements has been broken.
Intelligence reports indicate the enemy is retreating in small groups and
will defend in 2- to 3-man elements to slow friendly forces. The enemy is
believed to have the capability to counterattack in regimental strength
within the next 36 hours.
(2) Special situation. The company is in an assembly area when ordered
to conduct a movement to contact, cross the LD and orient on three
separate march objectives. The company commander’s FRAGO specifies
that enemy squads or larger formations will not be bypassed unless
ordered.
(3) Phase I. The squad, as part of the company movement to contact,
comes under sniper fire or fire from an OP. The squad executes the react
to contact battle drill and develops the situation. It continues the
movement to contact.
(4) Phase II. The squad continues the mission and comes under
indirect fire. It executes the react to indirect fire battle drill.
(5) Phase III. The squad then comes under direct small arms fire from
an OPFOR OP. It executes the react to contact battle drill, develops the
situation, and neutralizes the position. The squad consolidates and
reorganizes and continues the mission.
(6) Phase IV. The squad is engaged by an enemy squad and executes
the react to contact battle drill. If the squad leader determines he cannot
take the position, he establishes a base of fire to fix the enemy and
contacts the platoon leader for further instructions.
(7) Phase V. The unit conducts an AAR IAW the tactical situation and
prepares for the next mission.
c. Weapon Accommodation.
(1) Weapons systems used vary depending on the type of unit and
terrain available (to accommodate necessary SDZs). The Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC) uses up to 40-mm M203 practice rounds and
AT4s on its Movement to Contact range. It also uses live Claymores in its

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ambush scenario, and live grenades, mortars, artillery, and bangalore

torpedoes in its deliberate attack scenario.
(2) The SDZs are based on the largest caliber ballistic
weapon/munitions to be used. They are designed to provide the squad
with the maximum flexibility in the selection of tactically sound movement
techniques throughout the area. Specifically, they need to be plotted from
the most probable axes of march that the platoon leaders might select.
These axes of march can be influenced through operations orders that
define boundaries, restrictive fire areas, and so on, and control which
target array to activate.
(3) Using the extreme engagement limits, the maximum distance of
fire is plotted to the left, right, and forward of the participating unit’s line
of fire. The possibility of an injury caused by friendly fire is increased on
this range. Personnel must follow the safety precautions presented in the
safety briefing.

5-11. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support covers the amount and type of equipment and
ammunition needed for each phase of live-fire training at squad
level—whether crawl (dry fire/walk-through), walk (rehearsal with
MILES), or run (live fire) (Tables 5-1 through 5-6). The ammunition
requirements are based on DA PAM 350-38 using a maneuver box with no
weapon caliber restrictions. The equipment requirements are based on
various training documents. These requirements can be adjusted to the
unit’s training objectives based on METL and METT-T.
a. MILES Rehearsal Ammunition Requirements. Most blank
ammunition for the rehearsal is drawn from the unit’s squad, platoon, or
company FTX allocations. Adding all blank allocations listed in this
manual (from buddy team to platoon) equals that ammunition allocated
for one FTX. Depending on how much the unit forecasts for other uses,
this amount can be adjusted as desired.
NOTE: Additional ammunition will be needed for test fires. All weapons
should be test fired if possible.
b. Live-Fire Ammunition Requirements. The ammunition type and
quantity comes from DA PAM 350-38. The quantity of some ammunition
can be increased by integrating allocations for other training events as long
as those training requirements are addressed in the LFX. In some cases,
live ammunition can be used instead of simulators. (For example, even
though five 9-mm rounds for each platoon are allocated for the AT4 in the
LFX, a yearly allocation of one live round for each firer [four for each rifle
squad] exists. These live rounds can be integrated into the LFX.)
Pyrotechnics are addressed in DA PAM 350-38.

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5-14
CHAPTER 6

PLATOON TRAINING

This chapter discusses training and preparing the platoon to complete

an LFX. Platoon LFXs are normally resourced and coordinated by
the battalion. Example range and resource requirements are provided.

6-1. INTRODUCTION
Each type and size unit has different training needs. The platoon focuses
on different tasks than the squad. Like units train different tasks because
of varying degrees of proficiency. This paragraph provides training
considerations and objectives of the platoon with regard to LFXs.
a. The optimum training range is one that provides feedback and
realism (life-like targetry, room to maneuver, battle sounds, and so on). A
maneuver box has the most potential to meet these requirements. This
concept allows the subordinate leader to select the direction of approach
to an objective within his assigned sector and gives him a sense of
independence and freedom of action. It emphasizes the seriousness of
safety and control, and it is more realistic. However, a maneuver box may
be difficult to obtain at different installations, and it takes a lot of time and
effort to prepare. (The maneuver box and some alternatives are discussed
in greater detail in Appendix J.)
b. When a unit conducts an LFX, the soldier can observe the unit’s
command and control. For this reason, the command element must be
trained before the LFX. While a TEWT is important, it may not be
enough. A walk-through with team leaders and above, led by the
commander, can answer many questions and avoid potential problems.
However, reviewing the exercise with a TEWT generally does not
satisfactorily integrate the unit’s weapon systems. A fire coordination
exercise (FCX) can fill this void. (FM 25-4 discusses the different exercises
available to the unit, based on training objectives and resources.)

6-2. OBJECTIVES
Platoon training has many objectives. These include:
Reinforcement of principles of command and control. (See
Chapter 2.)
- Reinforcement of concepts of supporting fire, base of fire,
and synchronization of fires.

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- Reinforcement of concepts of starting, stopping, and lifting and

shifting fires. (Everyone must know [through training and
rehearsals] the signal for lift or shift. Lift simply means to cease
fire. Shifting is more complex. It can mean shifting from one
section of the objective to an adjacent section, or it can denote a
total shift from the objective to an adjacent area. Additional
coordination and a timed sequence of events [matrix] can apply
in certain missions such as a deliberate attack.)
- Concentration on maneuver (to include security), fire control
measures, and fire discipline.
Communications using radio, wire, and signals. (Communications
takes on a more significant role at platoon level. The equipment
and signaling devices become more complex. For example, the
task to lift and shift fires is a complicated issue that varies
depending on the situation [METT-T]. The more complicated
the situation, the more important communications become.
Different techniques using state-of-the-art technology must be
incorporated as an integral part of every LFX.)
Weapon system integration using organic and nonorganic
weapons normally at this level (M16 rifle, M203 grenade
launcher, M249, grenades, Claymore mines, AT4s, mortars,
artillery, and so on).
Use of terrain.
Target identification, acquisition, and engagement (emphasis on
fratricide avoidance).

6-3. FOCUS
Platoon training should focus on positions, volume of fire, fire distribution,
application of fire, fire control, and fire discipline. (These are discussed in
detail in Chapter 4 and Appendix I.)
a. Positions. The platoon leader must ensure that squad positions are
properly spaced (based on terrain) and offer concealment and protection
for both the offense and defense. In addition to the information discussed
in Chapters 4 and 5, the following points should be considered:
(1) Crew-served weapons should cover the most dangerous enemy
avenue of approach.
(2) Indirect fires, antiarmor weapons, and other weapon systems
should be integrated into the fire plan.
b. Volume of Fire. In combat, the volume of fire is usually high at first
to gain fire superiority, then decreases to a lower level.
c. Fire Distribution. Fire distribution is where a unit’s fires are directed
and where they hit. It is normally covered by a unit SOP and
supplemented as necessary by the team leader and the squad leader.

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d. Application of Fire. Fire can be applied as concentrated fire or

distributed fire.
e. Fire Control. Fire control includes fire commands and fire control
measures. Fire control can be accomplished by using oral signals,
arm-and-hand signals, prearranged signals (to include whistles, flares, and
so on), personal contact, and SOPs. Fire control allows the platoon to
select and designate targets, open fire at the desired instant, adjust fire,
control rate of fire, shift to other targets, and cease fire. (See Appendix I.)
f. Fire Discipline. Fire discipline means firing IAW SOPs, leader
instructions, or both. Fire should be directed at known targets to conserve
ammunition for the duration of the operation.

6-4. PLANNING
Before any unit starts planning an LFX, leaders must determine the
individual and collective tasks to be incorporated. This is based on the unit
commander’s assessment in conjunction with the unit’s METL. Once the
tasks have been identified, planning begins. (Figure 6-1 shows an example
of a platoon training plan.) (See Chapter 5 and Appendix E for further
information on planning an LFX.)

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6-5. SETUP
Preparing for the platoon LFX is similar to that of the squad.
a. A recommended maneuver box for the platoon would be one that
consists of a 2- by 5-kilometer box. The platoon needs to employ its
different types of weapon systems within the planned SDZs, with regard to
azimuth and distance. These should be incorporated into the TEWT and
rehearsal, which is conducted before execution of the LFX.
b. Leaders must adjust scenarios based on range restrictions, terrain,
and training objectives. At platoon level, all possible nonorganic weapon
systems should be used. The maneuver box area needed for different type
missions varies. The unit obtains a clear picture of this as it begins
planning its SDZs for all weapons.
c. Doctrine must support the target array. Leaders should use a
scenario to replicate threat dispositions. When planning the scenario,
leaders should consider the following:
(1) The enemy target must engage the unit at the proper distance.
(2) The enemy target must be located in proper relation to the rest of
the enemy positions.
(3) The enemy target must be located in a realistic area utilizing
terrain (not in an open field but behind a tree in a fighting position). For
example, on a movement to contact, an observation post could be placed
between 200 to 500 meters away from where the unit will be engaged, 200
meters in front of the enemy squad it supports (which is part of a notional
platoon), in hasty fighting positions.

6-6. EXECUTION OF THE LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE

The execution of a platoon maneuver box LFX is much like that of the
squad. However, when conducting a platoon exercise, the leader should
rotate the squads through all phases of training so all soldiers participate
and understand what is required to accomplish each mission.
a. Safety briefing. A safety briefing should always be conducted before
the LFX. (A sample briefing is included in Appendix A.)
b. Risk assessment. This is a leader’s responsibility. The unit must be
assessed to determine if conditions exist that will make the LFX hazardous
(lack of sleep, lack of experience with a complex and or dangerous task,
and so on). (A sample risk assessment can be reviewed in Appendix A.)
c. Leader Participation. In a platoon exercise, the company
commander can provide input and receive reports through radio
communications with his platoon leaders. The commander can direct
action as a teaching point or just allow the platoon to maintain
momentum. In addition, the commander can strengthen his working
relationship with his squad and platoon leaders, and gain first-hand
knowledge of their experience and capabilities.

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d. Combat Support/Combat Service Support Participation. Aidmen,

FISTs, and engineer personnel should participate in the LFX performing
the same duties they would in war. This provides training and tells them
what the unit expects of them in the field.

6-7. OBSERVERS-CONTROLLERS
The OC assists the unit in contributing to the realism of force-on-force and
LFXs by coordinating indirect fires, assessing casualties, controlling
targetry, stopping unsafe acts, and assisting in the conduct of AARs. (See
Chapter 5 and Appendix H.)

6-8. ASSESSMENT
Assessment is a critical part of the LFX. It is based on MTP standards,
FMs 7-7 and 7-8, and marksmanship data. An assessment is not a test. It is
a self-evaluation (with OC and unit input) that helps the unit focus on
areas for self-improvement. The assessment is facilitated through the use
of AARs. Leaders and OCs are not the only speakers in a unit AAR. All
soldiers should note problems and successes, and discuss them in the
AAR. (See Chapter 5 and Appendix J.)

6-9. AFTER-ACTION REVIEW

The AAR is one of the most important aspects of training. It allows a
unit’s strengths and weaknesses to be discovered and discussed so training
goals can be set for the future. The AAR should be conducted at the
lowest levels so all soldiers have input and will come to recognize their
unit’s strengths and weaknesses —not just be told what they are by the
chain of command. In this manner, training will have legitimacy, hence the
support of all soldiers. The success of an AAR depends mostly on the
conductor. This individual should be thoroughly trained and rehearsed in
giving AARs, and should be an expert in unit tactics. The AAR should not
only concentrate on the separate tasks and subtasks of the mission, but
also on each battlefield operating system (BOS) and the battle as a whole.
(More information can be found in the appropriate MTP.)

6-10. PLATOON MISSION

This paragraph focuses on the integration of three well-trained squads
into a combat proficient platoon. It presents an exercise scenario based on
ARTEP MTP missions/standards. The commander should change, add, or
delete missions based on his unit’s METL and METT-T. Before the LFX,
training following the crawl, walk, run concept will be conducted (dry fires
and MILES exercises).

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MISSION: 1st PLT, B CO, 2/22 IN conducts a movement to contact NLT

140630 Jul 92 to reestablish contact with enemy forces along Axis Green.
a. Range and Targetry.
(1) Threat and friendly targets should be constructed to simulate
three-dimensional life-size targets. Targets are activated by an OC using
an electronic transmitter. When a target is hit, a mechanism is activated
causing the target to drop to the ground.
(2) Enemy targetry is placed according to threat doctrine and engages
the friendly forces at the appropriate range with respect to the capabilities
of the enemy weapons and terrain. Targets are clothed in OPFOR
uniforms.
(3) Friendly targetry should be placed along boundary lines, contact
points, and so on. If they are engaged, range safety fans must not be
violated.
(4) Pneumatic firing devices with MILES transmitters attached to a
vehicle windshield motor creates a fan of return fire. This "fire" is
supplemented by the controllers for indirect enemy fires and unsafe acts.
All targetry equipment is hardened as much as possible to protect it from
weapon systems employed in the LFX.
(5) For a platoon-size LFX, the maneuver box should be about 3,000
to 5,000 meters long and 1,000 meters wide. This does not include an
assembly area or the SDZs that merge into the impact area.
b. Scenario.
(1) General situation. The battalion has seized key terrain within its
area of operations. Contact with enemy elements has been broken.
Intelligence reports indicate the enemy is retreating and will defend in
squad size elements to slow friendly forces. The enemy is believed to have
the capability to counterattack in regimental strength within the next 36
hours.
(2) Special situation. The company is in an assembly area when ordered
to conduct a movement to contact, cross the LD, and orient on three
separate march objectives. The company commander’s FRAGO specifies
that enemy squad or larger formations will not be bypassed unless
ordered.
(3) Phase I. The platoon, as part of the company movement to contact,
comes under sniper fire. The platoon executes the react to contact battle
drill and develops the situation. The platoon continues the movement to
contact.
(4) Phase II. The platoon continues the mission and comes under
indirect fire. It executes the react to indirect fire battle drill.
(5) Phase III. The platoon then comes under direct fire from an
OPFOR OP with machine gun. The platoon executes the react to contact
battle drill, develops the situation, and neutralizes the position. The

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platoon consolidates and reorganizes, and continues the mission. (The

platoon may continue the mission as long as necessary to attain the overall
training objective.
(6) Phase IV. The platoon is engaged by an enemy squad. The
platoon’s lead squad executes the react to conduct battle drill. It quickly
establishes a base of fire. The platoon leader determines whether to
maneuver one or two squads against the enemy. In rapid succession, the
platoon: employs fire support, supports assault by fire, breaches obstacles,
clears trench lines and or knocks out bunkers, consolidates and
reorganizes, and on order, defends the position. If the platoon leader
decides he can’t take the position, he contacts the commander for further
instructions (the CO may maneuver another platoon against the position)
and or he conducts the break contact battle drill. (Operations may
continue with other tasks the commander would like to train, such as
establish hasty defense.)
(7) Phase V. The unit conducts an AAR IAW the tactical situation and
prepares for the next mission.
c. Weapon Accommodation.
(1) Weapons systems in the platoon LFX now include M60 machine
guns, Dragons, fragmentation grenades, and AT4s. In addition, mortars,
artillery, and bangalore torpedoes could be integrated into a platoon
exercise, based on the mission.
(2) The SDZs are based on the largest caliber ballistic
weapon/munitions to be used. They need to be plotted from the most
probable axes of march that the platoon leaders might select. These axes
of march can be influenced through operations orders that define
boundaries, restrictive fire areas, and so on, and control which target array
to activate.
(3) Using the extreme engagement limits, the maximum distance of
fire is plotted to the left, right, and forward of the participating units line
of fire. The possibility of an injury caused by friendly fire is increased on
this range. Personnel must follow the safety precautions presented in the
safety briefing.

6-11. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support covers the amount and type of equipment and
ammunition needed for each phase of live-fire training at platoon
level—whether crawl (dry fire/walk-through), walk (rehearsal with
MILES), or run (live fire) (Tables 6-1 through 6-6). The ammunition
requirements are based on DA PAM 350-38 using a maneuver box with no
weapon caliber restrictions. (Appendix F provides a validated sample of
ammunition used at the JRTC for platoon movement to contact, ambush,
and deliberate attack.) The equipment requirements are based on various

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training documents. These requirements can be adjusted to the unit’s

training objectives based on METL and METT-T.
a. MILES Rehearsal Ammunition Requirements. Most blank
ammunition for the rehearsal is drawn from the unit’s squad, platoon, or
company FTX allocations. Adding all blank allocations listed in this
manual (from buddy team to platoon) equals that ammunition allocated
for one FTX. Depending on how much the unit forecasts for other uses,
this amount can be adjusted as desired.
b. Live-Fire Ammunition Requirements. The ammunition type and
quantity comes from DA PAM 350-38. The quantity of some ammunition
can be increased by integrating allocations for other training events—as
long as those training goals are addressed in the LFX. In some cases, live
ammunition can be used instead of simulators. (For example, even though
five 9-mm rounds for each platoon are allocated for the AT4 in the LFX, a
yearly allocation of one live round for each firer [four for each rifle squad]
exists. These live rounds can be integrated into the LFX.) Pyrotechnics are
also addressed in DA PAM 350-38.
WARNING
The M203 fires M 16A1 ammunition. Using M 16A2 ammunition
may cause damage to the M203.

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6-12
APPENDIX A
SAFETY

This appendix provides example recommendations, weapons training

safety checklists, briefings, and incident report formats for use on a
live-fire range. These are meant to be used as a guide and must be
modified to fit Army and installation safety regulations.

In order to train to combat readiness, the chain of command must act

as LFX safety officers. As in combat, the chain of command may
have to halt the move if certain safety concepts are violated. Once the
problem is resolved, the unit can continue the operation. The unit’s
command net should also be the safety communications net.

A-1. RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment is the process of identifying the risks associated with an
operation and weighing those risks against the overall training value to be
gained. Leaders must assess the risk of all training as a part of
pre-execution checks. Proper risk management makes safety a part of the
mission. It is a way of getting the mission done with the least possible risk
to soldiers and equipment.
a. The simplest method of identifying risks is the use of a risk matrix
(Figure A-l, page A-2). The risk matrix gives the leader an overview of the
inherent risks of the operation. Different missions will involve different
elements that can affect mission safety. Planning, supervision, soldier
endurance, soldier selection, weather, mission complexity, and equipment
have historically proven to be central causes of accidents. Using matrixes
to assign a numerical value to each of these elements is one way of quickly
determining the risk associated with a particular mission.

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b. Risk may be assessed by measuring the various risks present in the

operation, combining their values, and then making a judgment as to the
safety precautions that are appropriate in the given situation. By arriving
at a total risk value, the leader can determine if the proposed method of
conducting a mission falls within acceptable risk parameters. He can then
change one or all areas of the operation to reduce the total risk value. As a
minimum, he will know whether or not his soldiers are functioning in a
high-risk environment.
c. In addition to the general perspective, leaders need to detect specific
hazardous situations; for example, dangerous artillery support plans,
specific hazards of a river crossing. The hazard assessment provides this
detail. Hazard assessment is the initial examination of an operation’s
hazards and their implications. It is normally based on the mission analysis
and takes place before the details of an operation have been completely
defined. Hazard assessment has one objective. It defines at the earliest
possible stage what hazards can be expected in each of the major
operational phases. Hazards can be dealt with if assessed early when the
operation is still being planned. This assures that hazard controls can be
developed and implemented as the operation evolves.
d. The use of risk matrices and hazard analyses define the kinds and
significance of hazards faced in an operation. The task then is to reduce
the risk without significant adverse impact on the operation.
e. The countermeasure option checklist in Figure A-2 can be directly
applied to the development of risk-reduction options. It can be used to
develop a full array of possibilities and reject those that are clearly
impractical. The product of the risk-reduction phase should be a list of
options that are practical, although not necessarily desirable, for the
particular operation.
f. The basic assessment elements in Figure A-2 can be adapted to fit
organizational needs. Additional matrix charts that blend in special
considerations can be developed.

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g. The key to risk management is not accepting preventable risks.

Preventable risks are those that can be reduced or eliminated using
available resources and technology without disrupting the mission.
h. Changes in training progress and conditions must be continually
assessed during training and appropriate corrective actions taken as these
conditions affect the level of risk.

A-2. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are some safety recommendations for use on live-fire
ranges. They are not for use on all ranges, but must be considered when
planning an LFX. Remember, even though safety is important, the
primary focus is the establishment of a well-organized, realistic LFX.
a. Protective Jackets/Vests, Eye Protection. Using protective
jackets/vests and ballistic goggles (if available) on live-fire ranges greatly
enhances safety. They may be worn in time of war, so soldiers should get
used to fighting with them on. Ear plugs may be worn on special occasions,
but the commander should consider this in his risk assessment—not
hearing a command could get someone killed. The decision to wear such
protective equipment is based on the commander’s assessment of
METT-T, his risk analysis, and the weather. Protective jackets provide
extra protection against small-arms weapons and fragmentation.
b. MILES Harnesses. MILES harnesses can be worn by all soldiers to
enhance both safety and realism. Safety personnel can shoot controller
guns at soldiers who are either using improper individual movement
techniques or who are safety hazards.
c. Safety Signals. Safety signals must be planned so that they can be
seen by everyone on the range. While a red star cluster can be seen on a
clear night, it probably will not be seen when fired during the day toward
the sun. A minimum of one back-up signal and continuous
communications between all safety personnel must be planned. The
command frequency (the frequency that the live-fire unit is using) is used
to signal cease fire.
d. Night Fire. Night firing creates additional safety considerations
because of the reduced visibility. At a minimum, all safety personnel,
leaders, and machine gunners must have night vision goggles or sights
(NVDs). Compasses should be preset on their luminous points.
Commanders should consider marking firing limits based on terrain,
visibility, and the level of training his unit has achieved.
e. Smoke. The use of smoke can add realism to any range but must be
employed carefully. Before beginning the LFX, a rehearsal is conducted using
smoke to determine what effect it has on visibility. The support position must
be able to observe the movement of the assault force. Too much smoke can
create a safety hazard that could overcome the benefits of its use.

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f. Briefbacks. Conducting thorough briefbacks allows leaders to avoid

hazards caused by poor planning and communications. Briefbacks should
occur frequently during planning and execution of the LFX.

A-3. WEAPONS AND PYROTECHNICS PROFICIENCY TRAINING

Training should be conducted on all weapons and pyrotechnics that will be
used on the live-fire mission. All individual gunners who will take part in
LFXs must have fired and passed a qualification course for the
crew-served weapon assigned to them. All personnel who will fire a
weapon in the exercise must have fired, as a minimum, a familiarization
course with that weapon. Training should include demolitions, grenades,
Claymore mine simulators, and any other devices that could also be used
on the range.
a. Support positions for raids should be on terrain that has cover to the
flank (if possible) and does not allow M60 machine gun fire to go in the
direction of the assault line. If such a position is not available, a berm can
be constructed and camouflaged.
b. Hand-held flares and star clusters that are used for signaling or
illuminating must be handled with extreme caution. Instruction should be
given to those members of the unit who will use these pyrotechnics.
c. Individual movement techniques (IMT) training should be given to
all LFX participants. Weapons proficiency training should be
incorporated with emphasis on reducing stoppages (immediate action);
magazine exchange (M16A1/A2); loading and firing the M203, M60, and
M249 machine gun; and subcaliber rounds for the antitank weapons. Fire
and movement rehearsal should be extensive during training with both
officers and NCOs emphasizing muzzle control of weapons at all times.
Continual reminders to put weapons on safe before moving and to note
the whereabouts of other individuals in the area are aspects of safety
critical for both live-fire operations and combat.
(1) The movement of buddy teams, fire teams, and squads should be
trained progressively and in detail with emphasis on control of elements.
Training by platoon and squad leaders in arm-and-hand signals, visual
signals (such as pyrotechnics), and whistles is critical. Leaders find it
extremely difficult to communicate orally due to excessive levels of noise
during LFXs and force-on-force operations. Leaders at all levels must
retain control of their elements at all times throughout the conduct of the
live-fire mission.
(2) The fire-team leader is the foundation of fire and movement.
Based on the premise that the members of the fire team follow the
fire-team leader and "do as he does," this leader’s actions are critical to
the success and safety of live-fire missions. Assigning numbers to team
members can be used as a fire control measure. For example, the team

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leader is one, the automatic rifleman is two, the grenadier is three, and the
rifleman is four. The team leader can then simply refer to the team
member’s number if he wishes him to initiate a 3- to 5-second rush. All
soldiers should stay alert to the actions of fellow team members and
squads to their left and right. Anticipating actions on the battlefield gives
units the ability to remain flexible.

A-4. WEAPON-HANDLING PROCEDURES

The following guideline describes procedures and requirements for
handling all organic and special operation weapons. These procedures are
based on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war and are designed to
prevent safety-related accidents and fratricide. They are intended for use
in both training and combat and apply to all assigned weapons of a unit. In
all cases, strict supervision is critical for the safe handling of weapons. For
training purposes, the chain of command will include range cadre.
a. Procedures. The procedures for weapons handling may vary based
on METT-T. The following procedures are strongly recommended:
(1) Upon issue, all weapons are immediately cleared and placed on
"safe" IAW appropriate Soldier’s Manual or Operator’s Manual.
(2) Weapons always remain on "safe." The only exceptions to this
policy are—
(a) When weapons are stored in an arms room.
(b) Immediately before target engagement.
(c) When directed by the chain of command.
(3) Weapons should be handled as if they are loaded at all times.
Horseplay with weapons resulted in fratricide incidents during the Persian
Gulf War. Weapons are never pointed at an individual unless a
life-threatening situation justifies the use of deadly force. Soldiers must
always be aware of the muzzle direction of their weapon and of the
weapons status; for example, loaded/safe.
(4) Magazines/belts are inserted in weapons upon the direction of the
chain of command.
(5) AR 385-63 should be reviewed by the unit’s leaders before range
firing/qualification.
b. Load and Chamber Procedures (Lock and Load). The chain of
command determines when to load the weapon and chamber a round in
reference to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available in a
combat environment. Generally, weapons remain on "safe" until ready to
fire.
c. Administrative Procedures. Administrative procedures include
weapons clearing, grounding/stacking of weapons, and aircraft and
vehicle movement.

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(1) Administrative weapons clearing. Administrative weapons clearing is

performed following the completion of the tactical phase of all live fires
and range qualifications, or upon reentry of a secure area in combat.
Magazines or belts are removed from all weapons. The chain of command
inspects all chambers visually, using red filtered light if at night, and
verifies that each weapon and magazine is clear of ammunition. Weapons
should also be rodded. Magazines are not reinserted into weapons. During
training, ammunition must be turned in and accounted for with brass and
ammunition checks completed.
(2) Grounding/stacking of weapons. If stacked, procedures outlined in
FM 22-5 are used. If grounded with equipment, all weapons are placed on
"safe" and arranged off the ground with the open chamber visible, if
applicable. Biped-mounted weapons are grounded on bipeds with all
muzzles facing downrange and away from nearby soldiers.
(3) Aircraft and vehicle movement. Weapons should always be cleared
and on "safe" when conducting movement in aircraft and vehicles IAW
SOP. Weapon muzzles must be pointing downward when traveling on
aircraft. Weapons are locked and loaded only after exiting the aircraft or
vehicle, or upon command of the leader.
NOTE: Particular care must be given to correct handling of the pistol,
especially the M9 with its double action (fire from the hammer
down) feature. The removal of the M9 pistol from the holster can
accidentally move the safety lever to "fire" permitting immediate
double action mode of fire. Pistols should not have a round
chambered unless a specific threat warrants it.

A-5. EXAMPLE SAFETY CHECKLISTS

Safety checklists should be used before conducting LFXs. Figures A-3
through A-5 show examples of different safety checklists. The safety
checklist for soldiers should be the same that would be used in combat and
should be adapted to METT-T.

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A-8
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A-6. EXAMPLE SAFETY BRIEFING

Before any exercise, all soldiers should receive a safety briefing. This
briefing is based on the type of munitions to be used and on METT-T.
Figures A-6 through A-8 provide general guidelines for constructing a unit
safety briefing.

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A-7. INCIDENT REPORT FORMAT

In the event there is an accident, a malfunction, or incident on the LFX
range, accurate information concerning the accident or incident must be
relayed to the local range control in a timely manner. The unit should
supply the information contained in the installation range regulations. If
the installation range regulations does not address reports of accidents,
malfunctions, or incidents on the range, the following information should
be relayed to range radio control as soon as possible:
Unit designation.
Range and location.
Type weapon involved.
Type of ammunition involved.
Brief summary of what happened.
Personnel injuries, if any, and extent.
Full name, rank, social security number, and unit of injured
personnel.

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Extent of property damage.

Intentions regarding further investigation.
A-8. MEDICAL EVACUATION FORMAT
If a casualty on the range requires evacuation, the procedures outlined in
the installation range regulations should be followed.
a. As a minimum, the following information should be given:
Accurate six-digit coordinates of pick-up site or described location.
Number, type, and condition of casualties.
Special equipment needed (for example, resuscitator, oxygen,
blood, jungle penetrator).
Weather conditions at the pick-up site.
Description of ground markings (color panels, smoke, or
improvised ground identification to be used).
Terrain description.
b. The following procedures for directing aircraft are recommended:
(1) Vehicle lights used for identification during night evacuation
should be directed into the wind to allow the aircraft to approach over
the top of the vehicle.
(2) Smoke, when used, should be discharged as soon as the aircraft is
within sight. Smoke should be on the downwind portion of the clearing to
allow the aircraft to approach and land clear of the smoke.
(3) Panels, when used, should be securely fastened to the ground about
5 to 10 meters upwind of the landing area. This must be done to prevent
drawing the panels into the rotor blades.
(4) The pick-up site and approach route must be clear of small-arms
and artillery fire.
A-9. DUDS, MISFIRES, AND ERRATIC FIRING
The following paragraphs discuss safety considerations for duds, misfires,
and erratic firing.
a. Duds. Upon completion of firing outside of a permanent dud area, a
thorough search should be made of the impact area. Duds should be
marked and reported to range control for disposal. Marking should be
IAW installation range regulations. A recommended way of marking duds
is by stringing or laying durable material, engineer tape, or any distinctive
expedient. Objects should not be driven into the ground and the dud
should not be jolted in any manner. In addition to marking, a guide should
be furnished to assist EOD personnel in locating the dud(s). A report
should be submitted to range control IAW installation range regulations.
The report will normally contain the following information:
Coordinates of the dud’s location.
Location by terrain features.

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Number of duds.
Type and caliber of dud.
Method used to mark dud.
Names of individuals available to assist EOD personnel in
locating the dud.
Name, rank, unit, and telephone number of the individual
making the report.
(1) Upon completion of dud disposal by EOD personnel in
nonpermanent dud areas, the range OIC will normally be responsible for
submitting a written report to range control that a surface search has been
conducted and all known duds have been reported or destroyed.
(2) When firing is conducted in a permanent dud area, a record should
be kept indicating the number and caliber of duds observed or suspected.
Upon completion of firing, this information should be submitted to range
control.
b. Misfires. Misfire procedures for specific rounds are prescribed in
the appropriate weapon or ammunition technical manuals and field
manuals. These publications should be reviewed before conducting the
LFX. When in doubt, the local ammunition supply point (ASP) or EOD
should be contacted.
(1) If a small arms weapon misfires, it should be placed on "safe" and
not fired again until it has been inspected and cleared.
(2) Before the turn-in to the ASP, misfires should be repacked into the
original container, tagged or otherwise identified, and kept separate from
other ammunition items. For mortar ammunition, safety pins should be
emplaced in fuzes before turn-in. If the pin cannot be replaced, range
control is contacted before transporting the round.
c. Erratic Firing. Any projectile that lands outside of the firing limits
should be immediately reported to range control by radio. The report
should include the approximate coordinates of impact, ammunition,
caliber, estimated back azimuth, and time the round was observed.
Personnel on the range should cease fire immediately and follow
instructions from range control.

A-14
APPENDIX B

SITE SELECTION AND PREPARATION

This appendix provides information on considerations encountered by

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in emplacing their
live-fire area. The JRTC’s live-fire area is one of the best in the world
and this information provides units with insight in selecting their own
areas.

B-1. INTRODUCTION
The live-fire division of the JRTC conducts rifle platoon LFXs
independent of force-on-force training. Platoon missions include
movement to contact/hasty attack (MTC/HA), ambush of a vehicular
convoy (AMB), and deliberate attack on a fortified position (ATK).
Platoons execute one or a combination of these basic missions.
a. Area of Operations. Each mission requires different resources. For a
platoon-level movement to contact, the unit needs a maneuver live-fire
box approximately 1 kilometer by 4 kilometers in size. The best terrain is
rugged, closed in, and densely wooded. Maneuver through the area
requires surface clearance of dud munitions. Digging may be limited to
targetry emplacement and trenchwork construction. While these areas
must have subsurface clearance, subsurface clearing of the entire area
might be impractical or near impossible.
b. Scheme of Maneuver. Assembly and rehearsal areas are designated
in defendable, rugged terrain close to the line of departure. LFX areas
should be rotated over time to reduce damage to the terrain and to allow
vegetation to be as natural as possible.
c. Construction. Targetry is not permanently emplaced or hard-wired
within the maneuver area. All targets and target mechanisms are
hand-emplaced and, for the most part, are battery-powered and
radio-activated.
d. LFX Safety Procedures. These procedures are established and
enforced by the following:
(1) The commander is authorized to modify some provisions of
live-fire operations as outlined in AR 385-63 to provide realistic conditions
that replicate a near-combat experience. Range fans and small arms
surface danger zones that extend outside the maneuver area/impact area
have been waived IAW procedures stated in AR 385-63.

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(2) The chain-of-command is responsible for safety. The leaders

should stress safety practices inherent in the tactically sound principles
taught by the mission training plan. Safe, realistic, and successful execution
of the mission will result.
e. Training Philosophy. Live-fire training was developed and is
executed under the following training guidance:
(1) The live-fire complex (maneuver box) is "non-standard"-it is not a
range. LFXs are executed as tactical missions IAW an OPORD and
ARTEP 7-8-MTP.
(2) The focus of training and execution is at the platoon and squad
levels. The integration of other combat support assets is critical.
(3) Training emphasizes the employment of organic weapon systems at
squad and platoon level. Indirect weapons systems are used throughout.
(4) Units are provided a realistic threat within a target-rich
environment that presents each individual soldier the maximum
opportunity to employ his weapon, and tests the ability of that platoon’s
chain-of-command to control and distribute fires effectively.
(5) Platoons conduct planning and dry-fire rehearsals on terrain similar
to the objective but not the actual objective. The only time a platoon sees
an actual objective before mission execution is if that particular task
requires a leader’s reconnaissance. Platoons also receive a minimum of
four to five hours sleep within 25 hours before mission execution.
f. Unit Feedback. Observer-controllers (OCs) observe execution of the
LFXs and provide feedback to the maneuver unit in AARs conducted on
site after the completion of each event. They accomplish this by observing
unit performance, controlling external factors, teaching doctrine, coaching
the chain-of-command, conducting the after-action review, and monitoring
safety.

B-2. SITE DEVELOPMENT

Site development determines the composition of the live-fire complex and
the surrounding area. The following are recommendations for units to use
in the site development process.
a. Site Selection. The ground tactical plan should be developed first
and then terrain found to meet the needs of that mission. Often this does
not happen and the mission is modified to fit the terrain.
(1) The size of the impact areas and their proximity to civilian areas is
a limiting factor. Environmental concerns also impact on site development
ranging from Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers in North Carolina to
endangered snails in Hawaii.
(2) All posts are not alike and are subject to different MACOM,
installation, and range control safety limitations. The commander’s
guidelines and restrictions must also be considered.

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b. Site Reconnaissance. The three steps in the initial reconnaissance are:

(1) Analyze the desired terrain based on the safety restrictions IAW
post regulations, commander’s guidelines, and the surface danger zones
(SDZ) IAW AR 385-63. Consider these first before selecting terrain.
(2) Walk the terrain and carefully mark all desired target positions on
the ground and confirm each grid location to an eight-digit grid coordinate
using PADDS.
(3) Develop a detailed training scenario and sketch of the live-fire
event. Include in the scenario development: target locations, planned
routes to support, expected locations where the unit initiates direct fire,
and so forth. This scenario must include all actions that the unit conducts
from occupation of an assembly area to the conclusion of the mission and
consolidation on the objective.
c. Surface Danger Zones. A key to receiving range control approval of
the LFX plan is the creation of an accurate composite SDZ overlay. SDZs
must strictly adhere to constraints in AR 385-63 and local SOPs. Early and
continuous coordination with range control on SDZs is recommended.
Range control can greatly simplify the process of determining the SDZ
and decipher local safety requirements.
d. Target Emplacement. Targets must be emplaced to closely replicate
how the enemy will fight. The construction of objectives must be
doctrinally correct. Every effort must be made to portray a credible enemy
force that fights back and forces units to execute their battle drills. This
enemy must be tough and realistic, and inflict casualties on the attacker.

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APPENDIX C
LIVE-FIRE TRAINING ENHANCERS

The use of training enhancers on an LFX is limited only by the

trainer’s imagination. Trainers can easily create the effects of the
"dirty battlefield" complete with enemy dead, obscurants, and noises.
The guiding principles are that anything used to enhance training must
be safe and effective. The following techniques are safe and effective
when applied with common sense on the LFX range. By using the
training enhancers in this appendix, the following battlefield
environment effects can be simulated: realistic targetry, smoke, fire,
indirect fire, machine-gun sound, sniper fire, general battlefield sound,
battlefield illumination, mines, booby traps, casualties, chemical
weapons effects, and nuclear weapons effects.

C-1. CASUALTIES
Enemy dead are easily created using salvaged code X fatigue uniforms,
helmets, and boots from the local Defense Reutilization Office. The
enemy should not be dressed in the same uniform as the soldiers
conducting the training. The fatigues and boots can be stuffed with
newspapers, straw, or other filler material and the head can be made of
stuffed paper bags painted to resemble a face. Plastic enemy small-arms
weapons can be obtained from the local TSC and used to litter the
battlefield. Red paint makes excellent blood. The homemade dummies
can be dressed up with enemy identification documents, maps, and other
identification available from TSC or easily created in the unit. The easiest
realistic casualties are created by dressing E-type silhouettes in salvaged
uniforms and splashing them with red paint.

C-2. SMOKE
The traditional means of creating smoke on the LFX range is to use
smoke grenades, smoke pots, smoke generators and artillery or mortar
smoke rounds. Expedient materials can be ignited immediately before the
LFX or can be remotely ignited during the LFX by using time fuse.

C-3. INDIRECT FIRE

The best means of simulating indirect fire is to use indirect fire on the
target array. Soldiers will normally not be allowed to maneuver into

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permanent artillery impact areas because of the possibility of duds.

Temporary impact areas may be established, if necessary. With
concurrence of range control, certified ammunition may be fired into a
temporary impact area, which is later to be maneuvered through.
Participants should be alert to the possibility of duds and take appropriate
action if one is encountered. After the exercise is completed, the user
clears the area with the assistance of the explosive ordnance detachment
(EOD).
a. Units may maneuver in proximity to indirect fire under certain
conditions. Soldiers and vehicles involved in training may operate under
the artillery gun-target line in certain areas during firing. Armored vehicles
may maneuver under air bursts if variable time (VT) or time fuses are
used on certified ammunition, and if the firing data meet certain
conditions explained in paragraph 1l-5e, AR 385-63. In this specific case,
all downrange vehicles must remain buttoned up or in the protected open
(clamshell) position during firing.
b. Personnel may occupy approved bunkers within 200 meters of
impacting artillery in areas surrounding the impact area. However, this
situation must be planned to fit into the LFX scenario.
c. When indirect fire support is supplied by mortars, mortar firing
points must be planned to avoid firing over the head of soldiers. In order
to increase the training benefit for the mortar crews, the exercise could be
planned to cause mortars to displace and provide continuous support. By
keeping the mortars almost adjacent to the firing unit, the doctrinal
principle of keeping them well forward is trained while precluding a need
for overhead fire. Many of the safety considerations discussed for field
artillery are applicable to mortars.
d. A certified safety officer must be on the mortar point. The location
of the maneuver unit must be known by the mortar platoon or section
leader and FSO so they can ensure that the surface danger zone is
enforced with respect to the gun-target line. If the mortars are fired from
direct lay, verifying friendly unit positions is relatively easy.
e. If the decision is made not to use indirect fire on the range, artillery
can be simulated by using electrically primed TNT blocks. These blocks
can be used to create a rolling barrage that can be "walked" within
25 meters of the firing line. Artillery simulators can be used to supplement
the barrage and to simulate fire received to the rear of the unit. These
explosions also contribute to the battlefield haze by producing small dust
clouds.
f. In addition to TNT explosives, the propane-oxygen artillery
simulator is an excellent means of simulating incoming artillery rounds.
Also, remote receivers of the THM-TG and RMB can command detonate
any electrical firing explosive device including C4 and Hoffman devices.

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Each device can produce up to three separate events. Placed in critical

locations and activated at the right time, these explosions sound authentic
to maneuvering units. Smoke pots can be detonated on the objectives also.
C-4. EXPLOSIVES
Explosives use a surface danger zone involving only a bursting radius.
Unprotected soldiers are not authorized within the bursting radius, as
discussed in Chapter 18, AR 385-63. To integrate explosives into the LFX,
soldiers must not be within the prescribed radius once the munition is
armed. In defensive scenarios, explosives can be pre-positioned and
remotely armed and detonated. In offensive scenarios, bangalore
torpedoes and line charges can be used. If actual bangalore torpedoes are
not going to be used on the range, camouflage net poles can be used at a
pre-positioned breach point and a small explosive charge set off to breach
the obstacle.
C-5. BATTLE SOUNDS
Battle sounds can be created by prearranging with the local TSC to have
loud speakers and battle sound tapes played on the range. (This is done at
JRTC.) Another possibility is to arrange support from local PSYOP units.
C-6. ENEMY FIRE
Enemy fire can be simulated by having a pneumatic machine gun
positioned downrange with the remote firing device operated from a
concealed position behind the firing line. At night, enemy fire can be
simulated using the night muzzle flash simulator for the RETS target and
the infantry hostile fire simulator (Figure C-l). Enemy ATGM fire can be
simulated using electrically wired ATWESS charges downrange.

C-7. CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION

Chemical contamination can be simulated by various means. Perhaps the
simplest is to sprinkle liquid vegetable oil on bushes that the maneuver
unit will go through thereby simulating liquid agent contaminant. SPALS

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(simulator, projectile airburst liquid, M9, DODAC 1370L595) can be used

to simulate the burst of a chemical round. Coordination with the battalion
chemical officer will disclose other ways to simulate a contaminated
battlefield. The chemical officer will be able to assist in any pre-training
required before conducting an LFX in a contaminated environment.

C-8. LAND MINES

Except for Claymores, training with live land mines has been discouraged,
although current regulations permit their use. When using live mines for
training, all applicable regulations must be followed. Therefore, units
planning to incorporate land mines (other than Claymores) into a
defensive LFX should usually plan on using plastic land mines from TSC
for practice in laying hasty protective minefield. For offensive LFXs, the
M21 smoke-producing antitank mine (DVC-T 23-31) can be used. This
mine is a full-scale, three-dimensional plastic replica that has the size and
appearance of the actual M21 with tilt rod, M605 fuze, and M18 smoke
grenade (colors: yellow, green, violet, and red). The mine is expendable,
but it can be used three to five times before being damaged. The M605
fuzes and M18 smoke grenades must be requisitioned through normal
supply procedures. Antipersonnel booby traps can be created using trip
wire and nonexplosive smoke grenades and illumination devices. Pressure
activated antipersonnel mines can be created using the ends of Number 10
cans, a battery, camera flashbulbs, and communications wire and booby
trap techniques (Figure C-2). The booby traps and connecting wires are
buried near the surface. When a soldier steps on any of the mines, the
central flashbulb explodes injuring soldiers in the immediate vicinity. The
mines can be easily located by probing.

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C-9. NONCOMBATANTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Because friendly units can expect to encounter noncombatants or civilians
as they fire and maneuver, TOMI targets in civilian attire are mixed into
the target arrays to further confuse the battlefield. The friendly units must
identify civilians and react according to the rules of engagement.

C-10. SMALL ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE

An excellent way of cueing SAFAD is through the use of the
radio-controlled miniature aerial target (RCMAT). The RCMAT is an
aerial target that is used for air defense training. It can be tracked
throughout the effective range of small-arms weapons used in air defense.
The target is recoverable and has a 15-minute endurance time. To
coordinate RCMAT support for the range, the installation’s TSC must be
contacted. The TSC will usually control the device during the exercise.
Prior coordination must also be made with range control due to the
increased surface danger zone required because of elevating small-arms
weapons to engage an aerial target (Figure C-3).

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C-11. TARGETRY (FIELD-EXPEDIENT AND PORTABLE TARGETS)

Field-expedient targets are simple, low cost, live-fire targets that are easily
made within the unit using material that is readily available.
Field-expedient targets can be used to supplement standard targets or in
place of standard targets. Using field-expedient targets allows a unit to
accurately portray a realistic threat array by ensuring that adequate targets
are available to suit the scenario and the size unit being trained.
Field-expedient targets are of two types: personnel and vehicular.
a. Personnel Field-Expedient Targets. Personnel targets are stationary
or moving. (See Figures C-4 through C-9.)

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C-7
TC 7-9

C-8
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C-9
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C-10
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b. Vehicular Field-Expedient Targets. Vehicular field-expedient

targets are stationary or moving. The best vehicular target is a vehicle
itself. Salvaged vehicles for use as targets are available through the local
Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO).
(1) Getting a salvage vehicle. The battalion S4 must coordinate with
local post authorities to ensure that such targets are permitted on the
ranges. The request must clearly state that the vehicle will be used as a
target for an LFX and indicate the type of vehicle that is required (truck,
jeep, other). If the DRMO does not have the vehicle locally, it can
coordinate with other DRMOs to transfer the property, but the unit may
have to pay associated transportation costs. Before placing the vehicle on
the range, coordination must be made with range control. The unit must
be prepared to dispose of the property after the LFX is complete. The
property will routinely be turned back in to the local DRMO as scrap
metal.
(2) Preparing a salvage vehicle. If the vehicle still has an engine block or
other heavy metal structures that could cause ricochets, the unit should
either remove the engine block or structure, or pad it with sandbags.
(a) The vehicle should be purged of fuel and oil and the battery
removed to prevent hazardous waste spill during the LFX. Waste fuel and
oil are disposed of IAW local SOP.
(b) Any US Army markings should be painted over.
(c) If the scenario calls for the vehicular target to move, it will need to
be hooked to a prime mover outside of the surface danger area of the
LFX. Two ways of doing this are straight pull or pulled through a "dead
man." A straight-pulled vehicle is attached directly to the pull vehicle by a
metal cable and pulled in the direction of travel (Figure C-10, page C-12).
A vehicle pulled through a "dead man" is attached to the pull vehicle in
the same manner as the straight-pulled vehicle, but at an intermediary
point it is attached to a "dead man" that allows the pull vehicle to be offset
from the direction of pull (Figure C-11, page C-12). In both techniques,
the pull vehicle must have sufficient power to pull the target vehicle; if a
“dead man” is used, it must be heavier than the vehicle being pulled. The
cable used must be strong enough to withstand the tension involved. As a
safety measure, only the pull vehicle driver and assistant driver should be
permitted within twice the total distance of the cable to prevent injuries if
the cable snaps. The driver and assistant driver should be in the cab of the
vehicle and should wear helmets throughout the LFX. The assistant driver
looks toward the pulled vehicle and notifies the driver if the pulled vehicle
experiences any problems. To prevent the cable from snapping if shot
during the LFX, the pull vehicle should cease pulling after the target is
engaged. If the scenario calls for the target to be pulled after it is engaged,
multiple cables should be used and the target should be pulled slowly.

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(d) Vehicular targets can also be made of cut plywood or other

material painted to resemble the type vehicle desired. FM 25-7,
Appendix B has examples of the dimensions required.

c. Reduced Scale Vehicular Targets. Reduced scale targets are

discussed and illustrated in FM 25-7. Reduced scale 1:5 and 1:10 vehicle
targets can be used with the M3lA1 target mechanism (Figure C-12) to
simulate enemy vehicles. These targets have the advantage of being
command controlled, portable, and are usually available on large
installations. These targets can easily represent an attacking force by
arraying the targets in depth and moving the targets toward the firing line.
The targets are especially helpful in simulating a counterattacking enemy

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force. To simulate a counterattacking enemy force, targets beyond the

objective are left in the down position during the assault and consolidation
phases of the LFX and are activated as a counterattack force. Reduced
scale targets may also be used on a reduced scale range as part of LFX
preparatory training to train the platoon or squad in fire control
procedures.
d. Portable Targets. The standard portable target used on LFX ranges
is the target holding mechanism, trainfire (NSN: 6920-00-657-7533,
Figure C-13). It has a primary voltage (input) of 120 and 240 VAC and a
secondary operating voltage of 12 to 24 VDC. For use on field ranges, the
target holding mechanism normally operates on 12 VDC using 12 VDC
car batteries. These batteries have a tendency to freeze at temperatures
below 32 degrees Fahrenheit. When operating in low temperatures, fully
charging the batteries the night before and installing them in the targets
immediately before use is recommended. (For more information on the
M3lA1 mechanism, see TM 9-6920-203-14.) Several other portable target
types are available. To determine what is available locally, local range
control should be contacted.

C-12. SUBCALIBER DEVICES

Subcaliber devices are available for the LAW, AT4, and 90-mm antitank
weapons and can be used as part of the LFX when the proper antitank
ammunition cannot be obtained. These devices are cheaper to use than
service ammunition and can usually be obtained more easily. The

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battalion or brigade S4 has information for the types and amounts of

subcaliber ammunition available.

C-13. PLASTIC AMMUNITION

The Army currently has short range training ammunition for the M16 rifle
and .50 caliber machine gun. SRTA (plastic ammunition) consists of M862
for the M16A2, and M858 (ball) and M860 (tracer) for the .50 caliber
machine gun. Fielding of plastic ammunition for 7.62 (M60) and 55.6 drum
(M249) is anticipated in the near future. This ammunition allows safe,
realistic training at shorter ranges. It is particularly useful for MOUT
training because it does not ricochet. Plastic ammunition should never be
used in a support by fire role because of its limited range. It is as lethal as
ball ammunition; therefore, appropriate safety precautions must be taken.
a. 5.56-mm M2 Bolt Assembly. The M2 bolt is used to adapt the
M16-series rifle to fire the M862 SRTA. The M2 bolt converts the action
of the rifle from gas operation to blowback operation. It is a direct
substitution for the standard M16 rifle bolt with no additional modification
of the rifle required. Fielding of new bolts is anticipated in late 1993.
b. .50 Caliber Machine Gun M3 Recoil Amplifier Barrel Assembly
(RABA). When the machine gun is under-powered, the M3 HB machine
gun RABA provides the means to boost the power to the level required to
recoil the barrel and effectively cycle the weapon.
(1) Because .50 caliber SRTA enables realistic training at shorter
distances with greatly reduced danger areas, the use of standard M33 ball
(service) ammunition with its extended range must be restricted when the
RABA is attached to the weapon. A discriminator must be installed in the
feedway of the gun when the RABA is in use. This discriminator restricts
the entry of M33 service ammunition into the feedway of the M2 HB
machine gun, but permits the shorter training cartridges to feed.
(2) Machine gun RABAs are scheduled for full-scale release in late
1993.

C-14. LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE RECORDING

The Sony TV Rover is an excellent means of recording the LFX so that it
can be reviewed during the AAR or at a later time. The kit can be
obtained from TSC and contains three major parts (plus battery packs): a
portable television, a hand-held camera with monopod, and a video
cassette recorder (VCR). The system can be used with any 110-volt power
source or with the battery pack for mobile taping. When taping is
complete, the film can be monitored on the television set.

C-14
APPENDIX D

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR NIGHT EXERCISES

At night, LFXs are inherently more complex due to the increased

difficulty of control, target identification, location identification, and
execution. Controlling movement and checking positions of personnel
and vehicles is more difficult. Every precaution must be taken to
ensure the safety of personnel. A plan for night firing contains all of
the details of day firing with additional considerations to ensure
successful training and safety. This appendix deals with the special
considerations for conducting an LFX at night. The following
considerations must be incorporated into planning and execution
unless METT-T factors prevent it.

D-1. REHEARSALS
Rehearsals are critical to prevent personnel from becoming disoriented
and to check control procedures and marking techniques. Rehearsals must
be conducted first during daylight to orient personnel and then at night to
test control procedures and equipment.

D-2. MARKERS
Markers are the devices used by the unit to control fires. They should not
restrict tactical play.
a. Infrared lights (either chemical, LEDs, or others) can be used to
mark the sector limits to ensure firing stays inside the prescribed areas.
This method is visible through most NVDs but cannot be seen by the
unaided eyes. The unit must have AN/PVS-4s for individual weapons for
this method to be most effective. Safety personnel (OCs) must also have
NVDs. Chemical lights are plainly visible at all times, but are not bright
enough to interfere with tactical play. Using chemical lights also reduces
the requirements for NVDs.
b. Targets can be marked (to simulate realism) so they can be detected
by the means available to the maneuver unit. FM 25-7, Appendix B,
contains techniques for marking targets for thermal detection and
identification. FM 25-7 describes a reflective target that can be used with
night muzzle flash simulator (RETS, NSN 6029-01-148-3474) to simulate a
muzzle flash.

D-1
TC 7-.9

c. The maneuver unit should use its own marking system consistent
with the tactical situation and safety limitations. The unit should consider
using the following techniques consistent with METT-T and local safety
regulations.
(1) If the tactical situation will allow, the unit should mark its own
routes as part of the reconnaissance. This will help to prevent
disorientation as the unit maneuvers toward its objective.
(2) Positions should be marked to assist entry into the position,
weapons orientation, and exit from the position.
(3) Control points should be marked by the maneuver unit to ease
navigation and control problems. The marking should be done as part of
the unit’s reconnaissance of the objective area, consistent with METT-T.
(4) Individual soldiers should wear luminescent tape on their helmets
or caps for identification and to ease control.

D-3. NIGHT VISION DEVICES

Night vision devices are necessary for personnel to work effectively if
infrared lights or thermal markers are used.
a. The AN/PVS-4 is necessary for each weapon if the range limits are
marked with infrared lights. The AN/PVS-5 or -7 is necessary for leaders
to follow routes marked with infrared lights. During movement,
AN/PVS-5s will be necessary for control personnel (OCs or chain of
command) to track the unit.
b. The AN/TAS-5 and AN/PAS-7 are thermal viewers. They can be
used for target identification if thermal targets are used or for identifying
range limits marked with thermal markers.

D-4. COMMUNICATIONS
Communications requirements are the same for a night live-fire range as
they are for a day live-fire range, except plain red star clusters are used as
an emergency cease fire signal instead of red smoke. Red smoke cannot
be seen at night. The maneuver unit should plan all of the normal
communications for a tactical operation to include radio-listening silence.
The unit should never leave its radios behind because they may be needed
for an emergency even if they are not needed during the exercise itself.

D-5. LIGHT AND WEATHER DATA

When a night LFX is planned, the light data must be considered. A full
moon will greatly enhance command and control. A new moon will make
navigation and orientation more difficult and increase dependence on
NVDs. As the time for the night fire draws near, the weather should be
monitored. A heavy overcast will negate the effects of the moon and stars.

D-2
D-6. ILLUMINATION
Illumination should be planned by the firing unit as it would be in combat,
even if the firing unit does not intend to use fire support. The following
types of illumination have different planning considerations.
a. Flares are normal signaling and illumination devices for units in
night operations. They are used at command discretion and included in
the safety briefing.
b. The M203 may be used for signaling or limited illumination using
the 40-mm smoke, star cluster, or smoke rounds. This is a good expedient
method of illumination.
c. Mortars provide excellent illumination, but the firing fan must be
offset from the maneuver unit to avoid firing over the heads of the soldiers
(Figure D-l).
d. Artillery provides excellent illumination but must be coordinated for
in advance. Firing points must be surveyed in advance.

D-3
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APPENDIX E

LIVE-FIRE LESSONS LEARNED

(JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER)

By August 1990, over 23 maneuver based platoon-level LFXs had

been conducted at the JRTC. Platoons were detached from the
force-on-force and attached to a notional company in the live-fire
area for the conduct of each exercise. Three missions were conducted:
(1) movement to contact; (2) ambush; and (3) attack. The movement
to contact was conducted during daylight hours over 3 to 4 kilometers
against approximately eight target arrays consisting of approximately
70 targets total and culminated in a hasty attack against a defended
enemy cache (squad size). The ambush was conducted during the
hours of darkness against a vehicular convoy containing light armored
vehicles as well as dismounted targets and a reaction force. The attack
was conducted during daylight hours with a platoon acting as the
assault element of a notional company and conducting a breech of a
wire/mine obstacle, seizing a foothold to the trench line, clearing
trenches, and knocking out bunkers.

Platoon strengths during these operations varied but generally enough

soldiers were present to allow the unit to plan and issue orders, move
while not in contact, navigate, disseminate information, and react to
indirect fires. Areas that needed improvement were rehearsals,
movement techniques on enemy contact, infantry use of demolitions,
weapons discipline (muzzle orientation and accidental discharge),
night marksmanship, control and distribution of fires, direct fire
suppression, and basic execution of battle drills.

The following paragraphs highlight some of the areas noted above

from lessons learned during the past several rotations.

E-1. MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

Appropriate movement techniques were used at the start based on the
terrain and enemy situation. However, speed was costly. Squads often
moved too quickly, failing to sight the enemy targets when they were
within viewing range thus allowing the enemy targets to engage first,
pinning down the lead squad and resulting in casualties. Once pinned

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down, the thick vegetation prevented teams and squads from being able to
locate, identify, and suppress enemy targets. The traveling overwatch
formation was the movement technique normally used at the start and was
acceptable based on the threat. However, after initial contact had been
made, platoons failed to adjust the movement technique. Platoons
continued to use traveling overwatch despite the number of subsequent
contacts. Platoons were particularly strong in controlling movement when
not in contact and made good use of arm-and-hand signals to
communicate back and forth.

E-2. DIRECT FIRE SUPPRESSION

Platoons failed to understand the importance of direct fire suppression.
Units failed to achieve direct fire suppression or gain fire superiority
regardless of where the contact occurred (for example, engagement on
movement to contact, supporting the breach effort during the assault on a
fortified position, or ambushing a vehicular convoy). Point elements often
did not fire when they spotted the enemy first. Instead, they hesitated
waiting for guidance. Even when fired on first, there was a hesitation to
fire and when fire was returned, it was normally sporadic and not well
controlled. While volume and rate of fire was important, sound was often
mistaken for suppressive fire without regard to its effect (being accurately
placed in known or suspected enemy locations). Platoons were slow in
putting machine guns in action. Usually this was the result of them not
being under the direct positive control of the platoon leader, platoon
sergeant, or one of the squad leaders. Leaders who kept the guns under
positive control and well forward usually were effective in putting them in
action and influencing the outcome of the contact. However, this was the
exception. Additionally, the machine guns were not positioned to their
advantage due to the inability of junior leaders to quickly read the terrain.
Machine guns were more effective when tripods and traverse and
elevation mechanisms were used covering areas and locking in fires.
Tripods have normally been used in the ambush and the attack (during
support to the breach and assault), however, units routinely failed to use
the tripods during engagements on the movement to contact.

E-3. MARKSMANSHIP
Individual marksmanship during daylight operations was good when
soldiers took well-aimed shots. The majority of the targets hit were killed
with head or chest shots. Junior leaders failed to use fire commands or
other signals in controlling and distribution their fires. Soldiers continued
to fire too high at night. Platoons failed to use good night marksmanship
techniques such as elevation/aiming stakes, pyrotechnics, illumination, and
NODs to lower firing trajectories.

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E-4. WEAPONS DISCIPLINE

Weapons were generally well maintained. However, discipline concerning
muzzle orientation was poor. Regardless of their location (assembly area,
moving, or in contact), soldiers were not fully conscious of where their
weapons were pointing and few on the spot corrections were being made
by leaders. Several accidental discharges have occurred during these LFXs
due to incorrect handling of weapons, failure to move with the weapon on
safe, and complacency on the part of some soldiers to monitor their
weapon’s status. While fortunately no one was injured, this type
performance is inexcusable and cannot go unchecked. The immediate
chain of command in these incidents addressed the responsible soldiers. In
future exercises, individuals will be pulled and reported to the brigade
chain of command. Problems have also been noted with the handling and
accountability of hand grenades. To date, training indicates that soldiers
are uneasy when issued grenades to carry as part of their basic load.
Several grenades were dropped as soldiers moved through an event due to
failure to attach the grenades correctly to webbing, lack of periodic
personal checks for sensitive items (patting self down after a move/rush),
and lack of leaders to periodically check.

E-5. BATTLE DRILLS

Battle drills were not executed to standard. Fire-team and squad leaders
often demonstrated little initiative during contacts. Instead, they waited
for the platoon leader to move forward and assess the situation before
executing some form of maneuver or conducting fire and movement.
When fire was returned, units neglected to lay down an adequate base of
fire and gain fire superiority before attempting to assault. Units failed to
appreciate the principle that maximum and effective aimed fire power
must cover advancing troops. When elements got bogged down in the
thick vegetation, they were unable to maintain visual contact between fire
teams and squads, which limited the squad and platoon leaders' ability to
properly assess the situation. This led to the execution of platoon battle
drills when most of the time one squad had sufficient fire power and
means to deal with the engagement. Platoons/squads failed to assault all
the way across objectives. Once contact has been made, until the area
from which it originated has been physically secured, it must be treated as
though it is occupied by hostile personnel. An absence of fire does not
mean the area is secure. Squads must use fire and movement, either by
teams or individuals, all the way across limiting their exposure to hostile
fire. Soldiers are somewhat reluctant to use good individual movement
techniques. Some of this may be attributed to the rocky conditions of the
terrain and soil. It has been noted that soldiers wearing elbow and knee
pads were much more aggressive and performed better IMT. Additionally,

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soldiers often choose to use 3- to 5-second rushes in relatively open terrain

with waist-high grass, whereas, choosing to high crawl would have afforded
them some concealment. A number of the weaknesses noted here could
be alleviated through the conduct of more thorough rehearsals. The
majority of units do not want to spend enough time rehearsing actions on
enemy contact, actions on the objective, and so forth, instead trying to
focus a disproportionate amount of time on movement.

E-6. DEMOLITIONS
Basic demolitions tasks are weak within many of the infantry platoons.
Soldiers are unfamiliar with the materials and handling of demolitions
items such as C4 blocks, electrical/nonelectrical blasting caps, time fuse,
detonation cord, fuse igniters, crimpers, and so forth. Soldiers indicate a
lack of knowledge with regard to the procedures involved in the basic
preparation of electric and/or nonelectric charges. They are unfamiliar
with steps such as inspecting blasting caps, crimping caps, computing burn
time, and so forth. Many can remember doing it at one point in time
during their training (not necessarily with present unit) but their recall in
performing specific tasks is vague.

E-4
APPENDIX F
MISSION-BASED AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS

Ammunition usage and type for each mission varys from unit to unit.
Variables such as the number of soldiers participating, the type of
weapon systems used, and the type of mission being conducted
account for units forecasting and using more or less ammunition.
Each mission has unique ammunition requirements. STRAC should
be used as a resource base and guideline. Historical data within the
unit also helps determine ammunition requirements by showing the
type of ammunition and the quantity expended the last time the same
range or maneuver box was used. This will also assist the unit in
forecasting ammunition for upcoming training events. The number of
targets or engagements on a live-fire range will also determine the
amount of ammunition needed. Units should maintain records of
ammunition usage on each weapon system for future use.

Figure F-1, page F-2 shows examples of ammunition requirements for

three platoon LFXs: movement to contact/hasty attack, ambush, and
attack. (These are based on JRTC data.) Ammunition breakdown is
included for each mission. These ammunition requirements are based
on basic loads per individual/weapon, number of individuals/weapons
per light rifle platoon, STRAC, and ARTEP 7-20. These examples will
help in forecasting and projecting the ammunition requirements
needed for live-fire training. (Blank ammunition requirements must
also be projected for rehearsals.)

F-1
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F-2
APPENDIX G

SURFACE DANGER ZONES AND SAFETY FANS

The governing regulation for SDZs and safety fans is AR 385-63. A

thorough understanding of this Army Regulation is necessary. It and
local policies should be used to execute LFXs. The information in this
appendix provides a broad overview of SDZs and how they are used in
LFXs. Because this is not a sole-source document, Army and
installation procedures must be studied before conducting an LFX.

G-1. INTRODUCTION
Leaders must constantly stress muzzle orientation. Individuals must keep the
muzzle of their weapon directed away from friendly troops and the weapon
on safe when not firing or when moving (as in 3- to 5-second rushes).
a. Early in the planning phase of conducting an LFX, the leader should
read and understand the applicable portions of AR 385-63. As a
minimum, the following sections must be understood: paragraph 3-1,
ammunition positioning and issuance; Chapter 4, Firing; Chapter 16,
Live-Fire Exercises; and the applicable chapters and paragraphs for the
specific weapons being used.
b. A key to receiving range control approval of the LFX plan is the
creation of an accurate composite SDZ overlay. Adherence to the
constraints of the SDZ, AR 385-63, and local SOPs are the best assurance
of conducting a safe range. Early and continuous coordination with range
control can greatly simplify the process of determining the SDZ and the
safety requirements for the maneuver box or range.

G-2. MAKING A COMPOSITE SURFACE DANGER ZONE

A composite SDZ is an overlay of all the SDZs involved in a given
exercise. It considers each type of weapon to be employed, the scheme of
maneuver, and the relationships between each firing position and group of
targets. It represents the worst case for each phase of the operation and is
used to coordinate known constraints with realistic training. This process
is a necessary step in detailed planning.
a. Tools Required. The following tools are required to make a
composite SDZ:
(1) Topographical map of the area to be used. A scale of 1:25,000 is
preferred, but 1:50,000 is acceptable.

G-1
TC 7-9

(2) AR 385-63.
(3) Protractor.
(4) Straight edge.
(5) Compass.
(6) Templates of SDZs for all weapons to be employed. These may be
made using clear acetate, straight edge, compass, protractor, and the data
in AR 385-63 (Figures G-1 and G-2).
b. Outline Plan. The outline plan is the initial concept of maneuver as
applied to the proposed training area. This is usually the first step in
determining the composite surface danger zone. The basic information
required includes: the list of all weapons to be fired, a concept of what the
target array must represent in terms of an OPFOR scenario (available
from the battalion S2) and a general idea of the SDZ dimensions. A
ground reconnaissance would be helpful to verify suitable firing points and
engagement areas. An initial cross-check with the map will enable you to
estimate whether the SDZs will violate established constraints.
c. Direct Fire. After developing the outline plan, diagram the surface
danger zones for each direct-fire weapon system to be used.
(1) Step 1. Beginning at the first set of firing positions (FP), determine
the realistic boundary for each platoon and the target areas to be engaged
from that position. Using the SDZ template(s) for all weapons to be fired
from that position, diagram the SDZ—
From the farthest left FP to the farthest right target; that is,
farthest left in the target area.
From the farthest right FP to the farthest right target.
From the farthest left FP to the farthest left target.
From the farthest right FP to the farthest left target.
Verfiy that the overall outline contains the SDZ from likely FPs within
the position by double-checking with the template. Also verify that the
resulting crossfire SDZs do not overlap other FPs within the platoon
position, creating an unacceptable risk.
(2) Step 2. Repeat the process for each set of positions throughout the
scenario. Consider not only the target areas that you expect to engage
from each position, but also the other areas that can be safely engaged.

G-2
TC 7-9

(3) Step 3. War-game the battle considering likely contingencies, and

determine the appropriate actions. For example:
CONDITION RESPONSE
Platoon departs from expected 1. Interrupt established target
axis and drifts toward the sequence.
gun-target line of the 2. Present alternate target farther
overwatch element. away from maneuver element.
3. Ensure that the platoon leader
is aware of the situation and
issues a corrective FRAGO.
Platoon oriented on incorrect 1. Present the platoon’s prescribed
(unsafe) target area. target before presenting targets in
the incorrect area, so the platoon
will reorient and engage the
correct target.

(4) Step 4. Develop operational control measures such as axis, lateral

boundaries, TRPs, engagement areas, and phase lines along identifiable
terrain to support the SDZs (safe-sided).
d. Indirect Fire. In conjunction with the FIST, establish a fire support
plan that supports the scheme of maneuver. Targets are placed in groups.
(1) Step 1. Determine firing points to be used and match FPs to target
groups.
(2) Step 2. Diagram each set of FPs and targets. Make sure the diagram
accounts for nonstandard firing points if the firing unit is dispersed from
established (surveyed) FPs.
(3) Step 3. Develop contingent SDZs for FP targets not originally
programmed. This will help determine what constraints exist.
(4) Step 4. Compare indirect fire with the scheme of maneuver and
direct fire SDZs to determine—
When fires must be shifted.
When supporting elements must move.
Whether direct fire SDZs overlap onto indirect-firing points.
(5) Step 5. Establish maneuver and fire control measures, and express
the information developed in operational terms and or graphics. One of
the most critical elements is the control of scheduled fires. Generally,
preparatory fires before (and while) the unit crosses the LD are not a
problem. A positive check must be made to ensure all vehicles and
personnel are clear of the SDZ if they will occupy positions in the SDZ
during the exercise. For example, a mortar platoon that occupies a
position forward of the initial firing line after the firing line has moved.

G-3
TC 7-9

G-3. FLANK MANEUVER LIVE-FIRE EXERCISES

Flank maneuver LFXs are LFXs making maximum use of flanking fires to
engage enemy positions. Flank maneuver LFXs are set up and conducted
IAW AR 385-63 and are not new; they are, however, the preferred
technique for conducting the LFX. By using flank maneuver LFXs,
maneuver units receive the maximum benefit of close direct fire support
while attacking the vulnerable flank of the enemy objective.
a. Flank maneuver LFXs take maximum advantage of the SDZ in
achieving flanking fire on the objective. IAW AR 385-63, paragraph
16-4 1., all weapons may be used to provide flanking fire. Specifically,
small arms may be fired near the flank of the maneuver unit. When firing
near the flank of the maneuver unit, there must be at least an angle of 15
degrees between the limit of fire and the closest individual, all firing must
be conducted at low elevations, and all rounds must impact beyond the
maneuver unit. Additionally, traversing and depression stops will be
provided on machine guns to ensure that the minimum 15 degree angle is
maintained.
b. When conducting flank maneuver LFXs, the supporting unit must
know the location of the maneuver unit in order to ensure that no
unprotected personnel are within their sector of fire. Checkpoints, phase
lines, or other control measures are usually adequate, but in extremely
vegetated terrain, visual marking of lead and flanking personnel may be
required. Flags tied to the antennas of safety personnel or safety
personnel wearing road guard vests will usually suffice in adequately
marking the flanking unit’s location. Marking personnel undergoing the
LFX should be avoided as it detracts from realism.
c. When setting up a flank maneuver LFX, the route and location of
maneuver units and the location of those weapons providing supporting
fire must be described in detail. Natural terrain features or other
identifiable means may be used.
G-4. WAIVERS
Paragraph 1-6, AR 385-63 authorizes major Army commanders to waive
safety criteria contained in AR 385-63 if waivers result in acceptable safe
conditions and are in the best interest of the United States. Waiver
authority is delegated to general officers commanding TRADOC
installations. No further delegation is permitted and must be limited to the
following criteria.
a. The dimensions of SDZs as described in AR 385-63 maybe reduced
when terrain, artificial barriers, or other controlling factors make smaller
areas safe.
b. Prescribed firing procedures appropriate for training of
participating troops may be modified to increase realism in training,
provided safety of personnel is not degraded.

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G-5. INFORMATION FOR RANGE CONTROL

In planning for an LFX, range control will normally require the following
information:
A detailed scenario with sketches/overlays that define the
scheme of maneuver and the integration of supporting fires.
Coordination lines or checkpoints to identify maneuver limits.
Limits of fire for each element and/or weapon (SDZ).
Mortar/artillery firing data, safety cards, shift information.
Specific controls for firing while moving.
Provisions for search, marking, and disposal of duds.
Communication and control measures to include air observer if
employed.
Safety checklist.
Target system support.
Waiver justifications (if required).

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APPENDIX H

OBSERVER-CONTROLLER INFORMATION

OCs act as the commander’s principle trainers, provide tactical

realism, and supplement the unit’s safety program. They may be used
to evaluate any level of training and are most effective when used to
observe-control small groups of soldiers. The level of feedback desired
will be determined by the exercise commander and or his staff OCs
should work with, and for, the company and battalion commanders.
This appendix provides a guide to establish the minimum essential
information needed to perform as an OC. (See the appropriate
ARTEP MTP for additional OC information.)

H-1. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

All OCs should perform to the following performance standards:
Always use common sense and good judgement.
Know, understand, and enforce the exercise commander’s
guidance. When in doubt, check with higher.
Be an expert in the field, and doctrinally correct.
Know the safety standards and enforce them; protecting the
force is paramount.
Be a MILES expert and enforce MILES procedures.
Prepare and assist with AARs that are professional and
doctrinally correct.
Use and reinforce the unit chain of command.
Take control when safety violations occur or when life, limb, or
eyesight are threatened.
Go where the action is.
Control LFX target exposures, and record results.
Discuss individual and unit performance on a need-to-know basis
only.
Maintain high standards of personal appearance and conduct.
H-2. FUNCTIONS
OCs are the eyes and the ears of the exercise commander as well as the
primary trainer. The unit chain of command, while responsible for safety

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and training, cannot focus attention on these areas during a combat

exercise—their concern may be maneuver, calling for fire, or evacuating
casualties. OC functions may include the following as well as any
additional instructions provided within the commander’s guidance.
a. Observing and Controlling Training. This does not mean lead the
unit; it refers to ensuring that the unit understands the tactical scenario
and executes its missions within doctrinally correct parameters. Assessing
casualties and reporting unit activities are other important aspects of
control. OC duties require the OC to be where the action is to ensure the
feedback provided during AARs is beneficial and accurate. However, the
OC’s actions should not compromise the unit’s game plan.
b. Setting the Example. The controller should wear the same uniform,
camouflage, and equipment as the unit conducting training. When
possible, he should also move as the unit moves (for example, kneel,
assume the prone position, and so forth).
c. Teaching and Coaching. Knowledge of the unit, enemy doctrine, and
tactical scenario is expected. OCs must also understand the major points
of emphasis the commander is teaching and the results the commander
expects. However, OCs must not instruct or lead counterparts into doing
what they (OCs) think should be done. OCs should ask leading questions
to ensure counterparts understand the operational plan and achieve
results through the proper implementation of doctrine. OCs must also
tailor coaching to the level of the unit’s training.
d. Providing Feedback and Assisting with AARs. A major
responsibility of an OC is enunciated in the duty description, OBSERVE.
The observations of the OC provide feedback to the maneuver unit(s)
during the AAR so observations should be recorded. Although soldiers
and leaders provide valuable feedback, input from an outside observer is
important to a quality AAR.
e. Assessing Casualties. Assessing casualties is critical for replicating
battlefield conditions. Exercise commanders will provide specific tables for
kill ratios according to the varying combat multipliers available and used
by friendly forces or OPFOR. The following procedures provide general
guidance for most casualty assessments:
(1) The OC is alerted to contact. Usually the OC will hear shots or
explosions, be alerted over the radio, or see contact develop.
(2) The OC alerts the appropriate agency that a contact is in progress.
(3) The OC uses casualty ratio tables (kill cards) to assess casualties in
long-range engagements, indirect fire engagement, CAS engagements,
and other engagements as appropriate.
(4) The OC supports/supplements ineffective and inoperable MILES
equipment. Although MILES is the most effective means of assessing
force-on-force engagements, at times it must be supplemented due to

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environmental and/or resource constraints. The OC must be aware of the

various constraints and apply this to casualty ratios. When doctrine is
obviously being violated, the OC may assess casualties through the use of
the controller’s gun. Remember, the controller’s gun is an instruction tool
and should be used judiciously.
(5) The OC instructs MILES casualties to sit down where their MILES
went off, place the yellow weapons key in their harness, stay quiet, and
remove headgear. If soldiers are carrying casualty cards, the OC should fill
in casualty information as soon as possible. Casualty information will
instruct the soldiers as to the nature of their wounds and what they can
and cannot do and/or say.
(6) The OC reports casualties (type and number) to appropriate
agency.
(7) The OC monitors casualty treatment and evacuation procedures.
This is important to supply feedback during the AAR.
f. Controlling Targetry. When remote targets can be used in an LFX,
one OC should be designated as the primary controller and a second
should be designated as an alternate. These controllers should be with the
lead elements. By setting up multiple target arrays, the OC can influence
the movement of a unit to maintain a safe, tactically realistic scenario.
g. Reporting. All OCs must report unit activities to ensure higher
headquarters is kept informed and current on the ground situation. In
general, a report should be made whenever the situation changes. The
exercise commander or his representative should provide reporting
formats. The following events demand an immediate response:
Any contact and casualties from contact.
Any fratricide.
Use of chemical agents by either force.
Troop/unit movements.

H-3. PROTECT THE FORCE

Realism in force-on-force and live-fire engagements is never an excuse for
an unsafe act. OCs should supplement and enforce the commander’s
safety program. Every soldier is a safety, and protection of the force
precludes any other action.

H-4. CONTROLLER-TO-SOLDIER RATIO

For LFXs, each squad should have one controller. Force-on-force
exercises need one controller for each squad or at least one for each
platoon. For the best results in gathering information, one for each squad
is recommended.

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H-5. AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS

All controllers must be trained in AAR techniques and be prepared to
conduct AARs with subgroups. The chief controller should debrief all
controllers and assistants before the AARs.
a. Controllers should not critique or lecture. They should guide the
discussions by asking leading questions. They should enter the discussion
only to sustain the AAR, to get the discussion back on the right track, or to
bring out new points.
b. The following techniques make the AAR an effective part of
training:
Emphasize the positive; do not embarrass leaders or soldiers.
Have participants describe what happened in their own terms.
Outline and prepare the discussions and then rehearse them.
Prepare thought-provoking questions to stimulate discussion.
Relate tactical events to subsequent results and training objectives.
Ensure that alternate courses of action are discussed.
Avoid discussion of minor events that do not directly relate to the
major training objectives.
Use terrain models and training aids to illustrate events. Have
participants relate comments to the model and move the
markers for units, vehicles, and personnel to show events.
Playbacks of key events will generate interest and discussions.
Ensure every element that participated in the exercise is present
at the AAR.
Ensure training deficiencies that surface during the AAR are
incorporated into the unit training schedule within two to six
weeks after the exercise.
c. An AAR for an exercise might follow the following format: (See
appropriate ARTEP MTP for more detailed information.)
Statement of training objectives.
Statement of the commander’s concept.
Narration of events before contact.
— Assembly area.
— Planning.
— Preparation.
Discussion of events (initial engagement to termination of
exercise).
— Key events.
— Actions and reports.
— Results.
— Alternatives.
Summary.

H-4
APPENDIX I

FIRE CONTROL

Fire control consists of fire control measures and fire commands. Fire
control allows a unit to select targets, initiate fires at desired instant,
adjust fire, control rate of fire, and halt fire.
Fire control measures control the distribution of fires. Some fire
control measures include sectors of fire, priority tarqet
engagement, and target reference points. They must be simple
and clearly understood. Their use must be routine, without the
need for detailed or lengthy instructions. Fire control measures
should exist at all times (during movement, halts, actions on the
objective, and so on). Some simple measures that can be used
to effectively distribute and control fires are described in this
appendix.
Fire commands execute the control measures desired. They can
take the form of oral commands, arm-and-hand signals, visual
and sound signals, personal contact, or SOP.

I-1. TERRAIN-ORIENTED TECHNIQUES

Three primary techniques orient the weapon or unit to the terrain for
which they are responsible. These are sectors of fire, engagement areas,
and target reference points. Phase lines, a fourth terrain-oriented
technique, can supplement the other three. Almost any movement control
measure can be used to control fires. This includes restrictive fire areas
(RFAs) and restrictive fire lines (RFLs).
a. Sector of Fire. Each sector of fire is a specific area, limited by
boundaries, that is assigned to a unit or individual weapon system to cover
by observation and fire. A sector of fire is designated by pointing out easily
recognizable terrain features such as roads, streams, hills, or ridge lines
that outline the sector. It is most often designated by left and right limits
and can extend out from a firing position to the maximum engagement
range of the weapons. It can be an enclosed area with near and far limits
located a distance from the firing position. Also, the enclosed area can be
designated an engagement area. If a weapon is assigned an enclosed
sector or engagement area, the terrain between the sector of fire and the
firing position may need to be covered by other weapons.

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(1) In most situations, the terrain and the number and type of weapons
available to cover an area will dictate how sectors of fire are assigned.
They should be assigned so that an area is completely covered with the
appropriate type of fire and that mutual support is established between
each weapon or unit. To gain mutual support, each element normally is
assigned a primary and a secondary sector of fire. The secondary sector of
fire should correspond to another element’s primary sector of fire.
(2) A sector of fire is not meant to restrict fires. Fire is shifted to the
secondary sector on order, when there are no targets in the primary sector,
or to cover another element if it is forced to move.
(3) If concentrating the fires of several weapons in a critical area such
as a choke point is desired, overlapping sectors of fire can be assigned.
This increases the problem of fire control and target overkill. Control
measures such as TRPs, engagement priorities, fire patterns, and
nearest-half/farthest-half techniques are needed. Leaders must select
positions that allow them to observe and coordinate the fire. Different
operations should plan sectors of fire on the objective based on SOPs or
on the intelligence available. This is an appropriate measure to use in
assignment of terrain features from a thorough map reconnaissance up to
specific building assignments from an extensive site reconnaissance.
Leaders must plan fires through consolidation and reorganization on the
objective because the momentum will shift back to the defense.
b. Engagement Areas. An engagement area is an enclosed area or
sector used to mass the fires of weapons. Engagement areas are common
to antiarmor fire planning. They are usually designated by left, right, near,
and far limits with clearly definable boundaries, and can be located a
distance from friendly firing positions. They can also be designated by
TRPs. Engagement areas can further be defined by sectors of fire or TRPs
within the engagement area. Engagement areas are like sectors of fire, but
are used as a tool to concentrate fires. Because the fires of many weapons
may be massed into an engagement area, additional fire distribution
techniques are necessary. One or more of the other fire techniques can be
used for this purpose. Engagement areas can be identified by either
numbers or names.
c. Target Reference Points. A TRP is an easily recognizable point on
the ground (either natural or man-made) used as a reference point for
identifying enemy targets and for controlling indirect fires. TRPs can be
used to designate targets for company teams, platoons, sections, and
individual weapons. They can also designate the center of an engagement
area or the limits of a sector of fire. Once designated, TRPs also constitute
indirect fire targets.
(1) TRPs are usually designated by company team commanders or
platoon leaders. The task force commander may also designate TRPs in

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order to mass the fires of company teams. TRPs should be planned on

likely avenues of approach when defending and in likely enemy locations
during offensive operations. Because weapons will be engaging from
different directions, cardinal directions (north, south, east, west) are used
rather than right or left when giving directions centered on a TRP.
(2) TRPs are designated using the standard target symbol and target
numbers issued by the FIST or FSO. The symbol is a blank cross centered
on the TRP location. The target numbers consist of two letters and four
numbers. These identification numbers are recorded on range cards and
sector sketches for easy reference and coordination. To simplify fire
commands, TRPs may be referred to by the last three digits. For example,
TRP AB5010 may be referred to as TRP 010.
d. Phase Lines. A phase line is a linear control measure that is
normally used to control movement, but it can also be used to control and
distribute the fire of several widely separated elements or weapons. Any
natural or man-made linear terrain feature that is easy to identify can be
used as a phase line; for example, a ridge line, river or stream, road, or
railroad track. (Terrain features must be easily identifiable for phase lines
to be effective as linear control measures.)
(1) In either offensive or defensive operations, phase lines can be used
to simultaneously start or stop firing, shift fire to another sector, or
indicate when elements or weapons are to move to alternate or
supplementary positions. Phase lines can also be used to specify when
target priorities are to change. For example, "I want all squads to engage
only tanks with your Dragons until the enemy reaches Phase Line Silver.
When the enemy crosses Silver, I want you to begin engaging BMPs with
your Dragons."
(2) Phase lines can also be designated as fire-at-will lines for the
control of small-arms fire. When the enemy attacks, small-arms fire can be
held until he comes within rifle range (300 meters), or when he reaches a
spot on the ground such as a road, open area, or a stream bank designated
as a fire-at-will line. This control method allows the most effective fire
because it will surprise the attacking troops and mass fire on them when
they are in a disadvantageous position and formation. As the enemy
moves closer, the volume and rate of fire must stop the attack before it
reaches the platoon’s position.
(3) In addition to being a simple and effective control measure, phase
lines can be assigned as an emergency control measure if radio
communications are interrupted by enemy jamming.
I-2. TARGET-ORIENTED TECHNIQUES
Three target-oriented techniques complement the primary
terrain-oriented techniques. These are nearest-half/farthest-half, fire
patterns, and engagement priorities. Once a friendly unit has been

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oriented to the terrain using one or more of the primary techniques, these
three techniques, used individually or together, distribute fire on an enemy
formation (or target), thereby preventing overkill and ensuring complete
coverage of the target.
a. Nearest-Half/Farthest-Half Technique. This is a method for rapid
distribution of initial fire. Using the nearest-half technique, the element
leader estimates how much of a target area can be seen and then directs
his fires into that half of the target area nearest his element. An
alternative to this technique is the farthest-half technique. Each element
leader directs his fires into the half of the target farthest from his unit. This
technique can be used to achieve oblique shots against a target. These
techniques will not prevent an overkill on targets that appear to be in each
element’s half, but it does coordinate the initial volley. Within his half of
the target area, the element leader distributes his fires using variations of
fire patterns.
b. Fire Patterns. Three basic fire patterns can be used to distribute the
platoon’s or section’s fire when multiple targets appear in a sector, an
engagement area, or at a TRP. These are frontal fire, cross fire, and depth
fire. Fire patterns are changed or used concurrently with another fire
pattern when necessary to ensure maximum coverage of an enemy
formation. This may be necessary when the enemy adjusts his formation
after being engaged.
(1) Frontal fire is used when targets are dispersed laterally in relation
to the platoon’s direction of fire (Figure I-l). Initially, each weapon fires to
its front with flank weapons engaging flank targets first. As targets are
destroyed, fire is shifted toward the center of the enemy formation. This
fire pattern is most effective when the enemy is not only dispersed laterally
but is also moving laterally across the sector of fire. It is least effective
when the enemy is moving directly toward the firing weapons, because the
enemy’s observation, firepower, and frontal (or thickest) armor are
oriented toward the firing weapons. Frontal fire is least effective in the
offense, due to the same concept of moving into the jaws of the enemy.

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(2) Cross fire is used either when targets are dispersed laterally and
obstructions prevent all weapons from firing to the front, or when flank
shots can be achieved from positions with frontal defilade (Figure I-2).
Fire should be directed at the flank to increase the chance of a kill and to
avoid detection when the enemy is moving straight at the friendly unit.
Each element engages a target on a diagonal to its position, with flank
elements engaging targets on the opposite flank. As targets are destroyed,
fire is shifted to the center of the enemy formation.

(3) Depth fire is employed when targets are exposed in depth

(Figure I-3). Weapons on one side engage the nearest targets, while
weapons on the other side engage the farthest targets. Fire is then shifted
toward the center of the formation. Unit SOP and the tactical situation
will dictate which element is assigned the near targets and which element
is assigned the deep targets.

c. Engagement Priorities. Usually targets appearing in formations on

the battlefield will be of various types—tanks, BMPs, BRDMs, air defense
vehicles, and so forth. Fire can be rapidly distributed and effectively
controlled in such a situation by assigning each weapon or element a
particular type of vehicle to engage initially. For example, "First squad

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engage tanks. Second squad engage command vehicles. Third squad and
headquarters engage BMPs." Another method is to assign each type
friendly weapon system an enemy weapon system of the same type. For
example, "Tanks kill tanks; TOWs kill BMPs." Of course, if a particular
target is actually threatening a friendly weapon, that target must be
engaged immediately, regardless of engagement priorities.
NOTE: When assigning engagement priorities, consideration should be
given to destroying targets that present the greatest threat and
targets that will break up the momentum of an attack such as
command vehicles, mine-clearing vehicles, and bridging vehicles. It
is also important to consider the ranges, armor protection, and
lethality of the weapons involved to ensure that priorities reflect
the ability of friendly weapons to destroy enemy targets.

I-3. FIRE CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION PREPARATION

Most fire control and distribution measures are as viable in offensive
operations as they are in defensive operations. Both require thorough
preparation. This can be accomplished through rehearsals, individual
training, unit training, and SOPs. (Figure I-4 shows examples of fire
control and distribution.) Individual training should ensure that each
soldier knows his area, technique, and limits of fire. Unit training should
include instructions for specific weapons such as—
M249 priorities.
Antiarmor hunter/killer teams with thorough knowledge of
priority vehicles.
Security forces’ primary/secondary missions.
M203s—who carries, when/what they fire, marking techniques,
and under supervision of leaders.
M60 machine guns to include security and assistant gunner.
Sniper priorities.
Riflemen priorities.
Mortars, artillery (primary targets, TRPs).

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I-10
APPENDIX J

LIVE-FIRE ASSESSMENT

When a unit conducts an LFX, the soldier gets a good look at the
unit 5 command and control. Because of this, the command element
must be trained before the LFX. While a TEWT is important, it may
not be enough. A TEWT generally does not satisfactorily integrate the
unit's weapon systems. A fire coordination exercise (FCX) can fill this
void. (FM 25-4 discusses the different exercises available to the unit
based on training objectives and resources.)

J-1. AREAS OF ASSESSMENT

During an LFX, everything done can be evaluated. Measuring all
individual and collective tasks would be nearly impossible due to the
magnitude of tasks performed on a daily basis. While no tasks should be
completely ignored, selected tasks should be focused on. Since most tasks
can be assessed without conducting an LFX, concentration should be on
evaluating those areas that can best be measured within the context of an
LFX. Some of these are—
a. Reinforcement of principles of command and control within the
context of an LFX. (See Chapter 2.) This includes fire commands, fire
discipline, fire control measures (TRPs, FPFs, sectors of fire, and so on),
indirect fire support, and base of fire (lifting and shifting fires).
b. Weapon system integration using organic and nonorganic weapons
(M16 rifle, M203 grenade launcher, M249, grenades, Claymore mines,
AT4s, mortars, artillery, and so on).
c. Target identification (including friendly forces), acquisition, and
engagement (including suppression and fire distribution).
d. Concentration on the use of maneuver, fires, and terrain
simultaneously.
e. Communications.

J-2. ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Units should use different manuals such as FM 7-8, FM 7-7, and ARTEP
7-8-MTP to assist in assessing their unit’s proficiency at conducting
live-fire training. By using the checklists found in ARTEP 7-8-MTP and
incorporating those standards with SOPs and other doctrinal manuals,
units should be able to assess live-fire training and establish their own

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standards. (The checklist in Figure J-1 may also help.) These standards
will change with different variables such as weather, terrain, ammunition
availability, unit proficiency, and so on. Units might use competitions
among squads, or other incentives, to increase the unit’s ability to squire
and destroy targets with live ammunition. When assessing live-fire
training, data should be kept in the unit’s training files to help future
training and build a data base at the unit level.
a. Maintaining a positive environment is important for learning. An
assessment is not a critique. Therefore, empirical data should be used to
merely assist in identifying strengths and weaknesses, not to pronounce
pass or fail. The fact that variable conditions affect each LFX differently
should be remembered when compiling data.
b. MTPs should be used as the primary source of assessments.
c. Field manuals also help the leader in assessing the unit. These FMs
sometimes offer alternative concepts and ideas in an approach to a tactical
problem. FMs also go into much more depth than an MTP, and can be
used to help assess problem areas.
d. Marksmanship data helps the leader by pointing out potential
problems. The example in Figure J-2 on page J-4 shows how
marksmanship data can be used in the assessment process:
(1) Use of marksmanship data can be subjective. When using multiple
weapon systems, the OC may not always be able to tell what type of
projectile hit the target (hand grenade, AT4, M16 rounds, or M249
rounds). Therefore, this information should be evaluated and used
carefully to identify general strengths and weaknesses. (See Table J-1 for
an example of ammunition expended by a squad at personnel targets.)
(2) Using Table J-1, the deduction can be made that AT4 training is to
standard, M16 training is adequate, and M60 training needs work. Varying
conditions (day/night, NBC environment, precipitation, and so on) can
make determining proficiency difficult. These variables should be
discussed in the AAR. (See Chapter 2 for more information on live-fire
variables). The unit will then know which training areas need
improvement. For reference, all data may be written down. (Figure J-3
provides an example of how this data might be recorded.)

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J-4
APPENDIX K

TRAINING AREAS AND RANGES

Military leaders must determine which tasks the unit needs to train.
Each type and size unit has different training needs. Even like units
will focus on training different task because of varying degrees of
proficiency. The decision on what to train helps determine where to
train a unit on live-fire skills.

This appendix discusses training various elements through LFXs using

different types of Army ranges. (See FM 25-7 for additional
information on training ranges.)

K-1. INTRODUCTION
The Army has many fixed live-fire ranges located on various installations.
The optimum training area is one that provides feedback and realism
(life-like targetry, freedom to manever; battle sounds, and so on). A
maneuver box has the most potential to meet these requirements.
However, a maneuver box may be difficult to obtain at different
installations, and it takes a lot of time and effort to prepare. This
paragraph discusses the maneuver box and some alternatives (the
multipurpose range complex-light [MPRC-L] and the infantry platoon
battle course [IPBC] or the infantry squad battle course [ISBC]) that
require less effort to set up. (Table K-1 provides a comparison of the
MPRC-L, IPBC, ISBC, and maneuver box.)

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a. The maneuver box concept allows the subordinate leader to select

the direction of approach to an objective (within his assigned sector). It
gives him a sense of independence and freedom of action. It also heightens
the seriousness of safety and control, and it is more realistic.
b. While the ultimate goal is to get the squad or platoon into a live-fire
maneuver box to simulate realism, the unit may first want to participate in
an LFX within a more controlled environment. This is critical if the leader
determines that he wants to focus training on a limited number of
collective live-fire tasks (for example, fire control measures or fire
commands). The MPRC, the IPBC (Figure K-2 and the ISBC (Figure K-3,
page K-5) provide a controlled environment for live-fire training. (See
TC 25-8 for an example of an MPRC.) Even a standard range like the
known-distance (KD) range can be used as a stepping stone to the
maneuver box. Figure K-1 shows some of the different range training
complexes found on various installations that can be used to train different
size elements. (See FM 25-7 for more information.)

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K-2. TRAINING OBJECTIVES

Training objectives vary based on the size of the element to be trained, the
unit’s experience, and the unit’s METL. The following example illustrates
this point:
An infantry commander knows that his unit has little live-fire
experience. He decides that he wants to conduct a platoon LFX in
a maneuver box in six months. He first reinforces buddy team fire
and movement on the installation’s fire-and-movement range.
(Here his focus is on live-fire safety, individual movement
techniques, and marksmanship). Next he trains his fire teams on
reinforcing the concepts of fire control, fire discipline, and fire
distribution through the use of fire commands on a KD range
(rattle-battle drills). Then the commander trains his squads in fire
control measures on an infantry squad battle course, integrating all
previous training. Satisfied that his personnel are prepared in the
rudiments of live fire, he conducts a leader’s CPX to rehearse
command and control. He feels he is now ready to conduct a squad
or platoon LFX in a maneuver box. He coordinates with range
control for the terrain and local policies, and has TASC and DEH
assist with targetry and site preparation. Next, the unit conducts a
leader TEWT. a platoon walk-through, a platoon MILES rehearsal
(force-on-force), and finally, the LFX (the first time soldiers
actually see the targetry).

K-3. PLATOON MISSION

The unit decides which mission to train, based on its METL and past
performance of various tasks. The location is determined by training

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objectives; risk assessment; and range, equipment, and ammunition

availability.
a. The movement to contact mission is presented on three different
ranges: the MPRC, IPBC or ISBC, and the maneuver box. This shows the
limiting factors of the MPRC and the IPBC or ISBC, and allows training
objectives to be planned accordingly. Performing one of these before a
free-form maneuver box allows more concentration on areas or tasks that
need the most training. (For example: distribution of fires, fire discipline,
and so on.)
b. No matter which kind of range is used, the following points should
be remembered:
(1) During the exercise, fire directed at nontarget obstacles such as
trees, rocks, dud or discarded ammunition, and the tracks or wheels of
moving targets, should be prevented.
(2) When assaulting targets, personnel should cease fire within at least
20 meters of the target (depending on the weapon system used). Under no
circumstances should fire be directed inside target pits (this could damage
equipment).
(3) OCs must constantly stress the need to keep the weapon’s muzzle
directed away from friendly troops and the weapon on safe when not
firing.
(4) Positive communications must be maintained.
(5) All unused ammunition should be turned in at the conclusion of the
exercise to allow for an evaluation of the number of rounds expended
compared to the number of hits obtained. (Units that dump ammunition
penalize themselves by raising the number of rounds needed to hit each
target.)
(6) An AAR should be conducted at the end of the exercise at the
squad level, then at the platoon level. If multiple-phased operations are
conducted, the unit may want to conduct an AAR after each phase.
c. Developing realistic scenarios helps get the most out of an LFX.
Scenarios must be flexible enough to allow the commander and other
leaders to decide how to use the terrain. They must also be extensive
enough to facilitate training and evaluation of unit tasks executed IAW the
commander’s concept for the operation, which is formulated through a
METT-T assessment. Scenarios must be varied enough to allow leaders to
engage the proper targets with the right weapons at the appropriate times.

K-4. MULTIPURPOSE RANGE COMPLEX-LIGHT

The following example of platoon live-fire situational training exercise
scenarios contain collective tasks and drills identified in appropriate
MTPs. This is only one example of how to execute a mission. This
particular scenario is divided into three phases. Each phase contains tasks

K-7
TC 7-9

or drills that are achievable on the MPRC, and like all examples on all
range types, concludes with an AAR. Some or all of the tasks listed maybe
included in each phase depending on the unit’s training objectives. Time
required to complete each phase depends on the number of tasks included
and could be in excess of 12 hours if all tasks listed in the three phases are
conducted. In addition, alternative plans could include running platoons
consecutively through a single phase or running different platoons through
each succeeding phase. Whatever approach is selected, the scenarios are
based on only one platoon engaged in an LFX at one time on the MPRC.
Remaining platoons may run exercises using MILES. Only those tasks
identified as achievable on the MPRC should be trained here.
a. Range and Targetry. (See TC 25-8 for an example of an MPRC.)
(1) Targetry consists of nine moving vehicle targets, 37 stationary
vehicle targets, 153 stationary E-type pop-up personnel targets, and 46
moving E-Type personnel targets.
(2) Targets are fully automated and self-scoring. Hostile fire
simulators, thermal targets, night illumination devices, and visual flash
simulators are all used on this range.
(3) Instruction and briefing classrooms, an administrative area, an
ammunition breakdown area, and vehicle holding and maintenance areas
are available.
(4) This type of range is approximately 4,500 meters long and 1,000
wide. (This measurement does not include an assembly area.)
b. Scenario.
(1) General situation. The battalion has seized key terrain within its
area of operations. Contact with enemy elements has been broken.
Intelligence reports indicate the enemy has withdrawn, is reinforcing, and
has the capability to counterattack in regimental strength within the next
12 hours.
(2) Special situation. The company is in an assembly area when ordered
to conduct a movement to contact within zone to PL ___, seize objective
, and be prepared to continue the advance. The company
commander’s FRAGO specifies the axis of advance. It also specifies that
an enemy squad or larger formations will not be bypassed unless ordered
and that movement will orient on objective ___.
(3) Phase I. The platoon, as part of the company movement to contact,
comes under direct fire from an opposing force (OPFOR) squad. The
platoon executes its battle drill, develops the situation, and conducts a
hasty attack. Following consolidation and reorganization on the objective
(if needed), weapons are cleared and checked, and an AAR is conducted.
The platoon may retrain the phase as necessary to attain the overall
training objective or be succeeded by another platoon.

K-8
TC 7-9

(4) Phase II. The platoon continues the movement to contact mission
and executes optional cross danger area, breach obstacles, or clear
woodline battle drills. A squad comes under ambush from an OPFOR
squad and is ordered to break contact. The platoon reorganizes to
continue the mission. Weapons are cleared and checked, and an AAR is
conducted. The platoon may retrain the phase as necessary to attain the
overall training objective or be succeeded by another platoon.
(5) Phase III. The platoon continues the movement to contact mission
and comes under direct fire from an OPFOR squad near objective .
The platoon executes battle drill, develops the situation, and assaults the
objective. The platoon consolidates and reorganizes and establishes a
defense. Weapons are cleared and checked, and an AAR is conducted,
The platoon may retrain the phase as necessary to attain the overall
training objective.
c. Weapon Accommodation. The MPRC-L has pre-imposed weapon
caliber restrictions. Because it is a fixed site, obtaining waivers or
physically changing the range is difficult.

K-5. INFANTRY PLATOON BATTLE COURSE

The IPBC provides a range where a dismounted infantry platoon can
conduct mission-oriented training exercises IAW ARTEP 7-8-MTP. The
IPBC can accommodate the following training exercises:
Ambush.
Movement to contact.
Attack.
Raid.
Retrograde.
Defend.
Reconnaissance and security.

The IPBC is not designed to accommodate aerial gunnery support

activities. Each IPBC is tailored to the requirements set by the
installation’s training requirements and the specific site terrain features.
The strategies for final range layout will be based on the following criteria:
Training directives, priorities, and guidance established by the
installation’s chain of command.
Platoon battle tasks.
Platoon mission-essential task list.
Training priorities of the platoon.
Training resources and availability.
Terrain availability.

K-9
TC 7-9

This type of range is approximately 4,000 meters long and 1,500 wide.
(This measurement does not include an assembly area.)
a. Range and Targetry (Figure K-2).
(1) Targetry.
(a) Objective A consists of two stationary infantry targets (SIT)
simulating a enemy outpost position. Objective A will be sited
approximately 250 meters down range on a ridge line or other strategic
area that can be engaged from a frontal suppressing engagement and a
lateral (flanking) defeating engagement.
(b) Objective B consists of two groupings. The first group should
contain four SITs, one infantry moving target (IMT), and one machine gun
bunker. The second group should contain two SITs, one IMT, and one
stationary armor target (SAT). One mortar simulation device (MSD)
should also be included within objective B. Objective B should be located
approximately 1,100 meters from the baseline.
(c) Objective C consists of five SITs, two IMTs, one SAT, and one
MSD. Objective C should be located approximately 1,500 from the
baseline.
(d) Objective D consists of a trench with a machine gun bunker, one
SIT, and an MSD at each end. Objective D also contains a minefield and
or an impassable contaminated area that will channel troops toward the
trench. Objective D should be located approximately 2,600 meters from
the baseline.
(e) Objective E consists of three target groupings. The first group
contains seven SITs (two located in the two-story house), two IMTs, one
SAT, one machine gun bunker, and one MSD. The second group contains
one machine gun bunker and one SIT. The third group contains six SITs,
three IMTs, one armor moving target carrier (AMTC), one machine gun
bunker, and one MSD. Objective E should be located approximately 3,500
meters from the baseline.
(f) Objective F consists of three target groupings. The first group
contains three SITs, three IMTs, one SAT, one machine gun bunker, and
one MSD. The second group contains six SITs, one SAT, and one machine
gun bunker. The third group contains five SITs, two IMTs, one SAT, one
machine gun bunker, and one MSD. Objective F should be located
approximately 3,850 meters from the baseline.
(2) Bunkers.
(a) Bunkers will probably be of all wood construction and include a
mechanism to simulate machine gun fire. They should have at least three
walls and should be strategically located using natural cover.
(b) Each machine gun bunker should be accompanied by one SIT, one
night muzzle flash simulator (NMFS), and one infantry hostile fire
simulator (IHFS). The SIT, NMFS, and IHFS should be positioned to

K-10
TC 7-9

draw attention to the bunker. To accommodate the standard design, the

SIT, NMFS, and IHFS should be located outside the bunker. If the bunker
will be used to practice clearing techniques, the SIT, NMFS, and IHFS
MUST be positioned outside the bunker. If no clearing of the bunker will
take place, the SIT and NMFS maybe mounted inside the bunker.
(3) Trench layout. The location and layout of trench lines are IAW
enemy doctrine. They are squad size and generally linear. Individual
fighting positions are spaced approximately 5 meters apart. The total
length should be approximately 50 to 60 meters. According to enemy
strategies, antitank and antipersonnel obstacles are normally erected in
front of the trench line.
(4) Assault-defend house. The assault-defend house is a two-story
structure with targets in the windows of the lower level of the assault side.
The first floor of the assault side is not intended to be accessed during
training exercises. The door will be secured with a hasp and padlock. (See
FM 90-1 for MOUT operations.)
(5) Landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ). Troop transportation down
range requires that certain areas of the range be designated for helicopter
accessibility. Each IPBC will have a different LZ/PZ location.
b. Scenario.
(1) General situation. The battalion has seized key terrain within its
area of operations. Contact with enemy elements has been broken.
Intelligence reports indicate the enemy has withdrawn, is reinforcing, and
has the capability to counterattack in regimental strength within the next
12 hours.
(2) Special situation. The company is in an assembly area when ordered
to conduct a movement to contact within zone to PL ___, seize objective
, and be prepared to continue the advance. The company
commander’s FRAGO specifies the axis of advance. It also specifies that
an enemy squad or larger formations will not be bypassed unless ordered
and that movement will orient on objective ___.
(3) Phase I. The platoon, as part of the company movement to contact,
comes under direct fire from an opposing force (OPFOR) squad. The
platoon executes its battle drill, develops the situation, and conducts a
hasty attack. Following consolidation and reorganization on the objective
(if needed), weapons are cleared and checked, and an AAR is conducted.
The platoon may retrain the phase an necessary to attain the overall
training objective or be succeeded by another platoon.
(4) Phase II. The platoon continues the movement to contact mission
and executes optional cross danger area, breach obstacles, or clear
woodline battle drills. It then comes under direct fire from an OPFOR
squad near objective ___. The platoon executes battle drill, develops the
situation, and assaults the objective. The platoon consolidates and

K-11
TC 7-9

reorganizes and establishes a defense. Weapons are cleared and checked,

and an AAR is conducted. The platoon may retrain the phase as necessary
to attain the overall training objective.
c. Weapon Accommodation.
(1) The IPBC range has pre-imposed weapon caliber restrictions.
Because it is a fixed site, obtaining waivers or physically changing the
range is difficult.
(2) For dismounted operations, the IPBC accommodates all small
arms up to the M60 machine gun (7.62-mm). The IPBC can also handle
mounted operations to include the 25-mm cannon, M47 Dragon, and .50
caliber machine gun.

K-6. MANEUVER BOX.

Movement to contact simulates a third-world infantry force conducting a
movement to contact to engage a friendly force.
a. Range and Targetry.
(1) The lane has targets constructed of plywood or pressboard with
metal spring joints, clothed in OPFOR uniforms. Targets will be activated
by an OC using an electronic transmitter. When a target is hit, a
mechanism is activated causing the target to drop to the ground.
(2) Pneumatic firing devices with MILES transmitters attached to a
vehicle windshield motor will create a fan of return fire. This "fire" will be
supplemented by the controllers when soldiers commit an unsafe or
unrealistic act. All targetry equipment will be hardened as much as
possible to protect it from weapon systems employed in the LFX.
(3) For a movement to contact, this type of range is approximately
3,000 to 5,000 meters long and 800 meters wide. (This measurement does
not include an assembly area or the SDZs which merge into the impact
area.) The size of the maneuver box can be adapted to the mission and
terrain. (An ambush or attack mission might require a box 2,000 meters by
1,000 meters.)
b. Scenario.
(1) General situation. The battalion has seized key terrain within its
area of operations. Contact with enemy elements has been broken.
Intelligence reports indicate the enemy has withdrawn, is reinforcing, and
has the capability to counterattack in regimental strength within the next
12 hours.
(2) Special situation. The company is in an assembly area when ordered
to conduct a passage of lines, followed by a movement to contact within
zone to PL___, seize objective ___, and be prepared to continue the
advance. The company commander's FRAGO specifies the axis of
advance. It also specifies that an enemy squad or larger formations will not

K-12
TC 7-9

be bypassed unless ordered and that movement will orient on

objective___.
(3) Phase I. The platoon, as part of the company movement to contact,
comes under direct fire from an opposing force (OPFOR) squad. The
platoon executes its battle drill, develops the situation, and conducts a
hasty attack. Following consolidation and reorganization on the objective
(if needed), the platoon continues the movement to contact.
(4) Phase II. The platoon continues the mission and executes optional
cross danger area, breach obstacles, or clear woodline battle drills. It then
comes under direct fire from an OPFOR squad near objective ___. The
platoon executes battle drill, develops the situation, and assaults the
objective. The platoon consolidates and reorganizes and continues the
mission. Weapons are cleared and checked, and an AAR is conducted.
(The platoon may continue the mission as long as necessary to attain the
overall training objective.)
c. Weapon Accommodation.
(1) Weapons systems used will vary by installation, depending on
terrain available. The JRTC uses up to 40-mm M203 practice rounds and
AT4s on its movement to contact range. (It also uses live Claymores in its
ambush scenario, and live grenades, mortars, artillery, and bangalore
torpedoes in its deliberate attack scenario.)
(2) The SDZ will be based on the largest caliber ballistic
weapon/munitions to be used. The SDZ is designed to provide the platoon
with the maximum flexibility in the selection of tactically sound movement
techniques throughout the area. Specifically, the SDZ needs to be plotted
from the most probable axis of march that the platoon leaders might
select. This axis of march can be influenced through operations orders
defining boundaries, restrictive fire areas, and so on, and controlling which
target array will be activated. Using the extreme engagement limits, the
maximum distance of fire is plotted to the left, right, and forward of the
participating unit’s line of fire. The possibility of an injury caused by
friendly fire is increased on this range. Care must be taken to ensure that
personnel follow the safety precautions presented in the safety briefing.

K-13
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GLOSSARY

AAR after-action review

AMTC armor moving target carrier
AR Army Regulation
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASP ammunition supply point
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATWESS antitank weapon effect signature simulator
BOS battlefield operating system
CAS close air support
CTC combat training center
DZ drop zone
EA engagement area
EOD explosive ordnance detachment
FCX fire coordination exercise
FIST fire support team
FO forward observer
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSO fire support officer
FTX field training exercise
GP general purpose; group
IAW in accordance with
IET initial entry training
IHFS infantry hostile fire simulator
IMT individual movement techniques, infantry moving target
IN infantry
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
KD known-distance
LD line of departure
LFX live-fire exercise
LZ landing zone
MACOM major Army command
MACS multipurpose arcade combat simulator

Glossary-1
TC 7-9

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

METL mission-essential task list
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available
MILES multiple-integrated laser engagement system
MOGAS motor gasoline
MOUT military operations on urbanized terrain
MPRC multipurpose range complex
MPRC-L multipurpose range complex-light
MRE meal, ready-to-eat
MSD mortar simulation device
MTC movement to contact; moving target carrier
MTP mission training plan
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NMFS night muzzle flash simulation
NVD night vision device
OC observer-controller
OIC officer in charge
OP observation post
OPFOR opposing force
OPORD operations order
PL phase line
PLT platoon
PSG platoon sergeant
PZ pickup zone
RCMAT radio-controlled miniature aerial target
RETS remoted target system
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line
SAT stationary armor target
SDZ surface danger zone
SIT stationary infantry target
SOP standing operations order
SPALS simulator, projectile airburst liquid
SQD squad
STX situational training exercise
SWA Southwest Asia
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TBA to be announced
TBD to be determined

Glossary-2
TC 7-9

TEWT tactical exercise without troops

THM-TG target holding mechanism tank gunnery
TLP troop-leading procedure
TM team
TNT trinitrotoluene
TOT time of transmission; time on target (artillery support);
or time over target (air support)
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TP-T training practice tracer
TRP target reference point
TSC training support center
US United States
VT variable time
XO executive officer

Glossary-3
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REFERENCES

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
AR 385-63 Policies and Procedures for Firing Ammunition for
Training, Target Practice and Combat.
15 October 1983.
DA Pam 350-38 Training Standards in Weapon Training. 1990.
FM 7-7 The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad.
15 March 1985.
FM 7-8 The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne,
Air Assault, Ranger). 2 April 1992.
FM 23-9 M16A1 Rifle and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship.
03 July 1989.
FM 25-4 How to Conduct Training Exercises.
10 September 1984.
FM 25-7 Training Ranges. 16 September 1985.
FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain.
15 August 1979.
FM 90-10-1 An Infantrymen’s Guide to Urban Combat.
30 September 1982.

READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
FM 7-70 Light Infantry Platoon and Squad. September 1986.
FM 20-32 Mine/Countermine Operations. December 1985.
FM 21-60 Visual Signals. September 1987.
FM 21-75 Combat Skills of the Soldier. 3 August 1984.
FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development. March 1987.
FM 23-1 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Gunnery. March 1991.
FM 23-12 Technique of the Fire of the Rifle Squad and Tactical
Application. October 1967.

References-1
TC 7-9

FM 23-14 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) M249.

December 1985.
FM 23-23 (w/C2) Antipersonnel Mine M18A1 and MIS (Claymore).
January 1966.
FM 23-24 Dragon Medium Antitank/Assault Weapon System M47.
April 1990.
FM 23-25 Launcher and Cartridge 84-mm, M136 (AT4), HEAT.
June 1988.
FM 23-27 MK 19 40-mm Grenade Machine Gun MOD 3.
December 1988.
FM 23-30 Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals. December 1988.
FM 23-31 (w/Cl) 40-mm Grenade Launchers M203 M79. May 1972.
FM 23-33 (w/Cl) 66-mm HEAT Rocket M72A1 and M72A2 (LAW).
April 1979.
FM 23-34 TOW Weapon System. September 1987.
FM 23-65 Browning Machine Gun Caliber .50 HB, M2. May 1972.
FM 23-67 (w/Cl) Machine Gun 7.62-mm, M60. February 1984.
FM 23-85 60-mm Mortar, M19. February 1967.
FM 25-100 Training the Force. November 1988.
FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training. September 1990.
FM 71-1 Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team.
November 1988.
FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols. October 198.5.
TC 7-1 The Rifle Squads (Mechanized and Light Infantry).
31 October 1974.

References-2
Index-1
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TC 7-9
30 SEPTEMBER 1993

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
Official: General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
04924

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance

with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for TC 7-9, Infantry Live-Fire
Training (Qty rqr block no. 5146).

*U.S. Government Printing Office 1993—728-027/80060

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PIN: 013649-000