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Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions

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Abstract

Though most of analytic philosophy is basedupon intuitions, some philosophers arebeginning to question whether intuitions are anappropriate basis for philosophical theory. This paper responds to the arguments of somecontemporary philosophers who hold thatintuitions should not be treated as evidencefor anything other than our contingentpsychological constitution. It begins with ademonstration that skeptical arguments byGilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman are variationson an argument with the potential to underminethe use of intuitions in much philosophicalinquiry. After a demonstration that NicholasSturgeon's response to Harman's argument isinadequate, it argues that all of the instancesof the skeptical argument are unsuccessfulbecause they are epistemically self-defeating.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19716, USA

    Joel Pust

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  1. Joel Pust
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Pust, J. Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 106, 227–258 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013356707899

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