DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGEfIOCY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.

,JI. /!II

februar;
E.O. 13SUi, SECTION S.3(b)(3) 1
ISCAP'No. 2,06It - D"t 0 , document
, J
;,
1 like to ct:i?tib:li of our str,:ltcSic nuc]
force:;. I '.-lil1 first cOi::?nrC U.S. forct:!.:. .:is Z!rc cl!rrently
with our Lest esti:!i':U::C5 of Soviet strateg:i.c forces. Then
1 \dll briefly ciscuss the onjectives H,: use as the Lusis for dc.::.;igr.ir.r,
our forces. n>' 1c,st is more fonr.idaL1c -- to rilensure the
p.:!rfol':a:.nct! of our forces of t:1ose obj.:ctivc!!:.
.... _" __ ---.1.. __._._ ._______ __, ___ 1. Force Posture
Luunchers
-_._-' .. -._-- .... _----
SOlt ICB:rs 0 142-128 0 0
Haru rCfi:ls !}.I l,05
i
l 1,01'5-1,079 1.054 1,13
/
+-1,496
Soft ::RB>!s IIi1lU::; a 470-"370 0 0
Hard :IRB:is/IRll;;s 'E..! 0 160':'285 0 485-635
Submarine-Launched Ballistic
(SLB:;s) 656 158-238 656 542-SJO
Anti-fs<:,llistic (A.B:!s) 0 56-64 672 215-1,005
-
5/,9 13j-HO 44J 35-':0
1,530-1, no
-
2,870-3,110
al Inc ludes 50 mob ile ICn: [ launchers in FY 76.
'il Includes 25-75 mobile )lRm: lG.lll1chl!rs in FY 70 and 125-:00 mobile
launchers in F"l 76.
This chart cCr.lpares the currently U.S. forccs ilnd
Soviet strategic forces derived fror.! the most recent :laticn.:ll Intelligence
Projections for Planning (KIPP). The number of U. S. hard ICB?b
and Tit41n II) is prograr.lnlcd to be 1,054 FY 76, ti,e number
of Soviet hard ICn:is is projected to fro,,\ the current 1;:ve1 of
slightly under 1,000 to a possible high of 1,496 FY 76. The Soviet
are a threilt to our allies in El'rop<'. b:.:,: not: to tile U.S.
mainland. In our current tt..rf;ctinz, He give missilE'!s equal priority
with the ICB:!:; Ivhich do !:hrcuten the: United States. r,ow
hnve aboat a. 3 to 1 margin i:l SLB::s. By FY 76. both side::; "'ill probably
have about the same number of SLB:!sJ nlthough the Sovic ts could have
as m:ltly .:lS 50 Polaris-type submarines J 'vi th 16 'Cissilcs e.:.ch, if they
continue to deploy them at pre!:ent rate. In tens of missile c.echnolofY.
the Soviees are 5 to 7 years beltincl. us. They ar.; just heginninr;
to deploy co'Cparab1e to the and Polaris we
in the 19603. 't'he Alli! sho\/ Senti,'Iel syste:;! for ell.!
United St.:ltes, l.. hila the Soviet cystem is projected to grol'l from t;:C!
current system to a range of 215-1,005 ABir launchers by fY 76.
A of intercontinental bomber forces is shm.rn near the uoteo,ll,_.
1
"SEgRET

. 0822'
Seo Del Coat 5r. %-_*____________
(fI.. IA" O-zr.l-7'" 1\-1
of the chart. The. Soviets al:.;o hnve n 'nuubcr of ned.iUl:l
which ..Ire not becuuse. our. ihtc:lligence illdicates ti:at it is mo:.c:
unlikely t:ICY '.-:ould be used r.gdnst thr;! l.:nitccl 5t!ltes. Finally,
ci'wrt shous the: tot",l mmbers ot ,!arbe<lds for botil COllnt ri e';.
ifililc. t!IC nU[luer of U. S. offensive 1,1i:.;sUes is not to
ch.:-tnge dur.i 113 period sho::n in the chnr.t, t,!e arc i.rr.:-,rovinr, the
of our .. ic QY inc:roducins IITs and
cOl1vcrtinc Pola.ris to carry tile FOGeidon missile. These nc\/
\\'111 carry :':ultil\lc Indepandc:ltly-targetable r:.ccntry Vehicles
(NJRVs) -- three on !i:i.ollter.I'll1 nnd lID to 14 on Poseidon. arc also
dcployina neH cltt;.!C:" l:'lisf'iles for our bo:.!bcrn. lw.vc made
itnprovctnents to give Uri l1iZh cOl':fidcncc of being to
.:lny All: 1 system the Soviets deplo:! in tile
these in are not reflccte(1 i.n t:IC nU:':l<.!ricnl
sho'.m in the ch.lrt. Thus, a better com:"lr:i30n of IJ. S
stratcgh: Offl!lulive. forces can ho made by eXi.tr.llnin tile tililt
c3rried by and bombers-. As the next c!tart sho\Js, the lJni ted
States has and tdll continue to have morc warheads tiutn,tile Soviet
Ulliotl. In term:: of equivalent megatons (a commonly useJ. of COi;:
-parison) the NO forces will be ahollt equal in POi 76. The Soviets
have Cl total luissi.le payload as a result of their deployr,wnt
of large booster !!lissiles such as the 5S-9. Durinn PZi.l';t six mOllt;is,
the Soviets conducted a series of tests of the 5S-9s, each carrying
thrc.1! Re-entry Vebicles (RVs). He have no evidence that they have
the to tnrfjct the RVs to Hidely fiE'.par<l.tcd
as Hto! c::m tvith Poseidon ancI ninuter.lan. If their is Ilinwd at a
&URV system, they could achieve an Initial Operational Ca:pability
(IOC) for Q primitive system effective only against soft tarcets by
FY 70 and a morc accurate system effective against ilinuteman silos by
FY 72. The force loadinss Shot'lil reflect a :1IRV capClbiHty for the
Soviets as t.;ell as for our programmed forces.
CO:.tPARIS();! OF U.S. l'IJlD SOVIET FORCE l.OAODGS (Chart 2)
----------(End of Fiscal Years)
IT 70 FY 76
S=-o-v-:l-e-t-
Soviet u.s.
Total On-Line Force
-Warh"iiids--
1,580-1,710 2,8iO-3,l20
Equivalent
2,920-3,010 3,650-4,020
:lissile Payload (Kilopounds)
5,060-5,360 7,230-8,440
Alert force
-lia-r-hcads-
900-970 2,110-2,190
Equivalent :'!cgatons
1,690-1,740 2,630-2,790
Missile Payload (Kilopoundo)
3,470-3,630 5,470-6,35f)
These comparisons, \,hile descriptive, do not tell us hOH \lell our
str.:ltee
ic
nuclear forces can lllect their objectives.
2

Portions denied are S-FRD and thus outside of the jurisdiction
of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.
2. !t.r!l..t..!'..
The h"s:fs Clf our stratC'gic forces n.rc to ckter !Iuclc.:o.r
liAr in Cusc 11 uoc:; st.irt. to achieve the uest pO$r.ibl.(! outcor:c.
'i'ilis is t!IOUg;lt to be tllat outcome \'lhich \"ould rt:sult in the
e11($t U.S. 1 bcliIWP. is genernl agreement within the
Dcp'irtlll(.>nt of Defense. with this statetr.f'nt of our general objectives. On
I \1ill no;/ the ca!l.lbi1ity of o\.lr strl.ltcnic to
niect these
3. of U. S. StratcFic Force C.:a')3bilitics
-- -_._-------------_!--_--------
Centr:!l to our ability to c('!tcr a general nuclear ,,1 til tCle Soviet
Uuioa is our capabiI tty to a larce part of the Soviet population
and in to a Soviet In va
ablc to hold theSE! Soviet hostage in order to Soviet
agr.rcssion ourselves and our allies. The next chr.rt ShO:1S our
retnlitltory capability under various 1l.!03u;:.ptions ll.1Jout the availahility
of our strategic forces.
U.S. RETALIATORY CAPAr.ILITY AGAnlST THE illC:li HIPI' SOVIET Ti:::E/.T
(Chart 3)
- "-CPcrcent-oItflc Soviet Killed; End riscal YearsY-

r! }0,
,Ft 73
FY 76
-
Prusr.nlllr.lcd force 43% 44%
Land-Based :Iissiles Only 39 38 34
Only
30 36 30
Bombers Only 29 17 17
In c.:llculat inc the U. S. retaliatory capability. wa assume the
follm."inr,: (1) the Soviets a surprise atUcl: with till of their
av.nilablc missiles on our strategic forces, which are in a day-to-day
alert posture; (:!) the Soviets use all of their strategic offensive forces
in a first strike, except for their bordbers, t.::1icn thay kecl' to threaten
our cities; ilnd (3) the United Stiltes retaliates \Jith its surviving
11113Silcs Olnd bOlabers in an attac:, asninst Soviet cities. tJe then
cnlculate the level of deat:,s (Q'i a percentOlge of the total Soviet
population) that we Clln inflict in retaliation from blm:>t alone.
The capability to kill 30% of the Soviet people would correspond to the
destruction of the 190 large3t Soviet cities and at least 60% of the
Soviet industriill capacity. The capability to cau.. e this much dam.. -
under these conscrvOltive CirCu....lsttl.6!CCS -- correspondt: to tile capability
to des troy t;le 500 largest Soviet cities in core likely C:1!'es if we \lant
to do so.
Our currently pro!:ra::tmed force has the capability to over 4Ch
of the Soviet people In retaliation acninst the threat
IT 16. ;:orcover, e.o.ch of our force (ICC::S, and uOr.lbers)
has a subst.:tntbl cllpc.bility inJ!vidu<'l1ly. Thus, even if the Soviets
thr.;:.o.tun the v.labllit)' of oa.a of our force COrt;Joncnts I the remilininr. tITO
us adequiltc i'nsurl!ncoOl ......
.;,
U.ltlSt Soviet l<ucle.'lr attilck
1 ,:ould now like to consider cutcol".e or D.S./Soviet nuc1c:lr.
war (if oae s;.ol.llu sturt) in tcr:l:i of re1ntive :l\1:noers of cll'at:t::';. A
1nr!;c irabalc.:lCc in favor of coultl affect our
c;!cterrent. ,\5 sho:,,111 in tlw fo110.:1nl: chart, ho.cv:-;r, then: :fr. not :.t
grcnt d1 fCercllce in cff reoi'lc each !'lide coulc! ldll; the
h;.::ltmce dercilos t:iC c1.rcul:tH.'U:.C<:!s u''1cer t::l:i.ch t:'e ','<lr
5 tarts. 111 Gn nc tU<ll 1l\lcle.::.r e:;ci\l,ngc, tile rclat .i,ve n1.\i,t,cr of (h.:ntils
would also upon the \:.lr pl.::\ selected by each slue.
Soviets Strike First;
U.S. Strikes
::--_U;;"..;.,,:S:..,' Re tali ;,;.\:
nctnliatc
U .1. ueaths Sovie t l>C.:!fiil!,
'U:"[.i5C7t1;-;--Sovict
IT 62 60 120 60 120
FY 70 100 120 110 100
FY 76 100 120 110 100
The m;:;.jor ,,,\: coulC;! in an attemjlt to reduce t:.e number
of U.S. (or to limit arc: (1) a counterforcc: ntt,"ck
a3.c.inst the Soviet rctGliatory forces t:ith our forces.
actively defend Soviet air .. nd missile attac}:s. (3) tClke civil
defense l:iaaSures. Fro;n the Soviet t these actions would have t:IC
effect of redud.n::: their retaliatory capal>i.lit)'. They \,'ou1d then have thp.
option to react to our capabilities, just as ':e ean react
to any threats to our ecterrcnt. The to a lClrgc
sC4:lle U.S. dam:tt,e-lir.'litinZ effort voule be to increase the c:.rabilit: of
offensive forces. It can be argued that Q e!'callltion or
opposins forcel'> uould ;>lace gre:lter financi:ll burdens 011 t'!1e Soviet t:nion
than on the Un! ted States. Ho\."evcr. it is haret to estimate the cxtC<lt to
which the Soviets sacrifice 1n order to maintClin their ret31iatory
c:ap.:.bllity. (Bc.cl:up charts nre available on daJ:l.&3e limiting af;:l1nst
Soviet Vnioa and Red China.)
4. ConcluRion
In clOSing. let me say that t::ere are SOrlC fund':":;letltCll qu'!stions thClt
will be reviewed carefully in the neAt feu 1I'IOntils. 50:".18 of the issues
which come to mind are the required level of. Clnd confic.!encc in. our
retaliatory cllpabili ty; the extent to which we CCln lini t dac:a;e to tile
United St.:1tes in the event of <l :'luclear tl=.r: and the reactions bet,..,een
U.S. Soviet deploynents of strategic forces.
I belleve no'" h:lve and c.::n :naint:lin a retaliatory capability
throush the rnld-70:;. Our ability to limit to the United States
depends to a large extent on Soviet reactions and resolve. As 10n3 as
both nations .. re cctermined to maintain .. large retaliatory t
neitiler sidEl can count on gClining an (in terms of thQ relative
number of deaths) by Clttack.ing first.
4
;JOP"SEBfiET
}'inally. I ha\'c r.ot di!>cusscd it t our .. n... of
the prI..1pos{';!c! U.S. strz.ter;ic ilrl.IS cOlltrol <l:;rcc;ilcnt th4lt it: \-1Ould
!lav(': it sr.,nll but positive effect on our co.;'.llJility. jf t:'t!
Soviets should try to cntWe oa agree:f.:ent. t,'e could still tll.."lint.1in out"
retulia.tory capnbility t;lroug;lout the period cx";'!lined.
- --
A,;"lALYSIS OF 'i'HE U.S. .. FOlt U:II'l'ejC STRATEGIC ::H:SII.ES
We just cO;;lpl\.!ted un U;)(!lltcd a.\c1ysis of the U.S. ilrms control
proposal ,,;llie;l ,.:.,::) prejl... red lest su.. This updcte \0:4::' .. ry
bl::c<luSC there have been Ch:-Uli:CS in our projcctiona of threct
(prillwrily :t t',lo-j'cOlr JelL'.y in t:IC Soviet :.md
to OHr 0\;1\ since t:w.t 1 Hill briefly ..
t;ie cU('Cl of tile propo;lC(\ on our retH .. tory Cil!'C!J ility. I
",111 .:.1150 effects of by -the Soviets.
The Pl."O;.'O!.icC: :.rms control fix for both side,; tiH:
level of offcnAiv\: mis!';ilc (ICtUs. ma::s/:Jt;;;rs. and SLL:!!O) :It
the IluIII!.>cr in o?er&!tion or under construction at tilC time of the ::J.2,rC:(!il\cnt
(we 1, 1969 in ollr annlysis). (A buckup chart 0;1 force
levcb unJer ctu:! pro{'iosed llt,recn1cllt is av..dlable). l.'he nur.lbcr of A&<'
voulcl be fixeci at u yet V!vcl, but m! oelievli!
the uPl'm- lindt siloLllc! be ahout 1,000 lll.ullciter;:;. IC3::5 tuui
molJilt.= be banned. The nzrec::tent ,.'ould not Il!,ply to t
air l\nti-Subt:..1rine H.:rrfarc (ASt-:) forces, civil defc.:lse,
or and devO! lop::tenc.
In our nrullysis. l,:P' ussu::tetl that the nU:!'Ihcr of on hoth
sideR ,"ould fixeC: at 670 (Scntinel lcvel). The next t .JO sho'."
tile more il1portOlnt re!'Sults of our analysis.
U. S. T'J-."TALI.\TORY CAPAflILI1"f af
(Chart 5)
(Percent of tile Soviet People KUled)
!!o !!..lQ
FY72 FY 74 FY 76
(U.S. Forces vs. High
rapp
Soviet Force) 43% 444 44:t 41:

(U.S. Limited va. Soviet Lit:11tcd) 44% 44% 43l
_..----------------
!of Assumes that our missile penet ration aids do not '<lor:,.
This chart sho'.:s our rctal1&tory c::l?ability. in terr.:s of the pcrcent;l3e
of Soviet peo?le killed I and without an arms CO.ltrol c?,recl,lcnt. \Ie C:ln
do Slig:ltly better with an than ",it:lout onc. This is because
the agree::lcmt would lir.lit the ccployailcu!.; of Soviet offenc::ive> and most
i'lll,?ortuntly, of SOViet defensive elle levels projected in
the absence of an cgreement.
Feau '!Jill inevi tably arise thOlt Soviets c:.:m thc linitc(!
StOJtcs vulncr..ble to attack. by secretly illl?roving tr.dr offen!'tivc and
defensive forces. U(Y..;ever I they could try to surprise \,;s by the
6
SESHET
---
sume steps ill thc iibst.mce of an .:igrce::lcnt. Our anal)'si!-< c.:t..-;cs
,... hcrc tllc Soviets ... t by secTc.:riy IC,t::s :lnd t!tC'!;
by A!J:!fZ i1\ execs:; of the levels.
(Chart: 6)
l-"Y 70 F'i72
}O'Y 74 n 76
_SClVicts -....... Cheat __._bv 5ccreth- ,J-.._._ .......-.-l _ __ .. __ ..._____ ... .. ...l,.,.

No U.S. f:esponse . 447. 437.
. .\..'J::S.}lJ..!!
_ __ Rat:c __ . ___ :.:.;J_____
;-.0 U.S. 41 38
U.S. Put:> 14 :!K-33 011 Poscico:l
Defends :':inutcl:\<l11 III 44 43 43 42
!/ As!'iUwCS that U.S. penetrAtion <:lids do not \lor::.
In first situntion, \Ie ilS'iUl1ec!. that the Soviets t!ould ue
0.1>112 to 500 lcn;::> undetected aad taut \ie \-!ollle :r... no
t'hey could try to do this by buildinz systems,
deploying more or convcrHns IRB:'V:!ltB:l silos to A
erecial inl.:elligc:nc..: t::1H.illlute co'lclu!.l-=:; thaI.: \,;..,; L,- .. Lv J-."!L .. d
sucb actio!'ls before blore th.tm 100 to 2iJO r.dssiles tlerc so dc::-lo),{:d.
Even if '''c did ilo' . .;cver J !'IC could kill 43:: of Soviet in
retlllintion throu3h FY 76. This is becnuse much of our Iiltsdll'
force is relatively invulncrnble to a Soviet first strike.
On the othcr hand. :Ill of Ollr a.re subject: to uttrit:io.l by
a Soviet syster.l. For t!lis re.::soa, tie have exs':lined in
detail tile effect of Soviet in Amfs on our retaliatory cap.:.billty,
t'cr tilis case, \-Ie assumed that t';:e Soviet:; uould a conscious rlecio:;i.on
to che.::t bcgtnn1:Lr; in F':." 70 tlould deploy intcrcel'tors ;,ot a r.'lte
hicner than that snot!n in any intellizcnce estil'late. lYe nadc very con
iervuive ahout tiu! effectiveness of t:le Soviet inter
ceptors; that is. assurainr. ollr renetration :lids did not work, each
reliable Soviet interceptor !::ould be able to kill olle of our nvs. Titus.
WEl ,""ould hav.:! to use the tactic of "exhaustion" to over..lhel.;;: the Soviet
ABN defense. In the expected 5i tuation, a Soviet SYl'ltetl -- e5pcciully
one deploycc.l be ouch less and there are
less costly techniques thun exh:;.ustion to negate it.
The lar:;e I sccret Soviet AU:I deployr.umt included in our
covers such C.:lsc.s 4S the convcr:don of tlte Tallinn (SA-5) -- or any other
Surface-to-Air ::issile (S....:!) system -- to .tn Alt! or t:le of
mbile AIl"!s. It. special inte1li!;cnce analysis haS conclu<!ed thnt Cl
-----------
convcrtct: T<.;llinn syslem \Joulcl not lie ,a very effective Aii:,l Sy:.;te:r.l sin'c" He
could ie: by killin::. the three or four associated rmlars
and hi' the: Tallinn site:; thcTn3elvcs t,!lth (n::ninst
thc)' no f-,lcfcn'ic CtlPilhl1 ity). Any attcr.:pt to iIl:rrovc t!lc. sytotc'll
by radars ,",ould UC c<lsily detected our unilnt(H:'al
Ncycrthclcr.s, even if \"c ra.. v;.;ry COiut!rv:;tive <.l.bOl1t
the s.i;:e and of Che Soviet sY:'ite,;I. ... ill still be
;ahle to kill ovcr of the Sovip.t peo?l(! in throuzll FY 76.
If '.e ' .... nted to increM.(! thOlt perccntClf;C, .,.c coul.d do 50 by
options. For ex..:l'plc. ,,'e could im:ri!a!iC ti.e r.ul.,hcr of avs on P03ddon to
14 and defend. t;U;! :li.nutei:lan III force. Io-:ould cnnhle us to !dll
of the Soviet pco;llc ill ret.. lirotion in I-Y 76. In addition, tIC have j.l.::my
other o.'lions thr.t ,,;c conlcl cxercbe '.dtilin the tern... of the ar,rccr,l c.:nt
(for eXol:lple, 1ncre,13in:-: the ho:nl>er alert rate, plucinz morl! penetration
aids 011 bO;;lucrs and Poseidon) :lIld convertin:t :lll :linuter.lan to !;inlltCll':..1tl
Ills)
For our n.:!)(.t sct of calcul<ttions) "!e assumcC: the role of a Sovic:t
planner ir. order to see hCK-! the Soviet::; might vicl-I t:1eir deterrent U1\Ucr
an arrilS Control Clp,reCr.lC-nt. It is unlikely th&t the Soviets ...ould t:"..l::c
cKactly the s:nc ca.lculations th,'lt we do. if they nl.ldc the S"r.lC
conservative as:.;umptions th3t He co in analyzinz our 0\-:;\ stratceic nuclear
cap3hility. they coule! very \vell conclule th3t their deterrent is
In ordcr to inprove their rctllliatory capability, the Soviet::. mi3ht "'a:lt
to 1> ...11 .:1111.1 lii.llt AJ.r:s to l(!,.,els. The chnrc sho"s t:H!
results of calcuhtions a Soviet pl'lIlncr ulight !':1a!:e in ev,lluatinz the
Soviet retaliatory carability under conservative
(Churt 7)
N 7/. n 70
14: 4%
Altern3tive AilrCcl'I;,mts
--"-'" ----------J-1t.:..:..___ _
Limit A&:is to 100 01\ Both Sides
30 30
Limit AUlls to 100 Oil Both Sidcs nnd BAn mRVs 40 42
Soviet t.ct1ons in Violation of the Proposed A:lrccmellt
- Cfirit}:--rnSLS:i)
19 4
Add 500 t:obile Ic.tr:s
II 25
!oJ Tite Soviets as:;u:'\e tha.t their penetration aids do not wor!..
8
The rC'iultn of 0;'11: nnr.\Y3i!:l .nlso tia: U.S. ':::11': pi.rLicul.!rly
the Soviet ti.c:; arc ;tffccti:.:cl .!orc by t:u.: level of
AiH th;-,l\ by in offensive 'lil1ssilc (such
thro'.""l';.::.i3ht). Tll1$ effect would be espcdully Pfouout:ccc.l if
.nn OI"rCCi!lCI!t bI',lin" :rrl{Vs Thus, ou
. c
level:; :,(; one: of til& ':IO:H i.lI,'ortallt ill :\':i'!!',Ol1;:.t lnf',
all ",rl:1$ c"lltrv1 cl .:lrt t:lt:! U.S. :md SovjC.l
rct .. lintor)' c.,:,:.bJli vm.'r ,d.e:. tia: llu.;t;;(:r of ;,1);: inlcrccpcof!':.
0
of Sovi.:t

Both Sides Ueploy :mws
HIRVs llanned

41
457
36
43;;
25
37%
16
In
16
17%
1n
Soviet r-ctnlintorv
......... ..
0

165
of u.s. Ann In tc recntors
700 --}i6{i
Both Sides Deploy 36 32 4 4 4 4
Bltnncd 46 42 29 4 4 4
!,! Assunle.!'l that neither U.S. nor Soviet penetration .. ids "-"or!:.
There is an i:-;sue should be carf.'fully consi,Gered as we pr(!!'iire
to the terms of an ar:.lS control tlit;, advancin!1 laissllc
'.:e Cu.rI e:,;p-'lct thut nc'" ood str..
will be dcv(!loped w:llcn coul... i r.ul::e ollr present l:lOd-based .\is$llc a1los
e.lsy tnrC.. T!le :lgreencmt as nOH !\rO!'O$'lea docs not inclllde: an)' pro-
vi sions for inerl!.:lsin:; surv.1vahUity of our by such OIS
the 10c:!.1 defense of missile silo!'i or the tunsfer of to super
hard silos or to sell. In ti,l! long run, the .:q;rccr.lcnt elml !:ubsc
qucnt revi5ion!'; to it should pernlit us to maintain tile survlv.;;.billty of
our ICt::1 force.
In summary. we believe t:lat our nucleor deterrent c:!.n be maintained
atl well Clnd pro!Jnbly better unc!er the terms of a ':Jell-JcGigncd arlils
control .1,3recment than \-:ithout one. Also, an agrc(1!r.t:::nt (or even
preUlllina-ry d1scassioM) would give us valu:.tb1e in5ip,i:ts into ho!, the
Soviets vic,'1 nucle.. r forces and strate6Y. Finally. nn <l:,rcl!!:lcnt ,",ould
increase our confidence in our deterrent by reducing in
the nUlao.ers of offensive s.nd defensive mi$::ilc:;. However, \"c stUl
must insure .1sainst these uncert:!.intie::; by pursuinz to protect
our deterrent. Although ..e believe that such lln a:reemcnt could be
kept without on-site inerection, ',:e saould sec;: wtth the Soviet::;
on inspectlO;t i>rocecJures to reduce unccrt.;1intics further. .\ny such
asrecd inspection \/ould provide infornation not
9
,. SE&RH