MINE ACTION & TRAINING

Level 3 EOD
HANDBOOK
EOD Handbook
Mat Mondial KOSOVO

DISCLAIMER
The information contained in this document is from references and known best practices
for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no way exhaustive, and Qualified
EOD trained persons should always adhere to Authorised Standard Operating
procedures, in the theatre of operations. The IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for
any accident or incident that results in the use of the information contained within this
document, other than for use on the IMAS/ EOD training course.

COPYRIGHT

All Rights are reserved and the reproduction of

this document; in whatever form; is prohibited.
© 1 April 2010
International Mine Action Training Centre
and the
MAT Mondial Kosovo

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

This document (the 'Syllabus') is the property of the International Mine Action Training
Centre and the Mines Awareness Trust (the 'Authority'). The Syllabus is supplied by the
Authority on the express terms that it may NOT be copied, used or disclosed to others,
other than for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the IMAS/ EOD training
course.
EOD Handbook
Mat Mondial KOSOVO

EOD Level 3 Student Handbook

Contents page

Serial Content Page Number

SECTION 1 – EOD Hand book
1 Introduction to EOD 1-3
2 EOD Basic Principles and General Rules 4-6
3 Basic explosives 7 - 14
4 Munition Design Principles 15 - 45
5 Fuse principles of operation and safety devices 46 - 57
6 Ammunition Markings 58 - 66
7 ID of safe & unsafe to move UXO / Excavation 67 - 85
8 Charge placement 86 - 89
9 Protective works 90 - 98
10 Air delivered weapons / PISTOLS & FUZES 99 - 146
11 Guided weapons 147 - 163
12 10 phases of EOD task management 164 - 184
13 Question technique 185 - 186
14 Fuze extraction and disruption 187 - 191
SECTION 2
Destroying Mines and ERW
SECTION 3
Manual Demining handbook
SECTION 4
Mine Action Management handbook
SECTION 5
Onsite Documentation
SECTION 6
IMSMA Reports and Returns
SECTION 7
Recognition Aid Memoire & Tables
SECTION 8
Vulcan Aid Memoire
SECTION 9
GW / AD / SUB MUNITIONS ID Tables
EOD Handbook
Mat Mondial KOSOVO
Introduction to EOD

EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Terminology

EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal)

Is a general term which encompasses the neutralisation; render safe and disposal of all
munitions of war by explosive or other means.

EOD Disposal Methods:

 Disposal by detonation (That is causing the munitions to explode or function as designed)
 Burning (Under controlled conditions)
 Deep Sea Dumping (Dumping at sea in deep water)
 De-Militarization (Breaking down under controlled conditions into component parts for
salvage)

Munitions/Explosive Ordnance
Munition (Or Munition of war) or EO (Explosive Ordnance) refers to any item of ammunition
which is used in a war situation or training for war and includes:
 Mines, (Land mines or sea Mines)
 Grenades
 Artillery shells and rounds
 Mortar bombs
 Rockets and Missiles
 Aircraft Bombs
 Explosive Charges
 Booby traps
 Terrorist Bombs
 Sub Munitions
 Small Arms Ammunition. Rifle, pistol and machine gun ammunition, etcetera.

UXO (Un Exploded Ordnance)

UXO (Un Exploded Ordnance) Refers to any item of ammunition (Other than mines) found
on a battlefield or EOD task site. UXO used to refer to any item of ammunition which had
been fired, (Thrown if a grenade or dropped if an aircraft bomb) but had failed to function as
designed. This is sometimes now termed a “Blind” or “Dud” UXO/UXB. (Un Exploded Aircraft
Bomb) UXB Generally refers to an Aircraft Bomb which has been dropped from an aircraft on
a target but which has failed to function as designed.

Safe to Move UXOs

Safe to Move UXOs refers to munitions which can be handled and transported by vehicle
with no or very little risk that they will accidentally initiate. Safe to Move UXOs are normally
(But not always) unfuzed munitions or some types of fuzed munitions which have not been
fired or have not been involved in a fire or thrown out of an exploding ammunition store.

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Unsafe to Move UXOs
Unsafe to Move UXOs refers to munitions which cannot be safely handled or moved by hand
or vehicle and must be Destroyed in Situ. (I.e. destroyed where they are lying) Unsafe to
Move UXO normally are munitions which are fuzed and which have been fired (But which
have failed to function as designed) or a fuzed munitions which have been involved in a fire
or thrown from an exploding ammunition store.

EOD Categories

Mine Clearance Table of EOD Categories

This is the systematic search and clearance of
mines from minefields and mined areas using EOD
manual methods, mechanical methods and dogs (Explosive Ordnance Disposal)

BAC (Battlefield Area Clearance) NMD (Nuclear Munition

This is the systematic search and clearance of Disposal)

UXOs (Including sub munitions) from former BCMD (Biological and

Chemical Munition Disposal)
battlefields or abandoned military positions or IED (Improvised Explosive
military training areas. BAC may be done either Device) Disposal
by visual means to locate UXOs on the surface, Naval Munition Disposal
or searched using a metal detector or
UXB / GM (Un Exploded Aircraft
ferromagnetic locator to locate buried UXOs, or Bomb and Guided Missile) Disposal
a combination of both. CLSA (Conventional Land Service
Ammunition) Disposal

BAC (Battlefield Area Clearance)

Mine Clearance

CLSA (Conventional Land Service Ammunition) Disposal

Generally disposal of UXOs up to 160mm calibre (Provided they are not Aircraft Bombs or
Guided Missiles or Naval Ammunition or Chemical, Biological or Nuclear Ammunitions)

This is in the EOD training Class 2. In the IMAS (International Mine Action Standard)
categorisation it is level 3

UXB/GM (Un-Exploded Aircraft Bombs and Guided Missiles) Disposal

UXB/GM is the Clearance and Disposal of large and complex munition items such as
Unexploded Aircraft Bombs and Guided Missiles. It also includes Conventional Munitions
above 160mm calibre.

It often involves specialist techniques to neutralise fusing mechanisms or specialist explosive

techniques to produce a low power explosive effect (Low Order /Deflagration) which
neutralises the munition with minimal damage to the surrounding area. It also included
specialist techniques for locating, and gaining access to, buried UXBs and other UXO.

This is in the EOD training Class 1. In the IMAS (International Mine Action Standard)
categorisation it is level 4

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Naval Munition Disposal

Generally involves the location of and disposal or neutralisation of specialist naval ordnance
such as Sea Mines, Torpedoes, Depth Charges etcetera. It is often conducted by specialist
Clearance Divers.

IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Disposal

Basically the render safe and disposal of terrorist “Improvised” non-standard explosive
devices (Often manufactured from everyday items)

IED Disposal uses many techniques and procedures different from those used in other EOD
clearance methodology as often IEDs are initiated by an unknown time delay and may
incorporate improvised booby trap devices to initiate the device if it is moved or disturbed.
Improvised explosive devices, as the name suggests, are generally non-standard in design.

BCMD (Biological and Chemical Munition Disposal)

Specialist disposal techniques used to prevent or minimise any contamination from the
fillings of unexploded toxic chemical filled munitions (Poison or gases) or Biological Agents
(Bacteria or Virus Warfare Agents) and prevent leakage or spread of such agents to an extent
where they could pose a danger to human life.

NMD (Nuclear Munition Disposal)

The render safe and disposal of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons. (Atom and Hydrogen
Bombs)

Chemical, Biological and Nuclear/ Thermonuclear munitions are often termed Weapons of
Mass destruction. (WMD)

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EOD Basic Principles and General Rules

There are some Basic Principles and General Rules to follow when conducting EOD (Explosive
Ordnance Disposal) operations.

Principles

The basic principles are divided in to six categories:

1. Safety

The primary consideration in all operations involving the render safe or destruction/disposal
of UXO (Unexploded ordnance) is the protection of human life. No action should be taken
which causes risk to members of the civilian population and no actions should be taken
which causes an unnecessary risk to personnel involved in clearance activities.
Safety must never be sacrificed to save time, to save money or to increase productivity.

Any activity connected with explosives is inherently dangerous and it must be borne in mind
that there is no absolutely safe disposal method, only a method which is the least
dangerous. The disposal methods adopted must be as safe as possible for the operator
conducting the operations and, even more so, for the general public. EOD operations is
conducted to save lives, so nothing is gained if people’s lives are at risk while disposing the
UXO.

2. Effective

The individual disposal technique used for each munition must be effective and be capable
of producing the required results. The disposal method should be matched to the target, and
its surroundings.

3. Damage limitation

Each incident of UXO disposal is unique, because each munition and its surroundings will be
different. The safe guarding of human life must take precedence, but the planned disposal
method must cause the minimum of damage and restore the situation to normality as soon
as possible. The secondary consideration in all operations involving the render safe or
destruction/disposal of UXO is the protection of property.

4. Pollution

All explosive disposals will cause some pollution, but it must be considered and kept to a
minimum when conducting disposal operations. There is no point making an area safe from
explosive munitions, when in the process the water supply has been damaged and polluted,
or the area cannot be used for a long time because it has been contaminated with White
Phosphorus. The spreading of metal fragments in an area that shall be cleared using metal
detecting equipment must also be considered. (The area becomes “contaminated.”)

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5. Cost effective

The disposal methods must be cost effective. Specialist equipment and explosive charges are
available from most western countries, but at exorbitant prices. Ingenuity and improvisation
should be the normal practice and minimize the amount of expendable materials used. Also
plan your work to save time and money.

6. Versatile

The methods for disposal should be as varied and adaptable as required to deal effectively
and safely with all types of UXO found in Iraq, in various conditions and locations.

General Rules

There are 23 general rules:

1 Only one person at the site of the UXO until positive identification has been made and it
is determined whether the UXO is safe to move or not.

2 The operator will always go to the site of the UXO he will never allow another operator
or a member of the local population to bring a UXO to him for identification.

3 Evacuation must be in force when any attempt is made to move an unsafe to move UXO,
by pulling or other means. If the operator determines that he can only prevent
unacceptable damage by moving the UXO by hand, and pulling the item is not practical,
then the operator must move the item as a one man risk, all other members of the team
and all the local population must be evacuated.

4 Unsafe to move items will not be transported by vehicle under any circumstances.

5 The Minimum number of people should handle and prepare the explosives for any
demolition.

6 Evacuation must be in force before connecting the means of initiation to the charge or
bringing any detonator near the charge or UXO, and until the demolition has been fired
and the operator has checked the demolition site and declared the area cleared.

7 No UXO should be touched or disturbed until positive identification has been carried out
and it is known that the ordnance poses no danger.

8 Do not drop, jar, strike or otherwise mishandle any ordnance, of any type, at any time.

9 All explosive ordnance is to be treated as live at all times.

10 Stay clear of the front and rear of ejection type projectiles (Carrier shells) and bomb
containers.

11 Observe the UXO for signs of dead grass or wildlife. There is evidence of the use of
chemical weapons in Iraq and some explosives and Rocket propellants are toxic. Any
suspected chemical weapons or weapons containing toxic substances must be reported

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to relative Mine Action Authority and no attempts should be made to destroy them until
instructed to do so

12 Keep personnel upwind when destroying UXO.

13 In urban areas, always destroy UXO in a sandbag surround, (or using alternative accepted
forms of protective works) to minimize any damage which could be caused by blast and
fragmentation. If this is not possible and the resulting damage would be unacceptable,
the UXO should be marked, recorded and a report sent to the relative Mine Action
Authority. In rural areas, the use of sandbag surrounds will assist in reducing the danger
areas.

14 Expose the minimum number of people to the UXO, a general rule is to have one person
to one UXO.

15 All explosive charges should be made up in advance, so that they can be carried to the
UXO and placed, spending the minimum time at the UXO site.

16 Charges should be placed as close to any unsafe to move UXO as possible without
touching or disturbing the UXO.

17 All demolitions in an urban area should, wherever possible, be initiated electrically.

18 RF Hazard (Thunder, radios, power lines.) precautions must be enforced when handling
electric detonators and other Electrically Initiated devices.

19 No attempt will be made to destroy any item the EOD operator/Team Leader cannot
positively identify.

20 Only items up to 160mm calibre will be destroyed by a class 2 trained EOD Team Leader
or operator no attempts will be made to render safe or destroy any artillery, tank,
mortar, rocket, or other items of UXO above 160mm calibre. No attempts will be made
to destroy or render safe any aircraft bombs, guided missiles or chemical filled
munitions.

21 No unknown UXO is to be destroyed without first consulting with a Technical Advisor.

22 For submerged UXO’s, or UXO’s in difficult surroundings, mark, record and report to a
Technical Advisor.

23 If any mines are found or suspected, the team should mark the device and then
withdraw from the area, taking all precautions and report the facts to a Technical
Advisor.

THINK SAFE, ACT SAFE, BE SAFE

IF IN DOUBT STOP AND ASK

End of the EOD Basic Principles and General Rules chapter.

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Basic Explosives

Explosive Types

Explosives and other hazardous substances are used in munitions of war to propel
projectiles, rockets and other devices to a target and to achieve an effect at that target area.
Explosives can broadly be divided into two types:

 Low Explosives or “Propellants”

 High Explosives

Both Low and High explosives are compounds rich in Nitrogen as we will see in the examples
shown.

Low Explosives (Propellants)

Low explosives burn very rapidly, and this burning rate increases when they are confined in a
gun. When they are burning in the chamber of a gun they rapidly build up pressure. They
contain their own integral source of oxygen to achieve burning. They are most often in solid
form. (Although some large rockets use liquid propellant)

Low Explosives change to gas when burnt which takes up more volume. (Up to 1000 times)
They are therefore used as:
 Propulsive charges with artillery ammunition, mortars and rockets.
 Ejection charges for carrier shells.
 Fillings for burning fuzes. (E.g. Safety Fuze)

Gunpowder (Black powder)

This is the oldest known explosive and is a mixture of 75% Potassium Nitrate, (Saltpetre) 15%
sulphur and 10% charcoal. Gunpowder is not used so much nowadays as it produces much
smoke and residue. It is used in Safety Fuze and some primers for artillery propelling
cartridges. Gunpowder is very sensitive to sparks, shock or friction. The more modern types
of propellant like Cordite and Nitro Cellulose is often called Smokeless Powder.

Cordite

This is a blend of two high explosive

substances which are stabilized in such a
manner that they will only burn and not
explode. The two substances are Nitro
Glycerine and Nitro cellulose. (Guncotton)
Cordite is termed a double based propellant
as it has two explosive bases. It is often in
the shape of long light or dark brown sticks.
It is used as the main propellant filling of
Artillery gun charges and rocket motors.
Sticks of
Cordite is sensitive to sparks, heat or friction, CORDITE
but not as sensitive as Gunpowder. Propellant

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Nitro Cellulose

Nitro Cellulose is grey in colour and most often found as flakes or small granules. Like
Cordite it is used as the main propellant filling of Artillery gun charges, rocket motors, and
small arms ammunition. Nitro cellulose is sensitive to sparks, heat or friction but not as
sensitive as Gunpowder.

Triple Based Propellant

Triple Based Propellant is a blend of Nitro Glycerine, Nitro Cellulose, and Nitro Guanadine. It
is sensitive to sparks, heat or friction but not as sensitive as Gunpowder.

Liquid Propellants

Liquid propellants are normally used in very large guided missiles and rockets. The liquid
propellants are normally stored in the missile as two separate components in two separate
tanks. One is the Oxidizer (Normally liquid oxygen: LOX) and the other is the fuel. (Often
IRFNA; Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid.) The two are kept separate but are released in a
controlled flow and mixed in a combustion chamber on firing.

High Explosives (HE)

High Explosives “detonates” (Violently explode) when a shock wave is transmitted through
them. A detonation is a breakdown of the molecular structure, with a resulting release of
energy. This energy manifests itself partly as heat, but mainly as blast/overpressure. This
blast/overpressure has a shattering effect and therefore is no good as a propelling charge,
but very good as a filling for projectiles where blast/overpressure is required to produce a
destructive effect on a target and/or break up a steel shell casing to produce high velocity
fragments.

The detonation wave moves very rapidly through the explosive, at between 2,500 to 9000
metres per second. (2.5 to 9 kilometres per second) In comparison a Kalashnikov rifle bullet
travels at only 750 metres per second.

The High Explosive needs no confinement to produce a shattering effect. (But a certain
amount of confinement, known as “Tamping”, can enhance the effect.)High Explosives can
be ignited and can burn relatively slowly, but they can burn until they detonate.

TNT (Tri Nitro Toluene)

TNT is a yellow crystalline substance, turns brown with exposure to direct sunlight, It is the
most common military explosive encountered and may be found blended with other
explosives such as RDX, to increase the power of the explosive. TNT melts at a very low
temperature (80 degrees centigrade) and therefore is easy to melt and pour (Cast) as a shell
filling. This is safe as the temperature at which it will burn to detonation is very much higher.
TNT is very insensitive and requires a fairly large shock wave to get it to detonate. The
Velocity of detonation is approximately 6,000 metres per second. (6 km/s)

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RDX (Cyclo Tri Methylene Tri Nitramine)

Cyclo-Tri Methylene Tri Nitramine, sometimes known as Cyclonite or Hexogen, is a white

powder. RDX is a very powerful explosive, which is more sensitive than TNT. It is the main
constituent of Plastic Explosive and “Semtex”. It is also blended with wax, for High Explosive
Anti vehicle, (Shaped charge fillings) and with Aluminium to give a high explosive incendiary
effect, or with TNT to desensitize the RDX. The velocity of the detonation is approximately
8,400 metres per second. (8.4 km/s.)

Cast TNT TNT after exposure to sunlight

for a period of time

HMX (Cyclo Tetra Methylene Tetra Nitramine.

HMX is the most powerful military High Explosive currently produced. It is more sensitive
than RDX and therefore it is most often blended with TNT or wax. It is very expensive to
produce, and so is normally only used in specialized shaped charge projectiles. The velocity
of the detonation is approximately 9000 metres per second.

CE (Tetryl)

CE is a yellow crystalline substance, more sensitive than TNT used as a fuze booster charge,
or exploder charge. It is sometimes mixed with TNT, but never as a main explosive filling.

Picric Acid (Nitro Guanadine)

Picric Acid is an obsolete military explosive. It is found as a yellow crystalline powder used in
the 1900s until it was replaced by TNT. It still can be found in some models of Chinese stick
Hand Grenades. With age Picric Acid can react with the metal of the grenade bodies and
then become very sensitive.

DINAL (Di Nitro Napthelene)

Dinal is normally used mixed with TNT, in some Chinese mortar bombs and other munitions.

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Composition B

This is a blend of RDX and TNT in the Ratio 60/40; it is very commonly used in Western
design projectiles. It is 50% more powerful than ordinary TNT.

Torpex

This is a blend of RDX and TNT and Aluminium. This produces a very “hot” explosion with
incendiary effects. It is silver in appearance.

RDX/Aluminium

This is RDX mixed with wax and aluminium. It is a silver coloured powdery substance. This is
used in many new Russian projectiles, and in base charges for Armour Piercing shells. It has
the filling code A-IX-2.

RDX/Wax

The wax is designed to de-sensitize the RDX

powder and to bind the powder granules
together, preventing friction during firing
and the chance of accidental initiation. It is
used in many Russian and Chinese and
Western Shaped Charge and HESH
projectiles. In Russia it has the filling code A-
IX-1.

AMATOL

This is a mixture of Ammonium Nitrate and

TNT. It was originally used during world war
1 and world war 2 when there was a
shortage of TNT. It is not as powerful as TNT, TNT / Aluminium Booster Pellet
and when used in shell fillings it will produce
large fragments. It was used in Cast Iron
bodied projectiles.

BARATOL
This is a mixture of Barium Nitrate and TNT. It was used in old pattern British Grenades and
Mortar Bombs.

Plastic Explosives

They are mixes of RDX powder and an inert “plasticizer” to give it plasticity. The mix is
normally in the region of 88% RDX to 12% plasticizer in the case of British PE 4 and American
C-4. Pakistani PE-3A uses Carbon Black as part of the constituents of the plasticizing agent.

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Sheet Explosive SX 2

This is basically highly compressed PE-4. It can be used in special shapes to achieve a cutting
effect whilst using very small quantities.

Nitro Glycerine (NG)

This is the original High Explosive substance discovered approx 150 years ago. It is a
colourless liquid, but becomes yellow when contaminated. In its liquid state it is very
sensitive. Now it is used absorbed in solid substances such as gelatine, wood meal or
keisulguhr. (Special earth) Nitro Glycerine explosives can deteriorate with age, with the
liquid Nitro Glycerine “sweating” from the stabilizing compound, and thus becoming very
sensitive. Commercial “Dynamite” is Nitro Glycerine absorbed into keisulguhr and most Nitro
Glycerine based explosives can be found in various strengths, depending on the amount of
Nitro Glycerine absorbed into the stabilizing solid.

PETN (Penta Erithritol Tetra Nitrate)

This is a white powder. It is used as the explosive constituent of Detonating Cord. It has a
velocity of detonation of 6,200 metres per second. (6.2 Km/s)

ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil)

This is a commercial blasting explosive in which the two non-explosive constituents

Ammonium Nitrate and fuel oil (diesel) are mixed at the blasting site to produce the
explosive blend. This normally has a low velocity of detonation; approximately 2,500 metres
per second. (2.5 Km/s)

Primary High Explosives (Detonating Compositions)

These are very sensitive high explosive substances designed to detonate when exposed to
flame or flash. They are used as the main fillings of detonators and are initiated by priming
(Friction sensitive) compositions. Detonating compositions are:

 Lead Azide, (If the Lead Azide is in contact with copper it can become Copper Azide which
is very sensitive and dangerous.)
 Lead Styphinate
 Mercury Fulminate. (No longer used)

FAE (Fuel Air Explosive)

Fuel Air Explosives are normally High Energy liquid Fuels, such as Ethylene Oxide which,
when mixed with the air as vapour droplets and then ignited, detonate with extreme force
and heat. The Russians often term them Aerosol Explosives. The Fuel Air Explosives detonate
over the area covered by the vapour cloud giving a constant overpressure (about 429 foot
pounds) and 3000 degrees Centigrade temperature. This is in contrast to High Explosives
that give an extreme overpressure at the point of detonation, but which reduces with
distance. Normally a High Explosive bursting charge is used to disperse the fuel as vapour so
that it mixes with the air, then a secondary charge detonates the vapour cloud.

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Incendiary Mixes

Incendiary mixes are designed to cause burning of flammable materials. They can be used to
ignite wooden roofs of buildings, crops, trees, fuel stores etcetera. The two most common
incendiary fillings used in incendiary munitions are Thermite and Thermate. They are often
used in small bomblets with casings made of magnesium or aluminium alloys. (Both
magnesium and aluminium burn when subjected to high temperatures) One alloy used for
Incendiary bomblet casings is “electron”, which is an alloy of Manganese, copper, zinc,
magnesium and aluminium. In BLU 97 bomblets Zirconium is used as an incendiary. Some
large incendiary bombs have thickened Petroleum Gel or Naphthalene to produce the
burning effect.

NAPALM

Napalm is basically petrol thickened into a jelly. It is spread by a High Explosive bursting
charge then ignited by a White Phosphorus ignition charge.

Smoke Compositions

White Phosphorus (WP)

WP is a substance which, when exposed to air, burns. It is producing a dense white smoke.
(Phosphorus Pentoxide) White Phosphorus is used principally in smoke bursting munitions
where an instant smoke cloud is required. The filling code letters “P4” (R4 in English) are
used to denote White Phosphorus on Russian smoke shells.

Red Phosphorus

Red Phosphorus is more stable to store than White Phosphorus. When subjected to heat or
friction it behaves like White Phosphorus. It is used in some of the most modern smoke
bursting shells.

Titanium Tetrachloride

This is a substitute for White phosphorus in some smoke bursting munitions. (Mainly French
and Spanish) The Titanium Tetrachloride ignites spontaneously in contact with water vapour
in the air.

Hexa-Chloro-Ethane (HC)

This smoke composition is used in base ejection shells. When ignited it burns producing a
grey smoke cloud, it is often mixed with other chemicals to produce smoke of different
colours.

CSAM (Concentrated Sulphuric Acid Mix)

This is an obsolete smoke composition producing white smoke when exposed to the air.

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Pyrotechnic Compositions

Pyrotechnic compositions such as tracers and illuminating flares normally used magnesium
powders mixed with other chemicals. (E.g. Strontium for red light, Barium for green light,
Sodium for yellow light) The pyrotechnic composition is normally ignited by a heat friction
sensitive priming composition.

Chemical Toxic Agents

Chemical toxic agents sometimes termed war gas or poison gas can be used as a munition
filling to kill unprotected persons. They are normally dispersed as a vapour or a gas by a High
Explosive bursting charge. Chemical agents can be either Persistent, which means they
remain in an area for a long period, or Non Persistent, which means they will disperse
relatively quickly after use. There are five groups of Chemical Toxic Agents.

 Choking Agents
 Blister Agents
 Blood Agents
 Nerve Agents
 Chemical Harassing Agents

Choking agents

They attack the lungs and prevent oxygen entering the bloodstream. They can be defeated
by gas masks. Examples are:
 Chlorine (Code letters CL)
 Phosgene (CG)
 Di-Phosgene (DP)
 Chloropicrin (PS)

Blister Agents

They produce large blisters over the body which suck the plasma (fluid) from the blood. They
can be inhaled (breathed in) or absorbed through the skin. Examples are
 Mustard Gas. (The most common Blister Agent)
 Nitrogen Mustard (code HN-1, HN-2, HN-3)
 Phosgene Oxime (CX)
 Lewisite (L)
 Phenyl-di-chloro-Arsine (PD)

Blood Agents

They attack the body’s ability to absorb oxygen in the blood stream. Like Blister Agents they
can be inhaled (breathed in) or absorbed through the skin. Examples are:
 Hydrogen Cyanide (Code letters AC)
 Hydrocyanic Acid (HCN)
 Cyanogen Chloride (CK)
 Arsine (SA)

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Nerve Agents

They attack the body’s central nervous system to produce paralysis, coma and death.
(Within a few minutes of exposure) Like Blister and Blood Agents, they can be inhaled or
absorbed through the skin. Examples are:

 Tabun (Code letters GA)

 Sarin (Code letters DF)
 Soman (Code letters GD)
 VX (O-ethyl-S-di-isopropyl-amino-methyl-methl-phosphono-thiolate)
 GF (Cyclo-hexyl-methyl-phosphono-fluridate)

Chemical Harassing Agents

Harassing agents, or “tear gases” are designed to be non lethal. They are often used for riot
control as they producing a choking burning sensation without actually killing or injuring the
effected person, they also cause the eyes to produce large amounts of tears. (Hence the
term “tear gas”)

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Munition Design Principles

HE (High Explosive) Munitions

High Explosive (HE) munitions are generally the most commonly encountered and widely
used munitions of war. The body of the High Explosive munition is hollow with a thick steel,
or cast iron, casing. The hollow portion is filled with a solid powerful High Explosive charge
generally TNT (Tri Nitro Toluene) or a mix of TNT and other explosive substances.

The High Explosive munition has two destructive effects on a target, these being:
Blast/ Overpressure. The detonation (Explosion) of the High explosive main filling causes
severe destructive effect by creating an overpressure/ shock wave.

Fragmentation The overpressure / shock wave, in turn, breaks up the thick steel casing into
many hundreds or thousands of high velocity fragments and propels them at high velocity.
These fragments can kill or inflict serious injury at distances many hundreds of metres from
the point of burst, this distance depending on fragment size, weight and aerodynamic shape.
TTN 9:27 Figure 1

TYPICAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE) SHELL HE Fragmentation

and Fragmentation
(HE) Artillery shells
1
1. Fuze

3
2. Fuze Booster

4 3. Fuze adapter
(only on certain
models)

4. Ogive
5
5. Bourellet

6. Shell wall
(steel)

7. Main HE (High
Explosive) filling
normally TNT or
8 RDX/TNT

8. Driving Band
9
9. Boat Tail

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TTN 9:27 Figure 1B

HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE) SHELL FUNCTIONING

Direct Impact :
Fuze Functions
immediately the
shell hits the
ground, fragments
thrown upwards
and outwards in
inverted cone
pattern
HE Shell Fuzing Options

Fuze with
Delay Setting:
Shell has time
to penetrate
1. Fuze functions 2.Fuze booster Detonates
overhead cover
2. Main HE filling detonates or building
walls before
3.Shell wall fragments Into hundreds of pieces Fuze functions
4. Largest fragments from base (up to 1 km range)

Airburst Effect using

Time Fuze or Proximity
Fuze functions (either on impact or during flight if fitted with
Time or Proximity fuze) which causes the fuze booster to Fuze: Fragmentation
detonate (and the exploded if present). This in turn causes the goes downwards
main High Explosive filling to detonate, and the expansion of ,effective against troops
gas and blast overpressure shock wave causes the shell casing
to expand then split up into many hundreds of fragments each
in trenches or behind
travelling faster than a rifle bullet. cover

HE, (High Explosive) HE Frag (High Explosive Fragmentation) & Frag (Fragmentation)

Western HE munitions designed to produce Blast and Fragmentation are termed HE

regardless of the thickness of the casing and the charge weight ratio (The HE, high explosive
filling/charge weight in proportion to the total weight of the munition.) For example: A shell
weighing 20 kg with an HE Charge weight of 4 kg has a charge weight ratio of 1 in 5, a shell
weighting 42 kg with an HE weight of 7 kg has the ratio 1 in 6, a shell weight of 6 kg with a
HE weight of 500 grams has the ratio 1 in 12.

Russian HE munitions are divided into 3 categories these being:

1. HE (High Explosive)
2. HE Frag (High Explosive Fragmentation)
3. Frag (Fragmentation)

HE (High Explosive)

 Has a modest charge weight ratio not greater than about 1 in 5.

 Produces many small fragments of optimum size.
 Used on larger HE shells normally above 150mm caliber.

HE Frag or HE Fragmentation (High Explosive Fragmentation)

 Has a charge weight ratio of between 1 in 6 to a maximum of 1 in 10.

 Produces less (Fewer) fragments than the same calibre HE shell but of larger size.

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Frag (HE) or Fragmentation

 Has a charge weight ratio generally above 1 in 10

 Produces less fragments than HE Frag shell of the same calibre but of larger size.

HE Munitions Hazards

HE munitions produce Blast and Fragmentation when they function.

Blast

The blast will produce significant damage to buildings, if in the near vicinity, and may
damage foundations and crack walls through ground shock.

Fragmentation

Fragmentation from munitions above 100mm can travel up to 1200 metres whilst the
fragments from even the smaller thick cased HE munitions of 57mm, 76mm and 85mm can
travel and injure or kill at up to 1000 metres. This factor must therefore be taken into
account when establishing the evacuation and establishing the firing point.

HE Munitions Identification

 HE Munitions normally have a one piece body but may have a fuze adapter. (Some, but
not all, Russian designs.)
 Western HE designs do not have a fuze adapter
 Base of the projectile (If it is an artillery shell) is normally “Boat Tailed”.

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TTN 9:27 Figure 3 TYPICAL HE Frag (HIGH EXPLOSIVE TTN 9:27 Figure 2
FRAGMENTATION ) or FRAGMENTATION (Frag) SHELL
TYPICAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE INCENDIARY (HE) SHELL

1. Fuze
1. Fuze

2. Ogive

3. Fuze 2. Ogive
Booster

4. Shell 3.Fuze
wall Booster
steel or 4. Shell
cast wall steel 6. Driving
iron Band
thicker 6. Driving
than Band
HE
shell 5. Main filling
(up to 5.Main HE blend of High
15mm filling, Explosive and 7. Boat
thick) normally less Incendiary, tailed base
than for HE normally TNT or
shell of same RDX/TNT with
caliber aluminium or
magnesium
1. M
NOTE: Main difference between HE (High Explosive) and HEI a (High
NOTE: Major difference between HE and HE Frag / Frag
Explosive Incendiary) is in the main filling. The Aluminium ori
projectiles is the thickness of the shell wall and the amount of n
Magnesium blended with the HE raises the temperature of the explosive
HE in the main charge. HE gives smaller but greater number when it detonates causing fires amongst any inflammable materials
H
of fragments, HE Frag gives bigger but fewer fragments. otherwise effects exactly the same as HE. i

HEI (High Explosive Incendiary)

The High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) munition is basically the same as a standard HE
munition; the only difference being that the main explosive filling is a High Explosive blended
with aluminium or magnesium powder (Or other incendiary composition.) to raise the
temperature of the explosion and give some incendiary secondary effects. HEI munition
designs are often used in automatic cannon projectiles used against aircraft such as 23mm
and 30mm. Many of the HEI cannon projectile designs incorporate a tracer element, and
these are termed HEIT. (High Explosive Incendiary Tracer)

Tracers

Certain munitions are fitted with Tracers, at the base, which contain magnesium compounds
which burn and give a bright light when the munition is fired. This enables the gunner to
follow the flight of the projectile to the target.

Normally most HE shells are to long range to be fitted with a Tracer, and are used in indirect
fire which makes a tracer impractical. Small calibre Anti aircraft Shells may be fitted with a
Tracer so the gunner can see where his shells are going in relation to the target.

Some older forms of self-destruct device for small calibre Anti aircraft Shells was
incorporated in the Tracer. This was known as a Tracer /Igniter and when the tracer was
almost burnt through it ignited the priming composition of a flash detonator.

Self-Destruct in Fuzes

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Modern designs of Small calibre Anti Aircraft shell (up to, and including 57mm) normally
have a self destruct element incorporated in the fuze so that after a certain number of
seconds of flight (if the shell has not hit the target) the fuze functions.
TTN 9:27 Figure 4
Calibres up to
57mm, Fuze has a TYPICAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE Tracer (HE-T) or HIGH EXPLOSIVE
self destruct INCENDIARY TRACER (HEI-T) SHELL
mechanism or shell
has a Tracer/Igniter 2 Fuze Booster
Self destruct so that
the shell destroys
itself after a certain
time of flight, so that 7. Driving Band
a shell which misses
the target does not
fall back to the
ground and explode. 1. Fuze may be
impact with self
destruct if anti
3. Ogive
aircraft

4. Main HE
or HEI Filling
5. Tracer

Larger Calibre Anti Aircraft Shells e.g. 85mm and 8. Ignitor /

100mm , have a time fuze which is set by the Gunner Detonator
to the time it takes for the shell to reach the estimated
height which the plane is flying at. If the shell hits
the target it will explode on impact but if not the
fragmentation from a shell exploding near the aircraft
will destroy or damage it with the fragmentation.

6. Tracer / Ignitor
to provide self
destruct

HE A/Pers (High Explosive Anti Personnel)

The High Explosive Pre Fragmented munition, is otherwise commonly termed High Explosive
Anti personnel (HE A/PERS) The HE A/Pers normally has a thin outer casing and either a
fragmentation sleeve, grooved to assist the brake up into optimum fragment pieces, or a ball
bearings packed between the outer casing and an inner casing which houses the High
Explosive bursting charge.

Where ball bearings are used these are often bonded together by epoxy resin. Pieces of
chopped steel rod are sometimes used as a substitute for ball bearings in some designs.

The High Explosive bursting charge is normally much smaller than for the filling of the High
Explosive shell of the same calibre, but its purpose is purely to break up the outer casing and
spread the ball bearings or other fragment pieces at high velocity in all directions.

HE A/Pers Fuzing

HE Anti Personnel Shells normally have Time Fuzes or Proximity Fuzes to achieve an Airburst
Effect over a target area, but one form of Chinese HE Anti Personnel projectile for the RPG 7,
has a gunpowder charge in the fuze which propels the Grenade into the air after impact.

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Impact Nose Fuze

Time Fuze (for
airburst effect) Ejection Charge
(Gunpowder)

Ogive

Exploder HE Bursting Charge

Thin Outer Body

High Explosive
Bursting charge
Steel Ball Bearings

Delay Element

Steel Ball Detonator / Booster

Bearings
40 mm / 75 mm
Alloy or Steel Rocket Propelled
Outer casing Grenade
Anti Personnel
HE A Pers (High (Chinese)
Explosive Anti Type 69
Personnel) Shell (for RPG 7
Launcher)

Identification HE A/Pers

 The HE Anti Personnel Shell often (but not always) has a time fuze for Airburst effect.
 The Body will often be of two piece construction.
 The base (If it is an artillery shell.) will normally be flat.

Armour Defeating Projectiles

Certain types of munition are designed, primarily, to be used to destroy armoured targets
such as Tanks, AFVs (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) or APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers)

There are two main Groups of Armour Defeating Projectiles.

Armour Piercing (AP)

Those projectiles designed to punch a hole through armour by pure Kinetic Energy (Hitting
power) generated by the velocity (speed) of the projectile and its mass.

Explosive Effect Munitions

Those designed to use a special configuration of High Explosive charge to destroy the target
using an Explosive Effect. The Explosive effect projectile is used in a greater number of types
of munitions from Hand Thrown Grenades to Guided Missiles as it does not rely on the
speed at which it is projected at the target to achieve its effect, unlike the Kinetic Energy
projectiles that must be fired at High Velocity to achieve their effect on the target. The most
common Explosive Effect Armour Defeating Munition is known as HEAT (High Explosive Anti
vehicle) and is also sometimes termed a Shaped Charge or Hollow Charge.

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Monroe Shaped Charge Principle

The Shaped Charge principle was discovered in the 1880s by an American Chemist named
Munroe, who discovered that if a High Explosive charge was detonated from the rear on a
piece of Steel Armour Plate, a shallow crater was formed in the metal. If a Cone Shaped
Hollow was made in the explosive charge (so the hollow was facing the Armour) a deep hole
narrower than the diameter of the charge, was formed in the target armour. Further
experiment revealed that if the charge was detonated a short distance from the target
(approximately two and a half times the cone diameter) and a copper or steel cone shaped
liner was added the hole formed in the target armour became narrower and deeper. The
Cone shaped hollow in the charge had the effect of focussing some of the explosive energy
into a plasma jet which punched through the armour by the pure force it generated
(Estimates are that 1,000,000 bars of pressure are generated by the Shaped Charge energy
jet.)

Shaped Charge Principle

Result Shallow
crater

Charge detonated from the

rear against a steel target

Result Deep
crater narrower
than charge Ideal Standoff Shockwaves on
diameter Distance for inner surface of
Maximum cone
Penetration concentrate
Charge with Cone shaped Hollow 2.5 times into Plasma
Detonated from rear against steel target Cone Energy Jet
Diameter
Result very
narrow hole
very deep
Penetrates
target

SHAPED Plasma Energy

CHARGE Jet produces
Charge as above, but detonated
1,000,000 Bars
short distance from target, and ACTION Pressure which
hollow lined with copper cone
punches through
armour

HEAT Munition

The High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT) munition, sometimes termed a shaped charge, or
Hollow charge munition, uses the focussed jet of explosive energy, (as described previously)
when the munition detonates, to punch through armour plate or other hard target
substance.

The munition casing is normally comparatively thin with the High Explosive charge located in
the rear parallel sided portion of the munition, whilst the front tapered nose section (Ogive)
or the narrow distance tube is normally hollow.

The High Explosive charge itself normally incorporates a cone shaped hollow in which is a
copper cone. The cone shaped hollow focuses some of the explosive energy, whilst the
copper cone, which is formed into a liquid metal slug by the heat and energy of the
explosion, aids penetration.

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Whilst the primary designed effect of the munition is to punch an explosive energy jet
through armour or other hard target material considerable blast and fragmentation effects
are also produced as the munition detonates.

TTN 9:27 Figure 6 A TTN 9:27 Figure 6D

TYPICAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE ANTI TANK (HEAT) SHELL HIGH EXPLOSIVE ANTI TANK (HEAT) SHELL FUNCTIONING

1. Spitback fuze or
8. Thin shell wall
piezo electric
(steel or light generator functions
5. Hollow 11.
6. Copper alloy) on impact.
space Tail
cone
Unit
charge
liner 10 Tracer 2. Flash from spitback
4. Ogive fuze or electric
9. Obturating charge from piezo
(separate)
band
electric crystal
passed to booster in
3. Detonator
and Booster base or to base fuze
2. Relay
charge 3. booster or base fuze
detonates
7. Main HE
1. Impact
charge
fuze 4. Main charge
(spitback) detonates from the
rear

5. Copper cone
vapourises and forms
slug

6. Shell casing
fragments

7. Energy jet formed,

punches through
armour

HEAT Fuzing Systems

To achieve the Shaped Charge effect the HEAT munition must function immediately on
impact and must detonate the charge from the rear (furthest point of the charge from the
target). To achieve this one of three fuzing systems is normally used.
 PIBD; (Point Initiating Base Detonating) Spit back system
 PIBD; (Point Initiating Base Detonating) Piezo Electric system
 Inertia Impact Base Fuze

PIBD Spit Back

The PIBD Spit Back system uses a standard Direct Impact type fuze but the flash from the
fuze booster is passed to a detonator and second booster at the base of the munitions HE
charge. (Normally via a tube at the base of the copper cone.)

PIBD Piezo Electric

The PIBD Piezo Electric System uses a Piezo Electric generator containing Piezo Electric
Crystals which produce an electric current when crushed (on impact). The electric current is
passed through a wire or inner cone and charge liner to an electric detonator in the fuzing
mechanism in the base of the charge.

Inertia Impact Base Fuze

The Inertia Impact base fuzing system (when armed in flight) has a small spring to keep a
heavy Striker (known as an Inertia Pellet) away from the fuze detonator. On impact the shell
stops or slows down rapidly, but inertia momentum causes the Inertia Pellet to continue

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moving forward to overcome the spring tension holding the striker needle away from the
detonator. The striker needle hits the detonator causing it to function.

Fuze Piezo Electric Generator

Piezo Electric
On Impact, Generator produces
Nose Fuze Electrical charge
Functions, when crushed which
Flash from passes via electrical
Fuze Transfer cable to
Booster Electric detonator
passes back in Base Fuze
to
Detonator
and Booster Electrical
Transfer
in the base
Cable
of the shell
Electrical
Detonator Base Fuze
contact
and with
Booster Electric
detonator

PIBD (Point
Initiating Base PIBD (Point
Detonating) Initiating Base
“SPITBACK” Detonating)
Action on HEAT Piezo Electric
Shell Action

HEAT Identification

 Always have a 2 piece body, Ogive and main Body (containing the charge) are
manufactured as two separate parts, then joined together.
 Most designs (of Artillery Shell) are Fin stabilized.
 Normally fitted with an impact fuze or Piezo Electric generator at the nose.

HEAT Hazards

The same Hazards as per HE Munitions, (Blast and Fragmentation) but the shaped charge
energy jet can travel for at least 1 kilometer in the open air, so there is a minimum 1000
meters danger area in front of the projectile.

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On Impact, Nose
Nose Cap collapses and
Cap Crush Cap crushes Detonator
Piezo Electric Striker Heavy Inertia
Crystal between Creep Needle Pellet
Crush Cap Upper and Lower Spring
Anvils. Piezo
Upper Anvil Electric Crystal
produces
Piezo Electric Electrical charge
Crystal when crushed.

Insulator

Lower The Creep Spring Keeps the Striker Needle

Anvil of the heavy Inertia Pellet away from the
detonator. On IMPACT of the Projectile with
the target, The projectile slows or stops,
but the heavy Inertia Pellet, continues to
Contact move forward, overcoming the tension of
the Creep Spring. The Striker Needle hits
the detonator and causes it to detonate.

Piezo Electric
Generator Action

PG 7 HEAT Warhead with PIBD HEAT Artillery Shells (from

(Point Initiating Base Detonating) left to right, 76mm, 85mm,
Piezo Electric Fuze 100mm, 115mm, 122mm,
152mm)

Dual Purpose (DP) HEAT/Fragmentation

Dual purpose HEAT/Fragmentation munitions are simply HEAT munitions with a thicker body
(Or added bearing balls, pre-fragmented steel, etcetera.) to give an anti personnel
fragmentation effect, thus if they hit an armoured target they will achieve the same effect as
the standard HEAT Munition but if they miss the target the fragmentation of the body will
kill or injure personnel in the open in the same manner as a standard HE munition.

The 57mm aircraft rocket is often used with a dual purpose HEAT / Fragmentation warhead
(with spirally wrapped notched steel bar to achieve optimum fragmentation). The PTAB 2.5
KO bomblet has a body which is segmented for fragmentation effect.

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DP HEAT/Fragmentation Hazards

The Dual Purpose HEAT / Fragmentation has the same hazards as a HEAT Munition
(Blast/Fragmentation and the Shaped Charge Energy Jet) but there will be a greater amount
of fragmentation produced than for the standard HEAT Munition.

Warhead Rocket
Dual Purpose HEAT Dual Purpose
Fragmentation HEAT /
Rocket Warhead Fragmentation

Main HE Charge

Shaped
Charge

Fragmentation
Fragmentation Jacket (Notched
Jacket Steel Wire)
(Notched Steel
Bar)

HESH (High Explosive Squash Head) or HEP (High Explosive Plastic)

The HESH projectile is inertia impact base fuzed (Se Inertia Impact Base Fuze description for
HEAT munitions, page 8 and picture page 9.) and is designed for use against armoured
targets. (Tanks) The projectile body breaks up upon hitting the target armour and the
explosive “pancakes” against the armour. The resulting detonation of the High Explosive as
the base fuze functions sends shockwaves through the armour which breaks off a large scab
of metal on the inner surface of the armour.

HESH Hazards

As per HE Munition, Blast and Fragmentation. (Normally less fragmentation)

HESH / HEP Shell

105 mm HESH (High Explosive Squash Head)

(British) for Tank Gun

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HESH / HEP Shell Function

Nose Plug (not HESH (High
all models) Explosive
Squash
Head)
Inert HESH Shell hits
Composition / HEP (High armour plate, inert
Explosive composition cushions
shock of initial
Plastic) Shell impact, thin shell wall
breaks up, explosive
spreads across
(“pancakes”) against
Thin steel shell wall target armour
Base Fuze functions,
HE charge detonates,
shock waves pass
Driving HE Main Charge through armour and
band normally RDX/Wax or large scab breaks off
on inner face of
RDX/Wax/Aluminium
armour plate,
travelling around
inside of tank turret at
Inertia Impact BD high velocity
Tracer
(Base Detonating)
Fuze
Base Unit

Armour Piercing (AP) Projectiles

As described previously Armour Piercing Projectiles are designed to achieve their effect by
pure hitting power (Kinetic energy) caused by the heavy mass (weight) of the projectile and
the High Velocity (speed) it is fired at. Most Armour Piercing projectiles are Shot (That is they
are solid metal projectiles with only the tracer element as a live active agent, but there is
one design of AP Projectile which incorporates a High Explosive charge in the base and this is
known as APHE.

APHE (Armour Piercing High Explosive) Shell

The APHE shell is a standard pattern AP shot, but with a small hollow in the base containing
an HE charge and an Inertia Impact Base Fuze (Se Inertia Impact Base Fuze description for
HEAT munitions, page 8 and picture page 9.) with a functioning delay of a few milliseconds.
The short delay on the Inertia Impact Base Fuze is designed to give the shell time to
penetrate one side of the armour before the HE charge detonates. The HE charge is designed
to break up the rear of the shell into 3 or 4 large fragments which have a devastating effect
in the confines of a tank turret.

Some APHE Shell have a pointed thin metal cap known as a Ballistic Cap (Windshield in US
terminology) to give a better aerodynamic shape. Later models may also be fitted with a
hardened steel flat Penetrating Cap between the projectile body and Ballistic Cap.

The Penetrating Cap aids penetration of homogeneous armour (with a hardened outer
layer).

All APHE and other AP projectiles have a tracer fitted so that the gunner can visually follow
the flight of the projectile to the target.

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APHE (Armour Piercing High Explosive) hazards

Blast and Fragmentation. The Blast effect will be fairly limited APHE shells up to 100 mm
only containing about 65 grams of HE, shells of 152mm calibre about 200 grams HE. A small
number of large Fragments will be produced which can travel up to 1000 meters.
TTN 9:27 Figure 9

TYPICAL ARMOUR PIERCING HIGH EXPLOSIVE (APHE) SHELL

Hardened
steel Body
Base fuze
and Tracer

Driving
Thin metal Band
ballistic cap

Hard Steel
Solid Hardened
penetrating
steel body
cap

Base Cavity with Tracer

Base inertia
HE Bursting
impact fuze
charge

APHE shells without base fuze and tracer 100mm APHE

(Bottom shell fired and missing ballistic
cap)

Armour Piercing (AP) Shot

AP (Armour Piercing) Shot is very much the same in appearance to an APHE shell, the main
difference being that the AP Shot has no High Explosive charge or base fuze and is thus a
shot rather than a Shell. Like the APHE, the AP Shot may be fitted with a Ballistic Cap and
Penetrating Cap and is sometimes known as APC (Armour Piercing Capped) or APCBC
(Armour Piercing Capped Ballistic Capped). The shot is also fitted with a tracer which is
either external (That is it protrudes from the base) or integral. (Fitted in a cavity in the base
of the shot.)

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HVAP (High Velocity Armour Piercing) Shot

The HVAP (High Velocity Armour Piercing) sometimes termed APHC (Armour Piercing Hard
Core) is an advanced design of Armour Piercing projectile, which has a central core of a very
hard and heavy metal known as Tungsten Carbide. The HVAP shot contains no explosive
components other than the tracer element. The Tungsten Carbide core is the portion of the
projectile which normally punches through the target armour, whilst the mild steel or light
alloy body breaks up on impact. HVAP projectiles have a distinctive narrow waist or middle
portion. HVAP can still be found on Obsolete Russian calibers such as 57mm, (Not 57mm S
60) 76mm and 85mm, but is now replaced by HVAPDS.
TTN 9:27 Figure 10 TTN 9:27 Figure 11

TYPICAL ARMOUR PIERCING CAPPED (APC) SHOT TYPICAL HIGH VELOCITY ARMOUR PIERCING (HVAP) Shot

5. Flat base 6 Tracer

6. Centre body
1. Thin 2. Hard Steel
3. Solid 4. No HE (“Waist”)
metal Penetrating
Hardened charge or
ballistic cap
Steel Body base fuze
cap

3. Driving
1. Thin alloy 2. Hard
Band
ballistic cap Tungsten 6.
carbide core Center
7. Integral body
Tracer in (waist)
base on
some
designs

8.Some designs have incendiary

composition in cavity between
ballistic cap and body
5. Tracer
4. Mild steel outer body

HVAPDS (High Velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot)

The Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot-Tracer (APDS-T) is an advanced design of Armour

Piercing projectile, which consists of two sub-assemblies:

 The Sub Projectile

 The Sabot

The Sub projectile and Sabot are joined together prior to firing, but the light Sabot separates
from the heavy sub projectile as the projectile leaves the gun barrel, leaving the sub
projectile to travel onto the target and penetrate it. The Sub Projectile has a central core of
very hard metal known as Tungsten Carbide, whilst the outer casing is of mild steel. As in the
case of the HVAP it is the Tungsten Carbide core which punches through the target armour.
The projectile contains no explosive components other than the tracer element contained in
the sub projectile.

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The APDS projectile has a distinctive shape whilst the sub projectile has the appearance of a
standard Armour Piercing projectile without a driving band.
TTN 9:27 Figure 12
HVAP-T (on left with Tungsten TYPICAL ARMOUR PIERCING DISCARDING SABOT (APDS) Shot

Carbide Core exposed)

Sub Projectile

Sub
projectile Driving Band

Discarding Sabot

Complete QF fixed round of ammunition

Driving
Shear band
Screws
Sub Projectile

Discarding Sabot

4. Mild steel 6. Driving band

discarding APDS-T (on Left projectile with
sabot Sabot, on right Sub Projectile)
5. Tracer

1. Magnesium
Tip

3. Tungsten
Carbide core
(penetrator)
2. Light alloy
ballistic cap

Sub projectile separates from

sabot as projectile leaves gun
barrel

Action on Firing
On firing, the shear screws, securing the sabot to the sub
projectile, break and once the projectile leaves the gun barrel,
air resistance causes the lighter sabot to fall away from the sub
projectile, allowing the more streamlined sub projectile to
continue on to the target. The hard Tungsten Carbide core
punches through the target armour.

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HVAPFSDS (High Velocity Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot)

The Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot-Tracer (APFSDS-T) is an advanced design
of Fin Stabilised Armour Piercing projectile, (Designed for Smooth Bore Guns) which consists
of two sub-assemblies:

 The Sub Projectile (Arrow Shaped)

 The Sabot (normally 3 piece)

Just like the HVAPDS, the Sub Projectile and Sabot are joined together prior to firing, but the
light Sabot separates from the heavy arrow shaped sub projectile as the projectile leaves the
gun barrel, leaving the sub projectile to travel onto the target and penetrate it. The sub
projectile has a central core of Tungsten Carbide, whilst the outer casing is of mild steel. It is
the Tungsten Carbide core which punches through the target armour.

The projectile contains no explosive components other than the tracer element contained in
the sub projectile. The APFSDS-T projectile has a distinctive shape, with a 3 piece sabot
whilst the sub projectile has a distinctive arrow shape.

The APFSDS is the most advanced design of AP shot and is used in the most advanced
Russian and Western tank guns. (Including the US Abrahams and British Challenger tanks)
The 105mm APFSDS sub projectile can penetrate 400 mm of Armour at 1000 metres range.
TTN 9:27 Figure 13

TYPICAL ARMOUR PIERCING FIN STABILIZED DISCARDING SABOT -

Tracer (APFSDS-T) Shot
4. Fins (6)
3 three piece discarding sabot
2. Penetrator Tungsten
Carbide body

5. Tracer
1. Ballistic cap
3 piece sabot falls away
from penetrator as
projectile leaves gun
barrel

Action on Firing
In the gun barrel the sabot is secured to the sub projectile by
locking rings and grooves, but once the projectile leaves the
gun barrel, air resistance causes the lighter sabot to fall away 105 mm APFSDS-T (Armour Piercing
from the sub projectile, allowing the more streamlined arrow
shaped sub projectile to continue on to the target. The hard Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot –
Tungsten Carbide core of the arrow shaped sub projectile Tracer) Round Model M 900 (USA)
punches through the target armour.

Depleted Uranium-DU

Some of the latest AP, HVAPDS and HVAPFSDS ammunition have a core of Depleted Uranium
(DU) instead of Tungsten Carbide. Depleted Uranium is heavier and harder than Tungsten

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Carbide but also the outer surface of the DU burns as it goes through the armour producing
an Incendiary Effect.

The burning outer surface of the Depleted Uranium causes the formation of highly toxic dust
which lingers for a long time inside the confines of Armoured Vehicles. This Toxic dust if
breathed in or ingested by eating with hands that have been handling the DU, can over a
period of months or years produce cancer. Therefore respirators and disposable gloves must
be worn when entering an armoured vehicle suspected of being hit by DU.

APFSDS-T (top Sub Projectile,

bottom projectile with sabot)

105 mm APFSDS-T (Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized

Discarding Sabot –Tracer) Round Model M 900 (USA)
Projectile and Sub Projectile (Penetrator)

AP, HVAP, HVAPDS (HVAPFSDS) Hazards

There are no hazards with the AP, HVAP, HVAPDS, HVAPFSDS standard projectiles, (Other
than a slight incendiary effect of the tracer) provided the projectiles does not have a DU
(Depleted Uranium) core. If it has a DU core special precautions must be observed before
handling the projectile or working in an area contaminated by DU dust.

CP (Concrete Piercing) Munitions

The Concrete Piercing (CP) munition is a very thick cased munition with a hardened pointed
front (Ogive) and a High Explosive charge initiated by an inertia impact base fuze. The CP
projectile is designed to penetrate hard targets such as concrete bunkers, before exploding
and has a much thicker casing than a standard HE projectile of a comparable calibre.

Base Plate
Thick Steel
Shell Wall
CP (Concrete Piercing)
HE Shell
Thick Pointed
Nose

Booster

Base Detonating
(BD)(Inertia
Impact) Fuze
Main HE
Charge
(normally TNT)

(CP) Concrete Piercing (HE) Shell

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CP (Concrete Piercing) Projectile Identification

In appearance the CP projectile appears similar to an AP or APHE projectile but the explosive
charge is much greater than the latter. The Concrete Piercing projectile (unlike the AP shot
and APHE shell) does not have a tracer or grooves around the body.

CP (Concrete Piercing) Projectile Hazards

Like HE munitions the Concrete Piercing Munitions will produce Blast and Fragmentation,
but the fragments produced will be far larger than the comparable calibre of HE munition
and will therefore travel a far greater distance. (But fewer)

Bursting Shells

Bursting shells or munitions have a main filling other than High Explosive, but have a small
Central High Explosive bursting charge to break the munition casing open and scatter the
main filling over a wide area. Munitions which fall into this group are:

 Smoke Bursting WP (White Phosphorus)

 Smoke Bursting Red Phosphorus
 Smoke Bursting (Not WP)
 Chemical Bursting
 Incendiary Bursting

The Bursting munition body is often the same design, thickness and configuration as that
used in the standard HE munition so that it matches the ballistics of the standard HE
munition.

Smoke Bursting WP

The Smoke Bursting White Phosphorus or Smoke WP munition is designed to produce an

instant cloud of white smoke to obscure a target area. The White Phosphorus filling ignites
spontaneously when exposed to air creating dense white smoke. (Phosphorus Pentoxide) It
has a central High Explosive bursting charge contained in a steel tube or adapter, which
breaks the thick outer casing apart and scatters the burning White Phosphorus.

The adapter and bursting charge tube forms an airtight seal with the munition body to
ensure that no air can get to the White Phosphorus. The Munition body often has the same
basic configuration as the HE munition.

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TTN 9:27 Figure 15

TYPICAL SMOKE BURSTING WHITE PHOSPHORUS (Smoke WP) SHELL Smoke Bursting WP
1. Nose Fuze (can be impact, (White Phosphorus) Shell
time , or proximity)

3. Bursting charge Adapter

2. Fuze
booster
5. Central High Explosive
bursting charge
4. Ogive

7. Main filling
(White Phosphorus)
6. Shell
body steel
(same
profile as 8. Driving
HE body) Band

9. Boat tailed
base

10. Filling
plug in base
(only on
certain
models)

Smoke WP (White Phosphorous) Identification

The Smoke Bursting WP shell appears very similar to an HE shell but has an adapter. (NOTE
some Russian HE shells and large calibre HE Mortar Bombs also has an adapter for different
size fuzes.) Some (But not all) Russian Smoke WP shells have a filling plug in the base.

If in doubt as to whether it is a HE or a Smoke WP; take precautions as if it is a White

Phosphorus and assume hazards as for a HE.

Smoke WP (White Phosphorous) Hazards

Like HE, there is Blast and Fragmentation, but the major hazard is the incendiary nature of
the WP (White Phosphorus). Note: If White Phosphorus lands on a person it will continue to
burn until fully consumed or until the air supply is cut off.

Chemical (Bursting) Munition

The Chemical Bursting munition is almost identical to the Smoke Bursting White Phosphorus
munition. The only difference is the actual main filling and the size of the Bursting Charge,
which is generally smaller on the Chemical Munition.

The main filling of a Chemical (Bursting) munition is normally a liquefied toxic agent, which
may be persistent (I.e. be lethal in the target area for days, months or even years) or non-
persistent. (I.e. disperse or become harmless soon after delivery.) Chemical agents are
further classified as harassing (i.e. non-lethal) or lethal. (i.e. designed to kill) Lethal chemical
agents are either designed to attack the lungs through the nose or mouth or may attack the
blood or central nervous system through either inhalation or absorption through exposed
skin.

When the munition functions, the bursting charge spreads the toxic agent as a vapour cloud.
Like the Smoke Bursting WP munition, the Chemical bursting munition has an adapter to

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ensure the seal between the fuze, body and filling are airtight, thus preventing leakage of
the contents.

Chemical Bursting Identification

The Chemical Munition normally has one, two or three green bands. (If it is filled with a
lethal agent) Like the WP munition it will have an adapter (sometimes more than one.) and
some Chemical Munitions have a filling plug on the side or at the base. If in doubt ask a
Technical Advisor.

Chemical (Bursting) Hazards

Although there is some Blast and Fragmentation Hazards, the major hazard is from the Toxic
Chemical agent which can cover a wide area, especially downwind, and can contaminate
ground for many months or years.

Incendiary (Bursting) Munition

The Incendiary Bursting munition is like the Smoke Bursting White Phosphorus munition, but
has a main filling of Thermite or Thermate, which is spread by the Bursting Charge. Hazards
are as per the Smoke Bursting White Phosphorus Shell.

Carrier Munitions

Carrier munitions refer to a series of munitions which are designed to eject a payload, in
flight, over a target area. The body of the munition remains intact when the munition
functions in flight and acts like a gun barrel, ejecting the contents or payload to the rear.

The carrier artillery shell has a base plate which is normally pinned or screwed in position
and has a flange so that pressure from behind the shell, from propellant gasses during firing,
will not push the base plate into the shell thus crushing the payload.

Time Fuze (for SMOKE BE (Base Ejection) Carrier Shell

Airburst Effect)

Adapter

Bursting Charge
(normally
smaller than for
WP)

Chemical
Agent

Shell Wall
(Normally
same as
HE Shell)

1, 2 or 3 Green
Bands on Shell
denoting shell
contains Lethal
Chemical Agent

Typical Chemical
Bursting Shell

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Typical Carrier Rocket Warheads

(Nose Ejection)
Smoke BE Carrier Shell functioning
Payload
Time fuze (Smoke
functions in canisters)
flight, after set
time, and ignites Payload
ejection charge
Base Nose Fuze Ejection
Plate (Time) Charge
Ejected
Nose Payload
Cone
Pressure build up
from ejection
charge causes base
plate shear pins to
break, and shell
contents (payload)
are then ejected
from the shell

Carrier Munitions Functioning

When the Time fuze functions in flight, it ignites a small gunpowder ejection charge which
pushes the Payload or Payloads, such as sub munitions, on a pusher plate and rod. The
pressure inside the shell builds up until the screw threads or shear pins break and the
payload is then ejected through the base of the shell. Most Carrier Artillery Shells or Mortar
Bombs are termed Base Ejection (BE) because the shell contents or payload is ejected from
the rear.

Carrier Rocket Warheads: however, eject their contents to the front, because the rocket
motor is to the rear of the warhead and is pushing the warhead forwards in flight, that
prevents the payload to be ejected to the rear. The ejection charge is therefore in the base
of the warhead (to push the contents forward) and is linked to the fuze by a central flash
tube.

There are several types of Carrier Munition:

 Smoke
 Incendiary
 Illuminating
 Sub Munition
 Propaganda
 Chemical (Binary)
 Chaff/Counter Measure
 Shrapnel/Anti Personnel

Smoke Carrier Munition

Smoke BE (Base Ejection) normally has a series of Smoke Canisters (Normally between 3 to
5.) filled with hexachloroethane. The flash from the ejection charge ignites the priming

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composition of the Smoke Canisters (via a flash tube) and the ejected Smoke Canisters burn
for between 1 and 2 Minutes.

Incendiary Carrier Munition

Incendiary BE munitions function in the same manner as the Smoke BE, the main difference
being the Incendiary canisters produce an Incendiary effect and are normally completely
consumed (including the casing) by the fire. A 122mm Incendiary Rocket Warhead contains
almost 100 Incendiary Pellets.

Illuminating Carrier Munition

One of the most common Base Ejection Carrier Munitions is the Illuminating or Parachute
Illuminating Munition. On this munition the payload consists of a flare in a canister, with a
parachute attached. The Illuminating munition is designed to be fired at night to light up an
area, and the trajectory is set so that the munition is high over the target area when the
flare is ejected, giving the parachute plenty of time to deploy, and plenty of time for the
canister to produce light before it reaches the ground.
TYPICAL ILLUMIATING (BE -Base Ejection) SHELL

Action of Typical Base Base Time Fuze

Ejection Illuminating Shell Plate
Gunpowder Ejection
Charge

Payload, Flare Candle

Parachute and
Illuminating
Candle

Parachute

Base Plate

Sub Munition Carrier Munition

The Sub Munition Carrier Shell (also termed ICM -Improved Conventional Munition) Contains
a number of independently fuzed Anti Tank, Anti personnel or Dual Purpose (HEAT/Frag)
Bomblets or Anti Personnel or Anti Tank minelets.

The Bomblets fuzing system does not arm until the Bomblet has been ejected from the
munition. The bomblets are normally designed to function on impact but the Minelets are
designed to act as mines (or Area Denial Munitions) and do not arm themselves for about 1
minute after ejection

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Sub Munition Base Ejection
Carrier Shell (ICM-
Cross section view of Shell,
showing arrangement of
Improved Conventional
Time Munition) Functioning
Fuze bomblets in rows of 7

Ejection
Charge

Payload: (Bomblets
or Minelets)

Base Plate Time fuze functions in flight after delay set, ignites
ejection charge, which builds up pressure within the
Sub-Munition (Bomblet) Base Ejection (BE) shell until the shear pins holding the base plate break,
Carrier Shell and the gas pressure then forces the bomblets out of
(also termed “ ICM (Improved Conventional the rear of the shell. Each bomblet or minelet arms as it
Munition)” is dropping.

Propaganda (Leaflet)

The Propaganda (Leaflet) shell has a payload of hundreds of propaganda information leaflets
rolled into a cardboard tube. The base plate of the shell is normally screwed into position so
that the leaflets can be replaced with more current propaganda messages as necessary.

Chemical BE (Binary)

The payload of the Chemical Base Ejection Binary artillery shell consists of two canisters of
low toxicity chemical agent. On firing a disc separating the two canisters to break and thus
allows to two agents to mix. Rotational forces produced by the spinning of the shell in flight
ensure that the two agents mix completely producing a lethal agent which is ejected over
the target area by the ejection charge.

Chaff / Counter Measure

On this type of munition the payload consists of a number of aluminium foil strips which,
when ejected, spread out over a wide area. The aluminium foil strips (known as Chaff) reflect
radar beams and thus confuse enemy radar attempting to track a target.

Shrapnel/Anti-Personnel

The Shrapnel/ (Russian term) Anti-Personnel (US Term) is a Nose Ejection munition
containing thousands of ball bearings or small arrow shaped projectiles known as Flechettes.
The body is made up of two pieces, with the ogive held onto the main body by weak screw
threads or shear pins.

The Shrapnel shell has an ejection charge in the base, linked to the fuze booster by a flash
tube. The Ejection charge forces the ogive to break off and the Ball Bearings or Flechettes
are propelled forward at a high velocity and they spread out in a cone shaped pattern. The
rotational forces created by the spin of the shell aids the spread of Flechettes/Ball bearings

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and this type of shell is particularly effective against troops in the open. Note that the
Shrapnel or Anti Personnel shell is a Carrier Shell and should not be confused with the HE Anti
Personnel shell.

Shrapnel (Flechette) Anti Personnel shell

Time Chemical Chemical
Fuze Precursor A Precursor B

On Firing Disc
between
Canister A and
B ruptures
allowing the two
Precursors to
mix
Rotational
Forces as the
shell is spinning,
allow thorough
mixing of the two
precursors

Fuze functions and ignites ejection charge

which builds up pressure until threds on
baseplate rupture and gas is ejected from the
rear of the shell by pusher plate

Typical Binary Chemical BE

Base Ejection Shell

Shrapnel Shell Identification

The Shrapnel Shell ( like the HEAT Shell) has a two piece body , the Ogive and the Main
body, but unlike the HEAT Shell the Shrapnel shell has a Time fuze (Not an Impact fuze or
Piezo Electric Generator) and does not have a tracer.

Shrapnel Shell Hazards

The main hazard with the Shrapnel (Anti Personnel) Shell is the forward projection of the ball
bearings or flechettes (The danger area of which can be reduced, if the shell must be
destroyed in situ, by building a sandbag wall in front of the shell.)

Carrier Shells Identification

Carrier shells may be identified by:

 Always has a time fuze.

 Always has a distinctive Base Plate (Except Shrapnel)
 Normally has far less of a boat tail than the HE shell
 A one piece or two pieces body.

Carrier Shells Hazards

Carrier Shells always have a projection hazard to the rear of the shell (but Shrapnel and
Carrier Rocket Warheads have a projection hazard to the front). The main hazard, however,
may be determined by the munitions payload.

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Shrapnel (Flechette) Anti personnel Shell
function Shrapnel (Flechette-
Anti Personnel) Shells
(Soviet)

Time Fuze functions in Flight, Flash passes via flash

tube to an ejection charge in the base, gunpowder
ejection charge in base functions, pressure build up
causes threads holding Ogive to break, payload of
flechettes ejected from nose at high velocity, spin if
shell causes them to spread rapidly

Canister Shot

A Canister Shot projectile is basically a tinplate container filled with ball bearings or chopped
steel rod pellets. When the Canister Shot round is fired the heavier ball bearings or pellets
break through the tinplate closing disc and scatter as they leave the gun barrel. The Canister
Shot basically turns the artillery gun into a giant shotgun and is used to break up massed
infantry attacks against artillery gun positions.

Steel Pellets

Tinplate
Body Projectile

Driving
Band

Barrel of
Artillery
Pellets Gun
Closing
Disc

Typical
Canister
Shot Tinplate Body Splits
Open on Leaving
Gun Barrel

Canister Shot Round

FAE (Fuel Air Explosive)

Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) munitions are designed to destroy targets by a combination of
enhanced Blast/Overpressure effect over a wide area (Over 20 bars over an area of 125,000

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square metres for a 500 kg bomb.) and high temperatures (Over 3000 degrees centigrade)
within the fireball created on detonation.

Fuel Air Explosive munitions normally consist of a thin outer casing containing a liquid or
powdered high energy explosive fuel with a central High Explosive bursting charge and a
secondary High Explosive Incendiary ignition charge.

Secondary
charges

HE
Bursting
Charge

High Energy
Fuel (Main
Filling

Parachute
deployed
and probe
deployed Detail of Secondary
for airburst charge
approx
3 metres FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) Bomb
above (Example shown is US BLU 73 A/B)
FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) Bomb
ground
(example is US BLU 73 A/B)

When the munition functions, the bursting charge blasts open the outer casing and spread
the liquid explosive fuel or powder so that it mixes with the air and forms a vapour cloud
spread over a wide area. Less than one second after the bursting charge has functioned, the
secondary ignition charge functions and initiates the cloud of mixed explosive fuel and air.
The Fuel-Air mix detonates with extreme force and heat spread over the area covered by the
vapour cloud. Fuel Air Explosive can best be described as an enhanced blast effect weapon
and its blast and heat effects are far greater than those of the same calibre or weight of
conventional High Explosive munition.

FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) Identification

FAE can be found in many configurations, and so identification of the munition can be largely
dependent on the knowledge of the individual EOD Operator.

FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) Hazards

The Major hazard with the Fuel Air Explosive is the extreme blast effect and the high
temperatures/incendiary effects generated by the detonation of the Fuel Air Mixture. Also
the explosion creates a vacuum, momentarily, over a large area as it consumes the oxygen.

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2. High Energy Fuel spreads and mixes with the air

as fine vapor droplets or mist, after less than 1
second, the two secondary charges detonate

Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) functioning. 1. Fuze

functions and Central Bursting Charge detonates
breaking open the munition casing and spreading the
High Energy Fuel. At the same time, the short delay
on the secondary charges is ignited.

3. Detonation of secondary charges causes detonation

of cloud of Fuel and Air Mixture, with the result that
temperatures of over 3,000 degrees centigrade and
over 429 foot pounds of overpressure are produced in
the area covered by the cloud of Fuel air mixture.

Thermo baric Weapons

Thermo baric weapons are a development of the basic FAE principle, but they can achieve
their effects without needing large amounts of oxygen and so are more effective in confined
areas such as caves or bunkers and generate more Blast /Overpressure. (70 bars)

Rocket Assisted Projectiles (RAP)

RAP (Rocket Assisted Projectiles) also known as HERA (High Explosive Rocket Assisted) is a
design of HE shell incorporating a rocket motor to increase the range of the shell. The rocket
motor igniter has a delay which enables the shell to travel to the maximum Azimuth (High
point) of its normal trajectory before the rocket motor ignites and propels the shell to the
longer range.

RAP (Rocket Assisted Projectiles) Advantages/Disadvantages

The advantage of the Rocket Assisted Projectile is the increased range achieved over that of
the standard HE shell.

The disadvantages are reduces amount of HE and fragmentation produced and less accuracy
owing to inconsistencies of rocket motor ignition delay.

RAP (Rocket Assisted Projectiles) Hazards and ID

The main identification feature of the RAP is the Venturi at the back of the projectile, which
may, or may not have the delay unit fitted.

The Hazards associated with RAP shells are as for normal HE munitions but the propulsive
nature of the rocket motor must be considered when the RAP is being destroyed.

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HEBB (High Explosive Base Bleed)

The High Explosive Base Bleed projectile has a small charge of propellant at the base, not
designed to give extra propulsion but to neutralise the effects of drag created behind the
projectile in flight and thus enhance the range without affecting the HE payload delivered to
the target.

Rocket Motor Venturi

Propellant Base Bleed
Motor

Adapter
HE
Main HE Shell
Filling Igniter
and Delay
Assembly

HEBB
Typical HERAP (High Explosive (High Explosive Base Bleed)
Rocket Assisted Projectile) Shell

Practice Munitions

Practice Munitions are designed for training purposes only and are designed so that they can
be fired at a target but not produce the normal explosive effect on the target of the normal
operational HE or HEAT munition.

 Some Practice munitions have a completely Inert projectile or warhead with no explosive
components (the practice artillery Round, Mortar Bomb or Rocket will, however, have a
propulsive charge to propel the Projectile, Mortar Bomb or Warhead to the target)
 Some practice projectiles have a tracer so the gunner can follow the flight path of the
projectile to the target.
 Some other projectiles incorporate a small Low Explosive or a small High Explosive charge
(normally TNT/Aluminium) to produce a visible flash at the target.

Drill Munitions

Drill Munitions (Dummy in US terminology.) have no explosive components and are

completely Inert (without any propelling charges or Tracer elements). They are used purely
to practice loading and handling drills in training.

List of abbreviations
Abbreviation Meaning
HE High Explosive
HE Frag High Explosive Fragmentation
Frag Fragmentation (High Explosive)

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HEI High Explosive Incendiary
HEI-T High Explosive Incendiary - Tracer
HE-T High Explosive - Tracer
Frag-T Fragmentation - Tracer
HEBB High Explosive (with) Base Bleed (motor)
HERA High Explosive Rocket Assisted
HERAP High Explosive Rocket Assisted Projectile
HEAP High Explosive Anti Personnel
HE A/Pers High Explosive Anti Personnel
HEAT High Explosive Anti Tank
HEAT-FS High Explosive Anti Tank-Fin Stabilized
HEAT-FS-T High Explosive Anti Tank-Fin Stabilized-Tracer
HEAT/Frag High Explosive Anti Tank/Fragmentation (Dual Purpose)
DP Dual Purpose
HESH High Explosive Squash Head
HEP High Explosive Plastic (US term for HESH)
AP Armour Piercing (Or Anti Personnel for mines)
AP-T Armour Piercing – Tracer
API Armour Piercing Incendiary
API-T Armour Piercing Incendiary – Tracer
APC Armour Piercing Capped
APCBC Armour Piercing Capped Ballistic Capped
APHE Armour Piercing High Explosive
APHE-T Armour Piercing High Explosive – Tracer
HVAP-T High Velocity Armour Piercing – Tracer
HVAPDS-T High Velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot – Tracer
APDS-T Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot – Tracer
HVAPFSDS-T High Velocity Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot-Tracer
APFSDS-T Armour Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot – Tracer
Smk Bst WP Smoke Bursting White Phosphorus
WP White Phosphorus
Smoke BE Smoke Base Ejection (Carrier shell)
Illum or Ill Illuminating
Chemical Bst Chemical Bursting munition
Chemical BE Chemical Base Ejection (Carrier shell)
A/Tk or AT Anti Tank (For mines.)
FAE Fuel Air Explosive
Shrap Shrapnel
A Pers Anti Personnel (Shrapnel shell or for anti personnel mine)
PIBD Point Initiating Base Detonating
BD Base Detonating
PD Point Detonating
PDSQ Point Detonating Super Quick
SD Self Destruct
MTSQ Mechanical Time Super Quick
PDSD Point Detonating Self Destruct
DASD Direct Action Self Destruct
DA Direct Action (British term for PD)

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ICM Improved Conventional Munition

Artillery Ammunition Table Iraq, 75 – 203 mm

75\59 76/62 90 100 100 105 105 115 120 122 122
Naval Naval T55 T12 How Tank T62 Tank D30 A19
Munition Role How FdG
HE Fragmentation X X X X X X
Fragmentation X X
HE X X X X
HE Pre-Fragmented X
HE-T X
HE Rocket Assisted X
(HERA)
HEBB (HE Base Bleed)
HEAT FS (Fin X X X X X X X
Stabilized)
HEAT (Spin 1 X
Stabilized)
HESH-T / HEP-T X X X X
APHE-T X X
(HV)APDS-T X X X
(HV)APFSDS-T X X X X DU
Smoke Bursting WP X X X X X X
Smoke BE (Base X X
Ejection)
Illuminating X X X
Propaganda X X
Sub Munition (ICM) X
Anti Personnel X X X X
Shrapnel
Chemical Bursting X
CP (Concrete Piercing X
)
HESAP(Semi Armour X
Pierc)
Practice Inert X X X
Practice flash X X

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Artillery Ammunition Table Iraq, 75 – 203 mm
130 152 155 155 155 165 175 180 8 in.
125 M46 D20 152 How How G5 Dem Gun S23 203mm

Munition Role T72 FdG How FdG Iran US Gun Gun Iran Gun Iran
HE Fragmentation X X X X
Fragmentation X
HE X X X X X X
HE Pre-Fragmented
HE-T
HE Rocket Assisted X X X
(HERA)
HEBB (HE Base Bleed) X
HEAT FS (Fin X
Stabilized)
HEAT (Spin X 2
Stabilized)
HESH-T / HEP-T X
APHE-T X X
(HV)APDS-T
(HV)APFSDS-T X
Smoke Bursting WP X X X X X X ? X
Smoke BE (Base X X X ? X
Ejection)
Illuminating X X X X X X ? X
Propaganda X
Sub Munition (ICM) X X X X X ? X
Anti Personnel
Shrapnel
Chemical Bursting X X
CP (Concrete Piercing X X X
)
HESAP(Semi Armour X
Pierc)
Practice Inert
Practice flash

End of the Munition Design chapter.

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Fuzes Principles of Operation and Safety Devices

The Fuze is the vital component of any munition which is designed to explode at the target
or burst and scatter, or eject, a payload over a target area. (A smoke producing, incendiary
or other chemical, or sub munitions.) Without the fuze the munition cannot function at the
target as designed. The fuze is often the most complex part of any munition. They can be
Mechanical or Electro Mechanical. (A combination of mechanical and electrical operation,
they can often be referred to as Electrical, but even if the initiation is completely electrical,
most have mechanical safety devices.)

Understanding the fuzes Principles of Operation and Safety Devices will assist the EOD
Operator to assess which UXO is safe to move and which is not.

Principles of Operation for Mechanical Fuzes

The following types of mechanical fuzes will be described below:

 Direct Action Impact Fuze (Direct Impact)

 Inertia Impact (Base) Fuze
 Combination Direct Impact/Inertia Impact Fuze
 Direct Impact Action with Self Destruct Fuze (Direct Impact Self Destruct)
 Direct Action Fuze (Spitback)
 Mechanical Time Fuze
 Time Combustion Fuze

Direct Action Impact Fuzes

Fuzes designed to function on a direct impact with the target or the ground are generally the
simplest in operation. They are always Nose Fuzes. They often rely purely on a striker needle
being pushed onto a detonator at the moment of impact, the striker itself, after the fuze is
armed, being held away from the detonator, whilst the shell is in flight, by a spring.

Safety devices incorporated in direct action impact fuzes are normally designed to lock the
striker and detonator out of line with each other, and to ensure that the detonator is out of
line with the other explosive components in the fuze until the arming process is complete.

Inertia Impact (Base) Fuzes

Certain fuzes are designed to be fitted in the base of a shell because the specialized
explosive effect must be initiated from the rear and work forwards to achieve it’s aim, or
because the front portion of the shell is solid metal which is especially hardened to punch
through thick armour plate, (or other hard targets such as re-enforced concrete) and then an
explosive charge in the base functions once penetration is achieved.

These fuzes, for obvious reasons, cannot rely on a striker being directly pushed onto a
detonator but instead rely on the sudden deceleration of the shell as it hits the target. The
principle can simply be explained as being the same as when a moving vehicle hits an
immovable object such as a wall, the vehicle stops suddenly but the occupants are thrown

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forward. In the same manner a heavy striker (Often termed an “Inertia Pellet”) may be
thrown forward onto a detonator as the shell impacts with the target.

The heavy striker is normally held away from the detonator whilst the shell is in flight by a
weak spring. The heavy striker is often locked in position by a safety bolt which unlocks the
moment the shell is fired, thus eliminating any chance that the striker can hit the detonator.

Direct Action (DA) Detonator

(Direct Impact) Fuze Striker Heavy Inertia
Creep Needle Pellet
Spring

The Creep Spring Keeps the Striker Needle

of the heavy Inertia Pellet away from the
detonator. On IMPACT of the Projectile with
the target, The projectile slows or stops,
When Armed, but the heavy Inertia Pellet, continues to
Striker is in line move forward, overcoming the tension of
with the the Creep Spring. The Striker Needle hits
detonator but the detonator and causes it to detonate.
held away from it On Impact, Striker is
by the Striker driven onto detonator
Spring (overcoming striker
spring)

Combination Direct Impact/Inertia Impact

Certain types of nose fuze incorporate both a direct Direct Action and Graze Action
(DA and Graze)Fuze (Functioning at target)
impact action and an inertia impact action; these
fuzes are often termed “DA and Graze fuzes”. The Graze Action
inertia impact action is often used as a back up in (Inertia
Impact)
case the shell hits the target as a “glancing blow” (I.e. Detonator
Holder moves
hitting it at a shallow angle of impact) and the nose forward onto
of the fuze does not directly hit the target. striker
(overcoming
the striker
spring)
On certain models of combination direct
impact/inertia impact action fuzes there is a device
incorporated which gives the gunner the choice of
selecting either direct impact action (With the inertia
impact action as back up) or the inertia impact action Direct Impact
Striker Driven
only. onto detonator

Combination direct impact/inertia impact action

fuzes normally incorporate the same type of safety
mechanisms as are incorporated in the Direct Impact
Action and the Inertia Impact Action types.

Direct Impact Action with Self Destruct

Certain types of direct impact fuze have a self destruct mechanism incorporated which
causes the fuze to function in flight if the shell has not hit the target within a certain period

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of time after leaving the gun barrel. These types of fuzes are often fitted to Anti Aircraft
artillery ammunition (Especially the smaller calibres such as 20 mm, 23 mm and 30 mm) to
ensure that shells which miss the target explode harmlessly in the air and not when they fall
to the ground.

The Self destruct mechanism incorporated in the fuzes can either be a pyrotechnic delay
ignited the moment the shell is fired or a mechanical device which works on “Spin decay” i.e.
a slowing down of the rate of spin of the shell.

Downward
ON SETBACK Movement of the
The Setback Striker(1) onto the
Sleeve (4) moves Detonator (2) is
downwards blocked by a Coil
breaking the lugs 1 1 1
Spring (3) which is
on the Stirrup and held in position by
Ferrule (5) and a Setback Sleeve
releasing the Coil On Impact,
Striker (1) is
(4) held upwards 3
Spring (3) which by a Stirrup and
expands outwards forced onto the
3 Detonator (2) Ferrule (5)
and now frees the
Striker (1) to
2 causing it to 4
move downwards function and
onto the
5 initiate the fuze
Detonator (2) on booster
impact 5
4

2
2

Fuze Direct Action and Self Destruct Fuze Direct Action and Self Destruct
Fuze Direct Action and Self Destruct Model MG 25 (for 23mm HEI-T) Model MG 25 (for 23mm HEI-T)
Model MG 25 (for 23mm HEI-T) ACTION on IMPACT SAFE POSITION
SETBACK ACTION

Direct Action (Spitback) fuze Fuze

On Impact,
This is a direct action fuze, used on certain types Nose Fuze
of shaped charge (HEAT: High Explosive Anti Functions,
Flash from
Tank). The fuze functions as a normal direct Fuze
impact action type, but the explosion from the Booster
passes back
fuze travels down a tube to a detonator and to
Detonator
booster charge in the base. This fuze should not and Booster
be confused with the electro mechanical PIBD in the base
of the shell
(Point Initiating Base Detonating) fuze described
Detonator
later. and
Booster

Mechanical Time
PIBD (Point
Initiating Base
These fuzes are normally nose fuzes and are Detonating)
“SPITBACK”
designed so that they will function after a Action on HEAT
certain period of time after leaving the gun Shell
barrel. They are generally used where an
“airburst” effect is desired or a payload is to be
ejected over a target area whilst the shell is in
flight.

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The Mechanical time fuze is basically a clockwork mechanism, which releases a spring loaded
striker to fire a detonator when the hand of the clock corresponds to the time setting on the
fuze set by the gunner immediately prior to firing.

The hand of the clockwork mechanism is normally held by a small trigger which releases the
hand at the instant of firing. (There is normally a simple secondary safety device so that the
fuze cannot function within the first two seconds of flight.)

Many of the safety mechanisms incorporated in the Direct Impact Action fuze are also
incorporated in the Mechanical Time fuze, and many models of Mechanical Time fuzes also
incorporate a Direct Impact Action back up mechanism which functions if the shell hits the
ground before the delay set on the fuze has elapsed.

Mechanical Time Fuze, Action of Setback

Trigger and Muzzle Safety Bridge
Timing Hand

2
Setback Trigger
2 1
Time Mechanical Timing Hand Muzzle
Fuze Mechanism Safety
1 Bridge

4 Arbour

Timing Hand (1) is held 4 Timing Hand (1) Setback Trigger

down by Upper Ring (2) reaches cutout in Upper drops downwards on
3 so that the Timing Hand Ring (2) Main Spring (3) Setback releasing
(1) cannot be pushed forces Timing Hand (1) Setback
8 upwards by the Main
8 Timing Hand to move
7 upwards releasing Trigger clockwise, Muzzle
6 Spring (3) until it reaches 3 Arbour (4)
safety Bridge ensures
the Cut Out in the Upper
Ring (2). The Arbour (4) Arbour (4) when hand must travel for
7 is held in a groove in the released by Timing
Mechanical at least 2 seconds
underside of the Timing Hand (1) rotates, before it clears the
Hand. The Striker Flange moving Striker Time Fuze bridge and can reach
(6) is held in position by Flange (6) off the Mechanism
5 5 Pillar (7) Striker
the cutouts in the
the Pillar (7), preventing timing disc
any downwards 6 Spring (8) then
movement of the Striker forces Striker (5)
(5) by the Striker Spring downwards onto
(8). detonator

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Time Combustion Fuze, Nose Time Combustion and DA
Model D 1 - Action on Setback

This is an alternative delay type fuze to the

Mechanical time type and uses a pyrotechnic
Gunpowder delay. The fuze can best be
described as a “safety fuze” delay type fuze
and is simpler in operation, but not so
accurate, as the Mechanical Time fuze. The Rotary Shutter Locking
setting of the time rings on the fuze by the Mechanism as for RGM Fuze

gunner either lengthens or shortens the

amount of powder to burn before flashing
through to the main charge of the fuze. In
most models of this type, a striker is
normally driven onto a detonator at the
moment of firing, and the flash from the Prior to Firing, Gunner removes Safety Pin (1) and sets
detonator ignites the pyrotechnic delay train. Time Ring from Safe Position (3) to desired delay. ON
SETBACK Inertia Striker (7) moves downwards
Many models of Time Combustion fuzes, as overcoming the Creep Spring (6) to hit the Ignition
Primer (4) causing it to fire and in turn ignite the
with Time Mechanical fuzes, have direct Powder Train (5)
impact action back up mechanism.

Principles of Operation for Electro Mechanical Fuzes

Electro Mechanical Fuzing Mechanisms use an electric current to fire an electric detonator in
the fuze, but the safety devices normally incorporated are mechanical in operation. The
following types of mechanical fuzes will be described below:

 Piezo Electric PIBD (Point Initiating Base Detonating) Fuze

 Proximity Fuze

Piezo Electric PIBD (Point Initiating Base Detonating) Fuze

This type of fuze is designed for an extremely rapid initiation on direct impact with the
target. The nose initiating element does not contain an explosive but instead contains Piezo
Electric crystals which generate an electrical current when crushed. The current from nose
initiating element is transferred, via internal electrical leads, to the electrical detonator in
the fuze in the base.

The electrical contact from the nose initiator is normally locked out of line with the electric
detonators and the fuze explosive components. On firing a small clockwork mechanism
brings the contact, electric detonators and the fuze explosive components into line with
each other.

The Piezo Electric PIBD fuze often incorporates a back up impact inertia action mechanism in
case the target is hit a glancing blow, and the RPG 7 fuze incorporates a self destruct
element to initiate it after a certain time in flight, in case the grenade misses the target.

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On Impact, Nose
Piezo Electric Generator Nose Cap collapses and
Piezo Electric Cap Crush Cap crushes
Generator produces Piezo Electric
Electrical charge Crystal between
Crush Cap Upper and Lower
when crushed which
passes via electrical Anvils. Piezo
Transfer cable to Upper Anvil Electric Crystal
Electric detonator produces
in Base Fuze Piezo Electric Electrical charge
Crystal when crushed.

Insulator
Electrical
Transfer Lower
Cable Anvil

Electrical
Base Fuze
contact
with Contact
Electric
detonator

PIBD (Point
Initiating Base Piezo Electric
Detonating) Generator Action
Piezo Electric
Action

Proximity Fuzes

Proximity fuzes are designed to function when a shell is a certain distance from the ground
using a principle known as the “Doppler effect”. The fuze actually incorporates a miniature
transmitter/receiver, which bounces a signal off the target. The signal frequency changes as
the shell gets closer to the target, and at a certain pre set frequency, corresponding to a
certain distance from the target, switches an electrical current to the electric detonators in
the fuze and initiates them.

The older types of Proximity fuze used to have a small lead acid battery, like a miniature car
battery, with the acid contained in a glass ampoule. This ampoule was designed to break on
the shock of firing thus releasing the acid to react with the battery plates and generate
current to power the electronic components in the fuze.

The newer models of Proximity fuze do away with the lead acid battery and substitute a
small wind powered electric generator using an internal wind vane which turns as the shell is
in flight.

As with the Piezo electric PIBD fuze described earlier the electrical contacts, electrical
detonators and fuze explosive components are all kept out of line until the moment of firing.
A variable clockwork arming delay is also incorporated, so that the fuze will not be fully
armed until a certain time in flight, just before it reaches the target area. This ensures that if
the flight of the shell takes it over hilly or mountainous terrain the fuze will not prematurely
function.

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Some Proximity Fuzes incorporate a variable time arming

delay which can be set by the gunner. The arming delay can
be essential when firing over mountains to ensure the fuze
does not accidently initiate if the trajectory takes it close to a
mountain peak
The Proximity Fuze Transmitter / Receiver Electronics
Transmits Signals which bounce back off the ground
TIME DELAY SETTING
or target and are picked up by the Receiver. As the
munition approaches the target, the radio frequency
of the signals alters. (This is known as the Doppler
Effect). At a certain frequency (which corresponds to
a certain distance from the ground or target) the Firing
capacitor of the fuze electronics discharges an
electric current which initiates the fuze electric
detonator.

Proximity Fuze Action Proximity Fuzes Variable Time Arming Delay

Proximity Fuze Power sources Proximity fuzes are electronic 1. Transmitter

fuzes designed to function
when a shell is a certain
/ Receiver
On Setback, distance from the ground
Setback weight using a principle known as the 2.
crushes Glass “Doppler effect”. The fuze
actually incorporates a
Lead/Acid
Ampoule of Acid ,
miniature transmitter / Battery
releasing acid,
receiver (1), which bounces a
Centrifugal Force signal off the target. The signal
spreads Acid to frequency changes as the shell 3.
battery plates, gets closer to the target, and at Ampoule
Battery now starts a certain pre set frequency, of Acid
to generate power corresponding to a certain
distance from the target,
Electrolyte
Setback switches an electrical
weight current to the electric 4. Battery
detonators in the fuze and Plates
initiates them.The older types
of Proximity fuze used to have The newer models
Acid a small lead acid battery, (2) of Proximity fuze
Ampoule like a miniature car battery, do away with the
with the acid (electrolyte) lead acid battery
contained in a glass and substitute a
ampoule.(3)This ampoule (3) small wind
was designed to break on the powered electric
Battery Plates shock of firing thus releasing generator using an
Exhaust Vents the acid to react with the internal wind
Hole in Nose battery plates (4) and generate vane which turns
current to power the electronic as the shell is in
of Fuze
Wind components in the fuze. The flight.As with the
fuze also has a mechanical Piezo electric
Air Turbine
safety mechanism, such as a PIBD fuze
Flow Generator rotary shutter mechanism (5)
to ensure the firing chain is
6 described earlier
the electrical
broken until the shell has . contacts, electrical
traveled several hundred detonators and
metres from the gun, and fuze explosive
sometimes a mercury safety components are all
switch (6) to ensure a break in 5. Rotary kept out of line
the electrical contacts until the Shutter until the moment
shell is on a down ward of firing.
trajectory. Mechanism

Safety Devices

The principles by which fuzes operate once they are armed are usually comparatively simple,
but the safety devices which lock the internal components in an unarmed position are
generally what make the fuze into a complex mechanical device. These safety devices must
ensure that there is no chance that the fuze can be accidentally initiated during transport
and handling, or by the extremely violent forces it is subjected to at the moment the
munition is actually fired, but at the same time must disengage themselves the moment the
shell, bomb or rocket leaves the barrel of the weapon, (Or launcher) thus ensure the fuze is
ready to function when it hits, or is over, the target area. To achieve this disengagement
certain forces which act on the shell when it is fired or is in flight, are harnessed. The three
forces normally used for these purposes are:

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 Setback
 Centrifugal force
 Creep forward

Setback

Setback, which is sometimes termed “stop – start - acceleration” is the effect whereby all
moveable objects within the fuze are thrown rearwards by the sudden forces of acceleration
which occur when the shell is fired and it goes from being a stationary object to one moving
at speeds of several hundred metres per second in the space of less than one second.

The setback forces are so violent that spring loaded pins, known as detents, or spring loaded
collars are thrown backwards compressing any springs which previously held them in a
forward position.

The detents are normally used to lock the component holding the detonator, known as the
shutter, out of line with the striker and other explosive components. Once the shutter is
released it will normally be pushed across by a transverse spring so that it lines up with the
striker and other explosive components within the fuze. Some fuzes, for example the M-6
Mortar fuze used with 82mm Mortar bombs, use a setback arming sleeve.

Fuze Arming Forces

SETBACK – ALL
MOVEABLE COMPONENTS
THROWN BACKWARDS BY
SUDDEN ACCELERATION AS
THE PROJECTILE IS FIRED
(OVERCOMING ANY
SPRINGS PUSHING THEM
FORWARDS)

CENTIFUGAL FORCE
(SPUN PROJECTILES ONLY)
SPIN FORCES MOVEABLE
COMPONENTS OUTWARDS
(OVERCOMING ANY
SPRINGS PUSHING THEM
INWARDS)

CREEP FORWARD. IN
FLIGHT PROJECTILE
STARTS TO DECELLERATE
.SPRINGS REASSERT
THEMSELVES AND SPRING
LOADED ITEMS ARE
FORCED FORWARDS

Continuation of setback arming principles:

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Fuze safety devices

DETENT PIN Drops downwards on setback

force , overcoming tension of the spring,
unlocking fuze components

Striker
Sliding
shutter Detonator

Explosive Shutter spring

lead
Fuze
booster

SLIDING SHUTTER Keeps detonator out of line with striker,

and out of line with the explosive lead and fuze booster

Centrifugal Force

Centrifugal force is often used to unlock safety devices in fuzes used in conventional spin
stabilized artillery shells and canon projectiles. The effect of centrifugal force in a shell that is
spinning at several thousand revolutions per minute is that all moveable components are
thrown outwards away from the central axis of the fuze.

A good example of a fuze which incorporates mainly centrifugal safety devices is the U.S.
manufactured M557 fuze. This fuze uses spring loaded centrifugal locking bolts to lock the
inertia pellet, containing the detonator, away from a fixed striker needle, and a spring
loaded shutter called the “interrupter” which blocks the flash from the top (instantaneous
action) detonator thus preventing it from initiating other explosive components of the
explosive train.

Top Striker and Top On Firing, Setback

detonator action causes Setback
pin (1) to move
downwards releasing
Interupter / the Rotary Shutter (2)
selector allowing it to turn so
that the Shutter
Detonator (3) lines up
Centrifugal with the Explosive
locking Bolts Lead (4) and Fuze
Booster (5)

2
Lower
striker 3
Inertia Pellet 5 4
Detent Pin
Rotary Shutter

Fuze M 557 PDSQ (Point Detonating Super Fuze M 557 PDSQ (Point Detonating Super
Quick) Impact / Inertia Impact (for US Quick) Impact / Inertia Impact (for US
105mm and 155mm artillery Shells) 105mm and 155mm artillery Shells)
SAFE POSITION ACTION ON SETBACK

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Continuation of the description of the M557 fuze:
On Impact (with
In Flight, Centrifugal Forces
Interupter /Selector
cause the Centrifugal Locking
set on SQ) Top
Bolts (1) to move outwards
Striker (1) is driven
releasing the Inertia Pellet (2)
onto Top
so that only the Creep Spring
Detonator (2) and
(3) holds the Inertia Pellet
top detonator fires
away from the Lower Striker
(4) 7

1 6
6

4 5 5

2 4
3

8
2
3

1 Flash from Top Detonator (2)

If set on instant action, centrifugal force passes down Flash Channel
causes Interupter / Selector (5) to move (3) to Shutter Detonator (4)
outwards unblocking the Flash Channel Explosive Lead (5) and Fuze
(6) from the top detonator (7) to the Booster (6)
Shutter Detonator (8)

Fuze M 557 PDSQ (Point Detonating Super Fuze M 557 PDSQ (Point Detonating Super
Quick) Impact / Inertia Impact (for US Quick) Impact / Inertia Impact (for US
105mm and 155mm artillery Shells) 105mm and 155mm artillery Shells)
IN FLIGHT IMPACT ACTION (set on SQ)

Inertia Pellet (5) moves

forward, overcoming
4
Creep spring (6) and
1
Lower Striker (7) hits
Delay Detonator (8) which 9 10
in turn initiates Shutter
3
Detonator (4) Explosive
Lead (9) and Fuze 8 2
Booster (10)

4
7 5

6 Striker (1) locked in

2 position by 2 x
Locking Balls (2),
1 5 Locking Balls held by
Setback Sleeve (3)
Setback Sleeve held
With Interupter/ Selector downwards by Upper
(1) set on Delay, Flash
Channel (2) remains Locking Ball (4)
3 Blocked, and Flash from (Shutter (5) locked in
Top detonator (3) is blocked position by Rotary
from reaching Shutter
Detonator (4)
Shutter Locking Pin
AS PER RGM FUZE
Fuze M 557 PDSQ (Point Detonating Super
Quick) Impact / Inertia Impact (for US Fuze, Nose, DA and Graze (Direct Impact
105mm and 155mm artillery Shells) Action and Graze – Inertia Impact Action)
INERTIA IMPACT ACTION V 429 (for 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and
(Fuze Set on Delay) 152mm HE frag and Smoke WP Shells)
SAFE POSITION

Creep Forward

Creep forward is the action by which springs of components such as detents and setback
sleeves reassert themselves once the initial acceleration of the projectile ceases and
deceleration begins. In most cases the springs will attempt to push the component back to
the position it was in prior to setback. Above to the right and on the following page is the
operational principals of the fuze V 429 described.

Barrel Slap

Barrel slap is a condition which sometimes occurs in very worn gun barrels, whereby the
projectile body moves from side to side as it moves down and can, in extreme
circumstances, not only adversely affect the stability of the projectile in flight, but can also
prevent the fuze from arming as designed.

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Creep forward. Continuation off operational principals description of the fuze V 429:

ON CREEP
1 FORWARD
3 Setback Sleeve
4 3 Spring (7) pushes
Setback Sleeve (3)
7 fully upwards
7 releasing the two
2 Locking Balls (2)
ON SETBACK
Setback Sleeve locking the Striker
6 (3) drops (1) Striker can also
downwards into move upwards.
Recesses in Rotary Shutter
Primer Carrier Locking Mechanism
(6) overcoming (SEE RGM FUZE
the Setback for details) has
Sleeve Spring (7) released Shutter (5)
Upper Locking so that the Shutter
Ball (4) is 5 Detonator (8) is in
released and line with the
drops into the 8 Explosive Lead (9)
recess to the Fuze Booster
9 (10)
Fuze, Nose, DA and Graze (Direct Impact 10
Action and Graze – Inertia Impact Action)
Fuze, Nose, DA and Graze (Direct Impact
V 429 (for 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and
152mm HE frag and Smoke WP Shells)
Action and Graze – Inertia Impact Action)
ACTION ON SETBACK V 429 (for 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and
152mm HE frag and Smoke WP Shells)
ACTION ON CREEP FORWARD

Fuze, Nose, DA and Graze (Direct Impact Fuze, Nose, DA and Graze (Direct Impact
Action and Graze – Inertia Impact Action) Action and Graze – Inertia Impact Action)
V 429 (for 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and V 429 (for 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and
152mm HE Frag and Smoke WP Shells) 152mm HE Frag and Smoke WP Shells)
ACTION ON IMPACT ACTION ON INERTIA IMPACT
10 10
9 9
8 8
ON IMPACT Top ON INERTIA
Disc (11) IMPACT
13 ruptures, and
14 13 (GRAZE
14 Striker (1) is ACTION) Primer
driven onto the Carrier (6) moves
Primer (12) flash onto Striker (1)
12 then passes 12 firing Primer (12)
through Flash flash then passes
Channel (13) (or through Flash
Delay pellet (14) if
6 Channel (13) (or
delay is selected) Delay pellet (14) if
1 through to delay is selected)
Shutter Detonator through to
(8) Explosive Lead 1 Shutter Detonator
(9) and Fuze (8) Explosive Lead
11 (9) and Fuze
Booster (10)
Booster (10)

Spin Decay

Certain types of fuze (E.g. those used on automatic anti-aircraft cannon projectiles.) are
designed to function after a certain time of flight if the projectile has failed to hit the target.
Often the fuze incorporates a mechanism which causes a spring loaded striker to be released
as the spring of a component, thrown outwards by centrifugal force, begins to reassert itself
as the rotational speed of the projectile begins to slow and thus the centrifugal forces begin
to weaken. On the following page is the operational principal of the M785 fuze described.

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Spin Decay. Description of the operational principal of the M785 fuze.
Fuze Nose PD (Point Detonating) (Direct Action) Fuze Nose PD (Point Detonating) (Direct Action)
M 785A1 (USA) for 25mm HEI and HEI-T Shells M 785A1 (USA) for 25mm HEI and HEI-T Shells
4
ARMED 4
SAFE POSITION
POSITION

3 3
1 1
7

4
5
5
2 6
2
ON SETBACK Rotor Support (5) drops downwards
overcoming the Setback Spring (6) Rotor (3) also
Drops (and is no longer locked in position by the
Rotor Detonator (1) held out of line with Explosive Striker (4) and Rotor Detonator (1) is turned into
Lead (2) by Rotor (3) Rotor locked in position by line with the Explosive Lead (2) Arming Balls (7)
Striker (4) Rotor Support (5) locks Rotor upwards moves outwards by Centrifugal Force and lock the
and Rotor Support is locked upwards by Setback Rotor Support (5) in position so the Setback Spring
Spring (6) (6) cannot push the Rotor support and Rotor Ball
upwards onto the Striker (4)

Fuze Nose PD (Point Detonating) (Direct Action) Fuze Nose PD (Point Detonating) (Direct Action)
M 785A1 (USA) for 25mm HEI and HEI-T Shells M 785A1 (USA) for 25mm HEI and HEI-T Shells

ARMED 4
POSITION 4

1
3
1 3
7
7
5
5 SELF
6 DESTRUCT
6 ACTION
2
2
SELF DESTRUCT ON SPIN DECAY If shell
ON SETBACK Rotor Support (5) drops downwards does not hit the target after a certain period
overcoming the Setback Spring (6) Rotor (3) also of time, centrifugal forces grow weaker
Drops (and is no longer locked in position by the allowing the Arming Balls (7) to drop back
Striker (4) and Rotor Detonator (1) is turned into into the recesses in the Rotor Support (5) thus
line with the Explosive Lead (2) Arming Balls (7) allowing the Setback Spring (6) to force the
moves outwards by Centrifugal Force and lock the Rotor Support (5) Rotor (3) and the Rotor
Rotor Support (5) in position so the Setback Spring Detonator (1) onto the Striker (4) causing the
(6) cannot push the Rotor support and Rotor Ball Rotor detonator (1) to fire and Initiate the
upwards onto the Striker (4) Explosive Lead (2)

End of the Fuzes Principles of Operation and Safety Devices chapter

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AMMUNITION MARKINGS

Introduction

There are many different types of ammunition (UXO), within Iraq, and recognizing each type,
it’s role and its effects is essential to achieve an effective, safe and efficient demolition. The
letters and numbers painted on Russian munitions and the coloured bands used help
identify the type, caliber and likely effects. This TTN will examine the markings on Russian
munitions as well as some of the markings used on western designs used by the Coalition
Forces, or captured from the Iranians or purchased by the Iraqi Government.

The Aim of this chapter is to enable the EOD operator to understand what the markings on a
UXO mean, and from the information gleaned from this, recognize the type, role and hazards
associated with the munition.

Russian munitions

Code Letters denoting / role Type

Russian Munitions use basic code letters to identify the type and role of the munition as well
as coloured bands. The code letters prefix the model number of the ammunition item. The
code letter / model model numbers are normally marked on the middle parallel portion of
artillery projectiles, mortar bombs (behind the obturating grooves) and on the parallel
portion of rocket warheads. NOTE: Suffix letters after the model number denote a model
variation. A list of codes (in Russian Cyrillic and Western alphabet) and their meanings is
shown at Annex A to this Chapter.

Role Code Letters Russian Munition

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Calibre Identification

The calibre is often marked above or below the code letter/model number information.
Sometime, where there are two guns in service of the same calibre but which use different
cartridge sizes and ammunition systems, the model number of the gun will be marked next
to the calibre.

Explosive Filling Codes

On the ogive of the shell, Rocket or Mortar is marked the explosive filling code, which is as
follows:

 T = TNT
 A-IX-1 = RDX / Wax
 A-IX-2 = RDX / Aluminium

Other Information

Other Information normally marked on the munition is:

 Fuze details (normally base fuzed APHE only

 Lot number
 Month and year of manufacture.

Coloured Bands

Coloured bands can also be used to indicate the role of the item. Commonly used bands are:

 Black band indicates either smoke or sub munition.

 White band indicates Illumination (or light production)
 Red band indicates Incendiary.
 Blue band indicates Concrete Piercing.
 Green bands indicate CHEMICAL.

The overall body colour of the ammunition item is normally a camouflage colour (Such as
light grey, dark grey or dark green) which has no marking significance.

Chinese Markings

The Chinese markings system of coloured bands follows the Russian as does the Yugoslav.
The Chinese normally use an overall body colour of Khaki Green or Brown (Khaki is a mix of
Green and brown). Sometimes they use Chinese Characters and sometimes English munition
abbreviations (e.g. they mark HE for High Explosive, or High Explosive Frag, HEAT for High
Explosive Anti Tank, WP for White Phosphorus).

Often the caliber will be marked before the type abbreviation examples are:

 60HE = 60mm caliber High Explosive

 130WP = 130mm caliber White Phosphorus (Smoke Bursting)

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 120ILL = 120mm caliber Illuminating
 40HEAT = 40mm caliber High Explosive Anti Tank

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Western (Coalition) manufactured Munitions

Western (NATO) designs of munition normally have overall body colours or wide bands
which are used to denote the role, of the item. Narrow bands are used to denote the hazard.
The table below (Next page) shows the colours and the types of munition they are used on.

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Western (Coalition/NATO) markings

Overall body Wide Band Narrow Band

colour denoting denoting Colour of Type of
role hazard Lettering Munition
Dark Green Yellow - Yellow HE, HE Frag
Frag, A-Pers
Light Green - Yellow Red Smoke bursting White
Phosphorus
Light Green - Yellow Yellow Smoke Bursting (not
WP or Red Phos)
Light Green - Brown Brown Smoke Base Ejection
Black - Yellow Yellow HEAT
Black - Yellow Yellow APHE
Black Yellow - Yellow HESH
Ogive
Black Yellow - Yellow DP
HEAT/ HE Frag
Black - - White Armour Piercing (no
HE)
White - Brown Black Illuminating
Red - Yellow Yellow Incendiary
Bursting
Red - Brown Brown Incendiary
Base Ejection
Dark Green - Brown Black Propaganda
Light Grey - Yellow (if Black Chemical
bursting shell) Red bands- non lethal
Brown if Base Harrasing agent
Ejection Green bands lethal
agent.

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End of Ammunition Markings chapter

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Identification of safe and unsafe to move UXO’s (unexploded ordnance)

This chapter deals with identifying which items of UXO can be considered to be safe to move
to a convenient area for disposal and which are unsafe to move and must be destroyed in
the exact position in which they were found. (Destroy in situ) Being able to identify which
UXO that can be moved and which can not makes it possible to chose a method to destroy
the UXO that:

 That is the most cost effective way.

 That is the least disruptive to the local population.
 That will pose the least risk of damaging property.
 That, most important of all, will pose the least risk to the EOD team and the Local
population.

Terminology

There are six terms which are used to different safe to move from unsafe to move UXO’s,
(The condition of the UXO) of which the first three below are the most important and the
last three are less usual. These are:

 Strays (Unfired ammunition that is not a kick out)

 Blinds (Fired ammunition)
 Kick-outs (Also includes ammunition that has been involved in a fire.)
 Damaged UXO’s (UXO’s damaged from something else than a Kick-out.)
 Misfires
 Partial Detonations

Strays

Many UXO’s encountered may be unfired and may therefore be in a condition whereby they
can be moved by hand or vehicle to a convenient, open and safe site for disposal that will
pose no risk of injury to personnel and no risk of damage to property. (Bulk/large scale
demolition)

Strays are ammunition items which have not been fired (Or in the case of hand grenades
thrown, or Aircraft bombs dropped), and that are not being stored at an active storage
location. They have normally been abandoned on the battlefield by a retreating army or a
rapidly advancing army, but they may have been moved from the original location in which
they where abandoned.

Strays, generally speaking, can be classified as safe to move UXO’s, as even if they are fuzed,
the fuzing mechanism is not in an armed state. The exceptions to this rule, generally, are:

 White Phosphorus munitions (they may be prone to leaking)

 Old Nitro Glycerine based explosives (which may be “sweating”)
 Rusty, fuzed Hand grenades (where the safety pin may rust through)
 Chemical munitions (which like WP, may also be prone to leakage)
 Kick outs and munitions that has been involved in a fire

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Blinds

UXO’s that have been fired, (Or in the case of hand grenades thrown, or Aircraft bombs
dropped) but have failed to function as designed are highly unstable and unsafe to move, as
their fuzing mechanisms may be fully armed and require only the slightest movement to
cause them to function. Thousands of persons in Iraq and world-wide have been killed
handling or tampering with blinds.

If a person has moved a blind, it should not be assumed that the item is safe to move and
handle. Many instances have happened world-wide where several people have handled a
blind before it has eventually functioned.

The only blinds safe to handle are those which have been fired without a fuze, this happens
occasionally, but a positive identification must be made of the item to ensure that it is not
base fuzed, or a HEAT projectile which is fitted with a PIBD fuze.

Kick-outs

Kick-outs are a term used for ammunition items which:

 Have been thrown out of an exploding ammunition store or an other ammunition

storage location.
 Have been involved in a fire.
 Failed attempts have been made to destroy them. (I.e. they have been part of a large
scale demolition, which has been badly planned, and they have not been destroyed
during the detonation).

Unfuzed Kick–outs:

Kick-outs, if unfuzed, and not White Phosphorus or

Chemical, are generally safe to move.

Fuzed Kick-outs

Fuzed Kick-outs, however, must be considered

highly dangerous and unsafe to move. The fuzes of
fuzed Kick-outs have often been subjected to
extreme forces which can arm the fuze. Fuzed Kick-
outs must therefore be treated the same as fuzed Fuzed Kick
Out Shells
blinds (I.e. destroyed in situ and not moved).

Damaged UXO’s

UXO’s which appear to have suffered damage

through tampering, or other forces, (Shrapnel, run
over by vehicles, exposed to extreme heat,
etcetera.) must be treated as Kick-outs. If they are
fuzed, WP or chemical they must be considered

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unsafe to move and must be destroyed in situ.

Misfires

Occasionally, an attempt is made to fire a rocket, mortar, artillery or recoilless weapon but
the primer of the propelling charge, or cartridge or the ignitor of the rocket motor fails to
fire then this is termed a “Misfire”.

Misfires–Sensitivity

Misfires are not as sensitive as blinds, but a sharp blow to a primer can be all that is required
to fire the propelling charge. Misfires should therefore not be transported by vehicle but can
be hand carried to a convenient demolition pit for destruction.

Destruction of Misfires

To destroy a misfire, two charges must be used, one for the projectile or warhead, and one
for the cartridge or rocket motor.

Partial Detonations

Partial Detonations, sometimes termed “Partials”, are ammunitions items which have been
fired (or in the case of hand grenades thrown, or Aircraft bombs dropped) and where the
fuzing mechanism has functioned but the detonation of the item has been incomplete.
Depending on what parts that has been removed from the UXO it shall be treated
differently.

 If the fuzing mechanism has been completely removed by the explosion, then, the item
can be considered safe to move.
 If the mechanical elements of the fuze have been removed but the detonators still
remain, the item should not be transported by vehicle, but can be hand carried to a
nearby location for disposal.

Recognition of fired munitions (Blinds) by specific type/nature.

Spin Stabilized Artillery Shells

Spin stabilized artillery shells which are fired have grooves cut in the driving band by the
rifling should be considered to be “blinds”. Spin Stabilized Artillery Shells without Driving
Bands. If the local population have removed the driving bands of the shells, and there is some
doubt as to whether the shell has been fired or not, take the safest option, treat as a blind
and destroy in situ.

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Engraved Driving Band on Fired shell

Unfired (Spin Driving Band of
Fired (spin
Stabilized) shell missing,
stabilized)
Artillery shell Therefore
Artillery shell
Driving Band is cannot be
Driving Band
NOT engraved certain whether
is engraved by
by rifling, shell is shell is fired or
rifling, shell is
SAFE to move (if unfired
UNSAFE to
not a Kick out If Fuzed assume
move
from an worst case, that
explosion) shell is fired and
therefore Driving Band (Before Firing)
UNSAFE to
move

Fin Stabilized Shells

Fin stabilized artillery shells and HEAT projectiles, normally have the fins unfolded when
fired, and some damage normally occurs to the fins when the projectile hits the ground. If
there is any doubt as to whether the shell has been fired or not treat it as a “blind”.

Rockets

Rockets normally have a cover plate which covers the venturi (or venturies) prior to firing
(Blown off on firing).

If the rocket has fins which are still folded against the body and held in place by a retaining
band it can be assumed that the rocket has not been fired.

In addition, if there are ignitor leads and a contact plug present it can also be assumed that
the rocket has not been fired.

Most importantly, if in doubt destroy in situ.

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Fin Stabilized
Artillery Shell

If Fins are
Open and
Have been
damaged, then
Shell has
probably been
fired Rear of Rocket Motor, Cover
Rear of Rocket Motor,
Cover Plate in place Plate missing, Venturis
therefore Unfired and exposed, therefore assume
therefore SAFE to Move rocket has been fired and
therefore UNSAFE to Move

Mortars

Assume that the mortar has been fired if the primer of the primary cartridge in the tail has
been struck and the flash holes of the tail boom are open,

Assume that the mortar has not been fired if the Primary cartridge primer has not been
struck and the body of the primary cartridge can be seen through the flash holes. Note: some
western designs of mortar bomb have a “floating” firing pin at the base of the cartridge and
it is more difficult to determine whether this has been struck. If in doubt treat as a blind and
destroy in situ.

If the Primary Cartridge has been struck, but the Primary cartridge body can be seen through
the flash-holes, the Mortar Bomb is probably a misfire, so take action as described earlier.

Fired Mortar Bombs 1 –

Base of Primary Cartridge
percussion cap has been struck

Fired Mortar Bombs 2

Flash holes open or clogged with mud

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Recoilless Projectiles

Many Recoilless projectiles have a similar primary cartridge system to that of a mortar
bomb, the same criteria can therefore be applied to these.

OG 9 / PG 9

On the OG-9/OG-15 and PG-9/PG-15 projectiles, if the propelling charge is absent, assume to
be a blind and destroy in situ. And on the PG-9/PG-15, if the rocket motor has fired, assume
to be a blind and destroy in situ as well.

Flash
Holes

Cartridge
for GROM
US Pattern Gun
106mm if
complete
round unfired
(but check for
Primary
Misfire)
Cartridge Spigot
82 mm Recoilless Projectiles for B10 (if primary
cartridge struck and flash holes open) consider PG 9 / PG 15 or OG 9 / OG 15
Fired and Destroy in Situ) (unfired if Spigot intact or
Propelling Cartridge attached) if
Venturi is open on PG 9 /PG 15 Spigot
Projectile has been fired.

Hand Grenades

If the fly off lever, and/or safety pin is missing, from the grenade assume it has been thrown
and treat as a blind.

Chinese Stick Grenades

If the end cap of he Chinese stick grenade is missing, and the pull string deployed, treat as a
blind and destroy in situ.

RKG-3 HEAT Hand Thrown Grenade

If the Safety Pin is missing, and the Drogue chute has been deployed, treat as a Blind and
destroy in situ.

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Fly Off Lever

and Safety Pin
Fly Off Lever and of Hand
Safety Pin of Grenade is
Hand Grenade is missing , UNARMED- ARMED-
in place , Grenade Safety Pin in Place, Parachute deployed
Grenade therefore has Parachute NOT UNSAFE TO MOVE
therefore has been thrown deployed
NOT been and is
thrown and is UNSAFE to
SAFE to move move Grenade, Hand, HEAT (High Explosive Anti
Tank) Model RKG-3

Fired – Unsafe to Move

Safety Pin

Unfired (with Cartridge)

Grenade without Safety Pin, Grenade 30mm HE Fragmentation

Destroy in Situ Model VOG 17 and Model VOG 26
(for AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher)
Grenade, Rifle, HEAT (High Explosive
Anti Tank) Model M 60 (Yugoslav)

Rifle Grenades

Assume it has been fired if the safety pin is missing from the grenade. Treat as a blind and
destroy in situ.

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30mm VOG 17M / VOG 26 Grenades

Assume it has been fired if the driving band is

engraved or the cartridge case is missing from the
grenade. Treat as a blind and destroy in situ.

40mm VOG 25 Grenades

Assumed the grenade have been fired if the primer at

the base of the VOG-25 has been struck and/or the
propellant bleed off holes open. Treat as a blind and
Propellant Bleed Holes
destroy in situ. Open and Primer
Struck , Grenade has
been fired and is
unsafe to move
40mm US Discharged Grenades
Grenade 40 mm HE
Assume it has been fired if the grenade is separate Fragmentation Model
VOG 25 and VOG 25P
from the cartridge case. Treat as a Blind and destroy
in situ

If the Cartridge Case is attached to the Grenade, but

the percussion cap at the base has been struck, treat
as a misfire. (As previously described)

Grenade
40mm HE
(USA)
Model M 406
(for M 203
Grenade
Launcher)

UNFIRED

Grenade 40 mm HE M406
(USA) (Fired – Unsafe to Move)

PG -7 and PG -2

Assume it has been fired, treat it as a blind and destroy in situ, if:

 If the primer (at the junction of the sustainer and boost motor) has been struck.
 The transmission channel to the boost motor is open, (if the tail of the PG-7 has been
removed/is missing.
 And/or the venturies behind the warhead are open, (On PG-7 only)

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Rocket Propelled
Grenade PG-7G
HEAT

Hole Open

Primer Struck
Venturies Primer
Open
PG –2 HEAT Rocket Propelled Grenade
(Fired)

Flash Transmission
Tube

SPECIAL NOTE: If the nose cone of the PG-7 or PG-2 grenade is missing DO NOT ASSUME this
means the grenade is safe to move. The major fuzing components are at the rear not the
front.

RPGs 16, 18, 26 and 27

Assume it has been fired if the rocket is found away from the launch tube. Treat as a blind
and destroy in situ.

If the launching tube has been extended and there is still a rocket inside, carefully hand
carry, with the muzzle and venturi pointing in a safe direction, to a nearby pit for
destruction. (DO NOT touch the fire button on top, or any other controls on the launcher,)

Bomblets

If the bomblet is away from its parent cluster bomb or carrier rocket warhead/artillery shell,
treat as a blind and destroy in situ.

Fuzes

If the Fuze is loose, out of its normal packaging, and the local population have been
tampering with the ammunition, assume the fuze may have been removed from a Blind
Artillery Shell or Mortar Bomb (As applicable); treat as a blind and destroy in situ

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PG 18
HEAT
Rocket (out
of Launch
Tube
Destroy in
Situ)

Launch
Tube
Folded

Bomblets

Launch Tube Extended (with Rocket

Inside Treat as Misfire)

Chemical Munitions
Sandbag Enclosure for Suspect Chemical
UXO
Chemical munitions will not be moved or
destroyed in situ, if found, or it is suspected that SandBag Wood Poles
the UXO is a Chemical Munition, they are to be Surround supporting
Sandbag
reported to the local Mine Action Authority. Roof

If the chemical munition is in a populated area,

immediately evacuate the area and build a
sandbag enclosure around the item. Pack around
the sides of the item with Fullers earth (If
available) or wood charcoal if not. Cover the top Plaster of Paris to
seal Adapter Shell Fuller’s
of the sandbag enclosure with sandbags, and Body Joint and Suspect Earth or
Filling Plug Chemical Charcoal
report to the local Mine Action Authority UXO
immediately.

The major rule which must be remembered is:

If in doubt treat as a Blind and Destroy in Situ.

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Evacuation

In any EOD operation, the primary objective is to safeguard lives. To achieve this objective,
where there is a risk of a UXB (Un Exploded Aircraft Bomb) or other UXO (Un Exploded
Ordnance) item exploding, or otherwise functioning as designed, it will be necessary to
evacuate an area to minimize the risk of casualties.

Immediate Evacuation

Evacuation must be enforced immediately after the presence of any of the following devices
is suspected, unless there is convincing proof that no explosion will occur.

 A recently dropped UXB (Un Exploded Aircraft Bomb)

 Other recently fired UXO (Un Exploded Ordnance)
 IED (Improvised Explosive Device)
 Limpet Mine
 Booby Trap

The presence of a long delay time fuze or the slow electrical discharge of the firing
mechanism of an electrically operated fuze, must always be considered with UXBs which are
reported within 24 hours of being dropped by an aircraft.

Limpet Mines and some IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) work on a time delay principle
so they could explode at any time.

Booby traps could explode if approached (may be tripwire or pressure pad operated)

Recently fired HE and Smoke Bursting WP shells/rockets could be Proximity Fuzed and if the
electronics within the fuze are still active the fuze could function if approached from the
front.

When any of the above mentioned devices are involved it is good to follow the procedure
outlined under paragraph Incident Procedure/EOD Task Procedure at the end of this chapter.

Old UXBs/UXOs

If the UXB or UXO has been lying in the position in which it was found for some considerable
period of time (Months or years) immediate evacuation should be unnecessary, as the
UXB/UXO will be unlikely to explode unless moved. (Unless you have reason to suspect it
could be a booby trap) Steps must be taken, however, to ensure that the UXO/UXB will not be
moved or tampered with by the local population and Evacuation must be implemented prior
to any EOD action which involves movement, render safe, fuze neutralization or destruction
in situ.

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Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR)

Having arrived at the scene of the UXO/UXB to undertake his reconnaissance, the EOD team
leader should decide what immediate evacuation, if any, is required and what evacuation
will be required when EOD action is to be undertaken.

Questioning of Witnesses

To determine if immediate evacuation is necessary, the team leader should find out:
 WHEN was the UXO/UXB discovered? (E.g. may have been found recently or may have
been found and known of for months)
 HOW LONG has it been there? (May have been recently uncovered whilst digging but is
rusty and has probably been there since the war with Iran)
 WHY is it there? (Was the area subjected to artillery bombardment or bombed by
Aircraft, was it an old army post or used temporarily by the Coalition forces?)
 WHAT is it? (Shape, size, colour, etcetera)
 WHO found it and WHO put it there? (Who put it there could be advancing Coalition or
withdrawing Iraqi forces)
 HAS IT BEEN MOVED? (If it has been moved, it does not mean it is safe to move but
eliminates chances of anti disturbance or tripwire/pressure release booby trap)

Liaison with Government/Local Authorities

Effective authorized evacuation can only be implemented with an agreement between the
team leader and a Government official or a representative from the local authorities,
etcetera.

Responsibility for enforcing the evacuation should lie entirely with the Government official,
with the team leader acting as advisor.

False Alarms

If the incident turns out to be a false alarm, the Government official or representative of the
local authorities should be given a copy of the relevant EOD task completion report with a
second copy being submitted to the RMAC.

UXBs/UXOs posing no immediate threat

If the team leader confirms the presence of a UXB/UXO, but finds that it does not pose an
immediate threat to life if undisturbed, he will inform the Government Official or
representative of the local Authorities, that in his opinion evacuation is unnecessary but that
protective measures should be undertaken to prevent interference.

Evacuation

Circumstances for Evacuation

The EOD team leader must recognize the fact that any EOD action undertaken against a UXO
or UXB which is considered to be unsafe to move or transport can result in the item

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detonating or otherwise functioning as designed. Extensive evacuation must therefore be
enforced when any EOD action is undertaken which involves:

 Movement of UXOs/UXBs considered unsafe to transport. (By remote Pulling or other

means)
 Any fuze removal or neutralization techniques.
 Low order explosive techniques. (E.g. use of CLC, Ballistic disc, etcetera)
 Destruction in situ.
 Excavation to a buried UXB/UXO (Final stages of excavation if deeply buried bomb)
 Any other action where there is the slightest risk that the UXB/UXO may function.

Anticipation of Requirements

Where evacuation is required, the EOD team leader should anticipate, in advance, the
extent, timings and anticipated duration and must inform the Government official or
representative of the local Authorities accordingly, and through him the local population.

Duration of Evacuation

Once evacuation is implemented, it must be rigidly enforced until the team leader declares
the area all clear, or he considers the evacuation no longer necessary.

Evacuation Plan

An emergency plan for the introduction of evacuation should always be prepared and
agreed with the Government official before work at the site of the UXO/UXB commences.

Plan for Minimum Disruption

Whenever possible, the EOD actions or demolitions, which make the evacuation necessary,
should be timed to impose the least restriction to industry and the lives of the local
residents. Evacuation affecting factories may best be done on Fridays, or at dawn before the
workforce is due to arrive or at night after they have left. Evacuation undertaken in
residential areas is best done during the day but not on Fridays.

Factors Effecting Plan

The plan for evacuation depends chiefly on whether the UXB or UXO, if it were to explode,
would exert its maximum effect above or below ground. A UXB, from which most of the
forces produced would be felt above ground as blast and primary fragments, is referred to as
unburied and one, which would damage mainly by the effects of earth shock, as buried.

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For planning purposes a UXB is
UXO / UXB is considered Buried when it is more than
considered to be buried if the 2.5 times its own length below the surface of the Ground
closest portion to the surface of
the ground is more than two
and a half times the overall
length of the bomb. (Including Depth of
UXO / UXB
the tail unit) 5.1 metres

Length of
UXO / UXB
2 Metres

Degrees of Evacuation

There are two degrees of evacuation which are as follows:

1. Complete Evacuation. In the area of complete evacuation, no movement whatever is

allowed and all persons are evacuated.
2. Partial Evacuation. In the area of partial evacuation all vehicles and fragile stores not
adequately screened must be removed. Rooms on the remote sides of houses (Those not
facing towards the UXO/UXB) may be occupied but access must be by shielded
approaches, and pedestrian and vehicular traffic will only be permitted where there is
adequate screening from the UXB/UXO.

PARTIAL EVACUATION
PERSONNEL ALLOWED IF UNDER COVER

PARTIAL FAR SIDES OF COMPLETE

EVACUATION BUILDINGS EVACUATION BEHIND
ZONE WALLS
NO
PERSONNEL IN
THIS AREA

COMPLETE
EVACUATION
ZONE

Windows Open Distances

When an explosion occurs near buildings, a large percentage of casualties to persons,

animals, vehicles, etcetera is caused by flying glass. Windows in the affected area should
therefore be open so that the pressure inside and outside the rooms becomes equalized and
glass breakage is minimized. It must be remembered that the blast pressure wave from an
explosion will force glass from unopened windows inwards but this will be immediately
followed by a suction phase, where a drop in pressure will be felt round the building and this
will cause unopened windows to be sucked outwards. For this reason windows on all sides of
buildings should be open during the period of evacuation.

Building Damage Distances

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A Buried UXO of 45 kilograms weight is likely to damage buildings of single brick, or
Mud/Clay construction to a radius of 20 metres. An Un-buried UXO of 45 kilograms weight is
likely to damage buildings of single brick, or Mud/Clay construction to a radius of 75 metres.

Danger Areas General

These distances should be considered as a guideline only for minimum evacuation and the
EOD team leader must take into account factors such as building construction or natural or
artificial surroundings which could cause screening from, or a funnelling of, the
blast/fragmentation effects. The team leader may therefore decide to extend the safety
distances if he believes the situation warrants it. When planning the evacuation considered
especially where the UXO faces an area of open ground and fragmentation could travel a
considerable distance before encountering an obstacle.

Minimum distances of evacuation that should be considered, regardless of the size of the
UXO up to a UXO weight of 50 kg, (Not Net Explosive Content = NEC) and even up to 250 kg.
(EOD Class 2) are as follows:

 Complete Evacuation = 50 metres

 Partial Evacuation = 150 metres
 Windows Open = 150 metres

The following table can be used as an absolute minimum evacuation. It is the evacuation
distances outlined in the Iraq SOP. (Standard Operational Procedures) It measures the UXO
from its total weight, not its NEC.

Safety Distances/Danger Areas (metres)

Buried UXO Buried UXO Unburied UXO Unburied UXO

UXO weight Protected Un-protected Protected Un-protected
(kilograms) Personnel Personnel Personnel Personnel
2 kilograms 10 metres 20 metres 20 metres 200 metres
10 kilograms 20 metres 50 metres 50 metres 400 metres
50 kilograms 40 metres 70 metres 70 metres 900 metres
250 kgs 120 metres 185 metres 185 metres 1100 metres
500 kgs 140 metres 200 metres 200 metres 1250 metres
1000 kgs 185 metres 275 metres 300 metres 1375 metres
3000 kgs 300 metres 450 metres 450 metres 1750 metres
5000 kgs 400 metres 575 metres 575 metres 1850 metres

In the table above the UXO weight equals:

 A 2 kilogram UXO would equate to a 60mm Mortar bomb.

 A 10 Kilogram UXO would equate to an 85mm HE Artillery Shell.
 A 50 kilogram UXO would equate to a 152mm or 155mm HE Artillery Shell, or a 160mm
Mortar Bomb.

The following table gives a more detailed danger area for specific types of UXO. This table
gives a higher degree of safety and is a good guide in determining evacuation distances. It

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also shows the reduction of the danger area when protective works are used for UXO
destruction in situ. (Same table as in the chapter Protective Works)

Danger Areas
Danger Area Radius in metres
Item on the Item in Item on the
surface undercut trench surface no
adequately adequately protective
No: Type of UXO sandbagged sandbagged works
1 Hand Grenades HE 100 100 200
2 Rifle Grenades HE 100 100 200
3 RPG Series Grenades 100 100 500
4 Hand Grenades AT (HEAT) 100 100 500
5 Mortar Bombs 50 to 82 mm 100 100 500
6 Mortar Bombs 100 to 120 mm 400 400 1250
7 Mortar Bombs 160 mm 400 400 1250
8 Projectiles up to 100 mm 250 250 1000
9 Projectiles 100 to 152 mm 400 400 1250
10 Rockets up to 100 mm 250 250 1000
11 Rockets 100 mm to 140 mm 400 400 1250
12 Sub Munitions 250 Don’t move it! 500

Incident Procedure/EOD Task Procedure

The following procedure outlines in more detail the different actions to be undertaking
during an EOD task. It is primarily required when it suspected that the device is any of the
types outlined in paragraph Immediate Evacuation.
1. Report by radio to HQ on arrival at the agreed Rendezvous. (RV)
2. Contact the local informant and question him. (Se the previous paragraph EOR;
Questioning of Witnesses)
3. If it has not already been established, establish a cordon, or if the cordon has already
been established decide whether it is adequate and whether it should be increased or
decreased.
4. Identify an Incident Control Point (ICP). This will be inside the cordon but not with the
Government Official or functionary In Charge (IC) of the incident. (If any)
5. Only personnel responsible for the Render Safe Procedure (RSP) should be at the ICP, all
others should be with the IC.
6. The location of the ICP should be checked for signs of mines and other UXOs to a radius
of 20 metres.
7. There must be adequate cover to provide protection against blast and fragments should
the UXB or UXO explode.
8. After questioning any witnesses the EOD Team leader should undertake a forward
reconnaissance to gather more information.
9. On return to the ICP the team leader should decide on an RSP and with assistance
prepare any equipment.
10. The IC or liaison officer should be kept informed of any actions to be undertaken and
possible consequences of such actions.
11. In selecting an RSP for a UXB in an urban area, remote fuze removal is always preferable
to explosive attack.

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12. Wherever possible the RSP should be carried out remotely.
13. The EOD team leader should resist all pressure put on him by others and be prepared to
walk away and rethink his strategy if appropriate.
14. Protective works must be in place before a Cut and Deflagration (C & D) technique is
attempted (Using Ballistic Disc or other low order techniques.) and if there is no risk that
the UXB is a long delay type recently dropped. It must be remembered that the success
rate for Ballistic disc is approximately 85% and that there is therefore a 15% chance of a
high order detonation.
15. Brief the IC and all EOD team personnel prior to attempting the RSP.
16. After positioning any equipment or explosive charges the team leader shall return to the
ICP.
17. After an attempt at an RSP, the team leader will personally observe the outcome either
remotely or on site. He should be aware that secondary explosions could occur.
18. Any plan must be flexible, and it is important that the EOD team leader is able to stop
and reassess as necessary.
19. If the RSP is successful, the results observed, a Completion Survey report is completed
and passed onto the RMAC.
20. The team leader should thank the Government Official and all who have assisted in
undertaking the task.

In instances where the suspected devices is not any of the types outlined in paragraph
Immediate Evacuation it may not be necessary to establish an ICP or implement an
evacuation plan prior to the team leader undertaking a reconnaissance and task assessment,
and the EOD team actually preparing to undertake the RSP. All other procedures outlined
are still applicable. Se paragraph Old UXBs/UXOs.

End of Evacuation chapter

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CHARGE PLACEMENT

Correct charge placement is essential to ensure that the UXO is completely destroyed and
that no explosives or other dangerous explosive components remain.

Safety rules:

Concerning charge placement and a reminder of some general safety rules for demolitions:

 Unsafe to move UXO shall be destroyed in situ and not moved or touched. Destroyed in
situ means destroyed in the exact place it was found.
 Calculate the fragmentation danger area.
 Use protective works in urban areas.
 Evacuate, post sentries and check with the sentries that the area is clear, before firing
the charge or lighting the safety fuse.

Charge preparation:

 Prepare the charge away from the UXO.

 Mould the charge to the approximate shape of the part of the UXO where you are going
to place it. (Don’t touch the UXO)
 Place the charge as near to the UXO as possible without actually touching the UXO.
 Place a sandbag on the opposite side of the UXO, if required. (Don’t touch the UXO with
the sandbag.)

Use of Shaped Charges

 Shaped charges are an economical method to destroy UXO, because less explosives is
required.
 Shaped charges can reduce the Danger Area of a demolition because less explosives is
required. (But can add fragmentation if the UXO is non-metallic.)
 They reduce the risk of accidentally touching an unsafe to move UXO since they are
placed at a greater distance to the UXO. (The distance between the shaped charge and

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the UXO is termed “Standoff”. The best effect, depending of what shaped charge that is
used and what UXO that shall be destroyed, is normally achieved with a standoff of 50 to
100 mm.)
 There is a better chance of achieving a “deflagration”/”low order demolition” with will
decrease the Danger Area. (But which will increase the “risk” that the UXO is not
completely destroyed.)

Top Attack with shaped charges

 Calculate the length of the “legs” of the shaped charge (The diameter/size of the UXO
plus the standoff.) and bend the legs accordingly.
 Prepare the charge away from the UXO. (Fill it with explosives.)
 Place the charge and measure the standoff. (Make sure the legs or the ruler does not
touch the UXO.)

Side attack with shaped charges:

 Prepare a small earth/sand mound next to the UXO, without touching it, to fit the shaped
charge, at the correct distance to achieve the standoff required.
 Prepare the charge away from the UXO. (Fill it with explosives.)
 Place the charge on the mound and measure the standoff. (Make sure not to touch the
UXO.)
 Place a sandbag on the opposite side of the UXO, if required. (Don’t touch the UXO with
the sandbag.)

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The following pictures demonstrate Charge Placement and Shaped Charge Attacks on
specific types of UXO:

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PROTECTIVE WORKS

To reduce damage from demolitions protective works are used. The aim of this chapter is to
lay down some guidelines which will assist in destroying UXO’s, with the help of protective
works, in a manner which will be safe to the EOD operators and which will cause the
minimum damage to property and reduce the danger area to the absolute minimum. This
chapter provides guidelines, and each situation will be different, with it own unique
problems to overcome. These guidelines are designed to offer possible solutions to difficult
situations and not mandatory procedures which must be followed to the letter.

There are several types of protective works:

 Sandbag Protective Surrounds

 Sandbag Protective Walls
 Sandbag Protective Mounds
 Demolition Pits
 Protective Trenching
 Abutments
Before the separate types of protective works are described we will go through charge
placements, UXO HE filling weights, UXO charge weights, use of shaped charges and danger
area reduction.

Charge Placements

Complete Rounds/Rockets

Complete rounds of ammunition (I.e. where the projectile and cartridge case is one
complete assembly) require two separate demolition charges fired simultaneously, 250
grams PE (Plastic Explosive) being sufficient for the charge on the cartridge case. Unfired
rockets also require a second charge to destroy the rocket motor.

HE Shells/Mortar bombs

Nose fuzed HE and HE frag shells / Mortar bombs, where possible, should have the charges
placed on the ogive immediately below the fuze. This is normally the thinnest part of the
shell and ensures that the fuze as well as the shell/mortar bomb itself will be totally
destroyed.

HEAT Shells

Anti Tank Shaped Charge (HEAT–High Explosive Anti Tank) shells should have the destructive
charge placed approximately one half of the way along the parallel portion of the body. This
should ensure total destruction whilst at the same time collapsing the copper cone and
minimizing the effect of the shaped charge itself.

Charge weights HE/HEAT. Generally speaking the weight of explosive contained within a
HEAT projectile is normally between 50% to 70% of that which would be contained in an HE
or HE Frag projectile. The exception to this is HEAT shells of below 85mm calibre where the
charge is sometimes higher than that of the HE/HE-Frag projectile.

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Illuminating Munitions

Illuminating (Base ejection) shells or mortar bombs pose less of a hazard than HE filled
shells/mortar bombs when being destroyed, but care must be taken to ensure that the
burning flare is not ejected towards buildings or inflammable materials. When Illuminating
Shells/Mortar Bombs are being destroyed near buildings or cultivated land, fire fighting
equipment must be available on site to deal with any fires that may be caused by the
burning flares.

UXO HE Filling and Charge Weights

The Following table shows charge and weight details of HE (High Explosive ), HE-Frag (High
Explosive Fragmentation) and HEAT (High Explosive Anti Tank) tank shells, artillery shells, or
mortar bombs, of 76mm to 160mm which may be commonly encountered. The Table does
not cover every shell or mortar bomb which may be encountered but is a representative
group of what is commonly encountered. The table also gives suggested weights for
destruction charges. The Charge PE (Plastic Explosive) in the table is the suggested Minimum
demolition charge that should be considered, based on experience, to achieve a successful
destruction. 250 grams of PE is one half of a packet and 500 grams is a full packet. (Of the
normal Danish PE we use.)

HE filling weights and suggested demolition charges

HE Charge Charge
Filling Proj PE 3A Seismic
No: Calibre Type Nature Weight Weight (Grams) S-3
1 76 mm A HE Frag 640 grams 6.2 kg's 250 grams 1 kg
2 76 mm A HEAT 750 grams 250 grams 0.75 kg
3 82 mm RCL HE Frag 460 grams 3.9 kg’s 250 grams 1 kg
4 82 mm M HE Frag 560 grams 3.2 kg’s 250 grams 1 kg
5 85 mm A HE Frag 780 grams 9.6 kg’s 250 grams 1 kg
6 85 mm A HEAT 970 grams 7.3 kg’s 250 grams 0.75 kg
7 100 mm T HE Frag 2.16 kg’s 16 kg’s 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
8 100 mm T HEAT 1 kg’s 10 kg’s 250 grams 1 kg
9 115 mm T HE Frag 3.1 kg’s 18 kg’s 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
10 115 mm T HEAT 1.5 kg’s 13.1 kgs 250 grams 1 kg
11 120 mm MH HE Frag 4.9 kg’s 19.8 kgs 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
12 120 mm M HE Frag 2.5 kg 16 kg’s 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
13 122 mm A HE 4 kg’s 21.8 kgs 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
14 122 mm A HEAT 2.2 kg’s 21.6 kgs 250 grams 1 kg
15 125 mm T HE Frag 3.2 kg’s 23 kg’s 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
16 125 mm T HEAT 1.9 kg’s 19 kg’s 250 grams 1.5 kg’s
17 130 mm A HE 3.4 kg’s 33.2 kgs 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
18 152 mm A HE 6.8 kg’s 43.5 kgs 500 grams 1.5 kg’s
19 152 mm A HEAT 4 kg’s 40 kg’s 250 grams 10 cm
20 160 mm M HE 9 kg’s 40 kg’s 500 grams 1.5 kg’s

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Use of Shaped Charges

The use of shaped charges to achieve deflagration (Low Order Detonation) can considerably
reduce any damage which may occur. There is a strong chance, however, that a High Order
Detonation (I.e. the UXO functions as designed) could occur and thus protective works
should be used even when a deflagration is being attempted.

Shaped Charges Limitations. Shaped Charges should not be used when using Demolition Pits
or Pits with Undercuts as the pit can collapse following the attempted deflagration and the
condition of the UXO may be impossible to determine without extensive excavation.

Danger Area Reduction

Protective Surrounds and Demolition Pits considerably reduce the danger area from
fragmentation. A comparison can be seen between UXO’s with protective works and those
destroyed without protective works in the table following:

Danger Areas
Danger Area Radius in metres
Item on the Item in Item on the
surface undercut trench surface no
adequately adequately protective
No: Type of UXO sandbagged sandbagged works
1 Hand Grenades HE 100 100 200
2 Rifle Grenades HE 100 100 200
3 RPG Series Grenades 100 100 500
4 Hand Grenades AT (HEAT) 100 100 500
5 Mortar Bombs 50 to 82 mm 100 100 500
6 Mortar Bombs 100 to 120 mm 400 400 1250
7 Mortar Bombs 160 mm 400 400 1250
8 Projectiles up to 100 mm 250 250 1000
9 Projectiles 100 to 152 mm 400 400 1250
10 Rockets up to 100 mm 250 250 1000
11 Rockets 100 mm to 140 mm 400 400 1250
12 Sub Munitions 250 DON’T MOVE 500

Sandbag Surrounds

32 & 80 bag Sandbag Surrounds

UXO’s below 85 mm calibre generally contain less than 1 kilogram of High Explosive and
adding a 1 kilogram charge to destroy them means that the total UXO main filling plus
destructive charge will not normally exceed 2 kilograms. This is called the Net Explosive
Content. (NEC) An 80 bag sandbag surround can drastically minimize the damage caused
when the UXO is destroyed in situ in an urban area, providing the NEC does not exceed 2.5
kg’s.

UXO’s above 85mm Calibre. UXO’s of 100 mm to 160 mm contain between 2 to 9 kilograms
of explosive and together with a destructive charge of up to 2 kg’s for the thicker cased

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items this can raise the NEC to 4 to 11 kg’s. An 80 bag surround can not significantly reduce
the blast/fragmentation effects of charges of this magnitude.

32 Bag Sandbag Surround 80 Bag and 32 Bag Sandbag

Surrounds (for NEC of not
more than 2.5 kg UXO and
Demolition charge)

160 & 240 Bag Sandbag Surrounds

As mentioned a 32 or 80 sandbag protective surround will not prove particularly effective in

reducing blast/fragmentation effects of UXO’s of above 85 mm calibre.

For UXO’s above 85mm calibre or demolitions with an NEC of more than 2.5 kg’s a 160 bag
or 240 bags sandbag surround should be used.

SANDBAG SURROUND For B E 160 Bag

(BASE EJECTION) CARRIER SHELL
Sandbag
Surround

500 mm

SURROUND For Nose Ejection SHRAPNEL SHELL

4 x Rows
of 40 Bags
per Row
500 mm

240 Sandbag Surround

240 Bag
Protective
Surround

4 Layers Deep x 60 Sandbags

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The internal length of the surround to accommodate Artillery Shells, Projectiles or Mortar
Bombs of between 85 mm to 152 mm in calibre should be no less than 1 metre. A 160 mm
Mortar Bomb needs an internal length of 1.5 metres.

Long Rockets Surrounds

Long rockets such as the 122mm BM 21 require the bulk of the sandbag protection to be
concentrated around the warhead section and a single sandbag thickness may be sufficient
for the motor section.

The sandbag wall thickness should PROTECTIVE SURROUND

FOR LONG ROCKET
not be reduced at the point at which 122 mm BM 21
the warhead joins the rocket motor
and should be at the same thickness
as the warhead section at least 500
mm behind the warhead

Sandbag Protective Walls

Sandbag protective walls have Building

proved very successful in limiting to be Protected

damage from large aircraft bombs PROTECTIVE

WALLS
and would therefore also prove Protective Wall

highly successful at limiting

damage from UXO’s. The sandbag Line of
Sight
protective wall is most usefully Building
UXO
to be
employed where the UXO is Protected UXO

unsafe to move, and therefore has Probable Crater Area

to be destroyed in situ, and is
within 5 metres of the wall of a
building (but not closer than 4.5 Protective Wall

metres).

The sandbag protective PROTECTIVE WALL

1.2 metres
wall must be sited close (width at Base) WITH 80 BAG
SURROUND
to, but not within, the
probable crater area Height
1 metre 80 Bag
from the detonation of 500 mm
Surround

the UXO. (In the case of UXO

a UXO up to 50 kg’s
weight the crater will not
normally be more than 3
metres in diameter).

The dimensions of the sandbag wall should be as follows:

 Length is made to suit the structure to be protected.

 Base = 1.2 metres wide
 Height = 1 metre.

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 Should have a sloping face (Towards the UXO) of 1 in 6.(1 metre horizontal to 6 metres
vertical)

Sandbag protective walls

can also be used in
conjunction with sandbag
protective surrounds (E.g.
an 80 bag sandbag
surround) to increase the
protection offered.

Protective Mounds
PROTECTIVE MOUND

Covering a UXO have proved successful Sandbags Wood Battens

at limiting damage, especially where
the reduction of upwards blast and
fragmentation is desirable. The charge UXO
must be placed next to the UXO and
detonating cords laid to the outside of
the mound before building the roof to
the mound.

The base of the mound is normally 4 SANDBAG PROTECTIVE MOUND

sandbags deep and 2 high. Battens are (Alternative)
then placed over the central cavity
surrounding the UXO to support the
sandbags which go on top and to
ensure that no sandbags are touching
the UXO.

SANDBAG PROTECTIVE MOUND

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Demolition Pits

Demolition pits are highly effective at absorbing horizontal fragmentation and blast effects
and channelling these effects upwards. Unsafe to move items can be pulled to a prepared pit
using pulling drills and a pulley next to the prepared pit. This may prove to be less labour
intensive and more effective than using a sandbag surround.

Demolition pits should have the following dimensions:

 Depth = 1 metre (minimum)

 Width = 300 mm (minimum)

The length must be suit the size of the UXO. Guidelines as follows:

 Length Artillery shells and Mortar bombs up to 152 mm = 1 metre.

 Length Complete rounds of ammunition 100 mm and 115 mm = 1.5 metres.
 Length Mortar Bombs 160 mm calibre = 1.5 metres.
 Length Rockets = Length of Rocket with fuze + 300 mm.

Demolition Pits-construction

The walls of the pit must be perpendicular and not slope inwards towards the bottom of the
pit. The detonating cord linking the charge to the detonator must be a minimum of 2 metres
in length.

Demolition Pits Roofing. Wood Sandbags

Wood Batons 50mm x 50mm

batons 50 mm x 50mm thickness, or
branches of at least the same
thickness, can be used at the top of Length to
Suit UXO
the pit to support a sandbag roof of Depth
four bags depth. This will 1 metre
minimum
considerably reduce the amount of
fragmentation projected upwards.

Width 300 mm
DEMOLITION PIT Minimum

Much of the blast effects of the UXO being destroyed in a demolition pit is transmitted
through the ground as Earth shock. (Ground shock) This Earth shock can, in close proximity,
damage underground wells, pipes, and foundations.

The distances within which it is possible that damage can occur is:

 225 mm brickwork = 15 metres

 Foundations = 15 metres
 Cast iron/concrete pipes = 8 metres
 Earthen ware/Brick sewers =13 metres
 Steel cables and steel pipes = 6 metres

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Demolition Pits with Undercuts

Demolition pits with undercuts (narrow excavations at the side of the pit) often prove to be
more effective than a normal demolition pit and even the upwards blast and fragmentation
effects are considerably reduced. Undercut Dimensions:

 The undercut itself should run for the Detonating Cord Link
Sandbags

length of the pit and should be 2.5 metres long

approximately 250 mm wide and 250

mm high. UXO

 Other dimensions of the pit should be

as for a normal demolition pit
250 mm
High
DEMOLITION PIT Undercut
with UNDERCUT

Pulling Unsafe UXO to the Pit: If it is planned to pull an unsafe to move UXO to the pit using
pulling Drills, the bottom of the pit should slope towards the undercut, and the undercut
itself should have a slight slope so that when the UXO falls into the pit it naturally rolls into
the undercut. The detonating cord linking the charge to the detonator must be a minimum
of 2.5 metres in length.

Sandbagging the Undercut: Once the UXO is positioned in the undercut and the demolition
charge placed, the pit can be filled with sandbags (Without touching or disturbing the UXO),
the detonator attached to the detonating cord and the charge fired. Normal precautions to
protect against damage from earth-shock, as outlined for demolition pits apply equally to
pits with undercuts.

Earth shock and W P: Pits with DETONATION EFFECTS IN DEMOLITION PITS

undercuts should not be used for

destroying WP (White Phosphorus) or
other Smoke Bursting natures.

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Protective Trenching
PROTECTIVE Trench must be
TRENCHING 0.7 metres (700 mm)
The effects of earth-shock on buried deeper than the
Service to be protected
Pipe to be
pipes and other buried services within UXO protected

the distances mentioned can be largely

eliminated if a narrow trench is dug
between the pit and service to be 0.7
protected. metre

The trench should be dug to a depth 700 Trench dug for Concrete
Pipe
mm deeper than the pipe or other length of Pipe
until distance
Trench
service to be protected. No cross bracing from UXO to
pipe exceeds
should be used as this can transmit the 13 metres

shock wave. Damage

Radius to
Concrete Distance
Pipes to Pipe
13 metres 10
Metres
Protective
Trenching –
Calculation of
length

Abutments Gap between top of

ABUTMENTS Sandbags and Cellar roof

Abutments (Sandbag supporting Building Walls Sandbag wall in Cellar

walls) can be used to protect UXO
building cellars or walls where the
UXO is physically too close to
allow trenching, protective walls
or sandbag surrounds to be
constructed. The abutment should
extend far into the cellar and
extend almost to the roof (with a
slight gap)

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Air Delivered Weapons
Definition

1. With few exceptions, air delivered weapons (ADW) are fin or parachute stabilised
and have a ballistic body, the shape and construction of which is adapted to the function of
the weapon, as is its fusing. Air delivered weapons may contain explosive, inflammable,
pyrotechnic or chemical compounds, or may deliver a non-explosive nature such as
propaganda leaflets or graphite. They can be delivered from fixed wing aircraft, helicopters
or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Background

2. The first specifically designed air delivered weapons were of German design. They
were first delivered in anger by the Italians and Spanish in 1911 and 1913 respectively and
their development continued throughout WWI. Bombs were hand-dropped initially but
were later carried on release units under the wings of aircraft.

3. Bomb development moved along apace during WWII and different variants were
developed for specific tasks, with weights ranging from 1kg up to 10,000kg. Since WWII,
many new designs have evolved, with an increasing emphasis on precision guidance to
obviate the need for pattern bombing.

Scope

4. This Chapter describes the generic types of air delivered weapons. It excludes
Guided Weapons and Chemical Weapons which, due to their complex nature and particular
hazards, are dealt with separately.

5. The characteristics and recognition features described in the Chapter were derived
during and immediately following WWII. Not all air delivered weapons fit perfectly into
these classifications and categories and anomalies may occur when the generic guidelines
are applied to some modern day weapons, some of which may fit more than one category.
The EOD operator should use the generic guidelines to focus subsequent investigation and
must always refer to the appropriate up-to-date technical manuals or database’s to
ascertain the correct Render-Safe Procedure (RSP).

CLASSIFICATION OF AIR DELIVERED WEAPONS

Types and Categories

6. The EOD operator must possess a good understanding of the types of air delivered
weapons likely to be encountered. Such weapons are classified generically by type and
further sub-divided into categories, as follows:

a. High Explosive (HE) Bombs.

(1) General Purpose (GP).

(2) Medium Capacity (MC).

(3) Deep Penetration (DP).

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(4) High Capacity (HC).

(5) Armour Piercing (AP).

(6) Semi-Armour Piercing (SAP).

(7) Fragmentation (Frag).

(8) Anti Submarine (AS).

b. Practice Bombs.

(1) Full Size Practice Bomb.

(2) Lightweight Practice Bomb.

c. Incendiaries.

(1) Combustible.

(2) Non Combustible.

d. Pyrotechnics.

(1) Markers.

(2) Signals.

e. Containers/Cluster Bombs.

(1) Amiable Container.

(2) Non Amiable Container.

Design Characteristics

7. The design characteristics which determine EOD action required for air-delivered
weapons are as follows:

a. The type of explosive filling.

b. The type, positions and number of fuses/pistols.

c. The thickness of the bomb case.

d. The charge/weight ratio.

e. The effects to be expected if the weapon detonates. The ratio of blast,

fragmentation and earth shock will be applicable to the ordnance type. For example,
a GP HE bomb gives all 3 effects, whereas an HC HE bomb gives predominantly blast,
with minimal or no fragmentation or earth shock.

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HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

Recognition Features

8. To assist with the recognition of HE bombs, both generically and for final
identification, the key point method should be used. The 7 key points are:

a. Tail.

b. Shape.

c. Suspension.

d. Markings.

e. Dimensions.

f. Fuse/Pistol Location.

g. Fuse/Pistol Type/Shape.

Tail

9. The tail unit’s main purpose is to stabilise the weapon during its flight. It orientates
the weapon correctly in relation to the target and may also provide some fixtures which
form part of the fuse/pistol arming process (e.g. the arming spindle and fork assembly in
British tail units). The tail unit is usually a non-explosive component (although some tail
units contain explosive fills or explosively activated components) and is attached to the body
of the bomb by a variety of methods. On some weapons, the tail unit is welded to the bomb.

10. When the bomb impacts, the tail unit usually become detached from the bomb case
and are often the first indication of a UXO. Since WWII, the development of faster aircraft
has resulted in the use of ballistic tail units (see Figure 4-1); these are longer and more
streamlined than those previously used and normally take the form of enclosed cones with
open fins. When a ballistic tail unit is fitted, it is an indication that the bomb was delivered
from medium to high level. For low-level bombing, retarded tail units are used. These are
generally much more robust in construction and have either a parachute or flip-out fins for
retardation (see Figures 4-2 and 4-3).

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Figure4-1 – Ballistic Tail Unit

Figure 4-2 – Parachute-Retarded Tail Unit.

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Figure 4-3 – Fin-Retarded Tail Unit

11. Country of Origin. Different countries have adopted particular shapes and styles of
tail units and this can aid greatly in determining country of origin.

a. British. Early British tail units tended to be a cone and drum shape, with clip
on or screw attachments, as shown in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4 – British Multi-Fin Cone and Drum Tail Unit

In 1939, an arming vane/arming fork assembly was added and this is still used on British

tail units today.

b. American. Early American tail units were of an open, square boxed shape, of
relatively thin construction and secured by a large nut, as illustrated in Figure 4-5.

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Figure 4-5 – American Bomb with Box Tail Unit

Due to this thin construction, American tail units corrode easily, and the operator may

only be left with a large nut in the rear of the bomb as a recognition feature.

c. German. German tail units consist of cruciform parallel fins on a cone type
tail (Figure 4-6). The leading edge of the fins is ‘cut off’ at a 45-degree angle. It can
be bolted on or be part of the bomb construction. It may also have a cross brace to
improve rigidity.

Figure4-6 – Cruciform Tail Unit

d. Former Soviet Union. FSU tail units may resemble British, American or
German tail units in shape. Additionally, FSU bombs may sometimes be fitted with
multiple fins and cones on drum style tails (see Figure 4-7). FSU tail units can be the
bolt-on type or, as is quite commonly used, welded as part of the bomb body
construction with pockets or wells to accept fuses and boosters. When this is the
case, the tail is filled with the main explosive filling.

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Figure 4-7 – FSU Multi-Fin Cone and Drum Tail Unit

Shape

12. The shape of an HE bomb is a quick way to identify it by its generic category. Each
country tends to have its own characteristic shape. Basic shapes are described in the section
on Bomb Characteristics.

Suspension Lug

13. The purpose of a suspension lug is to enable the bomb to be fitted to the suspension
or release unit fitted in the aircraft wing or bomb bay. Some suspension lugs also double-up
as lifting points for use during storage, preparation and ground handling. Suspension lugs
usually screw into location wells in the bomb body although some are welded to the bomb
casing during manufacture (Fig 4-8)

14. Most NATO ordnance is designed to be interchangeable and hence the weapon may
have many receptacle points in the bomb skin, or the facility to fit adapter saddles, to enable
the weapon to be fitted to aircraft from different NATO countries. Typically, the distance
between the suspension lugs is 35-75cm (14 and 30 inches) for NATO bombs and 25cm (10
inches) for FSU bombs.

Figure 4-8 Russian Bomb Lugs (2 on one side 1 on the other).

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Markings

15. Markings are usually in one or more of the following formats.

a. Colour Codes. Bombs may be painted in an overall role colour, with bands
and markings to indicate the weapon’s hazards. For example, a British MC 1000lb HE
(post 1964) is coloured deep bronze green to denote operational use, with yellow
bands and markings to denote HE filling (Figure 4-9). Different countries use
different marking and colour coding systems. The authoritative document for the
NATO colour coding system, which was standardised in 1964, is STANAG 2321 and
the colours are described in DEF-STAN 08-10. Prior to 1964 colour codes were not
standardised and are therefore not a reliable key to identification.

b. Stencilling or Stamping. In addition to painting, markings can be stencilled,

stamped or embossed on the bomb body (Figure 4-9). These markings give technical
information such as type and mark of the bomb, explosive fill type, manufacture and
fill date, plus any modifications to the weapon. In the case of British HE bombs, a
brass ‘kidney’ plate is attached to the rear of the bomb body between the fuse well
and the tail unit attachment ring. Markings such as this can be a great aid to
identification, especially if the ordnance has suffered impact damage and the normal
painted markings have been abrasively removed or obliterated.

Figure 4-9 – Markings

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Dimensions

16. Accurate measurements of relevant features of the UXO are key when referring to
appropriate publications or identification databases. However, extreme care must be taken
not to disturb the item of ordnance, the undergrowth or other obstructions when taking
measurements. As a minimum, the dimensions shown in Figure 4-10 should be taken,
although they may not all be available as tail unit and suspension units may have been
ripped off during impact.

Figure 4-10 Key Dimensions

Fuse/Pistol Location

17. The fuse/pistol may be positioned in the nose, tail or transverse, as illustrated in
Figure 4-11. The fuse/pistol position will further aid weapon identification; for example, an
AP Bomb would not have the facility to fit a nose fuse. Blanking plugs are normally fitted if
there is no fuse/pistol fitted to a particular fuse pocket.

Figure 4-11 Fuse/Pistol Location

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Fuse/Pistol Shape/Type

18. The shape of a particular fuse or pistol will give the EOD operator a good indication of
the type of fuse/pistol fitted, and therefore the probable role of the bomb (i.e. pre-impact,
impact, short delay or long delay).

CHARACTERISTICS BY CATEGORY

General Purpose Bombs

Shape - pointed nose, tapers from shoulder to base plate (teardrop) (Figure 4-12). Early
British and foreign bombs can be teardrop shaped, or of a parallel-sided design similar to
British Medium Capacity (MC).

a. Case - moderately thick (09mm - 12.5mm (3/16 in - 1/2 in)).

b. Charge/weight ratio - 33 – 60%.
c. Weight range - 9-2500 Kg. (20lb - 5500lb)
d. Effects - blast, fragmentation and earth shock.
e. Fusing - nose and/or tail, transverse sometimes in foreign GP bomb types, pre-
impact, impact, delay (long or short), anti handling.
f. Use - general bombardment.

Figure 4-12 GP Bomb

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Medium Capacity Bombs

20. MC bombs were designed by the British to replace the GP bomb in order to give a

standard explosive filling. MC is British terminology and looks similar in appearance to

foreign GP Bombs.

a. Shape - pointed nose, parallel sides (Figure 4-13).

b. Case - moderately thick.
c. Charge/weight ratio – 50%.
d. Effects - blast, fragmentation and earth shock.
e. Fusing - Nose, tail, pre-impact, instantaneous, long or short delay and anti-handling.
Use - general targets.

Figure 4-13 MC Bomb

Deep Penetration Bombs

21. Deep Penetration (DP) bombs appear similar to MC Bombs in basic shape, but are

extremely large with a solid nose and special ballistic qualities.

a. Shape - streamlined, tapering from shoulders to base plate (Figure 4-14).

b. Case - solid nose, thick case.
c. Charge/weight ratio – 50%.

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d. Weight range - 5450 Kg - 10,000 Kg (12,000 - 22,000 lb).
e. Effects - earthquake.
f. Fusing - multiple short delay, tail only.
g. Use - penetration (reinforced concrete targets).

Figure 4-14 DP Bomb

High Capacity Bombs

22. High Capacity (HC) bombs are designed to cause maximum blast damage.

a. Shape - may be conventional bomb shape, prefabricated or made up of

sections, but usually drum or boiler shaped (Figure 4-15).

b. Case - very thin.

c. Charge/weight ratio - 75-80%.

d. Weight range - 1000-7000 Kg (2200 – 15,500lb)

e. Effects - blast.

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f. Fusing - nose and/or tail (usually multiple fuse wells) pre-impact or impact

instantaneous.

g. Use - where maximum blast effect is required.

Figure 4-15 – HC Bomb

Armour Piercing Bombs

a. Shape - pencil shaped or streamlined (Figure 4-16).

b. Case - thick with a solid nose.
c. Charge/weight ratio - 11-20%.
d. Weight range - 500-1000 Kg (1,100 - 2,200lb).
e. Effects - penetration and fragmentation.
f. Fusing - tail, short delay.
g. Use - penetration of heavily armoured targets (reinforced concrete bunkers etc).

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Figure 4-16 AP Bomb

Semi-Armour Piercing (Older generation)

a. Shape - teardrop, moderately streamlined, similar to GP (Figure 4-17).

b. Case - reasonably thick.
c. Charge/weight ratio - 20-30%.
d. Weight range - 100-500 Kg (220 - 1,100lb)
e. Effects - penetration and fragmentation.
f. Fusing - tail, short delay.
g. Use - light armour (tanks, ships, lightly reinforced facilities).

Figure 4-17 SAP Bomb

Fragmentation Bombs

23. Fragmentation bombs are constructed of cast steel with often visible pre-formed

‘scoring’ to optimise the fragmentation effect.

a. Shape – various, dependent upon weapon size (See examples at Figure 4-18).
b. Case - thick. (maybe with visible fragmentation scoring evident).
c. Charge/weight ratio – 20%.
d. Weight range - 1-250 Kg (2 - 500lb)

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e. Effects - maximum fragmentation.
f. Fusing - nose and/or tail, pre-impact, impact.
g. Use - dropped either singly or from containers (clusters) against soft skinned targets.

Figure4-18 Fragmentation Bomb

Anti-Submarine Bombs

24. Early Anti-Submarine (AS) bombs had pointed noses with truncated cone adapters;

later bombs were made with flat noses. These bombs have now been replaced by depth

charges.

a. Shape - flat nose, tapering from shoulders (Figure 4-19).

b. Case - thin walled.
c. Charge/weight ratio - 60-75%.
d. Weight range - 45 - 270 Kg (100 - 600 lb).
e. Effects - blast with minor fragmentation.
f. Fusing – predominantly tail (possibly hydrostatic) or short delay.
g. Use - underwater targets.

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Figure 4-19 AS Bomb

PRACTICE BOMBS

25. Practice bombs are designed to have the same ballistic properties as the bombs they
represent. They are instantly recognisable by their light blue colour. Practice bombs should
not be regarded as inert as some mark their point of impact and consequently contain
pyrotechnics or explosives (up to 23kg). The main hazards with practice bombs are smoke,
flash and fragmentation effects.

26. Practice bombs currently in use fall into 2 main categories.

a. Full size practice versions of real HE bombs. These consist of a real bomb
casing complete with normal fusing facilities. They are filled, or partly filled, with
sand or aerated concrete.

b. A lightweight, economic range of bombs designed primarily for aircrew

weapon training. These are small bombs, weighing only a few kilograms each but,
because of their aerodynamic shape, have a performance comparable with the types
of HE bomb they represent (Figure 4-20).

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Figure 4-20 Practice Bomb

INCENDIARY BOMBS

27. Incendiary bombs cause significant fire damage and historically have proved to be

highly effective when used against built up areas. There are 2 types of incendiary bomb,

combustible and non-combustible.

Combustible

28. The body of a combustible incendiary bomb is usually made of a magnesium alloy,

which burns fiercely and is difficult to extinguish. Bomb initiation is by thermite, which

burns with a heat sufficient to melt steel. Combustible incendiaries are usually small (about

2"/50mm in diameter and 8-12"/200-300mm long) and weigh between 1-2kg. The fuses are

of a simple impact type and may be fitted in the nose or the tail. They are usually delivered

from containers, which may hold several hundred bombs. This type of incendiary is often

fitted with an explosive device to discourage fire-fighting efforts. This anti-personnel device

may take the form of an explosive charge in either the nose or the tail which is initiated

simply by the heat of combustion or it may have a more complicated device incorporating a

delay of about 5 minutes. An example of a combustible incendiary is shown in Figure 4-21.

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Figure 4-21 Combustible Incendiary Bomb

Non Combustible

29. Non-combustible incendiary bombs differ from the combustible type in that only the

contents are designed to burn. They are normally a conventional bomb shape with a steel

body (or converted aircraft fuel tanks) filled with a flammable mixture. Impact fuses are

usually fitted and a burster charge incorporated to break open the casing and ignite the

contents. An example is shown at Figure 4-22. The filling may be:

a. An inflammable liquid such as crude oil or petrol, usually mixed with benzene or
phosphorous.

b. A number of small combustible incendiaries. Some bombs with this type of filling
also incorporate a HE charge arranged so as to detonate several seconds after the
contents have been ejected.

c. A solid combustible fill with thermite cartridges.

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Figure 4-22 Non-Combustible Incendiary Bomb

PYROTECHNICS

General

30. Pyrotechnics are used for many different purposes including illumination, navigation

and signalling. They are filled with a variety of fillings and come in various shapes and

colours.

Colour

31. Pyrotechnics are categorised by the way they function into markers (Figure 4-23)

which function on the surface, and signals, which function in the air. The colour of a

pyrotechnic generally gives an indication of its use or role. However, colour markings for

pyrotechnics and explosive stores have changed many times over the years and the colour

coding should never be relied upon as a means of identifying a munition, merely as a guide.

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Figure 4-23 Pyrotechnic Markings

Markings

32. As with other types of ordnance, markings are applied to a pyrotechnic. They can

often be covered with a number of different markings, the purpose of which is to.

a. Provide all necessary manufacturing and filling details to assist inspection.

b. Enable pyrotechnics to be clearly and easily identified by the user under all
conditions of service, and provide the user with the maximum information possible
concerning the nature, type, function and hazard of the pyrotechnic supplied. These
are known as 'Hazard Markings'.

c. Ensure the pyrotechnics are correctly stored, handled and transported, according
to the nature of the hazard.

Pyrotechnic Disposal

33. Pyrotechnics may seem quite harmless but are inherently dangerous. The specific

hazard and disposal procedures associated with particular pyrotechnics are detailed in the

relevant publications, to which reference should always be made.

Safety Considerations

34. The following safety rules should be followed when dealing with pyrotechnics.

a. Photoflash and flare bombs are particularly hazardous. Typically the 8-inch
photoflash should be treated with the same caution as a 120 kg HE Bomb.

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b. Some pyrotechnics have little or no explosive but the nature of the filling can be
such that with moisture, dangerous flammable gases are given off which can be toxic.
Personnel should approach from up wind and avoid inhaling the fumes. If the
pyrotechnic is in an enclosed area, it should be ventilated to clear the fumes.

c. The chemicals normally used - calcium phosphide, red phosphorous, white

phosphorous and magnesium - will burn the skin. Personnel should therefore wear
gloves and keep arms and face covered.

d. Some devices are initiated by percussion, which may fail due to imperfections in
the striker mechanism. Personnel should therefore avoid dropping or jarring the
object, which may free a hung-up striker.

e. Some devices fire a signal flare 300-500 ft into the air. The munition should
therefore be picked up in the same attitude as found and always kept pointing away
from any personnel.

f. A partially burned pyrotechnic may re-ignite. Personnel should therefore avoid

looking into the end.

g. Pyrotechnics should never be put in water (fresh or salt) as this cause some
pyrotechnics to function

h. Liquid splashes on personnel or vehicles may re-ignite when they dry out.

i. If in doubt, further information should be obtained before handling any

pyrotechnics.

CONTAINER/CLUSTER BOMBS

Definition

35. Containers are a means by which multiple items can be delivered to a target. The

payload of a container may be of a non-explosive nature, but the payload of a cluster bomb

will always be of an explosive nature.

36. There are 2 types of container/cluster; aimable and non-aimable.

Aimiable

37. An aimable container is a bomb shaped weapon which functions after it has left the
aircraft. Aimiable containers (Figure 4-24) are usually fitted with pre-impact (airburst) fusing
and on operation of the fuse; the weapon opens and disperses the contents. The external
appearance of the container gives an indication of how this dispersion is achieved, either by
weakened portions on the weapon surface, detachable skins, ejection holes or ejectable
tails. These weapons are often relatively soft skinned and there is usually a reinforced area
or saddle where the suspension units are attached.

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Figure 4-24 Aimiable Container

Non-Aimiable

19. A non-aimable container (Figure 4-25) is retained in the aircraft and operated by a crew
member, scattering its contents over a large area as the aircraft flies over the target.
Modern versions are known as dispensers and usually have the smaller weapons projected
from tubes within the container in either a rearward, sideways or downward direction (e.g.
JP 233). This type of container may have the facility to be jettisoned after it has dispensed
its payload. Non-aimable containers have a far greater capacity than aimable containers and
the contents tend to be complex in their fusing.

Figure 4-25 – JP 233 No2 Mk1 Non-Aimiable Container

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Fuses and Pistols

Purpose

39. The purpose of a bomb pistol or fuse is that it is a device designed to initiate the

detonation, ejection or dispersion of a bomb filling at a previously selected time or position.

They incorporate devices intended to ensure reliable and effective operation of the bomb,

hence they are considered to be the most hazardous components of a UXB. Therefore, they

must be approached, handled and rendered safe following acceptable EOD practices.

Definition

40. Pistol. A pistol (Fig 4-26) contains no explosives and is used in conjunction with a

separate detonator. When a pistol is removed from a weapon then the means of initiation is

removed but the explosive train remains in place in the weapon. A pistol is not a hazard

once it is removed. Detonators are not normally removed from a weapon if it cannot be

confirmed that they have been fitted for less than 14 days.

Fig 4-26 - Pistol

41. Fuse. Bomb fuses contain explosives such as a detonator and magazine (Fig 4-27). If

removed from a weapon then the explosive train is broken. The primary high explosive will

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be located in the Fuse. Fuses that have been removed are still a hazard and require care in

handling, transportation and storage.

Fig 4-27 - Fuse

CLASSIFICATION

42. Before any Render Safe Procedure (RSP) is attempted on a pistol or fuse, the
following facts must be determined:

a. Condition. Is the pistol/fuse safe, armed or partially functioned?

b. Number. Is there more than one fuse fitted to the bomb? When more than one
fuse is fitted, it may be possible to deal with both fuses at the same time. Otherwise,
then the most hazardous should be dealt with first.

c. Type. Is the pistol/fuse impact-operated, airburst, influence, long-delay or anti-

disturbance?

d. Plan of Attack. Should the pistol/fuse be immunized, removed or attacked?

20. To aid the recognition of pistols/fuses, 3 criteria are used:

a. Position in store.

b. Method of arming.

Functioning action.

Position in Store

21. Pistols/fuses are classified by the position in which they are fitted into the bomb as
follows (Fig 4-28):

a. Nose.

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b. Tail.

c. Transverse.

d. Multi position – fits into more than one of the other positions.

Fig 4-28 Position in store

Method of Arming

22. Arming commences when the bomb is released from the aircraft, usually incorporating
some form of delay to ensure safe separation of the bomb from the aircraft. Arming is
normally accomplished by one of 4 methods:

a. Mechanical. The most common form of mechanical arming is the rotation of an

arming vane or spindle. The action can be direct to the pistol/fuse or delayed by the
use of gearings. Another method used is the ejection or withdrawal of an arming pin
or removal of a safety cap.

b. Electrical. In electrical arming, an electrical charge, supplied by either the parent

aircraft or a self-contained battery, is passed through a resistor capacitor circuit to
charge a firing capacitor. The delay to arming can be achieved by varying the amount
of resistance through which the charge must flow to charge the firing capacitor.
Another example would be that of electrical energy being used to move inline
shutters that have been keeping the explosive train misaligned.

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c. Electro-Mechanical. (Figure 4-29). Electro-mechanical arming is the use of
electric or explosive motors that perform a mechanical function to arm the
pistol/fuse. The electrical input is normally passed from the parent aircraft to the
motor, which may operate an actuator (electrical) or gas piston (explosively), to shear
a shear wire within the fuse. Sometimes these are ‘bolt on’ additions to older
pistols/fuses where increased safety distances for arming are required when flown
on newer/faster aircraft.

Electro-Mechanical Component As Fitted to a Fuse

Figure-4-29 - Electro-Mechanical Arming

d. Combination. (Figure 4-30). Combination arming incorporates more than one

arming action to increase the safety of the pistol/fuse. The figure illustrates a fuse
that requires a mechanical arming action through the ‘T’-bar and an electrical arming
action delivered via the electrical connector. Therefore one action alone will not arm
the pistol/fuse.

Figure-4-30 – Combination arming

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Functioning Action

23. The functioning action, also called the final action, can be divided into 8 groups of
operation

a. Impact/short delay.

b. Airburst.

c. Influence.

d. Hydrostatic.

e. Long Delay.

f. Anti-Disturbance/Anti-Handling.

g. Protective/Anti-Withdrawal.

h. Modular/smart.

24. These main groups can also be split down into various sub-groups, according to the
requirements of a specific bomb and pistol/fuse combination.

IMPACT FUSES AND PISTOLS

25. There are 3 basic types of impact fuses/pistols:

a. Direct action - nose mounted pistols/fuses.

b. Indirect action - tail mounted pistols/fuses.

c. Combination/All-Ways Acting - nose, tail or transverse mounted pistols/fuses.

Direct Action

26. Direct action fuses operate by the impact of the bomb either driving the striker rearward
into the detonator or primer (mechanical action) or creating an electrical current by closing a
switch in an electrical circuit (electrical action). This can be achieved in a number of ways, of
which the following are the main examples:

a. Shear Wire. The striker is retained in position, clear of the detonator, by shear
wire. On impact, the wire is sheared and the striker is forced rearwards into the
detonator (Figure 4-31).

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Figure-4-31 – Shear wire

b. Compression Spring. The striker is held away from the detonator by a spring. On
impact, the striker is forced rearwards overcoming the spring pressure, which
compresses to allow the striker to strike the detonator (Figure 4-32).

Figure -4-32 - Compression Spring

c. Diaphragm/Membrane. The striker is attached to a convex thin metal

membrane, in front of which is an open air chamber. On impact, the air is
compressed in front of the membrane, reversing it and pushing the striker into the
detonator (Figure 4-33).

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Figure -4-33 - Diaphragm/Membrane

d. Heat of Compression. A heat sensitive material is placed adjacent to an air

cylinder. On impact, the air in the cylinder is compressed either by a plunger action
or by the crushing of the cylinder. The air is rapidly heated by the compression and
ignites the heat sensitive material (Figure 4-34).

Figure -4-34 - Heat of Compression

e. Electrical. There are a number of ways of using the impact force to create an
electrical current or circuit. One method is to use a piezo-electrical crystal which,
when crushed, produces an electrical charge to fire an electric detonator. A second
method is to use a protruding plunger which, on impact, drives a magnet through a
coil to produce an electric current, which in turn fires an electric detonator (Figure 4-
35).

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Figure 4-35 – Electrical

Indirect Action

27. Indirect impact fuses use the inertia force of the bomb impacting to drive the striker.
Main examples of this type of pistol/fuse are as follows:

a. Compression Spring. A heavy striker is held away from the detonator by a

compression spring. On impact, the inertia force drives the striker forward,
overcoming the spring pressure and striking the detonator (Figure 4-36).

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Figure -4-36 - Compression Spring

b. Plate. A heavy striker is retained in position by a thin metal plate or soft metal
cruciform. On impact, the inertia force bows the plate/cruciform, allowing the striker
to move forward to strike the detonator (Figure 4-37).

Figure -4-37 – Plate

c. Cocked Striker. Steel balls within firing pin housing hold a spring-loaded firing pin
back. The housing itself is kept in position by a compression spring. On impact, the
housing overcomes the spring and moves forward allowing the steel balls to fall into
a recess, freeing the striker, which is then driven forward by its pre-stressed spring
(Figure 4-38).

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Figure -4-38 - Cocked Striker

d. Heat of Compression. Heat sensitive material is placed adjacent to a sealed air

cylinder. On impact, a plunger overcomes a compression spring to move forwards to
compress the air cylinder. Compression of the cylinder heats the air, thus igniting the
heat sensitive material (Figure 4-39).

Figure-4-39 – Heat of compression

Combination/All-Ways Acting

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28. Combination/All-Ways Acting fuses are used mainly for low-level bombing and for
transverse fusing where the pistol/fuse needs to function regardless of the angle of impact.

29. The interior of the fuse body has a cammed surface, inside of which is housed the
combination (all-ways acting) mechanism comprising of detonator and striker carrier. When
the pistol/fuse is armed, both the detonator and striker carriers are free-floating within the
body, held apart by a compression spring. On impact, the cammed surfaces of the fuse body
acting on the cammed surfaces of the detonator and striker carriers drives the 2 assemblies
together, overcoming the compression spring and driving the striker into the detonator.

30. A pistol/fuse operating at any angle of impact is called universal (Figure 4-40) and a
fuse/pistol which operates at all angles except one it is called Multi-Way Acting (Figure 4-41).

Figure -4-40 - Universal

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Figure -4-41 – Multi Ways

Short Delay

31. A large number of impact fuses have an option of utilizing a short delay before actioning
the weapon, e.g. weapon target penetration. They are grouped with the impact functioning
action fuses and not as a separate type.

Airburst Pistols and Fuses

32. Airburst pistols and fuses are designed to detonate the store at some pre-selected time
before impact with the ground. There are 6 main airburst groups1.

a. Mechanical time (clockwork).

b. Mechanical.

c. Electrical.

d. Pyrotechnic time.

e. Barometric.

f. Blast pressure.

Mechanical Time

33. Mechanical time fuses (Figure 4-42) use a clockwork mechanism that releases a cocked
striker at a pre-set time. The majority of mechanical time fuses are constructed with the
detonator held 'out of line' with the explosive train until the fuse becomes fully armed. The

1
Proximity fuses do have an airburst function but are generally referred to as influence fuses.

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hazard with this type of widely used fusing system is that the mechanism may jam during
operation and subsequently restart by movement or jarring of the bomb.

34. A recognition feature for this type of fusing is the presence of a graduated scale
engraved around the pistol/fuse body, on a movable ring, or inside an inspection window.
No attempt should be made to reset the graduated scale as a means of rendering safe the
pistol/fuse. Calibrated scale measurements differ between countries and the fuse must
therefore be positively identified before the time of functioning can be established.

Fig-4-42 - Mechanical Time Airburst Fuse

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Mechanical

35. Mechanical fuses (Figure 4-43) normally function by using either the pull of a lanyard or
by vane rotation to release a cocked striker, the delay of operation being determined by the
length of the lanyard or the number of vane revolutions.

Figure-4-43 - Mechanical Airburst Fuse

Electrical

36. An example of an electrical airburst fuse is the German WWII No 9 fuse (Figure 4-44),
which consists of a capacitor-resistor circuit containing a glow tube acting as a firing switch.
The fuse functions by placing a charge on an arming capacitor. In time, the charge passes
through the arming resistor to energise the firing capacitor. When charged to the correct
voltage, the gas in the glow tube ionises and allows the charge to flow through to fire the
igniter bridge.

37. A method of varying the time of operation is to pre-charge the firing capacitor to a
voltage less than the actual firing voltage, thus shortening the time taken to ionise the glow
tube switch. Modern electrical airburst fusing incorporates electronic delaying chips to
achieve a delay prior to firing, the electrical current being produced by a turbo-generator.

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Figure 2-4-44 – Electrical Airburst Fuse

Pyrotechnic Time

38. Pyrotechnic airburst fuses (Figure 4-45) incorporate a pyrotechnic delay which may be
initiated mechanically (e.g. with a cocked striker) or electrically by means of an igniter
bridge. Variable time settings are achieved by means of a graduated setting ring containing a
moveable powder train, or by actuating one or more igniter bridges if electrical initiation is
used. The hazard with this type of pistol/fuse is that it is possible, due to the effects of
temperature and/or humidity, for the powder train or delay element to smoulder at a slower
or faster rate than set, thereby initiating the bomb outside the preset time range.

39. Both mechanical time (clockwork) pistols/fuses and pyrotechnic pistols/fuses have
calibrated scales as a recognition point. The key difference between the two is that the
pyrotechnic pistols/fuses have vent holes to release exhaust gases from the pyrotechnic
train and which, if fired, exhibit a sooty deposit around the vent holes.

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Figure-4-45 - Pyrotechnic Airburst Fuse

Barometric

40. Barometric pistols/fuses (Figure 4-46) are designed to function through the increase of
barometric air pressure as a bomb falls. The increase in pressure acts on a bellows assembly
which gradually collapses, releasing a cocked striker at a preset height. It is usual for these
pistols/fuses to be armed by mechanical means, such as vane rotation, to allow safe
separation from the aircraft.

41. A recognition feature for this type of fusing is the presence of air inlet holes around the
pistol/fuse body.

Blast Pressure

42. Blast pressure fuses (Figure 4-47) employ a diaphragm/membrane striker assembly
which is operated by the blast or pressure wave created by the detonation of another store
ahead of it. If the pressure wave is insufficient to reverse the diaphragm, it operates as a
standard impact pistol.

43. During clearance operations, it must be remembered this type of fusing is sensitive to
nearby demolitions.

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Figure 4-46 – Barometric Airburst Fuse Figure -4-47 - Blast Pressure Airburst Fuse

INFLUENCE FUSING

44. Influence fuses are designed to detonate a bomb at some optimum point from the target
to maximise the effect of the weapon. They can be operated using any of the following
stimuli.

Stimuli Method of Operation

Radio. Active (electro The most commonly used form of stimuli. It functions by
magnetic wave) (Figure -) using the Doppler effect between a transmitted and
reflected radio pulse. When the outgoing and incoming
pulses reach certain amplitude, the firing circuit is
energised to fire the fuse.
Radio. Passive Sensitive to energy radiated from the target.

Light Initiated by the detonation of a photoflash bomb in close

proximity to this fuse. Not a common method in modern
fusing.

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Heat Dropped over an incendiary fire, the resultant blast from
the bomb is used to spread the incendiary fires.
Acoustic (Seismic) Uses the acoustic signature from the target to initiate the
fuse.
Magnetism Uses the magnetic signature from the target to initiate the
fuse.
IR/Laser Modern variations of the radio wave fusing, using the same
principles but with IR or laser beams.

Proximity Sensing Elements

45. It is possible to install a proximity-sensing element in the nose of a bomb. This is

essentially a radio wave fuse but contains no explosive train. The sensing element houses a
thermal battery to power the system and to transmit a firing pulse through cabling to a tail-
mounted fuse. The tail-mounted fuse is usually impact functioning, capable of operating
independently of the proximity-sensing element (see Figure 4-48).

TAIL IMPACT FUZE

CHARGINGWELL

TAIL FUZE WELL

CONDUIT FOR
PROXIMITY SENSING
ELECTRICAL CABLE
ELEMENT

Figure -8 - Proximity Sensing Element

Recognition of Influence Fuses

46. Influence fuses are complex in design. Some common recognition features are.

a. Usually larger than other types of fusing.

b. Normally contain aerial or sensor arrays, the appearance of which depends on

stimuli type (Fig 4-49)

c. May have a plastic/ceramic radome, indicates the possibility of radio wave fusing
(the aerials being hidden underneath the radome).

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Fig 4-49 Influence Fuse

Approach

47. If an influence system of the radio wave type is suspected, the approach to the fuse should
be from the rear of the weapon along its centre line.

LONG DELAY FUSES AND PISTOLS

48. Long delay pistols and fuses are used primarily for their nuisance value and to demoralize
enemy forces and the civilian population.

49. The 4 main types of long delay fusing are:

a. Chemical.

b. Material Creep.

c. Clockwork.

d. Electrical.

Chemical Long Delay

50. Chemical long delay fuses (Figure 4-50) are the most common type. They usually take
the form of a cocked striker held by a soluble delay component. During the arming
sequence, a container holding a dissolving agent (usually acetone) is pierced or broken and
this dissolving agent reacts with the delay element, dissolving it over a set period of time
until the cocked striker is released to fire the pistol/fuse.

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51. The length of delay is normally set at manufacture and is governed by either the strength
of the dissolving agent or the thickness of the delay element. However, the ambient
temperature at the time of use can affect both these components, low temperatures
retarding and high temperatures accelerating initiation.

Recognition

52. The majority of long delay pistols and fuses are enclosed within the bomb body to
protect them; time of delay markings may not be visible. Possible recognition features are.

a. A weakened portion of the pistol/fuse is designed to break off, leaving little of it

protruding thus hindering attempts to remove it.

b. A stub of arming fork visible, but sheared off after having been screwed in to
break the capsule.

c. The smell of acetone (nail varnish remover) due to leakage along the screw
threads.

d. Chemical corrosion from acetone at the head of the pistol/fuse (dependent on

material used in the manufacture of the fuse).

Fig 4-50 - Chemical Long Delay Fusing

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Material Creep

53. Material creep pistol/fuses (Figure 4-51) use a cocked striker held by a delay component
made from plastic or an alloy of lead and tin. Arming of the pistol/fuse subjects the delay
component to continuous stress, usually in the form of spring pressure. After the delay has
elapsed, the delay component yields to the pressure and releases the cocked striker.

54. Time delay is set at manufacture and is dependent on the strength of delay component
and strength of spring. Both are influenced by ambient temperature.

Figure -9 - Material Creep Fusing

Clockwork

55. Clockwork pistol/fuses (Figure 4-52) incorporate a clockwork mechanism which releases
a cocked striker or completes an electrical firing circuit. The delay can be preset at
manufacture or prior to pistol/fuse installation. The advantage of clockwork pistol/fuses
over other types of long delay is that the delay time can be set very accurately and will not
be affected by ambient temperature.

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Figure 4-52- Clockwork Long Delay Fusing

Electrical

56. Electrical pistols and fuses (Figure 4-53) incorporate a firing circuit energized by a storage
capacitor through a high resistance timing network after the pistol/fuse has armed. Impact
arming is a common feature of this type of fuse and can be used to align the explosive train,
remove any safety switches and complete the firing circuit. The delay is achieved by the
value of the resistance through which the storage capacitor leaks its charge to the firing
capacitor. When the firing capacitor has accumulated a sufficient charge, a gas tube or some
similar electronic switch conducts the firing charge to the electrical detonator.

57. A hazard with this type of pistol/fuse is that if the switching device malfunctions, it is
possible an electric charge may be held by the firing capacitor for up to several months.

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Fig-4-53 Electrical Delay Fusing

Anti-Withdrawal Devices

58. Due to the functioning design of long delay pistols/fuses, it is usual for some form of
anti-withdrawal device to be fitted to prevent EOD operators from removing the fuse (Fig 4-
54). These mechanisms could be separate, in which case they are classed as protective
fusing, or an integral part of the pistol/fuse mechanism. Anti-withdrawal can be achieved by
the following methods.

a. Clawed Foot. Once a fuse is fully armed, a clawed foot is rotated outwards. On
attempted removal of the fuse, the clawed foot binds and digs into the wall of the
fuse well.

b. Offset Groove and Ball. As the fuse is screwed into the fuse well, the ball runs to
the deepest part of the groove. If an attempt is made to remove the fuse, the ball
runs to the shallowest part of the groove and jams up against the fuse well wall, thus
preventing fuse removal.

c. Knife Edges. As the fuse is inserted, spring-loaded knife-edges deploy. Should

fuse removal be attempted, the knife-edges dig into the fuse well wall.

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d. Anti-Removal Sleeve. Mainly used on pistols. The retaining sleeve is locked into
the detonator head by a rubber washer. Any attempt to remove the pistol results in
the retaining sleeve being unscrewed, thereby releasing the striker into the
detonator.

e. Electrical Contact. An electrical contact switch is kept open while the fuse is in
the fuse well. Any attempt to remove the fuse results in the contact switch being
closed, thereby short-circuiting the current to the electric detonator.

Fig-4-54 Anti Withdrawl Fusing

Anti-Disturbance Fuses

59. Anti-disturbance fuses are designed to function on slight movement or disturbance of

the store. They represent a major hazard to EOD operators as some types are so sensitive
that the vibration from personnel approaching the store can be sufficient to function the
fuse.

60. Anti-disturbance fuses can be used singly or in conjunction with another fuse, normally
long delay. They can be installed to be hidden from view or even disguised to resemble other
types of fuses or bomb plugs. Functioning can be achieved by:

a. Electrical (Figure 4-55). These contain switches which complete an electric circuit
to the detonator. The switches of various types (e.g. trembler, mercury tilt) are often
arranged in a number of different planes and angles and wired in parallel to the firing
circuit.

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Fig-4-55 - Electrical Anti-Disturbance Fusing

b. Mechanical. These usually consist of a cocked striker, held away from the
detonator by some form of sensitively balanced retaining device. They are not
normally found in modern fuses.

Protective Fuses

61. Protective fuses (Figure 4-56) are essentially an anti-withdrawal booby trap mechanism
designed to prevent removal of a long delay pistol or fuse. The hazard with this type of fuse
is that it sits beneath the fuse it is protecting and is not visible.

Fig4-56- Protective Fusing

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MODULAR OR SMART FUSES

62. Modern fuses are becoming increasingly more complex and sophisticated (‘smart’) than
their predecessors. They have the facility to be computer coded on the ground and, as aircraft
technology advances, in an air during the aircraft sortie.

63. The coding enables a single fuse to carry out a range of different functioning actions
(impact, influence, long delay and anti-disturbance), negating the need for several different
fuses to carry out specific functions. In the event of one functioning action failing, they have
the ability for other actions to take over e.g. if the weapon fails to operate through influence,
(when set) it operates on impact. They may incorporate anti-disturbance and anti-withdrawal
mechanisms as an integral part of the fuse and as such they represent a major hazard to EOD
operators. An example is shown in Figure 4-57.

Fig- 4-57 - Modular /”Smart” Fuse

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GUIDED WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION

43. A Guided Weapon (GW), or missile, is a system which accurately delivers a warhead
to a target. GWs are guided to increase the probability of a warhead hitting a target,
enabling the use of longer-range, stand-off weapons thus reducing the possibility of
collateral damage.

64. This Chapter describes the classification of GWs and their component parts. It also
outlines the procedures required for carrying out GW reconnaissance.

CLASSIFICATION

65. GWs with similar characteristics present similar EOD hazards. The ability to place an
unidentified GW in its correct role and category allows the relevant safety precautions to be
observed when approaching the weapon to obtain positive identification. It also aids the
use of publications and databases to confirm identification.

66. For EOD purposes, GWs are classified as follows:

a. Air-to-Air Missile (AAM):

(1) Short Range, often referred to as Within Visual Range (WVR).

(2) Long Range, often referred to as Beyond Visual Range (BVR).

b. Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM):

(1) Tactical - not capable of delivering NBC warheads.

(2) Strategic - capable of delivering NBC warheads.

c. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM).

(1) Hand held, often referred to as Man Portable Air Defence (MANPAD).

(2) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD).

(3) Long Range.

d. Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM). There are 3 categories of SSM:

(1) Anti-Armour.

(2) Tactical (non NBC-capable).

(3) Strategic (NBC-capable).

67. Helicopter-launched GWs have the same generic characteristics as surface-launched

weapons and are classified as such.

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COMPONENT PARTS

68. The characteristics of a GW’s components reflect its role and category. The 4 main
components of a GW are (see fig 5-1)

a. Guidance section.

b. Control section.

c. Warhead section.

d. Propulsion section.

69. These are examined in more detail in the sections below.

Fig 5-1

GUIDANCE SECTION

70. The guidance section tells the control section where to steer. The 3 types of guidance
are:

a. Homing.

b. Command.

c. Pre-set.

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Homing Guidance

71. Homing guidance operates by means of a sensor at the front of the weapon. This allows
it to home into a signal from target. The 3 types of homing guidance commonly used with
GW are:

a. Radar Homing. (Fig 5-2). Radar guidance tracks a reflected radio signal. The
weapon has a movable antenna (dish) mounted at the front and covered by a plastic,
glass-fibre or ceramic fairing. This is ogival in shape and is known as a radome. On
some weapons, fixed aerials replace movable antenna and radome. Radar is the
most common form of weapon guidance and is suitable for most weapons, although
it is too complex and large to be used in hand held SAMs and is not commonly used
in short range SAM. Radar homing is often employed on GWs that engage targets
beyond visual range.

Fig 5-2 – Radar Homing - Radome and Seeker

b. Infra-Red (IR) Homing. (Fig 5-3). IR guidance tracks heat sources and has a clear
or opaque (smoked) glass dome covering a sensor at the front of the weapon. The
sensor will be some form of gimballed ‘eye’ with a silvered mirror behind it. Other
forms of guidance (electro-optical and laser homing) also utilise a glass dome but
only IR weapons have opaque domes. Although used against a range of targets,
aircraft exhausts are the primary heat source. IR weapons have limited range and are
most commonly used in short range AAM and hand held and short range SAM.

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Fig 5-3 - IR Homing Guidance (smoked glass dome)

c. Laser Homing. (Fig 5-4). Laser guidance tracks reflected energy from a laser
beam fired at a target. It consists of a glass dome at the front of a weapon covering a
gimballed ‘eye’. Unlike IR guidance, it has clear glass and a gold coloured mirror.
Laser guidance is normally found on tactical air to surface weapons and laser guided
bombs (LGBs).

Fig 5-4 - Laser Homing Guidance

Command Guidance

72. Command guidance operates via a link at the rear of the weapon through which it
receives steering instructions after launch. For EOD purposes, there are 4 types of command
guidance commonly used with GW:

a. Wire Command. (Fig 5-5). Wire guidance uses thin electrical wire to send
steering information from the firing point to the weapon. A spool or spools of wire
fitted to the rear of the weapon remain connected to the firing position and payout
after launch. An advantage of wire guidance is its immunity to countermeasures.

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Limitations are the practical maximum length of wire (typically 5km) and the speed of
wire payout (subsonic). This means wire guidance is suitable only for SSM anti-
armour.

Fig 5-5 - Wire Command Guidance

b. Radio Command. Radio guidance uses radio waves to send steering information
from a command position to the weapon, the steering information being received by
rearward facing aerials on the weapon. Radio aerials can be plastic or metal and are
insulated from the main body of the weapon. They may appear as conventional
looking aerials (Fig 5-6) or square/rectangular cross sectional metal tubes (Fig 5-7).
Many GW will have a single rear facing aerial acting as a data link. The key
identification feature of radio guidance is two or more rear-facing aerials. Multiple
aerials ensure the airframe of a manoeuvring weapon does not screen the radio
guidance from its steering information. The need for a constant, secure link means
that radio guidance is not suitable for AAM and SSM and thus a radio command GW
will always be ASM or SAM.

Fig 5-6 - Radio Command Guidance Aerials (Roland)

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Fig 5-7 – Box-Type Radio Command Guidance Aerials

c. Beam-Riding. Beam-riding guidance uses a beam of energy pointing at a target,

the weapon being programmed to position itself in the centre of the beam. Provided
the beam remains trained on the target, the weapon will hit it. Modern beam-riding
weapons use laser technology and have a rear-facing glass window or windows. The
fact that line of sight is required means that beam-riding weapons will be SAM hand
held or SSM anti-armour.

d. Electro-Optical. Electro-optical (TV) guidance uses a camera in the front of the

weapon to identify and track its target (Fig 5-8). Depending on attack profiles, this
can be a conventional TV camera, a Low Light Television (LLTV) camera, or an Imaging
Infra-Red (IIR) camera. The camera will be housed behind a large, clear glass dome.
The need for target recognition, before or after launch, means that electro-optical
guidance is suitable only for ASM.

Fig 5-8 – Electro-Optical Command Guidance

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Pre-Set Guidance

73. For pre-set guidance, a weapon follows a route programmed in before launch. Used on
its own, it is not suitable for use against mobile targets although it can be used to position a
weapon in the general target area (mid-course guidance) before another type of guidance
(terminal guidance) takes over. Most forms of pre-set guidance are internal and may be
difficult to identify. Examples include.

a. Inertial. Inertial guidance uses a system of accelerometers and gyroscopes to

sense any deviation from a programmed flight plan. It is completely self-contained
but is the least suitable form of guidance for precision accuracy. It is often used as
mid-course guidance and in strategic weapons where pinpoint accuracy is not a
requirement.

b. Celestial. Celestial guidance uses distinctive fixed star formations as reference

points. Celestial guidance is only used in Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). These are classified as SSM
Strategic.

c. GPS. GPS guidance uses satellites to provide navigational reference from fixed
points. This can be very accurate but relies on satellite access and can be jammed.
GPS guidance is used in cruise missiles (ASM and SSM Tactical and Strategic) and
guided high explosive bombs.

d. Terrain Comparison (TERCOM). TERCOM guidance uses a stored radar map of

the programmed flight path to compare the actual flight. This can be very accurate
and only brief radar transmissions are necessary at waypoints. TERCOM guidance is
used in cruse missiles (ASM and SSM Strategic).

Guidance Section Hazards

74. Potential hazards associated with the guidance section are Radio Frequency (RF)
emissions, high voltages, high-pressure coolants, toxins, and carcinogens.

CONTROL SECTION

75. The control section of a GW performs 2 functions; it steers the weapon, acting on
instructions from the guidance section, and it controls the power and cooling required for
the other sections.

Weapon Steering

76. GWs can be steered by movable control surfaces or by altering the angle of the
propulsion exhaust. Movable control surfaces (Fig 5-9) require considerable power in a high-
speed weapon but they provide good manoeuvrability. Altering the angle of the propulsion
exhaust (Fig 5-10) also provides manoeuvrability and requires less power, although steering
is lost if the propulsion system runs down. Both types are common.

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Fig 5-9 - Movable Control Surface

Fig 5-10 - Altering Angle of Propulsion Exhaust

Rollerons

77. Many GWs are highly manoeuvrable and hence unstable. They require gyroscopic
stabilisation to allow them to fly without losing control. This places power and weight
demands on the weapon. Many short range AAMs use a simple method of gyroscopic
stabilisation known as rollerons (Fig 5-11). These are located on the wing trailing edges and
are driven by air passing over them. They differ in design but all work in a similar way. If
present, they normally confirm the weapon’s classification as AAM Short Range.

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Fig 5-11 – Rolleron’s

Steering Power

78. GWs need a power source to move control surfaces or to alter the propulsion exhaust.
Examples of power sources include pneumatics (high pressure air bottles), hydraulic
accumulators (high pressure liquids); diverting some of the propulsion exhaust gases to
provide pressure and low explosive charges that are ignited to provide pressure and
electrical energy. Steering power demands vary according to the weapon’s role and
category. Short-range, low speed weapons launched in the direction of their intended target
(SSM anti-armour) make minimal demands whereas high-speed, manoeuvring weapons
(AAM and SAM) have substantial power demands.

Electrical Power

79. Whatever the power source for steering, all GWs need an electrical power source for the
guidance and warhead sections. Electrical power can be provided by thermal batteries, wet
or dry cell batteries, or a turbo-generator driven by low explosives, liquid fuels, air pressure
or the propulsion exhaust. A key consideration in GW disposal is the length of time after
firing the electrical power source is capable of providing sufficient power to initiate the
weapon.

WARHEAD SECTION

Warhead Components

80. GWs are designed as a system and the component parts of the warhead section are
located in the optimum effective position within the weapon. The component parts of a
warhead section are the fuze(s), the Safety and Arming Device (SAD), and the warhead itself
(the payload). These may be grouped together or located around the weapon. As GW are
relatively complex systems, initiation is almost always by electrical means.

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Fuze Options

81. The fuze is the sensor that tells the warhead when to detonate. It differs in classification
from the fuzing on air-dropped weapons in that it contains no explosives; it performs the
‘functioning’ action only. There are 3 possible fuzing types fitted to GW.

a. Contact Fuzing. All GWs are fitted with a contact fuze, either as the primary
option or as a back-up. They are classified as ‘contact’ rather than ‘impact’ because
possible initiation options include break-wires, piezo-electric crystals, and crush
switches that require minimal pressure to operate. As with air-dropped weapons
classification, contact can include the incorporation of a short delay to allow target
penetration. Multiple contact fuze systems are very common.

b. Proximity Fuzing. Because of the difficulties of achieving a direct hit on a fast

moving target, almost all GWs designed for use against aircraft (AAM and SAM) will
have side-looking proximity fuzes fitted (Fig 5-12 and 5-13). It is potentially
hazardous to approach an unidentified unexploded GW from the side. Many ASM
and SSM will also have proximity fuzing fitted to the front or underside of the
weapon to enhance the warhead effects, and there are safety implications in
approaching such weapons from the front. Common sensors used in both sideways
and forwards looking proximity fuzing are Radio Frequency (RF), Laser, and Active IR.

Fig 5-12 - Sideways-Looking Laser Proximity Fuze

Fig 5 - Sideways-Looking Radio Proximity Fuze

c. Self-Destruct Fuzing. GWs used over friendly positions are likely to have self-
destruct fuzes fitted. All AAM and SAM fall into this classification. ASM and SSM are

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used over enemy positions and are not normally fitted with self-destruct fuzing.
Common methods of achieving self-destruct are loss of command signal on
command guided weapons, time delay, or power run-down. The disconnection of
electrical connections on weapons with power run-down self-destruct fuzing could
initiate the warhead.

Safety and Arming Device

82. The SAD performs 3 main functions:

a. Provides safety breaks before weapon launch.

b. Arms the weapon after launch.

c. Links the fuze or fuzes to the warhead.

83. In air-dropped weapon terms, SAD performs the arming actions and initiates the
explosive train. It contains the primary high explosive and is likely to contain a booster or
boosters.

84. Because SADs are an integral part of a weapon system, they cannot be identified
generically, unlike air-dropped weapon pistols/fuzes. However, SADs need to receive an
electrical input from their fuze(s) and will be in intimate contact with the warhead to initiate
the explosive train. An important point is that SADs are a common location for self-destruct
fuzing, if fitted.

Warhead

85. The warhead will be optimised to defeat targets for which the GW has been designed.
The main types of warhead are:

a. Armour Defeating. GWs designed for use against armour use a shaped charge
warhead. Some weapons are fitted with 2 shaped charges (tandem shaped charge)
to overcome the effects of Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA), which is designed to
disrupt the plasma jet of the shaped charge. Other weapons attack the thinner, top
armour using downward facing shaped charges.

b. Anti-Aircraft. Weapons designed for use against aircraft are designed to function
as they fly by the target. This means the warhead is designed to produce most
effects in a sideways, or annular, direction. The most common warhead used against
aircraft is an Annular Blast Fragmentation (ABF) type designed for maximum effect at
both high and low level. A variation on this is the Expanding Rod warhead, where
rods of steel are welded together at each end and protected from the explosives by
packing. Detonation throws the rods out in a spinning ring that ‘saws’ through the
target until the ring reaches its maximum extent and breaks up (Fig 5-14). This type
of warhead needs to be over a certain size to be effective and is not suitable for
smaller weapons. Other types of warhead designed for use against aircraft are blast,
which are used in small, light weapons against low level targets (SAM Hand Held),
and multiple shaped charge, where numerous small shaped charges are incorporated
into the annular surface of the warhead (used in some French short-range SAMs) (Fig
5-15).

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Fig 5-14 - Continuous Rod Warhead (CROW)

Fig 5-15 - Multiple Shaped Charge Warhead

c. Missiles and Strategic Warheads. Strategic weapons are capable of carrying NBC
warheads, which means the weapon must be over a certain size. Although difficult to
generalise, a guide to weapon sizes is included in Annex A.

d. Other Warhead Types. Anti-ship weapons may use a Misznay-Schardin plate,

with larger weapons incorporating a forward-looking proximity fuze to allow the slug
to form effectively. A variation is a semi armour-piercing warhead incorporating a
short delay to allow target penetration (Fig 5-16). Other types of warhead in service
include sub-munitions, blast, fragmentation, penetration, and thermo-baric (fuel/air).
Some weapons use non-explosive warheads such as shot (kinetic energy), copper
wire or graphite powder (for use against electricity grids).

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Fig 5-16 – Semi Armour-Piercing Warhead

PROPULSION SECTION

86. There are 2 methods of propulsion used by GW; air-breathing engines and rocket
motors. Although most GWs have a propulsion section, this is not always the case; e.g.
guided bombs delivered from aircraft and guided projectiles fired from heavy artillery.

Air-Breathing Engines

87. Air-breathing engines are only used in weapons that need to travel a significant distance
to their target. They can be either:

a. Ramjet. Although an air-breathing engine gives a weapon longer range, ramjets

must travel at supersonic speed to compress the air before it is mixed with the fuel
and burnt. A ‘shock cone’ in the intake compresses the air, but the weapon must be
at supersonic speed before the ramjet works. The extra drag created by travelling
supersonically also degrades overall range potential. Ramjets are most suitable for
use against high-speed targets and are used in a number of in-service SAM Long
Range. They have also been specified for use in next generation AAM Long Range.

b. Turbo-Jet. Turbo-jets are optimised for long-range performance but will not
propel a weapon at supersonic speed. This means they are not suitable for use
against aircraft. Turbo-jets used in GW are miniature aircraft engines and, as they
are very expensive, are generally only used against high-value targets. Turbo-jets will
have a simple intake, lacking the ramjet’s shock cone. They may also have a low
explosive charge to deploy or to clear the air intake.

Rocket Motors

88. Rocket motors can be either solid fuel or liquid fuel:

a. Solid Fuel. Solid fuel rocket motors are used in the majority of GW propulsion
sections as they are powerful and do not present any significant storage and handling

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problems. Low explosives provide the propulsive impetus. The main disadvantage is
that once burning, the rate of thrust cannot be varied. The cross-section of solid fuel
rocket motor propellant is often shaped to influence the rate of burn and this is a key
identification feature of solid fuel rocket motors (Fig 5-17).

b. Liquid Fuel Rocket Motors. Liquid fuel rocket motors tend to be used in older
weapons and the weapon needs to be over a certain size to accommodate its
complex propulsion system. Many of these older weapons are still in service and
liquid fuel is also used as a means to provide power in many GW control sections.

Fig 5-17 - Solid Fuel Rocket Motor Propellant Grain

Propulsion Section Hazards

89. Hazards associated with air-breathing engines are flammable liquids, such as kerosene or
paraffin, and possibly also low explosive charges. The primary hazard associated with solid
fuel rocket motors is low explosives. Hazards associated with liquid fuel rocket motors are
the presence of highly volatile, toxic, and possibly corrosive liquids.

Propulsion Section Make-Up

90. Many GWs have 2 parts to their propulsion section; a booster section and a sustainer
section. If fitted, the booster section will always use a solid fuel rocket motor or motors.

In-Line Boosters

91. In-line boosters, although separate from the sustainer, are incorporated within the main
airframe of the weapon. This ensures the weapon is more streamlined. The booster is not
jettisoned at burnout. The presence of 2 rocket motors might not be immediately apparent
but is particularly significant for charge placement if a demolition procedure is being carried
out.

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External Boosters

92. Tandem boosters attach to the back of the main weapon. Wrap-round boosters are
multiple boosters fitted around the main weapon, and strap-on boosters attach underneath
the main weapon. All external boosters create high drag and are jettisoned immediately on
booster burnout. Because of the high drag factor, external boosters are only fitted to
surface-launched weapons.

GW RECONNAISSANCE AND DISPOSAL

Characteristics of Impacted GWs

93. GWs are of relatively fragile construction and can be expected to break up on impact,
possibly into their component sections (see Fig 5-19 and 5-20). Parts may be scattered over
a large area and are likely to display the following characteristics:

a. The warhead is likely to have detached and travelled furthest from the point of
impact. It may be buried.

b. The thin metal cases of burnt-out solid fuel rocket motors will have distorted on
impact. If liquid fuelled, it is likely that residual fuel will remain in fuel tanks and
lines.

c. Pressurised containers are likely to have survived impact but may be fractured
and in a dangerous condition. Piping may still be pressurised.

d. Although GW are generally designed to provide high levels of power for a short
period of time, capacitors and batteries can hold a charge for a considerable period.
Electrically initiated warheads and motors can function as a result of exposure to RF
hazards.

Fig 5-19 - Missile and Pylon from Crashed Aircraft

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Fig 5-20 - Impacted Missile (TOW 2)

Arrival Procedures

94. Thorough questioning of witnesses and use of information sources may lead to a positive
identification and a reason for weapon failure. The RF environment that the weapon is in is
important, as any change to this environment could induce power to damaged or dormant
circuits and components, with possibly catastrophic results. The RF status quo should
therefore be maintained at all times.

Remote Reconnaissance

95. The potentially large impact area means a remote reconnaissance should be conducted
whenever practical. Any high ground providing an overview of the area should be used to
locate all parts and identify likely hazardous components. Particular attention should be
paid to the possible presence of liquid fuels (i.e. vapour type and drift). The weapon may be
identifiable by size, shape, colour coding and markings. If the target is known, the likely
warhead and fuzing can be deduced. Remote reconnaissance should also be used for
checking for secondary hazards, such as selecting an approach route, establishing a suitable
demolition firing point, and selecting a decontamination area if required.

Close-in Reconnaissance

96. The aim of any close-in reconnaissance is to positively identify the item. This allows all
relevant safety precautions to be taken and an appropriate RSP to be selected.

97. To minimise possible hazards, an unidentified GW must, whenever possible, be

approached at an angle of between 10 and 30º from the rear, (see Fig 5-21). This reduces
the hazard from any homing sensors, proximity fuzing, and propulsion exhaust. Due to the
possible hazard of static electricity, the potential difference between the EOD operator and
the UXO must be equalised. This can be achieved by carrying out earthing procedures whilst
operating within the immediate vicinity of the weapon.

98. Key identification features will be the weapon diameter and wingspan, and any
markings. It may be difficult to calculate the length of an impacted weapon, but all relevant
measurements and features should be noted.

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Fig 5-21 - Safe Approach Routes

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EOD Task Management

INTRODUCTION

Objectives of an EOD Task

1. The objectives of an EOD task are;

a. To remove ordnance that is a hazard to life, or property.

b. To return the situation to normal so that effected people or communities can go

about their daily lives as before without the threat of UXO contamination.

2. Elimination of the UXO hazard may involve use of Render Safe Procedures (RSP’s),
destruction of the item in place, or its removal from the area where it poses a hazard. The
preferred and safest method of eliminating an EOD hazard is to blow the item in situ.

3. Where explosive ordnance remains after elimination of the hazardous situation, its
final disposal may be accomplished in a number of ways. Disposal may be specified by the
tasking authority where further service or intelligence use is desired. When requirements for
recovery are not specified, the preferred method is to remove the hazardous components to
a demolition area and destroy them by detonation.

Phases of an EOD Operation

4. An EOD operation can be split into 10 generic phases. The phases, which may vary in
sequence and may not all be applicable to every EOD task, are as follows:

1. Tasking, Preparation and Deployment.

2. Arrival Procedures & Question Technique.
3. Location.
4. Access.
5. Reconnaissance.
6. Identification and Diagnosis.
7. Damage Limitation.
8. Render Safe Procedure (RSP).
9. Site Remediation.
10. Reporting.

Key Activities

5. In addition to the distinct phases of the operation, a number of key activities will occur
throughout the task. These are:

a. Evaluation and continual threat assessment.

b. Planning.
c. Command and Control.

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TASKING, PREPERATION & DEPLOYMENT

6. The tasking of EOD tasks or operations are normally the responsibility of the National
Mine Action Authority or a designated authority such as the UNMAC. This procedure will
vary from country to country, but in all cases information will have been gathered or
reported about the UXO or suspected UXO threat. This may be in the format of an IMSMA
report or by radio message from a tasking authority, in any case the EOD operator should be
given authority via the tasking request to deal with the EOD task.

7. Before planning to deploy to the EOD task the EOD operator or team leader should
gain as much information as possible to aid in preparing. The description and location of the
item may have been reported, this will help decide if extra resources, specific equipment or
man power is needed to deal with the task.

8. Once all sources of information have been exhausted and any necessary equipment
has been prepared the EOD operator or team should deploy to the task, the selected route
should take into account any information that may be a factor in which direction to
approach the task location, for example upwind of a crashed missile that may contain toxic
liquid propellant, or a leaking white Phosphorous munition. The route should always where
possible be a known safe route, i.e hard metalled road.

ARRIVAL PROCEDURES & QUESTIONING TECHNIQUE

Arrival Procedures

9. The operator or team should attempt to stop a minimum of 100m prior to the
reported location, again in a safe area or on a road if possible. This is an initial safe distance
until more information can be gained about the threat or UXO, and then can be adjusted
accordingly,

10. The team should always remain on hard ground or a known safe area upon reaching
this initial 100m safe distance. Use of buildings or other features that will afford some level
of protection should be utalised if available.

11. A check of the immediate area should be conducted to ascertain if there are other
UXO in the vicinity, the distance of this 360 degree check is dependant on the ground and
the situation the operator finds himself in on the ground.

12. Once all the above precautions have been met then the operator should encourage
any witness or contact persons to remain in this safe location, so that further information
can be gained by questioning. A local person that may have reported the UXO may have a
different perception of danger, and may want to lead the operator directly to the UXO, this
should be avoided.

QUESTIONING TECHNIQUE

13. An EOD operator must develop a sound questioning technique for dealing with

witnesses or points of contacts when he has arrived at the task location.

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14. When questioning relevant personnel for information, the following points should

always be borne in mind:

a. Questions do not always produce the answers required. The EOD operator must
therefore ask himself ‘What do I need to know?’ and then ask questions to gain this
knowledge. ‘Yes/No’ answer questions should be avoided.

b. Each answer must be fully exploited. A useful technique is to ask of the answer
received ‘So what happened then?’ or ask your self ‘What does that mean to me in
terms of my aim?’

c. When questioning personnel, it is advisable to allow them free rein to tell their
story rather than asking a range of pointed questions which may cause the person to
withhold information because the appropriate question was not asked. Only after
the story has been told should the person be questioned to fill in the gaps.

d. The operator should listen to what is being said and always keep an open mind.
Tunnel vision must be avoided.

e. Personnel should be interviewed separately as people in stress situations tend to

be confused and accounts of events can become contaminated by the accounts of
others.

f. The EOD operator should be firm and friendly and show no hostility towards
personnel. Whilst a degree of scepticism is healthy, this should not be revealed
during questioning and the operator should always remain impartial.

15. The WWAT ECHO - provide a good guide to ascertaining the information needed. These
are covered in more detail in the aide memoire for questioning technique at Annex A.

LOCATION

16. It might not always be immediately obvious where the ordnance or how many items of
ordnance is present. Systematic search techniques should be used to detect and locate the
exact position of the target, or to confirm there is no EO present. The full EOD team should
be used if necessary. The search can be carried out either visually or by using instrument
search.

ACCESS

17. To gain access to the target, physical barriers or obstacles may have to be overcome.
These can include demolished structures, water, or atmosphere that does not support life.
Deliberate access denial devices may also be present such as booby traps or Anti-Personnel
(AP) mines.

18. For physical or natural barriers, specialist teams, training and equipment are required.
Options include:

a. Avoiding the obstacle, (go around it).

b. Remove the obstacle, (use of hand/power tools or heavy machinery may be

needed).

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c. Ensure the obstacle is sufficiently supported or made safe, and got through it if
possible, (shoring).

19. For water or atmosphere that does not support life specialist teams, training and
equipment are required. Options include:

a. Divers.

b. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).

c. Protective suits.

20. For many access denial devices, the task is carried out by the EOD team before
approaching the main target. Options for dealing with access denial devices include:

a. Demolition in situ.

b. Deflagration.

c. Disruption.

d. Semi-remote removal.

e. Weight Dropper

f. Water cannon.

g. Manual.

RECONNAISSANCE

General

21. The aim of the reconnaissance is to ascertain whether an item is UXO and, if so, to obtain
all the information required to undertake the EOD task. Reconnaissance may be carried out
as a phase of the task itself or as a separate activity.

22. This section describes the procedures which should be followed when conducting a
reconnaissance.

Remote (Long Range) Reconnaissance

23. A great deal of information can be obtained without approaching the danger area of a
suspected item of UXO. This can be achieved either by the use of optical viewing devices
(e.g. binoculars) from a suitable observation point, or by the use of remotely operated
equipment.

24. A long-range reconnaissance should always be conducted when a crashed Guided

Weapon (GW) is suspected due to the hazards involved. If chemical weapons are suspected,
the operator should always keep upwind of the incident to avoid vapour hazard.

25. Information on the following points may be obtained from a long-range reconnaissance:

a. Identification:

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(1) Size, shape, colour and markings.

(2) Whether a live or practice munition.

(3) Type of warhead/fill - by deduction.

(4) Type of fuzing - by deduction.

b. Location of Parts:

(1) HE Bomb – tail fin, main body.

(2) GW – warhead, booster motors, fuel tanks, guidance and control sections.

(3) Container – sub munitions, cluster components.

c. Type of Fuel (GW):

(1) Solid or liquid.

(2) Type of smoke or fumes, i.e.:

d. Reason for Failure:

(1) HE Bomb – position of arming vane.

(2) GW - absence or presence of boosters, condition of venturi.

(3) Condition of cluster/container.

(4) LSA - presence of fuze cap.

e. Other Observations:

(1) Best approach route.

(2) Suitable demolition firing point.

(3) Nearest water supply.

(4) Evacuation areas.

(5) Decontamination area.

(6) Vapour drift.

Close-In Reconnaissance

26. Having obtained as much information as possible from a long-range reconnaissance, a

close-in reconnaissance should be carried out. The close-in reconnaissance allows the
operator to obtain all the detailed information needed to identify the ordnance and plan the
Render Safe Procedure (RSP).

27. When carrying out a close-in reconnaissance, the following points must be borne in
mind:

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a. If a GW is suspected, if it is beyond the qualification & experience of the
Operator, then specialist advice must be sought.

b. If a chemical weapon is suspected, Specialist BCMD trained and Qualified

Operators should be called.

28. The following detailed information should be obtained from the close-in reconnaissance:

a. Dimensions of the EO and fuze.

b. Body colour.

c. Hazard bands.

d. Stencilling.

e. Body stamping.

f. Spread of EO.

g. Associated hazards.

h. Secondary hazards.

Conducting a Reconnaissance

29. When conducting the reconnaissance, the operator should:

a. Always be prepared to transition from a long-range to a close-in reconnaissance.

b. Be alert to the possibility that the UXO may be influence-fuzed and take
appropriate precautions.

c. Treat the weapon and the fuze as 2 separate items.

d. Not assume that a particular weapon type will always have the same fuze.

e. Get a complete 360º observation of the fuze.

f. Have a team member watching from a safe distance to relay information back to
the team and act as safety man if necessary.

IDENTIFICATION AND DIAGNOSIS

30. During the reconnaissance the operator may have been able to make a positive I.D of
the UXO, if he cannot then he will have gathered enough information as described in
paragraph 16 to be able to use publications or a database to aid in the identification of the
item.
31. Once the operator has ensured he has positively identified the item, he should take
into to account the following factors, to aid him in planning the most appropriate render
safe procedure.

a. The condition of the item, i.e. has it been fired, thrown or dropped, is the fuze
in an armed or unarmed state.

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b. Has the item been subjected to any external trauma such as excessive heat or
shock?
c. The type and quantity of the net explosive content of the item, and any donor
charge that may be used.
d. The effects of the item, blast/frag, incendiary, smoke.

32. The operator having taken the above factors about the UXO into consideration
should also consider the following factors about the situation and environs.

a. Locality of any local population or communities.

b. Any buildings or facilities in close proximity to the item, will they be damaged.
c. Is protective works needed to either surround the item or protect property or
vital installations that cannot be moved?
d. Any radio frequency hazards in the area, i.e. proximity to Airports, Antenna or
transmitting aerials.
e. The type of immediate and surrounding ground, i.e. rocky ground will
produce secondary fragmentation if demolition in situ RSP is used. Also the ground
can dictate the travel of the blast or shock wave which can cause damage hundreds
of meters away from the item.
f. The weather as low cloud base will cause the shockwave to travel a greater
distance along the ground. Also electrical storms will create an RF hazard.
g. Will an effective cordon or evacuation be able to be enforced; i.e. thick
wooded area’s or densely populated urban areas will need a lot of resources to
enforce an effective cordon or evacuation.

33. Once the operator has taken into consideration all the factors he should be able to
make a plan to Render safe the UXO, this plan may involve a simple pick up and carry away
for disposal at a designated Demolition site, if safe to do so. Or it may involve extensive
resources to effect an evacuation and cordon, or extra machinery to create protective works
or protect property or vital installations.

34. An RSP flow chart is at annex B, although the flow chart does not take into account
the factors that have been discussed in the above paragraphs. It can help to aid the operator
in planning the best and safest course of action to take.

DAMAGE LIMITATION

Evacuation

35. Unless there is convincing proof that no explosion will occur, evacuation must be
enforced immediately the presence of a UXO is suspected if necessary.

Principles

36. Some degree of evacuation may be in force when the EOD operator arrives to carry out
the reconnaissance, if the national authority has an effective reporting and initial response
procedures. The extent of this evacuation will have to be assessed by the operator on arrival
or re-assessed after the reconnaissance has been conducted.

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37. If the EOD operator assesses that explosive munitions are not present, the evacuation
can be cancelled. If the presence of EO is confirmed and evacuation is considered necessary,
the operator should assess whether the measures already taken are either excessive or
inadequate, so their plan may be changed accordingly. If the EO is assessed as not
dangerous the EOD team and/or civil authority (i.e. Police) should be informed that
evacuation is unnecessary, but protective measures may be required to prevent
interference.

38. Evacuation around an EOD task may not have to be continuously maintained until the EO
is removed, but must be maintained until the maximum delay period of any time fuze likely
to be fitted has expired, or until any anti-disturbance fuze sensitive to vibration has become
inoperative.

39. The EOD operator should wait for the maximum safety period if any soak period is
observed. For example, arming vanes may be recovered indicating a fuze with a precise
delay time. When excavating to, or disposing of, UXO, it may be necessary to extend or
impose a further period of evacuation.

40. The EOD operator must consider and plan for variations in evacuation requirements so
the civil authority and through them the evacuees, are given ample warning of future
requirements. Wherever possible, EOD work needing evacuation is to be timed to cause the
least disruption to industry and local populace.

Evacuation Plan

41. The plan for evacuation depends primarily on whether the EO is likely to exert its
maximum effect above or below ground if it detonates. A bomb for example from which
most of the forces produced would be felt above ground, such as blast and primary
fragments, is referred to as surface UXO, whereas one which damages by the effects of earth
shock is termed buried. The dividing line between the two is not always clear-cut but, for
planning purposes, a bomb is defined as buried when its upper surface, exclusive of the tail
unit, is at least 2 to 2½ times the length of the bomb body below the surface.

Types of Evacuation

42. There are 2 degrees of evacuation: complete and partial. Complete evacuation is self-
explanatory. For partial evacuation, all vehicles and fragile stores not adequately screened
must be removed. Rooms on the remote side of houses may be occupied but access must
be by way of shielded approaches adequately screened from the bomb.

43. Flying glass can cause a large percentage of injuries to people as well as minor damage to
vehicles and equipment. Windows in the affected area are to be opened so that the
pressure inside and outside the rooms becomes equalised, minimising the chance of
breakage. It is important to remember that during the suction phase pressure changes are
felt all round the house, so windows on all sides are to be open.

44. As a general guide an initial evacuation should be 100m, this is the distance the EOD
team should set up its initial control point (ICP).

45. Small High Explosive Missiles. Evacuation distances for missiles lighter than 50kg are not
stated. However, a small buried missile is unlikely to be dangerous at over 50m in the open

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(although splinters from an unburied missile may travel some hundreds of metres). Every
incident must be treated on its merits, taking into account the fuzing, surroundings, and
operational situation.

46. Prevention of Vibration. Some fuzes, particularly in unburied bombs, are extremely
sensitive to vibration. It may be necessary to prohibit the driving of stakes into the ground
to form barriers etc. It may also be necessary to stop the passage of road and rail traffic,
even if safety screened, and to stop static machinery from causing vibrations.

47. Railways. There are no hard and fast rules for UXO near railway lines. An EOD
operator must make the reconnaissance as early as possible but must not take action to
affect the running of trains without consultation with the railway authority. The EOD
operator's role is to identify the bomb type, size and probable fuzing and to advise the
authorities as to a probable effect if it was to explode. Advice on the likely effects on UXO of
vibration from trains distant from the railways will also be required, as will the degree of
protection offered to the tracks by existing screens.

Example Evacuation Plan

48. Figure 7-1 illustrates the evacuation plan for an unburied, unexploded GP bomb
weighing between 250kg and 1500kg in a normal residential area. There are 2 possible
variations:

a. If Buildings A were tall, steel framed office blocks or similar, Buildings B might be
occupied fully or in rooms at the rear of the buildings.

b. If Buildings A and B were flimsy, partial or complete evacuation of Buildings C

would be necessary.

49. Partial evacuation of Buildings D will be necessary since, although outside the
300mradius they will be influenced by the funnelling effect of the street leading to them.
Equally, the church will need complete evacuation as it is exposed and because of the
inherent danger of flying glass. It is to be noted that church windows are very difficult to
protect.

Figure 7-10 - Evacuation Plan for a 500kg UXO on the Surface in an urban area.

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PROTECTIVE WORKS

General

50. Protective works are used to prevent damage to structures or services should UXO
inadvertently explode or be demolished in situ. They may also be used in order to reduce
the area of evacuation.

Preliminary Assessment

51. Before considering the design of protective works, the Operator must have an
understanding of the distances at which explosions will cause damage to people, structures
or public utilities. These distances are difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy
owing to a number of factors which must be taken into account but the following points
must be considered:

a. The type and size of the bomb.

b. The charge/weight ratio.

c. The kind of explosive.

d. Whether the UXO/bomb is buried or unburied.

e. If buried:

(1) The soil composition.

(2) The water content.

(3) If soil movement is restricted in any direction by structures such as heavy

foundations.

f. If unburied:

(1) Screening or funnelling influences.

(2) The relevant position of the object to be protected to the axis of the
bomb.

52. The tables for making these assessments (7-3 to 7-9) have been derived from data
gained during WWII. The figures quoted should be used as a rough guide only, as variations
will occur as a result of variations in the design and manufacturing process of modern
Munitions and UXO compaired to WWII munitions.

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ESTIMATION OF EXPLOSIVE DANGER AREAS

General

53. The hazard to the general public from the demolition of UXO and multi-item
demolitions arises from three main causes, the shock front, the blast wave and the
projection of high velocity fragments, (either primary or secondary).

54. The shock front hazard can be discounted for the purposes of danger area estimation
as it decays at a much higher rate than the blast wave (usually within 2 charge diameters),
which then takes over from it. If an individual is close enough to an explosion to be affected
by the shock front, then the individual is too close anyway. The calculations used to estimate
danger areas are based on the blast and fragmentation hazards, which extend much further
out from the explosion source than the shock front hazard.

55. The EOD operator should use the calculations stated in “Technical Note for Mine
Action (TNMA) 10.20/01, Estimation of explosive danger areas” to calculate the explosive
danger area when he has ascertained the All Up Weight (AUW) for the munition. These
calculations give figures for public access, Controlled access and fragmentation hazard zone.
A pre calculated table for these distances is at annex C.

Public access

56. It must be assumed that the local public will have access to most places outside
sealed military camps. This means that the mine action management has a responsibility to
ensure that the safety distances required to isolate the danger areas are strictly observed,
and the rules for setting up demolitions contained in IMAS 10.30 are strictly adhered to,
especially in the matters of warning the local villagers and of posting sentries to ensure no
involuntary incursions my locals or their animals during demolitions. Where the ground
makes observation by sentries difficult, the explosive weights of individual demolitions may
have to be reduced to reflect the practical capabilities of the village authorities and sentries
to keep locals, especially children, out of hazard range.

Controlled Access

57. Controlled access can only be assumed if the mine action manager is convinced that
there are no local people or animals in the area. If there is any doubt, the "public access"
formula should be used as a default solution.

No Fragmentation Hazard Zone

58. The No fragmentation zone safety distance should be calculated to reduce the risk of
harm from fragmentation thrown out from the explosion to those working on the worksite
and to the local population. Where necessary, protective works, such as demolitions pits,
earth bunds, sandbag walling or water suppression, should be used to reduce the extent of
fragmentation hazard zones.

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Explosive Damage

59. The below tables give distances for various expected damage results for explosions it
is stressed that these have been included in this publication as a guide only. The tables are
issued to British Army Bomb Disposal Engineers, and therefore the information cannot be
confirmed as accurate.
NOTE: The IMATC or MAT cannot be held responsible for operational use of these distances,
they are intended as a guide only, specialist information from local structural engineers
should be sought for operational use.

Damage to Brick Built Housing

60. The assessed damage to brick buildings from surface and buried UXO is shown in
Tables 7-1 and 7-2 respectively. 250mm brick walls are assumed and the distances indicate
the maximum at which the degree of damage specified is likely to be maintained.

TABLE 7-1 DAMAGE DISTANCES FOR BRICK BUILDINGS (SURFACE UXO)

Damage Distance (m)

Total
Type of Ordnance Weight Slight
Complete Uninhabitable/
(kg) Damage/
Demolition Repairable
Inhabitable
50 6 13 61
Penetration 250 19 37 183
and 500 29 58 290
GP Bombs 1000 43 86 427
2000 89 177 884
Blast Bombs and 500 43 86 427
Anti Ship Mines 1000 77 153 762

TABLE 7-2 DAMAGE DISTANCES FOR BRICK BUILDINGS (BURIED BOMBS)

Total Damage Distance (m)

Weight Complete Damaged Beyond Uninhabitable/
(kg) Demolition Repair Repairable
50 4 7 16
250 7 14 22
500 11 22 31
1000 19 37 61
2000 37 61 122
4000 61 92 168
6000 77 122 213

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Damage to Underground Services and Foundations

61. The distances given in Table 7-3 and 7-4 are the normal maximum at which damage
to underground services and foundations is likely to occur. They are applicable to clay soil
and the multiplication factors for other soils are:

 Made up ground: 1.3

 Chalk: 0.9

 Sand and Gravel: 0.8

TABLE 7-3 DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND SERVICES AND FOUNDATIONS (SURFACE UXO)

Damage Radii (m)

Total
Weight Cast Iron/ Earthenware Electric
Brick
(kg) Foundations Concrete or Brick Cables or
Walls
Pipes Sewers Steel Pipes
2 5 1 1 1 1
10 20 5 3 5 3
50 60 10 6 10 5
250 185 22 10 15 7
500 290 35 12 18 8
1000 430 50 15 30 12
3000 500 75 50 75 20
5000 1000 150 100 100 35

TABLE 7-4 DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND SERVICES AND FOUNDATIONS (BURIED UXO)

Damage Radii (m)

Total
Weight Cast Iron/ Earthenware Electric
Brick
(kg) Foundations Concrete or Brick Cables or
Walls
Pipes Sewers Steel Pipes
2 1 1 1 1 1
10 5 5 4 6 3
50 15 15 8 12 6
250 20 30 12 20 10
500 30 60 15 25 12
1000 75 75 18 35 15
3000 150 120 50 100 30
5000 250 200 100 175 50

62. Damage may occur at greater distances if a pipe enters a rigid structure such as a
manhole, which prevents its yielding to the earth's movement, and also if the ground is
waterlogged.

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Crater Diameter

63. The probable crater diameter, resulting from the delayed explosion of a buried bomb
are shown in Table 7-5.

TABLE 7-5 PROBABLE DIAMETERS OF CRATERS RESULTING FROM THE DELAYED

EXPLOSION OF BURIED BOMBS

Diameter of Crater (m)

Charge/Weight Radio (%)
Total Weight (kg)
Chalk, Sand or
Made-up-Ground Clay Soil
Gravel
50% 80% 50% 80% 50% 80%
50 5.8 8.2 4.6 6.4 3.7 4.9
250 9.1 13.1 7.3 10.4 5.5 7.9
500 11.9 16.5 9.5 13.1 7.3 10.1
1000 16.5 22.9 13.1 18.3 10.1 13.7
2000 21 29.6 16.8 23.5 12.8 17.7
Note: These diameters may increase as a result of collapse of the edges.

DAMAGE LIMITATION

Design of Protective Works

64. Having decided that the structure to be protected lies within the radius of probable
danger, but outside the probable crater area, the design of an adequate protective work can
be considered. Protective works other than mounds will have no mitigating effect if sited
within the crater likely to be formed by the delayed explosion of a buried bomb.

Protective Walls

65. Protective walls are used to deflect and absorb the blast and to arrest primary
splinters and debris. They may be used inside buildings as well as outside. The length of the
wall is adjusted to suit the object to be protected. It is to be sited a few feet outside the
probable crater area (see Figures 7-2 and 7-3).

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Figure 7-11 - Siting a Protective Wall

Figure 7-12 - Siting a Protective Wall

66. Protective walls are usually constructed of sandbag fresco bastions. For general use
the base must be at least 1.25m wide and 3m high. The surface of the wall furthest from the
bomb should slope at 6:1. In exceptional cases, where speed is vital and when vibration is
unlikely to affect the fuzes, earth-moving plant can be used and banks of loose earth built up
(for example, in the case of a suspected delay action fuze which cannot be reached before
explosion is due). Being less compact and with the soil lying at its natural resting slope, such
a wall would need to be considerably larger than a sandbag wall to be effective. Properly
sited, the borrow-pit could provide some protection against earth shock.

67. In some circumstances, it may be possible to improvise. Loaded rail trucks (with
relatively inert material such as coal) placed on the track nearest the bomb will frequently
provide adequate protection for trains using the other track. In factories, bales or crates of
merchandise may be used to protect vital machinery.

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Protective Trenching

68. Trenches are used to protect underground services and basements outside the
probable crater area from damage by earth shock. The bottom of the trench should be at
least 0.7m below the line joining the bomb to the bottom part of the object to be protected.
The trenching may be as narrow as convenient for construction but there must be no cross
bracing, since this would provide a bridge for the shock wave. (Figure 7-4)

0.7 m

TRENCH

Figure 7-13 - Trench Protecting an Underground Pipe

Sandbag Abutments

69. Where the bomb is too deep or too close to permit trenching, sandbag abutments
may be used to protect walls of cellars and basements against earth shock. The abutment
should be as large as possible and extend for at least 3m into the room, but must not touch
any other load bearing walls or the ceiling as this would transmit the shock through the
building (Figure 7-5).

Figure 7-14 - Protective Sandbag Abutment

Protective Vents

70. It is possible to minimise the intensity of the earth shock from a buried bomb if the
earth coverage above the bomb is reduced sufficiently to permit easy escape of the gases
arising from the explosion. If the resultant increased blast effect can be accepted, vents may
be dug from the surface. Such a course might be advisable when bridge abutments, dams,

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underground railways or deep underground services or structures are threatened.
Excavations sunk to recover UXO can also serve as vents.

71. Example. A deep-buried UXO containing a time fuse with a maximum delay of 24
hours threatens an important underground service and must be classed as Category A unless
some reduction of the effects of earth shock can be effected. It is not possible to recover
the bomb in 24 hours but it would be sufficient to sink a shaft rapidly to within 2 lengths of
the bomb, evacuate the site until the end of a maximum delay period, and then return to
recover the bomb. The use of remotely-operated earth-moving plant should be considered
for digging vents.

Protective Mounds

72. Protective mounds have the opposite effect of protective vents, since they minimise
blast and splinter damage but increase the effect of earth shock. The method is applicable
only to comparatively small bombs and consists of piling soil or filled sandbags in a cone over
the bomb position, thus forming an artificial camouflet.

73. Blocks of wood, masonry or brick must not be used since the shock wave may throw
them a considerable distance. Since mounds will hinder the recovery and disposal of the
UXO, the method is normally only used when UXOs are to be temporarily or permanently
abandoned. The specifications for protective mounds are shown in Table 7-6.

TABLE 7-6 REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTIVE MOUNDS

Weight Dimensions of
Total Position Type of of Soil No of Cone
Weight (kg) of Bomb Soil Required Sandbags Diameter Height
(Tonne) (m) (m)
50 Buried Clay 40 1,600 6.1 1.8
50 Buried Sand 60 2,400 7.3 1.8
50 Unburied Any 40 1,600 6.1 1.8
250 Buried Clay 125 5,000 12 1.8
250 Buried Sand 180 7,200 12 2.7
250 Unburied Any 90 3,600 12 1.8
Not
500 Buried Clay 270 14 2.7
Practicable
Not
500 Buried Sand 400 15 3
Practicable

Protective Surrounds

74. Protective surrounds are used to provide protection against blast and splinters from
anti-personnel bombs weighing up to 2.5kg. They are used as a precaution against
inadvertent explosion when sensitive fuzes are fitted, or when demolishing bombs in situ. A
square surround consisting of 80 sandbags gives almost complete protection. The bags must
be carefully laid and tightly packed with no gaps left through which splinters could pass
(Figure 7-6). The bags may be thrown as much as 3m from this surround and splinters will

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be thrown into the air unless boards are laid over the top covered with a layer of sandbags.
The bags may then be scattered up to 5m.

Figure 7-15 - Protective Surrounds

75. When a number of bombs have to be dealt with in a small area, it may be advisable
to provide every bomb with an inner wall of 32 bags in the first instance and then return to
complete the walls as time and labour permit. The 32-bag surround gives reasonable
protection against splinters but is not as efficient in absorbing blast. The bags are likely to be
shattered by the explosion and may be thrown up to 4m from the bomb. To provide further
protection to specific structures from blast effects and to reduce the chance of damage due
to displaced sandbags, a gap should be left in the surround on the side facing away from the
structure.

Summary of Protective Works Requirements

76. Walls. The minimum dimensions for protective walls to deflect blast from property
are:

a. Base width - minimum 1.25m.

b. Height - minimum 3m.

c. Outer wall slope - minimum 80º (6 in 1).

77. Trench. For protection against earth shock, the requirements for trenches are:

a. 0.7m deeper than the line connecting the bomb to the property to be protected.

b. No cross bracing.

c. Outside the anticipated crater area and as close as possible to the property being
protected.

78. Abutment. The requirements for abutments to protect foundations and walls
against earth shock where the bomb is too close or too deep for trenching are:

a. Base width - minimum 3.0m.

b. No contact with other walls or ceiling.

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79. Surround. The requirements for surrounds to provide protection against up to 2.5kg
of surface UXO are:

a. 32 bag - splinters only.

b. 80 bag - blast and splinters.

c. LSA on the surface - 20 sandbags per 0.5kg, inclusive of the disposal charge
weight, 10 sandbags per 0.5kg in an undercut trench.

RENDER SAFE PROCEDURES

80. Render safe techniques in general fall into 4 categories: component

isolation/removal; power interruption/removal; mechanical incapacitation and explosive
neutralisation.

Tools

81. Tools for carrying out RSPs include:

a. Rocket wrench.

b. De-armer.

c. Disrupter.

Explosive Techniques

82. Explosive techniques may be used to render the fuze inoperative or to break the
explosive train. Examples include:

a. Cracker Barrel.

b. Charge Linear Cutting (CLC)/Charge Demolition Liner Cutting (CDLC) (Blade).

c. Baldrick.

d. Vulcan.

e. Pyrotorch.

Hand Removal

83. For many items of UXO, hand-removal of the fuze is the only recognised method of
neutralisation. However, hand removal poses the greatest risk to the operator and should
only be undertaken when:

a. The category of the task merits the risk.

b. Other techniques are unacceptable or unsuited to the task.

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RECOVERY AND FINAL DISPOSAL

Recovery

84. The selection of a suitable recovery method will need to take into account the size of
the UXO, whether plant or manpower is required, where the UXO is going, how it is going to
get there, and the distances involved. The implications of each recovery option must be
carefully thought through.

Final Disposal

85. The final disposal actions need to be considered early in the task because the EOD
technique may affect the final result and there may be logistic problems. The first
consideration will be whether a high order event is acceptable; if so, this is normally the best
procedure.

86. Before carrying out any positive action, the following issues need to be reconsidered:

a. Incident Control Point location, Cordon, NOTAM.

b. Secondary hazards.

c. Vital installations.

d. Protective works plan.

e. Method of initiation.

SITE REMEDIATION

87. Restoration of the site is required to enable its safe use by others. If actual
restoration is beyond the scope of the EOD team, then advice is to be passed to the National
Authority or tasking agency. It is the EOD operators’ responsibility to ensure that the site is
handed over in a safe state.

88. If there are any doubts then the area must be marked to warn of hazards. More
resources may be required to complete a thorough and systematic search. Potential tasks
include marking-off dangerous areas or contaminated ground; removing protective works
and shafts; filling in craters; and repairing damage.

REPORTING

89. Reporting is the final phase, The EOD operator must complete the relevant report
and forms ASAP and submit them to the relevant organisation or agency. This will usually be
in the IMSMA format or any other as dictated by the national mine action authority.

Other reports that may be required, and should be recorded by the EOD operator as a

matter of course are.

a. Demolition report; This should detail, the charge size and placement, location and
time of the demolition, any protective measures used, result of demolition.

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b. Low Order Techniques (LOT) Performa: This should record the equipment and
technical information of the effectiveness of the procedure and equipment used in
the technique(s). This information can then be used to provide data from which new
RSPs can be devised by.

92. It is vital that EOD reports are given the widest possible circulation. This ensures that
appropriate action is taken with regard to lessons identified and that training, equipment
and procedures are developed to meet the threat.

Annexes:

A. Aide Memoire for Questioning Technique (EOD Task).

B. Render Safe Procedure (RSP) Flow chart.

C. IMAS safety distance table.

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Question Technique For EOD Task

What: IS IT?
 Happened?
 Did you do?
 Did you see?
 Why did the attack occur here?
 Is the target?
 Did you hear?

Where: IS IT?
 Were you when the attack occurred?
 Did the attack come from?
 Did you see it land/laid/thrown?
 Did you see the UXO? Where did you stand?
 Did you walk? How close did you get?

Am I Safe:
 How close?
 ICP Location?
 ICP Free from secondary items?
 Did you find the weapon/item?
 Is everyone in area safe?
 Did you report it?

Time Log:
 Arrival on site?
 Key moments?
 Depart site?

Evacuation:
 There are any casualties to evacuate. (e.g. fragmentation injury, chemical burns).
 Civilian population urban/rural
 Livestock?
 Is still in the area? Do they need to be there? Can they be moved?
 Any thing has happened since? (e.g. detonations heard, smoke seen, other sounds).

Cordon:
 Access routes
 Over watch
 Air/Sea
 Secondary Hazards Fuel, Gas, Nuclear, Chemicals

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Hazards:
 There are any secondary hazards (e.g. gas pipes, electricity lines, fuel storage)
 There are any vital installations that need protecting.
 Anything that could enhance the task in hand.

Other Agencies:
 Any IMAS agencies

 Emergency services

 Specialist services Fuel, Gas, Nuclear, Water

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ANNEX B: RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE (RSP) FLOW CHART

START
POSS ID ITEM

CAN ITEM BE
YES
BIS

BIS
NO

END
WILL PROTECTIVE
MEASURES/LOW ORDER
PERMIT BIS ?

NO YES

CAN ITEM BE PROTECT/LOW ORDER

PUCA AND BIS

YES NO END

PUCA RENDER SAFE

COMPONENT POWER REMOVAL/ MECHANICAL

ISOLATION/REMOVAL INTERRUPTION INCAPACITATION

DISPOSAL

SAVALAGE ALL OR DESTROY ALL OR IN

IN PART PART

SUBMIT
REPORTS

END

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ANNEX C: IMAS SAFETY DISTANCE TABLE

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Fuze Extraction and Disruption

Extraction: To completely remove the initiator from the UXO.
Disruption: To disable the initiator, thus preventing its function.

Explosive Extraction and Disruption

Rocket Wrench XL58E1

 The tool may be set for right and left handed fuze removal.
 It may be used against initiators with anti handling features.
 Can be reduced in size, if sufficient room is not available for rotation (although every
attempt should be made to fire the tool in its full size)
 It may be used on submerged ordnance.
 The vice assembly can accommodate fuzes up to approx 3.5”/90mm in diameter.

De-Armer Dragon
This is a weapon designed for use as either a De-Armer or Disruptor.
When used in the De-Armer role:
 Projects metal slugs and blades targeting specific initiation systems in UXO.
 Fires Standard/Plain or chisel slugs at high velocity, to either smash or shear the
working parts of initiators.
 A 3rd option (the Fork) is a low velocity device designed to gag a specific initiator.
 Due to the dangers of cocked strikers this weapon proved to be an ideal method of
non-touch means of rendering safe (If the firing mechanism is external of the UXO)
 It is NOT to be used against Always Acting / Universal type mechanisms.

When used in the Disruptor role:

 Projects a slug of water to disrupt the firing circuits of IED’s and military booby traps.
 Optimum stand off is 150mm.
 NOT authorised for use in peacetime, authority to be sought should you decide to
use in the disruptor mode.

Rearward safety distance of 50m, in both De-Armer and Disruptor modes.

Forward safety distance for De-Armer during training if no Protective works are used: Less
than 375mils = 3200m
More than 375mils = 4000m

Rocket Wrench/De-Armer Deployment Suitability

 The area around the UXO should be free from volatiles.
 The Rocket Wrench must have room to rotate freely.
 The Rocket Wrench must be free to extract.
 The slug in the De-Armer must be fitted as a last action at the UXO.

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EOD Weapon Warning

 Listen in.
 Preparing EOD equipment, no one passed this point (Indicate).
 All communications equipment is to be switched off within 30m of this point.
 Does everybody understand?

Operations with Rocket Wrench/De-Armer

 At the ICP, No 2 test shrike, cable and assemble equipment.
 No 2 move forward to prepared arming area and set up the tools less carts and slug.
 No 2 GIVE YOUR WARNING!!!
 No 2 arm the tools and complete the electrical connections in series.
 No 2 return to the ICP and with permission test for continuity.
 No 2 prepare all the relevant equipment for the BDO to fit the weapon to the UXO.
 BDO brief team on what and how you intend to do things at the UXO.
 BDO deploy with equipment to UXO.
 Chock the UXO (If you deem it necessary).
 Prepare backstop, stake and bungee.
 Remove any locking devices if using Rocket Wrench.
 Fit Rocket Wrench first, then position De-Armer.
 Fit slug (Last action).
 Return to ICP and fire using shrike.
 Wait a safe soak period of 10 mins unless the RSP states differently.
 Return to UXO, assess the results and act accordingly.

REMEMBER at all times:

 At all times maintain control of the firing device.
 When armed treat as loaded weapons.
 Use correct earthing procedures.
 Adhere to RADHAZ precautions.
 Ensure carts are kept in authorised containers.

Non Explosive Extraction and Disruption

Tape and Line

Used when in service extractors are not available to the operator or when detailed in the
RSP. The method uses tools and materials that should be readily available to the operator.
Equipment required:
 Adhesive tape (Bodge tape)
 Cordage suitable for device.
 Main line for Allen Hook and Line kit.
 Stilson Wrench with attached tape shoulder.
 Bungee.
 Pickets and suitable No of changes of direction.
 Lump hammer.
 Sandbags.

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Tape and Line Operations

 Ensure you have all equipment required and approach UXO.
 Chock the UXO (If it is deemed necessary).
 Arrange and put in place the stakes and changes of direction.
 Remove any locking devices.
 Place 2 turns of tape on fuze/pistol in direction of tightening.
 Fit the bridle (comprising 3 long/3 short lengths of tape).
 Place 4 turns of tape in direction of loosening leaving ideally 300mm of tape tail.
 Attach cordage to tape tail.
 Wind cordage around fuse/pistol in direction of loosening to the required no of
threads.
 Fit the stilson and tie on clove hitch above the tape shoulder.
 Snake (minimal) cordage through 90 deg change of direction and attach bungee.
 Connect cordage to main pulling line and return to ICP.
 Give warning (Preparing to pull, pulling now), and pull whilst walking away at same
time.
 Wait a safe soak period of 10 mins unless the RSP states differently.
 Return to UXO, assess the results and act accordingly.

Hand
Hand extraction/disruption of initiators may be carried out under the following
circumstances:
 When ASH or ref data gives permission to do so – usually on initiation systems that
are deemed UNARMED.
 If permission is given for an ARMED initiation system, it should only be undertaken as
a last resort; i.e. after all remote options are discounted.
 Hand extraction is also undertaken when you remove an initiation system from an
extraction tool.

Under whatever circumstances hand removal is undertaken a minimum standard is required:

 Helmet with visor down and body armour worn.
 Consideration should be given to the use of the lightweight EOD suit.
 The initiator should be carried in the plain in which it is found or as described in the
RSP (Avoid spinning it through its axis).

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MINE ACTION & TRAINING

DESTROYING MINES AND ERW

DISCLAIMER
The information contained in this document is from references and known best
practices for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no way
exhaustive, and Qualified EOD trained persons should always adhere to
Authorised Standard Operating procedures, in the theatre of operations. The
IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for any accident or incident that results in the
use of the information contained within this document, other than for use on the
IMAS/ EOD training course.

Page: 1
The procedures for neutralising and rendering safe mines described in this Chapter should not be
adopted without thoroughly checking them to confirm their accuracy. The mines described should be
extended to cover all those mines present in the country of operation.

Page: 2
DESTROYING MINES AND ERW

Contents
1.Destroying mines and ERW ....................................................................................................................... 4
2.Safety-distances......................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Safety-distances when burning unfuzed mines and ERW................................................................ 5
2.2 Safety-distances when burning fuzed mines and ERW ................................................................... 5
2.3 Control of entry into demolition areas .............................................................................................. 6
3.Explosive demolition of mines and ERW in-situ ......................................................................................... 6
3.1 General safety precautions .............................................................................................................. 6
3.2 Making controlled demolitions.......................................................................................................... 7
3.3 Conducting explosive demolitions of mines in-situ ........................................................................... 8
3.4 Conducting explosive demolition of ERW in-situ .............................................................................. 9
3.5 Demolition of misfires....................................................................................................................... 9
3.5.1 Non-electric misfire procedure.......................................................................................... 9
3.5.2 Electrical misfires ........................................................................................................... 10
4.Demolition explosives and accessories .................................................................................................... 11
4.1 Detonators ..................................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.1 Detonator crimping procedure ........................................................................................ 11
4.2 Safety-fuse .................................................................................................................................... 12
4.3 Explosive charges.......................................................................................................................... 13
4.4 Electric initiation of an explosive demolition ................................................................................... 13
4.4.1 Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) Hazards .................................................................... 14
4.4.2 Tests of Electrical Cable................................................................................................. 14
4.4.3 Connecting Electric Detonators ...................................................................................... 15
4.5 Detonating-cord firing systems ...................................................................................................... 15
4.6 Storing High Explosive material ..................................................................................................... 15
4.7 Transporting explosive materials ................................................................................................... 15
4.7.1 Rules for driving with HE and ancillaries ........................................................................ 16
5.Collection of mines and ERW ................................................................................................................... 16
6.Destroying mines and ERW by burning in fires ........................................................................................ 17
6.1 Mine Burning Team ....................................................................................................................... 17
6.2 The burning procedure for unfuzed AP mine bodies ...................................................................... 17
6.3 The burning procedure for separated AP mine fuzes ..................................................................... 18
6.4 The burning procedure for separated AT mine bodies ................................................................... 19
6.5 The burning procedure for fuzed AP blast mines ........................................................................... 20
6.6 The burning procedure for separated AT mine fuzes ..................................................................... 21
7.Destroying mines and ERW with the CDS ............................................................................................... 21
7.1 CDS powder and accessories........................................................................................................ 22
7.2 Before conducting a CDS demolition ............................................................................................. 23
7.3 Conducting a CDS burn ................................................................................................................. 23
7.3.1 Misfire of the CDS system .............................................................................................. 25
8.Approved render-safe procedures ............................................................................................................ 26
8.1 Rendering mines safe .................................................................................................................... 26
8.2 R2M1 and R2M2 AP blast mine (58 gm RDX) ............................................................................... 27
8.2.1 The R2M1/R2M2 initiation assembly .............................................................................. 28
8.2.2 Safety clip and booster................................................................................................... 29
8.2.3 Rendering an R2M2 safe to move .................................................................................. 29
8.2.4 Making an R2M2 safe to use as a metal-detector target ................................................ 29
8.2.5 Making an R2M2 safe to use as a MDD target ............................................................... 30
8.2.6 Neutralising the R2M1/2 ................................................................................................. 31
8.3 M14: AP Blast (29 gm Tetryl) ......................................................................................................... 32
8.3.1 Making an M14 safe to use as a metal-detector target ................................................... 32
8.3.2 Making an M14 safe to use as a MDD target ................................................................. 34
8.3.3 Neutralising the M14 ...................................................................................................... 34
8.4 PMN: Anti-Personnel blast (240 gm TNT)...................................................................................... 35
8.4.1 Making a PMN safe to use as a metal-detector target .................................................... 36
8.4.2 Making a PMN safe to use as a MDD target .................................................................. 36
8.5 PRB M35: Anti-personnel blast (100 gm TNT) ............................................................................... 37
8.5.1 Making a PRB M35 safe to use as a metal-detector target ............................................ 38
8.5.2 Making a PRB M35 safe to use as a MDD target ........................................................... 38
8.6 MAI-75: Anti-personnel blast (120 gm TNT) .................................................................................. 39
8.6.1 Making a MAI-75 safe to use as a metal-detector target ................................................ 39

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8.6.2 Making a MAI-75 safe to use as a MDD target ..........................................................................40
8.7 Type 72 A/B: Anti-personnel blast (50 gm TNT or TNT/RDX) ........................................................41
8.7.1 Making a Type 72A/B safe to use as a metal-detector target .....................................................43
8.7.2 Making a Type 72A/B safe to use as a MDD target ...................................................................43
8.8 PRB M3 and PRB M3A1 – Anti-Tank blast mine: 6 kg TNT/RDX/Al...............................................44
8.8.1 Making a PRB M3 safe to use as a metal-detector target ..........................................................44
8.8.2 Making a PRB M3 safe to use as a MDD target.........................................................................45
8.9 TM-46: Anti-Tank blast mine (5.3 kg TNT) .....................................................................................46
8.9.1 Making a TM-46 safe to use as a MDD target............................................................................46
8.10 TM-57: Anti-Tank blast mine (7 kg TNT Torpex) ............................................................................47
8.10.1 Making a TM-57 safe to use as a MDD target ......................................................................47
8.11 M15: Anti-Tank blast mine (10.3kg Comp.B – RDX/TNT) ..............................................................48
8.11.1 Making an M15 safe to use as a MDD target .......................................................................48
8.12 M19: Anti-Tank blast mine (9.5kg Comp. B – RDX/TNT) ...............................................................49
8.12.1 Making an M19 safe to use as a metal-detector target.........................................................50
8.12.2 Making an M19 safe to use as a MDD target .......................................................................50

Page: 4
1. Destroying mines and ERW
Destroying mines and ERW where they are found often reduces operational efficiency so mines and
ERW may be moved for later demolition when it is safe to do so. Mines and ERW can only be moved
by qualified EOD Operators. The EOD Operator must have been trained to assess the mines and
ERW so that they can decide which are safe to handle.
When there is any uncertainty, mines and ERW should be pulled before being handled. This will
ensure that they are not booby trapped. When there is total confidence that pulling is not necessary, it
need not be conducted.
EOD Operators should not touch mines or ERW that they cannot identify as being among those they
have been trained to move or render safe. When any mine or ERW is damaged or unstable, it should
be destroyed without moving it.
When mines and ERW are safe to move or can be safely neutralized or disarmed before being moved,
EOD Operators should move them to designated Collection Areas inside the Task site. If there is no
designated Collection Area for mines and ERW that have been discovered and moved, all mines and
ERW should be destroyed where they are found on the day when they were found.
When mines and ERW are not safe to be moved and cannot be rendered safe to move, EOD
Operators must destroy them without moving them. Mines and ERW that cannot be moved will
normally be destroyed at the end of each day or at a time directed by the Task Supervisor.

All mines and ERW moved from the Task site to Collection Areas should be destroyed on the same
day unless specific safety concerns or lack of demolition explosives/materials prevent this.
Mines may be destroyed by:
1. Explosive demolition using explosive charges;
2. In controlled fires;
3. With chemical burning powder and igniters; or
4. With flares and directed chemical burns or with proven gas burning methods.
When the procedures for using these are not described in this SOP, approved procedures must be
added before the method is used.
When mines or ERW are not destroyed on the day they are found, the Task Supervisor must ensure
that the mines and ERW are stored in a safe way. When necessary, a guard must be posted.

Before any mines are destroyed, the Task Supervisor must be told the place and time it will take place.
The Task Supervisor should also be told the quantity and types of mine and ERW that will be
destroyed. The Task Supervisor should liaise with the local authorities and the Programme Manager
about destroying mines by demolition or by burning.

2. Safety-distances
Safety-distances for demolition using explosive charges are much greater than the working-distances
used during manual demining operations. Demolition safety-distances are given in Chapter 2, Part 7 of
these SOPs.

When a device has been separated from its fuze and detonator(s), the risk of a high-order detonation
has been removed and safety-distances can be much shorter than when the device may detonate as
designed.
The procedures in this SOP allow for mines and ERW to be destroyed by burning in fires, or using a
chemical burning powder. Some will have been rendered safe before destruction, others may have

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been moved for destruction while still intact. The safety distances required when burning mines and
ERW are given below.

2.1 Safety-distances when burning unfuzed mines and ERW

When burning unfuzed mines and ERW, the demolition staff must be EOD Operators trained in the
identification of the devices being destroyed.
The safety constraints in the detailed procedures described in this Chapter must be followed.
Safety-distances imposed during burning in a fire or with chemicals are given below. These distances
should be applied when the mines or ERW are not fuzed and do not contain detonators.

� NOTE: When a device may be fuzed or contain a detonator, the fuzed safety-distances in Part 2.2
must be used.

Burning in a controlled fire

Unfuzed mines Minimum burning safety-distance
(distance in metres)
Burning Team Other staff
Separated mine bodies 10 50
Separated ERW bodies 25 100
Separated mine fuzes 15 50
Separated ERW fuzes 25 100
Burning with Chemical Deflagration System (CDS)
Unfuzed ordnance/ERW Minimum chemical burning safety-distance
(distance in metres)
Burning Team Other staff
Separated ERW bodies 25 75
Separated ERW fuzes 40 120
Notes to table:
1. Recommended minimum distances are for burning staff wearing IMAS 10.30 compliant PPE and other
staff not wearing PPE.
2. The distances shown are between the site of the chemical burn and the position of staff at the time of
destruction, not distances between demining staff.
4. Multiple unfuzed devices without detonators may be destroyed in a single fire.

2.2 Safety-distances when burning fuzed mines and ERW

When burning fuzed mines and ERW, the demolition staff must be EOD Operators trained in the
identification of the devices being destroyed. Generally the Burning Team Controller (BTC) must be
the only person to start the fires or initiators used when burning fuzed mines and ERW.
The safety constraints in the detailed procedures described in this SOP must be followed.
Safety-distances imposed during burning in a fire or with chemicals are given below. These distances
should be applied when the mines or ERW are fuzed and/or contain detonators.

Burning in a controlled fire

Fuzed mines Minimum burning safety-distance
(distance in metres)
Burning Team Other staff
AP blast mines in burning cones 30 60
Single AT blast mines in pits 75 150

Burning with Chemical Deflagration System (CDS)

Fuzed Ordnance/ERW Minimum CDS safety-distance
(burned one at a time) (distance in metres)

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BTC Other staff
Fragmentation mines 50 100
Shell up to 160mm 200 500
Shell above 160mm 300 600
Mortar up to 120mm 200 500
AT Rocket up to 88mm 150 250
Hand/rifle Grenade 40 100
Buried charges of up to 10kg 75 150
ERW 40 120
Notes to table:
1. Recommended minimum distances are for burning staff wearing IMAS 10.30 compliant PPE and other
staff not wearing PPE.
2. The distances shown are between the site of the chemical burn and the position of staff at the time of
destruction, not distances between demining staff.
4. Multiple unfuzed devices without detonators may be destroyed in a single fire.

2.3 Control of entry into demolition areas

When demolitions are being conducted, they must be complete confidence that people and livestock
will not enter the danger area.
During demolition by explosion, a perimeter guard that is further away than the safety-distances listed
in Chapter 2, Part 7 must be established.
During demolition by fire or chemical burning, a perimeter guard that is further away than the safety-
distances listed in Parts 2.1 and 2.2 in this Chapter must be established.
During all demolitions, sentries must be posted to ensure that no animals or people can enter the
area. Sentries should have communication with the EOD Operator controlling the demolition. When
electric detonators are not used, this may be by whistles, radios or reliable telephones. Electrical
communications equipment should not be used close to any electrically initiated detonators.
Warning signs must be placed on all routes around the Demolition area unless a sentry is placed at
that point. A sentry must be placed on frequently used routes.

The Platoon MRE and Community Liaison officer should ensure that all local people know that the
demolition(s) will take place and that they understand the need to keep away from the area.

3. Explosive demolition of mines and ERW in-situ

When necessary, mines and ERW will be explosively demolished in-situ by EOD Operatives under the
direction of the Platoon Commander, Platoon Supervisor or Task Supervisor (all of whom should be
EOD Level 3 qualified.
Demolition in-situ can be conducted using explosive charges or using the Chemical Deflagration
System described in Part 7 of this Chapter.

3.1 General safety precautions

The minimum number of people should be involved during the preparation and use of explosive
charges. All other staff should remain at or beyond the safety-distance until the EOD Operator
instructs otherwise.
During explosive demolitions, sentries must be posted to ensure than no people or livestock enter the
safety-distance before the all-clear is announced.

The following additional rules always apply:

1. Smoking within 30 metres of High Explosive is forbidden;

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2. Detonators must be handled carefully and kept separate from explosives (including detonating
cord) until such time as they are used in the planned firing circuit;
3. Detonators must not be left unattended in the field at any time;
4. Detonating cord must be treated as an explosive;
5. Safety-fuse must be protected from rain and dampness at all times;
6. Electrical firing cable should be a minimum of 100 metres long, two-strand cable and must
always be tested for continuity and discontinuity before use;
7. The minimum safety-distance applicable to the mines/ERW being destroyed must be
maintained at all times;.
8. Sandbags may be used to reduce the effects of any shrapnel or fragmentation; and
9. After demolitions, the EOD Operator must check that all charges have fired correctly before
announcing the all clear.

3.2 Making controlled demolitions

A senior EOD Operator (EOD Level 3 or 4) must be responsible for the safe and correct conduct of
explosive demolitions. This Operator must control and brief any deminers involved in preparation for
the demolitions. Staff involved in the preparation and conduct of the demolition must have the
appropriate experience to carry out the work safely.
The senior EOD Operator shall be responsible for ensuring that the following actions are carried out:
1. All staff are instructed that no radios are to be used within 50 meters of exposed electric
detonators;
2. Sentries must be briefed about their duties;
3. All equipment not required for the conduct of the demolition must be moved away from the
demolition;
4. Clearance and access lanes must be free from obstructions;
5. A communication system must be issued to sentries and tested;
6. All staff not involved in the conduct of the demolition must withdraw to the appropriate safety-
distance;
7. All equipment required for the demolition must be tested and working properly;
8. Sandbags must be available when required;
9. Cables must be correctly laid out when used;
10. Transportation of explosives and demolition accessories from the temporary Explosive
Storage area to the place where they will be used must be conducted safely; and
11. Charges must be correctly positioned and connected to the firing circuit (electric or non-
electric).
The senior EOD Operator should inspect the prepared demolition to verify that it has been prepared
correctly. The senior EOD Operative should then confirm that the area is secure before giving the
EOD Operator permission to continue.
The EOD Operator should conduct the demolition in this sequence:
If the demolition is electric:
1. Connect the detonator to the firing cable, then to the detonating cord;
2. Confirm with sentries that the area is secure;
3. Give a loud verbal warning; and
4. Initiate the demolition.

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If the demolition is conducted using safety-fuse:
1. Push the detonator into the charge or attach it to a detonating cord trunk-line;
2. Prepare the lighter or matches that will be used to light the fuse;
3. Confirm with sentries that the area is secure;
4. Give a loud verbal warning; and
5. Light the fuse and walk to a safe position.
Until the “All Clear” command is given, everyone except the EOD Operator must remain at the safety-
distance.
The EOD Operator should wait at least ten minutes after the last signs of smoke or burning have
stopped, or from the time of the demolition, whichever is the longest. The EOD Operator should then
approach the demolition site to ensure that the item(s) have been destroyed and no hazards remain.
When this is confirmed, the EOD Operator should give the “All Clear” command and ensure that the
senior EOD Officer is informed. The Senior EOD Officer should inform the Task Supervisor.

3.3 Conducting explosive demolitions of mines in-situ

Generally, charges must be placed as close as possible to a device without moving it. They should
also be positioned to direct the blast into the ground or into an unclear area so that metal
contamination of Cleared areas in avoided. The use of sandbags to contain blast and fragmentation
should be considered.
Explosive charges for anti-personnel blast mines and bounding mines should be placed next to the
mine as shown below. Partly filled sandbags may be used to hold the demolition charge in position
when this is considered safe.

When tripwires are present, they should be cut after the fuze has been pinned (when possible) and
before placing any barrier of sandbags. After tripwires have been cut, adhesive tape may be wound
around the fuze to hold the pin in place.
When sandbags are used, they should be placed at least 20cm from the mine. The minimum number
of staff should be used to place sandbags.
The charge for anti-tank mines should be placed next to the mine or on top of the mine as shown
below, unless previous damage to the mine would make this unsafe. Part-filled sandbags may be
used to hold the demolition charge in position when necessary.

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3.4 Conducting explosive demolition of ERW in-situ
ERW that is not damaged may be moved unless it cannot be identified or falls into a no-touch
category. The EOD Operator must ensure that no unrecognised device is touched until it has been
identified and the EOD Operator is confident that it is safe to do so. Unidentified ERW may be
destroyed in-situ even if it appears to be in good condition.
The destruction in-situ of the following items may be considered by the EOD Operator in consultation
with the Senior EOD staff.
1. Shells or bombs over 82mm in diameter;
2. All rockets;
3. Any projectiles fired from disposable anti-tank weapon systems;
4. Sophisticated or unidentified UXO; and
5. UXO suspected of containing a Piëzo-electric or a graze fuze.
Safety-distances for ERW demolitions are given in Chapter 2 of these SOPs.

3.5 Demolition of misfires

Care must be taken to ensure that all explosive demolitions are detonated successfully. When a
demolition is unsuccessful, it is called a “misfire”.
There are two types of misfire, each with a minimum wait-time which must always be observed. The
wait-times are:
• Non-electric detonators — 30 minutes;
• Electric detonators — 10 minutes.

3.5.1 Non-electric misfire procedure

The following actions must be carried out when there is a non-electric misfire:
• Wait 30 minutes under cover or at the safety-distance;
• When approaching the misfire, approach it from the up-wind side if possible; and
• Look for any smoke coming from the safety-fuse. If there is smoke, return to cover and wait an
additional 30 minutes.
Evaluate the situation and handle the misfire in accordance with the instructions below.
The following are common reasons for demolition failures when using non-electric methods of
initiation. The destruction methods for these misfires are also explained.
Failure of the detonator(s)
1. The detonator may be unstable. Do not move the detonator or explosive charge.
2. Prepare a new charge in a safe area.
3. Connect a new detonator to an appropriate length of safety-fuse (minimum length of one
metre).
4. Position the new charge close to the misfired charge.
5. Connect the new detonator to the new charge using detonating cord where appropriate.
6. Light the safety-fuse.
7. Walk back to a safe area.

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Failure of the detonating cord or safety-fuse
If the failure is because the detonating cord was cut or the safety-fuse did not burn, the misfire is
normally dealt with by attaching a new initiating set to the same explosive charge.
Follow this sequence:
1. Retrieve the explosive charge.
2. Connect new detonating cord to the misfired charge.
3. Connect a new detonator to a minimum length of one metre of safety-fuse.
4. Tape a new detonator to the new detonating cord.
5. Reposition the charge.
6. Light the safety-fuse.
7. Walk back to a safe area.

Failure of the High Explosive charge

In there has been a partial explosion, gather all scattered fragments of explosive and detonate them
by placing a fresh charge alongside them. If necessary, place them underneath a filled sandbag or in a
hole to prevent the pieces of explosive being scattered again by the blast from the new charge.
Follow this sequence:
1. Dig a hole large enough to take the failed explosives.
2. Gather the failed or broken-up explosives and place them in the hole.
3. Prepare a new charge and initiation set in a safe area.
4. Place the new charge on top of the failed explosives.
5. Light the safety-fuse.
6. Walk back to a safe area.

3.5.2 Electrical misfires

In the event of an electrical misfire, follow this sequence:
1. Check the firing cable for continuity.
2. Make another attempt to fire the charge.
3. If the charge still does not fire, wait 10 minutes.
4. Reel out a second cable.
5. Prepare a new charge.
6. Place the second charge as close to the misfired charge as possible without touching it.
7. Walk back to a safe area.
8. Fire the demolition.

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4. Demolition explosives and accessories
Only explosives and demolition accessories in good condition can be used for the explosive demolition
of mines and ERW.
All safety-fuse must be tested by burning a measured length before it is used.
Wire used in electrical initiation systems must be tested as described in Part 4.4.2 below.

4.1 Detonators
The following safety precautions must always be observed when using detonators.
1. Detonators must be handled with care at all times and never left unattended when out of their
containers.
2. Detonators must be removed individually from their container.
3. When the required numbers of detonators have been removed from their container, the cover
of the container must be replaced immediately.
4. When a detonator is not issued in a special container, a suitable container must be provided.
5. Detonators must never be carried in the pockets of clothing.
6. Detonators must remain in their containers until they are used.
7. Detonators must be stored separately from all other explosives.
8. The wires on an electric detonator should only be pulled apart enough to allow connection to
the firing cable.
9. Electric detonators must be connected to the firing cable before being pushed into the
explosive or connected to detonating cord.
10. Detonators must not be buried at any time.
11. Electric detonators should not be used if there is a risk of lightning.
12. When a detonator is inserted directly into a charge, the direction of the detonation shock-wave
should be considered. The detonator should normally be inserted into the charge at an angle
of 90º to the target.

4.1.1 Detonator crimping procedure

Eye protection must always be worn when crimping detonators to safety-fuse.
NOTE: Never force safety-fuse or detonating cord into a detonator.
To crimp a detonator to safety-fuse, follow this procedure:
1. Calculate and cut the length of the safety-fuse and ensure that the end to be inserted into the
detonator is cut square.
2. Before taking detonators from containers, the EOD Operator must “ground” himself by placing
all fingers of one hand on the ground for several seconds to remove any static electricity.
3. Select a detonator from the container and hold it by the open end.
4. Inspect the open end of the detonator to confirm that it is free from dirt and obstructions.
Detonators which are blocked should be destroyed.
5. Slide the open end of the detonator down over the safety-fuse until the safety-fuse is in
contact with the detonator filling. Hold the safety-fuse with the thumb and middle fingers and
apply a light pressure downwards to hold the detonator in position with the tip of one finger.

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6. Place the crimpers around the detonator opening approximately 5 – 10mm from the open end
(where the safety-fuse is inserted into the detonator).
7. Close the crimper jaws with just enough pressure to hold the detonator and safety-fuse
together.
8. To prepare the final detonator crimp to the safety-fuse, hold the detonator and the crimpers in
front of the body. With the sealed end away from the body, raise the hands above eye level
and lightly squeeze the crimpers. Look at the crimpers and make sure that they are in the right
position. While doing this, shout “crimping” in a loud voice.
Wear eye protection and do not look away during the crimping procedure.
After crimping is completed, remove the crimping tool from the safety-fuse and inspect the detonator
to ensure it is firmly attached to the safety-fuse.

4.2 Safety-fuse
A safety-fuse is used to ignite a detonator that will detonate a high explosive charge. There is a delay
between the time of lighting the safety-fuse and the initiation of the detonator. The delay enables the
EOD Operator who lights the fuse to move to a safe position before the detonator detonates.

The following procedure must be used to test the safety-fuse before it is used:
1. Cut off the first 300mm and destroy it by burning.
2. Cut off another 300mm of the safety-fuse and time how fast it burns by lighting one end and
timing how long it takes to burn through to the other end. If this time is within the
manufacturer’s specifications, the coil of safety-fuse can be used.
3. If the burning time is outside the manufacturer’s limits, the coil of safety-fuse is unreliable so it
should be destroyed as soon as possible.

The last 300mm of any safety-fuse coil must be destroyed by burning.

When the burn rate for 30cm of safety-fuse is known, it should be divided by three to give the burn
rate of 10cm of fuse. The answer should be multiplied by 10 to give the burn rate for 100cm of fuse.
Having established the time it takes for a metre of fuse to burn, the EOD Operative should walk the
distance between the charge and the safe place he/she will use during the demolition. He/she should
time how long it takes to walk this distance.
The EOD Operative can then calculate the length of fuse that is needed to allow time to walk to the
safe place. This can be done using this formula.

WS / BT + 0.3 = Length of safety-fuse in metres.

WS stands for the number of seconds it takes him/her to walk from the firing pit to the safe place.
BT stands for the actual Burn Time of 100cm of the safety-fuse (in seconds).

The 0.3 represents an additional 30cm of fuse which will be a safety factor.
For example: WS = 130 seconds. BT= 110 seconds per metre. So the formula becomes:

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130 / 110 + 0.3 = 1.48 metres.
A length of 1.48 metres of safety-fuse should be used.

The minimum length of safety-fuse to be used for a demolition is one metre.

The end of the fuse inserted into the detonator must be cut off squarely at an angle of 90° using a
sharp knife.
Before a detonator is inserted into the safety-fuse, the EOD Operative must ensure that all other staff
are at a safe distance. The detonator should be crimped as described in Part 4.1.1 of this Chapter.

Care shall be taken to protect the safety-fuse against rain and dampness. Safety-fuse should only to
be cut from the coil when it is needed.
If a new coil of safety-fuse is damaged, the content must be examined carefully and any damaged
lengths should not be used.
Care must be taken to ensure that the fuse length does not curl back when it is laid out ready for use.
If the safety-fuse curls back there is a risk that a flash transmission may cause a premature explosion.
Curling can be avoided by gently placing sticks or small stones on top of the safety-fuse. Do not place
items heavy enough to crush the fuse on top of it.

4.3 Explosive charges

Where several separate explosive charges are required to destroy several different targets, the
charges can be connected to a single initiation point. This is normally done by connecting the charges
with detonating cord. A main-line system is normally used. A main-line system has one main-line of
detonating cord with branch-lines of detonating cord used to link the main-line to each explosive
charge.
When preparing charges, only staff necessary for the preparation should be present. All other staff
must stay at a safe distance.
Charges must always be placed as close to the target as possible. Partly filled sandbags may be used
to hold the charge in place and to deflect the blast when required.

Charges may also be initiated using detonating cord. The end of the detonating cord should be tied
with a double knot. Plastic explosive is then moulded around the knot to bury it inside the explosive.

4.4 Electric initiation of an explosive demolition

The following safety precautions must be used during demolitions that are initiated electrically.
1. Before connecting detonators to a firing cable, all VHF radios and mobile telephones must be
switched off.
2. Before handling electric detonators, the EOD operator must “ground” himself to remove any static
electricity.
3. Only approved electrical accessories can be used.
4. Never connect detonators to a firing cable when the wires at the other end of the cable are not
twisted together (shunted).
5. Never leave detonators un-shunted unless actually testing or connecting to firing cable.
6. The EOD Operator in charge of the demolition should keep the blasting machine or exploder with
him/her at all times.
7. The exploder or blasting machine should not be connected to the firing cable until the EOD
Operator is told that the safety cordon is in place.
8. Precautions against electromagnetic radiation hazards must be taken during the preparation for
the demolition.

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4.4.1 Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) Hazards
An electric current induced by electromagnetic waves can fire electric detonators accidentally. Radio
transmitters, radar sets and electrical machinery including vehicles, may cause induced currents. The
current may be induced in the firing circuit as a whole, in part of the circuit, or in the leads of a
detonator. It is not necessary to have continuity in a circuit for it to be affected by electromagnetic
hazards.
The danger of accidental firing occurs when a circuit, or part of a circuit, acts as an aerial and picks up
energy from radio or other electromagnetic waves. The danger is greatest when part of the circuit of
the correct length and configuration becomes resonant to the frequency of the transmitter by
coincidence. Because the critical lengths and configurations vary with the frequency, power and
direction of the transmitter, a circuit that is safe at one frequency may fire when a radio changes
frequency or is moved to another location.
Avoid circuit configurations which tend to act as aerials. This will reduce the danger of accidental
firing.
Examples to avoid are:
1. Knots and loops in firing cables.
2. Untwisted double cable.
3. Separated ends of firing cable at the firing point (wide separation of the leads during a
discontinuity test).
4. Detonators taken from the same strand of double cable. A contributing factor is the number of
detonators in a circuit - the fewer the better so do not connect more than one detonator to a
firing cable.
5. A detonator with one lead connected to a circuit that is held by a person who acts as an aerial.
When there are possible electromagnetic radiation hazards, the safest possible demolition circuit is
one where a single electric detonator with completely twisted leads (two twists to each 25mm) is
connected to the end of one continuous double twisted firing cable. The firing cable should have at
least 60 complete twists per metre. The leads at the firing point should not be parted more than
necessary to achieve connection.
If detonators are issued with untwisted leads, they should be twisted over their entire length at two
twists in each 25mm.
Test the firing circuit for continuity and discontinuity after it is laid out. Before the circuit is connected,
the following components should be checked and tested individually and separately.
Test the:
1. exploder or blasting machine for power;
2. electric cables for continuity and discontinuity; and
3. detonators for continuity.

4.4.2 Tests of Electrical Cable

Electrical cable should be inspected for damage before use. This should be carried out before
continuity and discontinuity tests. Cables must always be tested for continuity and discontinuity prior to
use. To do this:
1. Connect the ends of the cable to the terminals of the ohmmeter or test-set.
2. Separate the leads at the far end of the cable. Signal to the assistant that this has been done
by showing hands separated above the head. The assistant at the far end should repeat the
hand-signal to confirm that he/she has seen it. If the ohmmeter gauge reads a fault, there is
discontinuity in the cable.
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3. Join together the leads at the far end of cable. Signal that this has been done by showing
hands brought together above the head. The assistant at the far end should repeat the hand-
signal to show that he/she has seen it. If the ohmmeter gauge reads between 0 and 300
Ohms, continuity is present in the cable.

4. If continuity is present, signal the assistant by moving a hand in a circular motion and then
touching the ground. This signals the assistant at the far end to check that the leads are
twisted together and place them into the earth in order to ground the circuit.

4.4.3 Connecting Electric Detonators

The following procedure must be used when connecting an electric detonator to a firing circuit:
1. Place the detonator on the ground beneath a sandbag or shock-absorbing object.
2. Untwist the demolition cable leads enough to allow them to be joined to the detonator leads.
3. Wind one lead wire of the detonator on to each of the demolition cable leads. Then bend each
cable lead back onto itself.
4. Cover each connection with adhesive insulating tape.
5. Tape the electric detonator onto the detonating cord or push it into the explosive charge.
Electric detonators must be connected to the firing cable before they are inserted into the explosive or
connected to detonating cord.
Connections must be taped together so that twists of the detonator leads continue smoothly into the
twist of the firing cable.

4.5 Detonating-cord firing systems

When firing more than one explosive charge during demolition operations, electrically initiated firing
systems should be used whenever possible.
A main-line and branch-line firing system should be used. This comprises a main-line of detonating
cord onto which a number of branch-lines are connected. The main-line is initiated with an electric
detonator.

4.6 Storing High Explosive material

Explosives and ancillary equipment stored at the Task site must be kept in lockable containers with
detonators separated from high Explosive by a wall of sandbags or similar material. A “No Smoking”
sign must be placed at the entrance to the temporary storage area.
During daily use, boxes which contain high explosive material must not also contain detonators or
detonation cord. All detonation equipment must be stored and carried in separate containers.
The EOD Operator must control the use of explosive and all related equipment. After demolitions, the
EOD Operator must report the quantity used and the purpose for which it was used to the Senior EOD
Operator or the Platoon Commander. The Platoon Commander will inform the Task Supervisor who
will liaise with the Programme Manager’s office to ensure that no explosives or ancillary equipment are
unaccounted for, and to arrange for resupply as required.

4.7 Transporting explosive materials

The Programme Manager is responsible for ensuring that all procedures and standards for the
movement of High Explosives and ancillaries are obeyed. The Senior EOD Operator appointed by the
Task Supervisor must ensure that:
1. An appropriate vehicle is designated to transport the explosives.

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2. The explosives are secure from theft and tampering in the transport vehicle.
3. The explosives are transported according to the manufacturers’ instructions and
specifications.
4. When it is necessary to transport passengers in the same vehicle as the explosives, the EOD
Operator must be in the same vehicle and in charge of the explosives.
5. That detonators and explosives are not transported on the same vehicle, unless the detonator
storage container meets the minimum design requirement as stipulated in IMAS 10.50.
6. That no material is loaded on top of the portable detonator container.
7. That the detonator container is secured to the vehicle to prevent movement during transport.
8. That the vehicle has 2 x 9 litre (or bigger) water fire extinguishers on board.
9. That the vehicle has a container for storing radios, cellular phones, smoking materials,
matches, lighters cigarettes etc.
10. That the vehicle has hazard warning signs and a red flags displayed at all four corners of the
vehicle when required by the NMAA.

4.7.1 Rules for driving with HE and ancillaries

The Driver, EOD Operator and a Security Guard (when security is an issue) are generally the only
staff allowed in the vehicle.
All staff involved in transporting High Explosives and ancillaries must have had adequate training in
both hazardous load handling and emergency procedures.

Vehicles should travel with a minimum safety-distance of 100 metres between them when in convoy
and at a speed not exceeding 60 km per hour.
Where possible, routes should be selected to avoid areas that are heavily populated.
The EOD Operator and driver must have written instructions covering the procedures to be followed in
the event of an accident.

It is the Drivers responsibility under supervision of the EOD Operator to ensure that:
1. boxed explosive is evenly distributed over the vehicle tray;
2. the load is secure against movement, loss and damage during transit;
3. explosives boxes are stored away from the vehicle exhaust pipes;
4. no smoking is allowed within 20 metres of the vehicle;
5. vehicle radios, hand held radios and cellular phones are switched off in any vehicle carrying
electric detonators;
6. rapid acceleration and deceleration is avoided;
7. vehicles carrying explosives are not parked near buildings or in populated areas;
8. vehicles carrying explosives are not left unattended;
9. during loading, unloading and refuelling the hand-brake is applied, the engine switched off,
and, if on a gradient, the wheels are blocked with stones or wedges; and
10. fuel is not to be carried anywhere on the vehicle except in the fuel tank.

5. Collection of mines and ERW

Mine and ERW Collection Points must be established at any Task where mines or ERW are moved for
demolition. The senior EOD Operator should advise on the positioning of appropriate Collection Points
for mines and ERW discovered at a Task site. The Senior EOD Operative or Task Supervisor must
ensure that the Collection Points are prepared appropriately. Because the destruction of mines and

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ERW is not conducted while work is being conducted inside the SHA/CHA, the Collection Points and
the Demolition area can be close to the start-line or base-line. See Chapter 4, Part 3.1.20.
The Collection points are often adjacent to the Demolition Area at a Task, but may be separated when
that is most convenient, and must be separated when the Demolition Area is not big enough to ensure
that items in the Collection Points are secure during the demolition of other items.
Shallow pits should be prepared for the collected mines and ERW to be placed inside. The pits should
be 15cm deep and large enough to allow all mines and ERW to be placed without touching each
other.
Separate pits should be prepared for:
1. fuzed mines;
2. fused ERW;
3. Unfuzed mines and ERW;
4. Mine and ERW fuzes.
When the ground is wet and pits would be flooded, a rack above ground should be constructed and
the mines and ERW stored on top of it. The rack must be constructed so that devices cannot fall
through it or roll off the sides.
A temporary shade should be erected over the area where the mines and ERW are placed.

6. Destroying mines and ERW by burning in fires

There are several methods of destroying mines by burning in a controlled fire. Defuzed blast mines
and their separated fuzes can be destroyed by burning in simple fires. Fuzed blast mines can be
destroyed by burning in Burning Cones or special pits. Fuzed fragmentation (AG) mines and ERW can
be destroyed by chemical burning using the Chemical Deflagration System (CDS) described in Part 7
of this Chapter or by using approved gas or flare systems.

6.1 Mine Burning Team

A Platoon’s Mine Burning Team will be led by an EOD Operator assisted by two seconded deminers.
All members of a Mine Burning Team must receive comprehensive training before mine burning is
conducted.
When burning is to take place, the Task Supervisor must appoint an EOD Operator to act as a Burning
Team Commander (BTC).
Burning is conducted in pits in a Demolition Area while no work in being undertaken in the SHA/CHA,
and so is generally conducted after normal demining work has finished for the day. The Burning Team
must be supported by a Paramedic, and the Task Supervisor must be on duty.

6.2 The burning procedure for unfuzed AP mine bodies

This procedure is used for the controlled destruction of Anti-Personnel mines without fuzes. AP mines
that have not had the fuze removed must not be included in this procedure. Despite the absence of
fuzes, the procedure includes many of the safety requirements necessary when burning mines with
fuzes. Variations are kept to a minimum in order to make supervision of the various activities in the
demolition area easier.
Mine bodies without detonators or booster charges will burn but will not detonate. Most plastic cased
mines burn very well. Bakelite cased mines burn less well.
Up to 50 mine bodies are placed in a 20cm pit on top of sand and inflammable material (often wood
shavings) spread with flammable liquid. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) starts the fire (using a
torch) then withdraws. When convenient, an oil drum may be used instead of a pit.

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The Burning Team should have a fire extinguisher available at the burning pit at all times.
All staff carrying unfuzed mines to the burning pit should wear frontal PPE and eye protection.
The following procedure must be followed:
1. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) orders the collection of mines bodies without fuzes
from the Mine/Fuze Collection Area(s) to the Demolition area where a pit has been prepared.
2. The BTC must make an accurate record of the number of the number of mines delivered to
the Demolition area.
3. Before the mine bodies are burned, the BTC should inform the Paramedic and the Platoon
Commander/Supervisor that he/she will start. The Platoon Commander should inform the
Task Supervisor. The Task Supervisor should ensure that a cordon is established to ensure
that persons and livestock do not enter the area.
4. The Paramedic should make sure that nobody enters the Demolition area. When necessary
demining staff should ensure that persons and livestock do not enter the area.
5. The Burning Team places up to 50 mine bodies on top of the prepared fire in the burning pit. A
chemical fire-lighter may be used to start the fire burning.
6. The Burning Team should withdraw a minimum 30 metres.
7. The BTC should starts the fire using a long torch.
8. The BTC should withdraw to 30 metres to observe the burn.
9. After completion The BTC should goes back to the burning pit and check that the mines have
completely burned out. This may be done using a light rake.
10. If all the mine bodies have not burned out, the fire should be rebuilt and burned again.
11. The BTC should then inform the Paramedic and the Platoon Commander/Supervisor that the
process is complete.
12. The Burning Team should then prepare the burning pit for its next use.
The BTC is responsible for completing the burning record, which must be signed by the Task
Supervisor.

6.3 The burning procedure for separated AP mine fuzes

AP mine fuzes include a detonator so can be expected to “pop-off” during the burning process. To
ensure that the detonators are all destroyed, it is necessary to burn them separately.
A fire should be started in either an oil-drum, or in a pit that is at least a 1.2 metres square and 60cm
deep. When the fire is burning well, a single fuze should be dropped into it by a person who
immediately withdraws to ten metres. When multiple pits or oil-drums are prepared they must be at
least five metres apart.

The Burning Team should have a fire extinguisher available at the burning site at all times.
All staff moving fuzes must wear frontal PPE and eye protection at all times.
The following procedure must be followed:
1. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) should order the movement of AP mine fuzes from the
Fuze Collection Area(s) to the Demolition area where a pit or oil-drum has been prepared.
Several pits or drums can be prepared when necessary.
2. The BTC must make an accurate record of the fuzes moved to the Demolition area.
3. Before the fuzes are burned, the BTC must inform the Paramedic and the Platoon
Commander/Supervisor that he/she will start. The Platoon Commander/Supervisor must
inform the Task Supervisor. The Task Supervisor must ensure that a cordon is established to
ensure that persons and livestock do not enter the area.

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4. The Paramedic should make sure nobody enters the Demolition area. When necessary,
demining staff must ensure that persons and livestock do not enter the area.
5. The Burning Team should prepares the oil-drum(s) or pit(s). Fire-lighters may be used to start
the fires burning.
6. When the fire is burning well, a single fuze must be dropped into it by a Burning team member
who must immediately withdraw to a minimum of ten metres.
7. After the fuze pops-off, another fuze can be dropped into the fire.
8. If a fuze does not pop-off, the fire should be allowed to burn out and the bed inspected to
ensure that the fuze has completely burned out.
9. After completion, the BTC must go back to the fuze burning pits or oil-drums and check that all
fuzes have completely burned out. This can be done in pits using a light rake.
10. If any of the fuzes do not burn out, a soak-time of 30 minutes should be allowed before the fire
is rebuilt and burned again. No partially burned fuzes should be handled.
13. The BTC must then inform the Paramedic and the Task Supervisor that the process has been
completed.
14. The Burning Team should then prepare the burning pits or oil-drums for their next use.
The BTC is responsible for completing the burning record, which must be signed by the Task
Supervisor.

6.4 The burning procedure for separated AT mine bodies

This procedure is used for the controlled destruction of Anti-Tank Mines without fuzes. It must never
be used for fuzed AT mines. AT mine fuzes, included boosters, can be burned as fuzed AP mines. AT
mine fuzes with small detonators and no boosters can be burned as AP mine fuzes. Fuze
mechanisms without detonators or boosters should also be burned and buried to prevent them being
re-used or causing alarm in future.

A group of up to 10 mine bodies should be collected together and placed upside down in a circle in a
shallow pit. The pit need only be 20cm deep. The filling caps of the mines must be removed and put
aside. TNT must be placed in the centre with the mines’ filling cap facing inwards. One or more fire-
lighters must then be placed on top of the TNT. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) should light the
fire-lighter(s) using a torch, then withdraw to a minimum of 20 metres.

� NOTE: Any AT mine that may have a detonator still inside must be destroyed as a fuzed mine.
The Burning Team should have a fire extinguisher available at the burning pit at all times.
All staff carrying AT mine bodies should wear frontal PPE and eye protection at all times.
The following procedure must be followed:
1. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) should order the collection of AT mine bodies from the
Mine/Fuse Collection Area(s), and their movement to the Demolition area.
2. The BTC must make an accurate record of the AT mine bodies moved to the burning area.
3. Before the mines are burned, the BTC should inform the Paramedic and the Platoon
Commander/Supervisor that he/she will start. The Platoon Commander/Supervisor should
inform the Task Supervisor.
4. The Paramedic should make sure nobody enters the mine burning area. When necessary, the
Task Supervisor should ensure that a cordon is established to ensure that persons and
livestock do not enter the area.
5. The Burning Team should remove the filling caps and places 4-10 mines in a circle with the
holes left by their filling caps facing inward. TNT should be placed in the centre of the mines
with one or more fire-lighters on top.

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6. The Burning Team should withdraw a minimum of 30 metres.
7. The BTC should set fire to the fire-lighter(s) using a long torch.
8. The BTC should withdraws to 30 metres to observe the burn.
9. After completion, the BTC must goes back to the mine burning site and check that the mines
have completely burned out. If all mines fail to burn out, a fire should be rebuilt and the mines
burned again.
10. The BTC should then informs the Paramedic and Task Supervisor that the process has been
completed.
11. The Burning Team should prepare the burning pit for its next use.
The BTC is responsible for completing the burning record, which must be signed by the Task
Supervisor.

6.5 The burning procedure for fuzed AP blast mines

This procedure can only be used when steel Burning Cones made for the purpose are available.
Burning Fuzed AP mines usually makes the detonators explode. Sometimes most of the high
explosive has burned before the detonator explodes. At other times the mine may explode with its full
force. The Burning cone is heavy enough to survive an AP mine blast and direct it upwards. But it is
essential that the Burning Team members keep at least 20 metres from the detonation and wear their
PPE correctly. The procedure has a very low risk of injury if it is conducted properly.

The size of each burning cone should be approximately 30 x 30 x 17cm. The

cone is made using 12mm (or thicker) mild steel plate welded together on all
sides. A photograph is shown alongside.
Wood-shavings or sawdust should be put into the cone and soaked with diesel
fuel or other flammable liquid. When sawdust is used, a thin metal grid is
placed on top of the sawdust to hold the mine a little away from the sawdust.
The mine is placed on the grid and the fire is lit using a torch by the BTC. When a metal grid is used,
the metal grid may “jump” from the Burning Cone when the mine explodes and generally lands within
a metre of the cone.

The following procedure must be followed:

1. The Burning Team Commander (BTC) should order the collection of fuzed AP mines from the
Mine/Fuse Collection Area(s), and their movement to the Demolition area.
2. The BTC must make an accurate record of the fuzed AP mines moved to the Demolition area.
3. Before the mines are burned, the BTC must inform the Paramedic and the Platoon
Commander/Supervisor that burning is about to start. The Platoon Commander/Supervisor
must inform the Task Supervisor. The Task Supervisor must ensure that a cordon is
established to ensure that persons and livestock do not enter the area.
4. The Burning Team must prepare the Burning Cone(s) and place a mine in the middle of each.

5. The Burning Team must withdraw a minimum of 20 metres.

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6. The BTC must set fire to the Burning Cone(s) using a long torch.
7. The BTC must withdraw to 20 metres to observe the burn.
The mines will generally low-order when the detonator explodes after burning for between four
and eight minutes. When they high-order, the blast and debris is deflected harmlessly upward
and the Burning Cone is undamaged.
8. After completion, the BTC must return to the Burning Cone(s) and check that the mines have
completely burned out. If any mine has failed to burn out, it should be left for 30 minutes to
cool down before the fire in the cone is rebuilt and the mine burned again.
9. The BTC must inform the Paramedic and Task Supervisor when the burning process has
been completed.
10. The Burning Team should prepare the Burning Cone(s) for their next use.
The BTC is responsible for completing the burning record, which must be signed by the Task
Supervisor.

6.6 The burning procedure for separated AT mine fuzes

This procedure can only be used when steel Burning Cones made for burning mines are available.
Burning AT mine fuzes complete with their detonators usually makes the detonators explode. The
detonators are generally not powerful, so the procedure has a very low risk of injury if it is conducted
properly.
The procedure used for burning fuzed AP mines described in Part 6.5 of this Chapter must be
followed.

7. Destroying mines and ERW with the CDS

The Chemical Deflagration System uses a dense and heavy magnesium powder that burns at a very
high temperature and is able to melt the casings of metal-cased mines and ERW.

All storage and transportation of deflagration powder and igniters should be conducted as if the
material were High Explosive. Deflagration powder is not High Explosive, and the initiators are not
detonators, but the danger of fire is very real so the precautions for transporting High Explosive should
be applied.
All AP and AT mines can be destroyed using CDS. The following ERW other than mines can also be
destroyed using CDS:
1. Heat munitions without rocket motors;
2. HESH munitions without rocket motors;
3. Other pyrotechnics like smoke and white phosphorus (WP). When WP is burned, all safety
regulations regarding WP must be obeyed; and
4. Any propellant that is not connected to an HE charges (the rocket motors of RPG-7s, for
example).
CDS may burn out some devices without any detonation or with only a low-order detonation (when the
detonator explodes after most of the High Explosive has already burned). In other cases the device
may high-order, so the precautions necessary for a high-order detonation must always be applied.
The following general rules apply to CDS whether destroying mines and ERW in-situ or in a
designated Demolition area:
1. Only one fuzed device should be burned at a time.

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2. Only EOD Level 2 and above Operatives who have been trained and certified to use the MDS
may conduct the demolition.
3. When using CDS on fragmentation mines, sandbags should be used to control fragmentation.
With bounding fragmentation mines, the mine may bound before the burning process is
completed, and an in-air detonation may occur. When safe to do so, the mine may be placed
on its side and the burn conducted through the side to prevent in-air detonation.
4. Smoking is prohibited within fifty meters of the Deflagration powder.
5. The booster box should always be fully charged before starting a demolition. The box can be
used for up to 50 ignitions before it need to be recharged.
6. The Burning Team must include a spotter with binoculars to confirm that the powder has
ignited during the “firing” process. The Spotter should be at the safety-distance or take cover
after confirming that smoke is visible, and the burn has begun. The spotter must remain under
cover until the BTC gives the all clear.

7.1 CDS powder and accessories

The Chemical Deflagration System is designed to be completely safe as long as it is conducted in the
correct way and the correct accessories are used.
The necessary accessories are shown below.

Booster box

Ignition box (trigger

Two strand electrical
with key)
cable (red & black) long
enough to reach from
Two strand electrical
the ignition box to the
cable (yellow & green)
booster box.
long enough to reach
from the booster box to
the mine or ERW.

Deflagration Deflagration pot

powder holder

Electrical igniter Deflagration pot lid. Deflagration pot.

Electrical igniters are the most sensitive accessory in the burning process and must be treated with
the greatest of care at all times. Handling of the igniters should be kept to a minimum.
Electrical igniters must be:
1. handled with care;
2. removed form their container one at a time immediately before use; and
3. After removing an igniter from the container, the container must be closed.
Deflagration powder is not shock sensitive but it must be kept away from all sources of fire or extreme
heat.
A fire extinguisher must be present whenever deflagration powder is used.

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7.2 Before conducting a CDS demolition
The senior EOD Operator must ensure that:
1. no radios are used within 50 metres of the CDS initiating system;
2. sentries are briefed about their duties and a means of communication with them is in place;
3. equipment not required for the CDS must be moved away from the Demolition area;
4. access lanes must be free from obstructions;
5. all staff not involved in the demolition must be at the appropriate safety-distance;
6. sandbags must be available when required;
7. there must be a fire-extinguisher at the Demolition site (brush-beaters should also be available
if there is any risk of a grass fire);
8. the CDS cable must be correctly laid out;
9. transportation of Deflagration powder and initiators from the temporary Explosive Storage area
to the Demolition area must be conducted safely and
10. the exploder key must be kept by the Senior EOD Operator until the burning process is ready
to be conducted.
The senior EOD Operator should inspect the prepared CDS demolition to ensure that it has been
prepared correctly. The senior EOD Operative should also confirm that the area is secure before
giving the EOD Operator permission to continue.

7.3 Conducting a CDS burn

CDS should be conducted by a Burning Team headed by an EOD Operator serving as Burning team
Commander (BTC). A Senior EOD Operative must be appointed by the Task Supervisor to oversee
the activities.
When necessary, the BTC should order the collection of a mine or ERW device from the Mine/Fuse
Collection Area(s), and its movement to the Demolition area. The BTC must make an accurate record
of all devices that are destroyed.
Whether destroying mines and ERW with CDS in-situ or in a Demolition area, the following procedure
must be followed:

1. Before the mine or ERW is burned, the BTC must inform the Paramedic and the Platoon
Commander/Supervisor that he/she will start. The Platoon Commander/Supervisor must
inform the Task Supervisor. The Task Supervisor must ensure that a cordon is established to
ensure that persons and livestock do not enter the area.
2. The Burning Team should approach the device and leaves the CDS equipment which the BTC
will use to prepare the CDS. The rest of the Team should withdraw to the safety-distance and
the Observer should take position to watch the CDS ignition start.
3. The BTC must anchor the yellow & green wire to a picket and arrange the wire so that it leads
to the device to be destroyed. He/she must leave enough wire to connect the electric igniter to
the cable and to reach from there to the deflagration pot.
4. The BTC must unwind the remaining yellow and green wire in the direction of the firing point,
then closes the wire ends and place the booster box next to the closed ends.
5. The BTC then closes the black and red ends of the wire that lead from the booster box to the
firing point. He/she must then unroll the wire up to the firing point and connect the red and
black wires to their corresponding terminals.

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6. The BTC must remove the key from the Ignition box, then carry the electric igniter,
deflagration powder, deflagration pot with lid, and the pot
holder to the device to be destroyed.
7. The BTC must insert the pot in the pot-holder and fill it 80%
full with deflagration powder, taking care not to overfill it.
He/she must then place the lid on the pot and turns the lid
clockwise until it locks securely.
8. The BTC must position the pot over the main charge of the
device to be destroyed. The bottom of the pot should be
approximately 6cm from the item to be destroyed, so the
legs of the pot holder should be bent when necessary.
9. Sandbags should be positioned to contain fragmentation when
necessary.

10. The BTC must then connect the electric igniter to the cable
and isolate the connections.
11. The BTC must insert the igniter in the hole in the lid of the
deflagration pot, ensuring that the black rubber end of the
igniter is just above the powder.

12. The BTC must walk back to the booster box and insert the
four cable ends into the colour coded sockets in the rear of the booster box.

13. The BTC must then walk from the booster box to the firing point. The
green “Ready” light on the Ignition box should light to confirm that
the ignition trigger is ready to use.
14. The BTC must confirm with sentries that the area is secure and
confirm that the spotter is ready with binoculars trained on
the deflagration pot over the device to be destroyed.
15. The BTC must give a loud verbal warning that burning is about to begin.
16. The BTC must then insert the key in the Ignition box and turn the key clockwise. The system is
ready to fire when the red light above the word “Fire” appears.

17. To start the fire, the BTC must press and hold down the button on
the ignition trigger until the Spotter indicates that smoke has been
seen. If the red light stays on after the button is released, the BTC
must press down the push button again to make the red light go out.
18. When smoke has been confirmed, the BTC must turn the key anti-
clockwise and remove the key from the Ignition box.
19. The BTC must wait until the burn has finished or the device has
detonated, then ask the Spotter to confirm that there is no more
smoke. When there has been no smoke for five minutes, the BTC can approach the
demolition site to inspect the outcome.

20. The BTC must inspect the site to confirm that a full demolition has taken place before giving
the “All Clear” signal. If there is any doubt about the completeness of the burning, the
procedure must be repeated and a second burn conducted.

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7.3.1 Misfire of the CDS system
In the event of a BTC misfire, this sequence should be followed:
1. Make another attempt to fire the initiator.
2. If the deflagration powder still does not burn, wait 5 minutes.
3. The BTC should go forward and check the connections on the booster box. If they were loose,
he/she must tighten them and then withdraw to make another attempt to fire the initiator.
4. If the initiator still does not fire and there is no smoke from the CDS, the BTC must approach
the device, separate the wires leading to the initiator and lift the pot holder and pot clear of the
device.
5. The BTC should check all connections and if satisfied that the CDS is in working order, set up
the demolition again using a new initiator.

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8. Approved render-safe procedures
The following are fundamental Render safe rules:
1. No staff can undertake render-safe procedures until appropriately trained. The training must
be strict and certificates of competence only given to those with proven professional
competence.
2. No render-safe or neutralisation procedure can be conducted without a Paramedic and
ambulance available for CASEVAC.
3. Only one appropriately trained EOD Operative should be present when conducting render-
safe or neutralisation procedures.
4. PPE must always be worn, and eye protection must be clear and easy to see through.
5. Gloves may be worn when cutting fuzes and may provide some small protection against the
small blast involved in a detonator exploding. They should only be worn when they do not
make the wearer clumsy and more likely to have an accident.
Some mines that may be rendered safe when found in good condition are shown in the table below.

NAME TYPE HAZARDOUS CONTENT

R2M2 AP Blast 58 gm RDX/WAX:88/12
M14 AP Blast 29 gm Tetryl
PMN AP Blast 240 gm TNT, 9 gm Tetryl
PRB M35 AP Blast 100 gm TNT
MAI-75 AP Blast 120 gm TNT
Type 72 A/B AP Blast 50 gm TNT (TNT/RDX: 50/50)
GYATA-64 AP Blast 300 gm TNT
PRB M3 & PRB M3A1 AT Blast 6 kg TNT/RDX/Al (70/15/15)
TM-46 (TMN-46) AT Blast 5.7 kg TNT
TM-57 AT Blast 6.34 kg RDX/TNT
M15 AT Blast 10.3 kg Comp.B – RDX/TNT
M19 AT Blast 9.5 kg Comp.B – RDX/TNT

Additional render-safe information must be added to these SOPs at a later date.

8.1 Rendering mines safe

Mines that are in good condition can often be made safe by either neutralising or disarming them.
To neutralise a mine, its arming system is turned off. This is normally done by using a pin or clip to
block the firing train in the mine. In some cases, the mine has a “switch” to turn it from “armed” to
“Safe”.

To disarm a mine, the mine body and the fuze mechanism including detonator(s) must be separated.
When a detonator remains inside the mine, it has not been disarmed.
There are three main reasons why mines should be rendered safe to handle.
1. When metal-detectors are used, mines with their entire metal content but no High Explosive
are needed as Target-mines.
2. When MDD are used, mines with the original High Explosive inside but no initiation
mechanism are needed as MDD Test mines.
3. Rendering the mines safe for movement to a demolition area can be very convenient.

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8.2 R2M1 and R2M2 AP blast mine (58 gm RDX)
The R2M1 and R2M2 are anti-personnel blast mines with a plastic
case. They were made in the Republic of South Africa.

The picture on the right shows an R2M2 made in 1976.

The R2M1/2 is a small cylindrical AP blast mine with an injection
moulded plastic body and initiation assembly. It has many parts. The
pressure plate on the top of the mine has 12 radial ribs with a raised
projection in the centre surrounding the plunger which is red and
visible as a red nipple.
On the upper side of the mine body is a ribbed plastic sleeve with a short lip at the bottom and a
flange at the top. On the R2M2, the short lip is trapped between the two screw-together halves of the
High Explosive chamber at the bottom of the mine, acting as a seal. On the R2M1 the plastic sleeve
extends to the bottom of the mine. The flange at the top forms the upper edge of the mine and is
stiffened with a red plastic ring on the inside. There is a foam sponge in between the pressure plate
and the body cap.
The other differences between the R2M2 and the R2M1 are the colour and the shape of the plastic
moulding on the booster plug. R2M1s are usually dark green.
Red nipple, firing
plunger.

The mine on the left is as R2M2. The

mine on the right is an R2M1. Both
mines were recovered from a
minefield and are in the kind of
condition that should be expected.

If the red top of the plunger can be seen, the mine should be safe to disarm. When the mines are in a
bad condition such as those shown below, they must be destroyed in-situ.

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There is an R2M2 “TNT variant” that is a simpler model with a TNT fill. This mine cannot be separated
and the case must be cut with a fine toothed saw in order to expose the main charge. The fuse
mechanism and detonator are identical. The R2M2 “TNT variant” has a “flat” base with a raised central
platform with three equally spaced circular recesses around the booster well. The TNT variant is
reported to be common in some parts of Africa.

R2M1 R2M2 R2M2 TNT Variant

Height 57 mm 57 mm 57 mm
Diameter 69 mm 69 mm 69 mm
Mine weight 130 gr. 128 gr. 145 gr.
Explosive weight 58 gr. 58 gr. 75 gr.
Explosive type (main
RDX/WAX:88/12 RDX/WAX:88/12 TNT
charge)
Booster explosive weight 12 g 12 g 12 g
Detonator explosive weight 6.5 g 6.5 g 6.5 g
Casing material and colour Plastic, brown, green Plastic, brown, green Plastic, green
Ball retained striker, spring Ball retained striker, spring Ball retained striker,
Fuze type pressure spring pressure
pressure
Sensitivity 3-7 kg pressure 3-7 kg pressure 3-7 kg pressure
Can be very hard to detect. Metal components are usually made of stainless steel:
Detectability
some variations occur.

8.2.1 The R2M1/R2M2 initiation assembly

The picture below shows the following:
1. Below, on the left, the metal parts and a detonator in its plastic housing.
2. Below, in the middle, the entire initiation assembly. The pin is visible through the clear plastic
body. The detonator is set into the plastic beneath this. The spring, pin and balls are inside the
red upper part.

3. Below on the right is a cutaway view of the stab-sensitive detonator. When the layers inside
are disturbed, it detonates. This is why the detonator cannot be safely emptied without
specialist equipment.

3
1 2

The three retaining balls are held in a recess in the plastic head of the pin. When the red plunger is
depressed the balls line up with the holes in the plunger and move to the side, allowing the spring to
press down onto the plastic head of the pin and push it into the detonator.

The detonators measure 7.5mm in diameter and are coated with a transparent lacquer that glues them
into the clear plastic housing.
The same initiation mechanism is reported to be present in the South African No.8 AT mine.

Page: 29
8.2.2 Safety clip and booster
An unarmed mine has a safety clip inserted in a slide in the centre of the
pressure plate and through the groove at the top of the red plunger. This holds
the plunger up. A clip is shown alongside.

The booster well is positioned in the centre of the base of the mine,
directly beneath the detonator. The booster is shown at "A"
alongside. The booster charge has a fibre washer on top of it. The
detonator initiates the booster charge and the shock wave of its
detonation initiates the main charge.
The threaded booster plug is made of red plastic and screws into
the booster-well. It has a rubber O-ring washer.
Some booster plugs are varied to allow the attachment of a plastic
spike, shown at "B" alongside. The spike is designed to prevent
mine movement in washout areas.
The mine is relatively watertight but mines that have been buried
for a long time are often found with the striker pins and/or retaining
balls rusted.
The RDX and wax (8:1 ratio) High Explosive filling is white.

8.2.3 Rendering an R2M2 safe to move

When a mine is in good condition, it may be rendered safe to move.
Follow these stages:
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Expose the mine completely so that it can be picked and held by the sides. Never put any
pressure on the top.
3. Turn the mine, still holding it by its sides, and unscrew the booster charge from the base of the
mine.
The mine is now safe to move BUT the detonator may still be initiated if any pressure is applied to the
top of the mine. The booster charge is missing so the detonator should not initiate the main explosive,
but the detonator is powerful and could still cause injury. The detonator is powerful enough to shatter
the mine casing and cause injuries to exposed areas (such as the holder’s hand).

8.2.4 Making an R2M2 safe to use as a metal-detector target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its booster charge inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Put the mine on a flat surface and hold it by the sides.
3. Cut and remove the outer Plastic sleeve, allowing the pressure plate and foam disc to be
lifted away.
4. Unscrew the knurled plastic boss in the centre of
the mine (A in the photograph).
5. The top and bottom of the body (B and C in the
photograph) of the mine can then be separated A
by unscrewing them. It is usually necessary to B
cut the remains of the PVC sleeve from the join
(where it forms a gasket) between the mine
C
Page: 30
halves so that they can unscrew easily.
6. The RDX/WAX fill is a tight fit but can be removed from the smooth inner casing of the
bottom of the mine relatively easily.
7. The plunger and detonator assembly are moulded into the central pillar of the mine’s base
which must be cut so that they can be withdrawn.
8. Cut the brown plastic threaded tube rising from the bottom of the mine on both sides, cutting
from top to bottom and using a fine toothed saw (a small hacksaw is appropriate). Then
bend the brown plastic sideways. Considerable care is needed not to initiate the detonator
at this time.
9. The complete fuze can then be lifted out.
10. Cut the clear plastic where the needle can be seen, shown by
a red arrow on the photograph.
The detonator is then separated from the firing pin and spring.
11. Mix some two-part epoxy glue. Fill the gap around the pin with glue, then coat the face of
the detonator with glue and place a small disk of stiff plastic on top. Do not push them back
together. Stand the detonator on a flat surface, then place the top part of the assembly back
in position. Ensure that there is glue all around the join.
12. When the glue has dried hard, the assembly can be handled and the mine reassembled.
Use plenty of glue so that it does not come apart in use.
13. Fill the cavity where the RDX/TNT went with clay or Plaster of Paris.
NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will sometimes signal on a cavity.
14. When the mine has been reassembled, paint it red.

8.2.5 Making an R2M2 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its booster charge inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Put the mine on a flat surface and hold it by the sides.
3. Cut and remove the outer Plastic sleeve, allowing the pressure plate and foam disc to be
lifted away.
4. Unscrew the knurled plastic boss in the centre of
the mine (A in the photograph).
5. The top and bottom of the body (B and C in the
photograph) of the mine can then be separated A
by unscrewing them. It is usually necessary to B
cut the remains of the PVC sleeve from the join
(where it forms a gasket) between the mine
halves so that they can unscrew easily. C
6. The plunger and detonator assembly are moulded into the central pillar of the mine’s base
which must be cut so that they can be withdrawn.

7. Cut the brown plastic threaded tube rising from the bottom of the mine on both sides, cutting
from top to bottom and using a fine toothed saw (a small hacksaw is appropriate). Then
bend the brown plastic sideways. Considerable care is needed not to initiate the detonator
at this time.
8. The complete fuze can then be lifted out.

Page: 31
9. Mix some two-part epoxy glue and glue the mine back together, leaving the explosive in
place.
10. Fill all gaps and the booster well with glue to try to reproduce the sealed condition of the
original mine.
11. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

8.2.6 Neutralising the R2M1/2

If the top of the red plunger is not visible, the spring may have been depressed and no attempt should
be made to neutralise the mine by replacing the safety clip. If the red plunger is clearly visible in the
middle of the pressure cap, the safety clip can be slid into the groove at the top of the red plunger and
the slot in the pressure plate. When the clip is in place, replace the split-pin through the clip and the
holes in the pressure plate to lock it in place. This is seldom a simple operation when a mine has been
in place a long time and earth has filled the clip cavity.

Do not attempt to disarm a mine that has been exposed for any length of time. Discolouration of the
plastic (fading) may be the best indication of exposure which means that the plastic case may be in
an unpredictable state.

Page: 32
8.3 M14: AP Blast (29 gm Tetryl)
This mine may be rendered safe by suitably trained EOD Operators BUT if the mine is not in good
condition, the mine should be destroyed where it is.

The picture on the left shows the “A” Armed and “S” Safe positions. The picture on the right shows an
M14 in a minefield.
To render the mine safe and defuze it, the following sequence should be followed.
1) Rotate the pointer on the pressure plate away from the “A”
(Armed) mark to point at the “S” (Safe) mark. If this cannot be
achieved, but the mine is in good condition, go to step 2. If the
mine is not in good condition or if the EOD Operator is in any
way concerned, the mine should be destroyed where it is.
2) If a safety-clip is available, fit the safety-clip.
3) Turn the mine over and, without pressing on the pressure
plate, unscrew the detonator assembly from the base of the
mine. Use fingers or the correct key/spanner to achieve this.
If the detonator assembly cannot be removed but the
pressure plate pointer is indicating “S”, the mine has been
neutralised but not disarmed. The mine can be moved for bulk
demolition if required.

4) If the detonator assembly has been separated, the mine has

been disarmed.

NOTE: The small copper-cased detonator and steel firing-pin are

the only metal components in this mine. This can make it
very difficult to detect with a metal-detector.

8.3.1 Making an M14 safe to use as a metal-detector target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its detonator inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Put the mine on a flat surface and hold it on one side.
3. Use a fine toothed saw (a small hacksaw is appropriate) to cut the mine in half.

Page: 33
4. The picture below shows the parts inside an M14.

Arming clip Belleville spring

Firing pin

Mine partition

Pressure plate

Mine body with Tetryl filling

Fuze-assembly cover Detonator

5. The mine has a “Mine partition” inside. Lever out the partition and break out the Tetryl filling.
Collect the Tetryl in a bag for later disposal.
6. Mix some two-part epoxy glue. Put a small disk of plastic over the hole in the middle of the
mine partition and fill the mine partition with glue, then put it aside to dry.
7. Push epoxy glue into the top part of mine, filling all the cavities between the pressure plate,
fuze assembly cover and the Belleville spring.
8. Glue a small disk of plastic on top of the detonator.
9. Before rebuilding the mine, fill the cavity where the Tetryl went with clay or Plaster of Paris.

NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will sometimes signal on a cavity.
10. When the glue has dried, reassemble the mine using plenty of glue to hold the sawn halves
together.

11. Paint the finished mine red.

NOTE: Remember to dispose of the discarded Tetryl safely.

Page: 34
8.3.2 Making an M14 safe to use as a MDD target
Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its detonator inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Mix some two-part epoxy glue and glue the top of the mine together so that the pressure
plate is stuck in the Safe position.
3. Fill the cavity in the bottom of the mine where\the detonator was removed with epoxy glue.
4. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
5. Ensure that the detonator is safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

8.3.3 Neutralising the M14

The M14 is neutralised by turning the pressure plate to point to Safe and
inserting a safely clip. This design allows the mine to be re-used.
If the grooves through which the clip slides are damaged or filled with dirt,
neutralisation should not be attempted. When clips are available and you
want to use them, the clips can be filed down to make it easier to insert
them as shown in the lower picture alongside.
The clip is then used before disarming the mines, and removed for re-use
after the detonator has been removed.

Page: 35
8.4 PMN: Anti-Personnel blast (240 gm TNT)
This mine may be rendered safe by suitably trained EOD Operators BUT if the mine is not in good
condition, the mine should be destroyed where it is.

The mine cannot be neutralised by replacing its

arming pin.
There are some reports of this mine being unsafe to
disarm because of crystals forming in the threads of
the booster cap.
The mine is more easily initiated by pressure on the
extreme edge of the pressure plate than by pressure
in the centre, so it must be handled with extreme
caution. Booster-cap

The mine has a 240g TNT main charge and a 9gm Tetryl booster charge around a No 9 detonator.
The cutaway drawing below shows the mine parts.

Rubber-cap over
Pressure plate

Metal clip holding

rubber in place
Firing pin

Booster and
Safety pin detonator

Main charge

Firing pin lock. When

pressed down, the pin can
fire through it.

To render the mine safe and defuze it, the following sequence should be followed.
1. Unscrew and remove the booster-cap. The booster cap has a flat tab that is designed to be
easy to grip.

� NOTE: Do not try to unscrew the knurled cap over the firing pin.
2. Tilt the mine so that the booster and detonator slide out.
3. Pointing the booster-hole away from you, press on the top of the mine to fire the firing pin. The
pin is large and heavy. Never fire it at anyone.

4. Collect the booster cap, the pin and its spring which may be needed for making a metal-
detector target.

Page: 36
8.4.1 Making a PMN safe to use as a metal-detector target
Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its firing-pin, detonator or
booster detonator inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Put the mine on a flat surface and untwist the split pin that holds
the metal ring tight on the rubber cover.
3. Lift the rubber cover away.
4. The TNT filling is often coated with black lacquer.
5. Break out the TNT filling. The filling is cast in place so often has
to be chipped out in small bits. Collect the TNT in a bag for later
disposal.
6. With no TNT inside, rebuild the mine leaving out the detonator
and booster. This means there is slightly less metal
than in the original, but still more than enough for any
detector to find.
7. Before replacing the top, fill the cavity where the TNT
went with clay or Plaster of Paris.

NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will

sometimes signal on a cavity.

8. Glue the booster plug back in place and paint the

finished mine red.

NOTE: Remember to dispose of the discarded TNT and the Tetryl booster with detonator safely.

8.4.2 Making a PMN safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its firing-pin, detonator or
booster detonator inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Mix some two-part epoxy glue
3. Fill the hole where the booster plug screws with glue.
4. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
5. Ensure that the detonator and booster are safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

Page: 37
8.5 PRB M35: Anti-personnel blast (100 gm TNT)
This mine may be rendered safe by suitably trained EOD Operators BUT if the mine is not in good
condition, the mine should be destroyed where it is found.

Pressure-shaft

To render the mine safe and defuse it, the following

sequence should be followed.

1. Wear PPE and a visor.

2. Standing up from the top of the fuze is a plastic
pressure shaft indicated by the red arrow above.
The plastic shaft has a hole through it. Insert a stiff
wire pin (that has been previously prepared) through
the hole. If the hole is blocked, move to Step 2.

� NOTE: If the plastic shaft has been pressed down so

that the hole is not accessible, the mine should
be destroyed where it is.
3. Unscrew the fuze assembly from the top of the mine
using fingers or an appropriate tool. If the fuze
assembly cannot be removed, but the pin is in place,
the mine has been neutralised, but not disarmed. The mine can be moved for bulk demolition
when that is required.
4. If the mine body and the fuze assembly have been separated, the mine has been defuzed.

NOTE: This mine has a small metal content and can be difficult to detect with a metal-detector.

Page: 38
8.5.1 Making a PRB M35 safe to use as a metal-detector target
Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its fuze attached.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Put the pinned fuze on a flat surface and use a small-toothed saw (a small hack-saw is
appropriate) to saw across the fuze at the bottom of its thread as shown with the red-line
below.

3. When the top of the fuze is separated from the detonator, take out the safety-pin and cut
through the pressure shaft level with the top of the fuze so that no part of the pressure
shaft stands up.
4. Mix epoxy glue and glue a small piece of plastic on top of the detonator, then fill the cavity
on top of the detonator.
5. Press glue around the plunger to hold it in place.
6. Place the two halves of the fuze back together with plenty of glue holding them together
and put them aside to dry.
7. Take the mine body and cut the base off with the hack-saw. Break out the TNT and collect
it in a bag for later disposal.
8. Glue the base back onto the mine-body.
9. When the glue has dried, fill the cavity left by the TNT with clay or Plaster of Paris.

NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will sometimes signal on a cavity.

10. When all the glue has dried, reassemble the mine and paint it red.
NOTE: Remember to dispose of the discarded TNT safely.

8.5.2 Making a PRB M35 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe to move, so does not have its fuze attached.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Mix some two-part epoxy glue
3. Fill the hole where the fuze is screwed with glue.
4. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
5. Ensure that the fuze and detonator are safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

Page: 39
8.6 MAI-75: Anti-personnel blast (120 gm TNT)
The MAI-75 is a bakelite cased AP blast mine.
Height: 61mm
Diameter: 95mm
Explosive charge: 120g TNT

The mine has a small metal content and can be difficult to detect.
The mine may be neutralised by replacing the forked pin through the holes on both sides of its circular
pressure plate. This should not be attempted in the holes are blocked with soil or debris.
NOTE: If the holes are not visible and the pressure plate has been partly depressed, the mine should
be destroyed without moving it.
To render the mine safe and defuse it, the following sequence should be followed.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Either pin the mine, or hold it carefully avoiding putting any pressure on the pressure plate.
3. Unscrew the top and bottom halves of the mine.
4. If the mine will not unscrew, use a sharp knife to cut the gasket between the two halves and
try again.
5. When the two halves are separated, remove the detonator from the lower half.
6. The mine has been defuzed.

8.6.1 Making a MAI-75 safe to use as a metal-detector target

Start with a mine that has been defused, so does not have its detonator inside.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
Firing pin
2. Unscrew the fuze assembly
Fuze base
from inside the top half of the
mine.
Spring
The parts of the fuze assembly
are shown in the photograph on Pressure plate
the right.
3. Cut a stiff plastic disc the same
diameter as the black plastic
cup on the firing pin.
4. Mix some epoxy glue and glue
the disk inside the fuze base
blocking the hole where the
firing pin passes through. Add more glue covering the white “arms” on the fuze base, then
reassemble the fuze in the top of the mine.
5. Glue a plastic disc over the top of the detonator.

Page: 40
6. Remove the TNT from the bottom half of the mine.
7. Fill the cavity left by the TNT with clay or Plaster of Paris.
NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will sometimes signal on a cavity.
8. Set the detonator into the Plaster of Paris in the centre of the mine.
9. When all the glue has dried, reassemble the mine and paint it red.
NOTE: Remember to dispose of the discarded TNT safely.

8.6.2 Making a MAI-75 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been defused, so does not have its detonator inside
1. Unscrew the mine and ensure that the detonator is missing.
2. Press on the pressure plate until the firing pin clicks through.
3. Screw the mine back together. Use glue on the threads to make a good seal.
4. Paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
6. Ensure that the fuze and detonator are safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

Page: 41
8.7 Type 72 A/B: Anti-personnel blast (50 gm TNT or TNT/RDX)
The Type 72 anti-personnel blast mine is a small plastic mine made in China. The mine is green with a
green rubber inset on the top. The Type 72a is a minimum metal mine and can be very difficult to
detect with a metal-detector. The Type 72b has a
battery and circuit board so has a lot of metal and is
easy to detect.
Height: 38mm
Diameter: 78mm
Main charge: 50g TNT

The picture alongside shows the separate parts of a

Type 72a. The rubber top has holes in it, which often
happens when the mine has been exposed for years.
The Type 72a is operated by applying pressure which causes a non-metallic belville spring to "click-
through". A metal pin in the centre of the belville spring strikes a small aluminium cased pyrotechnic,
which fires the detonator that is beneath it inside an RDX booster. The booster detonates and its
shock-wave initiates the 50g TNT main charge in the mine.

The metal content of a Type 72a is shown in the

picture on the right. The white plastic ring is inside
the top of the mine and is the spring-loaded
arming-ring. The spring is a long, thin coil-spring
which is very hard to detect with a metal-detector.
The metal content of the mine is so low that it may
be impossible to detect with any modern metal-
detector when the mine is in electromagnetic soil
at a depth of 10-15cm.
The Type 72b looks exactly the same from the
outside. The Type 72b incorporates an electronic
anti-tilt device that makes it relatively easy to detect because of the presence of a circuit board and
batteries. The two 1.5v batteries should last for up to ten years (although the entire circuit board is
very vulnerable to moisture damage which would render the mine inactive far sooner).

The picture on the right shows the trembler anti-tilt device in the
Type 72b. The trembler can be triggered by tilting the mine through
less than 10°, so could be activated during excavation of a metal
detector signal, and would almost certainly be activated if a mine
were picked up.
The Type 72b can only be initiated electronically. If the batteries are
dead or the circuit broken, there is no mechanical process to
detonate the mine. (Poking at the pyrotechnic with a pin or a stick
can still do it, of course.)

In tests, the Type 72b's anti-tilt trembler device was reliably triggered
by passing a strip of neodymium magnets laterally above the mine at
an 11mm distance. As a consequence using hand-held magnets in areas where active Type 72b
mines are anticipated is not recommended UNLESS the magnets are attached to a blast resistant
hand-tool that protects the user's hand by distance, ground angle and a hand-guard. The relatively
small amount of HE in the Type 72b (50g) means that such a tool used at a low angle to the ground

Page: 42
should mean that blast injury to the hand is avoided (shock injury, sprains or broken bones may
occur). Of course the magnet user should also have suitable frontal PPE.
The only easily visible difference between the Type 71a and the Type 72b is in the shape of the
arming pin. The "a" has a round ring on the pin. The "b" has a triangular "ring" on the pin.
Copies of the Type 72a have been made in South Africa and these are reported to have been glued
together, so may be impossible to separate safely.
The mine cannot be neutralised because the arming pin passes through the spring-loaded arming
ring. When the pin is removed, the hole moves, so the pin cannot be replaced. Sometimes the top of
the mine can be rotated to line up the holes but this is not recommended because the inner hole
cannot be seen.

To render the mine safe, the following sequence should be followed.

1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Hold the mine by its sides and unscrew the booster assembly from the
bottom of the mine.
The booster cap has four notches around the edge, as shown in the
photograph alongside. A specialist tool can be made to fit it, or a
screwdriver can be used. Some long-nosed pliers with thin ends fit the
notches well.
3. When the booster has been removed, the firing train has been broken.
The detonator is inside the booster.
4. Above the detonator is a small detonator called a pyrotechnic. It is not powerful enough to initiate
the mine, but can cause injury if it detonates while the mine is held in a
hand.
5. There is a plastic pin on the underside of the mine, shown in the
photograph on the right. Unscrew the plastic pin on the underside of
the mine – continuing to take care not to press on the pressure plate.

6. Unscrew the top of the mine.

7. With the Type 72a, lift away the brown plastic Belleville spring
with the firing pin in the middle of it. The Belleville spring has a
hole on one side. Put a screwdriver through the hole and lever
the spring away if it is not easily withdrawn.
8. With the Type 72b, lift away the circuit board with the white
plastic pressure plate wired to it.
9. The bottom of the mine is now separated as shown in the
photograph on the right. Cut a blunt wooden peg the same
diameter as the pyrotechnic and push it out of the mine body.
10. Break out the TNT, which was cast in place and may only be
removed in small pieces. Collect it in a bag for later disposal.
11. Reassemble the mine without the pyrotechnic and the booster.
The mine has been disarmed.

Page: 43
8.7.1 Making a Type 72A/B safe to use as a metal-detector target
Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its booster or pyrotechnic in place.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Use a knife to enlarge the hole in the bottom of the mine where the pyrotechnic fits.
3. Carefully use a pointed tool to scrape out the explosive around the detonator in the
booster. Free the detonator from the explosive.
4. Mix some epoxy glue.
5. Glue the pyrotechnic upside down in the hole in the lower half of the mine.
6. Glue the detonator into the centre of the booster plug. Glue a small piece of plastic on top
of the detonator.
7. When the glue has dried, fill the cavity left by the TNT with clay or Plaster of Paris.

NOTE: The cavity must be filled because some detectors will sometimes signal on a cavity.
8. When all the glue has dried, reassemble the mine putting the Belville spring in upside
down (so that the pin points upwards).
9. Paint the mine red.
NOTE: Remember to dispose of the discarded TNT (and RDX from the booster) safely.

8.7.2 Making a Type 72A/B safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its booster or pyrotechnic in place.
1. Mix some two-part epoxy glue and fill the cavity in the bottom of the mine where the
booster was removed with glue.
2. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
3. Ensure that the pyrotechnic, detonator and booster are safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

Page: 44
8.8 PRB M3 and PRB M3A1 – Anti-Tank blast mine: 6 kg TNT/RDX/Al
The PRB M3 is a large AT blast mine with a thin plastic case that is stitched together on the sides. The
mine case has a thin webbing handle on one side.

The explosive charge incorporates a central well where

two booster pellets are held in a Bakelite moulding below
an M60 fuze and detonator. Above the fuze, a Bakelite
pressure plate screws into place. The pressure plate is two
mouldings held together with white plastic pins. When
sufficient pressure is applied to the plate, the pins break
and the pressure plate pushes down onto the fuze,
initiating the detonator.
The M60 fuze has two steel strikers held apart by a plastic collar.
Inside the collar are two stab-sensitive igniters inside a cavity leading
to the detonator. The mine’s only metal content is the igniter caps,
detonator casing and steel strikers.
The PRB M3A1 is a design variation that has an extra fuze well in
the side and another in the underside. The mine may be used with
the PRB M30 anti-lift device. The mine body is normally olive green
and the pressure plate is sand brown.

Size: 230mm square

Main charge: 6 kg TNT/RDX/Aluminium powder
(70/15/15)
Operating pressure: 250 kg
The mine cannot be neutralised without disarming it.
To render the mine safe, the following sequence should be followed.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Unscrew the pressure plate turning it anti-clockwise.
3. Lift the fuze from the cavity inside the mine. It the
fuze does not lift out easily, do not use a tool to lever
it.
NOTE: When the fuze remains in the mine it has not been
disarmed and must be treated as a fuzed mine.

8.8.1 Making a PRB M3 safe to use as a metal-detector target

The fuze can be used as the metal detector target without using any other part of the mine.
It is not recommended that the fuze be cut open because it does not require much pressure to set it
off. The entire fuze can be set into the centre of a block of epoxy resin so that it cannot be initiated
accidentally. If you do this, set string into the resin so that it is easy to find a fuze that has been buried.
The fuze should then be treated as a detonator and stored carefully.
When the fuze must be cut open:
1. Wear PPE and a visor. Wear a thick glove on the hand holding the fuze.
2. Use a junior hacksaw to cut around the body of the fuze just above the lettering. Take
care not to cut deeper than the plastic.
3. When the top of the fuze can be lifted away, mix some epoxy glue.

Page: 45
4. Fill the cavity inside the fuze with epoxy glue and tape the top back into place while the
glue is still wet.
5. When the glue has dried, paint the fuze red to show that it is live and dangerous. Although
it should not fire with pressure on the top, it should not be stepped on or otherwise
mistreated.
NOTE: Remember to dispose of the rest of the mine safely.

8.8.2 Making a PRB M3 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have the pressure plate or fuze in place.
1. Mix some two-part epoxy glue and fill the cavity in the top of the mine where the fuze was.
2. When the glue has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
3. Ensure that the fuze is safely destroyed.
NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain the metal parts
that the detector can find.
The picture below shows a PRB M3 after a flail had been used in an area. The mine has been
damaged, but not destroyed.

When mines are found without the pressure plate assembly attached, always presume that the fuze is
inside and treat the mine as a live mine. Do not use a tool to try to clean out the fuze well. Deminers
have died trying this.

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8.9 TM-46: Anti-Tank blast mine (5.3 kg TNT)
The TM-46 is a metal cased AT blast mine containing 5.3 kg of TNT. The mine is usually laid with a
pressure fuze, but may be used with a tilt-rod fuze.

This mine should always be pulled before any attempt is made to disarm it. This is because:
1. The mine have a pressure release device or anti-disturbance fuze which cannot be detected
without removing the cap.
2. The mine may be paid with an anti-lift device fitted into an auxiliary fuze-well on the underside
of the mine body. MUV fuzes may be used.

To disarm the mine, follow this sequence.

To render the mine safe, the following sequence should be followed.
1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Check the immediate area around the mine for anti-disturbance devices.
3. Excavate the rear side of the mine to place a pulling hook.
4. Pull the mine remotely.
5. Hold the mine firmly and unscrew and remove the fuze assembly.
6. Unscrew and separate the detonator from the fuze.

8.9.1 Making a TM-46 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its fuze in place.
1. Fill the fuze-well with resin, clay or Plaster of Paris.
2. When it has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
3. Ensure that the fuze and detonator are safely destroyed.

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8.10 TM-57: Anti-Tank blast mine (7 kg TNT Torpex)
The TM-57 is a metal cased AT blast mine containing 7 kg of TNT. The mine is usually laid with a
pressure fuze, but may be used with a tilt-rod fuze.

Fuzes used may be the MVZ-57 or the MVSh-57 (tilt rod). AN MUV or other fuze may be used in the
secondary fuze-well.

To render the mine safe, the following sequence should be followed.

1. Wear PPE and a visor.
2. Check the immediate area around the mine for anti-disturbance devices. There is secondary fuze
well on the side of the mine, so carefully excavate all around it.
3. Excavate the rear side of the mine to place a pulling hook.
4. Pull the mine remotely.
5. Hold the mine firmly and unscrew and remove the fuze assembly.
6. Unscrew and separate the detonator from the fuze.

8.10.1 Making a TM-57 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its fuze in place.
1. Fill the fuze-well with resin, clay or Plaster of Paris.
2. When it has dried, paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
3. Ensure that the fuze and detonator are safely destroyed.

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8.11 M15: Anti-Tank blast mine (10.3kg Comp.B – RDX/TNT)
This is a large AT mine with a metal case.

The pictures above show the filler cap on the side of the mine and the carrying handle.
To render the mine safe, the following sequence should be followed.

1) Turn the arming lever from ARMED, past DANGER to SAFE. Use an approved tool if necessary. If
the arming lever cannot be moved to SAFE, destroy the mine where it is.

2) Unscrew the arming plug. If the arming plug cannot be unscrewed, but the arming lever points to
Safe, the mine has been neutralised, but not disarmed.
The mine can be safely moved for later demolition when
required.
3) Remove the M603 fuze. If the fuze cannot be removed,
the mine has been neutralised, but not disarmed. When the fuze
cannot be removed, the mine can be moved for later bulk
demolition when required.
4) If the mine body and pinned fuze assembly are separated,
move the disarmed mine body and the fuze separately to the
mine and fuze Collection Areas.
NOTE: The size of this mine means that other mines within a six metre radius may be detonated
sympathetically if it is destroyed in-situ.

8.11.1 Making an M15 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its fuze or detonator in place.
4. Ensure that the fuze is absent, then screw the arming plug back in place.
5. Paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
6. Ensure that the fuze and detonator are safely destroyed.

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8.12 M19: Anti-Tank blast mine (9.5kg Comp. B – RDX/TNT)
This is a large AT mine with a plastic case and a minimum metal content. A small copper-cased
detonator and stainless steel firing-pin are the only metal components in this mine. This can make it
very difficult to detect with a metal-detector.

The mine above was removed after 30 years in a minefield.

To render the mine safe to move for destruction, the following sequence should be followed.
1) Turn the arming switch so that the switch moves from pointing at “A” (armed) to “S” (safe). If the
switch cannot be moved, destroy in-situ.

The mine on the left is “A”rmed.

The mine on the right is “S”afe.

2) Turn the fuze assembly anti-clockwise by hand or with an approved tool. Lift the fuze. If the fuze
cannot be removed, the mine has been neutralised, but not disarmed. The mine may be moved for
later bulk demolition when required.

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3) Unscrew the detonator from the bottom of the fuze. If the detonator cannot be removed, do not use
excessive force. The picture below shows the detonator removed from the underside of the fuze.

NOTE: When the detonator has been

separated from the fuze assembly
the rest of the assembly poses no
threat. It should be destroyed to
prevent people finding it and
thinking it is dangerous.

NOTE: The size of this mine means that other mines within a six metre radius may be detonated
sympathetically if it is destroyed in-situ.

8.12.1 Making an M19 safe to use as a metal-detector target

Use only the fuze assembly.
1. Mix a very small quantity of epoxy glue.
2. Glue a small disc of stiff plastic to the top of the detonator. Let it dry.
3. Mix some more epoxy glue and fill the detonator hole with glue.
4. Screw the detonator back into the fuze before the glue in the hole has dried.
5. Paint the mine red.

NOTE: Remember to dispose of the mine body safely. Large mines like this can be excellent sources
of explosive from which to make your own demolition charges.

8.12.2 Making an M19 safe to use as a MDD target

Start with a mine that has been rendered safe, so does not have its detonator in place.
1. Ensure that the detonator is absent, then screw the fuze assembly back in place.
2. Paint the mine red and clearly mark it “MDD”.
3. Ensure that the detonator is safely destroyed.

NOTE: MDD targets cannot be used as detector targets because they do not contain all of the metal
parts that the detector can find.

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GENERIC SOPs
CHAPTER 6: MANUAL DEMINING

Date:

Deminer checking the position of a metal-detector indication.

Page: 1
CHAPTER 6: MANUAL DEMINING

Contents

1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Manual demining platoon structure.................................................................................................... 4
2. DEMINING PLATOON DEPLOYMENT................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Daily briefing ...................................................................................................................................... 5
3. APPROVED MANUAL DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS............................................................................... 6
3.1 Lanes ................................................................................................................................................. 6
3.1.1 Clearing vegetation from the side of a lane ............................................................................ 6
3.1.2 Lateral lanes ........................................................................................................................... 7
3.2 Spot Tasks......................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.1 EOD Spot Tasks..................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.2 MDD Spot Tasks .................................................................................................................... 9
4. TASK SITE PREPARATION ................................................................................................................. 10
5. WORKING-DISTANCES BETWEEN STAFF ........................................................................................ 10
5.1 Supervisor working-distances .......................................................................................................... 11
5.2 CASEVAC procedures during manual demining.............................................................................. 11
5.2.1 Initial accident investigation .................................................................................................. 12
6. MANUAL DEMINING PROCEDURES .................................................................................................. 13
7. LANE CLEARANCE USING METAL-DETECTORS.............................................................................. 13
7.1 General principles............................................................................................................................ 13
7.1.1 Detector calibration area ...................................................................................................... 14
7.1.2 Detector test area ................................................................................................................. 14
7.1.3 Using the detector Test and Calibration areas...................................................................... 15
7.1.4 Search-head movement ....................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Using the metal-detector.................................................................................................................. 16
7.2.1 Switching “mode” with the MineLab F3................................................................................. 16
7.2.2 Turning on and checking the detector .................................................................................. 16
7.2.3 MineLab F3 Search patterns ................................................................................................ 18
7.2.4 Pinpointing with the MineLab F3........................................................................................... 18
7.3 Metal-detector search procedure ..................................................................................................... 19
7.3.1 Pinpointing a detector reading .............................................................................................. 22
7.4 Investigating a metal-detector signal using hand-tools .................................................................... 22
7.4.1 Magnets................................................................................................................................ 23
7.4.2 Special tools for hard ground................................................................................................ 23
7.4.3 Slicing tools .......................................................................................................................... 24
7.4.4 Procedure ............................................................................................................................. 24
7.5 Investigating a metal-detector indication using rakes ...................................................................... 26
7.5.1 Procedure ............................................................................................................................. 27
8. AREA EXCAVATION USING HAND-TOOLS........................................................................................ 29
8.1 Procedure ........................................................................................................................................ 30
9. AREA EXCAVATION USING RAKES ................................................................................................... 32
9.1 Procedure ........................................................................................................................................ 32
10. USING WATER TO SOFTEN GROUND............................................................................................... 35
11. ACTION ON LOCATING A MINE OR ERW .......................................................................................... 35
11.1 Pulling procedure ..................................................................................................................... 36
12. REMOVAL OF VEGETATION............................................................................................................... 37
12.1 Approved vegetation cutting tools ............................................................................................ 37
12.2 Manual cutting of vegetation .................................................................................................... 38
12.3 Using a petrol-driven Strimmer ................................................................................................ 39
12.4 Burning-off vegetation .............................................................................................................. 40
13. REMOVING OBSTACLES .................................................................................................................... 41
13.1 Rocks ....................................................................................................................................... 41

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13.2 Fences and wire....................................................................................................................... 41
13.3 Vehicle wrecks ......................................................................................................................... 42
13.4 Ditches/trenches ...................................................................................................................... 42
13.5 Abandoned or destroyed buildings........................................................................................... 42
13.6 Fallen trees .............................................................................................................................. 44
14. DEALING WITH HUMAN REMAINS ..................................................................................................... 44
14.1 Reporting finding human remains ............................................................................................ 45
14.1.1 Recording the finding of human remains .............................................................................. 45
14.2 Ancient human remains ........................................................................................................... 46
14.3 Human remains from conflict ................................................................................................... 46
14.4 Recent human remains ............................................................................................................ 46
14.5 Human remains found outside the SHA/CHA .......................................................................... 47
14.6 Health hazards......................................................................................................................... 47
14.6.1 Psychological considerations ............................................................................................... 47
15. TRIPWIRE LOCATION ......................................................................................................................... 48
15.1 Action on locating a tripwire ..................................................................................................... 48
16. COLLECTION OF MINES AND ERW ................................................................................................... 48
17. AREA REDUCTION BY BAC ................................................................................................................ 49
18. AREA REDUCTION BY BACS.............................................................................................................. 51
18.1 BACS detectors ....................................................................................................................... 51
18.2 BACS with the UPEX 740M ..................................................................................................... 52
18.2.1 Signal investigation during BACS with the UPEX 740M ....................................................... 54
18.3 BACS with the MineLab F3 ...................................................................................................... 55
18.3.1 Changing the MineLab F3 to low sensitivity for BACS.......................................................... 55
18.3.2 Using MineLab F3 detectors close together ......................................................................... 55
18.3.3 Procedure for BACS using the MineLab F3.......................................................................... 56

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1. General
Before any demining Task is undertaken, the Country/Programme Manager must ensure that the
Task area has been visited and a Task Assessment (including a Task Release Plan) has been
produced. The Task Supervisor should be involved in the assessment and planning to ensure that
he/she understands it fully. Making a Task Assessment in described Chapter 3 of these SOPs.
The Task Release Plan is described in Chapter 9 of these SOPs. The Task Release Plan will be
included in a Task Folder containing all available information about the SHA/CHA. A copy of the
Task Folder must remain with the Task Supervisor until the Task is completed.
This Chapter only gives details of manual demining operations. Demining work often involves the
co-ordinated application of mixed manual, mechanical and MDD assets. The Task Release Plan
must take this into account, and requires integrated asset management as described in Chapter 9
of these SOPs. As long as safety is not compromised, some details of the manual demining
procedures may be varied when integrated processes are used at a Task. For example, elements
of site layout, marking and control will vary according to the assets deployed at any one time.
CASEVAC requirements will be common across assets and must be managed to avoid
duplication.
The Task Release Plan will have estimated the manual demining that is required and the other
demining assets that are necessary. The Plan will include details of the staff, equipment and all
logistical and transport requirements.

1.1 Manual demining platoon structure

The diagram below shows the various staff in a manual demining Platoon.

Platoon Supervisor

Platoon Commander

Section Leader Section Leader Section Leader EOD Operative

Deminer 1 - 10 Deminer 1 - 10 Deminer 1 - 10 Driver/mechanic(s)

Paramedic

MRE specialist

The demining Platoon structure may vary as numbers of staff change. Generally, a Platoon
comprises three Sections of up to ten deminers who work under a Platoon Commander. The
Platoon Commander works under a Platoon Supervisor. The Platoon Support team provides an
EOD operator, MRE Specialist, Paramedic and drivers. A Platoon may also have a cook attached.
When necessary, a Platoon may be divided to work on two Tasks. When this occurs, the Platoon
Supervisor must control one Task and the Platoon Commander must control the other. The
Programme Manager will appoint them Task Supervisor for the Task they control. Appropriate
medical provision should be made to ensure that a Paramedic is never more than five minutes
away from any working deminer. A well equipped ambulance must be manned and in close
contact with the Task Supervisor. It should be no more than ten minutes away from the site it
serves.
Each Platoon Commander may control three or more Section Leaders. Each Section Leader
normally controls eight to ten deminers. Field supervision is essential to ensure the correct
application of SOPs and procedures. When accidents have occurred in demining, field supervision

Page: 4
has almost always been unsatisfactory. Deminers who do not obey instructions must be
disciplined and, when necessary, dismissed. Field supervisors who do not take their
responsibilities seriously must never be tolerated.
Deminers are expected to take responsibility for remembering their training and applying it
sensibly without always having a supervisor looking at them. This is essential if cost-efficiencies
are to be achieved. When deminers are known to be experienced and reliable, the number of
deminers in a Section may be increased to twelve at the discretion of the Programme Manager.
To promote efficiency, if absences or vacancies reduce the ratio of deminers to supervisors below
6:1, the Task Supervisor should ensure that Section Leaders work as deminers until more
deminers become available. A well designed Task Release Plan should mean that deminers
never stand idle and that supervisors are always busy.

2. Demining platoon deployment

The demining platoons will be deployed under the direction of the Task Supervisor appointed by
the Programme Manager. The Task Supervisor is responsible for ensuring that all the equipment
and consumables necessary for the deployment are available on time and in the right place.
Demining teams may deploy for one of three main purposes:
1. Combined technical survey and Clearance Tasks;
2. Separate Technical Survey Tasks; or
3. In support of MDD or mechanical assets.
Whether working with other assets or as a solely manual team, demining Platoons should not
deploy until a written Task Release Plan has been approved by the Programme Manager. Task
Release Plans are described in Chapter 3 of these SOPs. The Task Release Plan includes a
map of the Task site layout and the positions of safe-areas. The Task Supervisor must ensure that
all necessary equipment, including Task site marking material, is prepared before deployment.
On deployment, the Platoons should establish the safe-areas as described in Chapter 4 of these
SOPs.

2.1 Daily briefing

A Platoon briefing must be given every day before starting any work at a demining Task site. The
Platoon Commander should brief all the Sections under his/her management on the following:
• The layout of the Task (using a map drawn on a whiteboard or on paper);
• The Task Risk Assessment and any changes that have been made as work has
progressed;
• Mines and ERW anticipated in the area;
• Procedures and tools to be used;
• Field communication methods to be used;
• Working shift timings and any meal breaks;
• The CASEVAC procedure;
• Each Section’s area of responsibility; and
• Each deminer’s responsibility for his/her own safety and the safety of those around him.
Time should be taken to encourage questions from the Section Leaders and deminers.
The Platoon Paramedic should attend the briefing and be satisfied that all Platoon members are fit
to work.
After the briefing, the Platoon Commander should oversee each Section Leader briefing his/her
Section about each deminer’s start position. The Platoon Commander should use this opportunity

Page: 5
to check that the deployment matches the reports of progress at the Task and assist the Task
Supervisor to update the Task Release Plan when necessary.
At the end of the daily briefing, the Section Leaders must check that their deminers are wearing
approved PPE and have the appropriate tools before the Section is deployed.

3. Approved manual deployment patterns

Deminers generally work in the following patterns:
1. One-man one-lane search patterns from a safe base-line;
2. Spot Task patterns, covering EOD Spot Tasks and when investigating an MDD indication
by Clearing a small area; and
3. Lateral lanes (sometimes called “Crab-pattern”) as when working on road verges.
The use of deployment patterns should be integrated at any Task in order to promote efficiency
and keep each deminer busy.
Frequently, the full Clearance of a Task is not necessary because most of the area is not mined.
The deployment patterns are usually designed to locate the mined area(s) and allow reduction of
the areas that are not mined. Most Tasks begin using Technical Survey search patterns in order
to locate or confirm those parts of the SHA/CHA that are mined. Those parts are then Cleared
using manual processes. Technical Survey is described in Chapter 3 of these SOPs.
After the mined areas have been located and Cleared, mechanical, BAC and BACS processes
may be used over the remaining area to confirm that there are no unexpected mined areas within
the area to be Reduced. Mechanical, BAC and BACS processes do not result in full Clearance,
but they can give full confidence that there is no need to Clear an area. Approved procedures for
Reducing areas are described in Chapter 3, Part 2.1 of these SOPs.
In pursuit of efficiency, assets should not Clear areas where there is no reason to believe that
Clearance is necessary unless required to do so by the NMAA or a contracting client. When a
contract requiring full area Clearance has been agreed, the terms of the contract must be strictly
honoured.

3.1 Lanes
Most manual demining is conducted in lanes. Demining lanes start from a base-line in a marked
safe-area and cut into the SHA in what are known as “breaches”. Breach lanes can be widened
with adjacent lanes until they join up to provide area Clearance.
Each lane is marked as one metre wide. An overlap of 10cm on each side means that the area
Cleared is actually 1.2 metres wide. This ensures that adjacent lanes overlap without any
possibility of missing gaps between them.
No 1.2 metre wide lane into a High Threat Area should be more than five metres long. When the
lane reaches five metres long, the lane should be closed and an adjacent lane cut so that the lane
is 2.2 metres wide. This allows easier supervision and CASEVAC.
Lane marking is described in Chapter 5 of these SOPs.

3.1.1 Clearing vegetation from the side of a lane

When a lane has reached 5 metres long, a lane should be made alongside it. The part of the
adjacent lane that is alongside the first lane can be prepared from the side. Undergrowth, rocks
and other obstructions can be removed and, when approved, the vegetation Strimmer described
in Part 12.3 of this Chapter can be used.
This allows deminers to work more quickly because they are not constantly changing tools.
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The procedure is shown in the diagram below.

Vegetation removal when using metal-detectors in lanes

The first 5 metres of Lane 1 is searched. Vegetation

1
is cut as the metal-detector search advances.

Vegetation across half the width of Lane 2 is cut

2 from the side before the metal-detector search
starts from the safe-area. The cut may reach 5
further if a Strimmer is available.

Lane 2 is searched. Remaining vegetation is cut as

3
the metal-detector search advances.

4
Lane 2 is continued with a further 5m breach.
4 Vegetation is cut as the metal-detector search
advances. Lane 1

5 metres
2
Vegetation across half the width of Lane 1 is cut
5
from the side before the metal-detector search Lane 2
starts from the safe-area. The cut may reach
further if a Strimmer is available.

safe-area 1 3

Using normal hand-tools, deminers cannot reach safely across the width of the lane to cut
vegetation. They can only safely reach to around half a metre. They should cut as much as they
can safely reach, then cut the rest as they Clear the lane with the metal-detector.

3.1.2 Lateral lanes

Lateral lanes are lanes that cut slices from the front of the SHA/CHA instead of cutting directly into
it. This approach can be especially useful when Clearing road-verges, alongside railway lines or
up to buildings. It is only used when the entire area is to be Cleared.
The photograph alongside shows a deminer extending
a lateral lane. The road is behind the deminer.
Lateral lane widths are not a metre wide. They should
be as wide as the deminer can safely reach to cut
vegetation and prepare the area for metal-detector
search. This is usually between 30 and 50cm unless a Direction of
Clearance
Strimmer is available.
Lateral Lanes are prepared from a base-line in the
safe-area. This may be a road. The length of a Lateral
lane should be varied to suit the Task but is usually
ten metres.

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Because lateral lanes involve the deminer moving sideways along the baseline, it is sometimes
called a “Crab pattern” approach. Procedures for using this pattern vary 1 and the selected system
is the simplest.
The deminer should follow this procedure:
1) From a base-line, the deminer places a start and end marker ten metres apart. The markers
are linked with tape that must be pulled tight to ensure a straight line. The deminer should
always start on the right of the area.
2) When necessary the tripwire drill must be conducted before cutting vegetation.
3) At the start marker, the deminer puts down the vegetation cutting tools and kneels to start
work. Undergrowth should be cut in a kneeling position unless the vegetation Strimmer is
used.
4) Undergrowth should be cut in two or more stages to ground level.
5) The deminer removes the cut vegetation and moves sideways to repeat the area preparation.
Cut undergrowth may be removed with a light rake when the Task Risk Assessment has not
identified a threat from tripwire mines or tilt-sensitive fuzes.
6) Moving sideways to the left, the deminer works towards the end marker clearing all of the
undergrowth.
7) When the vegetation has been cut and removed across the entire ten metres, the deminer
returns to the start marker and places the base-stick on the first metre of the base-line. The
base-stick provides a guide when using the metal-detector and ensures an overlap.
8) A temporary marker is placed at the other end of the base-stick. This may be red painted
stone because it will not be in place for long.
9) The deminer searches the area in front of the base-stick using the metal-detector and signal
investigation procedures in Parts, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 of this Chapter.

Clearance direction
SHA
Tape
Vegetation cut area

Cleared area
Road

10) When the first metre has been Cleared, the deminer moves the base-stick to the left, then
moves the temporary marker to the left, as shown in the diagram above.
11) Step nine and ten are repeated until the prepared 10 metre wide area has been Cleared.
12) The start and end markers are moved forward to 10cm inside the area where the vegetation
has been cut. They must be replaced by hazardous area markers. The tape should be
straight. When the vegetation prevents the tape being straight, the deminer must move the
markers back until the tape can be straight.
13) The Deminer checks along the tape with the metal-detector and investigates any signals.
14) The process begins again at Step 2. The process is repeated until the required area has been
searched.

NOTE: The vegetation Strimmer increases speed and should be used when the Task Risk
Assessment has not identified a threat from tripwire mines or tilt-sensitive fuzes.

1
For example, the small part of the GICHD 2005 Manual Demining study that was conducted in Sudan used
a significantly more complex procedure that should not be used.

Page: 8
3.2 Spot Tasks
Spot Tasks are generally conducted over small areas that may be approached presuming that the
area is safe. If there is any uncertainty about approaching a Spot Task, the area must be reached
by Clearing a lane.
Most EOD Spot Tasks are made in response to a report of ERW made by the local community or
local authorities. In many cases a device is in a frequently used area. In some cases, several
items have been collected in one place.
Deminers may also conduct Spot Tasks when supporting the MDD Team by investigating an MDD
indication.

3.2.1 EOD Spot Tasks

EOD Spot Tasks will be conducted when required using an EOD Spot Task Team as described in
Chapter 9, Part 5 of these SOPs.
The Spot Task Team Leader will assess each Task and approach the area where the device(s) is
reported with appropriate caution. In many cases, EOD Spot Tasks can be approached directly
using well-used land. When gaining safe access involves Clearing an access-lane, all rules and
procedures for manual demining must be applied.
When the reported device is a mine, or when an explosive incident has occurred, an assessment
must be made of the extent of the area that must be searched. If the area is greater than 200 m2,
the EOD Spot Task Team must record all details of the area and consult the Task Supervisor
about whether to continue or to make a SHA report so that the area can be treated as a separate
Task conducted by a larger Team. The Task Supervisor must liaise with the Programme Manager
to reach a decision.
When a search must be made over an area greater than ten square metres, a start-line must be
made in a safe-area, a bench-mark established and the entire area accurately mapped. All the
management and reporting procedures appropriate to a major Task is required.

3.2.2 MDD Spot Tasks

Typical MDD Spot Tasks are the Clearance of two metre Step 1 MDD indication
square areas surrounding an MDD indication. The MDD
marker is placed and the Clearance box starts 50cm back
from the marker. The Clearance box is Cleared using the
following procedure:
Step 1, the deminer marks the closest side of the two
metre area with three hazardous area markers placed at
metre intervals.
If at any stage during the Clearance a mine or ERW is
found, the deminer stops work, closes the lane and
informs the Section Leader. Step 2

Step 2: When one metre has been Cleared the deminer

places hazardous area pickets on both sides and starts
on the second metre. He/she does this whether or not
anything has been found. The whole area must be
searched even when something is found in the first metre.

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Step 3
Step 3: When two metres have been Cleared, the deminer
places hazardous area markers at the extent of the
Clearance and moves the base-stick to the adjacent lane.

Step 4: The deminer Clears the first metre in the adjacent

lane and places a hazardous area marker on the outside
edge.

Step 4
Step 5: The deminer Clears the second metre in the
adjacent lane and places a hazardous area marker in the
last corner of the four metre square box.
Step 6: The deminer removes the centre marker. If he/she
has found a mine or ERW, the task has been completed. If
he/she has not found anything, the deminer must extend
the start-line with a marker on both sides and Clear another
metre on each side of the original indication.
If nothing is found, the MDD spot task has been completed. The MDD Team Leader should
instruct an MDD set to search the area again after the marking has been removed.
Spot task marking must remain until the QA check has been conducted and the co-ordinates of
the area have been accurately recorded.

4. Task site preparation

Site preparation must always be designed to optimise safety for those working in the SHA/CHA.
When the deployment of mechanical assets requires the removal of marking, the marking must be
replaced before manual demining is restarted.
The detailed requirements for Task site preparation and safe-area marking are given in Chapter 4
of these SOPs.

5. Working-distances between staff

All staff should understand that no human activity is risk free. Safety is not achieved by reducing
risk to zero. If it were, no one could ride in a car or cross the road. Safety is achieved by keeping
risk to a tolerable level. In demining, the recorded accidents show that the greatest risk is faced by
the deminer closest to the hazard. Those at a greater distance are at a smaller risk of secondary
injury.
Working-distances do not make an accident less likely to occur. They make it less likely that there
will be more than one victim of an accident. This means that they should not be called “safety-
distances”. They should be called “working-distances” because they have been selected to reduce
the risk of secondary injury to a tolerable level.
To reduce the risk of secondary injury at a Task to a tolerable level, working-distances should be
established based on a written Task Risk Assessment (TRA). The TRA takes into account the
expected mines and ERW at the site, the ground and vegetation at the site, and the PPE provided
to staff. Instructions for determining Task working-distances, are given in Chapter 2, Part 6 of
these SOPs. The principles used to determine working-distances appropriate for manual demining
should also be used when determining appropriate distances between MDD.

Page: 10
NOTE: Working distances do not guarantee safety. The minimum distances provide a practical
means of reducing risk of secondary injury without compromising the quality and
efficiency of the work.

5.1 Supervisor working-distances

During manual demining, authorised supervisors and QA staff are allowed to approach as close
as two metres to working deminers as part of their work. EOD Operatives collecting discovered
devices may approach the deminer showing the device as long as the deminer is standing and not
working. Supervisors and EOD Operatives should not stand closer than two metres to a deminer
who is showing the position of a discovered device. The deminer should withdraw to the working
distance before the device is approached by a single, appropriately trained, person.

5.2 CASEVAC procedures during manual demining

If an accident involving a casualty occurs during manual demining the following procedure should
be followed:
1. All deminers must stop work, step back from the base-line area and wait for instructions.
They must keep calm and quiet.
2. The Section Leader must order all work to stop and inform the Platoon Commander that
there has been an accident. If the Section Leader is the Casualty, a deminer should
inform the closest Section Leader or the Platoon Commander who will then take charge of
the CASEVAC.
3. When the casualty is inside a safe-area, the Section Leader should instruct the nearest
two deminers to go carefully to the casualty, walking on known safe-areas, and offer First
Aid and psychological support in accordance with their training. All other members of the
Section must stand still and await instructions.

NOTE: Even if there is more than one casualty, only two deminers should be allowed into the
area to offer first aid and psychological support.
Any other Sections working nearby must stop work, stand still and their Section Leader(s)
should ask their Platoon Commander for instructions whenever they hear an unscheduled
detonation. Their Platoon Commander must order all work to stop and all staff to stand
still until more information is known.
4. The Platoon Commander must call the Paramedic and instruct the Ambulance driver to
move the ambulance close to the base-line near to the casualty when that is practical.
The Paramedic and Ambulance may already have responded.
5. The Platoon Commander must inform the Task Supervisor that there has been an
accident. The Task Supervisor should notify the Country Office and the NMAA that there
has been an accident and that more details will follow.
6. If the casualty is inside a SHA/CHA, the Section Leader must order the nearest deminer
to Clear a direct route to the casualty. If the Casualty is mobile, he/she should be guided
back to the safe-area.
7. When the casualty is inside a safe-area, the Section Leader must order other deminers to
bring the stretcher and, following their training, move the casualty onto the stretcher and
bring the casualty to the base-line where the Paramedic is waiting. All casualties should
be put on a stretcher even if their injuries appear to be minor or they appear to be dead.
Generally, the Section Leader should go to the casualty after ensuring that the Paramedic
and Ambulance are en-route to ensure that all deminers are acting in a calm and

Page: 11
controlled manner. All accidents are shocking events, and deminers who cannot cope
must be ordered to stand back and replaced by deminers who are less shocked.
8. The Paramedic should have arrived at the base-line by the time the stretcher is carried
there. The Section Leader must support the Paramedic, providing stretcher-bearers to
carry the casualty to the waiting ambulance when appropriate.
9. The Paramedic will stabilize the victim in accordance with appropriate treatment protocols,
then ask for the casualty to be moved to the waiting ambulance. Generally, the Platoon
Commander or Platoon Supervisor will have arrived and taken charge by this time.
10. The Platoon Commander must stay in radio contact with the Task Supervisor and keep
him/her informed of all developments.
11. The Task Supervisor will liaise with the ambulance driver and confirm the CASEVAC
route to the nearest hospital. The Task Supervisor should also arrange for an escort
vehicle to accompany the ambulance with two staff who have a compatible blood group.
Compatible blood groups are listed in Chapter 11 of these SOPs.
12. As soon as the casualty is inside the ambulance, the Task Supervisor must notify the
hospital that a casualty is en-route, giving his/her name, blood-group and an initial
assessment of the injuries. The Task Supervisor must stay in contact with the Ambulance
and its escort vehicle throughout their journey to hospital. When appropriate, he/she
should telephone ahead to arrange fast transit through any traffic bottlenecks.
13. When the casualty has been evacuated, the accident site must be left undisturbed. All
staff must be withdrawn to the Control Points or the Administration area, closing their
lanes and collecting their equipment in an orderly manner. When equipment has been left
at the accident site, the Platoon Commander should order a guard to be placed when that
is necessary.
No work should be conducted in the SHA/CHA at the Task site until an accident
investigation has been completed. Generally, staff should be kept busy with maintenance
tasks and kept informed about the condition of the casualty as it becomes known.
14. When all staff have left the SHA/CHA, the Task Supervisor should carry out an initial
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident. When the circumstances are
known, he/she must notify the Programme Manager and request a formal Accident
Investigation team to be convened. Generally the Task Supervisor, Platoon Supervisor or
Platoon Commander will be a member of the Accident Investigation team.

5.2.1 Initial accident investigation

The Task Supervisor should conduct an Initial investigation immediately after the accident. During
that investigation the accident site should be photographed but left undisturbed. The names of all
staff present at the time and involved in the CASEVAC must be noted and a brief description of
events surrounding the accident compiled. Generally, formal interviews of witnesses should not be
conducted until the Accident Investigation is conducted.
The Task Supervisor should compile the information into a brief report and submit it to the
Programme Manager on the same day that the accident occurred. The Programme Manager
should notify the victim’s family, the Insurance Company and the NMAA.
In case of a fatal accident, the Programme Manager must ensure that the police or local
authorities are informed and that any police investigation is assisted by all Platoon members.

Page: 12
6. Manual Demining procedures
The following manual demining procedures are designed to be used by a single deminer working
alone in a Clearance lane. If deminers work in pairs to share equipment, the tasks allocated to
each deminer should alternate at each rest period.
A demining Section is led by a Section Leader. Each Section generally comprises up to ten
deminers.
The following are general rules that the Section Leader must implement:
1. All working deminers must wear approved PPE at the Task site except when in
designated Rest or Administration areas. PPE should be worn before leaving a Rest Area
and removed when arriving back in a Rest Area;
2. No deminer should work for more than 50 minutes without a ten minute rest break;
3. Deminers must always have sufficient drinking water available to prevent dehydration
while working;
4. When using metal-detectors, metal-detector test and calibration areas must be prepared
close to the working deminers; and
5. When using the Rake system, the deminer must always work in a standing position when
using a rake.

7. Lane Clearance using metal-detectors

The metal-detector may be used in either a one-person-one-lane procedure or a two-person-one-
lane procedure in which roles alternate at rest periods. The deminer using the metal-detector is
issued with a detector and a tool-kit and works
independently in a Clearance lane.
To allow the detector to be set aside safely, a
wooden detector stand should be provided
whenever possible. The frame may be a simple
arrangement of support sticks or a more
complicated structure that is designed to be
moved from Task to Task. An example of a
purpose-made support-frame is shown alongside.

7.1 General principles

Only deminers internally trained and tested in the use of the specific model of detector can be
used to perform metal-detector search procedures with that detector.
There must always be absolute confidence in the metal-detector’s ability to locate the target
device at the required depth before metal-detector Clearance procedures are used. Because
equipment and deminers can both be at fault, it is essential to confirm that the metal-detector and
its operator can locate the anticipated target. To determine whether the detectors can be used,
metal-detector Test and Calibration areas must be established. Metal-detector Test and
Calibration areas are described in Chapter 4 of these SOPs.
At the start of the working period, or after any period when the detector has been turned off, the
detector must be switched on and set-up. The deminers must follow metal-detector turning-on and
set-up procedures as outlined in the manufacturer’s instructions.

NOTE: The manufacturer's instructions determine whether the detector is working as designed,
NOT whether it can locate the threats at a particular Task. Deminers shall NOT follow the

G Page: 13
manufacturer's instructions for USING the detector unless those instructions coincide with
the content of the procedures described in these SOPs.

Hand-grip
Control
box

Telescopic
handle

Parts of a metal-detector

Search-head

When conducting metal-detector Clearance inside High Threat parts of the SHA, no 1.2 metre
wide lane should exceed five metres in length. It must be closed and an adjacent lane cleared.
The 2.2 metre wide lane can then be extended with a further 5 metre long 1.2 metre wide lane.
When conducting metal-detector Clearance in No Known Threat areas identified in the Task
Release Plan, the 1.2 metre wide lane may be extended indefinitely. This may be appropriate for
crossing unknown areas outside the High threat Areas before the MDD or mechanical assets are
used to raise confidence and confirm the absence of threats.

7.1.1 Detector calibration area

The Calibration area is needed for carrying out Ground Compensation (GC). This is the same
thing as the “Ground Learning Function” referred to in the some metal-detector manuals.
The GC must be set-up as described in the manufacturers' documentation. To do this, a metal-
free Calibration area of one metre square should be prepared close to where the deminer will
work. The area should be moved forward as work progresses so that it is always within 100
metres of the place where the deminer will work. Usually the Calibration area will be close to the
detector Test-area. Both areas can be inside access lanes as long as those lanes are at least two
metres wide and the areas are marked by white painted stones (this is permitted because the test
and calibration areas can be stepped into if necessary in an emergency).
It is the Section Leader's responsibility to ensure that all Calibration areas are metal-free and that
Calibration and GC procedures are followed. When a metal-detector cannot compensate for the
electromagnetic properties of the ground and continues to signal or signal erratically where there
is no metal, it must not be used at that Task (or that part of the Task).

7.1.2 Detector test area

The metal-detector Test area is used to ensure that the detector can reliably signal on a Target
mine at the required depth. After the detector has been set-up with appropriate Ground
Compensation, its ability to detect a Target mine must be checked at all Tasks where the Task
Assessment has identified the possible presence of minimum-metal mines. Each detector's ability
to signal the presence of a Target mine at the Clearance depth must be confirmed.

Page: 14
The deminer must NOT use a metal-detector manufacturer's test piece as a reliable simulation of
a real mine target. Target mines that accurately reflect the electromagnetic signature of the mine
that is most difficult to locate at the Task must be used. This is usually a real mine that has been
rendered safe. Target mines are described in Chapter 4, of these SOPs. Examples of how to
make some common mines into Target mines are given in Chapter 10, Part 8 of these SOPs.

NOTE: A minimum-metal mine that has been rendered safe for use as a metal-detector target is
NOT Free From Explosive (FFE) because the detonator is generally present. They must
not be marked as FFE but as "Detector Targets". They should be transported and stored
as "detonators". They should be clearly marked (painted red) to avoid any confusion.
The Platoon EOD Operative should provide and control all Target mines, ensuring that they are
recovered when they are no longer required and stored in the Explosives storage area.
The target mines must be buried in metal-free Detector test areas
close to where the deminers will work (usually within 100 metres).
Each target mine should be concealed in a marked area measuring
at least 0.5 metres on each side. The target mine must be buried so
that the top of the mine is at the required Clearance depth at the
Task. The photograph alongside shows the depth of a test mine
being measured.
It is the Section Leader's responsibility to ensure that metal-detector
Test areas are metal free before the target mine is placed and that
target mines are placed at the required depth.
The detector Test area is often positioned alongside the detector
Calibration area but need not be. Both areas must be clearly marked.

7.1.3 Using the detector Test and Calibration areas

The deminer must set-up the detector in the Calibration area and then use it over the detector
Test area to check that the detector signals on the test mine. If the metal-detector does not give a
distinct signal over the test mine, the detector should be set-up (with GC) again and a second
attempt made by a Section Leader. If there is any ambiguity about the signal, the Section Leader
must repeat the test with other detectors. If the problem is repeated, the Section Leader must
report that Clearing the area with metal-detectors is not appropriate and the Platoon Commander
should ensure that the Task Release Plan is adjusted appropriately.
If the Section Leader can detect the test mine but the deminer cannot, the deminer must not be
allowed to work with a metal-detector until he/she has been trained to use the detector again.
If the Section Leader cannot detect the test mine but can detect it with other detectors, the metal-
detector must be withdrawn from service immediately.
Every time that a deminer leaves the working area (for rest breaks etc) the ability of the detector
to signal in the Test area should be confirmed. Detector performance can change while it is being
used. This may happen, for example, as a result of temperature variations, battery condition or
general malfunction. If the detector does not signal on the target concealed in the Test area when
the deminer leaves the working area, the area searched since the last check must be searched
again. The second search can be conducted using a detector that does signal reliably in the Test
area, or using other procedures.

7.1.4 Search-head movement

The sideways movement of the search-head depends on its operating principle ("static" or
"dynamic"). The search-head of a dynamic detector must be constantly moved over a target in

Page: 15
order to signal. The search-head of a static detector will continue to signal when held still over a
target. Some models of detector can be switched between static and dynamic operation.
Whichever model of detector is used, the required rate of advance is one third (or less) of the
search-head width when searching for minimum metal mines or one half of a search-head width
when looking for mines with more metal inside. The search procedure is described in Part 7.3 of
this Chapter. (This may be varied in BACS processes, but not in full Clearance processes).

7.2 Using the metal-detector

This section provides a detailed description of the use of one particular
model of metal-detector, the MineLab F3. This detector is a very good
“all-rounder” able to be used anywhere in the world. It is probably the
best detector for locating minimum metal mines at depth in
electromagnetic soils, but it is not the simplest or most robust metal-
detector available. When simpler and more robust detectors are
capable of finding the mines reliably in the ground conditions at a task,
they should be preferred.
The preferred secondary detector is one of the Ebinger (EBEX) 420
series. Over ten years, these have proven especially popular. Their
lightness makes them easy to use vertically when kneeling, as shown
in the photograph alongside, which can speed up fragment location.
Whichever model of metal-detector is used, it is essential that the
detector is used frequently to confirm the position of the metal during the signal investigation
process.

7.2.1 Switching “mode” with the MineLab F3

The Control-box of the F3 has a coloured plastic end-cap that is changed to select different
modes. By changing mode, users can reduce the sensitivity of the detector and allow it to be used
for BACS without signalling on all small metal items.
While searching for mines, the black end-cap should always be used. When searching for large
metal objects during BACs, the red end-cap can be used.
The end cap is removed by pressing in the centre at the same
time as pulling the lower edge away – as shown in the
photograph alongside.
Small electronic connectors inside the end-cap change the
configuration of the detector. If no end-cap is fitted, the detector
operates with the same sensitivity is with the black end-cap.
If other coloured end-caps are sourced, their use must be fully
documented in an amendment to this SOP before they are
issued.

7.2.2 Turning on and checking the detector

The MineLab F3 detector must be prepared for use in the following manner:
1. Hold the F3 upside down and unlock the battery pack lid by twisting the battery-lock lever
anti-clockwise a quarter of a turn. Pull the lid away from the battery pack.
The lid will stay attached by a tether to the battery pack.
2. Using the battery maps on the side of the battery pack and on the inside of the lid, insert
four D cell batteries.

Page: 16
3. Replace the battery pack lid and turn the battery lock lever clockwise a quarter of a turn.
If the batteries are not inserted correctly, the F3 will not work when it is switched on.

Battery
Pack

Battery
Lock
Battery
Lever Battery
Pack Lid
Map

NOTE: Only use NiCad or NiMh D cell rechargeable batteries with a capacity of at least 4000
mAH.
4. Unclip the search-head lock and position the
search-head in line with the handle.
5. Extend the lowest part of the detector by at
least 10cm.
The detector may not work properly unless it
is extended by at least this amount.

6. Extend the telescopic handle to the length that

will be used.

7. Adjust the arm-rest and tighten the arm-strap as required.

8. Hold the detector with the search-head high in the air and
slide on the on/off-switch towards the handgrip.
The detector runs through a series of internal self-tests that
take 12 seconds. While this is happening, the detector makes
four Start-up tones that rise in pitch.
9. When the Start-up checks are completed the detector makes
a low steady low tone called the normal tone.
The normal tone will get louder if the search-head is left
over electromagnetic ground for a long time, or if the
search-head is twisted around in relation to the handle. If
the normal tone ever gets louder, press the green Audio-
reset button to return it to normal.
Interference from electrical motors, lights, power lines and
other detectors may make the normal tone vary in pitch
and volume. When this happens, press the Noise Cancel
button to make the detector search for an operating
frequency that will minimise the interference.
10. Wait half a minute after the normal tone has started, then
move to the detector calibration area to perform a “ground
balance” on the detector. Start by holding the search-head
15cm above the ground over the calibration area.

Page: 17
11. Press and hold down the green Ground Balance button the detector handle. Holding the
button down, slowly lower the search-head to the ground, then slowly raise it again.
12. Slowly lower and raise the search head until the detector makes a short, high-pitched
beep-beep noise. Then stop pressing the green Ground Balance button.

15cm

13. Test the detector using the detector test-piece. Hold the test-
piece so that the metal part is AWAY from the search head.
Slowly move the test-piece towards the centre of the coil until it
lightly touches the surface then move it sideways off the coil.
A faint but clear change in volume and pitch should be heard.
14. The detector is ready to use in the detector Test area.
15. In the detector Test area, the search-head must be used over
the concealed test-mine to confirm that the test-mine gives a
distinct signal. This gives the deminer confidence and also allows
the deminer to become familiar with the sound that the detector
makes when the target mine is located at that depth.

7.2.3 MineLab F3 Search patterns

The detector is a “static” detector, so the search-head does not have to be kept moving in order
for the detector to signal when there is a target under it.

7.2.4 Pinpointing with the MineLab F3

Having detected a target and gained a rough idea about its size and location using the sweeping
search procedure, the precise location of the target can be found using the F3’s “Edge Detection”
technique.
To detect the edge of concealed metal, the search-head should be brought towards
the target location from all angles as shown on the right.
As the search-head approaches the target, the normal tone will change,
indicating that there is a target close by. When the normal tone
changes, the deminer should note the position on the ground,
move the search-head away, and approach the target from another angle.
This should be repeated until the deminer has a mental picture of the target area.

NOTE: After an initial detection, if the search-head is repeatedly swept over a small
target, the signal may fade. If this happens, move the search-head away from the target
and quickly press and release the green Ground Balance button. This will reset the tone
and the detector should signal over the target again.
The signal marker should be placed at the nearest part of the signal to the base-stick.

Page: 18
When pinpointing using the edge-detection technique reveals an irregularly shaped target, it may
be that there are more than one target close together as shown in the drawing below.

P0627 A
The variation in pitch of the detector signal as the search-head is passed over the top of the
target(s) may allow an experienced operator to discriminate between the separate targets. This is
because the detection noise varies with different metals.

1 NOTE: In all cases where an irregular perimeter is found, the deminer must expect that there
may be small targets close to a larger target.

7.3 Metal-detector search procedure

The following procedure achieves a one third overlap of a detector search-head.

1/3
Advance by
1/3 at a time 1/3 Sideways sweep

1/3

The detector search-head should be moved so

that it is always as close to the ground surface as possible.

1 NOTE: The detector search-head may be brushed lightly over ground that has been visually
inspected but must not be used to "pat" the ground with an up-and-down movement.
The ground in front of the deminer should be prepared using vegetation cutting techniques, and
surface rocks should be removed. Cuttings and rocks must be placed behind the deminer and
behind the last QA marker to ensure that they are in a safe-area.
The deminer works forward from a base-stick. After cutting the vegetation, a 50cm long flat
wooden "Guide-stick" may be laid so that is extends forward of the base-stick. The Guide-stick
should be marked along its length to guide appropriate search-head overlap. The Guide-stick is
optional.

Page: 19
The preferred base-stick has 5 metre tapes attached to each end. The tapes are rolled out as
work progresses. They are marked at every metre, providing a reminder to the deminer about
placing side-marking. See Chapter 5, Part 2.1 in these SOPs.
The same search pattern must be used whether the deminer is standing or kneeling. The
telescopic handle should be adjusted to an appropriate length before the detector is used in the
detector calibration and test areas because changing the length of the telescopic handle can
change the detector’s sensitivity.
The picture on the left shows a standing deminer
with the handle of the MineLab F3 extended. This
deminer is using a Guide-stick to ensure the correct
search head overlap.

The picture below shows a kneeling deminer with a

short-handled Ebinger 420 detector.

1. The search-head is placed in the middle of the base-stick, with at

least one third of the search-head behind the base-stick. When
using a raised base-stick, the search-head is placed under the
base-stick. See Chapter 5, Part 2.1 of these SOPs.

2. The search-head is moved to the right and beyond the end of

the base-stick. The overlap outside the lane must be at least
10cm. The search-head is constantly kept as close to the
ground as possible without applying pressure to the ground.

Page: 20
3. The search-head is moved all the way to the left without
advancing it and beyond the end of the base-stick. The
overlap outside the lane must be at least 10cm.

4. The search-head is moved forward by a third of the search-head

length or less, and swept to the right. If the detector signals, the
sweeps are not interrupted.

5. Advancing by one third of a search-head length or less, the head

is advanced until it is at least one-third over the end of the guide-
stick (or 40cm in front of the deminer) and over the nominal side
of the search area (overlap). If the detector signals, the deminer
must remember the approximate position and keep searching.

6. The detector head is moved back over the search area in a

reverse action. If the detector signals, the sweeps are not
interrupted, but a mental map of the search area is made.
The deminer now knows how many signals are in the area
and their approximate position. If two signals are close
together, or are in a linear pattern (as is common with
lengths of wire), the deminer knows this and so can pinpoint
the closest signal (or the part of a signal that is closest).
7. If there are no signals in an area, the base-stick is moved forward to 10cm closer than the
extent of the search. The deminer then removes the vegetation and rocks in front of the
stick and starts the search process again.
If there are signals in the area, the deminer should first inspect the ground visually for
surface metal and carefully remove any obvious metal by hand. Exposed wire or other
items must not be pulled if parts are under the ground. After a visual inspection, the
deminer should use a magnetic tool to try to remove metal that cannot be easily seen.
The magnet should be brushed lightly over the ground surface to attract magnetic
material on the surface.
After using the magnet, the area must be searched with the detector again as described
in Steps 1-6 above.
8. After the area has been searched with the metal-detector, surface fragments removed
and the search repeated, the deminer must pinpoint the closest signal to the base-stick
and place a marker at that place.
If there are no metal readings, the deminer should move the base-stick forward to 10cm
closer than the extent of the search. To ensure overlap, the base-stick should never be
moved all the way to end of the area searched.

Page: 21
When a base-stick with marking tape attached is used, the deminer looks at the tapes to
see whether any of the one metre marks on the tape are showing. If they are, the deminer
must place side of lane marking. When a mark is very close to the base-stick, the marking
may be left until it is moved forward again.

7.3.1 Pinpointing a detector reading

The method of pinpointing varies with the metal-detector but will either involve using the search-
head to approach the signal from all sides ("a" below as with the MineLab F3) or moving the
search-head across the signal in "cross-hairs" ("b" below). When a small target is deeply buried, it
may not be possible to pinpoint accurately, so the deminer should be cautious and place the
marker slightly closer to the base-stick than the signal.

The marker must be placed at the nearest part of the signal to the deminer's base-stick.

NOTE: When marking mines with a central fuze mechanism, the marker often indicates the
centre of the mine. When marking large metal-cased mines, the marker indicates the side
of the mine nearest to the base-stick.
When the nearest signal has been pinpointed, the signal investigation procedure must be started.

7.4 Investigating a metal-detector signal using hand-tools

When a metal-detector signal has been pinpointed and a signal marker placed at the nearest part
of the reading, the deminer can begin a signal-investigation procedure. If at any point during the
procedure the source of the metal-detector indication is found and it was not a mine or ERW, the
deminer should stop the investigation and return to the metal-detector search procedure, checking
the area where the metal was found to see if there are other indications. If a mine or ERW is
located, the deminer should expose the side of the device closest to the base-stick and follow the
actions detailed in Part 11 of this Chapter.
Hand-tools approved for use during signal excavation should meet the design requirements given
in Chapter 2, Part 3.3 of these SOPs.

The picture above shows some of the approved blast resistant hand-tools. Any tool that is used in
the ground during signal excavation should be blast-resistant. Tools designed for gardeners may
only be used for vegetation cutting.

Page: 22
7.4.1 Magnets
Strong magnets can be very useful in areas where metal-detector search is used and there is a lot
of metal contamination in the ground. Magnets may be attached to tools such as the light rake or
trowel, or can be held in the hand. They should be brushed over the ground surface without
downward pressure.
The photograph below shows typical minefield scrap metal. Most of the metal has a ferrous
content, so it is magnetic. The only item that is not magnetic is the ring-pull from a drink can.

7.4.2 Special tools for hard ground

When ground is exceptionally hard, a signal investigation may be started using a two-handed
digging tool to break up the ground surface at least 20cm from the nearest part of the indication
(the distance from the indication must be more than half the diameter of the largest anticipated
target at the Task). Digging down to the Clearance depth in a safe place gives the deminer a point
from which to work forward towards the indication using other tools.

The deminer in the photograph above is using a two-handled tool to start the excavation well
away from the metal-detector reading. The tool is made using blast-resistant material and its
design includes a guard for the hand that would be closest to any blast.

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7.4.3 Slicing tools
When investigating a metal-detector investigation or conduction area-excavation, there are times
when the use of a tool that slices away the face of the excavation without first prodding that
ground for obstructions can be efficient and safe.
Prodding must be conducted as described in the procedures under Part 7.4.3 below unless none
of the anticipated targets are movement sensitive and none have pressure plates extending to the
edge of the mine.
Movement sensitive ERW includes some submunitions that must be excavated with the greatest
caution.
AP blast mines have pressure plates of various sizes. Pressure plates that are small make the
mine less likely to be stepped on – but they also make the mine less likely to be detonated by the
pressure wave associated with an air-blast nearby.

The GYATA-64 and PMN mines shown above have pressure plates extending to the very edge of
the top of the mine. When these mines are anticipated in a SHA, signal investigation using a
slicing procedure must NOT be conducted without first prodding the ground that is to be sliced
away.

The AP mines shown here are the MAI-75, PMN-2 and Type-72. In each case the pressure plate
is smaller than the top of the mine and excavation using a cautious slicing procedure is permitted.

7.4.4 Procedure
The following procedure should be followed to investigate a metal-detector signal:
1) The deminer must begin by looking closely at the ground surface for sources of the metal-
indication. If any metal is found, the deminer should remove the metal and check the
position with the metal-detector. Throughout the investigation, the deminer should be
constantly searching the ground by eye, looking for the source of the metal-detector
signal.
2) When magnets are available, the deminer should pass a magnet over the ground surface
where the detector indicated. The signal marker may be temporarily removed for this. The
Light rake with a magnet may also be used for this. After a magnet is used, the deminer
should check the area with the detector again.

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3) An investigation should be started by prodding the ground at least 20cm back from the
signal marker. In most ground, the prod will not penetrate more than a few centimetres.
The deminer must not apply excessive pressure to make the prodder go more deeply into
the ground. If the prodder will not penetrate 3cm, the deminer should use another
approved tool to break the ground surface. Sometimes the ground has a crust with softer
spoil underneath. Frequently the ground becomes harder as the investigation gets
deeper, and the use of other tools may be required.
The ground should be prodded or broken-up over a width of excavation equal to the width
of the anticipated threats at the site. If AP mines are expected, a width of 15cm is
required. If AT mines are expected, a width of at least 30cm is required.

4) The ground that has been loosened with the prodder should then be removed with a
trowel.

Whenever metal is found during the excavation, with the magnet or by eye, the deminer
should check the position of the original indication with the metal-detector.
5) Steps 3 and 4 should be repeated as many times as necessary to create a sloping hole at
least 15cm wide advancing towards the signal-marker. The depth of the hole should reach
the required Clearance depth at the site BEFORE the marker is reached.

The side of the excavation closest to the marker is approximately vertical. This must be
prodded from the bottom upward at a spacing of 2cm. The prodded earth can then be
removed with the trowel. When the prodder meets an obstruction, the prodder should be
used to feel for the sides of the obstruction and so estimate its size. The trowel should
then be used with extreme caution to expose the obstruction.
In soft ground, it may be possible to insert the prodder a considerable length into the
ground. The prodded ground can then be cut away with the trowel in complete confidence
that there is nothing concealed within it. The ground cut away must never be more than
the ground searched with the prodder.

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For safety and to ensure an overlap, the deminer must never cut more away than 75% of
the soil that has been prodded. The length prodded is NOT the distance ahead of the
excavation face that can be safely removed with a trowel. The picture above shows a
prodder inserted 8cms into the ground. Because of the angle of the prodder, the prodder
has only reached 7cms into the unknown ground. In this example, if a deminer were to cut
8cm of soil away with the trowel he/she would press on the edge of a concealed PMN
mine.
After prodding (bottom upwards) the face of the signal-investigation, the deminer should
insert the prod a final time and grip the blade to record the depth before withdrawing it.
He/she should then estimate three-quarters of the length and mark the ground ahead of
the hole lightly with the prodder tip. The ground up to that mark can then be removed with
the trowel safely.
Lightly tapping an obstruction with the prodder can sometimes provide feedback to
confirm that the object is likely to be a mine. The deminer must expose any obstruction
with extreme caution, regardless of the “feedback” from the prodder.
6) If no obstruction is found at the signal-marker, the deminer should check the position of
the indication with the metal-detector. When the metal-detector continues to signal over
the area, it may be appropriate to dig more deeply. The Section Leader should decide this
based on the Task Risk Assessment and any pattern of mines that may be known. The
Section Leader should consult the Platoon Commander over any uncertainty. Generally,
when a mine is missing from an anticipated pattern and there is a metal-detector signal
near where the mine was expected, the depth of excavation should be increased until the
source of the signal is found.
When searching more deeply, the deminer should start excavating again, beginning
further away from the indication and extending the slope of the hole so that any hidden
device will still be approached from the side.
When a mine/device has been found and the parts facing the deminer have been gently exposed,
the deminer should follow the actions detailed in Part 11 of this Chapter.

7.5 Investigating a metal-detector indication using rakes

The REDS rakes can be used for signal investigation. The hand-tools approved for signal
investigation must also be available, along with a plastic bucket in which to place contaminated
ground. The use of the REDS rakes for Area Excavation is covered in Part 9 of this Chapter.
The light rake can be fitted with a magnet to help remove metal-clutter.

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The photograph on the left shows a light rake with a magnet attached. The photograph on the
right shows a deminer removing magnetic pieces from the magnet after raking the ground.
The scratching action of the rake loosens fragments in the soil surface and often means that the
deminer finds the metal that made the metal-detector signal.
NOTE: The light rake must be tested against the AP blast mines that may be present. Testing the
light rake involves using the rake to expose a rendered-safe test-mine. The initiation
mechanism of the test-mine must be intact and the High Explosive removed. If the light
rake initiates the fuze mechanism in the test-mine, it fails the test and cannot be used at
Tasks where that mine is anticipated. Anti-personnel mines that have passed previous
tests include the PkMk2/4, Type 72, PMA-3 and PRB M35.
The use of REDS rakes to investigate metal-detector signals can be very fast when mines are
relatively close to the surface or when the source of a detector reading was a ferrous fragment
close to the surface. In soft ground, the time saving over using other hand-tools to make the
investigation can be significant.

Variations in REDS rake design should be tested. Heavy rake heads should be made using E304
Stainless Steel. Light rake heads may be made from plastic or sprung steel.
The REDS light rake (with or without a magnetic attachment) and the REDS heavy rake can be
used to investigate metal-detector readings or for area-excavation.
Before starting the REDS detector investigation procedure, an area behind the deminer must be
prepared to place the rakes and the metal-detector so that the deminer can change tool quickly.

7.5.1 Procedure
When a detector signal has been pinpointed, the deminer can begin a signal-investigation
procedure with rakes. The following procedure should be followed:
1. Remove the signal marker and make a mental note of its position.
2. In a standing position, and holding the handle well away from the rake-head, use the light
rake over the area where the metal-detector signalled. The rake tines scratch the ground
surface and can help to loosen fragments just below the ground surface, which are then
attracted to the magnet. Soil collected by the brushing of the rake should be moved back
to the base-stick.
The area raked will usually extend from 20cm beyond the metal-detector reading to the
base-stick and be the width of the light rake head.

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3. Look closely for exposed metal. When the magnetic light rake is used, the magnet may
have picked up the metal. Use a hand-held magnet if necessary. If metal is found, the
deminer should use the metal-detector to check the position of the indication. If the
indication has gone, the investigation has been completed and the deminer should return
to the metal-detector search procedure.
4. The area must be searched with the metal-detector again. This must be done whether or
not metal fragments have been found because the action of the rake may have moved the
signals around. Not all metal is magnetic, and non-magnetic metal may have been moved
by the rake.
5. Use the light rake to move soil from the area of the indication back to the base-stick.
Continue until the light rake becomes ineffective. When roots are uncovered, they should
be cut with pruners.
6. Check with the metal-detector to find out whether the signal has moved.
7. If the signal has moved, move the loosened earth into the plastic bucket and check with
the metal-detector again.
8. If the metal-detector signal has not moved, use the heavy rake. Hold the rake handle as
far as possible from the rake head. Place the heavy rake on the ground surface beyond
the metal-detector reading in a place where the metal-detector did not signal when the
area was searched.

NOTE: The metal-detector search procedure usually means that an area beyond a signal position
has been searched with the detector. When it has not, the deminer should ensure that the
area closest is clear, then advance the base-stick so that he/she can safely sweep the
search-head beyond the area under investigation before using the heavy rake.
9. Drag the heavy rake towards the base-stick without downward pressure. Repeat this
across the area where the metal-detector signalled until the soil is loose. Place the heavy
rake in the safe-area.
10. Use the light rake to move the loosened soil back to the base-stick.
11. Return to Step 3 and check with the metal-detector to find out whether the metal has
moved. Repeat Steps 3 to 10 until the detection depth has been reached or until the
reason for the metal-detector signal has been found.
When a device is close to the surface or in loose soil, the light rake will expose the top of it. When
this happens, the movement of the rake tines over the device can make an obvious scratching
noise. In soft ground the heavy rake may expose or lift a mine or ERW to the surface.
When a mine or ERW is found, the deminer should expose the parts facing the base-stick using
approved hand-tools when necessary, then follow the instructions in Part 11 of this Chapter.

NOTE: The heavy rake must not be placed on the ground directly above a metal-detector
indication or on ground that has not been searched using the metal-detector.
If the ground becomes very hard as the depth increases, the deminer should be permitted to use
the metal-detector to reposition the signal-marker and start an alternative investigation procedure
using approved hand-tools.

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8. Area Excavation using hand-tools
In area-excavation, the whole ground surface is searched by moving it. A base-trench is used and
the base-trench moves forward as work progresses in the same way that a base-stick moves
forward during metal-detector Clearance. When conducted properly, area-excavation gives total
confidence that the area searched contains no mines or ERW to the Clearance depth. The
method is slow and hard work, but absolutely thorough.
Area excavation is performed using a one-person one-lane procedure. When a mine or ERW is
found, the deminer withdraws, informs his/her Section Leader and either waits until the EOD
Operative has dealt with the device or starts a new lane. When the EOD Operative is not
immediately available, the Section Leader should always instruct the deminer to start a new lane.
The area-excavation procedure is hard work, so, depending on weather and ground conditions,
deminers should work in their lanes for a maximum of 30 minutes between rest breaks.
The deminer must start by making a “base-trench” within the safe-lane at the start of the
Clearance lane. The “base-trench” moves forward into the SHA as the lane progresses. The first
base-trench is always inside the safe-area, 120cm from side to side, and 10 - 20 cm from front to
back. Its depth must be the required Clearance depth at the Task. As the base-trench is
advanced, the sides of the lane are marked using hazardous-area sticks or stones on both sides
at every metre.
Tools issued may include:
• Tripwire feeler
• Grass cutting tools
• Root cutting tools (pruners)
• A handsaw
• A hammer (for placing marking pickets)
• Wire-cutters
• Blast resistant ground engaging tools (see Part 7.4 of this Chapter).
• A mattock to dig the first base-trench inside the safe-area.

NOTE: Mattocks must NEVER be used inside the SHA.

As a deminer progresses, all tools that are not being used should be kept behind the deminer and
on one side of the working lane.
Tools used to slice away the ground may be used as described in Part 7.4.2 of this Chapter when
the anticipated mines do not have pressure plates extending to the edges of the mine.

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8.1 Procedure
Follow the four steps shown below. They illustrate Clearance in a lane, but the same principle
applies when starting from a base-line.

Step 1 Step 2
120cm

Visual check, Cleared of vegetation and

30 – 50cm Undergrowth removal obstructions

Base-trench

The first base-trench is

safe-area entirely inside the safe-
area. It must be 120cm
wide and as deep as the
required Clearance depth

Step 4
Step 3

Slice away ¾ of the area that

has been prodded and move
Prod from the bottom the soil to the near side of the
upwards and at 2cm base-trench.
intervals across the face
of the excavation. Ensure that the far side of the
base-trench remains as deep
as the required Clearance
depth.

When steps three and four have been completed across the entire face of the base-trench, the
prodding in Step 3 starts again.
When mines with pressure plates extending to the edges of the mine are expected, the safety of
the procedure relies heavily on prodding the face of the excavation before cutting it away.
Prodding should begin at the bottom of the far side of the trench. The face of the trench should be
prodded at 2cm intervals upwards and sideways.

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Face of the base-trench

Base-trench

If an obstruction is encountered, prod to both sides of the obstruction. If the obstruction continues,
soil must be cautiously removed up the obstruction to check whether it is a mine or other ERW.
In soft ground, it may be possible to insert the prodder a considerable length into the ground. The
prodded ground can then be cut away with the trowel in complete confidence that there is nothing
concealed within it. The ground cut away must never be more than the ground searched with the
prod. For safety and to ensure an overlap, the deminer must never cut more away than 75% of
the soil that has been prodded. The length prodded is NOT the distance ahead of the excavation
face that can be safely removed with a trowel.

75%

The picture above shows a prodder inserted 8cms into the ground. Because of the angle of the
prodder, the prodder has only reached 7cms forward into the unknown ground. In this example, if
a deminer were to cut 8cm of soil away with the trowel he/she would press on the edge of a
concealed PMN mine as he/she did so.
After prodding (bottom upwards) the face of the signal-investigation, the deminer should insert the
prod a final time and grip the blade to record the depth before withdrawing it. He/she should then
estimate three-quarters of the length and mark the ground ahead of the hole lightly with the
prodder tip. The ground up to that mark can then be cut away with the trowel safely.
If a mine or ERW is discovered, the deminer must tell the Section Leader and withdraw from the
lane until the EOD Operative has assessed the situation and dealt with the device. Work in the
lane must not continue until the mine or ERW has been removed or destroyed. Generally the
deminer should start another lane and continue working.

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9. Area Excavation using rakes
When the Task Risk Assessment has NOT identified a threat from especially sensitive devices,
tripwires or vertical fuzes (as are commonly used with fragmentation or AG mines), the Rake
Excavation and Detection system (REDS) can be used. The vegetation in the area to be raked
must always be cut before rakes are used. Because the use of mechanical demining systems
generally removes all vegetation and loosens the ground, the REDS system can be especially
useful after mechanical ground processing.
REDS is performed using either a one-person one-lane procedure or a two-man one-lane
procedure in which roles alternate at rest periods. The raking deminer is issued with rakes and a
tool kit and works independently in a lane. His/her partner rests at the appropriate safety-distance
while the raking deminer works. When a mine is found, the raking deminer must close the lane
and inform the Section Leader. He/she then either waits until the EOD Operative has dealt with
the device or starts a new lane.
The raking procedure is hard work, so, depending on weather and ground conditions, deminers
should work in their lanes for a maximum of 30 minutes between rest breaks or between
alternating with their resting partner.
All working deminers must wear frontal blast protection. As a further safety feature to ensure the
deminer’s distance from any initiation, all deminers must work in a standing position when using
the rakes, but they may kneel or squat when using other tools.
The raking deminer must start by making a “base-trench” within the safe-lane at the start of a
Clearance lane. The “base-trench” moves forward into the suspect area in the same way as a
base-stick does in metal-detector procedures as the lane progresses. The first base-trench is
always inside the safe-area, 120cm from side to side, and 10- 20 cm from front to back. Its depth
must be the required Clearance depth at the Task. As the base-trench is advanced, the sides of
the lane are marked by leaving narrow trenches. A hazardous area picket or painted stone should
be placed in the side trenches on both sides at every metre.
Heavy- and light rakes are used. Other tools issued may include:
• tripwire feeler;
• grass cutting tools;
• root cutting tools (pruners);
• a handsaw;
• a hammer (for placing marking stakes);
• wire-cutters; and
• a trowel.
As a deminer progresses, all tools that are not being used should be kept behind the deminer and
on one side of the working lane.

9.1 Procedure
To start a lane, a base-trench is dug to the required Clearance depth, 120cm wide and at least
20cm from front to back in a known safe-area at the start of the lane. The distance front to back of
the base-trench may be varied according to ground conditions but should never exceed 50cm.
When the first base-trench is made, it should always be entirely inside the safe-area. Because it is
inside a safe-area, it can be dug with other tools than the rakes.
The soil from the initial excavation should be moved out of the base-trench and to the rear until
the process is under way.
The area (up to) 50cm forward of the base-trench is visually checked and cleared of vegetation
and loose stones. The light rake is then used to move all soil in the 20-50cm by 120cm area to the

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front. The loosened spoil is brushed towards the back of the base-trench. The light rake is used as
the main excavation tool and, when possible, is used to excavate to the required depth, exposing
any mines/devices in the process. When the rake comes into contact with a mine, the sound of it
scratching the device is often heard, alerting the deminer to the presence of the mine before it is
visible.
The heavy rake should be used only when the light rake becomes ineffective. The heavy rake
scratches the ground, loosening it so that the light rake can be effective again. The head of the
heavy rake is placed to the front of the base-trench and pulled back towards the deminer. The
rake tines then plough back through the soil to the rear of the area being Cleared. The deminer
must not hack at the ground with the heavy rake.
The heavy rake ploughing action is repeated across the width of the base-trench. The deminer
may change between using the light and heavy rake several times until he/she is able to excavate
to the required depth with the light rake.
Water may be used to soften the ground or damp-down dust if required.
When a mine or ERW is discovered, it should be exposed using an approved hand-tool. When the
device can be clearly seen, the deminer must close the lane and alert the Section Leader who will
inform the EOD Operative. Work in the lane must not continue until the mine or ERW has been
removed or destroyed. Generally the deminer should start another lane and continue working.

The rakes are used as shown above and below (the deminers are wearing blast goggles).

Found mine
marker

Side of lane
trenches

The photographs show deminers using rakes in Mozambique. The method was found to be safer
than some others methods of excavation. The deminer’s head is a long way from any accidental
detonation so the risk of severe injury is low as long as basic PPE is worn.

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Making a base-trench

When starting a new lane from a safe-area, a

Area cleared of vegetation base-trench is dug entirely inside the safe-area
and obstructions
from which to start moving forward.
Base-trench

The base-trench is
entirely inside the
safe-area. It must be
120cm wide and as
deep as the required
Clearance depth.
The basic raking sequence is shown in the four
steps below.

Visual search of the ground Cut and remove the

and removal of rocks vegetation

Base-trench Base-trench

Safe-area Safe-area

Rake over the entire area to Rake over the entire area to
5cm depth 10 cm depth

Safe-area
Safe-area

When steps 1 to 4 are completed, steps 3 and 4 are repeated until the base-trench reaches the
required depth. Then the entire procedure is repeated to extend the processed lane forward.

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As the base-trench at the front of the lane moves forward, side-trenches to the full excavation
depth are left at the sides of the lane in the area marked as “Overlap”. These side-trenches mean
that the internal QA can ensure that the required depth has been consistently maintained.
Each deminer's Section Leader must use QA markers to show the extent of the lane to which the
depth of the side trenches has been checked, and the side-trenches must be maintained until this
has occurred. The Platoon Commander should periodically QA the work of the Section Leaders,
checking that they are measuring the depth of all lanes regularly and that depth has genuinely
been maintained.
Internal QA is part of the system. External QA must be made during Clearance if it is to be made
in the same way. Post Clearance sampling (using rakes) may also be used for external QC.
When conducting REDS in a High Threat area, no 1.2 metre wide lane will normally exceed five
metres in length. The lane will be closed and an adjacent lane cut. When the second lane reaches
five metres, it can continue a further five metres before being closed and the deminer returns to
extend the first lane.
When conducting REDS in areas in which No Known Threat has been identified in the Task Risk
Assessment, the 1.2 metre wide lane may be extended beyond 5 metres in length. This may be
appropriate for crossing No Known Threat areas before MDD or mechanical assets are used to
raise confidence and confirm the absence of threats.

10. Using water to soften ground

Water may be used to soften the ground or damp-down dust when necessary. A bucket or hose
delivery system may be used to transport the water to end of the lane where the water should be
splashed over the required area. All safety requirements at the Task should be observed during
the watering process with working-distances maintained and PPE worn.
The deminer must close the lane and work in another lane while the water is allowed to soak into
the ground. No signal investigation or excavation should be conducted until the surface water has
gone.
When a bowser is available, water should be applied the day before the area is Cleared.

A dedicated bowser that is narrow enough to be driven along two metre wide lanes is ideal. The
example shown in the photograph is both low-cost and versatile.

11. Action on locating a mine or ERW

When the EOD Operative determines that it is safe to do so, mines and ERW may be moved for
destruction outside the minefield. Damaged or unstable devices should be destroyed in-situ.
On locating a mine or ERW during any procedure, deminers should expose enough of the device
to be sure that it is a mine or ERW and then close the lane. The deminer must inform his/her
Section Leader who will inform the Platoon Commander. The Platoon Commander will instruct an

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EOD Operative to deal with the device. If there is a delay dealing with the discovered device, the
Section Leader must instruct the deminer to start work in another area. The deminer should not
return to the lane until the device has been removed or destroyed.
The approved render safe procedures for some mines are documented in Chapter 10 of these
SOPs. Some devices may be cautiously moved without rendering them safe.

1 NOTE: Mines or devices that are damaged or cannot be identified should not be moved.

11.1 Pulling procedure

The pulling procedure must be conducted by one-person who should be an EOD Operative. The
EOD Operative must presume that a detonation may occur. The pictures below show a set of
pulling tools and the way that they are used.

Fulcrum, line and

hooks used to turn
devices over from a Pulling equipment may vary but the illustration shows the
distance. principle involved.

Pulling is conducted using the following procedure:

1. All people not involved in the pulling operation must be withdrawn to a safe-area.
2. Sentries must be posted to prevent people/livestock entering the area when necessary.
3. A pulling line must be rolled out from a safe point to the mine or ERW. The line must be in
place before the hook is put under the mine or ERW. The length of the line should equal
the safety distance for the mine or ERW except when the EOD Operator can take
adequate cover closer.
4. A fulcrum device may be used to make it easier to turn the device over.
5. When the line is prepared, the EOD Operative should attach the line to the device, usually
by pushing a hook under the far-side.
6. The EOD Operative must then confirm that the area is clear of people before returning to
the safe point from which he/she will pull. Before pulling he/she must inform the Platoon
Commander that he/she is about to pull (usually by radio).
7. The line should then be pulled in a slow, continuous movement until the mine or ERW has
turned over or moved a minimum of two metres.
8. When the device does not detonate, the EOD Operative must wait a minimum of one
minute before approaching it. The wait time should be extended if there is any concern
about the condition of the device being pulled.
9. The EOD Operative should move the device to the place where it will be destroyed and
place an appropriate marker where it was found.

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10. The Platoon Commander must ensure that the original position of the mine or ERW is
searched for any devices that were beneath it before it was pulled.

NOTE: The pulling procedure is not normally necessary for mines that have no anti-disturbance
feature. Exceptions occur when any mine is in a condition that causes concern.

12. Removal of vegetation

Whenever there is significant vegetation, the use of mechanical assets to cut the vegetation in
front of manual demining should be considered. Whenever the Task Assessment indicates both
the presence of vegetation and active tripwire activated devices, mechanical assets should be
used to remove the vegetation whenever possible.
When mechanical assets are used to cut vegetation, minimum ground disturbance is necessary.
Cut vegetation that is lying on the ground may be removed using a light rake as the follow-up work
progresses as long as intact tripwires or active tilt-operated fuzes are not anticipated in the area.

12.1 Approved vegetation cutting tools

A range of approved hand-tools can be used for the manual removal of vegetation. The hand-held
petrol-driven Strimmer may also be used. There are restrictions on the way in which each tool can
be used and the places in which their use is appropriate.
The tools generally approved for vegetation removal are listed below. It is the responsibility of the
Programme Manager to ensure that deminers are always issued with appropriate tools for the
task and have access to strong "gardening" gloves.
A: Shears;
B: Secateurs (pruners);
C: Sickle (hook);
D: Saw (one-handed);
E: Wire-cutters;
F: Light rake;
G: Petrol-driven Strimmer (long-handled);
H: Tripwire feeler.
Deminers do not have to wear "gardening" gloves but they must be available whenever vegetation
includes thorns, is sharp, or has stinging or skin-irritant properties. The gloves protect against the
cuts and scratches that can occur during vegetation cutting.

1 NOTE: All tools can be used in a dangerous way, but some are hard to use in a safe way at
any time. The following tools may NOT be used in any area that has not yet been
declared safe (or presumed safe): machete; scythe; chainsaw; axe/hatchet. This is
because the user cannot reliably control the tool (or the vegetation it cuts). These tools
may be used in safe-areas, but should never be inside the SHA/CHA during demining.
The petrol-driven Strimmer and light rake may NOT be used in an area where the Task
Assessment indicates the presence of functional tripwire initiated mines or other touch-sensitive
devices on the ground-surface.
When using shears, sickle or saw, the blade(s) must not be pushed into the vegetation beyond the
area that has been visually checked, or through which fingers have not passed feeling for
obstructions.
When using a sickle (hook), the stem(s) to be cut should be gripped in one hand and cut carefully
using the tool with the other hand. The tool must not be swung at the vegetation in a scything
action.

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When using a petrol-driven Strimmer the operator should wear frontal leg protection unless the
design of the Strimmer removes all chance of a broken blade being thrown back towards the
operator. The operator must always ensure that the cutting blade does not touch the ground. The
operator must always ensure that his/her feet never leave the safe-area.
When using a light rake to collect vegetation cuttings, the user must always work in a standing
position and hold the handle so that he/she is as far as possible from the head of the rake.
All tools should be in good condition with appropriately sharp blades. It is the responsibility of the
Platoon Supervisor to ensure that sharpening stones and files are available in the rest area and
for use during tool maintenance in the afternoons.

12.2 Manual cutting of vegetation

Vegetation must be cut during manual Clearance, BAC and BACS procedures and in front of
MDD. Because the vegetation will vary and may not cover the whole area in front, the process is
described in terms of principles that must always be followed rather than as a step by step
process.
The manual removal of vegetation must be conducted in a controlled and deliberate manner,
avoiding any disturbance of vegetation outside the width of the lane and the safety overlap. The
following rules must be applied:
1. Before and during the cutting, the deminer must make repeated visual checks for any item
that has become visible.
2. Generally, trees or bushes with a trunk diameter of up to 10cm should be removed during
manual demining.
3. Grass is cut 15cm above ground level to ensure that surface devices would be seen
before ground level is reached. The height of the first cut should be increased if the Task
Assessment suggests that large items may be on or above the ground surface.
4. When the deminer is confident that the tool will not strike any devices, the deminer should
cut the vegetation close to the ground surface. Because stem thickness often increases
near the ground, the deminer should use secateurs (pruners) when necessary.
5. When metal-detectors will be used, the vegetation should be cut very close to the ground.
This allows the detector search-head to move close to the ground, so maximising the
depth of search.
6. Undergrowth must always be cut. It must not be torn or broken.
7. The deminer’s feet must never leave the safe-area while cutting and removing vegetation.
This usually limits the area in front of a deminer that can be cut to between 30 and 50cm
from the base-line.
8. When vegetation is so tall that it might fall outside the lane when cut, it should be cut in
lengths that allow the deminer to hold it and easily remove the cuttings to the safe-area.
9. When vegetation is unlikely to fall outside the working area, the deminer should work on
his/her knees or crouching.
10. When using a one-handed cutting tool, the deminer should use one hand to hold the
vegetation while the other uses the tool to cut it. When using shears, the deminer should
move the cuttings to the safe-area as he/she works.
11. While cutting vegetation, the deminer should look for any indication of devices. This may
include areas where no vegetation is growing but which can be seen more clearly
because other vegetation has been removed.

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12. Any cut vegetation in the Clearance area should be removed by hand or by using a light
rake. The use of the light rake will depend on the hazards identified in the Task
Assessment and must be approved by the Platoon Supervisor.
13. Cuttings should be stacked outside the lane for later disposal. Cuttings must always be
stacked so that they do not obstruct emergency access to the working areas. The Section
Leader should allocate an area for the deminer to place his/her cuttings and ensure that
the cuttings are later moved and destroyed.
14. Destroying cut vegetation by burning must be conducted in a controlled manner inside a
safe-area when no work in the SHA/CHA is happening. When burning is not appropriate,
cut vegetation should be stacked in a safe-area where it causes no obstruction.
Devices that are located during vegetation removal should be left where they are until the ground
up to them has been Cleared. The deminer must notify the Section Leader if any unexpected
obstructions, such as barbed wire, ditches or large rocks, become visible as a result of vegetation
removal.

12.3 Using a petrol-driven Strimmer

The vegetation Strimmers (also called
Brush-cutters) are commercial items
developed for use in agriculture and
municipal maintenance tasks. Proven in
Humanitarian Demining in many
countries, the tool provides a rapid and
effective means of cutting grasses and
thin-stemmed vegetation in areas where
there is no tripwire or tilt-fuzed mine
threat. Variations may be made to the
tool to improve efficiency.
The photograph shows a Strimmer being
used in demining.
The petrol-driven Strimmer may only be used by a deminer who has been internally trained and
tested in its use. Usually the same person is responsible for its maintenance and for the correct
storage of its spare parts and consumables.

Petrol-driven Strimmer
(Usually with a 2-stroke engine)

The shaft of the Strimmer should be 1.5 metres

from the handle to the cutting head, or longer.

The engine is carried

on the deminer’s back.

The cutter is usually made using shaped metal with two or three blades.

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The Strimmer may be used to cut inside the SHA/CHA along the sides of safe-areas. The width of
the cut is usually around a metre, depending on obstructions. This can be especially useful when
using lateral lanes in manual or MDD demining procedures.
Before Strimmer use, the Platoon Commander must ensure that an appropriate means of
communication is in place. The noise of the machine prevents voice communication being
adequate, so the Strimmer operator will usually have a VHF radio and may have an ear-piece.
When necessary, a simple flag-system can be used and the Section Leader controlling the
Strimmer operator must carry the relevant flag(s).
Detailed control of the Strimmer varies with each design. However, the following constraints apply
whatever model of Strimmer is used:
1) The Strimmer operator should not put the moving cutting head in or over the uncleared
area until all other staff are at the approved working-distance.
2) The Strimmer operator must wear frontal PPE, and should also wear frontal leg
protection when the design of the tool makes this desirable.
3) The Strimmer operator must take all care to keep his/her feet inside the safe-area at all
times.
4) The Strimmer operator should not allow the cutting head of the tool to strike the ground
at any time.
5) The Strimmer operator must not move around in the safe-area with the cutter spinning.
6) No other person should approach closer than the working distance while the Strimmer
is cutting vegetation (including supervisors).
Because a Strimmer must not be used in areas where surface fuzes, intact tripwires, or touch-
sensitive devices are anticipated, vegetation cut with a Strimmer may be raked into a safe-area
using light rakes.

12.4 Burning-off vegetation

Burning-off vegetation can be done in the right conditions. These conditions are:
a) The Task Release Plan does not include the use of MDDs for at least seven days after
the burning.
b) The Task Assessment has not identified plastic-cased mines on the ground surface.
c) A broad (usually at least two metres wide) fire-break can be made on all sides of the area
to be burned. This is usually best achieved using a mechanical asset.
d) The vegetation must be low and dry. Generally, dense or green vegetation should not be
burned-off because it will not burn well.
e) Essential area-marking must be either already fire-resistant or replaced with fire-resistant
markers, such as painted stones and metal pickets.
f) There is no expectation of high winds.

Controlled burnings are subject to the following additional constraints:

1) No demining work should be conducted within the working-distance for the area to be
burned or in any area where smoke drifts.
2) Sentries should be posted to prevent people or livestock entering the area during a
controlled burning whenever necessary.

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13. Removing obstacles
Common obstacles are:
• Rocks;
• Barbed wire;
• Fences;
• Vehicle wrecks;
• Ditches/trenches;
• Abandoned or destroyed buildings; and
• Fallen trees.

13.1 Rocks
Some areas are littered with rocks of various sizes. In other places, piles of rocks and low-walls of
rocks are found. All these impede demining. If there are many rocks, the use of mechanical
demining assets that process the ground can be unwise because the rocks will cause a high level
of wear to the machine and can prevent the machine processing the ground to a constant depth.
When using manual demining procedures, surface rocks that are small enough to be easily lifted
should be removed. The deminer may reach in front by 30-50cm to lift the rocks. Rocks that are
too large to be removed, or that resist lifting because they are partly buried, should be left in place
until cleared around. Removed rocks should be transferred to an area behind the deminer that
has been subjected to internal QA. They should be moved out of the lane before continuing to
search.
When larger rocks have been cleared around so that the deminer can stand beside the rock, the
deminer may try to move it again. This is because the rock may impede easy access in the lane
and should be removed when possible. If the rock is moved, the area beneath it must be searched
to ensure that no devices are present. If the rock cannot be easily moved, it should be left unless
there is reason to believe that devices were placed beneath large rocks.
When piles or walls of rocks are encountered, the Task Release Plan should allow for the lanes to
be diverted around the obstruction. When the area around the obstruction(s) has been cleared,
the Task Supervisor must re-evaluate the Task Assessment and decide whether the piles must be
moved and searched. When MDD assets are available, it may be appropriate to use them to
search the piles of rocks.
If the rock obstruction must be moved, appropriate Mechanical assets may be used to assist.

13.2 Fences and wire

Some minefields were originally fenced with strands or coils of barbed wire. In other areas,
security and agricultural fences may be inside the area to be cleared. All broken fences should be
removed and the area beneath them searched. Intact fences may be left unless their presence
restricts the use of mechanical assets or prevents necessary access. When the area around an
intact fence requires full Clearance, MDD may be used. If the metal-detector and the operator are
capable of searching close to the fence reliably, metal-detectors may be used. When MDDs and
metal-detectors are unavailable or inappropriate, the area around the fence must be excavated
using area excavation techniques.
Wire obstructions can be cut cautiously using efficient wire-cutters. The wire must then be
removed in sections and placed in a metal-collection area. The Platoon Commander may order
that entanglements or buried wires are pulled using manual or mechanical means. Generally, the
area surrounding the wire should have been searched first.

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13.3 Vehicle wrecks
When wrecked vehicles are found in the SHA, it must not be presumed that ground beneath the
vehicle is safe. The remains of wrecked civilian vehicles should be pulled onto a known safe-area
using mechanical assets.
Wrecked military vehicles should only be approached over ground that has been searched. They
must be individually assessed by an EOD Operative who must presume that:
• there may be booby traps in and around the wreck;
• there may be ammunition in and around the wreck;
• there may be mines surrounding the wreck; and
• there may be mines between the wreck and any nearby route.

13.4 Ditches/trenches
If a ditch with collapsed sides is suspected of containing mines, it is possible that the mines will
have become deeply buried. In these places, mechanical assets may be used to dig out the ditch
and sift the spoil removed. The need for this will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the
Task Supervisor. The use of a mechanical excavator is covered in Chapter 7.
In the photograph below, the trench has not collapsed but local people have moved barbed wire
and mines into the trench so that they can move livestock in safety. The trench was cleared slowly
by hand because there were also corpses in the trench and the local villagers thought that it would
be disrespectful to dig the trench out with an excavator. The Task Supervisor must decide the
best method to use on a case-by-case basis and should always listen to the desires of local
people.

13.5 Abandoned or destroyed buildings

If the building has been used by people and animals, the risk of booby trapping may be low. When
a building has been destroyed in battle, there is a high chance that there may be UXO in and
around the building.

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1 NOTE: Buildings that still have window and door frames, roofing or plumbing fittings must be
approached with great caution. In many countries, useful parts of buildings are
scavenged. When useful parts are left in place, presume there is a reason for it. Consult
the local population about the threat.
If the building is known to have been booby trapped, the time since the devices were placed may
be relevant. Battery operated or improvised devices usually have a short operational life but may
still be dangerous.
When manual Clearance must be conducted, lanes must be marked using painted stones. When
there is rubble inside the building, the deminers must be issued with strong buckets to move the
rubble outside. Intact walls may provide protection and allow a reduction in working-distances
between deminers. Material on the floor must be removed until the search has reached the
original floor level. Metal-detectors can be used in some areas but there may be a lot of scrap
metal among the debris. Excavation using rakes or hand-tools may be more appropriate in some
parts of the building.
The most efficient method of searching a building where booby traps are not expected is to use
appropriately trained MDD.
When an abandoned building is not needed by the end-user and is believed to be booby trapped,
it may be carefully dismantled using mechanical assets. Parts should be lifted into a marked safe-
area and searched as work progresses. As with all mechanical processes, manual deminers may
not approach the machine while it is working and approved area marking must be used.
Safe access around the building must be Cleared in a two metre wide safe-lane. After a safe-
access route has been Cleared, the building must be inspected from the outside looking for visible
devices or booby traps. When buildings have more than one room, the Section Leader must make
a sketch map of the rooms inside the building.
The Task Supervisor must ensure that an appropriate plan is made for the clearance of any
building with several rooms. This plan must include a demining sequence that allows for the
following:
1. All access corridors must be Cleared before any rooms are entered.
2. Only one deminer is allowed into any room at one time, unless the floor area is big
enough to allow working-distances to be applied. In small rooms, the deminers should
work with two walls between them when possible.
3. A one-metre lane should be cleared into each room from the door to the far wall. Using
this lane as a base-line, clearance lanes should be made at right angles to the base-line.
The Section Leader must supervise the deminer and always be aware of his/her progress. When
visual contact may not be possible, the deminers must have radios and report progress regularly.
When access has been made to the inside of the building, the deminers should be withdrawn and
an EOD Operative should check for possible booby traps. The EOD Operative should not move
outside the Cleared access lanes. He should inform the Section Leader about possible booby
traps and the Section leader must instruct the relevant deminer to stop as soon as access to the
possible booby trap has been gained. The deminers will then withdraw and the EOD Operative
will deal with the device appropriately.
Each room must be searched using the following procedure:
1. Check the area in front of the base-stick visually and feel for tripwires when appropriate.
2. Carefully cut and remove any vegetation.

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3. Search the area using the metal metal-detector or area-excavation procedures. When using
the metal-detector, the rubble must be removed in stages, searching again after every 10cm
is removed.
4. Building rubble must be taken outside the building and collected in a safe-area. Access lanes
must never be obstructed with rubble.
5. When the original floor across the entire width of the base-stick is visible and there are no
metal-detector signals, the deminer should advance the base-stick and start at Step 1 again.
6. When the original floor across the entire width of the base-stick is visible and there are one or
more metal-detector signals, the deminer must investigate those signals unless the floor is
cement, concrete, or fixed tiles.

13.6 Fallen trees

Fallen trees and branches in the SHA/CHA must be moved so that the area underneath them can
be searched. When conducting manual or MDD procedures, the area leading to the obstruction
must be Cleared along its entire length.
If the tree is to be moved manually, a rope can be securely attached around it. This often means
that the area on both sides of the tree must be Cleared to allow safe access. Sometimes it is
appropriate to cut away smaller branches and move them out of the way.
If the tree is to be moved using a mechanical asset to lift it or pull it, the area leading up to the tree
must be Cleared and marked in a lane at least two metres wider than the machine unless the
machine is able to process that approach itself.
The tree or branch must be moved into a safe-area. When it is moved by machine, mechanical
safety-distances must be applied. When it is moved by manual pulling, the distance from the tree
to the nearest man must be the working-distance at the Task site. Several deminers can stand
behind each other pulling the rope. All deminers involved must wear PPE and work under the
strict supervision of the Section Leader.
The place from which the tree or branch was before it was removed must be searched and
Cleared.

14. Dealing with human remains

If human remains, or suspected human remains, are found during operations, the procedures
required by the NMAA must be followed. When the NMAA does not have published procedures,
the following procedures should be followed. Work in the area immediately surrounding the
remains must stop. Mechanical demining must not be conducted within a 25 metre radius of the
human remains.
The management of human remains, including the investigation of suspicious deaths and the
recovering, storing and identifying of remains is usually the responsibility of national police and
health workers.
Although the anticipated human remains that may be located during mine action activities often
date from the time of known conflict, human remains that are much older may be found. It is also
possible that human remains that are more recent will be located. Whatever the origin of human
remains, they must always be treated with respect and dignity by everyone involved in their
recovery.

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14.1 Reporting finding human remains
All findings of human remains must be reported to local police and the NMAA immediately, using
telephone or radio networks. A written report should also be made as soon as possible.

14.1.1 Recording the finding of human remains

Every discovery of human remains must be reported to the NMAA and the police immediately by
radio or telephone. After making a verbal report, a written report must be made.
When the remains of more than one person are found together, the Task Supervisor should make
one report describing the finding of multiple human remains. When the remains are formally
investigated with a police presence, a separate record should be prepared for each set of
remains.
As a minimum, the following details must be recorded:
a) the time, date, and place where the human remains were found. This should include a
detailed description of the location and a grid reference obtained using a GPS;
b) the name and contact details of the person(s) doing the recording;
c) a unique identification number must be assigned to each separate set of human remains.
If the human remains are too mixed to identify which body parts belong to each individual,
a single identification number can be assigned pending investigation by specialists. Any
files, bags or boxes used for artefacts associated with a set of human remains should be
clearly marked with the same reference number;
d) a description of the scene, including the location and distance of the remains in relation to
any features and landmarks. The description should include any obvious disturbance to
the human remains. Photographs should be included whenever possible;
NOTE: When photographing human remains, place a paper showing the identification number
assigned to the remains so that it will be shown in the photograph.
e) state what Task was being conducted when the remains were found;
f) state whether the human remains are inside a SHA/CHA;
g) state whether the remains appear to be complete. If they are not complete, the report
should make a statement giving a degree of confidence over whether they are human.
For example, if a human skull is visible, the confidence may be given as “certain”. If there
are only scattered bones, the level of confidence may be “possible” or “uncertain”;
NOTE: When it is uncertain whether the remains are human, they should be referred to as
“possibly human” in the report.
h) state whether the remains appear to be ancient, dating from known conflict, or recent. The
way in which the remains are investigation and removed will depend on their age. Include
a detailed description or a photograph; and
i) when possible, state whether the remains appear to be those of an adult or a child, and a
male or a female.
Investigation of the remains and associated artefacts with a view to determining the identity of the
deceased is the responsibility of the police or other authorities.
The report should be signed, dated and delivered to the NMAA and the local police as soon as
possible.

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14.2 Ancient human remains
When it is suspected that human remains may be ancient it should be presumed that the site may
be of archaeological interest. The human remains must be photographed and each assigned a
unique identification number. The discovery of the remains must be reported to the NMAA and the
police by telephone or radio immediately. A written report must be sent to NMAA as soon as
possible. An area extending at least two metres radius from the discovered remains must be left
undisturbed until authorisation is granted for the removal of the remains by the appropriate
authorities. The area surrounding the remains must be marked with hazardous area marking and,
if necessary, guarded to ensue that they remain undisturbed.
Generally, the police and a representative of an appropriate archaeological institute should be
present when the area immediately around the remains is cleared and the remains are collected.
The NMAA should arrange collection to occur with the minimum possible disruption to demining
activity.
Any artefacts found within a five metre radius of the remains must be bagged and given an
identification number that is the same as that of the human remains. When human remains may
be from more than one person, the artefacts closest to the torso of each body should be given the
same identification number as that torso.

14.3 Human remains from conflict

Demining is often conducted in battle areas where combatants may have died in action. In some
cases, bombardment may have buried the remains at the time of death. Because the areas are
known to be dangerous, the remains may have been undisturbed since the fighting ended.
When the remains of combatants are discovered and the artefacts found with them (clothing and
other items) confirm their status as former soldiers, the discovery must be reported to the NMAA
and the police immediately by telephone or radio. The remains must be photographed and
assigned a unique identification number. A written report of the discovery must be made and sent
to the NMAA as soon as possible. The human remains must not be disturbed more than is
necessary to determine whether they were former combatants. The area surrounding the remains
must be marked with hazardous area marking and, if necessary, guarded to ensure that they
remain undisturbed.
The police should visit the site to confirm the identification of the human remains as being that of
former combatants. The police should then arrange for the remains to be collected and removed,
and may ask for assistance in doing so.
Manual or MDD demining may continue to within two metres of the remains of former combatants.
Any portable artefacts found within a five metre radius of the remains must be photographed and
placed in a bag with the same Identification number as that assigned to the remains. All artefacts
must be collected in case they have a significance that is not immediately obvious and may help
to identify the remains later. When human remains may be from more than one person, the
artefacts closest to the torso of each body should be given the same identification number as that
torso.

14.4 Recent human remains

If there is any suspicion that human remains discovered during mine action activities are too
recent to date from the time of conflict, demining in a radius of at least ten metres around the area
must stop immediately. The police and the NMAA must be informed immediately by telephone or
radio.

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A written report of the discovery must be made and the human remains must be photographed
and assigned one or more unique identification numbers. The area surrounding the remains must
be marked with hazardous area marking and, if necessary, guarded to ensue that they remain
undisturbed.
The police should attend the site in a timely manner. The Task Supervisor must assist the police
in their investigation of the remains, arranging for deminers to clear up to and around the remains
while the police are present. While this occurs, responsibility for safety at the task site remains
with the Task Supervisor and any police that are inside the safety distance for the site must wear
the appropriate PPE and obey the safety constraints required in these SOPs.
NOTE: If the police do not wear the appropriate PPE or obey safety constraints, the Task
Supervisor must refuse to carry out any demining work in the SHA/CHA. The NMAA
should liaise with the police to gain their cooperation.
Any artefacts found within a ten metre radius of the human remains must be collected and
recorded as required under police procedures.
Generally, the actual recovery of the body of a recent corpse must be conducted by specialist
police and medical staff. Until the cause of death is known, demining staff must not touch the
remains unless wearing suitable protection against disease.

14.5 Human remains found outside the SHA/CHA

Human remains found outside the Task area should be reported to the NMAA and the police by
telephone or radio. The position of the remains should be marked with stakes or painted stones
and a written report should be sent as soon as possible.
The management of human remains found outside the Task area falls outside our remit, so we
should not accept responsibility for that duty.

14.6 Health hazards

The health hazards (biohazards) of handling human remains from an armed conflict that occurred
some time ago are usually very low. When the human remains are recent and have not
desiccated or decomposed, a risk of infection may occur from direct contact. All blood and some
body fluids are considered potential vectors of the hepatitis B and C virus, human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and other blood-borne pathogens. To avoid these risks, staff must
never handle fresh or decomposing bodies unless specifically trained, qualified and equipped to
do so.

14.6.1 Psychological considerations

The psychological burden for staff dealing with human remains can be considerable. Persons
unwilling to be involved in the activity must not be ordered to do so.
Any staff member who is traumatised by the discovery of human remains must be treated with
respect and offered professional counselling in order to effect a full recovery.

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15. Tripwire location
When the Task Risk Assessment indicates a possible threat from tripwire operated mines with
functional fuzes, the Task Release Plan for the affected area may include the use of machines for
mechanical preparation of the area. Flails can be deployed in a manner designed to ensure that
no intact tripwires remain before manual deminers are deployed. The flails need not be used to
process the ground to a set depth unless ground processing is also required.
When it is necessary to use a manual demining tripwire
detection procedure, the search must be made using the
eyes and hands. After a thorough visual check of the
area, the deminer searches the area in front by gently
parting any thick vegetation that may conceal tripwires,
unexploded ordnance, surface-laid mines, protruding
fuses or other suspicious items. The vegetation should
be parted by pressing the palms of the hands together
and pushing gently into the vegetation, then spreading
the fingers and slowly parting the hands as shown in the
photograph on the right. This should be repeated across
the width of the deminer’s lane, including the overlap.
After conducting the tripwire location procedure, the deminer must take great care not to cut
vegetation ahead of the area that has been searched for tripwires.

15.1 Action on locating a tripwire

When a tripwire is found, the deminer must stop work and notify the Section Leader. The Section
Leader should decide where the wire is likely to lead. Generally, the wire should be marked and
the lane closed. Another lane must be started in order to find the anticipated mine. When it is not
clear where the mine may be, the second lane should run parallel to the tripwire. Because AP
blast mines may be placed along tripwires, the lane must always be subjected to a full Clearance
procedure regardless of the Task Release Plan. Because the wire will run between an anchor
(usually a stake) and the mine, Clearance in both directions should be conducted.
When a tripwire operated mine is located, the Platoon Commander should be informed
immediately if the mine was not anticipated in the Task Assessment.
When a tripwire is taut, the tripwire must not be moved or disturbed until the ends are exposed
and the threat identified. When a tripwire is slack, it may be cut at the discretion of the Platoon
Commander and in the interests of safety.
When the type of mine is not known and its condition is uncertain, a working distance of 30 metres
should be enforced until the ends of the tripwire have been located and the device identified.
Working distances for mine threats are given in Chapter 2 of these SOPs.

16. Collection of mines and ERW

Deminers may NOT handle or move mines or ERW unless trained to do so. When mines or ERW
are safe to move, they should be moved by an EOD Operator to clearly marked and separated
areas. Under the direction of an EOD Level 3 Operative (often the Platoon Commander or Platoon
Supervisor), the mines and ERW must be destroyed using one of the procedures described in
Chapter 10 of these SOPs.

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17. Area Reduction by BAC
When no pressure or movement-sensitive mines and ERW are anticipated in an area and the
Task Assessment indicates that there may be other ERW on the ground, the Task Supervisor may
authorise areas to be subjected to a visual Battle Area Clearance (BAC) search.
A visual BAC search can only be conducted in areas with sparse vegetation or from which
vegetation has been removed. The vegetation may be removed by a suitably armoured machine
before the BAC. The machine should only be used to remove the vegetation. Do not allow the
machine to disrupt the ground surface before BAC when disrupting the ground may bury ERW.
A visual search does not constitute Clearance as defined in the IMAS, but it is an accepted Area
Reduction and confidence building procedure. Land processed with BAC must NOT be released
as Cleared. It should be released as being Reduced by BAC and having “No Known Threat”.

NOTE: BAC may NOT be used in an area where there may be pressure or movement-sensitive
mines and ERW. Because of this, the marking systems and working-distances that are
required in mined areas need not be used.
In BAC, the area to be searched is considered safe to walk on. The area should be divided into
square boxes and marked with 1.2 metre Section markers or flags.
The following procedure can be used to search each box:
1) The width of the area to be searched depends on the number of searchers. Six deminers can
generally search an area approximately ten metres wide.
2) Wearing approved PPE and carrying a scrap-bag, the deminers form a rank approximately
one metre apart at the base-line.

3) On command from the Section Leader they advance slowly across the area looking closely at
the ground. The Section Leader walks five metres behind the deminers ensuring that they
maintain a straight line and placing side markers every ten metres.
4) At the end of the marked area, the deminers form a rank in the adjacent area, then walk back
over the adjacent area.
5) As the deminers advance on the return pass, the Section Leader moves the side of lane
markers so that they always mark the side of the area visually searched.
6) When necessary, light rakes should be issued for deminers to move vegetation cuttings aside.
7) The deminers move in ranks up and down the area as shown in the diagram on the next
page.
8) When a deminer sees something suspicious he should shout “STOP” and the line of deminers
should stand still while the deminer kneels to inspect the suspicious item.

Page: 49
If a device is discovered, the deminer should mark its position by placing a scrap bag 30cm
away from it and the deminers should withdraw to the base-line. When discovered devices are
known to be safe to touch, they can be marked with a hazardous area marker without the
deminers withdrawing. The EOD Operative can then deal with the devices when the deminers
have moved on.
The position of each device must be recorded using GPS by the Section Leader.

1 NOTE: If the discovered device is a mine, all deminers must be withdrawn and the Task
Release Plan must be immediately revised. A serious error has been made.
9) If a potentially sensitive explosive device if found, an EOD Operative must assess the item.
He/she may decide to pull it, move it, or start the procedure to destroy it where it is. When the
device has been removed, the BAC can continues from a metre behind the point where the
deminers withdrew.

1st search

2nd search
3rd search

The Section Leader removes sticks

on the searched side as the line of
deminers moves forward.

10) All battle debris such as mortar fins or

abandoned devices/equipment must be
removed during the search. This will
prevent people who use the land being
concerned in future.
The photograph shows a pile of scrap
collected during BAC.
BAC allows wide areas that are not mined to
be released to the community quickly.

Page: 50
18. Area Reduction by BACS
When no pressure or movement-sensitive mines and ERW are anticipated in an area and the
Task Assessment indicates that there may be subsurface ordnance, the Task Supervisor may
authorise areas to be processed using Battle Area Clearance Subsurface (BACS). BACS is an
extension of traditional BAC methods in which deminers only search the area visually. In BACS,
deminers search the area visually and with a rapid metal-detector search.
A BACS search can only be conducted on areas with sparse vegetation or from which vegetation
has been removed. The BACS procedure does not constitute Clearance as defined in the IMAS,
but it is an accepted Area Reduction and confidence building procedure. Land processed with
BACS must NOT be released as Cleared. It should be released as being Reduced by BACS and
having “No Known Threat”.
Working-distances during BACS are dictated by the interference range between detectors. The
deminers are usually 10 metres apart but this distance may be reduced when the detectors do not
interfere with each other. Lane marking and start and finish lines must be marked as for manual
Clearance, except that side of lane marking can be placed at two metre intervals. Painted stones
are usually used.
The metal-detector should be adjusted so that it does not signal on small pieces of metal but still
signals on a piece of ordnance at 20cm. The ability to do this must be confirmed for each detector
by conducting a test every time that the detector is switched off and on. The ordnance used for
the test should normally be a rifle or hand grenade buried in a hole at 20cm depth and the hole
filled with earth. The detector must signal clearly when passed over the buried device.
A base-stick is not generally used. The search-head is overlapped by 50% of its diameter and
extended outside the lane at the sides by 20cm. This allows a rapid advance over areas where
there are no large pieces of buried metal.
All battle debris such as mortar fins or abandoned devices/equipment must be removed during the
search. This will prevent people who use the land being concerned in future.
If a device is discovered, the deminer should place a scrap-bag as a marker and withdraw to the
start-line. When discovered devices are known to be safe to touch, they can be marked with a
hazardous area marker without the deminer withdrawing. The EOD Operative can then deal with
the devices when the deminer has moved on.
The position of each device should be recorded using GPS by the Section Leader.

1 NOTE: If the discovered device is a mine, all deminers must be withdrawn and the Task
Release Plan must be immediately revised. A serious error has been made.
If a potentially sensitive explosive device if found, an EOD Operative must assess the item.
He/she may decide to pull it, move it, or start the procedure to destroy it where it is. When the
device has been removed, the BACS can continue from a metre behind the point where the
deminer withdrew.

18.1 BACS detectors

The metal-detector used may be a conventional detector that has been adjusted so that it does
not signal on small pieces of metal. It may also be a conventional detector fitted with a large
search-head. The large search-head enables the detector to find large items at greater depth, but
stops the detector finding small pieces of metal at shallow depths. This means that it will not
reliably find plastic-cased mines at any depth.

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1 NOTE: A detector that has been tuned down or had a large search-head fitted can only be
used when searching for large metal-cased ERW. They must never be used to search for
plastic cased mines.

1 NOTE: Magnetometer detectors (which only find ferrous items) must not be used when
searching for metal items that so not have a high ferrous content.
Except where ground is very electromagnetic and the metal-detector signals without apparent
cause, the most efficient way to search wide areas for ordnance is by using a large-loop detector
such as the Ebinger UPEX 740M large-loop detector. This detector is carried by two men as
shown in the photograph below.

18.2 BACS with the UPEX 740M

The UPEX 740M is used for searching areas where they may be ordnance deep under the ground
and the predicted end-use of the land will involve digging deeply (such as when making
foundations for buildings). It can also be useful for looking for metal-cased AT mines on roads. It
is often used as a second process over ground that has already been Cleared of shallow mines
using other tools.

1 NOTE: The UPEX 740M will NOT find minimum metal mines and should never be used in
areas where any low-metal content mines are anticipated.
Before the search is conducted the vegetation in the area must be removed. When this is done
mechanically, the ground should not be disturbed. If the ground has been disturbed, there may be
more indications because surface scrap has become buried.
When there is ordnance or metal debris on the ground surface, the area should be BAC searched
and surface ordnance and all debris removed before BACS is conducted.
The general rules for using the UPEX 740M are:
1. The UPEX 740M can only be used by staff who have been appropriately trained and tested.
The detector must be set up in a prepared detector Calibration area. Assembly of the detector
is complex and the manufacturer’s directions should be followed closely. Variations that allow
more efficient batteries to be used are permitted. The sensitivity of the UPEX 740M must be
set appropriately for the anticipated targets following the instructions in the handbook.
2. After calibration, the search-head must be passed over a Target ERW. The ERW should be
an example of the smallest item that may be in the area. The default item is a 38mm rifle
grenade. The search-head must be passed over the test-piece at the detection height (which

Page: 52
is generally 30cm unless otherwise specified in the Tasking order). The detector can only be
used if there is a clear reading on the meter when the search-head is moved over the device.
3. The UPEX 740M detector is carried by two deminers. One carries the control panel and one
end of the search-head and the second deminer carries the other end of the search-head and
a bag of markers to place where there are indications. Another two deminers may be needed
to move the marking forward as the search progresses. Indications are marked and the
search is continued until the search area has been completed.
4. The UPEX 740M detector must be re-calibrated after every hour of use, or every time it is
switched off. It should also be calibrated at any time when the users get erratic readings.

Before using the UPEX 740M, the search area must be prepared. The area should be marked out
in boxes. Each box should be numbered and mapped on a Task Map and the corners of each box
accurately recorded using GPS. The Task map showing the box positions and numbers should be
provided to the Section Leader by the Platoon Commander.

A 3 x 3 metre metal-free detector Calibration area must be prepared outside the first Box.

The start-line marking in the first box must be removed and replaced by a tape (or rope) that can
be stretched tight along the ground on the base-line. More tape must be stretched to make a line
crossing the box between every side marker at two metre intervals.
When the box has been prepared, the search is conducted in this way:
1. The deminers move the search-head so that it is centrally over the stretched tape that
marks the base-line.

The tape marking crossing the box every two metres

can be moved forward by other deminers as the
search progresses.

Start position of search-head

3
2
1 1

The deminers walk slowly along the tape holding the search-head centrally over the tape.
The search-head should always be less than 30cm above the ground surface and held
level between the deminers.
2. At the other side of the box, the deminers move sideways so that the sides of the search-
head are each over a tape. They walk back across the Box keeping the sides of the
search-head over the tapes.
3. At the other side of the box, they position the search-head so that it is centrally over the
second stretched tape and walk back across the box keeping the centre of the search-
head over the tape.

Page: 53
This is continued over the entire box. The method means that the search-head is always
overlapped by 50% to ensure complete ground coverage. Where the ground rises and
falls, the deminers should ensure that the search-head follows the ground contours.
4. When there are indications, a deminer should place a marker to show the position of the
detector reading. The stone should be placed on the centre of the indication. The
indication is crudely “pinpointed” by moving the search-head back and forward and side to
side.
When the UPEX 740M has been used over the entire Box, the deminers should move to search
another box while other deminers investigate the markers they have placed.

NOTE: The UPEX 740M has a large search-head and there may be several small pieces of metal
beneath it at one time. When this happens, the detector can give a reading as if one large
piece of metal were present. After some of the metal has been removed, the UPEX 740M
may no longer indicate over the same area.
After all indications have been investigated in a box, the UPEX 740M must be used to search over
the excavated areas again to confirm that the indications have gone. When an indication is still
there, further excavation should take place.

NOTE: THE UPEX 740M must not be used close to other metal-detectors because it is sensitive
to electronic interference.

18.2.1 Signal investigation during BACS with the UPEX 740M

Deminers can expose BACS signals using less caution than usual when the expected devices will
not have a sensitive pressure plate like an AP mine, or be sensitive to movement. Extreme
caution should be used when the devices may be movement sensitive (as are some
submunitions).
The following procedure should be followed:
1. The deminers should use a standard metal-detectors to confirm the indication and should
start to excavate 15cm back from the nearest-point marker.
2. When the indication cannot be confirmed, they should start to excavate 30cm back from
the marker placed earlier. The ground above the indication should be removed to a depth
of 10cm and the standard metal-detector should be used again to try to pinpoint the
source. If no source is found, a further 10cm depth of ground over the indication must be
removed. This should be repeated until the metal-detector can pinpoint the indication.
3. An excavation is then made to locate the indication pinpointed using the standard metal-
detector. If the anticipated devices may be movement sensitive the deminer must
investigate each indication with extreme caution. Excavation should be conducted as
described in Part 8 of this Chapter.
4. When ERW is discovered, the deminer should withdraw. The Section Leader should
inform the Platoon Commander who will instruct an EOD Operative to deal with the
device. When the EOD Operative cannot attend immediately, and the ERW is not
movement sensitive, the deminer can place a marker beside the device and continue to
excavate other indications. When the device may be movement sensitive, the deminer
should not investigate another indication within ten metres of the exposed device.
When excavation of a signal is taking place, the minimum working-distance between deminers
should be not less than 10 metres.
When scrap metal or battle debris is found, it must be collected and placed in a designated scrap
metal area.

Page: 54
18.3 BACS with the MineLab F3
The MineLab F3 has a simple way of reducing sensitivity so that it will not signal on small metal
pieces. The detector has a coloured end-cap that is changed to adjust sensitivity. The Black end-
cap is for normal sensitivity, the Red end-cap is for reduced sensitivity. When sensitivity is
reduced, the detector can still locate large metal objects deep in the ground but will not signal on
small fragments or minimum-metal mines.

1 NOTE: Never use the Red end-cap when searching for minimum-metal mines. The end-cap is
Red so that the supervisor can easily see when it is being used and correct any error.

18.3.1 Changing the MineLab F3 to low sensitivity for BACS

Sensitivity is changed by changing the end-cap at the end of the control box of the detector. The
Black end-cap is the one normally used. The Red end-cap is used when searching for targets
bigger than minimum-metal mines, so is used during BACS.
To change the end-cap, follow this procedure:
1. Ensure that the detector is switched off.
2. Place the thumb of one hand in the centre of the end-cap and curl
the fingers under the bottom edge of the end-cap.
3. Push inwards with the thumb and at the same time pull the base of
the end-cap away from the Control box as shown in the
photograph alongside.
4. Hook the inside of the bottom of the Red end-cap under the bottom of the control box,
then press with the palm of the hand to clip the red end-cap into position.

18.3.2 Using MineLab F3 detectors close together

During BACS, it is usual for deminers to work as closely together as possible while avoiding
interference between detectors.
The MineLab F3 detector can be used close together but they must be set up so that they do not
interfere with each other.
To achieve this:
1. Mark the area and position each BACS deminer at the start of lanes three metres apart.
2. Ensure that all detectors are switched off.
3. Turn on the first detector and hold the search-head at least
60cm above the ground.
4. Press and immediately release the Noise Cancel button (the
Black Button positioned behind the handle).

5. Noise Cancel will start with two single beeps. These are
followed by 45 seconds of sharp double beeps, and the
process finishes with four single beeps.
6. During the 45 seconds, the detector scans the environment searching for any electrical
interference. If disturbance is detected, the F3 will automatically select a different
operating frequency.
7. After Noise Cancel has been completed for the first detector, leave it switched on and
switch on the second detector.
8. Conduct the Noise Cancel procedure for that detector from Step 4 above.
9. Repeat this process for all detectors being used.

Page: 55
18.3.3 Procedure for BACS using the MineLab F3
BACS can only be conducted on areas where there is no threat of pressure or movement-
sensitive mines and ERW. This may mean that the area to be searched can be walked over and
marked out before the search is conducted.
Follow this procedure:
1. Remove the undergrowth over the area to be searched and mark out a start-line with
lanes three metres or more apart.
2. Make a metal-free detector Calibration area and a Test area outside the area to be
searched. Bury a target device at the required search-depth in the Test area. The default
target is a 38mm rifle grenade which should be substituted with an example of the
smallest ERW that might be present .
3. Fit the red end-caps to the MineLab F3 as described in Part 18.3.1 above.
4. Switch on and set up the MineLab F3 detector as described in Part 18.3.2 above.
5. Ensure that each deminer checks that the detector signals over the buried target in the
Test area.
6. Search in the lanes using a search-head advance of 50% of the search-head width (10cm
with the standard search-head). 1.2 metre wide lanes can be extended across the area to
be searched without widening them to 2.2 metres. Search is generally rapid, so a base-
stick need not be used but side of lane marking (stones or pickets) should be placed
every two metres.
7. When there is a signal, the deminer must place a marker (usually a painted stone) at the
nearest point of the signal. Because no pressure or movement-sensitive devices are
expected, the deminer should continue the search past the signal marker.
If the anticipated devices may be movement sensitive (such as some submunitions) the
deminer must investigate each indication before continuing the search. Excavation should
be conducted as described in Part 8 of this Chapter with extreme caution.
8. When the anticipated devices are not pressure or movement sensitive and a lane has
been completely searched with markers placed, the deminer should return to the start of
the lane and begin to excavate any marked signals, starting 15cm back from each marker.
The excavation can be conducted less cautiously than when looking for mines.
9. When ERW is discovered, the deminer should withdraw. The Section Leader should
inform the Platoon Commander who will instruct an EOD Operative to deal with the
device. When an EOD Operative cannot attend immediately, the deminer can place a
marker beside the device and continue to excavate other indications.

1 NOTE: When a discovered device may be movement sensitive, the deminer must inform the
Section Leader who must inform all the deminers investigating signals to proceed with
extreme caution. Deminers must not be allowed to investigate other indications within ten
metres of the exposed device until it has been removed or destroyed.
10. After the reason for an indication has been discovered, the area must be searched again
with the metal detector. If the detector still signals, the excavation must continue at least
until the required depth of search has been reached.
When excavation of a signal is taking place, the minimum working-distance between deminers
should be 10 metres.

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MINE ACTION & TRAINING

Level 3 EOD
Mine Action Programming
Version 1.0 Dated 27/05/13 UNMAC
1
DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this document is from references and known best
practices for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no way
exhaustive, and Qualified EOD trained persons should always adhere to
Authorised Standard Operating procedures, in the theatre of operations. The
IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for any accident or incident that results in the
use of the information contained within this document, other than for use on the
IMAS/ EOD training course.

A Handbook for:

Mine Action
Programming
United Nations Mine Action Service

Version 1.0 Dated 27/05/13

2
FOREWORD

Governments, the United Nations, non-governmental organisations and commercial operators have
learned much about mine action over the years and many valuable tools have been developed for
dealing with the problems that landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) pose to affected states and communities.
Mine Action programmes supported by the United Nations are now active in over 30 mine-
contaminated countries around the world. Large numbers of national and international staff work in
these programmes. All need quick access to basic programming information, formats and procedures
that are accepted as good practice in their field. This handbook has been written and compiled with
that need in mind.
The Mine Action Programming Handbook makes available to headquarters planning and programme
staff the essential procedures and documents that they may need to do their job. In the Handbook, this
target group is collectively referred to as “Programme Officers”. Similarly, the Handbook will be of
value to many national managers and their Technical Advisers in mine-affected countries. In the
Handbook, this group has been collectively referred to as “Technical Advisors”.
We hope that this Handbook will be seen as more than a “How to” book. It is a compendium of useful
documents and information for those involved in Mine Action programmes at headquarters and in the
field.
We are sincerely grateful to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement of the United States Department of State for a generous grant which made this publication
possible. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions of all UN agencies, departments, funds,
programmes and offices, as well as the many international NGOs, mentioned in the Handbook, who
have given valuable staff time and resources and also without whom the production of the Handbook
would not have been possible. Particular thanks go to Mr. Stephen Bertrand who has patiently
accepted comment and changes and produced the final product.
We hope that many friends and counterparts in the mine action world will find useful material in this
book.

DISCLAIMER

Although care and attention is taken to ensure the handbook contents are current and accurate, the
ever changing response to mine action programming implies the possibility that sections of the
handbook may need updating.

Users are therefore responsible to ensure they have the current version of any policy or procedural
document contained in this handbook. This can be achieved as follows:

1. Electronic updates can be found on the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) website
(www.mineaction.org)

2. Updated hardcopies of the Handbook and/or amendments can be obtained from UNMAS.
Amendments, or suggestions for the inclusion of additional information, should be sent to the United
Nations Mine Action Service for consideration in future drafts of the Handbook. (Send to
[email protected]) © 2004 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
All rights reserved. Use and duplication of the content of this handbook is permissible with source
attribution to UNMAS.

Version 1.0 Dated 27/05/13

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INTRODUCTION

AUDIENCE AND PURPOSE

The Mine Action Programming Handbook is a management and reference tool containing guidelines on
the general roles and responsibilities of the different United Nations (UN) entities engaged in mine
action. It facilitates an understanding of their inter-relationships and the aims and policies that govern
their activities. It details many of the processes involved in the strategic management approach taken
by the UN over the life cycle of a mine action programme.
The handbook also serves as a reference for others interested in knowing how the different UN
organizations operate during a mine action programme. It demonstrates that no one organization can
operate alone; each must communicate and coordinate with all stakeholders at different levels both
inside and outside the UN for a programme to be successful.

The sequence of activity outlined in this handbook is oriented towards the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) programmes associated with humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping
operations, which are eventually handed over to the government of the mine-affected country - often
with continued support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, these
situations are not the norm. The majority of UN-supported mine action programmes are nationally
owned from the outset, with UNDP providing technical advice and capacity building support. Many
aspects of the activities outlined in this handbook, however, are common to both scenarios.
The handbook purposely avoids dealing with programme management activities at the field level as
this is addressed in the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Operational Manual for UN
Programme Managers.

MAJOR TERMS USED

PROGRAMME OFFICER
Describes the individuals acting as ‘focal points’ in headquarters for programmes in the field (Desk
Officer, Technical Officer, Programme Officer, Threat Monitoring Officer, etc). For UNDP-supported
programmes, the Programme Officer could be a member of the Resident Representative’s staff based
at the Country Office.

TECHNICAL ADVISOR (TA)

Refers to the senior UN officer responsible for the UN mine action programme in the contaminated
country (e.g. chief technical advisor, programme manager or senior technical advisor). For UNDP-
supported programmes where technical advice and capacity building support is provided to a
government-owned mine action programme, the TA is the counterpart and advisor to the national
Director of the Mine Action Centre and to the Chairman of the National Mine Action Authority. S/he is
responsible for assisting national staff to achieve the outputs specified in the UNDP Project Document.

NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY (NMAA)

Describes the government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in a mine-affected country
charged with the regulation, management and coordination of mine action. The TA may be closely
involved in advising the government on the legislation necessary for this body to be established,
including its composition, roles and responsibilities.

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MINE ACTION CENTRE (MAC)
Is used to describe the organization - sometimes referred to as Mine Action Coordination Centre
(MACC) or Mine Action Office (MAO) - that carries out mine risk education training, conducts
reconnaissance of mined areas, collects and centralizes mine data and coordinates local mine action
plans with the activities of external agencies, mine action NGOs and local deminers. The MAC normally
acts as the operational office of the National Mine Action Authority. In UNMAS programmes, the MAC
is implemented and managed by the UN as a transitional structure intended to become a nationally-
owned and managed body to which UNDP may provide technical advice and capacity building support
after transfer has occurred.

MINE BAN TREATY (MBT)

This term is used throughout the handbook to refer to the “Convention on the Prohibition of Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction”.

COMMON ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

CAP Consolidated Appeal

CCA Common Country Assessment
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CTA Chief Technical Advisor
DEX Direct Execution
DPA Department of Political Affairs
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ERW Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
IACG Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action
IASC Inter-Agency Steering Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
MAC Mine Action Centre
MAIWG Mine Action Information Working Group
MASG Mine Action Support Group
MBT Mine Ban Treaty
MRE Mine Risk Education
MSA Management Services Agreement
NEX Nationally Executed
NMAA National Mine Action Authority
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
POC Point of Contact
RRP Rapid Response Plan
TA Technical Advisor
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
VTF Voluntary Trust Fund

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The Bank World Bank Group
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization

COORDINATION AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

1. Mine action is a complex discipline that encompasses five complimentary core components: (a) mine
risk education; (b) mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking; (c) victim assistance; (d)
destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines; and (e) advocacy to stigmatise the use of
landmines and support a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. Although mine action programmes
may incorporate one or any combination of the above components, they should be as comprehensive
as possible to meet the needs of affected communities.
2. The sheer scope of mine action and its multi-disciplinary nature requires that different parties will be
involved in programme design and planning. It is therefore necessary to have a clear understanding of
the players involved, their respective mandates, their area of technical expertise and the guidelines
they follow when deciding on how and to what extent they can be involved.
3. Coordinating mine action activities is critical to ensure an effective response and to avoid duplication
of efforts. By identifying the appropriate parties from the start and understanding their respective roles
and responsibilities, the programme is more likely to achieve the desired results.
4. This chapter gives an overview of the major players and the coordination mechanisms governing
their actions both at the headquarters and field level; it is divided into the following categories:

 United Nations
 International Organizations
 NGOs
 Commercial Operators
 Donors
 Coordination and Liaison Groups
 Field Coordination

UNITED NATIONS

5. At the global level, the role of the UN in mine action is primarily one of coordination through the
development of guidelines and standards, the collection and dissemination of appropriate information,
the coordination of operational activities on the ground and the mobilisation of financial and technical
resources. These functions are carried out with the support of, and in partnership with, various
governments and non-governmental and international organizations. UN mine action programmes will
take place either in a humanitarian context under the overall authority of a Humanitarian Coordinator,
as part of a development programme under a UN Resident Coordinator, or in a peacekeeping operation
under a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). In some situations, programmes may
relate to more than one of these entities.

6. Most UN mine action programmes are developed under the auspices of either the United Nations
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations or the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for long-term capacity building programmes, and are
frequently executed with the support of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is the lead agency for mine risk education, and the World
Health Organization (WHO) leads on victim assistance1.

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7. The UN policy on mine action and effective coordination2 encapsulates the key principles on which
UN mine action is based and clarifies roles and responsibilities within the UN system. The following is a
summary of the policy passages relevant to coordination:

 All relevant information on landmine contamination and its humanitarian and socio-economic
consequences should be provided to UNMAS through the UN Resident/Humanitarian
Coordinators in the field or other partners as appropriate, so that a comprehensive profile of
the landmine problem can be developed and early action can be initiated.
 In dealing with the landmine problem, the UN will respect the fundamental humanitarian
principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity so that priority is given to those who are
most vulnerable.
 The UN will take every opportunity to stigmatise the continuing use of landmines and to
support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines.
 The UN supports a holistic approach to mine action, addressing its various elements in a
complementary manner both in the field and at headquarters.
 Mine risk education, minefield mapping, marking and clearance, victim assistance and
rehabilitation, stockpile reduction, advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines, and support
for a comprehensive ban are all integral parts of mine action.
 This holistic approach requires that appropriate attention be given to national ownership,
sustainability and capacity building. In countries with long-term needs, mine action
programmes must be sustainable and should include as a key component the development of a
national/local capacity from the outset of mine action activities throughout the development of
integrated programmes. A national/local capacity formed most often under the auspices of a
government or local authority is characterized by its ability to develop and articulate overall
policy and direction. It also must be able to plan, coordinate, manage, and sustain a
programme that is accountable, cost-effective, and able to address the humanitarian and socio-
economic implications of landmine contamination.
 Mine action initiatives must also be an integral component of the support provided to societies
recovering from violent conflicts and must be included in strategies designed to rehabilitate
health care, education, infrastructure, agriculture and marketing systems, to name but a few.
 To ensure effective coordination within the UN system, mine action activities should be
organized in consultation with UNMAS3, and with the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators
in the field as appropriate.
 Donors, NGOs, and other entities involved in mine action should be encouraged to coordinate
their activities with UNMAS and with the UN and local authorities responsible for mine action
in the field.
 Without prejudice to an organization’s existing mandates and accountability processes, all
requests for assistance in mine action should be reviewed in consultation with UNMAS.

8. The major UN system entities4 involved in mine action and their area of interest are described in the
following pages.

UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION SERVICE (UNMAS)

9. UNMAS was formed in October 1997 by combining the mine action offices of the Department for
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the former Department of Humanitarian Affairs, to serve as the single
UN focal point for all mine action issues and activities. It is part of the UN Secretariat and placed under the
authority of the Under Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Operations. Its responsibilities include:

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Policy Development and Coordination

10. In consultation with relevant partners, UNMAS develops and implements UN policy guidelines on all mine-
related issues. The main policy document for UN mine action is "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The
United Nations Policy.”

Assessment and Monitoring of the Landmine Threat

11. One of the main responsibilities of UNMAS is the assessment and monitoring of the global landmine
threat in order to identify needs and develop appropriate responses.

Programme Initiation and Programme Support

12. UNMAS, in cooperation with other agencies, is responsible for identifying and designing programmes in
the context of humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations. However, many mine action
programmes supported by the UN are initiated following a request from governments of mine-affected
countries and involve technical advice and capacity building support by UNDP.

13. In both cases, the majority of mine action programmes are executed at least in part with UNOPS.

Information Management

14. UNMAS coordinates the collection, analysis and dissemination of landmine-related information at the
global level; it is also responsible for the development of appropriate standards for mine action information
and information management systems.

15. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), a principal executing partner,
installs and provides initial training of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
software while UNMAS coordinates the process, sets priorities for system development and coordinates IT
operator training.

16. UNMAS maintains E-MINE, a major information website for the mine action
community.

Quality Management and Technology

17. UNMAS remains responsible for quality management through the development, maintenance and
promotion of technical and safety standards for mine action. It is custodian of the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS)6 developed in cooperation with GICHD.

Advocacy and Treaty Implementation

18. UNMAS actively advocates for the universalisation and full implementation of both the Mine Ban Treaty
(MBT) and the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects”
(CCW). UNMAS also advocates for Protocol V of the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)

Resource Mobilisation

19. UNMAS coordinates UN resource mobilisation efforts and manages the Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In order to inform the donor community of mine action needs, UNMAS

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annually publishes “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects”.

Rapid Response Plan

20. UNMAS is responsible for leadership in emergency mine action and coordinates the development and
implementation of the Rapid Response Plan, in cooperation with other agencies, when an emergency
response is necessary.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

21. UNDP is responsible for addressing the socio-economic consequences of landmine contamination and for
supporting national/local capacity building. When applicable, UNDP has primary responsibility for the
development of mine action programmes in situations where the problem of landmines is being addressed by
a mine affected state outside the context of a humanitarian emergency or a peacekeeping operation. UNDP
works closely with UNMAS and shares all relevant information.

22. UNDP acts as a service provider to the national authorities of mine-affected countries and delivers
services that enable those countries to deal with the problems of landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
contamination. These services include:

 Assistance in the development of sustainable programmes through provision of mine action-related

technical advice and capacity building support. This encompasses:

 Advice on the legislative framework for national mine action initiatives.

 Establishment and strengthening of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and/or Mine
Action Centres (MACs.)
 Development of national policies on mine action and associated work plans, particularly with
regard to assessing and responding to the socio-economic impact of landmine and UXO
contamination within the framework of the UN policy on mine action and the MBT.
 Implementation of Landmine Impact Surveys and projects to incorporate their results into
National Mine Action Plans.
 Collection and dissemination of lessons learned.
 Delivery of management training courses through partners, and Promotion of the socio-economic
approaches to mine action.
 Administration of relevant thematic global projects and trust funds, including projects for the socio-
economic reintegration of landmine victims.
 Development of management training materials for senior and mid-level managers of national mine
action programmes.
 Resource mobilization support through liaison with donors, including the preparation of materials for
inclusion in the “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” establishment of trust funds and preparation of
Cost-Sharing Agreements, and the development and support of public-private partnerships, such as
the Adopt-A-Minefield® programme of the United Nations Association of the United States of
America (UNA-USA) and the Better World Fund.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

23. UNICEF, working in collaboration with UNMAS, is the lead UN agency for Mine Risk Education (MRE). In
this capacity, it supports the development of policies and standards insofar as they relate to MRE
requirements. UNICEF:

 Works closely with UNMAS and UNDP to ensure that MRE is effectively planned, coordinated and
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implemented in the field.
 Works closely with UNDP to ensure that national MRE capacity is effectively developed when
required.
 Actively supports a total ban on antipersonnel landmines, including promotion of the universal
ratification and implementation of the MBT; and risk in close cooperation with other agencies on
victim assistance and advocacy issues.

24. The UNICEF Landmines Team has two offices:

 The first office, as part of the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) in New York, has overall
responsibility for coordinating emergency-related activities; fundraising; managing the global
emergency reserve; ensuring coordination of assistance amongst the UN, international organizations,
bilaterals and NGOs from outside the region; and, supporting the Afghanistan Country Office and
countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region (TACRO).
 The second office is part of EMOPS Geneva and is responsible for supporting all the UNICEF Country
and Regional Offices for inter-agency coordination with Geneva-based UN System entities, NGOs and
other international organizations; fundraising; and, staff training.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES (UNOPS)

25. UNOPS is a principal provider of mine action technical and management services within the UN system
and assists partners to:

 Formulate projects and programmes focusing on implementation arrangements and budgetary

requirements/constraints.
 Manage projects to completion, which includes:
 Identification and recruitment of international and local staff.
 Management and signature of agreements with donors for in-kind personnel.
 Procurement of equipment.
 Contracting of services through mine action NGOs and commercial firms.
 Provision of technical and legal support.
 Development of mine information systems to record minefield location and socio-economic
impact and to support priority setting and tasking.
 Build local capacity to increasingly assume full responsibility for mine action.
 Support to develop national mine action strategies, policies and plans.
 Monitor project progress through technical missions.
 Provide substantial and financial reports to funding agencies.

DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (DDA)

26. DDA is the repository of all treaty-related information, in particular, information submitted under Article 7
of the MBT and under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II of the CCW, with the aim of supporting transparency
measures and the facilitation of compliance. It is responsible for the organization of meetings of States
Parties. DDA also:

 Monitors and analyses developments and trends in the field of disarmament.

 Supports the review and implementation of existing disarmament agreement.
 Promotes openness and transparency in military matters, verification, confidence-building measures,
and regional approaches to disarmament.

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DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)

27. DPKO was created in 1992 as the operational arm for all UN peacekeeping operations, and is responsible
for their conduct, management, direction, planning and preparation. UNMAS is a division of DPKO.

28. Through DPKO, the Secretary-General formulates policies and procedures and makes recommendations
on the establishment of new missions and on the functions of on-going missions. The Secretary-General
directs and manages all UN peacekeeping operations and reports to the UN Security Council on their
progress.

29. Member States voluntarily provide equipment, troops and/or civilian police under UN command, for
which they are compensated from a special peacekeeping budget. The roles and responsibilities of
peacekeepers can be diverse and include:

 Implementation of peace agreements.

 Monitoring of ceasefires.
 Creation of buffer zones.
 Support for complex military and civilian functions essential to maintain
peace;
 Early reconstruction and institution-building in societies devastated by war;
 Demobilization of former fighters and their reintegration into society;
 Mine clearance.
 Organization and execution of elections.
 Promotion of sustainable development.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (DPA)

30. The Secretary-General has designated the DPA as the UN focal point for post-conflict peace-building,
which serves as the mechanism for ensuring that UN efforts in countries emerging from crises are fully
integrated and faithfully reflect the mission objectives specified by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-
General.

31. DPA provides advice and support to the Secretary-General on all political matters relating to the Charter
on the maintenance and restoration of peace and security. Accordingly, DPA:

 Monitors, analyses and assesses political developments throughout the world.

 Identifies potential or actual conflicts in which the UN could play a useful role.
 Recommends to the Secretary-General appropriate actions in such cases and executes the approved
policy.
 Assists the Secretary-General in carrying out political activities decided by him/her and/or mandated
by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.
 Provides the Secretary-General with briefing materials and supports him/her in the political aspects
of relations with Member States.

OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA)

32. As the office responsible for the coordination of humanitarian issues, OCHA:

 Is responsible for sharing all relevant information with UNMAS and other partners regarding the

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humanitarian implications of landmines.
 Works closely with UNMAS on resource mobilization in its capacity as manager of the Central
Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and coordinator of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)

33. FAO is involved in mine clearance activities related to its humanitarian agriculture relief projects.

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON GENDER ISSUES (OSAGI)

34. The role of OSAGI is to reinforce the importance of gender mainstreaming in all United Nations peace-
making, peace-building, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, including mine action
programmes.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

35. UNHCR in coordination with UNMAS and other partners contributes to the collection and analysis of
appropriate information to support the development of mine action responses when and where required.
UNHCR also:

 Works with UNICEF to develop appropriate Mine Risk Education programmes in refugee camps.
 Works with the World Food Programme for safe delivery of food to refugee camps.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR)

36. OHCHR works closely with other United Nations agencies, Member States and civil society organizations in
advocacy on issues of access, freedom of movement and other threats posed by land mines, as well as
drawing attention to serious humanitarian and human rights consequences of mines.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)

37. WFP, in coordination with UNMAS and other partners, contributes to the early collection, analysis and
dissemination of mine-related information. WFP helps determine emergency and humanitarian mine
clearance needs relating to:

 Clearance of access roads for the delivery of food assistance.

 Clearance of land required for the safe return of displaced populations.
 Clearance of crop land for agricultural use.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

38. Within the framework of its mandate, and in cooperation with UNMAS, UNDP, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF, WHO supports the development of policies and standards for
mine action information and information systems insofar as they relate to victim assistance.

39. WHO ensures that information collection and management activities that concern victims are designed
and executed within the principle of non-discrimination, so that all victims of trauma are equally served by
the development of victim information systems.

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WORLD BANK GROUP (THE BANK)

40. As a development agency, the Bank supports programmes in Member States that help lead to the
eradication of poverty and to the promotion of sustainable development. Its support of mine action is based
on the recognition that mine pollution is a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of normal development
activities. Globally, the Bank shares responsibility with UNDP for convening donor groups in reconstruction
situations and thus, has a major role in resource mobilization and in setting long-term agendas for
international support for mine action and other needs. It works closely with all UN System entities.

41. The Bank is potentially one of the major sources of funding for mine action. However, it is important to
keep in mind that the Bank’s Member States decide the priorities for the usage of funds. The Bank’s credits
and loans can be used to support mine action in:

 Countries emerging from conflict where mine pollution significantly hinders a transition to peace and
economic development.
 Countries with on-going conflicts where the conflict has led to the laying of mines but where
hostilities have ceased in specific regions and where no new mine-laying is likely to take place.
 Countries where peace has already been consolidated, but where a residue of mine pollution left
from previous conflict(s) blocks access and development in specific regions or where the transition
from conflict is in process but where the magnitude of mine pollution puts specific populations at risk
but does not block the transition to peace.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
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International organizations are defined as organizations with membership from and representing interests of
more than one country. There are many international organizations involved in mine action. The following list
highlights only a few.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)

43. The ICRC takes the lead role within the Red Cross Movement for all mine-related issues.

44. ICRC cooperates with other mine action organizations according to its humanitarian priorities by
developing mine risk education activities and providing assistance to victims.

45. ICRC is an invaluable source of information on landmine-related issues and contributes actively to the
development of information management systems for mine action. Its objectives are:

 To reduce the risk of civilian casualties in mine-contaminated areas.

 To reinforce existing mine risk education programmes in an effective manner.
 To encourage and promote Mine Risk Education as a national society activity in mine-affected
countries.
 To carry out assessments and surveys to determine the feasibility of and need for additional projects
and, if appropriate, to support them.
 To actively engage in advocacy of the MBT.
 To propose the adoption of a new Protocol V (CCW) on Explosive Remnants
of War (ERW).

GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)

46. The GICHD aims to promote cooperation in the field of mine action in three main areas:

 Research work.
 Operational assistance.
 Support for the MBT.

47. The mission of the GICHD is:

 To assist the UN by providing services for their mine action-related activities, bearing in mind that
UNMAS is the focal point for mine action within the UN system.
 To contribute to the formulation and development of coherent strategies and procedures in mine
action worldwide.
 To provide specific operational support and assistance for on-going mine action activities.
 To support the implementation of the MBT.
 To support the implementation and further development of the humanitarian mine action elements
of the “Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects” (CCW) in cooperation with States Parties to the Convention and the Protocol.
 To cooperate and coordinate with relevant organizations.
 To provide a variety of platforms for discussion and information exchange among relevant key actors
in mine action.
 To provide specific operational support and assistance to on-going mine action activities. To this end,
GICHD continues to develop the IMSMA system in cooperation with UNMAS and other users.

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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

48. The OAS has created a programme called “Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines” (AICMA).
This programme incorporates the previously existing demining assistance effort into its structure and serves
as the focal point for the OAS on all landmine issues.

49. The OAS, through the AICMA programme, has emphasized assistance to Member States who are
signatories of the Convention and who request assistance with landmine stockpile destruction in order to
meet their obligations under the accord. The OAS:

 Promotes a regional approach to mine action.

 Cooperates with the UN on several projects, including information management and standards.
 Calls on Member States to ratify and comply with the MBT of 1997, which prohibits the use,
stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines among signatory countries.
 Collaborates with mine action NGOs, including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,
Landmine Survivors’ Network, Mine Action Group and the Survey Action Centre.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

50. EU funding supports mine-related projects on almost every continent, covering a range of activities from
mine surveying, detection and clearance, mine destruction and demining research to assistance to victims
and Mine Risk Education programmes.

51. There are two Council Regulations7 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines.

52. Operations financed under these Council Regulations shall in principle benefit those countries that are
committed to the fight against anti-personnel landmines and are parties to the MBT. Exceptions may be made
for humanitarian emergency, for assistance to mine victims and for actions in direct support of vulnerable
civil communities, such as refugees and displaced persons, or where the national administration is not
functioning.

53. The European Commission shall promote coordination and cooperation with international contributors
and actors, in particular those that form part of the United Nations system and with NGOs, as well as other
relevant entities such as GICHD

54. Wherever possible, EU projects should be clearly integrated within a national anti-personnel landmines
programme, which is coordinated by the beneficiary government or by local authorities in cooperation with
NGOs, or by an international institution mandated for that purpose. The aim should be for the project to be
taken over, in due course, by the beneficiary government itself or by a local authority or NGOs in order to
enhance local capacity and the sustainability of the project.

55. The EU has called for the elimination of all landmines worldwide in 10 to 15 years.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)

.
6. “Non-governmental organizations, as a category of organizational entities, were created at the founding of
the United Nations. The category was invented in order to describe a specific relationship between civil
organizations and the intergovernmental process, and since then the term has been loosely applied to any
organization that is not public.”
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7. NGOs exist in great numbers and varieties; some are international in focus and have branches in numerous
countries, while others may focus on only a small, localized area. Some mine-related NGOs deal with only a
single aspect of mine action, while others cover every aspect. Some have a considerable number of
professional staff and substantial financial resources, while others operate thanks to the work of volunteers.

58. An NGO is:

 Non-profit making.
 Independent of government and of politically partisan bodies.
 Considered to work for the welfare/benefit and/or development of society or certain section of
society.
 Entity that functions according to its own constitution, rules and by-laws.

59. NGOs make an important contribution to mine action. They:

 Implement mine action programmes particularly in the areas of risk education, clearance, survey and
victim assistance.
 Build indigenous capacities to respond to the consequences of landmines.
 Have highly developed skills related to mine risk education, mine survey and marking, mine clearance,
data collection, analysis and programme management.
 Contribute to the promotion of safety and quality assurance standards.
 Raise local and global consciousness of the landmine problem (and its moral implications).
 Often work with affected communities prior to UN mine action involvement in a mine-affected
country.
 Serve as important partners in the implementation of integrated and cost effective mine action
programming.

60. Because of their numbers and their diversity, this chapter does not capture all the types of NGOs, let
alone the individual organizations. However, one organization stands out as a bridging organization to most
NGOs involved in mine action - the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (see next page).

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES (ICBL)

62. ICBL was founded by a group of NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico
International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation) in October 1992 and was co-laureate of the1997 Nobel Peace Prize.

63. ICBL is a flexible network of organizations that share common objectives and represents over 1,100
human rights, de-mining, humanitarian, children's, veterans', medical, development, arms control, religious,
environmental, and women's groups in over 60 countries, who work locally, nationally, regionally, and
internationally to ban antipersonnel landmines. It is coordinated by a steering committee of nine
organizations.

64. ICBL was a major factor in the achievement of the 1997 MBT, which came into force 1st March 1998. ICBL
supports this international treaty, which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and sale, transfer, or export of
antipersonnel landmines. ICBL advocates for:

• The ratification of or accession to the MBT.

• Compliance with the Treaty provisions.
• Increased resources for humanitarian mine clearance and Mine Risk Education programmes.
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 Increased resources for landmine victim rehabilitation and assistance.

65. ICBL publishes a document “The Landmine Monitor”10. It is a unique and unprecedented civil society-
based reporting network to systematically monitor and document national compliance with the MBT and the
humanitarian response to the global landmine crisis. Established in 1998 by ICBL, it is coordinated by a core
group of five NGOs - Human Rights Watch, Handicap International, Kenya Coalition against Landmines, Mines
Action Canada, and Norwegian People's Aid.

66. Approximately 125 researchers collect the information for the publication. Each is allocated a specific area
related to landmines, and guidelines are issued to ensure some uniformity of content. Information is also
discussed with the UN. These researchers are invited to participate in training courses and are encouraged to
prepare a lengthier version of their reports on their area of focus to be published separately – preferably in
the language of that country.
COMMERCIAL OPERATORS

67. The UN works with international and local commercial companies on a variety of mine-clearance and
explosive-ordnance disposal projects. A demining company may be a prime contractor, subcontractor,
consultant or agent that is licensed to conduct one or more prescribed demining activities, such as technical
surveys, mine risk education, marking, manual clearance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or the use of
mine detecting dog teams and/or mechanical equipment to augment other clearance procedures.

68. Commercial companies perform many different mine action tasks such as:
.
• Providing experts to train local technicians.
• Developing national capacities so that demining can continue to be conducted in the host country
without the need for foreign assistance.
• Introducing time proven technologies to increase safety, speed and accuracy of the clearance
process.
• Utilizing innovation to address problems unique to a particular country or clearance.

69. All commercial entities contracted under UN-sponsored, or supported, mine action programmes are
required to operate in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

70. UNOPS has the most experience within the UN system in dealing with demining contractors and should be
approached for assistance on contracting issues.

DONORS

71. There are many types of donors such as governments, international organizations, charities, foundations
and companies and each has its own area of interest. This may be political, geographic (certain countries or
regions), programme specific (Mine Risk Education, clearance, advocacy, etc.) or a combination of all.

72. Donors are vital to mine action and offer different types of assistance such as funding and in-kind
donations, for example, material goods (demining equipment, computers, etc.) and/or services (advisors,
technical and administrative staff, etc.).

73. Donors are integral to coordination of mine action activities as they can ensure:

• Recipients of donor resources coordinate their activities with the host government and the UN.
• Projects they are funding are integrated in the overall development plan of a country.
• Recipients work to established IMAS.
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MECHANISMS FOR MOBILISING AND CHANNELLING DONOR FUNDS TO UN MINE ACTION EFFORTS

74. These mechanisms include:

• The Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), managed by UNMAS.
• The country-specific trust funds, generally managed by UNDP.
• Management Services Agreement (MSA) signed by UNDP for execution by UNOPS.
• The Adopt-A-Minefield programme of the UNA-USA and the Better World Fund.

UN MINE ACTION INVESTMENT DATABASE

75. This database (located at: www.mineaction.org) gives the mine action community a clear picture of past,
existing and planned donor government activities. It can be used to:

• Allocate mine action resources more effectively through the identification of duplication, gaps, and
trends.
• Develop a better understanding of relationships between the nature and extent of donor activity and
mine action progress.
• Better communicate the efforts of donors to address the mine problem.
• Provide data on their resource contributions into a password-protected investment database.

MINE ACTION SUPPORT GROUP

76. The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) is an informal grouping of donors which meets in New York with
representatives from the Permanent Missions of the donor countries to the UN. This group takes a keen
interest in mine action and receives briefings on a monthly basis from UN agencies involved in mine action, as
well as from a variety of invited speakers. It is an effective means of making donor nations and their capitals
aware of the needs of mine action.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION CONTACT GROUP

77. This is an informal grouping that meets in the context of the inter-sessional work programme of the MBT.
It seeks to make mine affected states aware of resource mobilization possibilities and to promote resource
mobilization in support of the treaties’ objectives.

COORDINATION AND LIAISON GROUPS

78. There are various UN coordinating groups and mechanisms affecting mine action programmes.

I. GENERAL COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTION

THE INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE (IASC)

79. The IASC is composed of the heads of the principal UN System entities and is chaired by the Emergency
Relief Coordinator (ERC), OCHA. Among other things it is the central forum for discussion of disaster reduction
policies, strategic applications, and programmes of action among the UN partners within the International
Framework for Action.

80. Other invitees to the IASC are: the ICRC; the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies; the International Organization for Migration; Interaction; the International Council on Voluntary
Agencies; the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the Representative of the Secretary-General

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on Internally Displaced Persons; the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response; and the Bank. The IASC
meets formally at least twice a year. UNMAS participates when issues relating to mine action are discussed.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (ECHA)

81. ECHA was created by the Secretary-General, with the aim of enhancing humanitarian coordination within
the UN system. Chaired by the head of OCHA in his/her capacity as Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs, and composed of senior executives of various UN System entities, ECHA meets on a monthly basis in
New York.

82. ECHA’s membership includes various UN System entities that add a political/ military dimension to
humanitarian consultations. It works closely with the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and
the Development Group (DG), collaborating on developing a conceptual Strategic Framework as a tool to
define the principles, goals and institutional arrangements for a coherent and effective UN response to a
particular country in crisis.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND SECURITY (ECPS)

83. ECPS, in collaboration with other executive committees as appropriate, is responsible for the design and
implementation of post-conflict peace-building initiatives, including the definition of objectives, criteria and
operational guidelines for post-conflict peace building by the organizations of the UN system.

84. The DPA is the focal point and convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. However, the
chairmanship is decided on each occasion on a pragmatic basis.

DEVELOPMENT GROUP (DG)

85. This is a grouping of UN programmes, funds and agencies engaged in development assistance and related
activities. It is chaired by the Administrator of UNDP.

86. An Executive Committee leads the DG and is comprised of the heads of UNDP, UNICEF, the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), WFP, and other entities participating as warranted by their interests and
mandates.

FRAMEWORK TEAM

87. The Framework Team is a mechanism for early warning and country planning and is composed of senior
managers (D1/D2) from each of the participating organizations (DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF,
UNHCR, WFP, FAO, the Bank and WHO) and facilitates the bringing together of other UN entities into a joint
review and analysis process. This is accomplished by adherence to the principle that situations of concern to
one or more of the participating departments, programmes, offices and agencies are required to be reviewed
by the others from their unique perspective. UNMAS participates when required.

88. The Framework Team normally meets monthly or more often if needed to review and prioritise
countries/situations of concern, principally through:

• Identifying an incipient crisis.

• Devising strategies for preventing and mitigating possible crisis.
• Ensuring that appropriate measures are carried out.

II. COORDINATION SPECIFIC TO MINE ACTION

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INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION GROUP ON MINE ACTION (IACG)

89. Chaired by the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the IACG supports the overall inter-
agency coordination of UN mine action initiatives and activities. It includes inter alia representatives from
DDA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNMAS, UNOPS, WFP, FAO, the Bank and WHO. It also meets more
frequently at a working level when it is chaired by the Director, UNMAS.

STEERING COMMITTEE ON MINE ACTION (SCMA)

90. Meeting about twice a year, the SCMA supports the coordination of UN mine action initiatives with those
of non-UN partners and is chaired by the Under Secretary-General, DPKO or Director, UNMAS. In addition to
the members of the IACG, it includes inter alia representatives from ICRC, the ICBL, the GICHD, and invited
international NGOs involved in mine action.

MINE ACTION WORKING GROUP (MAWG)

91. Formed in February 1998 by ICBL to serve as the focal point for addressing issues related to mine action,
MAWG strives to ensure that the realities of mine action work in the field are reflected in global mine action
policies developed by the international community.

92. MAWG is a loose structure, where the main medium of communication is by e-mail. Members of the
group also meet for discussions within the context of various international mine action meetings.

MINE ACTION INFORMATION WORKING GROUP (MAIWG)

93. Established and chaired by UNMAS under the auspices of IACG, MAIWG supports the overall coordination
of UN mine action information issues and activities. It reviews, validates and prioritises information and
information system needs, and provides guidance and support to the GICHD in this context.

FIELD COORDINATION

94. In the framework of the Secretary-General’s Reform Agenda, all UN System entities are called upon to
cooperate and to "act as one at the country level."

95. There are many different coordination mechanisms employed in the field. The type of mechanisms used
will vary according to the situation and the response method employed.

I. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT COORDINATORS

96. Within the UN, the senior officer in country is responsible for coordinating humanitarian and
development activities. Mine action is therefore always coordinated through the senior UN staff in country,
who may be the:

• (Special) Representative of the Secretary-General.

• UN Resident Coordinator.
• UN Humanitarian Coordinator.
• UNDP Resident Representative.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (SRSG)

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97. The SRSG is appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN and acts on his behalf having overall authority
with regard to UN operations in the designated country. The appointment of an SRSG is normally reserved for
those complex emergencies which require UN involvement in major political negotiations and/or when UN
peacekeeping forces are deployed. If heading a political mission, the SRSG reports to the Secretary-General
through the Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs or, if heading a peacekeeping operation, through the
Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

98. The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator retains the mandate for coordination of humanitarian
assessment/ response, under the SRSG's strategic lead. All concerned agencies and NGOs deal with the
SRSG’s office through the Humanitarian Coordinator. In multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, a Deputy
SRSG will often assume the role and responsibilities of the Humanitarian Coordinator.

RESIDENT COORDINATOR (RC)

99. The Resident Coordinator is the UN Secretary-General's designated representative for development
cooperation at the country level and is responsible for the integration and coordination of all the UN agencies
present. S/he may also represent UN agencies not present.

100. The UNDP Resident Representative often undertakes this function. However, depending on
circumstances, it may be the head of another agency.

HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR (HC)

101. In complex emergencies, the Head of OCHA, as Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), may appoint a
Humanitarian Coordinator to facilitate and coordinate humanitarian assistance. Usually this will be the
Resident Coordinator. However, where there is no Resident Coordinator in place, or where the in-country
situation means it would not be viable for the Resident Coordinator or a lead agency to carry out the
humanitarian coordination functions, one will be appointed. The Humanitarian Coordinator is accountable to
the ERC.

UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE (RR)

102. The Resident Representative is the UNDP Administrator's designated representative at the country level.
The Resident Representative often serves as Resident Coordinator, who is responsible to the Secretary-
General through the UNDP Administrator for coordinating UN system operational activities at the country
level.

103. Where UNDP provides technical advice and capacity building support to a national mine action
programme, the Resident Representative is responsible for provision of that support through the TA and is a
key player in resource mobilisation efforts and relations with governments.

II. PRINCIPAL PROGRAMME COORDINATION MECHANISMS

UNITED NATIONS RESIDENT COORDINATOR SYSTEM

104. Managed and funded by UNDP14 this system aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
country-level operational activities of all different UN System entities by promoting a coordinated
multidisciplinary approach to the needs of recipient countries. This includes sharing of information, joint
planning and harmonisation of programme cycles. Coordination is achieved through several mechanisms
including the monthly meetings of the Heads of UN System entities and any local consultative groups that

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may exist.

FIELD COORDINATION UNIT (FCU)

105. The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator is supported by field staff who, depending on the scale of the
emergency, may be organized into FCUs. These are usually staffed by OCHA, but may also include personnel
from UN System entities or NGOs. The structure and size of FCUs vary depending on the nature of the
complex emergency but their primary roles and responsibilities remain the same:

Ensure common programming among humanitarian organizations in the field:

 Liaise regularly with government counterparts, NGOs and UN Agencies on

humanitarian programmes and related requirements.
 Analyse and disseminate information on the humanitarian situation,
including access to humanitarian partners and donors.
 Give press briefings on the situation.
 Plan, facilitate and monitor the Consolidated Appeal (CAP).
 Organise field assessments to affected areas for the UN, NGOs,
governments and donors, and ensure appropriate follow-up.
 Support UN Agencies’ efforts to build institutional capacity at national and
local levels for adequate response to and management of humanitarian
crises and disasters.

COMMON COUNTRY ASSESSMENT (CCA)

106. The CCA is a country-based, independent assessment undertaken by the UN to identify the critical gaps
and issues impacting the development of a country. The process of formulating the CCA is a participatory one,
involving all UN System entities, as well as key partners at the country level, in particular, governments.
107. The findings of the assessment are described in a CCA document and are used to formulate UN
Development Assistance Framework.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (UNDAF)

108. UNDAF is a mechanism for improved and more effective aid coordination and collaboration among UN
System entities at the country level. UNDAF, both as a process and a product, is based on the CCA. It consists
of common objectives and strategies of cooperation, and lays the foundation for cooperation with the
government, and other development partners, through the preparation of a complementary set of
programmes and projects. It will also identify the roles that each UN agency will play to assist in the country’s
development

CONSOLIDATED APPEAL (CAP)

109. In major or complex emergencies, which require a system-wide approach, the typical framework for
mobilising international humanitarian assistance will be a CAP coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
110. Through the CAP, the UN presents to the international community a strategy for emergency
humanitarian relief in a country (or sometimes an entire sub-region) and asks for the necessary assistance,
covering the entire range of needs of the affected population.

PORTFOLIO OF MINE ACTION PROJECTS

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111. Each year UNMAS, in consultation with all UN departments, agencies and funds involved in mine action,
develops a “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects”. This portfolio outlines mine action programmes and projects
supported by the UN and NGOs and is intended to promote field level coordination and to mobilise voluntary
contributions to expedite their successful completion. 24 MAPH draft 26 March 2004

ASSESSMENTS

An assessment defines the landmine problem in terms of its humanitarian, public health, and socio-economic
implications. The nature of the problem and the impact of the mines on affected communities have a major
bearing on the development of an appropriate response.

113. Within the UN system, UNMAS is responsible for organising assessments in consultation with partners
and the senior UN official in-country. Assessments take place as soon as a request is received or there is a
recognised need.

114. The aim of an assessment is to:

• Give an overview of the scope and impact of the landmine contamination and UXO problem in the
affected country.
• Identify constraints and opportunities relating to the development of mine action programmes.
• Determine the existing national capacity to respond and establish how these capabilities can be
integrated into a comprehensive strategy.
• Make recommendations for a response including institutional arrangements for the coordination and
implementation of mine action activities.

115. An assessment does not detail the exact location of landmines – this is done by a survey which is
normally carried out as part of a mine action programme and is often contracted out to other organizations.

116. This chapter outlines the different components of a successful assessment:

• Threat Monitoring.
• Information Management.
• Forward Planning.
• Security.
• Rapid Response Plan.
• Assessment Missions.

An accurate and credible assessment reduces the need for other organizations to conduct further
assessments and lays the foundation for developing a mine action programme.

THREAT MONITORING

117. Threat monitoring is the process of identifying a mine-contaminated country; estimating the general
location, extent and type of mine/unexploded ordnance; forecasting when conditions will allow assistance;
determining the national capacity; and estimating the external resources required to respond.

PROFILING COUNTRIES AT RISK

118. Whenever a country is known to be contaminated with mines or UXO, a country profile15 should be
created by an UNMAS Programme Officer to serve as the basis for future programmes and as the foundation

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for forward planning and emergency response.

119. The information gathered, although often incomplete, will nonetheless assist in determining the type
and extent of mine action necessary. It also will help develop relationships within the country in advance of
any programme.

120. Through reviewing and updating the profiles, priorities can be forecasted. When a country shows signs of
coming out of war or is gearing up to clear its land of mines, the Programme Officer can alert the IACG who
will review the profile and determine what responses may be necessary.

121. Once a country is identified as a potential candidate for mine action, the senior UN official in-country
(usually the Resident Coordinator) will be requested to nominate a point of contact (POC) for mine action.
The Programme Officer will then make contact with the POC (normally a staff member from the Resident
Coordinator’s office) and request his/her assistance in:

• Developing the country profile.

• Forwarding information on any meetings (including agenda, participants and conclusions) in which
mine action was discussed.
• Distributing any information packages received from UNMAS to the concerned parties.
• Forwarding data on mine-related incidents as to when they occur.
• Giving updates on any government initiatives regarding mine action.

122. The Programme Officer assists the POC by:

• Keeping in regular contact and advising him/her on the different aspects of mine action.
• Forwarding mine action information packages tailored to the needs of the country.
• Profiles serve as the basis for future programmes and as the foundation for forward planning and
emergency response.

INTEGRATION
130. Integration involves the detailed examination of two or more pieces of information to establish patterns
and to draw conclusions. Examples are the integration of media photographs of mine victims with
unconfirmed reports from a local NGO.

131. The new data is examined to determine where it fits within the country profile and how it may be used
to plan a future assessment mission or programme.

INTERPRETATION
132. Comparing new information against that which is known or suspected assists in building a profile of the
country and in forecasting events. This may increase confidence in the reliability of a source of data, or it may
raise new questions or uncertainty.

133. This stage of the process should be well-documented by the Programme Officer with assumptions clearly
stated and reasons given for all deductions and conclusions. This provides an “audit trail” which can be re-
visited should new information become available or should assumptions subsequently be challenged, revised
or refined.

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DISSEMINATION
134. The most critical part of the Programme Officer’s information management process is establishing a
routine for disseminating information to colleagues and UN databases (e.g. E-MINE17). However, information
should not be dispersed widely; the target audience should be carefully selected and the information tailored
appropriately. Through dissemination, information can be readily and easily used and exploited. For example,
the Programme Officer should determine which desk officer in UNDP is responsible for a certain country and
initiate an information exchange. Furthermore, when data is shared, it undergoes a variety of evaluation
processes as partners review it and provide feedback on any inaccuracies.

FORWARD PLANNING

135. Forward planning is advanced planning carried out in conjunction with other agencies when a mine
action response appears imminent.

136. Although not the usual method by which a mine action programme commences, there are times when
emergency mine action may be necessary. The Programme Officer may determine this from the media
(reports of peace treaty negotiations or an end of conflict), partner organizations (OCHA declaring a
humanitarian emergency or requesting specific mine action assistance) or other sources (UNDP Programme
Officers in the field). Situations such as these are monitored closely and, if necessary, planning for the
possibility of an assessment mission and emergency response begins.

137. Forward planning has several phases. The activities of the Programme Officer in one phase set the stage
for the next. These include:

 Increased Monitoring.
 Determining Resources.
 Alerting Partners.
 Coordinating and Planning.

138. In this stage, the Programme Officer continues to build up the country profile, verifies current data and
seeks to obtain new information18. The more information gathered, the more informed the response.
Specifically, the Programme Officer:

 Creates lists of contacts within the national government, local and international organizations and
donors involved in mine action.
 Opens lines of communication with key contacts and develops professional relationships.
 Refines any knowledge on the location and extent of landmine contamination and the socio-
economic impact on development programmes.
 Obtains current maps (preferably digital).

Studies neighbouring countries (How will they be affected? Refugee return.):

• Determines current status of the country in regard to the MBT and amended protocol II to the CCW.
• Researches current information on travel and health issues (UNSECOORD, UN Medical Services, UN
Agencies, etc.)
• Investigates logistics of travel arrangements for assessment team including location, availability and
cost of hotels and accommodation.
• Updates all information regarding MOSS and any other security matters.

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DETERMINING RESOURCES

139. As the situation changes so do the priorities. Based on the country profile and in the absence of a
completed assessment, the Programme Officer must attempt to approximate the services or assistance
needed to respond to the threat. The following information is needed:

 Types of assistance victims will need and estimates of what they can reasonably expect to receive
from national resources.
 What resources (personnel, equipment and finance) are available for mine action from international
partners already in-country.
 The various risks associated with establishing programmes and the level of acceptance from national
authorities and communities.

ALERTING PARTNERS
140. The Programme Officer makes an inventory of UN agencies and other organizations (public and private,
domestic and foreign) interested in that particular country and determines those that may be interested in
giving assistance. Care is taken to ensure that UN agencies are associated with their areas of responsibility
and interest such as:

 Socio-economic development (UNDP).

 Mine Risk Education (UNICEF).
 Project management, contracting and procurement (UNOPS).
 Refugee’s resettlement or camp establishment (UNHCR).
 Access roads for food delivery (WFP).

141. It is also important to be aware of circumstances when partners will not be interested in assisting.
Donors, for example, often will not contribute resources to countries that are not signatories of the MBT.

142. After identifying potential partners, the Programme Officer creates an executive summary of the country
profile and distributes it to the parties on the list with an attached memo advising on the possibility of mine
action and soliciting expressions of interest. The replies will often provide an overview of what is available.

COORDINATION AND PLANNING

143. Feedback gathered from UN, donors and other organizations can provide the basis for future
coordination of resources and activities. It also reveals the gaps in resource availability and allows time to
develop alternatives for providing these services.

144. Once there is an overview of what is available, the Programme Officer can develop a plan for a
coordinated response by:

 Identifying key organizations to be involved in the development of policies and standards.

 Looking for synergies and effectiveness among different organizations.
 Ensuring that the methods and programme policies of organizations do not conflict.
 Determining lines of authority and standard reporting formats.
 Allocating specific tasks to those best-suited to perform them;
 Ensuring that resources are distributed to the areas of greatest need, and that they are distributed
equitably.
 Avoiding duplication and waste.

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145. Although planning at this stage is tentative, the forward planning strategy can be shared with the IACG,
IASC and other concerned partners who can then participate in the process. Look for areas of conflict and
consider alternative plans. Be flexible in strategies but firm on humanitarian principles. Detailed planning is
addressed in the next chapter.

146. There may be occasions when OCHA may request an emergency response plan for a humanitarian
emergency. The Programme Officer will accept their authority and make every effort to assist. Coordination is
a two way street.

147. Problems of coordination arise when:

 The Programme Officer responsible for the concerned country is not clear from the outset that s/he is
the coordinator and the funnel for all information.
 The Programme Officer does not show the relevance of his/her position – coordination must avoid
duplication of effort and resources.
 Vested interests are overlooked or omitted. This may be due to lack of information or oversight.
Whatever the reason, it must be corrected as soon as it becomes obvious.
 Not sharing updated information on a regular basis causes other partners to go it alone. A system of
sharing data must be implemented.

SECURITY

148. Security of staff members is a key concern when planning any mine action programme. In particular it is
important to be aware of the UN Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS).

149. MOSS is a fundamental security policy document governing all UN operations. It is system-wide and
affects all UN staff members and their dependants whether operating in the field or based in headquarters.

150. MOSS was developed in response to the growing threat to UN staff in the day-to-day execution of their
duties. It provides a mechanism to increase the security consciousness of personnel, reduce risk and
establishes a minimum standard for all UN staff.

151. There are no exceptions to MOSS compliance. Every UN staff member must receive a minimum standard
of security training and be given security equipment appropriate to the Security Phase area in which they
travel or work.

REQUIREMENTS

151. There are no exceptions to MOSS compliance. Every UN staff member must receive a minimum standard
of security training and be given security equipment appropriate to the Security Phase area in which they
travel or work.

152. The MOSS tables in Annex 2 illustrate the requirements for the different Security Phases. It commences
with the requirements for countries in which no security phase has been declared, i.e. ‘No Phase’. This is
followed by the requirements of the five separate Security Phases of the UN Security Plan. The tables are
cumulative, with those requirements starting at ‘No Phase’ being implicit to all other Phases; e.g. the
requirements of MOSS under Phase Three include all the requirements of ‘No Phase’, Phase One and Phase
Two.

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153. It should be noted that these requirements are a minimum. The Designated Official in each duty station,
in conjunction with the Security Management Team19 (SMT), may decide that the minimum is not sufficient
for local needs and increase the requirements accordingly.

154. There are costs associated with MOSS. For example, UN offices in a security phase country may be
required to contribute to the cost of running a 24-hour/7-day per week UN common system communications
centre and/or additional security staff. This includes salaries, vehicles, communication equipment, etc.
Normally this is agreed upon by the SMT in country and costs are apportioned according to the number of
staff each office employs. These costs must be reflected in the different programme/project budgets.

155. The policy, as a minimum, requires that:

 Security responsibilities must be included in the job descriptions of all staff in the field in line with
what is already described in the Field Security Handbook.
 All staff members assigned to the field must acknowledge in writing that they have received a security
briefing and understand the responsibilities in regard to their own security;
 All UN Offices and staff are MOSS compliant at all times.
 In the event that a Security Phase changes in a country, all UN System entities meet the new MOSS
requirement within 30 - 60 days.

PROGRAMME OFFICER

156. The Programme Officer is required to:

 Know and monitor the current MOSS requirements for any country under his/her authority.
 Ensure that all staff complete the “Basic Security in the Field: Staff Safety, Health and Welfare”
course. (Available on CD from UNSECOORD or on the UN intranet).
 Brief each staff member travelling to the programme area on their MOSS requirements prior to
departure. This includes knowing the type of security and telecommunication devices that are used
in-country.

TECHNICAL ADVISOR (TA)

157. The TA is required to:

 Assume responsibility for the safety and security of personnel employed by the programme in the
country, their eligible dependants and for the implementation of the security plan;
 Consult with and assist the Designated Official on all matters concerning MOSS compliance.
 Ensure full and complete compliance by programme personnel and eligible dependents with all
security-related instructions.
 Ensure that all programme personnel attend appropriate security awareness training and briefing;
 Personally attend all training programmes.
 Ensure that personnel have adequate security and communications equipment in line with MOSS;
 Provide the Designated Official on a regular basis, with updated lists of all personnel employed by the
programme and their eligible dependants in the area.
 Ensure that the Designated Official is at all times informed of the whereabouts and movements of
programme personnel and eligible dependants in the area in accordance with established procedures.
 Report to the Designated Official all security-related incidents.
 Ensure that movement of all personnel is undertaken in accordance with UN rules and procedures.

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RAPID RESPONSE PLAN (RRP)

158. The Director of UNMAS is responsible for emergency mine action and has the necessary resources and
staff on standby to respond at short notice. However, there are differences between peacekeeping and
humanitarian emergencies.

159. If a request for emergency response from peacekeeping is received, key DPKO staff will immediately be
involved in the planning process.

160. If a humanitarian request is received, the Director of UNMAS will convene an urgent meeting of the
IACG. This group, composed of the UN system entities principally involved in mine action, will approve the
response and provide specialists to assist, if necessary.

161. An emergency response may be requested by the:

Government of the mine-affected country:

 Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

 UN Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator.
 UN Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) prior to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission.

162. As soon as the request is received by UNMAS, an emergency meeting of the IACG will be convened at the
working level. If the Director of UNMAS decides that staff should be dispatched before such a meeting can be
held, the Director will consult the representatives of UNDP and UNICEF before they depart.

163. On arrival in-country, the RRP elements will work under the supervision of the senior UN official
responsible for requesting their deployment. Terms of reference drafted for the deployed element will detail
the exact relationship between UNMAS, the deployed staff and the requesting UN official.

164. Both the fixed and optional components of the RRP rely on cooperation and joint planning with mine
action partners. They build on the capabilities of mine action organizations already in-country and agree to a
response accordingly, ensuring the integration of individual plans in order to achieve an overall strategy.
Coordination with NGOs working in mine action occurs at this level. To ensure that these activities take place,
the following may need to be established:

 A RRP working group within the SCMA.

 RRP points of contact with mine action partners.
 A method for sharing information with mine action partners in a timely manner.

165. An emergency response has two distinct components:

 Fact Finding Team (FFT).

 Mine Action Coordination Team.

FACT FINDING TEAM (FFT)

66. A team of experts of up to 3 people, depending on the nature of the emergency, will be deployed within
3-5 days and gather information on the emergency. This will include
data on mines, injuries, Mine Risk Education , victims, administration, logistics, finance and anything else
deemed pertinent and not already contained in the country profile.
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167. In the early stages of an emergency, critical information will be gathered from mine action partners
already involved in the emergency or by the deployment of an appropriately configured FFT. The FFT will
report to the Director of UNMAS, and should normally consist of staff experienced in mine action operations.

168. The team will gather information on the emergency situation to determine an appropriate UN response,
as well as assist planners on deciding on the configuration of the next deployable element – the coordination
capacity. It also will provide the Coordination Team with the information it requires for its own deployment.

169. Staff for the FFT will normally be drawn from UNMAS, UNICEF and UNOPS.

COORDINATION TEAM (CT)

170. The UN will coordinate its mine action response through a Coordination Team22. In cases where a
national mine action authority and/or UN coordinating mechanism already exists, the Coordination Team will
be designed to offer support and assistance to this authority, supplement the capacity of the existing team
and will report to the senior UN official requesting its deployment.

171. However, in certain situations, it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN to assume some or all of
the responsibilities, and to fulfil some or all of the functions of a national mine action authority. In such cases,
the Coordination Team will initially assume these responsibilities and carry out these functions.

172. The tasks of the Coordination Team may include:

 Establishing a functioning facility for the Coordination Team and the follow on organization.
 Liaising with government, local, political and military authorities as appropriate.
 Initiating the following:

 An accreditation process (if required).

 Population of a database with known mine information.
 An operational priority setting mechanism.
 Implementation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) based on the IMAS.
 A national standards framework.

• Coordination with capabilities in-country to reduce the risk of mine/UXO incidents.

• Establishing a functioning coordination mechanism such as coordination meetings/ communications).
• Preparing a work plan for the immediate emergency phase;
 Establishing a basic communications network.
 Producing project proposals.
• Establishing a coordinated MRE campaign.
• Establishing a victim’s identification mechanism, including determining information requirements of
victim service providers and establishing a victim referral mechanism in conjunction with the local
authorities and service providers.

173. The Coordination Team will normally deploy as soon as possible after the FFT. Personnel will be on
standby through a variety of mechanisms and normally recruited on standard conditions through UNOPS.
Personnel for the Coordination Team will be recruited from NGOs, UN headquarters, UN mine action
programmes, the UNOPS consultant roster and national staff. The Coordination Team will be staffed
according to the situation, but normally will include the following appointments:

• Team Leaders.
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• Administration/Logistics/Finance Officer.
• Programme Officer.
• Operations Officer(s).
• MRE Officer.
• Mine Information Officer.
• Military Liaison Officer.

174. In many cases, the most suitable candidate for a particular position may already be employed elsewhere.
In order to maximise the opportunity for such people to be recruited, the Coordination Team will initially
deploy for a set period of 90 days, thereby allowing sufficient time for more long-term recruitment to take
place. After this 90 day period, the Coordination Team will be in a position to handover its responsibilities to a
Mine Action Centre (MAC) or other coordination body.

175. The team will deploy with all the necessary equipment in order to function effectively, and will have the
capacity to establish an information database based on the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA). It will be able to provide accreditation if no other national mine action authority exists, and will
liaise with any military force deployed.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR UN SYSTEM ENTITIES

176. UNMAS has overall responsibility for the development, implementation and coordination of the RRP.
Specifically, it has the following responsibilities:

 Conducting resource mobilisation for all aspects of the RRP and provide a donor brief and update.
 Advising UNOPS of specific requirements for mobilisation of optional operational capabilities.
 In cooperation with UNOPS, facilitating the review of organizations contracted.
 Selecting personnel for the FFT and Coordination Team in conjunction with UNICEF/ UNOPS and
provide training for the implementation of the RRP.
 Providing mine action input to the IMTF as required.
 As part of the Framework for Coordination, providing mine action input via the Framework Team.
 Deploying, supporting, and providing, as a minimum, the team leader for the FFT.
 Determining, in conjunction with UNOPS, equipment requirements for the FFT and Coordination
Team.
 Promoting and providing guidance on IMAS as the foundation for establishing mine action
programmes.

177. UNICEF, as lead agency for MRE, is responsible for the following:
Providing a member to the FFT.

• Participating in the mine action planning process including contingency planning.

• Assisting in the population of the database of personnel deployable as part of the Coordination Team.
• Providing input into the overall MRE strategy.
• Providing input into the overall victim assistance strategy.

178. UNOPS is responsible for the following:

 Establishing contracts or other appropriate arrangements with various NGO, governmental and
commercial mine action partners for the optional operational capabilities.
 Establishing an agreement for the logistics provider.
 Conducting periodic reviews of contractual service providers.

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 Contracting personnel from outside the UN system for the Coordination Team.
 Providing a member to the FFT.
 Purchasing equipment required by the FFT.
 Arranging rapid purchase mechanisms for those items of equipment not held by the logistics provider
for the Coordination Team.
 Participating in the mine action planning process.

179. UNDP is responsible for the following:

 In negotiation with UNMAS, assisting in the provision of in-country support and liaison if there is a
resident UNDP country office.
 Coordinating deployment of Rapid Response assets in countries where UNDP is the lead agency for
mine action.
 Reviewing CVs of Rapid Response staff and advising UNMAS and UNOPS on requirements of Rapid
Response fixed and optional assets for countries where UNDP is the lead agency for mine action.
 Initiating, if appropriate, planning for longer-term capacity building activities.
 Participating in the mine action planning process including contingency planning.
 Assisting in the population of a database of personnel deployable as part of the Coordination Team.

180. DPKO Office of Mission Support is responsible for the following:

 Dispatching mine action equipment to peacekeeping missions.

 Providing appropriate support to the FFT and Coordination Team when part of a peacekeeping
operation.

181. OCHA is responsible for the following:

 Providing in-country support and liaising if there is a Humanitarian Coordinator.

 Participating in the mine action planning process including contingency planning.

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

LOGISTICS

182. The equipment required to support the FFT will be held at UNMAS and signed out from the UNMAS RRP
focal point in the event that a fact finding mission is required.

183. A scope of work will be prepared for a logistics provider who also will be required to provide
accommodation, transportation support and medical support. Other equipment, such as computer
equipment, will be purchased just prior to a deployment in order to ensure that it is not obsolete and that it is
appropriate for the location to which it is to be deployed.

FUNDING

184. The RRP will be funded via contributions from the VTF. Funding for fielding the FFT and Coordination
Team will be provided from earmarked resources in the VTF.

185. Funding for the operational capabilities will not normally be available from existing funds in the VTF and
will therefore need to be sought from the donor community.

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186. A donor meeting will be convened, by UNMAS, or UNMAS together with UNDP for countries where
UNDP is the lead agency for mine action at the earliest opportunity for each specific emergency in order to
mobilise the resources necessary for these capabilities.

187. When the Coordination Team is deployed as part of a peacekeeping operation, the Assessed Budget may
meet some or all of the costs.

ASSESSMENT MISSIONS

188. UNMAS is committed to respond to requests for an assessment within two months of receipt and, for
emergency situations, within two weeks.

189. Assessment missions can be broken down into distinct stages:

 Requests.
 Preparation.
 Planning.
 Field Trips.
 Final Report.

REQUESTS

190. Formal requests for multi-disciplinary assessment missions are normally presented as follows:

 From a government24 to UNMAS through their Permanent Mission to the United Nations.
 From a government to UNMAS through the senior UN official in-country.
 From UNMAS, in consultation with the IACG and the senior UN official in-country, if it is determined
there is an urgent need for an assessment. In such cases, A Note Verbale25, drafted by the
Programme Officer and signed by the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, will be
sent to the country’s Permanent Mission to the UN requesting permission for the assessment to take
place.

191. NOTE. In circumstances where either a UN transitional authority or a peacekeeping mission exists,
UNMAS deploys an assessment mission under the existing UN mandate.

192. The UNMAS Programme Officer will collate information from the country profile and different
organisations such as NGOs, Landmine Monitor, etc. and prepare a point paper (see Annex 2) of the country
to be distributed to partners.

193. The security and political aspects of the country are then reviewed and discussed with:

 The senior UN official of the concerned country.

 IACG.
 Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

194. The senior UN official will advise on the feasibility of undertaking a mission to the country. S/he will also
ensure the government understands the requirements of the assessment team. For example, the assessment
team will want to meet with opposition forces to discuss mine contamination.

195. The IACG will review the request within the context of other priorities and determine if it warrants
immediate action. The major factors are as follows:
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 Humanitarian Impact: Landmine contamination has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, reflected by the
number of victims or affected communities. This includes situations where mines prevent the delivery
of humanitarian aid, and also potential problems as a result of the planned movement of returning
refugees and IDPs. Other humanitarian considerations can be added as they are identified.
 Socio-Economic Impact of landmines on planned or on-going developmental projects and activities,
such as infrastructure redevelopment, reconstruction, agriculture, and education.
 Mandated Activity: based on current or planned UN operations or
activities.

196. If warranted, the IACG will develop general terms of reference for the assessment mission (see Annex 2)
and will agree on the selection of the team leader.

197. The Department of Political Affairs will advise on the political and security situation as it may affect the
ability to implement mine action activities. This includes aspects of the general political environment such as
stability and a demonstrated commitment to a non-use policy.

PREPARATION

98. Once an assessment mission is approved, different players have specific and interrelated tasks:

UNMAS

199. The Programme Officer:

 Drafts a letter, signed by the Director of UNMAS, informing the senior UN officer in-country that an
assessment mission is planned, and requests a POC to assist with planning arrangements for the
mission.
 Informs the country’s Permanent Mission in the form of a Note Verbale of the planned assessment.
 Identifies a team leader to coordinate and lead the assessment mission who will:
 Request key agencies (normally UNDP, UNICEF and WHO) to nominate a representative to join
the assessment and assist with planning.
 Ask the representatives to contact their respective country offices to inform them of the mission,
request their support and solicit their input.
 Arrange meetings of team members to discuss details on the scope and arrangements for the
mission, which will be detailed in a terms of reference.

SENIOR UN OFFICIAL

200. The Senior UN official in-country nominates a POC to prepare for the assessment team. The POC is
responsible for:
.
Arranging meetings with:

• Senior UN official in-country.

• Heads of UN Agencies in-country.
• Representatives of Ministries (Defence, Health, Education, Interior, Agriculture, Reconstruction,
Transport, telecommunications.)
• Military and police officials.
• International and local NGOs.
 International Organizations such as ICRC.
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 Donors.
• Administrative and Logistic Support including:
 Interpreters.
 Transportation to meetings (some areas will require military support such as vehicles or
helicopters, etc.)
 Accommodation for team members.

PLANNING

01. An accurate assessment requires thorough planning. The information collected triggers specific actions
relating to programmes thereby requiring team members to be aware of their roles, responsibilities and
information needs.

02. Because an assessment lasts between one and two weeks, the team must cover a lot of ground in a very
short time. The better planned and prepared the team the more likely the assessment will be successful.

03. The team leader as the overall coordinator must plan and organize the mission in consultation with the
other team members.

TEAM COMPOSITION

204. Although the team is normally composed of representatives from the key mine action UN System
entities (UNDP, UNICEF and WHO), there are situations when it may be beneficial to include others. For
example, UNHCR should be included if mines are impacting refugees; WFP if landmines affect food supply
transport routes; or UNOPS if implementation is expected to follow soon after the mission.

205. Input from others is desirable; however, the team leader must offset their contribution and consequent
logistics and administrative requirements by the value they bring to the assessment. The use of field-based
representatives, where possible and appropriate, should be considered as a means of keeping team numbers
at ideal levels.

206. It may be necessary to contract the services of a consultant or a qualified organization to undertake or
participate in an assessment mission. For example, GICHD could be contacted to provide an expert on
stockpile reduction. The team leader consults with other organisations not participating in the mission to
follow-up on any vested interests pertaining to them.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF TEAM MEMBERS:

UNMAS policy advisor

207. In some cases, a policy advisor from UNMAS will accompany the team (The policy advisor could be the
team leader). Under the authority of the team leader and within the framework of the mission's terms of
reference, the policy advisor is responsible for ensuring that issues related to the UN policy on mine action
and the promotion of a global ban on anti-personnel landmines, as well as relevant political and security
concerns, are addressed. S/he:

In some countries, due to the nature of the conflict, it may be necessary to transit a third country to talk to
opposition forces or to visit sites of interest. The team leader, in consultation with the point of contact,
should factor this travel into the team’s agenda.

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• Liaises with DPA and diplomatic missions as appropriate.
• Presents the UN policy on mine action and the UN partners' main roles and responsibilities when
meeting with UN representatives, government officials, and diplomatic missions.

208. The UNMAS policy advisor gathers information and reports with emphasis on:

 The overall impact of the landmine/UXO situation, including the impact on national reconciliation
when applicable.
 The political and security environment.
 Status of the country vis-à-vis the MBT and the Amended Protocol 11 to the CCW.
 The commitment of the host country to support mine action actively.
 The position of the donor community.

UNDP representative

209. Within the framework of the mission's terms of reference, the UNDP representative (who also may serve
as the team leader) is responsible for ensuring that the interests of UNDP are addressed.

210. S/he gathers information and reports as required with a particular emphasis on:

 The impact of the landmine/UXO contamination on reconstruction and

socio-economic development.
 The local / national administrative structures.
 The existing capacities to support mine action.
 The requirements associated with the development of appropriate capacities for mine action.

UNICEF representative

211. Within the framework of the mission's terms of reference, the UNICEF representative is responsible for
ensuring that the interests of UNICEF are addressed.

212. S/he gathers information and reports as required with a particular emphasis on:

 The impact of landmines on children, civilian populations and humanitarian aid.

 The local capacities available to support Mine Risk Education and victims rehabilitation;
 The existing activities to support Mine Risk Education and victim rehabilitation.
 The willingness of the various parties, including donor countries, to support Mine Risk Education and
victim rehabilitation.
 The requirements associated with the development of Mine Risk Education and victim rehabilitation
activities.

OCHA representative

213. Within the framework of the mission's terms of reference, the OCHA representative is responsible for
ensuring that the areas of concern to OCHA are addressed.

214. S/he gathers information and reports as required with a particular emphasis on:

 The humanitarian impact of the landmine/UXO problem, including the impact on refugees and IDPs,
the delivery of humanitarian aid, and settled populations.

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 The activities already initiated to respond to the problem.
 The humanitarian concerns of the host country, NGOs, international
organisations, UN System entities and diplomatic missions in relation to
the mine/UXO problem.
 The requirement for emergency assistance if applicable.

WHO representative

215. Within the framework of the mission's terms of reference, the WHO representative is responsible for
ensuring that the concerns of WHO are addressed.

216. S/he gathers information and reports as required with a particular emphasis on:

 The impact of landmines on health.

 The local capacities available to support victim assistance.
 The existing activities to provide assistance to landmine victims.
 The willingness of the various parties, including donor countries, to support victim assistance.
 The requirements associated with the development of health service capacity for sustainable victim
assistance.

AGENDA

217. It is important that the agenda reflects the needs of the different agencies and incorporates their
information requirements into the mission schedule.

218. To this end, the team leader must ensure that the POC in-country is aware of the team’s requirements
when arranging meetings and logistical support and informs him/her of any additional requirements for
meetings or field visits.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

219. Terms of Reference29 for the mission will be developed and finalised by the team and then forwarded to
the senior UN official in-country (through Director, UNMAS) with a request that they are distributed to
representatives of the national authorities and all other organisations on the agenda.

220. The Permanent Mission of the government will similarly receive a copy of the terms of reference.

TRAVEL

221. The team leader will contact the Designated Official30 to determine if security clearance is required to
travel to the country or any part thereof. If so, the team leader will forward the necessary bio-data of the
team members and their itinerary to the Designated Official for approval. The team leader will copy the
clearance to team members so that they can inform their respective security office.

222. The team leader will determine visa requirements and inform team members accordingly.

223. The representatives participating in the mission submit a request for Travel Authorisation. In the case of
UNMAS, the request is submitted, along with a copy of the terms of reference, to the Director, UNMAS for

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approval.

224. Vaccinations or other necessary medical treatment must also be completed well in advance of travel
through the Medical Services Office.
COST OF MISSION

225. Assessment mission costs are normally assessed in the budget of the VTF. Approximately 90% will be
travel-related costs.

226. Agencies will cover costs of sending their respective team members.

227. UNMAS will reimburse field offices for mission expenses (e.g. interpreters and transportation).

IN THE FIELD

228. On arrival, the team leader introduces the team to the senior UN official, briefs him/her of their mission
and presents any updated documentation. In some situations, the team may be required to attend a security
briefing by the Field Security Officer31 (FSO).

TEAM LEADER

229. During the mission, the team leader:

• Introduces the various team members at meetings.

• Presents the mission's terms of reference and objectives during meetings.
• Explains what input is needed for the debriefing and the final report.
• Gathers information deemed necessary for the purpose of the mission, with a particular emphasis on:

 The scope of the landmine/UXO contamination (types of mines and UXOs used; areas known or
suspected to be contaminated; and statistical data when available)
 The overall impact of the landmine/UXOs (where applicable: national reconciliation; repatriation
of refugees; resettlement of IDPs; delivery of humanitarian aid; reconstruction and development;
health services; and casualties)
 The existing capacities available and the activities initiated to deal with the issue (local/national
administrative structures; information initiatives and capacities; victim assistance initiatives; and
medical capacities to assist and rehabilitate landmine victims)
 The political/security situation (including: position of country vis-à-vis the MBT and the amended
protocol II to the CCW; commitment of the various parties involved to supporting mine action
actively and to desist from stockpiling, using, and transferring antipersonnel landmines; position
of the donors; potential impact of the security situation on a mine action programme; and points
of contact)
 Assembles the team daily to review and discuss progress.
 Liaises with POC to ensure logistical requirements are in place for each meeting (e.g.
transportation and interpreters).
 Is responsible for coordinating any travel arrangements with the FSO and ensuring that the team
complies with security instructions.

TEAM MEMBERS

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230. During the mission, the team members work under the authority of the team leader. Due to the inter-
relational nature of the meetings, the team works as a single unit. However, in some instances where
meetings overlap, the team will split according to priorities. For example, the representative of WHO would
attend a meeting with hospital staff.

ADVOCACY

231. The team leader or policy officer, when present, will take the opportunity to advocate wherever
appropriate on the MBT and emphasize that assistance is facilitated once the treaty is signed. The team will
point out that some key donors do not donate to non-treaty countries.
DEBRIEF

232. At the end of the mission, the team compiles a debriefing report for the senior UN official and other
officials such as Heads of UN System entities and donors.

233. Team members will provide their input in writing in accordance with the guidelines listed as follows:

STANDARD DEBRIEFING OUTLINE

EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM TEAM MEMBERS Main Contributor/s

General observations ALL

I BAN ON LANDMINES UNMAS
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
II VICTIM ASSISTANCE WHO/UNICEF
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
III MINE RISK EDUCATION UNICEF
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
IV DETECTION AND CLEARANCE UNMAS/UNDP
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
V CAPACITY BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNMAS/UNDP
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
VI SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT UNMAS/UNDP
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations
VII KEY IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS UNMAS/UNDP
Observations/findings
Conclusion/recommendations

General Recommendations ALL

234. The team leader will review the contributions for the debriefing report in consultation with the team
members and seek consensus on their findings and recommendations.

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235. It is important to note that the debriefing report contains preliminary findings only. The report is not
distributed at this time and is subject to further analysis at headquarters. However, in some cases, a copy may
be left with the senior UN official.

The landmine/UXO threat:

 Locations of Mine/UXO.
 Types of Mine/UXO.
 Environmental Conditions.

The consequences of the presence of Mines/UXO:

 Mine/UXO accidents.
 Socio-economic impact.

Capacities and current activities that deal with the problem:


 Achievements.
 Mine/UXO Information Management.
 Donor support provided.
 Mine Risk Education.
 Victim assistance.
 Advocacy and international conventions.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

 Conclusions:

 General.
 Detection and clearance.
 Mine Risk Education.
 Victim assistance.
 Ban on landmines.
 National mine action structure.

• Recommendations:
 General.
 Detection and clearance.
 Mine Risk Education.
 Victim assistance.
 Ban on landmines.
 National mine action structure.
 Implementation arrangements.

The team leader then convenes a meeting of team members to agree on the content of the report. Once the
team has agreed on a final draft, it is:

 Submitted to the Resident Coordinator for comment.

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 Shared with DPA for comment on the political sections.

FINAL REPORT

236. Analysis of data is crucial to the planning of mine action programmes. The information gathered gives an
overview of the nature of the response and the resources required.

237. The team will have up to three weeks after the assessment to draft their respective submissions under
the following general outline (adaptable according to the situation).

BACKGROUND

History of the landmine contamination and reason for assessment mission.

OBSERVATIONS

Current Environment:

 International environment (relationship and treaties with other countries).

 Socio-economic environment.

238. The team leader then convenes a meeting of team members to agree on the content of the report. Once
the team has agreed on a final draft, it is:

 Submitted to the Resident Coordinator for comment.

 Shared with DPA for comment on the political sections.

239. After ten days for solicitation of comments, the report is sent to the Under Secretary-General, DPKO for
approval to release. Once granted, it is forwarded to:
.
Governments through their Permanent Mission

 Resident Coordinator.
 UN System entities.
 All parties on the assessment agenda.
 Donors that have expressed interest in the country.

240. The report is then published on the UNMAS database E-MINE.

241. The assessment report gives an overview of the mine problem and offers general recommendations for a
comprehensive response, including institutional arrangements for the coordination and implementation of
mine action activities. In cases where the assessment deduces that the situation in the country is not yet
conducive to mine clearance, the country profile is built up until such time as UN intervention is feasible.

Great care should be taken during the assessment process to ensure that the mine contaminated country
expectations are not raised. Many factors must be taken into consideration before the UN can commence a
mine action programme.

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42
MINE ACTION & TRAINING

TASK SITE DOCUMENTATION

DISCLAIMER
The information contained in this document is from references and known
best practices for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no
way exhaustive, and Qualified EOD trained persons should always adhere to
Authorised Standard Operating procedures, in the theatre of operations.
The IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for any accident or incident that
results in the use of the information contained within this document, other
than for use on the IMAS/ EOD training course.

Page: 1
Clear documentation obliges managers to make clear plans – which makes management easier
and is a part of any Quality Management system. It also provides an audit trail with which to
assess errors and omissions, so ensuring that corrections are made quickly and efficiently.
Documentation can also provide evidence that all required and reasonable actions were taken
and so provide an invaluable defence against unjust criticism when things go wrong.
All documentation required by the NMAA must be completed and returned in a timely manner.
The suggested formats in this Chapter are very simple. They are only suggestions and must be
revised at the direction of the Programme Manager. For internal management purposes, any
replacements should include at least as much information as is required in the examples provided.
Additional templates for gathering information should be added to suit each particular programme.

Page: 2
DOCUMENTATION

Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3
2. Task reporting requirements ...................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Section progress report form ................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Depth of discovered device form ............................................................................................. 4
2.3 MDD progress report form ...................................................................................................... 5
2.4 Machine progress report form ................................................................................................. 6
2.5 EOD Progress report form....................................................................................................... 7
2.6 Platoon progress report form .................................................................................................. 8
2.7 Task progress report form ....................................................................................................... 9
3. Tasking orders ......................................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Manual demining Tasking Order ........................................................................................... 10
3.2 MDD Tasking Order .............................................................................................................. 11
3.3 Mechanical demining Tasking Order ..................................................................................... 12
4. Task Sketch map requirements ............................................................................................... 13
5. Mechanical assessment reports .............................................................................................. 15
6. Forms for Task Risk Assessment (TRA) ................................................................................. 16
6.1 TRA Table 1: Probability of Detonation (PoD) ...................................................................... 16
6.2 TRA Table 2: Severity of Consequences (SoC) numbers..................................................... 17
6.3 TRA Table 3&4: Risk(s) added by the Task Conditions (TC)................................................ 18
6.4 TRA Table 5: Calculating the Risk Numbers ......................................................................... 20
7. Completion documentation ...................................................................................................... 21
7.1 Completion report .................................................................................................................. 21
8. Daily MDD health care form..................................................................................................... 22
9. Accident report form ................................................................................................................ 23
10. Internal QA/QC reports ............................................................................................................ 26
10.1 QA evaluation form: All manual procedures ....................................................................... 27
10.2 QA evaluation form: MDD procedures ................................................................................ 29
10.3 QA evaluation form: Mechanical procedures ...................................................................... 31
10.4 QA evaluation form on Task completion ............................................................................. 33
10.5 QA evaluation form: Command and Control ....................................................................... 34
11. Cancellation report format ....................................................................................................... 36
12. Demolition Records ................................................................................................................. 37
12.1 Burning Team Records....................................................................................................... 39
13. Daily attendance record ........................................................................................................... 41
14. CASEVAC and emergency response plan .............................................................................. 42
15. Personnel, logistical and financial reports ............................................................................... 42
16. Senior Paramedic S&OH pan .................................................................................................. 42
16.1 Paramedic’s report on treatment of Accident victim ........................................................... 42
17. Vehicle Service Log ................................................................................................................. 42
18. Vehicle Travel Log ................................................................................................................... 42
19. Machine Deployment Plan ....................................................................................................... 42
20. Visitors Log .............................................................................................................................. 42

Page: 3
1. Introduction
Good management requires accurate and timely reporting at all levels. Some reports are internal
and some are required by the NMAA. Examples of basic internal reporting requirements are
detailed in this Chapter. Other report formats should be added as required. Additional reports
required by the NMAA must be produced in a timely manner.
The Task Supervisor ensures that reports are compiled from all levels of field supervisor. The
Task Supervisor compiles those reports into weekly and monthly reports that are sent to the
Programme Manager’s Office. All reports must be held on file and become a part of the Task
Folder Documentation and of the organisation’s own internal audit trail.
The Programme Manager’s Office forwards required reports to the Head Office and to the NMAA
at the required reporting times.

2. Task reporting requirements

The following reports must be generated by the designated supervisors:
1. Daily Section report (Section Leaders);
2. Daily MDD reports (MDD Handlers);
3. Daily Mechanical Asset reports (Mechanical Team Leaders);
4. Daily EOD Operative report (Senior EOD Operative);
5. Weekly Section report (Section Leaders);
6. Weekly MDD reports (MDD Team Leader/Coordinator);
7. Weekly Mechanical Asset reports (Mechanical Team Leaders);
8. Weekly Platoon report (Platoon Commanders);
9. Weekly EOD Operative report (Senior EOD Operative);
10. Monthly Platoon report (Platoon Commanders/Supervisors);
11. Monthly Mechanical Asset reports (Mechanical Team Leaders);
12. Monthly MDD reports (MDD Coordinator);
13. Monthly EOD Operative report (Senior EOD Operative);
14. Weekly Task-Progress report (Task Supervisor); and
15. Monthly Task-Progress report (Task Supervisor).
All Section, Platoon, MDD and Mechanical reports should be completed on the day of the
completion of the reporting period and handed to the Task Supervisor. The Task Supervisor
should compile the Task Weekly and Monthly reports and pass them to the Programme
Manager’s office within three days of the end of the reporting period.
The Task Supervisor liaises with the Programme Manager’s office to provide other reports that
may be required by the NMAA.
The same basic formats can be used for daily, weekly and monthly reports, with the reporting
period clearly indicated on the form. Sample reporting forms are given on the following pages.

Page: 4
2.1 Section progress report form
SQUADRON REPORTING FORM Day/Week/Month……………………. Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Section Leader’s name: No. in Section:
Platoon Commander’s name:
2
Procedure M Cleared No. and type of mines/ERW located

Manual detectors

Manual rakes

Manual excavation

Spot Task(s)
2
Total M manual clearance: Was depth of devices recorded? Yes/No

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

STAFF Total number No. of working days Absences:

Deminers

2.2 Depth of discovered device form

Device Type Approx. depth* in cm Position (GPS) Section that found device Date found

* After digging it can be hard to see the original ground level. When in doubt, estimate the depth as greater than it was.

Page: 5
2.3 MDD progress report form
MDD REPORTING FORM Day/Week/Month……………………. Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
MDD Handler’s name: Name of MDD:
Task Supervisor’s name:
2
Procedure M Cleared No. and type of mines/ERW located

MDD area search

MDD Spot Task(s)

2
Total M MDD Clearance:
2
Total M MDD search (one dog only):

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

Page: 6
2.4 Machine progress report form
MACHINE REPORTING FORM Day/Week/Month……………………. Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Team Leader’s name: No. in Mechanical Team:
Task Supervisor’s name:
2
Procedure M processed/prepared Depth processed No. and type of device
detonated/located

MV-4 flail

MineWolf Tiller

MineWolf flail

Converted excavator
Steel wheels/rollers

VMMD

REST

Other machine(s)

2
Total M mechanical preparation at varied depths:

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

STAFF Total number No. of working days Absences:

Mechanical Team
Attached deminers

Page: 7
2.5 EOD Progress report form
EOD REPORTING FORM Day/Week/Month……………………. Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
EOD Operator’s name:
Task Supervisor:
Procedure Explosive demolition CDS Burning No and Types of mine/ERW

Destroy in-situ

Move before destruction

Rendered safe and moved
before destruction

Make detector targets

Make MDD targets

Total number of mines/ERW destroyed:

Total number of mines/ERW made into MDD or detector targets:
Total of destroyed and target mines added together:
Tor destroyed and target ERW other than mines added together:

Explosive consumables used: Burning consumables used:

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

Page: 8
2.6 Platoon progress report form
PLATOON REPORT FORM Week/Month…………………… Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Platoon Commander: Platoon Supervisor:
Number of Sections: Task Supervisor:
2
Procedure M Cleared No. and type of mines/ERW destroyed

Manual detectors

Manual rakes
Manual excavation

Spot Task(s)
2
Total M manual Clearance: Was depth of Clearance recorded? Yes/No

Consumables used: Marking used:

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

STAFF Total number No. of working days Absences:

Deminers
Support staff

Page: 9
2.7 Task progress report form
TASK-PROGRESS REPORTING FORM Week/Month…………….. Year……………
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Task Supervisor:
2 2
Procedure M Cleared M processed/prepared No. and type of mines/ERW destroyed

Manual detectors

Manual rakes

Manual excavation

MDD search

MV-4 flail

MineWolf Tiller

MineWolf flail

Converted excavator
Steel wheels/rollers

VMMD

REST

Other machine(s)

Total manual/MDD:
Total mechanical preparation:
Area cleared: Area Reduced: Area Verified: Area Cancelled:
Total area prepared for Release:

Remarks/problems:

Reasons for down-time:

External QA or other visits:

STAFF Total number No. of working days Absences:

Deminers
Support staff
Mechanical Teams
MDD Teams

Page: 10
3. Tasking orders
Tasking orders are issued by the Task Supervisor to each of the assets at a Task. Generally,
Tasking orders should be agreed with the Supervisors who will oversee the work to ensure that
the requirement is realistic and safe.
Tasking orders are issued to:
1. Platoon Supervisors/Commanders;
2. Mechanical Team Leaders; and
3. The MDD Team Coordinator.
When a manual Section (or part of a Section) is assigned to support a Mechanical or MDD Team,
that Section falls under the command of the MDD or Mechanical Team Leader.
Tasking orders should always be accompanied by a detailed map to ensure that those tasked
know where they must work within the hazardous area.

3.1 Manual demining Tasking Order

MANUAL DEMINING TASKING ORDER

Date of Order:
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Platoon Commander: Platoon Supervisor:
Task Supervisor:
Estimated Area processed (m2)
Area ID Area (m2) Start date Procedure used
completion date and depth

Page: 11
3.2 MDD Tasking Order

MDD TASKING ORDER

Date of Order:
Task ID(s): Country programme:
MDD Team Leader: MDD Coordinator:
Task Supervisor:
Estimated
Area ID Area (m2) Start date Search approaches to be used
completion date

Page: 12
3.3 Mechanical demining Tasking Order

MECHANICAL DEMINING TASKING ORDER

Date of Order:
Task ID(s): Country programme:
Mechanical Team Leader:
Machine(s):
Task Supervisor:
Estimated
Area ID Area (m2) Start date Processing depth Procedure/tool used
completion date

Page: 13
4. Task Sketch map requirements
The Task Sketch Map should include a box in the lower right hand corner indicating who drew the
map and when. The box should also record the date it was checked by the Task Supervisor.

Drawn by:
Date: Signed:

Checked by (Task Supervisor):

Date: Signed:

The Task sketch map should include a Key in the lower left hand corner indicating the position of
the bench-mark and the Symbols used to indicate the positions of discovered mines and ERW.
The symbols can be colour coded or simply be different letters.
The map should also show:
a. The Task name and identifying code;

b. The direction of magnetic North, using this symbol:

c. The distances (in metres) and bearing (in degrees) from the bench-mark to the start-point;
d. All distances and bearings between Turning Points on the Task perimeter;
e. The position, direction and bearings of all breaches into the hazardous area;
f. The extent of areas processed in the hazardous area;
g. The Threat levels assigned to various parts of the hazardous area; and
h. Any obvious features (trees, buildings, etc, inside the hazardous area.
A sample sheet of map paper is reproduced on the next page. Copy several sheets and tape them
together when other map paper is not available. Return the original page to this SOP after
copying.

Page: 14
Page: 15
5. Mechanical assessment reports
In addition to the performance reports required by the Task Supervisor, all Mechanical Team
Leaders must provide a weekly assessment report to the Task Supervisor covering Mechanical
performance data of interest to Head Office. The Task Supervisor will forward these reports to the
Programme Manager.
The following information should be recorded in a assessment report compiled by the Mechanical
Team Leader:
• number of working hours;
• square metres of prepared surface;
• approximate depth to which the machine has processed the ground;
• description of the undergrowth removed;
• type and number of intact mines located;
• type and number of damaged mines located;
• number of detonations counted (and devices identified when possible);
• quantity of fuel consumed;
• repairs and replacement parts used;
• unusual events, breakdowns, repair requirements; and
• service actions carried out.
Copies of all weekly reports should be filed in the Machine Log Book that accompanies the vehicle
wherever it is deployed.
Copies of the daily and weekly performance reports must be added to the Machine Log Book.

Page: 16
6. Forms for Task Risk Assessment (TRA)
6.1 TRA Table 1: Probability of Detonation (PoD)
For each demining procedure and for each hazard, a Probability of Detonation (PoD) is estimated
in TRA Table A below. The condition of the anticipated hazards is considered when estimating the
probability of detonation. The probability of detonation is given a number from the following list.

Probability of detonation (PoD) for a given hazard and procedure

4 Frequent Could occur often with this procedure
3 Probable Could occur if the procedure is used correctly
2 Occasional Could occur if the procedure is used incorrectly
1 Improbable Very unlikely to occur even if the procedure is used incorrectly

Circle a number for each of the listed procedures below. Add more procedures if necessary.

TRA Table 1: Probability of Detonation (PoD) during available manual procedures

Hazard:……………………………………………………………………………………………… PoD
Procedure 1: Manual demining using metal-detectors and signal investigation 1 2 3 4
Procedure 2: Manual demining using area excavation with short hand tools 1 2 3 4
Procedure 3: Manual demining using area excavation with REDS rakes 1 2 3 4
Procedure 4: Using MDD for detection (with manual demining of MDD indications) 1 2 3 4
Procedure 5: Manual demining conducting BAC 1 2 3 4
Procedure 6: Manual demining conducting BACS 1 2 3 4
Hazard:……………………………………………………………………………………………… PoD
Procedure 1: Manual demining using metal-detectors and signal investigation 1 2 3 4
Procedure 2: Manual demining using area excavation with short hand tools 1 2 3 4
Procedure 3: Manual demining using area excavation with REDS rakes 1 2 3 4
Procedure 4: Using MDD for detection (with manual demining of MDD indications) 1 2 3 4
Procedure 5: Manual demining conducting BAC 1 2 3 4
Procedure 6: Manual demining conducting BACS 1 2 3 4
Hazard:……………………………………………………………………………………………… PoD
Procedure 1: Manual demining using metal-detectors and signal investigation 1 2 3 4
Procedure 2: Manual demining using area excavation with short hand tools 1 2 3 4
Procedure 3: Manual demining using area excavation with REDS rakes 1 2 3 4
Procedure 4: Using MDD for detection (with manual demining of MDD indications) 1 2 3 4
Procedure 5: Manual demining conducting BAC 1 2 3 4
Procedure 6: Manual demining conducting BACS 1 2 3 4
Hazard:……………………………………………………………………………………………… PoD
Procedure 1: Manual demining using metal-detectors and signal investigation 1 2 3 4
Procedure 2: Manual demining using area excavation with short hand tools 1 2 3 4
Procedure 3: Manual demining using area excavation with REDS rakes 1 2 3 4
Procedure 4: Using MDD for detection (with manual demining of MDD indications) 1 2 3 4
Procedure 5: Manual demining conducting BAC 1 2 3 4
Procedure 6: Manual demining conducting BACS 1 2 3 4
Hazard:……………………………………………………………………………………………… PoD
Procedure 1: Manual demining using metal-detectors and signal investigation 1 2 3 4
Procedure 2: Manual demining using area excavation with short hand tools 1 2 3 4
Procedure 3: Manual demining using area excavation with REDS rakes 1 2 3 4
Procedure 4: Using MDD for detection (with manual demining of MDD indications) 1 2 3 4
Procedure 5: Manual demining conducting BAC 1 2 3 4
Procedure 6: Manual demining conducting BACS 1 2 3 4
Continue this Table for all the anticipated Hazards at the Task.

Page: 17
6.2 TRA Table 2: Severity of Consequences (SoC) numbers
SoC for Manual procedures

General rule for SoC numbers for manual procedures

Small AP blast mines (under 50g HE) 2
Large AP blast mines 3
POMZ 2 and 2M AP frag mines 3
All other AP frag mines 4
All AT mines 4
Separate AP mine fuzes 2
All other separate fuzes 3
All submunitions 4
All other ordnance 4

TRA Table 2A: SoC for the detonation of each hazard during manual procedures
Hazard name /description
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Extend this Table if there are more Hazards than lines.

Page: 18
6.3 TRA Table 3&4: Risk(s) added by the Task Conditions (TC)
Task Conditions (TC) are unique at each Task, so the content of TRA Table C may need to be
adjusted to suit the Task.

New conditions must be added when appropriate to the context where you will work. The most
experienced staff and other demining groups should be consulted and asked to share their
experience about local conditions, and how to reduce the risk of an accidental detonation.

TRA Table 3: Task Conditions and ways to reduce risk of detonation

Task Conditions (TC) Ways to reduce risk of detonation
When searching for AP blast mines
Hard/rocky ground Use of blast resistant and long tools, and/or use mechanical ground preparation.
Soft/wet ground Allow to dry.
Cut or dead vegetation on ground Use of metal-detectors, then long-handled light rakes, then metal-detectors.
Cut vegetation using a machine, or cut carefully by hand until ground surface is
Dense undergrowth
visible and metal-detector can be moved close to ground.
Roots on ground surface Mechanical ground preparation.
2
More than 7 fragments in every m Use of powerful magnets (where no magnetic influence fuzes are expected).
Steep incline Work uphill and ensure employees have slip-resistant boots.
Issue wire cutting and pulling tools and conduct refresher training in their use at
Wire obstructions
the Task.
Clear up to then wreck, then use armoured machine to move the wreck into the
Wrecked vehicles
Cleared area. Then Clear where the wreck was.
Use marking. Train in a similar situation and increase depth of search inside the
Ditches, trenches or canals
obstruction and/or use mechanical excavation and sifting.
Presence of livestock MRE officer to liaise with owners to arrange absence of livestock.
When searching for AP fragmentation mines (stake mounted)
Cut or dead vegetation on ground Use metal-detectors, then use again after vegetation is removed by hand.
Cut undergrowth using a machine, or cut vegetation from the top in short
Dense undergrowth lengths, sweeping with metal-detector after each cut. Use tripwire feeling
procedure before each cut when tripwires may be present.
2
More than 7 fragments in every m Use of powerful magnets (where no magnetic influence fuzes are present).
Steep incline Work uphill and ensure employees have slip-resistant boots.
Issue cutting and pulling tools and conduct training. Pull using an armoured
Wire obstructions
machine if tripwires or mines may be among the obstructions.
Clear up to wreck, the then use armoured machine to move the wreck into the
Wrecked vehicles
Cleared area. Then Clear where the wreck was.
Presence of livestock MRE officer to liaise with owners to arrange absence of livestock.
When searching for AP bounding fragmentation mines
Cut or dead vegetation on ground Use metal-detectors, then use again after vegetation is removed by hand.
Cut undergrowth using a machine or cut vegetation from the top in short lengths,
Dense undergrowth sweeping with metal-detector after each cut. Use a tripwire feeling procedure
before each cut when tripwires may be present.
2
More than 7 fragments in every m Use of powerful magnets (where no magnetic influence fuzes are present).
Steep incline Work uphill and ensure employees have slip-resistant boots.
Issue cutting and pulling tools and conduct training. Pull using an armoured
Wire obstructions
machine if tripwires or mines may be among the obstructions.
Use marking. Train in a similar situation. Also increase depth of search inside
Ditches and canals
the canal/ditch.
Clear up to the wreck, then use an armoured machine to move the wreck into
Wrecked vehicles
the Cleared area. Then Clear where the wreck was.
Presence of livestock MRE officer to liaise with owners to arrange absence of livestock.
When searching for AT mines
Hard/rocky ground Do not use heavy hand tools such as mattocks and picks.
Presence of livestock MRE officer to liaise with owners to arrange absence of livestock.
When searching for ordnance
Hard/Rocky ground Use distinct area marking and metal-detectors.
Soft/wet ground Use distinct marking and metal-detectors. Do not rely only on visual search.
Significant undergrowth Cut vegetation from the top sweeping with detector after each cut below 40cm.

Page: 19
Steep incline Conduct Clearance uphill and ensure employees have slip-resistant boots.
When searching for submunitions
Hard/Rocky ground Use distinct marking and metal detectors. Do not rely only on visual search.
Soft/wet ground Allow to dry and search to greater depth.
Cut or dead vegetation on ground Use metal-detectors. Do not rely on visual search. Do not use ferrous locators.
Cut undergrowth using a machine or cut vegetation from the top in short lengths,
Dense undergrowth
sweeping with metal-detector after each cut.
Conduct Clearance uphill and ensure employees have slip-resistant boots.
Steep incline
Presume munitions may have moved downhill.
Issue cutting and pulling tools and conduct training. Pull using a suitably
Wire obstructions
armoured machine if munitions may be among the wire obstruction(s).
Use Clear marking, train in a similar situation and increase depth of search
Ditches and canals
inside the canal/ditch.
Presence of livestock MRE officer to liaise with owners to arrange absence of livestock.

TRA Table 4 below shows how to assess the additional risk presented by the Task Conditions at
each Task.

TRA Table 4: Assessing risk presented by Task Conditions (TC)

Increased risk posed by the Task Conditions
Roots on ground surface

More than 7 metal pieces

Cut or dead vegetation

Presence of livestock
Ditches, trenches or
Dense undergrowth
Hard/rocky ground

Wire obstructions

Wrecked vehicles
Soft/wet ground

Steep incline
on ground

canals
TC
p/m²

Hazard type number

+2 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2 +1 +1
AP blast mines
+1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

AP frag mines - - +1 +2 - +1 +1 +1 - - +1
(stake mounted)
- - 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0
AP bounding - - +2 +3 - +1 +1 +1 - +1 +1
fragmentation
mines - - 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0
+1 - - - - - - - - - +1
AT mines
0 - - - - - - - - - 0
+2 - - +2 - - +2 - - - -
Ordnance
+1 - - 0 - - 0 - - - -
+2 +3 +1 +2 - - +1 +1 +1 +1
Submunitions
0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0

The additional risk presented by the hazard is the number with a yellow background. In most
cases, the measures in TRA Table 3 can be taken to reduce that risk. When those measures have
been taken, the numbers with a green background must be used.
To assess the additional risk presented by Task Conditions:
1. For each hazard, check whether the measures to reduce the additional risk presented by
Task Conditions will be taken.
2. For each type of hazard at the site and for each of the Task Conditions listed, select the
yellow or green number depending on whether the measures to reduce the additional risk
will be taken. Add the numbers for the hazard and write the total in the column on the
right.

Page: 20
6.4 TRA Table 5: Calculating the Risk Numbers
Write each hazard into TRA Table 5, then calculate the total Risk Number for that hazard and that
procedure at this Task by multiplying the PoD by the SoC number, then adding the TC number.

TRA Table 5: Calculating Risk Numbers

Total Risk
PoD x SoC + TC = Number
Hazard:
Procedure 1 x + =
Procedure 2 x + =
Procedure 3 x + =
Procedure 4 x + =
Procedure 5 x + =
Procedure 6 x + =
Hazard:
Procedure 1 x + =
Procedure 2 x + =
Procedure 3 x + =
Procedure 4 x + =
Procedure 5 x + =
Procedure 6 x + =
Hazard:
Procedure 1 x + =
Procedure 2 x + =
Procedure 3 x + =
Procedure 4 x + =
Procedure 5 x + =
Procedure 6 x + =
Hazard:
Procedure 1 x + =
Procedure 2 x + =
Procedure 3 x + =
Procedure 4 x + =
Procedure 5 x + =
Procedure 6 x + =
Hazard:
Procedure 1 x + =
Procedure 2 x + =
Procedure 3 x + =
Procedure 4 x + =
Procedure 5 x + =
Procedure 6 x + =
Extend this table for the number of Hazards at the Task.

Page: 21
7. Completion documentation
Before the land can be released for use, documentation for the Task must be completed and
included in the Task Folder that is returned to Programme Manager’s office. The Task Supervisor
must ensure that:
1. The Task Release Plan is finalised with a complete record of the work prepared in a
Completion Report.
2. The Task map must be accurately drawn and show areas cleared, reduced, verified and
cancelled.
3. The position of the Benchmark, Turning Points and Intermediate Points should be
checked. The Task Release Plan will have changed as work progressed and the
anticipated perimeter of the area may have changed. New markers must be placed and
recorded whenever necessary.
4. The Platoon MRE officer should be briefed and given copies of the maps showing the
work conducted to present to the local administration.

7.1 Completion report

When necessary, the IMSMA Completion Report should be completed by the Programme
Manager.

An internal Completion Report should include the following information:

1. task identification number and name;
2. demining conducted over specific parts of the site;
3. the depth of any search in all areas;
4. a summary of the procedures and assets used to process the area;
5. any external Quality Assurance (QA) reports there may be;
6. any external post-clearance inspection reports there may be;
7. coordinates of the turning points and intermediate points,;
8. a list of the mines and ERW located and destroyed;
9. accurate details of parts of the Task that have been reduced or cancelled;
10. details of any accidents that occurred at the Task;
11. a comparison with the survey data available before demining began; and
12. a formal declaration that indicates that the land has been processed in a way that gives
sufficient confidence to declare that there is no reason to believe it is hazardous.
The Programme Office must send the completed Task Folder to the NMAA, and ensue that they
receive copies of the required Completion Reports in a timely manner.

Page: 22
8. Daily MDD health care form

MDD handler’s name:_ Date: _

MDD’s name: Location: _
(Write OK or write details of any problems)
Temperature: __
Appetite: _

Water Consumption: __

Stool: __

Urine: __

Genital area: ____

Anal area: ____

Tail: __

Legs: __

Paws:_ __

Nose: __

Mouth: __

Breath: __
Eyes: __
Ears:_ ____

Coat: ____

Wounds (if any):

Medication (type and dose): _

Overall condition and attitude:

Other notes:_

MDD Handler MDD Team Leader

Page: 23
9. Accident report form
To generate a report that covers all required information quickly, the content of this Annex can be
cut and pasted and an entry made under each heading.

Demining accident

Accident details
Accident date: Accident time:
Where it occurred:
Primary cause: Secondary cause:
Class of accident: Date of main report:

Internal document ID: Name of investigator(s):

Mine/device: Ground condition:

No of victims:
Map details
Longitude: Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Coordinates fixed by:
Map east: Map north:
Map scale: Map series:
Map edition: Map sheet:
Map name:

SECTION 2: Accident report

Write under the following headings.

2.1 History of mined area

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.2 Processes in use

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.3 Activity surrounding the accident

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.4 Injuries sustained

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.5 Timeline
xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.6 Photographs and sketches

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

2.7 Statements
xxxxxxxxxxx.

2.8 Conclusions
xxxxxxxxxxxx.

Page: 24
2.9 Recommendations
xxxxxxxxxxxx.

SECTION 3: Victim Report

Complete a victim report for each Victim.

Internal Victim ID: Name:

Age: Gender:
Work title: Time to hospital:
PPE issued: PPE used:

3.1 Summary of injuries

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

3.2 Medical report

xxxxxxxxxxxx.

SECTION 4: Accident Notes

Notes that may be relevant to this accident. Tick the appropriate boxes.
Disciplinary action against Victim (?) ............. ......... □
Disciplinary action against supervisors (?) .... ......... □

Dog missed mine (?)................. .................... ......... □

Hand-tool may have increased injury (?) ....... ......... □

Inadequate area marking (?) .... .................... ......... □

Inadequate communications (?) .................... ......... □

Inadequate equipment (?)......... .................... ......... □

Inadequate investigation (?) ..... .................... ......... □

Inadequate medical provision (?)................... ......... □

Inadequate metal-detector (?) .. .................... ......... □

Inadequate survey (?) ............... .................... ......... □

Inadequate training (?).............. .................... ......... □

Inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?) ........ ......... □

Incomplete detonation (?) ......... .................... ......... □

Inconsistent statements (?)....... .................... ......... □

Long hand-tool may have reduced injury (?) . ......... □

Mechanical detonation (?) ........ .................... ......... □

Mechanical follow-up (?)........... .................... ......... □

Metal-detector not used (?)....... .................... ......... □

Mine/device found in “cleared” area (?) ......... ......... □

Page: 25
No independent investigation available (?).... ......... □
Non-injurious accident (?)......... .................... ......... □

Pressure to work quickly (?) ..... .................... ......... □

Protective apron not worn (?) ... .................... ......... □

Request for better equipment (?)................... ......... □

Request for machine to assist (?) .................. ......... □

Squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) ................ ......... □

Standing to excavate (?) ........... .................... ......... □

Use of pick (?)........................... .................... ......... □

Use of rake (?) .......................... .................... ......... □

Use of shovel (?)....................... .................... ......... □

Vegetation clearance problem (?).................. ......... □

Victim ill (?) .............................. .................... ......... □

Visor not worn or worn raised (?)................... ......... □

Working distances ignored (?) .. .................... ......... □

SECTION 5: Analysis
Select a Primary and Secondary cause from the following:
1. Victim inattention (?)
2. Field control inadequacy (?)
3. Unavoidable (?)
4. Inadequate equipment (?)
5. Inadequate survey (?)
6. Inadequate training (?)
7. Management control inadequacy (?)
8. Other (?)
SECTION 8: Signed by
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Position:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Position: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comments from Task Supervisor:

..............................................................................
..............................................................................
..............................................................................
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Position:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page: 26
10. Internal QA/QC reports
The reports on the following pages are the templates for internal Quality Control reporting.

Page: 27
10.1 QA evaluation form: All manual procedures
1.General

Task ID: Date of QA:

Name of QA Inspector: Team:
Task Supervisor: Grid reference of
bench-mark:

2. Briefing [N/S means Not Seen]

Was a Task briefing conducted? Yes No N/S
Was a visitor’s log maintained? Yes No N/S
Were copies of all relevant SOPs available at the Task? Yes No N/S
Was a Task Release plan available? Yes No N/S

3. Site Preparation
Were the safe-area features laid out as described in the SOP? Yes No N/S
Was the Task area marked as described in the SOP? Yes No N/S
Could you easily see the line between cleared and uncleared areas? Yes No N/S

4. Procedures
What procedures were seen:……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Were the search lanes marked according to the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Were the working-distances as required in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Did the Section Leaders supervise at all times? Yes No N/S
Was PPE worn correctly by all staff in the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
Was the base-stick used correctly? Yes No N/S
5. Metal-detector procedures
Were the detector’s set-up and calibrated correctly? Yes No N/S
Was the detector test-area used with a Target mine? Yes No N/S
Was the correct metal-detector search patterns used? Yes No N/S
Was the detector search-head advanced appropriately? Yes No N/S
6. Prodding and Excavation Drills
Were approved hand-tools used and were they well maintained? Yes No N/S
Was the ground excavated to the Clearance depth? Yes No N/S
Did the deminer use the magnet and metal-detector during excavation? Yes No N/S
Was the excavation procedure conducted safely? Yes No N/S

7. Demolition
Were mines and ERW disposed of as described in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Were sentries posted on all access routes during demolitions? Yes No N/S
Were moving and render-safe procedures conducted correctly? Yes No N/S
Were demolition materials stored correctly? Yes No N/S
8. Command and Control
Did the Task Supervisor:
Know the location of all Staff? Yes No N/S
Have communication with all Supervisors? Yes No N/S
Was the Platoon Commander at the Task area at all times? Yes No N/S
Were the rest-breaks in accordance with the SOP? Yes No N/S
Did the supervisors know the CASAVAC plan? Yes No N/S

Page: 28
9.Medical
Was the following in accordance with the SOP?

Was a Paramedic present Yes No N/S Was an Ambulance present? Yes No N/S
Was the Ambulance parked Was there a stretcher at the
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
correctly base-line?
Was the Ambulance driver Was the Paramedic close
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
present enough to the deminers?
Were the contents of the Was the HLS appropriately
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
Medical bag correct marked?
Were all medical Was the Ambulance fitted with
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
consumables “in-date” the minimum equipment

10.Communications
Was there adequate communication between site and Task Supervisor? Yes No N/S
Was there communication between Task Supervisor and Country Office? Yes No N/S

11.Internal QA
Are internal QA checks conducted as required in the SOPs? Yes No N/S

12.QA Inspector’s assessment Good Satisfactory Poor

Justify the assessment in the space for comments below.

QA Inspector’s time at the Task site:

QA Inspector’s Comments and Recommendations

13.Task Supervisor

Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Task Supervisor’s Comments

14.Signatures

QA Inspector’s name: Signature:

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Page: 29
10.2 QA evaluation form: MDD procedures
1.General

Task ID: Date of QA:

Name of QA Inspector: Team:
MDD Coordinator: MDD Team Leader:
Task Supervisor: Grid reference of
bench-mark:

2. Briefing [N/S means Not Seen]

Was a Task briefing conducted? Yes No N/S
Was a visitor’s log maintained? Yes No N/S
Was a copy of the MDD SOPs available at the Task? Yes No N/S

3. Site Preparation
Was there an MDD training area close to the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
Did the MDD search successfully in the training area? Yes No N/S
Was MDD marking as described in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Was the MDD tasking order clear and logical? Yes No N/S

4. Procedures
What search patterns were seen:………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Were the working-distances as required in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Did the MDD Team Leader supervise at all times? Yes No N/S
Was PPE worn correctly by all staff in the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
Did the MDDs search with concentration as described in SOPs? Yes No N/S
Did the MDDs indicate targets as described in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Was MDD search conducted as required in the MDD Tasking order? Yes No N/S
5. MDD preparation
Was there an up-to-date record of each MDD’s training? Yes No N/S
Was there a daily record of each MDD’s health and fitness? Yes No N/S
Were the MDDs exercised appropriately? Yes No N/S
Were the kennel areas clean and suitable? Yes No N/S
Was a shaded area available for MDD rest? Yes No N/S
Did the MDDs have plenty of clean drinking water? Yes No N/S
Was there a “weather-station” in use? Yes No N/S
Were the dog’s leashes in good condition? Yes No N/A
6. Medical Aspects
Do the MDDs appear to be well cared for and in good condition? Yes No N/A
Were the MDDs travelling arrangements as required? Yes No N/A
Was an MDD medical bag on site? Yes No N/A
Was the following in accordance with the SOP?

Was a Paramedic present Yes No N/S Was an Ambulance present? Yes No N/S
Was the Ambulance parked Was there a stretcher at the
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
correctly base-line?
Was the Ambulance driver Was the Paramedic close
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
present enough to the deminers?
Were the contents of the Was the HLS appropriately
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
Medical bag correct marked?

Page: 30
Were all medical Was the Ambulance fitted with
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
consumables “in-date” the minimum equipment

7. Communications
Was there adequate communication between site and Task Supervisor? Yes No N/S
Was there communication between Task Supervisor and Country Office? Yes No N/S

8.QA Inspector’s assessment Good Satisfactory Poor

Justify the assessment in the space for comments below.
QA Inspector’s time at the Task site:

QA Inspector’s Comments and Recommendations

9.MDD Team Leader

Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

MDD Team Leader’s Comments

10.Task Supervisor
Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Task Supervisor’s Comments

11.Signatures

QA Inspector’s name: Signature:

MDD Team Leader’s name Signature

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Page: 31
10.3 QA evaluation form: Mechanical procedures
1.General

Task ID: Date of QA:

Name of QA Inspector: Team:
Machine in use: Mechanical Team Leader:
Task Supervisor: Grid reference of bench-
mark:

2. Briefing [N/S means Not Seen]

Was a Task briefing conducted? Yes No N/S
Was a visitor’s log maintained? Yes No N/S
Was a copy of the relevant Mechanical SOPs available at the Task? Yes No N/S

3. Site Preparation
Was there a machine Parking Area close to the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
Were there machine Inspection Areas close to the base-line? Yes No N/S
Was Mechanical marking as described in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Was the Mechanical tasking order clear and logical? Yes No N/S

4. Procedures
What ground processing patterns were seen:………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Were the safety-distances as required in the SOPs? Yes No N/S
Did the Mechanical Team Leader supervise at all times? Yes No N/S
Was PPE worn correctly by all staff in the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
Was there PPE inside the cab of any manned machine? Yes No N/S
Was there a fire extinguisher in any manned machine? Yes No N/S
Was ground processing conducted as required in the Tasking order? Yes No N/S
Had the depth of processing been tested outside the hazardous area? Yes No N/S
What depth of processing was achieved inside the hazardous area?
…………………………………………..
Were the overlaps of the ground processing as required in the SOP? Yes No N/S
5. Machine preparation
Was there an up-to-date record of each machine’s use? Yes No N/S
Was there mechanical log-book kept as required in the SOP? Yes No N/S
Was the machine well maintained and working properly? Yes No N/S
Were machine consumables kept cleanly and safely? Yes No N/S
6. Medical Aspects
Was there an appropriate CASEVAC plan available? Yes No N/A
Was the following in accordance with the SOP?

Was a Paramedic present Yes No N/S Was an Ambulance present? Yes No N/S
Was the Ambulance parked Was there a stretcher at the
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
correctly base-line?
Was the Ambulance driver Was the Paramedic close
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
present enough to the deminers?
Were the contents of the Was the HLS appropriately
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
Medical bag correct marked?
Were all medical Was the Ambulance fitted with
Yes No N/S Yes No N/S
consumables “in-date” the minimum equipment

Page: 32
7. Communications
Was there adequate communication between the Operator,
observers and the Team Leader? Yes No N/S
Was there adequate communication between the Team Leader
and the Task Supervisor? Yes No N/S
Was there communication between Task Supervisor and Country Office? Yes No N/S

8.QA Inspector’s assessment Good Satisfactory Poor

Justify the assessment in the space for comments below.
QA Inspector’s time at the Task site:

QA Inspector’s Comments and Recommendations

9.Mechanical Team Leader

Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Mechanical Team Leader’s Comments

11.Task Supervisor
Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Task Supervisor’s Comments

12.Signatures

QA Inspector’s name: Signature:

Mechanical Team Leader’s name: Signature

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Page: 33
10.4 QA evaluation form on Task completion
1.General

Task ID: Date of QA:

Name of QA Inspector: Team:
Task Supervisor: Grid reference of
bench-mark:
Task start date: Task completion date:

2.Demining procedures in the hazardous area: Mechanical Manual MDD

3. Marking and Recording [N/S means Not Seen]

a. Was the work at the Task properly recorded and mapped? Yes No N/S
b. Were all discovered mines and ERW properly recorded? Yes No N/S
c. Are the reference points easy identifiable? Yes No N/S
d. Is the bench-mark permanently marked as required? Yes No N/S
e. Has temporary marking and fencing material been removed? Yes No N/S
f. Were scrap-metal, rubbish and latrines filed in? Yes No N/S
g. Was the Completion Report completed properly? Yes No N/S
h. Was the Task Folder present? Yes No N/S
i. Were the following included in the Task Folder?
i. The updated Release Plan? Yes No N/S
ii. Clear map showing areas processed? Yes No N/S
iii. Visitors log? Yes No N/S
4.Hand Over
a. Have local people been told that the Task is completed? Yes No N/S
b. Has the owner(s) of the area been informed? Yes No N/
c. Have local authorities been formally notified? Yes No N/
d. Have the residual risks been fully explained to the end-users? Yes No N/
e. HAS MRE been conducted and recorded in the Task Folder? Yes No N/
If the answer to any of the above in “No”, explain why under Comments below.
QA Inspector’s time at the Task site:
5.QA Assessment: Acceptable Not acceptable
QA Inspector’s comments and recommendations

6: Task Supervisor: Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Comments by Task Supervisor:

7. Programme Manager
Comments by Programme Manager:

9. Signatures:

QA Inspector’s name: Signature:

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Programme Manager’s name: Signature:

Page: 34
10.5 QA evaluation form: Command and Control
1.General

Task ID: Date of QA:

Name of QA Inspector: Team:
Task Supervisor: Platoon Supervisor(s):

Platoon Commander(s): Section Leader(s):

2. Task Documentation [N/S means Not Seen]

Was the Task Folder available and up-to-date? Yes No N/S
Was the Task Release Plan clear and logical? Yes No N/S
Were the Task Maps clear and up-to date? Yes No N/S
Were all demining assets issued clear Tasking orders? Yes No N/S
Were there appropriate CASEVAC plans that all supervisor and
medical staff knew? Yes No N/S
Did Section Leaders produce appropriate daily reports? Yes No N/S
Did Platoon Commanders/Team Leaders produce appropriate
daily and weekly reports? Yes No N/S
Did Platoon Supervisors work with the Task Supervisor to
produce all progress reports? Yes No N/S

3. Logistics
Was all necessary equipment available? Yes No N/S
Were all necessary consumables available? Yes No N/S
Was the system for resupply of consumables applied properly? Yes No N/S
Were the system for reporting breakdowns and requesting new
equipment working efficiently? Yes No N/S

3.Integration and teamwork

What demining assets were used at the Task:………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Did all the responsible supervisors agree Tasking orders? Yes No N/S
Were there Team meetings to discuss progress and efficiency? Yes No N/S
Did Supervisors accept responsibility for the work under their control? Yes No N/S
5. Field controls
Were all field supervisors with their men at all times? Yes No N/S
Were errors and omissions corrected immediately? Yes No N/S
Was there a feeling of Team Spirit among the field staff? Yes No N/S
Did all staff accept responsibility for safety and efficiency? Yes No N/S

7.Communications
Was there adequate communication at the Task site? Yes No N/S
Was there adequate communication between site and Task Supervisor? Yes No N/S
Was there communication between Task Supervisor and Country Office? Yes No N/S
Were field staff able to communicate concerns to Supervisors freely? Yes No N/S
8.Anonymous comment and recommendations
Use the space below to write comments, questions and concerns from all levels of Staff without
recording the name or position of the person commenting.

Page: 35
Anonymous comments, questions and recommendations:

9.QA Inspector’s assessment Good Satisfactory Poor

Justify the assessment in the space for comments below.
QA Inspector’s time at the Task site:

QA Inspector’s Comments and Recommendations:

10.Task Supervisor

Were you debriefed after the QA inspection? Yes No

Task Supervisor’s Comments:

12. Signatures

QA Inspector’s name: Signature:

Mechanical Team Leader’s name: Signature

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Page: 36
11. Cancellation report format
Task ID: Date of Assessment:
Task Supervisor: Platoon Supervisor(s):

Platoon Commander(s): Squadron Leader(s):

Cancellation of: Part of hazardous area All of hazardous area

Bench-mark GR: Start-point GR:

Turning and
Intermediate points GR:

(Enter GR for all Turning Points and Intermediate Points in numbered sequence.)
Is the Survey marking permanently recorded on the ground? Yes No
(When the area Cancelled is part of a hazardous area, its perimeter must be marked.)

The following Cancellation Criteria have been met:

1. There have been no reports of accidents to people or livestock within 150 metres;
2. There is no military record of a minefield within 150 metres;
3. No mines have been discovered within 150 metres;
4. There is no evidence that the area was a battle-area;
5. There are no features on the land that may have been defended;
6. Local people have used the area and report no mine or ERW threat;
7. Staff have walked and mapped the perimeter of the land; and
8. The Task Supervisor has walked over the land.
When the area to be cancelled is a part of a recorded hazardous area:
1. Ground between the area to be Cancelled and the nearest mine found has been Reduced
and no evidence of mines has been found; and
2. The perimeter of the area to be cancelled has been marked.
A detailed map is attached to this form showing the perimeter of the area Cancelled.
This area is hereby Cancelled as having No Known Threat.

Task Supervisor’s name: Signature:

Task Assessment Team Signatures:

members:

Province: Country Office:

Programme Manager’s name: Signature:

Page: 37
12. Demolition Records
EOD Operatives should fill out these forms as they work.

Form A: Mines and ERW found in the hazardous area

Complete one record for each item, or use Form B for bulk records

1. Name of mine/ERW: GPS coordinates where found:

Depth located: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Moved Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS
Explosive CDS Burned Explosive CDS Fire Powder HE and Fuel for
demolition (or flare) As-found Disarmed demolition Burned Burned (or flare) dets fire

Notes:

2. Name of mine/ERW: GPS coordinates where found:

Depth located: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Moved Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS
Explosive CDS Burned Explosive CDS Powder HE and Fuel for
demolition (or flare) As-found Disarmed demolition Burned Fire burned (or flare) dets fire

Notes:

3. Name of mine/ERW: GPS coordinates where found:

Depth located: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Moved Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS
Explosive CDS Burned Explosive CDS Powder HE and Fuel for
demolition (or flare) As-found Disarmed demolition Burned Fire burned (or flare) dets fire

Notes:

4. Name of mine/ERW: GPS coordinates where found:

Depth located: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Moved Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used:
CDS
Explosive CDS Burned Explosive CDS Powder HE and Fuel for
demolition (or flare) As-found Disarmed demolition Burned Fire burned (or flare) dets fire

Notes:

5. Name of mine/ERW: GPS coordinates where found:

Depth located: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Moved Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used:
CDS
Explosive CDS Burned Explosive CDS Powder HE and Fuel for
demolition (or flare) As-found Disarmed demolition Burned Fire burned (or flare) dets fire

Notes:

Page: 38
Form B: Bulk demolition of unfuzed items
Complete one record for each item, or use Form A for items found in the hazardous area

1. Name of mine/ERW: Number of these devices in this demolition:

Place where found: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS Powder HE and dets Fuel for fire
Explosive Explosive CDS Fire
demolition CDS Burned demolition Burned Burned

Notes:

2. Name of mine/ERW: Number of these devices in this demolition:

Place where found: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS Powder HE and dets Fuel for fire
Explosive Explosive CDS Fire
demolition CDS Burned demolition Burned burned

Notes:

3. Name of mine/ERW: Number of these devices in this demolition:

Place where found: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used
CDS Powder HE and dets Fuel for fire
Explosive Explosive CDS Fire
demolition CDS Burned demolition Burned burned

Notes:

4. Name of mine/ERW: Number of these devices in this demolition:

Place where found: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used:
CDS Powder HE and dets Fuel for fire
Explosive Explosive CDS Fire
demolition CDS Burned demolition Burned burned

Notes:

5. Name of mine/ERW: Number of these devices in this demolition:

Place where found: Condition:
Destroyed In-situ by: Destroyed after moving by: Consumables used:
CDS Powder HE and dets Fuel for fire
Explosive Explosive CDS Fire
demolition CDS Burned demolition Burned burned

Notes:

EOD Operative’s Signature: …………………………………………………………………….

Page: 39
12.1 Burning Team Records

Form A: Burning mine bodies and fuzes separately

Complete one record for each type. Use Form B for fuzed mines

BTC Name: …………………………………………Demolition site:……………………………………Date:…………………..

1. Name of mine:
Number of mine bodies delivered to demolition site:
Number of separated fuzes delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in barrels Number burned in “burning cones” Consumables used
Liquid Fire- Kg of
fuel lighters sawdust
Notes:

2. Name of mine:
Number of mine bodies delivered to demolition site:
Number of separated fuzes delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in barrels Number burned in “burning cones” Consumables used
Liquid Fire- Kg of
fuel lighters sawdust
Notes:

3. Name of mine:
Number of mine bodies delivered to demolition site:
Number of separated fuzes delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in barrels Number burned in “burning cones” Consumables used
Liquid Fire- Kg of
fuel lighters sawdust
Notes:

4. Name of mine:
Number of mine bodies delivered to demolition site:
Number of separated fuzes delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in barrels Number burned in “burning cones” Consumables used
Liquid Fire- Kg of
fuel lighters sawdust
Notes:

BTC Signature: …………………………………………………………………….

Page: 40
Form B: Burning fuzed mines
Complete one record for each type. Use Form A for separated mines

BTC Name: …………………………………………Demolition site:……………………………………Date:…………………..

1. Name of mine:
Number of mines delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in trenches Consumables used
Liquid fuel Fire-lighters Kg of sawdust

Notes:

2. Name of mine:
Number of mines delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in trenches Consumables used
Liquid fuel Fire-lighters Kg of sawdust

Notes:

3. Name of mine:
Number of mines delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in trenches Consumables used
Liquid fuel Fire-lighters Kg of sawdust

Notes:

4. Name of mine:
Number of mines delivered to demolition site:
Number burned in pits Number burned in trenches Consumables used
Liquid fuel Fire-lighters Kg of sawdust

Notes:

BTC Signature: …………………………………………………………………….

Page: 41
13. Daily attendance record

Date: Task ID: Task Supervisor:

Platoon Supervisor: Section Leader:

Name Internal ID number Signature

Date: Task ID: Task Supervisor:

Platoon Supervisor: Section Leader:

Name Internal ID number Signature

Page: 42
14. CASEVAC and emergency response plan
An accurate sketch map showing routes from a new Task to the nearest hospitals with surgical
facilities must be prepared before work starts in the hazardous areas. The hospitals should be
visited, their facilities assessed and reliable contact numbers obtained so that there is confidence
that the hospital will be able to respond appropriately to a casualty’s needs. The routes should be
driven and the time taken recorded to allow an accurate Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to be
given if an accident occurs. The information gained from the hospital visits must be recorded in
writing in the CASEVAC plan (and may be written on the sketch map).
The sketch map should have enough detail to ensure that a driver following the map will not take
a wrong turning. The route should start at the Task site and show the alternative positions at
which the ambulance will be positioned as work progresses.

15. Personnel, logistical and financial reports

16. Senior Paramedic S&OH pan

16.1 Paramedic’s report on treatment of Accident victim

17. Vehicle Service Log

18. Vehicle Travel Log

Vehicle travel log with all journeys and all fuel use recorded.

19. Machine Deployment Plan

20. Visitors Log

Page: 43
MINE ACTION & TRAINING

IMSMA DOCUMENTATION

DISCLAIMER
The information contained in this document is from references and known best practices
for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no way exhaustive, and Qualified
EOD trained persons should always adhere to Authorised Standard Operating procedures,
in the theatre of operations. The IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for any accident or
incident that results in the use of the information contained within this document, other
than for use on the IMAS/ EOD training course.

Page 1 of 83
WHO AND WHEN COMPLETES DOCUMENTATION

Dangerous area form:

1. The dangerous area forms will be filled based on the GMAA of the area by the organization.

2. The dangerous area forms will be filled for any hazards reported by non-technical survey organization, UNMIS, aid
organization, MRE teams and local authorities.

3. Dangerous area report should be filled for the spot mine/UXO that are cleared by an organization. The organization will
also fill the last part of the report, which defined the clearance identifications. The quantity and type of mines/UXO
destroyed will be recorded under the type of devices. In this case no extra completion or clearance report is required.
(IMSMA data entry will enter this a dangerous area and change its status to close. They also should enter a progress
report for the devices destroyed)

Task Data Sheet:

Ops fill the task data sheet for the defined activities. The task data sheet will be filled when the Ops plan a TS, CL, Assessment or
verification process. The task data sheet should clearly indicate the type and amount of the work, which is to be implemented by
the tasked organization.

Technical Survey form:

1. This form will be filled by the organization that is implementing TS on DA or MA only in case one or few minefields are
generated from the tasked items.

2. During the technical report part of the DA could be UXO locations or part of DA will not be required to convert to MF at
this time i.e top of the mountain, then new DA form will be filled for this specific part of DA or UXO location.

3. In case the tasked area was safe and no evidence of mines/UXO were found during the TS than TS form is not required.
The completion report based on assessment to remove this hazard from the database should be filled by the tasked
organization.

Minefield form:

This form will be filled when the perimeters of the hazard is defined. The minefield form provide full information on the hazards,
its impact and future mine action implication.

Progress report form:

This form should be filled for the clearance of a task by implementing organization on weekly basis for each team separately.
Two teams cannot report on one weekly progress report.

Completion Survey form:

1. After completion of the clearance for a task the clearance organization will fill the completion survey form. This
completion survey forms should be accepted by the UNMAO QA and properly handed over to the local authority or
interested parties.

2. In case based on the assessment of a tasked area, which is not yet known as a dangerous area, a modified completion
survey report will be filled out by the tasked organization.

External QA form:

Related QA forms will be filled during the monitoring of QA/Ops officers from a task.

MRE Activity form:

MRE activity form is filled by the organization implementing MRE activities for each kind of the activity for the audience at one
session.

Page 2 of 83
Demining Accident/Casualty forms:

Demining Accident form is filled when a mine/XUO accident happened during the mine action activity. The demining
organization will fill the form. One casualty form will be filled for each staff who got injured or killed in the Demining Accident.

Accident/Victim forms:

For all other mine/UXO accident an accident form will be filled. One victim form will be filled for each victim.

Location form:

Any mine action staff working in the field will fill this form. The location form provides information on the various location in
country.

Contact form:

This form will be used for the information on the external and internal contacts. Internal contacts are the mine action
supervisory and field level personnel such as ops officer, QA officers. External contacts are the contact outside of the UN mine
action program such as governmental authorities who deal with mine action program, organization focal points and local
community focal points who has information on mines/UXO.

Town form:

The town form could be filled in case some data elements on the town form is known to the mine action staff.

Page 3 of 83
IMSMA Dangerous Area Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General information
1.1 1.9
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.10
Owner MAC: Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.11
Source: A B C D E F
1.3 1.12
Reported by: (Address & Tel) Organisation (Address & Tel):
1.4 1.13
Position: Date of report:
1.5 1.14
Data entry date: Date report received:
1.6 1.15
Data entry by: Date of verification:
1.7 1.16
Verified by: Referenced Task ID:
1.8 1.18
Status: Name of Dangerous Area:
2
Geographical reference
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 1 2.11

Nearest boma/village: MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
2.10
Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or
2.5 2.11
Municipality: Map with <30 m or >30 m accuracy Map scale: 1 :
2.12
Description of the geographical reference

3
Description of the dangerous area perimeter points

3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6

From No. To Bearing Distance X/ East./ Long. Y/ North./ Lat. MGRS Coord.
Point Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

1
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.9.2001) Page 4 of 83
IMSMA Dangerous Area Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
4.1
Distance from nearest town: km
4.2
Direction from nearest town: North South North – East South – East
East West North – West South West Unknown
4.3
Was there fighting in the area? Yes No

4.4
Kind of dangerous area: Ammunition dump Suspected minefield Current ambush area
Confrontation area UXO Location

4.5
Information source: Civilians Mine acc. involving animals Mine accident report
Military person Minefield record
4.6
Type of area: City Field Forest Roadside Road for vehicles Path
Governmental building Military installation Residential building
Riverbank Unknown Other:

4.7 4.8
Estimated length of the area: m Estimated width of the area: m
4.8 4.8 2
Azimut: ° Calculated size of area: m
4.9
Marking: Official signs Local signs Fenced Several None

5
Suspected device in the dangerous area
5.1
Unknown
5.2 5.3
Device category Device type
5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7
(Landmines, bombs etc.) (AP, AT etc.) Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

6.1
Comment about Mine/UXO location and access? (Description of location/area):

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IMSMA Dangerous Area Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
6.2
Information on minefield record:
(Warring fraction, designer (name & address), date laid, amount & type of mines/UXO)

Terrain: Vegetation:
In case the Dangerous area is UXO spot and is cleared then please provide the following
Confirmed Clear: Confirmed Clear Date:
Confirmed Clear by:
Comments of the clearance of UXO Spot:

7
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

8
Attach explanatory map and/or sketch: (Show on sketch: type and location of mines/UXO)

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.9.2001) Page 6 of 83

IMSMA Dangerous Area Report Locator code: …/…/…/…

Checklist

• Main road
• Road condition
• Towns
• Provincial, District
boundaries
• Airfields
• Railways etc.
• Mined Areas with:
Reference point
Distance &
bearing to Area(s)
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.9.2001) Page 7 of 83

IMSMA Task Data Sheet
1
General information
1.1 1.3
ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.4
Owner MAC: Data entry by:
1.5
Task Name:
1.6
Task manager:
1.7 1.7
Task owner: Team Number:
1.8 1.9
Planned start date: Planned end date:
1.8 1.9
Effective start date: Effective end date:
1.8 1.9
Actual status: In this state since:
If the task is of the road please state the estimated length:

1.10
Description of the task

2
Task Description
2.3
What happened in the past:

2.4
What will happen in the near future:

11
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

3
Tasked items
Kind ID Name Nearest City Priority Status

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 03.08.01) Page 8 of 83

IMSMA Task Data Sheet
4
Related items
Kind ID Name Nearest City Tasked item related to

5
Additional items
5.1
Towns / Villages
Locator Name

5.2
Contacts
ID Name Phone number E-Mail address

5.3
Locations
ID Name Type Nearest City

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 03.08.01) Page 9 of 83

IMSMA Task Data Sheet
5.4
Accidents / Incidents
ID Number of victims Nearest City

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 03.08.01) Page 10 of 83

Impact Survey
Cover Sheet Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1.
General
Name Code
1.1 1.10
Country Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.11
Region Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.12
State/County Source: A B C D E F
1.4 1.13
Locality/Payam Survey ID: (Leave blank)
1.5 1.14
Data enumerator Owner MAC:
organisation
1.6 1.15
Data enumerator 1 Referenced TaskID(s):
1.7 1.16
Data enumerator 2 Survey planned start date:
1.8 1.17
Area officer Survey planned completion date:
1.9 1.16
Area supervisor Survey effective start date:
1.18 1.16
Status Survey effective start date:
2
Location:
2.1
Village/Boma name:
2.2
Village/Boma code:
2.3
Name alternative 1:
2.4
Name alternative 2:
2.5
Name alternative 3:
2.6
Name alternative 4:
2.7
Name alternative 5:
2.8
Municipality:

3
Geographical reference:
3.1 3.6
Coord. system: Map name:
3.2 3.6
X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:
3.3 3.6
Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:
3.4 2 3.6
MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
3.5
Coordinate fixed by: DGPS GPS
3.6
or Map with accuracy: <30m >30 m Map scale: 1:
3.7
Description of the geographical reference:

22
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
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Impact Survey
Cover Sheet Locator code: ….../….../….../…

4
Interview group data
3 4.3 4.4 4 4.5 4.6 5
Name Sex Age Mine Vocation
4.1 4.2
Family name First name M F 5 - 14 15 - 29 30-44 45-59 60 + victim 1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

4.7
In which language was the group interview primarily conducted?

3
Interviewee name should be entered with English (Latin character set).
4
Age categories derived from the Cambodia Red Cross Victims surveillance program.
5
Three categories such as: farmer, merchant, soldier or housewife. To be determined by the country MAC
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 12 of 83
Impact Survey
Cover Sheet Locator code: ….../….../….../…
5
External / Expert opinion (prior to Impact Survey):
5.1
Origin of impact survey report:  National Capital  Provincial Headquarters  State/County Headquarters
 While visiting another community  Former non-affected community National  Other ______________
5.2
Kind of expert responsible:  Government  NGO  UN  Member of Community
 Other ______________
5.3
Judgment of area condition prior to visiting:  Affected  Possibly affected  Not affected

6 6
Historical / Conflict information:
6.1
Last conflict in the area: (year)
6.2
Year mines problem began: (year)
6.3
Year mines last planted: (year)
6.7
Comments on local history of mines problem

6.8
Intensity of military activity: A great deal A moderate amount A little
None Unknown
6.9
When was settlement established?: (year or description)
7 7
Mine Risk Education:
7.1
Mine risk education took place within past 24 months: Yes No Unknown
Select:
School presentation Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Posters Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Radio Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Performing group Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Community center Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Religious organisation Last 24 months over 24 months ago
Other: Last 24 months over 24 months ago

6.2
Organisations involved in recent mine risk education (if any):

6
Date (Year) that last conflict took place in the area should be entered.
7
Mine risk education given during the specified time frame?
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Impact Survey
Cover Sheet Locator code: ….../….../….../…
7
Victim totals
7.1 7.2 7.3
Number Number Total
killed injured
Number of recent victims

Number of victims more than 24 months

8
ago and recent victims not specified
Total number of victims
8
Victim assistance during past 24 months: Yes No Unknown

9
Locality/Payam:
9.1 9.2
Pre-war population Current population
Data collected Census Key Census Key
informants informants
Number of households
Total population
9.3
Marking and survey during the past 24 months: Yes No Unknown
9.4
Mine clearance during the past 24 months: Yes No Unknown
9.5
Local clearance efforts: Yes No Unknown
If yes, effects of local clearance efforts:
9.6
Piped water supply: Yes No Unknown
9.7
Electricity supply: Yes No Unknown
9.8
Fuel available: Yes No Unknown
9.9
Telephone connection: Yes No Unknown
9.10
Medical facility: Basic health facility Hospital None Other Unknown
9.11
Number of primary schools:
9.12
Number of secondary schools:
9.13
Presence of higher education institutions: Yes No Unknown
If yes, what institutions?
9.14
Economic base: Agriculture Industry Tourism Government Other
What other?

8
Aggregate data determined through group discussion. Numbers will be entered in the boxes.
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 14 of 83
Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…

(One sheet per mined area)

10
Mined area
10.1 10.2
ID (consecutively) Name of mined area (geographic location)

Viewing point
10.4
Starting point measured from viewing point Yes No

Geographic coordinates of viewing point

10.5
Coordinate system:
10.7 10.8 10.9 9
Map east Map north MGRS

Starting point of mined area (from viewing point or from geographical reference of community)
10.11 10
Bearing degrees Distance
10.12 11 10.13
Meters Walk time (min)

Starting point converted to geographic / UTM / MGRS coordinates

10.14 10.15 10.16
X/ Easting/ Longitude Y/ Northing/ Latitude MGRS

10.17
Coordinates visually verified Yes No
10.18
Description of the mined area and starting point:

10.20 2
Estimated size of mined area: m
10.21
Marking (choose only one): Local signs Official signs Fenced None
10.22
Was there fighting? Yes No Unknown
10.23
Status of mined area:

9
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
10
Bearing in degrees, geographic. North is 0 degrees and 360 degrees; east is 90 degrees; south is 180 degrees; and
west is 270 degrees.
11
Estimated distance in meters from the Village/Boma center coordinate to the closest point of mined area.
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Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…
11
Suspected ordnance in the area:
11.1 11.2
Type of Device Model (description)
AP AT UXO Unknown
AP AT UXO Unknown
AP AT UXO Unknown
AP AT UXO Unknown
AP AT UXO Unknown
AP AT UXO Unknown

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 16 of 83

Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…

(One sheet per mined area)

12.1
Agricultural fields blocked:
Select: Crop type: Irrigated Grain
Rain fed Fruit
Vegetable
Other
Unknown

Pasture Type: Fixed pasture Cattle

Migratory pasture Goats, Sheep
Other
Unknown

12.2
Non-agricultural areas blocked:
Select: Fuel
Food
Building materials
Medicinal

12.3
Water access blocked:
Select: Irrigation
Fishing
Watering animals
Bathing
Laundry
Other
Drinking: Lake, Stream etc.
Well, Spring, etc.

13.1
Infrastructure blocked:
Housing area blocked
Roads blocked to:
State/County Other:
center
Provincial capital Alternative routes:
National capital

13.2
Other infrastructure blocked (one or more):
Bridge Factory
Dam or canal Oil field
Railroad Medical facility
Airstrip Educational facility
Power line Market
Power station Cultural site
Other vital points: What:
13.3
Is a development project planed in the area: Yes No Unknown
13.4
If yes, is the project funded: Yes No Unknown
13.5
Contact info for project:
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 17 of 83
Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…

(One sheet per mined area)

14
Terrain data
14.1
Vegetation: Short grass Tall grass Bushes Trees None
Other: Unknown
14.2
Ground profile: Flat Hillside Ridge Gully Other: Unknown
14.3
Special features:

14.4
Major impacts of this mined area:

Person that identified this mined area

14.5
Name:
14.6
Contact information:

Mined area sketch

14.7
Attach explanatory map or sketch:
14.8
Picture ID’s:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 18 of 83

Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…

(One sheet per individual victim)

15
Recent Victims
15.1 12
Victim number:
15.2
Known dangerous area: Yes No
15.3 13 (year / month / day)
Date of detonation [if known]:
Name [if known]
15.4
Family name:
15.5
1st name:
15.6
2nd name:
15.7 15.8
Sex and age:
Male Female Unknown 0 – 4 year old
5 - 14 years old
15 - 29 years old
30 – 44 years old
45 - 59 years old
60 years and older
15.9
Occupation: Artisan Office work
Farming Trading
Herding Was not earning
Household work Other What other:
Military Unknown
15.10
Activity: Military
Civilian Travel Herding
Tampering Playing
Farming Unknown
Household work Other
Collecting food, water, etc.
15.11 15.12
Wounds: Fatal Care: Emergency medical
Amputation Physical rehabilitation
Loss of Sight Vocational training
Other body wound Other
Unknown None
Immediately fatal
Unknown

12
The victim number is assigned in a sequential order by the enumerator.
13
This sheet is to be completed for each victim/survivor during the last 24 months. The time and detonation is being
asked here as a check that the mine accident happened during the last 24 months. Date should be entered YYYY-
MM-DD.
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 19 of 83
Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…

16 14
Local contacts :
15 16 17
Name Address Communications Remarks

14
Not only contacts collected during survey, but all contacts from Village/Boma.
15
Fill in name, first name, and position.
16
Fill in organisation, department, address, postal code, Village/Boma, and country.
17
Fill in phone and fax numbers, e-mail address, call sign, frequency, and channel.
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 20 of 83
Impact Survey
Mined Area Locator code: …/…/…/…
17.1
General comments:

Field adjustment:
17.2
Correction factor: -20% -10% 0 +10% +20%
17.3
Justification of correction factor:

17.4
Major mine impacts:

17.5
Change of severity: Less severe Same More severe
Not applicable Unknown
18
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

19
Data collection information:
19.1 19.5
Tasked by Area supervisor
19.2
Date report received Date & signature

19.3 19.6
Data entered by Verified by
19.4 19.7
Date & signature Date of verification

19.8
Enumerator name 1
19.9
Enumerator name 2
19.10
Date & signature Total number of pages 83
20
Community leader certifying:
20.1
Name
20.2
Position
Date & signature

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 21 of 83

Impact Survey
Contacts
21
Attachment:
• General location & Contacts
• Sketch:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 22 of 83

Technical Survey
IMSMA Sketch of General Area(s) Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General technical survey information
1.1 1.10
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.11
Owner MAC: Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.12
Impact survey ID – Mined area ID: - Source: A B C D E F
1.4
Referenced TaskID:
1.5 1.8
Reported by: Report received
1.6 1.9
Position: Date of report
1.7 1.18
Organisation: Status

1.13
Area officer
1.14
Area supervisor
1.15 1.16
Planned start date Planned end date
1.15 1.16
Effective start date Effective end date
1.17
Tasked by

2
Coordinates of Survey (geographical reference)
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/Payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 18 2.11

Nearest Village/Boma: MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
2.10
Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or
2.5
Municipality: Map with accuracy <30m or >30m 2.11
Map scale: 1 :
2.12
Description of geographical reference

3
Data collector information:
1.12 3.2
Reported/collected by (name): Verified by (name):
Location: Location:
1.16 3.1
Date: Date:
Signature: Signature:

Attachments:

18
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 23 of 83
Technical Survey
IMSMA Sketch of General Area(s) Locator code: …/…/…/…

Attach a sketch map

A) General area indicating main road, Village/Bomas, regional and State/County boundaries, railwais, airfields etc. (this
can be an annoted A 4 size)

B) Map of detailed area indicating mined area, area to be cleared, access roades, recommanded campsite and
emergency landing zones, local landmarks etc. Include a north pointer, scale and legend.

1 Square(5mm) = meters

Checklist

• Landmark
• Benchmark
• Datum point
• Turning
points
• Start line
• Safe lanes
• Safe areas
• Cleared
access roads
• Mine rows
• Location of
booby traps
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 24 of 83

Technical Survey
IMSMA Sketch of General Area(s) Locator code: …/…/…/…

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 28.9.2001) Page 25 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General Mine Field Information
1.1 1.11
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.12
Owner MAC Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.13
Technical survey ID: Source: A B C D E F
1.4 1.14
Minefield name Reported by:
1.5
Referenced TaskID(s):
1.5 1.15
Referenced Dangerous Area ID: Position:
1.6 1.16
Region: Organisation:
1.7 1.17
State/County: Report received
1.8 1.18
Locality/payam: Date of report
1.9 1.19
Nearest village/boma: Status
1.10
Municipality
1.20
Distance from nearest village/boma: km
1.21
Road possible for: Small 4x4 Big truck All
1.22
Best road to site from nearest village/boma:

1.23
Minefield description:

2
Medical facilities:

Name of location [specify details in “location sheet" for level 3,4, med.] Travel time in hours & minutes
2.1 2.2
Level 1:

2.3 2.4
Level 2:

2.5 2.6
Level 3:

2.7 2.8
Level 4:

2.9 2.10
Medivac:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 26 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
3
Minefield geographical reference and perimeters
3.1 3.2
Coord. system: Map edition:
3.2 3.2
Map name: Map sheet:
3.2 3.2
Map series: Map scale: 1:
5 6
Coordinates of the landmark: Coordinates of the benchmark:
5.1 6.1
X/ Easting/ Long: X/Easting/Long:
5.2 6.2
Y/ Northing/ Lat: Y/Northing/Lat:
5.3 6.3
MGRS Coord.: MGRS Coord.:
5.4 6.4
Coordinates fixed by: DGPS GPS Coordinates fixed by: DGPS GPS or
Import. from GIS: <30m >30m Map with accuracy of: <30m or >30m
5.5 6.5
Description of landmark: Description of benchmark:

6
Description of the minefield perimeter points
7.1 7.2 7.3
From point No. To point Bear. Dist. 7.4 7.5 7.6
[°] [m] X/ East./ Long. Y/ North./ Lat. MGRS Coord.
Benchmark 1 Datum point
Datum point 2

6.1
Size of area in square meters: m²
6.2
Marking: Local signs Official signs Fenced None

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 27 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
7
Estimated Devices
Type of Device Model Estimated
(AP, AT, UXO, etc.) Quantity

7.1
Estimated devices: Total:
7.2
Information Classification:

Code Evaluation Information Source

M1 Mines or UXO physically verified Confirmed Reliable
M2 Area reported with observed evidence of mines or UXO Unconfirmed Reliable
M3 Area reported with observed evidence of mines or UXO Unconfirmed Unreliable
M4 Area reported as mined with no evidence or indications of mines Unconfirmed Unreliable
or UXO
7.3
Condition of UXO: Unfused Safe Blind Unknown

8
Demining (operational information)
8.01
Vegetation: Grass Bushes Trees None
8.02
Vegetation density: Low Light High
8.03
Vegetation removable by: Manual Mechanical Chemical Burning
8.04
Terrain category: A (open, week ground)
B (hard ground mixed with rocks and light vegetation)
C (very hard stony ground with heavy vegetation)
D (wet/mud)

8.05
Soil Type: Sand Chalk Ploughed Clay Rocky Swamp
8.06
Contamination with: Metal Rubble tree stumps Other
8.07
Level of contamination with metal: Low Medium High
8.08
Level of soil metal content: Low Medium High

8.09
Drainage features: Canals Rivers Drainage Lakes Other
8.10
Ground profile: Flat Hillside Ridge Gully Embankment
8.11
Slope: 0-5% 5-10% 10-15% 15-20% 20-25% 25-30%
30% +

8.12
Is the terrain suitable to use dogs? Yes No Unknown
8.13
Is the terrain suitable to use detectors? Yes No Unknown
8.14
Is the terrain suitable to use prodding? Yes No Unknown

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 28 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
8.15
Is mechanical demining possible? Yes No Unknown
8.16
What type of mechanical device can be brought to the minefield: Light Medium Heavy

8.17
Special seasonal consideration:

9
Recommendation
9.1
Assessed degree of difficulty: 1 2 3 4 5
9.2
Recommended clearance priority: Low Medium High
9.3
Recommended no. of demining teams:
9.4
Type of operation recommended: Manual Mechanical Dogs Combined
9.5
Depth of clearance recommended: cm
9.6
Reason for clearance depth:

9.7
Estimated time for completion of clearance: days
9.8
Intended land use: Housing Development Industrial Agricultural Community
Other:
9.9
Date of intended land use: (month/year)

10
Agricultural fields blocked:
Select: Crop type: Irrigated Grain
Rain fed Fruit
Vegetable
Other
Unknown

Pasture Type: Fixed pasture Cattle

Migratory pasture Goats, Sheep
Other
Unknown

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 29 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…

11
Water access blocked:
Select:
Irrigation
Fishing
Watering animals
Bathing
Laundry
Other
Drinking: Lake or stream
Well or spring

12
Non-agricultural areas blocked:
Select: Fuel
Food
Building materials
Medicinal

13
Infrastructure blocked:
Housing area blocked

Roads blocked to:

State/County Other:
center
Regional capital Alternative routes:
National capital

14
Other infrastructure blocked:
Bridge Factory
Dam or canal Oil field
Railroad Medical facility
Airstrip Educational facility
Power line Market
Power station Cultural site
Other vital points: What:
15
Is a development project planed in the area: Yes No Unknown
15.1
If yes, is the project funded: Yes No Unknown
15.2
Contact info for project:
16
Mine risk education given: (How trained/who trained)

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 30 of 83

IMSMA Minefield Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
17
Additional information/comments

18
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

19
Data source information:

19.1 19.2
Reported (Collected) by: Verified by:
Location: Location:
19.1
Date: Date:
Signature: Signature:

19.3
IMSMA Data entry by:
19.4
Date entry date:
Signature

Total number of pages: 83

Attachments:

Attach a sketch map

Map of detailed area showing mined area, area to be cleared, access roads, recommanded campsite and emergency
landing zones, local landmarks etc. Include a north arrow, scale and legend.

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 31 of 83

Minefield Report
IMSMA Detailed sketch of area(s) with mine/UXO contamination Locator code: …/…/…/…

1 Square(5mm) = meters

Checklist

• Landmark
• Benchmark
• Datum point
• Turning
points
• Start line
• Safe lanes
• Safe areas
• Cleared
access roads
• Mine rows
• Location of
booby traps
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 32 of 83

IMSMA Progress Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General Information
1.01 1.09
Report ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.02 1.10
Owner MAC: Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.03 1.11
Reference: Source: A B C D E F
1.04 1.12
Report date: Start of reporting period:
1.05 1.13
Reported by: End of reporting period:
1.06 1.14
Position: Team leader:
1.07 1.15
Organisation: Team name:
1.08 1.16
Report received: Supervisor:
Type of Task: BAC Clearance UXO spot
1.17 1.18
Team hours worked: h Area cleared: m²
1.171 1.19
Team hours lost: h Clearance depth: cm
1.172 1.173
Man hours worked: h Man hours lost: h
1.18 1.174
Area prepared by GPM: m² If manual clearance then number of lane:
1.20
Visitors:

2
Destroyed devices:
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO, etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

3
Marked devices:
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO, etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Devices Moved:
Name of Devices Where was it moved Quantities Comments

3.
Assets Deployed during reporting period:
No of Deminers No of EOD Personnel No of Dogs

Type and quantity of explosive used:

Explosives Detonation Safety TNT Blocks Non electrical Electrical Ammonium Nitrate FIXOR
Coord (m) Fuze (m) (unit) dets.(unit) dets. (unit) powder (kg) (unit)
Quantity

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 33 of 83

IMSMA Progress Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
4.1
Uncleared area left: Yes No
4.2
Uncleared area marking: Local signs Official signs Fenced Several None
4.3
Description:

Methods used
5
Method of marking used: Local signs Official signs Fenced Several
None
6
Mine/UXO destruction method used:
7
Used demining methods:
7.1
Manual method used? Yes No SOP reference:
7.2
Dog method used? Yes No SOP reference:
7.3
Mechanical method used? Yes No SOP reference:
7.4
Combination method used? Yes No SOP reference:

8
Metal detectors:

Type 1 Type 2 Type 3

9
External quality control during reporting period: No Yes
9.1
If yes: Monitoring
Physical spot-check Manual
Mechanical
Dogs
9.2
Comments to quality control:

10
General comments / problems

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 34 of 83

IMSMA Progress Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
11
Data collector information:

11.1
Tasked by: Verification by:
Location:
11.2
Reported by: Date:
11.3
Location: Name:
1.4
Date: Signature:
1.5
Name:
11.4
Signature: Data entry by:
11.5
Date in IMSMA:
Signature

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 35 of 83

IMSMA Clearance Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General Information
1.1 1.7
ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.8
Owner MAC: Data entry by:
1.3
Referenced TaskID(s):
1.4 1.9
Organisation: Total size of cleared area: m²
1.5 1.10
Planned start date: Clearance depth: cm
1.6 1.11
Planned end date: Total of work hours: h
1.5 1.5
Task start date: Task end date:
1.7
Status:

1.12
Object: Housing Industry Agricultural terrain Other
1.13
Methods and technologies used? Manual Mechanical Dogs Combined
1.14
Type of task: Clearance Impact survey Dangerous area Minefield (technical survey)
1.15
Reference ID:
1.16 1.17
Accident/incident occurred during Survey/Clearance: Yes No Accident IDs:

1.18
Uncleared area left: Yes No
1.19
Uncleared area marking: Local signs Official signs Fenced Several None
1.20
Description of uncleared area:

1.21
Additional information:

1.22
Quality control carried out by:
(name & organisation)
1.23
Quality control method: Manual Dog Mechanical Combination

2
Location
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 2.11

Nearest boma/village: MGRS Coord.: Map sheet:

2.5 2.10 2.11

Municipality: Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or Map scale: 1 :
Map with <30m or >30 m accuracy
2.12
Description of reference point

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IMSMA Clearance Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
3
Description of the perimeter points:
3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6
From Pt. To Bearing Distance X/ East./ Long. Y/ North./ Lat. MGRS Coord.
Point No. Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
3.1
Size of area: m²

4
Quantity and type of destroyed devices:
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

5
Quantity and type of marked devices:
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

Devices Moved:
Location where devices were moved:
Type of devices Quantity

5
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

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IMSMA Clearance Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
6
Declaration

Declaration by senior representative of the Declaration by responsible authority.

organisation that carried out the work.

I declare that the area described in this document has 1) This declaration of clearance is accepted.
been cleared in accordance with UN MAC Technical
2) The area described in this report is accepted as clear
Guidelines, and that, to the best of my knowledge and
of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
belief, it is free of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
6.1 6.4
Name: Name:
6.2 6.5
Position: Organisation:
6.3 6.6
Date: Date:
Signature: Signature:
This document has been distributed as shown below
6.7 6.9
a. Original to: c. Copy to:
6.8 6.10
b. Copy to: d. Copy to:
7
Attach explanatory map(s) and/or sketch(es) (required):
(Show on sketch type and location of cleared/marked area marking)

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 38 of 83

IMSMA Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General Information
1.1 1.7
ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.8
Owner MAC: Data entry by:
1.3
Referenced TaskID(s):
1.4 1.9
Organisation: Total size of cleared area: m²
1.5 1.10
Planned start date: Clearance depth: cm
1.6 1.11
Planned end date: Total of work hours: h
1.5 1.5
Task start date: Task end date:
1.7
Status:

1.12
Object: Housing Industry Agricultural terrain Other
1.13
Methods and technologies used? Manual Mechanical Dogs Combined
1.14
Type of task: Clearance Impact survey Dangerous area Minefield (technical survey)
1.15
Reference ID:
1.16 1.17
Accident/incident occurred during Survey/Clearance: Yes No Accident IDs:

1.18
Uncleared area left: Yes No
1.19
Uncleared area marking: Local signs Official signs Fenced Several None
1.20
Description of uncleared area:

1.21
Additional information:

1.22
Quality control carried out by:
(name & organisation)
1.23
Quality control method: Manual Dog Mechanical Combination

2
Location
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 2.11

Nearest boma/village: MGRS Coord.: Map sheet:

2.5 2.10 2.11

Municipality: Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or Map scale: 1 :
Map with <30m or >30 m accuracy

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IMSMA Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
2.12
Description of reference point

3
Description of the perimeter points:
3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6
From Pt. To Bearing Distance X/ East./ Long. Y/ North./ Lat. MGRS Coord.
Point No. Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
3.1
Size of area: m²

4
Quantity and type of destroyed devices:
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 40 of 83

IMSMA Completion Survey Locator code: …/…/…/…
5
Quantity and type of marked devices:
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

Devices Moved:
Location where devices were moved:
Type of devices Quantity

5
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

6
Declaration

Declaration by senior representative of the Declaration by responsible authority.

organisation that carried out the work.

I declare that the area described in this document has 3) This declaration of clearance is accepted.
been cleared in accordance with UN MAC Technical
4) The area described in this report is accepted as clear
Guidelines, and that, to the best of my knowledge and
of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
belief, it is free of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
6.1 6.4
Name: Name:
6.2 6.5
Position: Organisation:
6.3 6.6
Date: Date:
Signature: Signature:
This document has been distributed as shown below
6.7 6.9
a. Original to: c. Copy to:
6.8 6.10
b. Copy to: d. Copy to:
7
Attach explanatory map(s) and/or sketch(es) (required):
(Show on sketch type and location of cleared/marked area marking)

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 41 of 83

IMSMA Completion Survey based on the assessment Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General Information
1.1 1.7
ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.8
Owner MAC: Data entry by:
1.3
Referenced TaskID(s):
1.4 1.9
Organisation: Total size of cleared area: m²
1.5 1.10
Planned start date: Clearance depth: cm
1.6 1.11
Planned end date: Total of work hours: h
1.5 1.5
Task start date: Task end date:
1.7
Status:

1.12
Object: Housing Industry Agricultural terrain Other
1.13
Methods and technologies used? Manual Mechanical Dogs Combined
1.14
Type of task: Clearance Impact survey Dangerous area Minefield (technical survey)
1.15
Reference ID:
1.16 1.17
Accident/incident occurred during Survey/Clearance: Yes No Accident IDs:

1.18
Uncleared area left: Yes No
1.19
Uncleared area marking: Local signs Official signs Fenced Several None
1.20
Description of uncleared area:

1.21
Additional information:

1.22
Quality control carried out by:
(name & organisation)
1.23
Quality control method: Manual Dog Mechanical Combination

2
Location
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 2.11

Nearest boma/village: MGRS Coord.: Map sheet:

2.5 2.10 2.11

Municipality: Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or Map scale: 1 :
Map with <30m or >30 m accuracy
2.12
Description of reference point

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IMSMA Completion Survey based on the assessment Locator code: …/…/…/…
3
Description of the perimeter points:
3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6
From Pt. To Bearing Distance X/ East./ Long. Y/ North./ Lat. MGRS Coord.
Point No. Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
3.1
Size of area: m²

4
Quantity and type of destroyed devices:
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

5
Quantity and type of marked devices:
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Type of device Model Quantity Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
(AP, AT, UXO etc.)
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

Devices Moved:
Location where devices were moved:
Type of devices Quantity

5
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

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IMSMA Completion Survey based on the assessment Locator code: …/…/…/…
6
Declaration

Declaration by senior representative of the Declaration by responsible authority.

organisation that carried out the work.

I declare that the area described in this document has 5) This declaration of assessment is accepted.
been assessed in accordance with UN MAC Technical
6) The area described in this report is accepted as no
Guidelines, and that, to the best of my knowledge and
evident of mines/UXO.
belief, there is no evidence of mines/UXO in the area.
6.1 6.4
Name: Name:
6.2 6.5
Position: Organisation:
6.3 6.6
Date: Date:
Signature: Signature:
This document has been distributed as shown below
6.7 6.9
a. Original to: c. Copy to:
6.8 6.10
b. Copy to: d. Copy to:
7
Attach explanatory map(s) and/or sketch(es) (required):
(Show on sketch type and location of cleared/marked area marking)

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.2001) Page 44 of 83

IMSMA Mine Risk Education Activity Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1
Mine Risk Education Activity:
1.1 1.10
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.11
Owner MAC: Reliability: Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.12
Status: Source: A B C D E F
1.4 1.5
Activity class / Method:
Community liaison: Community mapping Marking
maintenance Minefield handover Support to demining
Other
Info. management: Data gathering Evaluation
Monitoring Other

Media: Material distribution Printed press Radio TV

Video Other
Presentation: Community Safety briefing School Other

Public performance: Festival Music Poetry Theater Traveling road show

Other

Training: Child-to-child Peer-to-peer Lecture/Classroom Community mobilisation

Other

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 45 of 83

IMSMA Mine Risk Education Activity Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1.6
What other method:
1.7
Campaign level (only for Media, 1.4): Country Region State/County
Locality/Payam Village/Boma
1.8 1.9 19
Project: Quantity :

2
General:
2.1 2.2
Planned start date: Planned finish date:
2.2 2.13
Effective start date: Effective finish date:
2.3 2.5
Region: Locality/Payam:
2.4 2.6
State/County: Nearest Village/Boma:
2.7
Municipality:
2.8 2.9
Location ID: Location name:
2.10
Location kind: Airport/Airstrip Community center Cultural site Fire station Harbor
Health care center Hospital Local administration Market
Medical evacuation Military base Police station Railway station
Refugee/IDP camp Religious site School Team site UN site
Victim rehab. service Unknown Other:
2.12 2.11
Implementor: Organisation name: Organisation ID:

3
Audience: Use values from the lists provided in the Appendix!
3.1 - 3.4 3.5 – 3.6 3.7 3.8
Audience type Age Gender Number of people

4
Integration in other processes
4.1
Support to: Mine action Refugee return / IDP / resettlement Relief activities
Health care activities Development activities Infrastructure rehabilitation
4.2
Other:
4.3
Reason
Demining accident Mine accident Begin of work End of work
Suspension Reactivation Standard operation Unknown
4.4
Other:

Only to be entered if Mine action is chosen in (4.1):

19 2.2 2.13
How often was the activity done in the specified time period (under and )

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 46 of 83

IMSMA Mine Risk Education Activity Locator code: ….../….../….../…

4.5
Period: Before During After Unknown
4.6
Mine action process:
Clearance Impact Survey Technical Survey Completion Survey
4.6
Other:
Process ID:
4.7
Handover briefing undertaken including (only if Completion Survey is chosen in (4.6)):
Limits of cleared land: Yes No Unknown
Identification of remaining threats (e.g. other ordnance): Yes No Unknown
Perimeter and cleared land walked: Yes No Unknown

5
Comments:

6
Status History

Status Valid from Status user Reason Comment

7
Data collector information:
7.1 7.2
Data entry by: Date & signature:
Total number of pages: 83

For Key individuals, use Contact data entry sheets.

8
Attachments: Add a picture or sketch of the MRE location (General MRE & Contact data collection sheet)

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 47 of 83

IMSMA Mine Risk Education Activity Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1 Square(5mm) = meters

Checklist

• Main roads
• Road condition
• Villages
• State, Locality
boundaries
• Airfields
• Railways etc.
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 48 of 83

IMSMA Mine Risk Education Activity Locator code: ….../….../….../…

Appendix
3.1
Audience type: (choose one for each row)
• At risk population • Community representative • Facilitator • Government official
• Health worker • International observer • NGO (non-mine action) • Religious
• School • Teacher • Volunteer • Women's group
• Mixed • Unknown
• Military: ↓ • Mine action personnel: ↓ • Other: what other?
3.2

- International - Commercial
- National - Government
- MAC
- Military
- NGO international
- NGO national
- UN
For the Activity class (1.4) Information management, no Audience shall be entered. For the Activity class Media, the
Audiences have the meaning of the targeted audience, for all other classes of the reached audience.

• Children: ↓ • Youth : ↓ • Adult • Mixed

3.5
Age:
3.6
If youth or adults, specify an age category

Gender: • All female • Mainly female • All male • Mainly male • Equally distributed • Unknown
3.7

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 49 of 83

IMSMA Casualty Locator code: …/…/…/…
2
Casualty data
2.1 2.2
Casualty ID: Owner MAC:
2.3 2.5 2.7
Family name: Sex: Male Female Address:
2.4 2.6
First name: Date of Birth:
2.8 2.10
Nationality: Organisation:
2.9 2.11
Position: Status: Civilian Military

1
General demining accident information:
1.1 1.5
Demining accident ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.6
Date and time of dem. acc.: Data entry by:
1.3 1.7
Reported by: Date of report:
1.4 1.8
Organisation (Addr. & Tel): Date of report received:

Nearest city from demining accident

1.9 1.11
Region: Locality/payam:
1.10 1.12
State/County: Nearest boma/village:
1.13
Municipality:
3
Injuries:
3.1 3.2
Was the person injured or killed: Killed Injured If killed, manner of death:
In site at health care facility
During transport to health care facility
other:

Loss of: Other Injuries:

Eyesight Eyesight Head/Neck

Hearing Hearing
Back Chest
Right side Left side
Abdomen
Arm Arm

Pelvis/Buttocks
Hand/Finger Hand/Finger Upper limbs

Above Knee Above Knee

Leg Leg Lower limbs
Below Knee Below Knee

Foot/Toes Foot/Toes

4
Other Information:
4.1
First medical facility reached: Dispensary Health Care Hospital
4.2
Time until first facility reached: h
4.3
Name of first hospital reached:
4.4
Time until first hospital reached: h

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 50 of 83

IMSMA Casualty Locator code: …/…/…/…
4.13
Occupation:
Mine action personnel ► Contractor
Government
MAC
NGO
UN
Military ► Int. peacekeeper
National
Civilian ► IDP
Local resident
Passing through
Pastoralist/nomad
Refugee
Aid worker
Civilian
Government official
International observer
Other
Unknown

4.7
Did the person wear protective equipment? Yes No Unknown
4.8
Was the equipment effective? Yes No Unknown
4.11
Medical report reference (if available):

5
List of other Casualties
6.2 6.1 6.3
FirstName Name Status

Killed Injured
Killed Injured
Killed Injured

6
Device that caused the demining accident
5.1
Unknown
5.2 5.3
Device category Device type
5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7
(Landmines, bombs…) (AP, AT etc.) Model Qty Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 51 of 83

IMSMA Victim Locator code: …/…/…/…

2
Victim data
2.1 2.2
Victim ID: Owner MAC:
2.3 2.5 2.7
Family name: Sex: Male Female Address:
2.4 2.6
First name: Date of Birth:
1
General mine accident information:
1.1 1.6
Mine accident ID: Data entry date:
1.2 1.7
Date and time of mine acc.: Data entry by:
1.3 1.8
Data gathered by: Date of report:
1.4 1.9
Reported by: Date of report received:
1.5
Organisation (Address & Tel):

Nearest city from mine accident

1.10 1.12
Region: Locality/payam:
1.11 1.13
State/County: Nearest boma/village:
1.14
Municipality:

Distance and direction from nearest town (Not necessary, if coordinates are known):
1.20
Distance from nearest town: Less than 500m 500 m – 5 km More than 5 km
1.21
Direction from nearest town: North South North – East South – East
East West North – West South - West Unknown

3
Injuries:
3.1 3.2
Was the person injured or killed: Killed Injured If killed, manner of death:
In situ at health care facility
During transport to health care facility
other:

Loss of: Other Injuries:

Eyesight Eyesight Head/Neck

Hearing Hearing
Back Chest
Right side Left side
Abdomen
Arm Arm

Pelvis/Buttocks
Hand/Finger Hand/Finger Upper limbs

Above Knee Above Knee

Leg Leg Lower limbs
Below Knee Below Knee

Foot/Toes Foot/Toes

Degree of Burns:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 52 of 83

IMSMA Victim Locator code: …/…/…/…
4
Other Information:
4.1
First medical facility reached: Dispensary Health center Hospital
4.2
Time until first facility reached: h
4.4 4.3
Time until first hospital reached: h Name of first hospital reached:
Means of Transportation:
4.13 4.14
Occupation: Occupation prior to mine accident
Mine action personnel ► Contractor Mine action personnel ► Contractor
Government Government
MAC MAC
NGO NGO
UN UN
Military ► Int. peacekeeper Military ► Int. peacekeeper
National National
Civilian ► IDP Civilian ► IDP
Local resident Local resident
Passing through Passing through
Pastoralist/nomad Pastoralist/nomad
Refugee Refugee
Aid worker Aid worker
Government official Government official
International observer International observer
Other Other
Unknown Unknown
4.5
Activity at time of mine accident:
Tending animals/livestock Passing/standing nearby Collecting wood/food / water Hunting/fishing
Demining Military Police Playing/recreation Tampering
Farming Unknown Traveling in vehicle Traveling on foot
Other:
4.6
How often did the person go there? More than once a day Once a day
Several times a week or less Never before
4.7
Did the person know that area was dangerous? Yes No Unknown
4.8
If they knew area was dangerous, why did they go there? no other access economic necessity
peer pressure other
4.9
Did the person see the object before the accident? No Yes, did not touch Yes, touched it Unknown
4.10
Did the person receive mine awareness training? Yes No Unknown
4.11
Medical report reference (if available):

4.12
Was area marked? Yes No

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 53 of 83

IMSMA Victim Locator code: …/…/…/…
5
Received MRE: Use values from the lists provided in the Appendix!
5.1 5.2 – 5.3 5.4
Activity class Method Frequency

6
Other persons involved How many others were killed ?
How many others were injured?
List of other Victims
6.2 6.1 6.3
FirstName Name Status
Killed Injured
Killed Injured
Killed Injured
6
Device that caused the mine accident
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
Unknown Anti-personnel mine Anti-tank mine Cluster ammunition other UXO
2.6 2.7 2.8
Booby trap Fuse Specify device, if it is known:

Appendix
5.1 5.2
Activity class / Method:
Community liaison: • Community mapping • Marking
maintenance • Minefield handover • Support to demining
• 5.3 Other: what other?
Info. management: • Data gathering • Evaluation • Monitoring • 5.3
Other: what other?
Media: • Material distribution • Printed press • Radio • TV • Video
• 5.3 Other: what other?
• Community • Safety briefing • School •
5.3
Presentation: Other: what other?

Public performance: • Festival • Music • Poetry • Theater • Traveling road show

• Other: what other?
5.3

Training: • Child-to-child • Peer-to-peer • Lecture/Classroom • Community mobilisation

• Other: what other?
5.3

• Once • Several times • Regularly

5.4
Frequency:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 54 of 83

IMSMA Demining Accident Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
1
General information:

1.1 1.9
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.10
Owner MAC: Reliability:Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.11
Reported by: Source: A B C D E F
1.4
Position:
1.5
Organisation (Address & Tel):
1.6
Duty officer:
1.7 1.12
Data entry date: Date of report:
1.8 1.13
Data entry by: Date report received:

1.14 1.18
Date of demining accident: Was area marked? Yes No
1.15 1.19
Kind of area where demin. acc. occurred: Was mine/UXO marked? Yes No
1.16 1.20
Identification of Area: Number of persons involved:
1.17 1.21
Clearance in progress? Yes No Number of casualties:

1.22
Demining accident occurred as part of a tasked mine action activity: Yes No
If yes: Impact survey Technical survey Clearance Completion survey Quality control
Other: ID:

2
Geographic reference
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:

2.2 2.7 2.11

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

2.3 2.8 2.11

Locality/payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

2.4 2.9 20 2.11

Nearest boma/village: MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
2.10
Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS
2.5 2.11
Municipality: Map with <30m >30m accuracy Map scale: 1 :

2.12
Demining accident coordinates description:

3
Location of demining accident
3.1
Distance from nearest town: Less than 500m 500 m – 5 km More than 5 km
3.2
Direction from nearest town: North South North – East South – East
East West North – West South - West Unknown

20
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 55
IMSMA Demining Accident Report Locator code: …/…/…/…
3.3
Type of area
City Field Pasture land On or near coastline Forest In/Near governmental building
Near military installation In/Near residential building On/Near riverbank
Roadside Road for vehicles Path Unknown Other
4
Demining accident details:
4.1
Cause of dem. acc.: Incorrect procedure Booby trap Mine/UXO malfunction
Anti-lift device Equipment malfunction Unknown
Other:
4.2 4.3
Property damage: US$ Equipment damage: US$
4.4
Reference to inquiry report:

4.5
Demining accident description.

5
Device that caused the demining accident
5.1
Unknown
5.2 5.3
Device category Device type
5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7
(Landmines, bombs…) (AP, AT etc.) Model Qty Anti-lift fitted Booby trapped
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No Yes No

6
Attach explanatory map and/or sketch:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 56

IMSMA Demining Accident Report Locator code: …/…/…/…

1 Square(5mm) = meters

Checklist

• Location of
demining accident
• Main road
• Road condition
• Towns
• Provincial, District
boundaries
• Airfields
• Railways etc.
• Mined Areas
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 57

IMSMA Country Data Sheet
1
Location:

1.1
Country name
1.2
Owner MAC
1.3
Alternative name 1
1.4
Alternative name 2
1.5
Alternative name 3
1.6
Alternative name 4
1.7
Alternative name 5

2
Population:
2.1
Total population:

Age structure Number of men Number of women

0– 4
5– 9
10 – 14
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 +

2.2
Number of people affected by mines/UXO:
3
General
3.1
Population growth per year: %
3.2 3.4
Schools: Number of primary schools: Number of colleges and universities:
3.3
Number of secondary schools:
3.5
Literacy rate: %
3.6
Unemployment rate: %
3.7
Main economical activity:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 58 of 83

IMSMA Country Data Sheet
3.8
Administrative structure:

3.9
Religious groups:

4
Comments:

5
Data collector information:

Enumerator name: Area supervisor:

Enumerator number: Area supervisor number:
5.1
Date collected: Data entry by:
5.2
Checked by: Data entry date:
Date checked: Total number of pages 83

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 59 of 83

IMSMA Location Locator code: ….../….../….../…
1
General information:
1.1 1.9
ID: Confirmed: Yes No
1.2 1.10
Owner MAC: Reliability:Information: 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.3 1.11
Data gathered by: Source: A B C D E F
1.4
Reported by:
1.5
Organisation (Address & Tel):
1.6 1.12
Data entry date: Date of report:
1.7 1.13
Data entry by: Date of report received:
1.8
Date of mine accident:
1.14
Was area marked? Yes No Unknown
Nearest town from mine accident
1.15 1.16
Region: State/County:
1.17 1.18
Locality/payam: Nearest boma/village:
1.19
Municipality:

Distance and direction from nearest town (Not necessary, if coordinates are known):
1.20
Distance from nearest town: Less than 500m 500 m – 5 km More than 5 km
1.21
Direction from nearest town: North South North – East South – East
East West North – West South - West Unknown
2
Coordinates of mine accident (Only provided as an alternative to distance and direction):
2.1 2.5
Coord. system: Coordinates fixed by: DGPS GPS or
Map with: <30m >30 m accuracy
2.2 2.6
X/ Easting/ Long.: Map name:
2.3 2.6 2.6
Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map series: Map edition:
2.4 21 2.6 2.6
MGRS Coord. : Map sheet: Map scale: 1:
2.7
Mine accident coordinates description:

3
Device that caused the mine accident:
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Unknown Anti-personnel mine Anti-tank mine Cluster ammunition other UXO
3.6 3.7 3.8
Booby trap Fuse Specify device, if it is known:

21
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 60 of 83
IMSMA Location Locator code: ….../….../….../…

List of Victims
First Name Name Status

Killed Injured
Killed Injured
Killed Injured
General Observations/Comments. In case the accident does not include human then provide the information here:

1
Location:
1.1 1.2
Location number: Owner MAC:
1.3
Location name:
1.4
Location kind: Airport/Airstrip Community centre Cultural site Fire station
Hospital Health care centre Police station Railway station
Military base Local administration Religious site Market
School Victim rehab. service Refugee/IDP camp UN site
Team site Medical evacuation Harbor Unknown
Other
2
Coordinates of the location center (geographical reference):
2.1 2.6 2.11
Region: Coord. system: Map name:
2.2 2.7 2.11
State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:
2.3 2.8 2.11
Locality/Payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:
2.4 2.9 22 2.11
Nearest Village/Boma: MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
2.10
Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or
2.5
Municipality: Map with accuracy: <30 m or >30 m 2.11
Map scale: 1 :
2.12
Description of the geographical reference:

3
Address:
3.1
Address Line 1:
3.2
Address Line 2:
3.3 3.4
Postal Code: City:
3.5 3.6
Province / State/County: Country:
3.7 3.8
Telephone: Fax:
3.9 3.10
E-Mail: Home Page:
4
Comments:

5
Additional information for medical facilities
5.1 5.2 5.3
Numbers of doctors: Number of nurses: Number of beds:

22
MGRS provided when X/Y absent and vice versa.
Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 61 of 83
IMSMA Location Locator code: ….../….../….../…

5.4
Type of possible treatment:
5
Data collector information:
6.1 6.2
Data entry by: Date & signature:
Total number of pages: 83

6
Attachments: Add a sketch of the location (General location & contact data collection sheet)

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 62 of 83

IMSMA Location Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1 Square(5mm) = meters

Checklist

• Main roads
• Road condition
• Village/bomas
• State/County,
Locality/payam
boundaries
• Airfields
• Railways etc.
• Legend

Drawn by: Date: Checked by: Date:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 63 of 83

IMSMA Region Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
1
Location:

1.1 1.0
Region name ID:
1.2
Owner MAC
1.3
Alternate name 1
1.4
Alternate name 2
1.5
Alternate name 3
1.6
Alternate name 4
1.7
Alternate name 5

2
Population:
2.1
Total population:

Age structure Number of men Number of women

0– 4
5– 9
10 – 14
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 +

2.2
Number of people affected by mines/UXO:

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev 11.09.01) Page 64 of 83

IMSMA Region Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
3
General
3.1
Population growth per year: %
3.2 3.4
Schools: Number of primary schools: Number of colleges and universities:
3.3
Number of secondary schools:
3.5
Literacy rate: %
3.6
Unemployment rate: %
3.7
Category: Urban Suburban Rural Other
3.8
Economic Base: Agriculture Industry Tourism Government Other

3.9
Main economical activity:

3.10
Administrative structure:

3.11
Religious groups:

4
Road access data
4.1
Route to capital name: from: to:
4.2
Distance and time to capital: km hours
4.3
Road condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.4
Road condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.5
Road type: Track paved
4.6
Road capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.7
Road restrictions:

4.8
Bridge type: Road bridge Railway bridge Footbridge Auxiliary bridge

Emergency bridge Floating bridge

4.9
Bridge condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.10
Bridge condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.11
Bridge capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.12
Bridge restrictions:

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IMSMA Region Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
5
Transportation:
5.1
Rail available: Yes No
5.2
Rail condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.3
Rail condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.4
Frequency of train: daily weekly monthly
5.5
Rail restrictions:

5.6
Airstrip available: Yes No
5.7
Airstrip condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.8
Airstrip condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.9
Airstrip restrictions:

5.10
Waterway available: Yes No
5.11
Waterways condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.12
Waterway condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.13
Waterways restrictions:

6
Infrastructure data
6.1
24h electricity available: Yes No
6.2
Electrical supply reliability: good poor
6.3
Telephone service available: Yes No
6.4
Telephone service reliability: good poor
6.5
Piped water available: Yes No
6.6
Piped water supply reliability: good poor
6.7
Petrol, Oil, Lubricants available: Yes No
6.8
POL location:

6.9
Weekly market available: Yes No
6.10
Permanent market available: Yes No

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IMSMA Region Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
7
Medical:
7.1
Health facility available: Yes No
7.2
Type of health facility: Hospital Basic health unit
Other
7.3
Health facility funded by: (name / reference to location)

7.4
Victim rehabilitation facility: Yes No
7.5
Government supported rehab facility: Yes No
7.6
NGO supported rehab facility: Yes No

8
Comments:

9
Data collector information:

Enumerator name: Area supervisor:

Enumerator number: Area supervisor number:
9.1
Date collected: Data entered by:
9.2
Checked by: Data entry date:
Date checked: Total number of pages 83

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev 11.09.01) Page 67 of 83

IMSMA State/County Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
1
Location:
1.1 1.0
State/County ID:
name
1.2
Owner MAC
1.3
Alternative name 1
1.4
Alternative name 2
1.5
Alternative name 3
1.6
Alternative name 4
1.7
Alternative name 5
1.8
Region:

2
Population:
2.1
Total population:

Age structure Number of men Number of women

0– 4
5– 9
10 – 14
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 +

2.2
Number of people affected by mines/UXO:
3
General
3.1
Population growth per year: %
3.2 3.4
Schools: Number of primary schools: Number of colleges and universities:
3.3
Number of secondary schools:
3.5
Literacy rate: %
3.6
Unemployment rate: %
3.7
Category: Urban Suburban Rural Other
3.8
Economic Base: Agriculture/husbandry Industry Tourism Government Other

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IMSMA State/County Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
3.9
Main economical activity:
3.10
Administrative structure:
3.11
Religious groups:

4
Road access data
4.1
Route to Region center: name: from: to:
4.2
Distance and time to Region center: Km hours
4.3
Road condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.4
Road condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.5
Road type: Track paved
4.6
Road capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.7
Road restrictions:

4.8
Bridge type: Road bridge Railway bridge Footbridge Auxiliary bridge

Emergency bridge Floating bridge

4.9
Bridge condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.10
Bridge condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.11
Bridge capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.12
Bridge restrictions:

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IMSMA State/County Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
5
Transportation:
5.1
Rail available: Yes No
5.2
Rail condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.3
Rail condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.4
Frequency of train: daily weekly monthly
5.5
Rail restrictions:

5.6
Airstrip available: Yes No
5.7
Airstrip condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.8
Airstrip condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.9
Airstrip restrictions:

5.10
Transport by waterway available: Yes No
5.11
Waterway condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.12
Waterway condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.13
Waterway restrictions:

6
Infrastructure data
6.1
24h electricity available: Yes No
6.2
Electricity supply reliability: good poor
6.3
Telephone service available: Yes No
6.4
Telephone service reliability: good poor
6.5
Piped water available: Yes No
6.6
Piped water supply reliability: good poor
6.7
Petrol, Oil, Lubricants available: Yes No
6.8
Location of Petroleum Products (POL):

6.9
Weekly market available: Yes No
6.10
Permanent market available: Yes No

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IMSMA State/County Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
7
Medical:
7.1
Health facility available: Yes No
7.2
Type of health facility: Hospital Basic health unit
Other
7.3
Health facility funded by: (name / reference to location)

7.4
Victim rehabilitation facility: Yes No
7.5
Government supported rehab facility: Yes No
7.6
NGO supported rehab facility: Yes No

8
Comments:

9
Data collector information:

Enumerator name: Area supervisor:

Enumerator number: Area supervisor number:
9.1
Date collected: Data entered by:
9.2
Checked by: Data entry date:
Date checked: Total number of pages 83

Created by IMSMA v. IMSMA reports and returns (Rev 17.09.01) Page 71 of 83

IMSMA Locality/Payam Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
1
Location:

1.1 1.0
Locality/Payam ID:
name
1.2
Owner MAC:
1.3
Alternate name 1
1.4
Alternate name 2
1.5
Alternate name 3
1.6
Alternate name 4
1.7
Alternate name 5
1.8
Region:
1.9
State/County:

2
Population:
2.1
Total population:

Age structure Number of men Number of women

0– 4
5– 9
10 – 14
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 +

2.2
Number of people affected by mines/UXO:

Created by IMSMA v. Locality/Payam (Rev. 11.09.01) Page 72 of 83

IMSMA Locality/Payam Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
3
General
3.1
Population growth per year: %
3.2 3.4
Schools: Number of primary schools: Number of colleges and universities:
3.3
Number of secondary schools:
3.5
Literacy rate: %
3.6
Unemployment rate: %
3.7
Category: Urban Suburban Rural Other
3.8
Economic Base: Agriculture/husbandry Industry Tourism Government Other

3.9
Main economical activity:

3.10
Administrative structure:

3.11
Religious groups:

4
Road Access Data
4.1
Route to State/County center name: from: to:
4.2
Distance and time to State/County center: Km hours
4.3
Road condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.4
Road condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.5
Road type: Track paved
4.6
Road capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.7
Road restrictions:

4.8
Bridge type: Road bridge Railway bridge Foot bridge Auxiliary bridge

Emergency bridge Floating bridge

4.9
Bridge condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.10
Bridge condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.11
Bridge capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.12
Bridge restrictions:

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IMSMA Locality/Payam Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
5
Transportation:
5.1
Rail available: Yes No
5.2
Rail condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.3
Rail condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.4
Frequency of train: daily weekly monthly
5.5
Rail restrictions:

5.6
Airstrip available: Yes No
5.7
Airstrip condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.8
Airstrip condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.9
Airstrip restrictions:

5.10
Transport by waterway available: Yes No
5.11
Waterways condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.12
Waterway condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.13
Waterways restrictions:

6
Infrastructure data

6.1
24h electricity available: Yes No
6.2
Electricity supply reliability: good poor
6.3
Telephone service available: Yes No
6.4
Telephone service reliability: good poor
6.5
Piped water available: Yes No
6.6
Piped water supply reliability: good poor
6.7
Petrol, Oil, Lubricants available: Yes No
6.8
POL location:

6.9
Weekly market available: Yes No
6.10
Permanent market available: Yes No

Created by IMSMA v. Locality/Payam (Rev. 11.09.01) Page 74 of 83

IMSMA Locality/Payam Data Sheet Locator code: …../..…/..…
7
Medical:

7.1
Health facility available: Yes No
7.2
Type of health facility: Hospital Basic health unit
Other
7.3
Health facility funded by: (name / reference to location)

7.4
Victim rehabilitation facility: Yes No
7.5
Government supported rehab facility: Yes No
7.6
NGO supported rehab facility: Yes No

8
Comments:

9
Data collector information:

Enumerator name: Area supervisor:

Enumerator number: Area supervisor number:
9.1
Date collected: Data entered by:
9.2
Checked by: Data entry date:
Date checked: Total number of pages 83

Created by IMSMA v. Locality/Payam (Rev. 11.09.01) Page 75 of 83

IMSMA Road Assessment Locator code: …../..…/..…

Created by IMSMA v. Locality/Payam (Rev. 11.09.01) Page 76 of 83

IMSMA Road Assessment Locator code: …../..…/..…

Created by IMSMA v. Locality/Payam (Rev. 11.09.01) Page 77 of 83

IMSMA Road Assessment Locator code: …../..…/..…

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IMSMA Contact Locator code: ….../….../….../…

1
Contact:
1.1
Family name:
1.2
First name:
1.3
Position:
1.4
Organisation:
1.5
Department:
1.6
Address line 1:
1.7
Address line 2:
1.8
Postal code:
1.9 1.10
City: Province/State/County:
1.11
Country:

2
Nearest Village/Boma:
2.1 2.3
Region: Locality/Payam:
2.2 2.4
State/County: Nearest Village/Boma:

3
Communication:
3.1 3.2
Main phone number: Alternative phone number:
3.3 3.4
Main fax number: Alternative fax number:
3.5
E-mail address:
3.6
Call sign:
3.7
Frequency:
3.8
Channel:

4
Comments:

5
Data collector information:
5.1 5.2
Data entry by: Date & signature:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 79 of 83

1
Location:
1.1 1.4
Village/Boma name Alternative name 2
1.2 1.5
Owner MAC Alternative name 3
1.0 1.6
Village/Boma ID: Alternative name 4
1.3 1.7
Alternative name 1 Alternative name 5

1.8 1.11 1.16

Region: Coord. system: Map name:

1.9 1.12 1.16

State/County: X/ Easting/ Long.: Map series:

1.10 1.13 1.16

Locality/Payam: Y/ Northing/ Lat.: Map edition:

1.14 23 1.16
MGRS Coord .: Map sheet:
1.15
Coord. fixed by: DGPS GPS or
Map with accuracy of <30m or >30m 1.16
Map scale: 1 :
1.17
Description of Village/Boma center coordinates

2
Population:
2.1
Total population:

Age structure Number of men Number of women

0– 4
5– 9
10 – 14
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 +

2.2
Number of people affected by mines/UXO:

23
Instead of the fields 1.12 and 1.13.
Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 80 of 83
3
General
3.1
Village/Boma is country capital: Yes No
3.2
Village/Boma is Region center: Yes No
3.3
Village/Boma is State/County center: Yes No
3.4
Village/Boma is sub State/County center: Yes No
3.5
Population growth per year: %
3.6 3.8
Schools: Number of primary schools: Number of colleges and universities:
3.7
Number of secondary schools:
3.9
Literacy rate: %
3.10
Unemployment rate: %
3.11
Category: Urban Suburban Rural Compact Village/Boma Dispersed
Village/Boma
Seasonal Village/Boma Nomadic Unknown Other:
3.12
Economic Base: Agriculture Industry Tourism Government Other
3.13
Main economical activity:

3.14
Administrative structure:

3.15
Religious groups:

4
Road access data
4.1
Route to (sub)State/County center name: from: to:
4.2
Distance and time to (sub)State/County center: Km hours
4.3
Road condition dry season: usable cannot be used
4.4
Road condition wet season: usable cannot be used
4.5
Road type: Track paved
4.6
Road capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.7
Road restrictions:

4.8
Bridge type: Road bridge Railway bridge Foot bridge Auxiliary bridge
Emergency bridge Floating bridge
4.9 4.10
Bridge condition: Dry season: usable cannot be used Wet season: usable cannot be used
4.11
Bridge capacity: motorbike passenger car 6x6 truck
4.12
Bridge restrictions:

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 81 of 83

5
Transportation:
5.1
Rail available: Yes No
5.2
Rail condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.3
Rail condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.4
Frequency of train: daily weekly monthly
5.5
Rail restrictions:

5.6
Airstrip available: Yes No
5.7
Airstrip condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.8
Airstrip condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.9
Airstrip restrictions:

5.10
Transport by waterway available: Yes No
5.11
Waterway condition dry season: usable cannot be used
5.12
Waterway condition wet season: usable cannot be used
5.13
Waterway restrictions:

6
Infrastructure data

6.1
24h electricity available: Yes No
6.2
Electricity supply reliability: good poor
6.3
Telephone service available: Yes No
6.4
Telephone service reliability: good poor
6.5
Piped water available: Yes No
6.6
Piped water supply reliability: good poor
6.7
Petrol, Oil, Lubricants available: Yes No
6.8
POL location:

6.9
Weekly market available: Yes No
6.10
Permanent market available: Yes No

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 82 of 83

7
Medical:

7.1
Health facility available: Yes No
7.2
Type of health facility: Hospital Basic health unit
Other
7.3
Health facility funded by: (name / reference to location)

7.4
Victim rehabilitation facility: Yes No
7.5
Government supported rehab facility: Yes No
7.6
NGO supported rehab facility: Yes No

8
Comments:

9
Data collector information:

Enumerator name: Area supervisor:

Enumerator number: Area supervisor number:
9.1
Date collected: Data entered by:
9.2
Checked by: Data entry date:
Date checked: Total number of pages 83 of

Created by IMSMA IMSMA reports and returns (Rev. 17.09.01) Page 83 of 83

MINE ACTION & TRAINING

RECOGNITION AIDE MEMOIR

DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this document is from references and known best
practices for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This information is in no way
exhaustive, and Qualified EOD trained persons should always adhere to
Authorised Standard Operating procedures, in the theatre of operations. The
IMATC or MAT will not be held liable for any accident or incident that results in the
use of the information contained within this document, other than for use on the
IMAS/ EOD training course.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 1 of 33

COLOUR CODES: GENERAL
This aide memoir to identification of UXO has been compiled using information from Janes
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 2005-2006, fifth edition, edited by Colin King.

Colour codes offer a simple and effective means of identifying the filling or function of a
munition, and have been used by most ammunition manufacturers at some time or another.
However, simplification and refinement of colour codes, together with the need to
accommodate new ammunition types, has led to a succession of changes within national
marking systems. Many nations have now adopted the NATO colour codes defined with
Standard NATO Agreements (STANAG 2321).

Colour does should never be relied upon in isolation, especially for the identification of older
ordnance. Inconsistencies and ambiguities can be misleading, even where the category, age
and nationality of a munition is known. Some of the shades are similar and may fade or
discolour with time, heat, or exposure to chemicals; among unexploded ordnance, colours
such as bright red, dark red and brown sometimes become indistinguishable.

There are several marking practices specific to munition categories or roles, and a colour that
is ‘non-significant’ but in one can be ‘significant’ in another. For example, black is used as a
background colour on some underwater munitions, but signifies ‘armour-defeating’ on land-
based ordnance. There is further potential for confusion with chemical and phosphorus-filled
munitions. A dark green band, for example, normally denotes a toxic agent, but has been
used on some Yugoslav HE projectiles.

In summary, while colour codes can provide the EOD technician with a convenient aid to
identification, it is always wise to look for supplemental identifying features or markings.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 2 of 33

NATO COLOUR CODES
Colours which denote a munition filling or function are known as `significant', while
background colours are termed `non-significant'. Significant colours may appear as the
overall munition colour, in hazard bands or stencilled markings, and can be used in
combination. Certain colours can be either significant or non-significant, depending on the
munition type (see tables).

The following colour codes are currently in use, under the Standard NATO Agreement
(STANAG 2321), for ammunition above 30 mm calibre.

SIGNIFICANT COLOURS

Colour Filling / purpose Notes

White Illuminating Including coloured lights

Sometimes non-significant; see table below

Grey Chemical agent Used as background colour for chemical agents,

which may include riot agents. Sometimes non-
significant; see following entry

Silver Countermeasures Such as chaff and propaganda

Non-significant if unpainted metal

Black Armour-defeating Sometimes non-significant; see table below

Brown Low explosive Including Black Powder (gunpowder)

Light red Incendiary May include liquids and gels. Not to be confused
with dark red, which denotes a chemical filling (see
following entry).

Dark red Riot control agent See following entry

Yellow High explosive A band may indicate the presence of an HE

component

Light green Smoke/screening

Light green White phosphorus An unofficial colour code adopted by Belgium,

with red France and the UK. The same colours, with an
markings additional yellow band, are used by Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the US

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 3 of 33

Light green White phosphorus White Phosphorus may now be marked, officially,
with yellow with: a light green body, light red band and yellow
and light red markings; or light green body, yellow band and light
red markings

Dark green Toxic agent On grey background. See following entry.

Blue Practice/training May have additional bands to denote explosive

content

Purple (band) Incapacitating agent See following entry

'BZ'

Violet Experimental
(stripes)

NON-SIGNIFICANT COLOURS

Colour Notes

White Generally, non-significant as markings, on underwater munitions,

missiles, rockets and dispensers. Can also be significant (see table
above).
Grey Generally, non-significant on underwater munitions, missiles, rockets
and dispensers. Can also be significant (see table above).
Dark grey Always non-significant

Black Generally, non-significant as markings or on underwater munitions. Can

be significant as a band or background colour (see table above).
Green Generally non-significant on underwater munitions

Deep bronze green Always non-significant

Green, infra-red Always non-significant

reflective
Olive drab Always non-significant

Unpainted Always non-significant

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 4 of 33

The red band (Incendiary) on a light green
background (Smoke). The yellow stencilling
The danger of reliance on colour codes: this
120mm denotes the calibre, TK indicates
Yugoslav KB-1 submunition has a yellow band
Tank Ammunition, SMK indicates its role
and markings, but in this case it denotes
Smoke, and the WP indicates White
`practice'. This bomblet has an inert fill, but a
Phosphorous, the yellow colour of the
live detonator (Colin King).
stencilling also denotes a HE component
(Colin King/DEODs)

Embossed colour codes

Colours may also be denoted using embossed shapes, which can be read by touch, according
to the following code:

Line: white
Cross: red
Triangle: green
Circle: yellow

NATO AMMUNITION MARKINGS

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are widely used by UN and NATO countries. They may be
encountered on packaging and on the munitions themselves as part of a designation or
associated information. Some words (such as `SHELL' and `MINE') are normally written in
full and are therefore not listed here.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 5 of 33

Abbreviation Meaning Abbreviation Meaning

A RIOT Anti-riot AA Anti-aircraft

AMMO Ammunition AP Armour piercing

APDS Armour piercing APFSDS Armour piercing fin stabilised

discarding sabot discarding sabot

APERS Anti-personnel API Armour piercing incendiary

APSE Armour piercing special AS Anti-submarine

effect

ATK Anti-tank

B HIV `Beehive' demolition BANG TORP Bangalore torpedo

charge

BE Base ejecting BMLT Bomblet

BU Break-up

CAN Candle (pyrotechnic) or CART Cartridge

Canister ammunition

CE Composition exploding CHGE Charge

(Tetryl)

CLSTR Cluster CNSTR Canister

CNTCT Contact

DEM Demolition DESTR Destructor

DET Detonator/detonating DP Dual purpose

DSCHR Discharger

ELEC Electric

F DEV Firing device FD Field gun ammunition

FLAR Flare FRAG Fragmentation/fragmenting

FUZ Fuze FZD Fuzed

GEN Generator (pyrotechnic) GM Guided missile

GP General purpose or GREN Grenade

Gunpowder

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 6 of 33

H Howitzer ammunition HC Hollow charge

HE High explosive HEAT High explosive anti-tank

HEDP High explosive dual HEI High explosive incendiary

purpose

HEIT High explosive incendiary HESH High explosive squash head

tracer

ILLUM Illuminating INCDY Incendiary

INFLU Influence INIT Initiator

INST Instantaneous IRRT Irritant

LE Low explosive LPA Liquid propellant actuated

M Mortar ammunition MOR Mortar

MTR Motor

NE Nose ejecting

PE Plastic explosive PRAC Practice

PRIM Primer

RAP Rocket assisted projectile RKT Rocket

SAA Small arms ammunition SER Serial

SMK Smoke SPA Solid propellant actuated

T Tracer TK Tank ammunition

TP Target practice / training

practice ammunition

VOL Volume

WHD Warhead WP White phosphorus

WT Weight

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 7 of 33

C:\Users\Jock
Forde\Documents\111 MAT LESSONS\ISPEC 11 UXO
Recognition\Technical\Recognition
Guides\JANES\JEOD\jeod2002\images\p0074156.jpg
British L15A1 155 mm HE projectile. Note the
weight category markings towards the nose. The British L36A2 81 mm mortar bomb with
Yellow stencilling indicating HE. C:\Users\Jock yellow warning band and markings
Forde\Documents\111 MAT LESSONS\ISPEC 11 UXO denoting HE. Note also that the actual
Recognition\Technical\Recognition filling (RDX/TNT) is specified.
Guides\JANES\JEOD\jeod2002\images\p0074157.jpg

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 8 of 33

NATO SPECIAL SYMBOLS
MARKINGS

The diagrams show typical markings for NATO artillery projectiles and mortar bombs. The
HE function is denoted both by the yellow colour code on an `insignificant' green background
and by the stencilling. Ammunition calibre, type and filling are normally given according to
the abbreviations listed in the table below; NATO colour codes are listed in a separate entry.

Weight zone markings: Weight/mass zone marks indicate how much the
ammunition varies from the standard weight for that item. The marks may
be in either a single or double row (as shown); they are normally placed
near the nose of a projectile and may also be marked on packaging.
Weight zone symbols are normally in a `significant' colour (for example,
yellow on a projectile filled with high explosive) but have no other
relevance to EOD.

Symbol used for inert or instructional aids: The `INERT' marking

indicates that the munition is completely Free From Explosive (FFE),
normally for demonstration or instructional purposes. Inert munitions
must contain no energetic material of any kind, and should not be
confused with practice ammunition, which is often hazardous.

Interchangeability symbol: The symbol of interchangeability may appear

in any colour, and indicates that the ammunition conforms (in dimensions,
performance and service) to a model approved by NATO.

Colour designator: This symbol is normally seen on smoke-producing

munitions and indicates a colour effect. The `C' letters are printed in the
colour of the effect, usually on a `significant' colour background, such as
light green for smoke.

Radar echo symbols: Either of these symbols may be used to indicate a

Radar Echo effect. The symbols may vary slightly between manufacturers
and are normally in silver on a non-significant background, or black on a
silver background.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 9 of 33

Storage and transportation temperature marking: This marking shows the
temperature limitations for the storage and transportation of munitions. It
is normally marked on packaging but may also be placed on the munition
in some cases (such as missiles).
Usable temperature marking: This symbol shows the extremes of
temperature under which the ammunition may be fired. It may be found
on both munitions and packaging.

Design mark: This mark indicates that ammunition meets an approved

NATO design.

Parachute symbol: This symbol indicates a parachute, and is normally

seen (in white or black) on illuminating carrier munitions.

Single flare marking: A star indicates a pyrotechnic signal. A white star

on a non-significant background, or black star on a white background,
indicates an illuminant or white light. A coloured star indicates a single
light source of the colour shown.

Multiple flare marking: Two stars indicate separate lights in the colours
shown. If different colours are present, the upper star will be the first
colour to appear. Numbers, or `MULTI' may be placed beside the stars to
indicate multiple flares.

The symbol used to denote a payload of flechettes: A band of white

diamond shapes around a munition indicates that it is loaded with
flechettes (small darts, normally made from steel). A yellow band is also
used if an HE charge is present.

The symbol used to denote a payload of scatterable mines: A band of

yellow triangles around a munition denotes a payload of scatterable
mines.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 10 of 33

The symbol’s used to denote a payload of submunitions: A band of yellow
diamonds either outlined or fully coloured yellow around a munition
denotes a submunition payload of anti-material or anti-personnel
bomblets.

US WEAPON DESIGNATIONS
Current US air-launched weapon nomenclature is based on an identification designator.
These letters are followed by a dash, then a serial number to indicate the design; the serial
number may also have a letter to indicate first-generation (A) or second generation (B). A
forward slash is then followed by a suffix letter to specify the type of installation.
Designators are listed in the different designations when combined with other munitions or
components.

Identification designators

Designator Meaning Designator Meaning

AB Explosive item LM Ground-based launcher
AD Weapon adaptor LU Illuminating unit
AG Air-to-ground M Army munition
BB Explosive item MA Miscellaneous weapon item
BD Practice bomb MD Miscellaneous simulated
munition
BL Bomb or mine MH Munition handling equipment
BLU Bomb Live Unit MJ Munition countermeasure
BR Bomb rack or shackle MK Navy bomb
BS Stabilising or retarding device ML Miscellaneous munition
CBU Cluster bomb unit MS Munitions countermeasure (old)
CC Actuator cartridge MT Weapon mount
CD Clustered munitions PA External dispenser
CN Miscellaneous container PD Leaflet dispenser
DS Target detecting device PG Ammunition
FM Munition fuze PW Internal dispenser
FS Fuze safety and arming device RD Dummy rocket
FZ Fuze-related item RL Rocket
GA Aircraft gun SA Weapon sight
GB Guided bomb SU Dispenser suspender and
release
GF Gun-related item SUU Suspension Underwing Unit

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 11 of 33

GP Podded gun TM Miscellaneous tank
GU Miscellaneous gun TT Test items
KA Munition clustering hardware U Unit
KM Kit WD Warhead
LA Aircraft-installed launcher WT Training warhead
LK Ammunition link

Installation
designators

Shown as a
suffix
A Aircraft installed - fixed E Ground box for munitions
B Aircraft installed - expendable

Example: CBU-87A/B

CB: Identification designator (cluster bomb)

U: Unit
87: Serial number (87th cluster bomb design)
A: Model (first version)
B: Installation designator (aircraft installed -
expendable)

Rocket and missile designators

Operational Launch Mission Type Design Series

status prefix environment number symbol
(used only if
necessary)

C: Captive A: Air D: Decoy L: A figure A letter

(on launcher) Launch identifying identifying
vehicle major design the version of
changes a particular
D: Dummy B: Multiple E: Special M: within the design,
(for training) electronics Guided same mission changed with
installation missile category. each
Design significant
J: Special C: Coffin G: Surface N: Probe
numbers modification.
test, (horizontal attack
begin with Series
temporary enclosure,
`1' and run symbols
ground
consecutively begin with `A'
launched)

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 12 of 33

M: F: Individual I: Intercept, R: Rocket within each and run
Maintenance (hand-held) aerial category. consecutively,
(for launcher except for
checks) letters `I' and
`O', which are
N: Special G: Runway Q: Drone not used.
test,
permanent

X: H: Silo- T: Training
Experimental stored (but
not launched
from below
ground)

Y: Prototype L: Silo- U: Underwater

launched attack
(stored and
launched
below
ground)

Z: Planning M: Mobile W: Weather

(meteorological)

P: Soft pad

R: Ship

S:
Underwater

Example: YAIM-9B `Sidewinder'

Y: Operational status (Prototype)

A: Launch environment (air)
I: Mission (intercept)
M: Type (guided missile)
9: Design number (9th missile)
B: Series symbol (2nd version)

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 13 of 33

RUSSIAN AMMUNITION DESIGNATORS
The following markings may appear, together with other letters and figures, in designations
on Russian and other former Warsaw Pact ammunition. Great care should be taken when
interpreting markings, since the same letter may have several meanings when used in
different contexts. See previous entries for fill designators and other markings.

Russian Cyrillic English Meaning

designation

9Э 9E As a prefix: Fuze or Fuze component ( for example

Piezo element)
9К 9K Whole system
9Х 9Kh As a prefix: Pyrotechnic element (for example tracing
flare)
9М 9M As a prefix: Munition designation (for example 9M22U
Rocket)
9Н 9N As a prefix: Warhead or projectile designation
9П 9P As a prefix: Launcher or component or system
9В 9V As a prefix: Test unit or apparatus
9Я 9Ya As a prefix: Box or crate/packaging
A A Fragmentation or propaganda
Б B Armour piercing
БК BK High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT) fin stabilised
БМ BM Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS)
БП BP HEAT spin stabilised
БР BR Amour Piercing tracer
БЗА BZA Amour Piercing improved
БЗР BZR Amour Piercing Incendiary Tracer
Д D Smoke
ДЦ DTs Smoke target marking
Ф F High Explosive
Г G Concrete piercing
ИНЕРТ INERT Contains no harmful or hazardous material

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 14 of 33

M M As a suffix: Modified version of munition or system
O O Fragmentation
OФ OF Fragmentation HE
OФР OFR Fragmentation HE Tracer
OФЗТ OFZT HE Incendiary tracer
OГ OG Fragmentation grenade, Rocket propelled
OP OR Fragmentation tracer
OCКOЛ OSKOL Fragmentation
OЗ OZ Fragmentation Incendiary
OX OKh Fragmentation Chemical
ПБР PBR Armour piercing, target practice
ПГ PG HEAT Grenade, Rocket propelled
ПРАКТ PRAKT Practice
ПУ PU Target Practice
P R Tracer
PПO RPO Infantry Rocket “Flame thrower” or Fuel Air Explosive
C S As a prefix: Electronic component or launcher
C S Illuminating
Щ Sh As a prefix: Optical sight unit or component
СП SP Armour piercing, solid shot
Я Ya Box or crate

RUSSIAN AMMUNITION MARKINGS

General

The below information explains and illustrates some of the markings used on ammunition
manufactured in Russia, and several other former Warsaw Pact countries. Lettering on older
ordnance will be in Cyrillic but, recently, some ammunition intended for export has been
marked in English. While these markings can convey valuable information if interpreted
correctly, they can also be confusing and potentially dangerous if misread. Several of the
markings have no significance to the EOD technician, but are detailed here for information.
Examples of markings on various munitions are given in the accompanying diagrams. The
following entries contain additional information on Russian projectile markings and
packaging, munition designations and fillings.

Stamped markings

A number of marks may be stamped into munition casings at the foundry, and may include
the following:

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 15 of 33

Factory code
Lot number
Type of fill to be used
Weight zone marks
Inspection marks
Smelting number and hardness test

With the exception of the fill designator (which is an instruction for the filling factory) these
marks apply to the casing only.

Stencilled markings

With stencilled markings, particularly where several are placed close together, it is often
unclear whether a designation, factory code or lot number is for a component, filling or the
entire munition. In some cases it is also difficult to differentiate between lot numbers, factory
codes and year of manufacture, since these are often in a single line of markings, but do not
always appear in the same order. The following principles normally apply:

Factory code

This may be in the form of a shape, letters, numbers or a combination of these. In many
cases, factory number, lot number and year appear in the same marking, but sometimes
factory codes appear inside shapes. Bulgaria, for example, prints factory numbers inside two
concentric circles. Where more than one factory code is present, this is because
subassemblies have been manufactured or filled by different plants. For example it is
common for one factory to manufacture a projectile body, another to make the fuze and a
third to insert the explosive fill. Where a factory code such as `76' appears in a marking, it is
easily confused with the year.

Lot numbers

Lot numbers are usually accompanied by the year of manufacture, with the lot normally
preceding the year and separated by a dash. The lot number just gives the batch and does not
identify day or month, while the year is denoted by the last two figures. As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, certain lot numbers and years are easily confused with factory codes.

Fill designators

The stencilled fill designator denotes the actual filling used, while the stamped marking only
indicates the intended fill. In other words, if the two differ, it is the stencilled marking that
will be correct. Russian fill designators are listed in separate entries within this section.

Weight zone marks

As with NATO ammunition, Russian ordnance is marked according to its weight category.
Average weight ammunition is marked with a Cyrillic H (English N). Underweight
ammunition is marked with one or more `-' minus sign dashes and overweight ammunition
with one or more `+' plus sign crosses. Stencilled markings relate to the weight zone of the
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 16 of 33
finished munition, while stamped markings denote the weight variation of the unfilled body.
The tolerances are given in the table below.

Marking Meaning Marking Meaning

---- Lighter by 2{1/3}-3% ++++ Heavier by 2{1/3}-3%

--- Lighter by 1{2/3}-2{1/3}% +++ Heavier by 1{2/3}-

2{1/3}%

-- Lighter by 1-1{2/3}% ++ Heavier by 1-1{2/3}%

- Lighter by {1/3}-1% + Heavier by {1/3}-1%

H (English N) Average weight ammunition, varying by no more than {1/3}%

Inspection marks

A large number of factory marks are used on former Warsaw Pact ammunition. They are
generally smaller than the significant markings, but may take almost any form and be located
in virtually any position.

Typical markings on a Russian 122 mm Typical markings on a Russian 82 mm O-832D

OF-462 HE frag projectile. HE mortar bomb.

RUSSIAN PROJECTILE MARKINGS

General

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 17 of 33

Russian, projectiles are normally stencilled with a projectile index, and may bear a colour
code, in addition to the markings detailed in the previous entry. These provide another aid to
identification, although care is needed because codes have changed over the years, and some
markings may have more than one meaning. The following markings have been used by
Russia, and several other former Warsaw Pact countries, since 1941.

Projectile index

The projectile index is a code consisting of letters and numbers. The letters, listed in the table
below, denote the type or role of the ammunition. The numbers refer to the system for which
the ammunition was first fielded, and have little relevance to identification for EOD
purposes.

Projectile Index Letters and Prefixes

Cyrillic designation English Meaning
А A Propaganda
Б B Propellant charge for use in a casing
Б B Armour-piercing
БК BK HEAT (post-war)
БМ BM Sabot rounds (kinetic penetrators)
БП BP HEAT (WWII)
БР BR Anti-personnel HE fragmentation (WWII)
БР BR Armour-piercing tracer
БЗР BZR Armour-piercing incendiary tracer
Д D Smoke
Ф F Blast
Г G Concrete-piercing
ИНЕРТ INERT Contains no explosive material
Х Kh Chemical
ХОЛ KhOL Blank
МАКЕТ MAKET Training model
O O Fragmentation
OФ OF Fragmentation HE
OСКОЛ OSKOL Fragmentation
ОР OR Fragmentation tracer
ПРАКТ PRAKT Practice
С S Illuminating
Ш Sh Shrapnel (WWII)
Щ Shch Cannister (WWII)
У U As a prefix: complete round – unitary
В V As a prefix: complete round – separated
З Z Propellant bag charge
З Z Incendiary
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 18 of 33
Ж Zh Powder charge (in casing)

Projectile Index Suffixes

Cyrillic Designation English Meaning
А A Cast Iron
Б B Improved armour piercing projectile
Д D Improved armour piercing projectile
ДУ DU Improved fragmentation projectile
К K Improved armour piercing projectile
М M HEAT projectile with copper liner
Н N Improved fragmentation projectile
П P Improved high-velocity armour
piercing projectile
ПК PK Improved high-velocity armour
piercing projectile
С S Improve HEAT projectile
СП SP Improved armour piercing projectile
У U Improved armour piercing projectile
УМ UM Improved HEAT projectile
Ж Zh Sintered iron rotating band

Colour codes

The following colour codes may be present on projectiles from Russia and other former
Warsaw Pact countries, particularly on older ammunition. With some exceptions, the
background colour for ammunition manufactured during World War 2 was dark green, while
newer projectiles are normally painted grey.

Colour Code Meaning Cyrillic Index

Red body with white Propaganda A (“AGIT”)
stencilling
Yellow body Airburst shrapnel – ball Ш
bearing (obsolete)
Olive green body Airburst shrapnel – rods Ш
(obsolete)
Black body with white Target practice ammunition
markings
Blue band Concrete piercing Г
Red band Incendiary or armour- З or БЗР
piercing incendiary tracer
Black band (towards base) Cast steel body (separate
nose section)
Black band (towards nose) Smoke, bursting Д
White band (towards nose) Illuminating carrier (delay С
fuzed)
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 19 of 33
High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) projectile
Armour-piercing. Note the `BR' projectile
bearing the `BP' projectile index, which was
index and `A-IX-2' HE fill designator
used during World War II

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 20 of 33

Bursting smoke is designated by the upper
A base ejecting carrier projectile containing a
black band and `D' projectile index, while
flare. The illuminating role is indicated by the
the lower black band denotes a cast steel
white band and `S' projectile index
body. The `R-4', marking confirms a
Phosphorus fill

RUSSIAN HIGH EXPLOSIVE DESIGNATORS

The following HE filling designators and terms are used on ammunition and explosives manufactured
in Russia and several other former Warsaw Pact countries. Ammunition designators and other
markings are detailed in separate entries. Where known, approximate proportions of mixed fills are
given (as percentages) in brackets, though these may vary.

Cyrillic Designation English Meaning

A A Ammonium Nitrate
A-40 A-40 Ammonium Nitrate/TNT (40/60)
A-50 A-50 Ammonium Nitrate/TNT (50/50)
A-80 A-80 Ammonium Nitrate/TNT (80/20)
A-90 A-90 Ammonium Nitrate/TNT (90/10)
AЛУМИТ Alumit Ammonal (Ammonium Nitrate/Aluminium)
AMATOЛ Amatol Amatol (Ammonium Nitrate/TNT)
AT-40 AT-40 Ammonium Nitrate/pressed TNT pellet (40/60)
AT-90 AT-90 Ammonium Nitrate/pressed TNT pellet (90/10)
ATФ-40 ATF-40 Ammonium Nitrate/pressed TNT pellet (40/60)
A-IX-1 A-9-1 RDX/wax (94/6)

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 21 of 33

A-IX-2 A-9-2 RDX/Aluminium/wax (72/23/4)
A-IX-20 A-9-20 RDX/Aluminium/wax (78/19/3)
A-IX-П A-9-P RDX/Aluminium
AЗИД CBИНЦA Azid svinsta Lead azide
ДБ DB Dinitrobenzene
ДБТ DBT Dinitrobenzene/TNT
ЭBB-11 EVV-11 ‘Elastic’ explosive: RDX/plasticiser (80/20)
ЭBB-34 EVV-34 ‘Elastic’ explosive with minimal critical cross-
section:PETN/plasticiser (80/20)
Г G RDX
ГЕКФОЛ GEKFOL Desensitised RDX (normally RDX/wax)
ГЕКСОГЕН GEKSOGEN RDX
И I IPN (IsoPropyl nitrate: fuel-air explosive)
К-1 K-1 TNT/Dinitrobenzene (70/30)
К-2 K-2 TNT/Dinitrobenzene (80/20)
ЛД-70 LD-70 Liquid explosive based on EGDN
M M Picric acid
MC MS RDX/TNT/aluminium/desensitiser (57/20/17/6)
ОКТОГЕН OKTOGEN HMX
ОКФОЛ OKFOL HMX/wax (normally 95/5)
ОКФAЛ-20 OKFAL-20 HMX-based explosive
ОКТОЛ OKTOL HMX/TNT
ОЛ OL HMX/wax (normally 95/5)
ПBB-4 PVV-4 RDX/plasticiser (79/21)
ПBB-5A PVV-5A RDX/plasticiser (85/15)
ПBB-7 PVV-7 RDX (71.5)/Aluminium/wax
ПBB-12c PVV-12c Frost-resistant RDX-based plastic explosive
T T TNT
TA-77/23 TA-77/23 TNT/aluminium (77/23)
T-80 T-80 TNT/RDX (80/20)
TC TS TNT Sulphite
TД-42 TD-42 TNT/Dinitronapthalene (42/58)
TД-50 TD-50 TNT/Dinitronapthalene (50/50)
TДУ TDU TNT with spotting charge
TЭH TEN PETN
TETPИЛ TETRIL Tetryl
TГ TG TNT/RDX
TГ-20 TG-20 TNT/RDX (20/80)
TГ-30 TG-30 TNT/RDX (30/70)
TГ-40 TG-40 TNT/RDX (40/60)
TГ-50 TG-50 TNT/RDX (50/50)
TГA TGA TNT/RDX/Aluminium (15/70/15)
TГA-16 TGA-16 TNT/RDX/Aluminium (60/24/16)
TГAФ-5 TGAF-5 TNT/RDX/Aluminium (40/40/20)
TГAФ-5M TGAF-5M Desensitised TGAF-5
TГAГ-5 TGAG-5 TNT/RDX/Aluminium/wax (60/20/15/5)

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 22 of 33

THPC TNRS Lead Styphnate
TPOTИЛ Trotil TNT
TT TT ‘Tetranit’ fuel-air explosive compound
Ш Sh Ammonium Nitrate/Dinitronapthalene (88/12)
ШT ShT TNT/Ammonium Nitrate/Dinitronapthalene
BC-6Д VS-60 4-component liquid explosive
BBO-32 VVO-32 TNT/AI/NC (65/20/15)

YUGOSLAV AMMUNITION MARKINGS

General

The following information and illustrates some of the markings used on Yugoslav
ammunition, which are broadly similar to those used on Russian munitions. Markings may
be in Cyrillic, Latin or English; in general Croatian ammunition was marked in Latin, while
Serb ammunition was marked in Cyrillic. Some ordnance manufactured for export was
marked in English. Although markings can convey valuable information if interpreted
correctly, they can also be confusing and potentially dangerous if misread. It is important to
establish which language has been used as some letters appear the same but have different
meanings; for example, the letters ‘N’, ‘R’ and ‘S’ in Latin and English are written as ‘H’, ‘P’
and ‘C’ in Cyrillic. The most significant markings are as follows:

Fill Designators

Fill designators are normally marked prominently on munitions, usually on a separate line
from other markings to avoid confusion, but may not appear on outer packaging. Warheads,
cartridges, rocket motors and so forth will bear different designations.
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 23 of 33
Ammunition designator

Ammunition designators are marked on most items of ordnance and on outer packaging.
These may include the category, type and the model of ammunition. In many cases, the
model number is prefixed with an ‘M’, followed by a number that approximates to the year of
introduction. Where applicable, the calibre, type and model of the firing weapon may also be
shown.

Factory code

The factory code is normally two or three letters depicting the initials of the factory name, for
example SRB: Slavo Rodic Bugojno. The factory code is often followed by the lot number.
Multiple factory codes and lot numbers may be present where a munition is composed of
several assemblies (such as projectile, fuze and cartridge case).

Lot numbers

On recent munitions, lot numbers are usually 4-digit numbers. The first 2 digits represent the
year of manufacture and the second two digits the series or lot; thus ‘8702’ signifies year of
production: 1987, second lot or series. A lot number ending in ‘00’ is likely to be a prototype
or pre-production lot. Some older munitions have the lot numbers reversed, although this is
generally obvious from the figures. For example: ‘Ser. 03/70’ is the third lot (or series) of
1970.

Other markings

Other markings may include weight zone marks (similar to those found on other former
Warsaw Pact and NATO ammunition) and various factor inspection and control marks.
Outer packaging will normally include the number of items and the overall weight in
kilograms.

Colour codes

Coloured bands are used on some munitions to indicate role, but should not be relied upon in
isolation. The following colour codes normally apply:

White Illuminating

Black Smoke

Red Incendiary

Yellow (on smoke munitions) Toxic or riot agent (CS, for example)

Yellow (on packaging and other munitions) Practice (may contain live components)

Green Used on some HESH projectiles

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 24 of 33

YUGOSLAV AMMUNITION TERMS AND
DESIGNATORS
The markings show in the Yugoslav Ammunition Terms and Designators table may appear,
together with other letters and figures, in designations on Yugoslav ammunition and
packaging. Great care should be taken when interpreting markings, since the same letter may
have several meanings when used in different contexts. The markings may be in English,
Latin or Cyrillic.

Yugoslav Ammunition Terms and Designators

Latin or English Usual Meaning
A Aerial, air delivered
A As a suffix: modified version, Blast (eg mine)
B Bomb, grenade or submunition
Bomba Bomb or grenade
Bombica Submunition
Č, Čas Hour (normally delay time)
D, Dimna Smoke
Eksplozivno Explosive
F HE
Fugasna HE
Granata Projectile
H Chemical (as in friction igniter)
Haubica Howitzer
K HEAT
Kazetna Submunition carrier
Kom Number or quantity
Kum, Kumulativna HEAT
M As a prefix: model (often followed by year of introduction)
M Abbreviation for Mina
Metak Charge or block (of explosive)
Mina Mortar bomb, projectile or mine
Municija Ammunition
O Bounding (mine), tracer or illuminating
Obelež Tracer
Odskočna Bounding (mine)
Osvetljavajuča Illuminating
P As a suffix, followed by a number: modification number
Panc, Pancirna Armour-piercing
Protiv Anti-
R Fragmentation, or hand (grenade), or rocket
Raketa Rocket
Rasprskavajuca Fragmentation
Ručna Hand (as in hand grenade)
Školski Practice

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 25 of 33

S Special
T Time (fuze) or fragmentation
Tempirni Time
Tr, Tren, Trenutna Fragmentation
U Fuze or delay
Upaljača Fuze
Usporač Delay
V As a prefix: practice
Vežbovna Practice (may not be inert)
Z Incendiary
Zap, Zapaljiv Incendiary

Examples:
KB-1: HEAT submunitions, 1st design series
FAB-250: HE aerial bomb, 250 kg nominal weight
RB-3.5: Fragmentation aerial bomb, 3.5 kg nominal weight

YUGOSLAV FUZE DESIGNATORS

The markings shown in the following Yugoslav Fuze Designators table may appear on Yugoslav
ammunition fuzes. Great care should be taken when interpreting markings, since the same letter may
have several meanings when used in different contexts. The markings may be in English, Latin or
Cyrillic.

YUGOSLAV FUZE DESIGNATORS

Latin or English Cyrillic Usual Meaning
A A Aerial
BU ЬУ Proximity
DDM ДДМ Impact, Mechanical Time
DDP ДДП Impact, Pyrotechnic Time
DI ДИ Base, Inertia
DT ДТ Base, time
SM CM Mechanical self-destruct
SP CП Pyrotechnic self-destruct
T T Time
TM TM Mechanical time
TP TП Pyrotechnic time
TR TP Time fuze (for rockets)
U У Fuze or delay
UT УT Fuze, impact
UTE УТЕ Fuze, delay, electronic
UTI УТИ Fuze, impact, inertia
UT-PE УT-ПЕ Fuze, impact, piezoelectric
UTIU УТИУ Fuze, impact, inertia, with delay
UTU УТУ Fuze, impact, with delay
V B AS a prefix: practice
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 26 of 33
YUGOSLAV LANDMINES AND BOOBY TRAPS
Modern Yugoslav mines and booby traps are largely original designs developed in isolation
from the Warsaw Pact. Together with demolition stores, they form a comprehensive
integrated system, which provides great versatility. The majority of the mechanical fuzes
have a standard metric 10 mm (M10 x 1) thread which fits the TNT demolition blocks and
several mines. A number of old British and US booby traps are also in use, some remaining
from Second World War stocks. The electric and electronic fuzes use standard electric
detonators of No 8 strength, capable of initiating any of the service high explosives.

Former Yugoslavia had an extensive munitions production capability and the majority of the
mines used in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo were of fairly recent design and manufacture
(many were produced during the 1970s and 80s). Although the designs are relatively simple,
most of the blast mines are plastic-cased and use fuzes containing friction-sensitive
compositions instead of spring-loaded striker mechanisms; this minimises their metallic
content, making them very difficult to locate. Most categories of mine and booby trap are
present in some form. Soldiers were taught how to employ mines to maximum effect,
including the combination of different varieties, booby-trapping and innovative use. As the
conflicts continued and stocks became low, further varieties of mine were improvised, locally
manufactured, or altered from existing munitions. Very few of the obsolete designs from the
immediate post Second World War period were used.

In addition to all of the environmental and political constraints, mine clearance in the Balkans
is complicated by the following technical factors:
 The wide variety of mines, booby traps and demolition stores
 The versatility and compatibility of this ordnance
 The large quantity of munitions available
 The variety of improvised and locally manufactured munitions
 The highly developed mine warfare and booby trap training among soldiers

English Cyrillic Meaning (Mines) Meaning (Booby Traps)

A Non-metallic (Blast) or modified
version (as a suffix)
D Wooden (except in MRUD)
H Chemical (friction sensitive)
M Metallic (as a suffix) Mechanical
N Pressure operation
O Bounding (jumping) Pressure release operation
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 27 of 33
P Pull operation
PM Anti-personnel (AP)
R Projected fragmentation
S Inclusion of a flare (as a suffix
for an AP mine)
TM Anti-tank (AT)
U As a prefix: fuze As a prefix: fuze
V As a prefix: practice (Not As a prefix: practice (Not
necessarily inert) necessarily inert)
1,2,3 etc Model number Model number

A photo showing a Yugoslav PROM 1

A/P Mine, Using the above table we
can see that it is designated as a Pull
operated, Projected Fragmentation,
Bounding, Metallic Mine.

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 28 of 33

HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

SEVEN KEY POINTS

1. TAIL UNIT DESIGN (INCLUDING BALLISTIC OR RETARDED OPTIONS).

2. METHOD OF SUSPENSION (DISTANCE BETWEEN AND SHAPE).
3. BASIC SHAPE.

EOD ASSOCIATED TIMINGS CWR HAZARDS

SHAPE FUZE LOC REMARKS
CLASSIFICATION %
OLDER WPNS
POINTED NOSE,
OLDER WPNS
TAPERS FROM
NOSE
SHOULDER TO BASE GENERAL BOMBARDMENT
PRE-IMPACT TAIL
PLATE (TEAR BLAST, FRAG, MIGHT EMPLOY
GP IMPACT 33-60
DROPPED SHAPED). EARTHSHOCK MULTI - FUZING
POST IMPACT MODERN WPNS
MODERN WPNS
NOSE TAIL
PARALLEL SIDED.
TRANSVERSE

COMMONLY
PRE IMPACT EARLY MODELS CAN HAVE
CYLINDRICAL SHAPED
(Impact with stand off NOSE MUILPILE NOSE FUZES /
HC WITH FLAT NOSE 75-80 BLAST
acting as low tech TAIL CENTRAL BOOSTER FULL
(BOILER SHAPED)
effective pre impact). LENGTH / THIN CASE
VARIOUS SHAPES
OBIVOUS FRAG RIBS PRE IMPACT NOSE ANTI PERSONNEL / SOFT
FRAG 20 FRAG
OR SMOOTH SKINNED IMPACT TAIL SKINNED TARGETS

LONG AND SLENDER

AP (PENCIL SHAPED) POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 10-20 FRAG HEAVY ARMOURERED TARGETS

SOLID POINTED NOSE

LIGHTLY ARMOURERED
SAP (TEAR DROP SHAPED) POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 20-30 FRAG
TARGETS
FLAT NOSED
PARALLEL SIDED OR
BLAST = Land UNDERWATER TARGETS
AS TAPERS FROM POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 60-75
BPE = Sea THIN CASED
SHOULDER TO BASE

SOLID POINTED NOSE

PARALLEL SIDES REINFORCED CONCRETE
DP POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 50 EARTHQUAKE
(VERY BIG) TARGETS

4. COLOURS / MARKINGS.
5. DIMENSIONS.
6. FUZING LOCATIONS ON WEAPON.
7. FUZING SHAPE (POSSIBLE INDICATION OF ROLE OF BOMB).

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 29 of 33

OTHER AIR DROPPED WEAPONS

ASSCOIATED
EOD SHAPE FUZE LOC CHARACTERISTICS HAZARDS REMARKS
TIMINGS
CLASSIFICATION
VARIOUS
SMALL
TUBULAR OR
MULTI ITEMS
COMBUSTABLE SPHERICAL. NOSE ENTIRE ITEM FIRE
IMPACT MAGNESIUM ALLOY
INCENDIARY MAYBE SILVERY TAIL BURNS /POSIBLE HE
THERMITE FILL
GREY IN
COLOUR

FLAMMABLE LIQUID FILLS

MULTIPLE COMBUSTILE
FIRE -
NON BOMB TYPE OR INCEDIARIES
NOSE CONTENTS ONLY LARGE
COMBUSTABLE AIRCRAFT FUEL IMPACT THERMITE BALLS CARTS
INTERNAL BURN SPREAD
INCENDIARY TANK TYPE POSS HE IGNITER CHARGE
AREA
FUZE ALWAYS ACTING TYPE

LEAVES AIRCRAFT DEPENDENT FUZE WILL BE AIRBURST

AIMABLE NOSE TO FUNCTION. ON CONTENTS MAYBE
BOMB SHAPED PRE IMPACT
CONTAINERS SADDLE PORTION MUNITIONS EXPLOSIVE OR NON
CARRIED EXPLOSIVE
REMAINS
VARIOUS
ATTACHED TO DEPENDENT SAME TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE
LARGE
NON AIMABLE OPERATED AIRCRAFT WHEN ON STORE AS CARRIED BY
TOO UNSTABLE N/A
CONTAINERS BY AIRCREW PAYLOAD MUNITIONS AIMABLE CONTAINER BUT IN
FOR FREE
DISPENSED CARRIED LARGER QUANTITIES
FLIGHT
ROLE COLOURS AS MAIN
VARIOUS SMOKE
PYROTECHIC NOSE FUNCTIONS ON THE COLOURING
TUBULAR WITH IMPACT FLAME
MARKERS INTERNAL SURFACE HAZARD BANDS
FLAT NOSE
LIGHT
PRODUCING
VARIOUS
NOSE CAN BE ROLE AND HAZARD
PYROTECHIC NORMALLY FUNCTIONS IN THE
PRE IMPACT TAIL MILLIONS OF INDICATORS TAKE THE
SIGNALS LARGER THAN AIR
INTERNAL CANDLE FORM OF COLOUR BANDS
PYRO MARKERS
POWER

ADAPTED FULL EACH USER HAS

BOMB SHAPED
SIZE WEAPONS. PREFERRED SHAPE TO
FULL SIZE BUT
NOSE SMALLER SIZE SMOKE DUPLICATE OWN USER
PRACTICE NORMALLY
IMPACT TAIL EITHER LOW OR FLASH BOMBS
BOMBS MUCH SMALLER
INTERNAL HIGH EXPLOSVE FRAG SHAPE TO MATCH
THAN NORMAL
CONTENTS BALLISTIC OR RETARDED
HE BOMBS
ROLE OF BOMB
WARHEAD HE.
FIRED INDIVIDUALLY OR
SOLID FUEL (LOW NON EX
ROCKET MULTIPLES
ROCKETS IMPACT NOSE EXPLOSIVE). CHEM.
SHAPED LAUNCH FROM RACKS OR
FINS SHAPED
NORMALLY PODS
VENTURI CHARGE

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 30 of 33

GUIDED WEAPONS CATEGORISATION TABLE

AAM ASM SAM SSM

Short Range Long Range Tactical Strategic Hand Held Short Range Long Range Anti-Armour Tactical Strategic
Dimensions L. 2m-3.5m L. 3m-7m L. 2m+ L. 5m+ L. 1m-1.5m L. 1.25m-3m L. 3m+ L. 0.8m-1.8m L. 2m+ L. 5m+
D. 120-150mm D. 150-400mm D. 200mm+ D. 500mm+ D. 70-120mm D. 120-250mm D. 300mm+ D. 100-250mm D. 200mm+ D. 450mm+
Guidance IR homing Radar homing IR, laser or Homing and/or IR homing, IR homing or Radar homing Wire Homing and/or Homing and/or
radar homing, pre-set beam rider or radio or radio command, pre-set pre-set
radio or TV radio command command possibly other
command command command or
homing
Control Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust
gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases,
movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable
control control control control control control control control control control
surfaces, may surfaces surfaces surfaces (may surfaces surfaces. surfaces (may surfaces surfaces (may surfaces (may
have rollerons have liquid have liquid have liquid have liquid
fuel) fuel) fuel) fuel)
Warhead Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Blast/frag, Nuclear, Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Shaped charge Blast/frag, Nuclear,
frag or frag or SAP, shaped chemical or frag or blast frag, frag or or tandem SAP, shaped chemical or
expanding rod expanding rod charge, large HE blast expanding rod expanding rod shaped charge charge, large HE blast
tandem or multiple penetration,
shaped charge shaped charge sub-munitions
Fuzing Side-looking Side-looking Forward- Forward- Side-looking Side-looking Side-looking Contact Forward- Forward-
proximity, proximity, looking looking proximity, proximity, proximity, looking looking
contact and contact and proximity and proximity and contact and contact and contact and proximity and proximity and
self-destruct self-destruct contact contact self-destruct self-destruct self-destruct contact contact
Propulsion Solid fuel Solid fuel (may Solid fuel (may Air-breathing Solid fuel, in- Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing Solid fuel with Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing
have in-line have in-line engine or liquid line booster line or engine, solid or in-line booster line or engine or
booster) booster) fuel (may have jettisonable liquid fuel jettisonable rocket motor,
solid fuel in- external rocket motor, external in-line or
line booster) booster in-line or booster jettisonable
jettisonable external
external booster
booster
MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 31 of 33
SUBMUNITION TYPES

METHOD
OF
EOD
SHAPE FUNCTIONING FUZE LOC CHARACTERISTICS HAZARDS REMARKS
CLASSIFICATIONS
VARIOUS
ONE PART
CONSTRUCTION. NOSE DESIGNED TO
SUBMUNITION FRAG FOOT PRINT DEPENDENT ON
POSSIBLE FRAG IMPACT TAIL FUNCTION ON
ANTI-PERSONNEL BLAST DELIVERLY METHOD
SCORING ON INTERNAL IMPACT
BODY

VARIOUS
MULTI PART
SHAPED
CONSTRUCTION DESIGNED TO STABILIZED IN FLIGHT
SUBMUNITION NOSE CHARGE
REQUIRES IMPACT FUNCTION ON (FOR ANGLE OF ATTACK)
ANTI-VEHICLE TAIL BLAST FRAG
STAND OFF IMPACT
INCENDIARY
CAPABILITY

ROCKET ASSISTED
SUBMUNITION CRATERING LIKELY TO BE FOUND AROUND
SIMILAR TO IMPACT SINGLE MAIN
RUNWAY NOSE EFFECTS VEHICLE / AIRCRAFT
LARGE ROCKET (SHORT CHARGE
CRATERING INTERNAL CAMOUFLET OPERATING SURFACES
IN APPEARANCE DELAY) PARACHUTE MAY
(ASSISTED) HEAVE
BE PRESENT

CRATERING
SUBMUNITION FREE FALL
IMPACT EFFECTS LIKELY TO BE FOUND AROUND
RUNWAY TUBULAR IN TWIN CHARGES
(SHORT INTERNAL CAMOUFLET VEHICLE / AIRCRAFT
CRATERING SHAPE PARACHUTE MAY
DELAY) HEAVE OPERATING SURFACES
(NON-ASSISTED) BE PRESENT

VARIOUS TYPES
SUBMUNITION
GENERALLY ONE IMPACT / ANTI LARGE DELIVERY NUMBERS
AREA DENIAL INTERNAL SMALL IN NATURE BLAST
PART DISTURBANCE PAINTED TO SUIT THEATRE
VICTIM OP
CONSTRUCTION

VARIOUS TYPES,
BLAST FRAG
SUBMUNITION IDENTICAL TO MODIFIED DESIGN
IMPACT / SHAPE SPORADIC / RANDOM
AREA DENIAL STANDARD VARIOUS OF KNOWN
TIMED DELAY CHARGE EXPLOSIONS
MODIFIED AP & AV MUNITIONS
INCEND
SUB MUNITIONS

ANTI
VARIOU, BLAST FRAG
SUBMUNITION DISTURBANCE
KEY FEATURE: MULTIPLE TARGET SHAPE VERY HIGH THREAT
AREA DENIAL ANTI INTERNAL
SELF RIGHTING WARHEAD CHARGE CONSIDER P.A.T.
SMART COUNTERMINE
LEGS INCENDARY INFLUENCE PRECAUTIONS
TIMED DELAY

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 32 of 33

MAT Mondial – Recognition Aide Memoir – Jan 2010 Page 33 of 33
IN LIEU OF AESP

USER INSTRUCTIONS (PROVISIONAL)

[AND GUIDANCE NOTES

FOR EOD APPLICATIONS]

CONTAINER, CHARGE, EXPLOSIVE ENGINEERING,

UNIVERSAL (SMALL)
[ASSET DESIGNATION TO FOLLOW]
[NATO STOCK NUMBERS TO FOLLOW]

‘VULCAN’

ISSUING AUTHORITY: MOD DPA, MOBILITY IPT

AUTHOR: M Mondial
ISSUE NUMBER: 1
DATED: 11 November 2012
SAFETY ADVICE NOTES
• APPROVED AUTHORITY FOR USE. THE DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THE
‘VULCAN’ CHARGE CONTAINER SYSTEM HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED FOR DEFENCE
ORDNANCE SAFETY GROUP (DOSG) ASSESSMENT. ‘VULCAN’ IS COVERED BY ’MANNED
FIRING CLEARANCE’ (MFC). VULCAN IS APPROVED FOR USE BY SERVICE PERSONNEL.
• MATERIALS HAZARDS. THE ‘VULCAN’ SYSTEM IS CONSTRUCTED FROM INERT AND
INNOCUOUS MATERIALS (MOSTLY ACRYLONITRILE-BUTADIENE-STYRENE (ABS)
PLASTIC). THE MATERIALS USED FOR THE SYSTEM AND ITS PACKAGING PRESENT NO
EXPLOSIVE OR ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS IS STORAGE, TRANSIT AND USE.
• EXPLOSIVES AND ACCESSORIES. THE ‘VULCAN’ SYSTEM IS CLEARED FOR UK
SERVICE USE USING SERVICE PE4 PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES AND AUTHORISED SERVICE
DETONATORS (INCLUDING DETONATING CORD BOOSTERS (DCBs)). NOTE THAT EACH
SYSTEM MUST BE INITIATED DIRECTLY BY A DETONATOR, DCB OR SHOCK TUBE
INITIATOR. KNOTTED DET CORD WILL NOT BE USED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
• EXPLOSIVE SAFETY. THE EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ‘VULCAN’
SYSTEM ARE THOSE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SERVICE EXPLOSIVES AND ACCESSORIES
LOADED INTO THEM. THE RELEVANT SERVICE EXPLOSIVE AND EOD SAFETY
PRECAUTIONS AND PROCEDURES WILL BE USED TO ASSURE EXPLOSIVE SAFETY.
• PREPARATION FOR USE. THE ‘VULCAN’ IS A VARIABLE CONFIGURATION SYSTEM. IT
ENABLES ACCURATELY DETERMINED, VARIABLE EXPLOSIVE LOADS (~5 TO ~55g) TO BE
USED AND IS FITTED WITH A VARIETY OF PROJECTILES (e.g. MAGNESIUM INCENDIARY;
COPPER EFP, etc), AS REQUIRED BY THE DESIRED TARGET EFFECT. THERE IS LITTLE
MERIT IN EXTENSIVE PRE-PREPARATION, AS THE CONFIGURATION IS SELECTED TO SUIT
THE TARGET AND THE DESIRED EFFECT. WHERE THE TARGET FIELD IS KNOWN AND THE
DESIRED CONFIGURATION CAN BE SELECTED IN ADVANCE, IT IS FEASIBLE TO PREPARE
‘VULCAN’ CHARGES OFF-SITE IN ADVANCE, FOR CARRIAGE TO SITE. INITIATORS WILL
ONLY BE FITTED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO USE.
• STORAGE. FILLED ‘VULCAN’ BODIES SHOULD NOT BE PREPARED AND KEPT IN
AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITIES AS FILLED STORES. ONCE FILLED, THEY SHALL BE
EXPENDED OR DESTROYED SAFELY BY DETONATION AND NOT RETURNED TO STORES.
(EXCEPTIONS, ON OPERATIONS AT LOCAL DISCRETION, MAY APPLY TO STORAGE OF
CHARGED BODIES, AS PART OF OPERATIONAL READINESS AND BATTLE PROCEDURE).
• ‘VULCAN’ DANGER AREA. ‘VULCAN’ IS A SHAPED CHARGE DEVICE; ITS WEAPON
DANGER AREA HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED FORMALLY. THE ESTIMATED FRAGMENT
HAZARD FROM THE PLASTIC CASE IS ~20m. THE POTENTIAL DANGER AREA FROM THE
SHAPED CHARGE VARIES ACCORDING TO THE PROJECTILE BEING FIRED. (e.g. THE
MAGNESIUM PROJECTILE BURNS IN AIR AND IS CONSUMED WITHIN ABOUT 30m; THE
POLYETHYLENE/WATER COMPOUND PROJECTILE MAY PRESENT A HAZARD TO ~50m;
THE COPPER EFP HAS A CONSIDERABLE DOWN-RANGE HAZARD). AS WITH ALL EOD
SHAPED CHARGES, APPROPRIATE JUDGEMENT MUST BE APPLIED TO DEPLOYMENT,
AIMING, TARGET RESPONSE AND DANGER AREAS. THE BDO OR DCO, AS APPROPRIATE,
WILL ENSURE THAT THE APPROPRIATE DANGER AREA IS CLEAR.
• TARGET DANGER AREA. THE VULCAN SYSTEM IS, BY DESIGN, A LOW ORDER
TECHNIQUE. IN USE, ASSEMBLY OF POST-FIRING DATA SHALL PROVIDE AN INDICATION
OF PREDICTABILITY. HOWEVER, THE RESPONSE OF THE TARGET CAN NOT BE
GUARANTEED. BDOs AND SAFETY OFFICERS (DCOs AND DSOs) ARE ADVISED THAT
THE DANGER AREA AROUND A TASK SHALL BE THAT WHICH SHALL APPLY TO THE
TARGET STORE SHOULD IT DETONATE.
MANUFACTURER’S TECHNICAL SYNOPSIS
Sidney Alford
LIMITED
EXPLOSIVES
ENGINEERING
41A Pickwick,
THE VULCAN Corsham,
Wiltshire, SN13 0HX

Tel: 01249 714444

Fax: 01249 714440
e-mail: [email protected]
DESCRIPTION

VULCAN consists of a kit of parts from which small point-focal COPPER EXPLOSIVELY-FORMED PROJECTILE A wide angled
and explosiveliy-formed projectile shaped charges may be copper cone, essentially a slightly domed disc, generates an
assembled. The cylindrical plastic body is internally shaped to form explosively-formed projectile (EFP) which may be used to penetrate
an efficient charge and is provided with a detonator well. robust targets at much greater ranges than the jet-forming cone.
This enables the VULCAN to be used as a de-armer and disruptor
Various Types of Projectile are available. These are selected device.
according to the target and intended application of the charge.
ALUMINIUM PROJECTILE The aluminium projectile is able to
User-filled Charges may be transported and stored as a set of deliver a powerful blow to shell fuses and bomb pistols thus
inert components, then assembled by the operator to meet specific removing them or jamming their mechanisms. It thus provides a
applications and filled with plastic explosive. low-priced, disposable, alternative to de-armers using heavy steel
barrels.
Explosive Loads vary between five and fifty grams according to
application. POLYETHYLENE CONE (FORMING COMPOSITE PROJECTILE)
The polyethylene cone is used with water to constitute a composite
Ease of Portability results from the lightweight plastic body projectile. A conical cavity is formed in the explosive, water is
construction. The operator can therefore carry a large number of poured into the cavity, and the polyethylene cone is inserted to
charges which require no heavy means of support. They may be retain the water. The charge thus becomes a shaped charge, able
deployed by hand or by the smallest of remotely controlled to penetrate thin-walled steel-cased munitions, and to disperse their
vehicles. Since they disintegrate upon firing, there is no recoil. contents with minimal risk of detonation. Charges are quickly
assembled and robust.
Freedom from dangerous fragments is an incidental advantage
of the plastic body components; this greatly reduces incidental NOZZLE The Nozzle consists of an elongate plastic cone which
damage behind and to the sides of the exploding charges. fits onto the open end of the VULCAN body assembly. This
provides a highly pressure resistant stand-off space and makes it
Support for deployment and aiming is provided by means of possible to use the charge as an underwater disruptor which is very
aluminium wire legs which may be configured into a bipod or tripod; much easier for a diver to handle than are conventional steel
as the situation allows, the devices may be laid directly on the underwater disruptors. The nozzle also limits projectile impact to a
ground. No precautions against recoil are required. very restricted zone and greatly facilitates aiming with pin-point
accuracy even in conditions of zero visibility. Integral sights enable
the device to be used effectively at great stand-off distances.
Initiation and Body Variants. The detonator well is ordinarily sized
to take the British in service L1A1 and L2A1 detonators and the
L10 detonating cord booster (DCB); it can also accept commercial JET TREPAN The Jet Body may be fitted with a trepanning
detonators and shock-tube initiators. The system can be adapted to attachment which enables the charge to cut a disc approximately
accept other military and commercial detonators, as required. All 37mm in diameter from a munition case for inspection or flooding.
detonators are held by a universal detonator holding screw.

CONFIGURATIONS & APPLICATIONS

MAGNESIUM INCENDIARY CONE The jet formed by this cone
is less penetrating than that formed by the copper cone, but is a
less powerful initiator of detonation. It is used to penetrate even CODIFICATION
thick-walled shells or bombs and ignite the explosive or pyrotechnic
filling. In this application it is much less likely to cause inadvertent VULCAN and its components are being codified by the UK National
high order detonation than other, more conventional, charges. It Codification Bureau. NSNs will be available in due course.
thus provides a reliable means of bringing about a “low order”
deflagration event The usual explosive load for this purpose is
between 30 and 40g.

COPPER CONE Using the jet-forming copper cone, the charge

produces a jet which may be used to pierce holes, typically
throughup to 50mm (2 in) of mild steel or greater thicknesses of
concrete or brickwork. It may be used for causing the detonation or
deflagration of steel-cased ammunition without any risk of
inadvertent disturbance of the target before firing. The usual
explosive load is between 20 and 40g. A wider
VULCAN SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND ANCILLARIES
[ASSET DESIGNATION AND NSNs TO FOLLOW]

PE4 CARTRIDGE
FOR COMPARISON VULCAN
BODY
(SET PROVIDED
AS SHOWN)

UNIVERSAL DUMMY CHARGE SPACERS x3 SCREW

DETONATOR DETONATOR CONTAINER CONSOLIDATING
HOLDING SCREW BODY (EXPLODED: DEFAULT IS RING
JOINED AS A BLOCK OF 3)
DETONATOR WELL N.B. ‘O’ RING ON LEAD SPACER (WHERE PROVIDED)

[CHARGE CONTAINER]
ANCILLARIES
PROJECTILE FOCUSING NOZZLE

TREPANNING ATTACHMENT
OR
STAND-OFF ATTACHMENT

EXPLOSIVE CHARGE
LOADING TOOLS
THE LOADING TOOLS ARE NOT
DISPOSABLE AND SHOULD BE
RETAINED FOR FUTURE USE

STEMMING ROD
N.B. REDUCED PROFILE AT ONE END

LOADING MANDREL
N.B. FLAT AND PROFILED ENDS

20g EXPLOSIVE MEASURE

PROJECTILES AND ATTACHMENTS
[NSNs TO FOLLOW]

MAGNESIUM [JET FORMING] CONE

EFFECT: DEFLAGRATION
REVERSE [BLACK-PAINTED] FACE
IN CONTACT WITH EXPLOSIVE

FORWARD [CONCAVE, HOLLOW , RED PAINTED]

FACE TOWARDS TARGET
CONE APEX

COPPER [JET FORMING] CONE

EFFECTS: DETONATION, PENETRATION (CASE ENTRY),
DISRUPTION (?), DEFLAGRATION (?)
REVERSE [CONVEX, POINTED] FACE
IN CONTACT WITH EXPLOSIVE

CONE APEX FORWARD [CONCAVE, HOLLOW] FACE TOWARDS TARGET

COPPER EXPLOSIVELY-FORMED PROJECTILE

EFFECT: PENETRATION AT LONGER STAND-OFFs (~1m),
DISRUPTION (ALSO USED WITH EFP FOCUSING NOZZLE)
REVERSE [CONVEX] FACE
IN CONTACT WITH EXPLOSIVE

FORWARD [CONCAVE] [BLACK PAINTED] FACE

TOWARDS TARGET

N.B. AN ALUMINIUM EFP VARIANT IS ALSO PRODUCED

POLYETHYLENE CONE
EFFECT: PENETRATION, DISRUPTION (USED WITH WATER
PROJECTILE AND FOCUSING NOZZLE)

FORWARD [CONCAVE, HOLLOW] FACE TOWARDS TARGET

REVERSE [CONVEX, POINTED] FACE

IN CONTACT WITH WATER-FILLED SPACE

TREPANNING ATTACHMENT
EFFECT: CASE ENTRY OR WEAKENING BY MEANS OF AN
EXPLOSIVELY-FORMED, ANNULAR [RING OR ‘PIE CUTTER’-TYPE]
TREPANNING PROJECTILE. USED WITH REVERSED Cu/Al EFPs
NOTE: IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE FORMATION OF THE ANNULUS,
THE Cu/Al EFP PROJECTILE SHOULD BE INSERTED IN THE REVERSE
DIRECTION TO THAT NORMALLY EMPLOYED.

FOR TREPANNING, THE CONVEX (BULGING) FACE OF

ANNULUS-FORMING CONE THE EFP IS DIRECTED TOWARDS TARGET
INFO: STAND-OFF ATTACHMENT. THE STAND-OFF ATTACHMENT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME
ANCILLARY BUT WITHOUT THE INTERNAL PLASTIC CONE. IT IS USED TO MEASURE AND ASSURE
CONSISTENT PHYSICAL STAND-OFF WHERE CONTACT WITH THE TARGET IS PERMITTED
PREPARING FOR FIRING
PREPARING EXPLOSIVE LOADS
‘VULCAN’ IS A VARIABLE CONFIGURATION DEVICE, DESIGNED FOR ‘LOW ORDER’ APPLICATIONS. THE
USER SELECTS THE OPTIMUM EXPLOSIVE LOAD ACCORDING TO THE DESIRED EFFECT ON THE TARGET.
EXPLOSIVE LOADS BETWEEN 5g & ~50g MAY BE USED: A +/- 5g VARIATION IS +/-10%, WHICH IS ENOUGH
TO INFLUENCE PERFORMANCE AND EFFECT. SELECTING THE EXPLOSIVE LOAD THAT BEST SUITS THE
DESIRED EFFECT ON A PARTICULAR TARGET IS IMPORTANT. MATCHING, BUT NOT OVER-MATCHING THE
TARGET REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF HIGH ORDER EVENTS. CONSISTENT AND ACCURATE EXPLOSIVE
LOADS GIVE MORE PREDICTABLE AND CONSISTENT TARGET EFFECTS. THE EXPLOSIVE LOADING TOOLS
PROVIDE THE BEST MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS. LESS ACCURATE EXPLOSIVE MEASURING AND
ARBITRARY, PARTICULARLY FULL LOAD FILLS WILL REDUCE PREDICTED EFFECTIVENESS.

DIG AND WORK THE CHAMFERED EDGE

OF THE 20g EXPLOSIVE MEASURE INTO
THE PE UNTIL IT HAS FILLED. THIS MAY
REQUIRE CONSOLIDATION OF LOOSE
PE IN THE MEASURE USING THE
STEMMING ROD.
WHEN FULL, THE EXPLOSIVE MEASURE
CONTAINS 20g (+/- ~0.2g) OF PE

ENSURE THAT THE EXPLOSIVE MEASURE

IS FULL OF COMPACTED PE. THEN
SCRAPE THE EXCESS OFF BOTH ENDS
USING THE EDGE OF THE STEMMING ROD

EXTRUDE THE 20g SLUG OF PE FROM THE

MEASURE IN A CONTINUOUS, SMOOTH
ACTION ONTO AN APPROPRIATE SURFACE
(e.g. PE4 BOX LID, AS SHOWN), USING THE
THICK END OF THE STEMMING ROD.
THE ACCURACY OF THE LOAD MAY BE
COMPROMISED IF THIS SLUG BREAKS UP DURING
THE PROCESS
(PE4 IS EASILY EXTRUDED AND DOES NOT STICK EASILY TO THE
PTFE 20g MEASURE. US C4 PERFORMS DIFFERENTLY WHEN
COMPRESSED AND IS DIFFICULT TO EXTRUDE BY THIS METHOD)

20g SLUGS OF PE4 MAY BE DIVIDED INTO 2

x 10g PIECES ACCURATELY, USING ANY
APPROPRIATE CUTTING TOOL
(NOTE: THESE 10g PIECES MAY BE SUB-DIVIDED FURTHER INTO
5g LOADS IF REQUIRED).

THIS ENABLES INCREMENTAL EXPLOSIVE LOADS

(e.g. 10g; 20g; 30g, etc) TO BE PREPARED
MANUALLY AND WITH ACCEPTABLE ACCURACY

HINT: AS PART OF BATTLE PREPARATION, LOADS OF, SAY, 20g AND 30g OF PE MAY BE PRE-PREPARED
AND KEPT IN SUITABLE CONTAINERS (e.g. FILM CANISTERS), TO REDUCE THE TIME AND EFFORT OF ON-
SITE PREPARATION OF EXPLOSIVE LOADS PRIOR TO STEMMING INTO THE VULCAN BODY.
PREPARING FOR FIRING
LOADING AND STEMMING EXPLOSIVES
PRELIMINARY LOADING AND STEMMING

PLACE A SMALL AMOUNT (SAY 5-10g) OF PE

INTO THE VULCAN BODY. COMPACT IT INTO
THE DETONATOR WELL USING THE NARROW
END OF THE STEMMING ROD

NOTE:
THE SPACERS ARE SHOWN JOINED. THEY HAVE
PROFILED EDGES TO ALLOW THEM TO BE SNAPPED
TOGETHER. THE LEAD SPACER IS FITTED WITH A
WATERPROOFING ‘O’-RING

PLACE THE REMAINDER OF THE PE INTO THE

VULCAN BODY AND COMPACT IT USING THE
WIDE END OF THE STEMMING ROD TO
ACHIEVE A COMPACTED LOAD WITH AN
APPROXIMATELY FLAT SURFACE

PREPARING THE EXPLOSIVE FOR LOADING PROJECTILES

FIRST, COMPACT AND SHAPE THE PE USING THE FLAT END OF THE LOADING MANDREL.
APPLY FULL MANUAL PRESSURE TO COMPACT THE EXPLOSIVE. CONCURRENTLY, TURN
THE MANDREL AGAINST THE PE TO ENSURE A SMOOTH, FLAT SURFACE (SEE 1., LEFT)
IF A CONICAL CAVITY IS REQUIRED, THE FLAT SURFACE OF THE PE MAY BE WORKED
SUBSEQUENTLY USING THE PROFILED END OF THE MANDREL. AGAIN, FULL MANUAL
PRESSURE SHOULD BE APPLIED AND THE MANDREL TURNED (SEE 2., RIGHT)
1. FLAT FACE 2. PROFILED END

THE FLAT FACE ONLY IS USED WHEN THE PROFILED (POINTED) END IS USED
THE LINER IS: SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN THE LINER IS:
• MAGNESIUM CONE • COPPER JET FORMING CONE
• EFPs • WATER/POLYETHYLENE PROJECTILE
PREPARING FOR FIRING
FITTING PROJECTILES - CONES [AND EFPs]
THE PROCESS OF FITTING ALL CONES AND EFPs IS ANALOGOUS TO THE
PROCESS SHOWN, ILLUSTRATED USING THE MAGNESIUM CONE

INSERT THE CONE INTO THE CHARGED

VULCAN BODY, ENSURING THAT THE APEX
OF THE CONE IS IN CONTACT WITH THE
EXPLOSIVE. WHEN USING THE MAGNESIUM
CONE, THE RED PAINTED, CONCAVE
(HOLLOW) SURFACE SHOULD FACE
OUTWARDS, TOWARDS THE TARGET

INSERT SPACERS, SUCH THAT THE LEADING

EDGE OF THE FORWARD SPACER [ONLY]
PROTRUDES PROUD OF THE LEADING EDGE
OF THE VULCAN BODY (e.g. AS SHOWN). AT
LEAST ONE SPACER MUST ALWAYS BE
FITTED, EVEN WITH A FULL EXPLOSIVE LOAD
WHERE SPACERS ARE IN A SET OF 3, SNAP SPACERS
OFF FROM THE BOTTOM AS REQUIRED. SINGLE
SPACERS MAY BE SNAPPED TOGETHER TO FORM
A BLOCK OF 2 OR 3, AS REQUIRED.
SPACERS IN BLOCKS MUST ALWAYS BE JOINED
TOGETHER PROPERLY TO ASSURE THE INTERNAL
NOTE: IF SPACER SETS ARE ISSUED FITTED WITH SYMMETRY OF THE LOAD AND HENCE THE
‘O’-RINGS (1/SET OF 3), THE FITTED SPACER LEADS PERFORMANCE OF THE DEVICE. THIS REQUIRES
THEM TO BE LINED UP CORRECTLY AND PRESSED
HOME UNTIL AN AUDIBLE ‘CLICK’ IS DETECTED.

SCREW ON THE SCREW CONSOLIDATOR RING

TO HAND TIGHTNESS.

PRIOR TO THIS, ENSURE THAT THE SCREW THREAD IS,

AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, FREE OF EXPLOSIVE RESIDUE

THE PROCESS OF SCREWING ON THE SCREW CONSOLIDATOR RING TRANSMITS

PRESSURE THROUGH THE SPACERS, TO THE LINER AND INTO THE PE FILL.
CONSOLIDATING THE SYSTEM ENSURES RADIAL AND AXIAL SYMMETRY WITHIN THE
CHARGE, ASSURING CONSISTENCY OF PERFORMANCE.
THE MECHANICAL ADVANTAGE PROVIDED BY THE SCREW THREAD ENSURES THAT: THE
LINER IS IN INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE FACE OF THE PE. THE PE
IS COMPRESSED, MINIMISING THE POSSIBILITY OF OCCLUSIONS (AIR GAPS).
NOTE: IF THE SYSTEM IS SCREWED PARTICULARLY TIGHT, OIL MAY OOZE FROM PE4.
PREPARING FOR FIRING
FITTING A WATER/POLYETHYLENE COMPOUND PROJECTILE
HAVING CREATED A CONICAL EXPLOSIVE
FILL USING THE PROFILED END OF THE
MANDREL, FILL THE REMAINING SPACE IN
THE CHARGE CONTAINER WITH WATER

NOTE: PE4 IS NOT FULLY WATER RESISTANT AND DEGRADES

OVER TIME IN CONTACT WITH WATER. IT IS DESIRABLE BUT NOT
ESSENTIAL TO SEAL THE SURFACE OF THE EXPLOSIVE USING A
COMMONLY AVAILABLE SPRAYED ACRYLIC LACQUER BEFORE
FILLING WITH WATER. FOR IMMEDIATE USE AFTER
PREPARATION, THIS PROCEDURE IS NOT NECESSARY

INSERT THE POLYETHYLENE CONE INTO THE

BODY, THEREBY DISPLACING EXCESS
WATER. ENSURE NO AIR BUBBLES REMAIN.
CONTINUE TO INSERT UNTIL THE FLAT-SIDED
PART OF THE PROJECTILE ENGAGES
POSITIVELY WITH THE VULCAN BODY.

NOTE: NO SPACER RINGS ARE REQUIRED FOR THIS

PARTICULAR PROJECTILE

TO COMPLETE PREPARATION, SCREW ON THE SCREW CONSOLIDATING RING FULLY.

THIS WILL EXPEL FURTHER EXCESS WATER. RETAIN THE BODY IN THE UPRIGHT
POSITION SHOWN UNTIL THE SCREW CONSOLIDATING RING HAS BEEN SCREWED ON.

FITTING VULCAN BODY ANCILLARIES

PROJECTILE FOCUSING NOZZLE TREPANNING ATTACHMENT OR

STAND-OFF ATTACHMENT

THE PROJECTILE FOCUSING NOZZLE, TREPANING ATTACHMENT AND STAND-OFF

ATTACHMENT ARE FITTED TO THE FRONT FACE OF THE SCREW-CONSOLIDATING
RING BY PRESS-FITTING: THE SELECTED ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT IS SIMPLY
FORCED MANUALLY ONTO THE SCREW CONSOLIDATING RING.
PREPARING FOR FIRING
EACH VULCAN REQUIRES A DETONATOR/DET CORD BOOSTER
FITTING [ELECTRIC] DETONATORS
UNSCREW THE UNIVERSAL DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW FROM THE CHARGED
VULCAN BODY AND DISCARD THE DUMMY DETONATOR.

OPEN THE DETONATOR HOLDING ENSURE THAT THE REAR END OF THE
SCREW AT THE HINGE AND DETONATOR ABUTS THE CHOKE IN
PLACE THE DETONATOR INTO IT, THE TOP OF THE SCREW AND DOES
ENSURING THAT THE DETONATOR WIRE NOT SIT TOO FAR FORWARD.
LEADS ARE LED IN THROUGH THE
CIRCULAR CONDUIT.
CLOSE THE DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW, ENSURING THAT THE WIRE LEADS ARE NOT
TRAPPED IN IT. SCREW THE ENSEMBLE INTO THE VULCAN BODY. A SLIGHT
RESISTANCE SHOULD BE ENCOUNTERED, SINCE THE DUMMY DETONATOR IS
DELIBERATELY JUST SHORTER THAN IN-SERVICE DETONATORS. THE LIVE DETONATOR
MUST THUS BE URGED GENTLY INTO THE PE, ENSURING FULL CONTACT.

PULL THE WIRE LEADS AROUND THE

WIRE RETAINING HOOK. THIS SAFETY
FEATURE ENSURES THAT ANY
INADVERTENT PULL ON THE LEADS WILL
BE UNLIKELY TO DISCONNECT THEM
INTERNALLY [WITHIN THE DETONATOR]

FITTING FLASH DETONATORS AND SHOCK TUBE INITIATORS

FITTING FLASH DETONATORS AND SHOCK TUBE INITIATORS IS AN ANALOGOUS
PROCESS TO THAT DEMONSTRATED ABOVE. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE
CORRECT SEATING OF THE DETONATOR IN THE DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW.
THE DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW FITS TIGHTLY AROUND UK MILITARY SAFETY
FUZE. THE SCREW DOES NOT CLOSE OVER SAFETY FUZE FULLY UNLESS IT IS
PRESSED MANUALLY. THIS DOES NOT PREVENT THE ENSEMBLE BEING SCREWED
INTO THE VULCAN BODY SAFELY. THIS GRIP PROVIDES A PHYSICAL SECURITY
FEATURE: IT PREVENTS POTENTIAL MOVEMENT OF THE DETONATOR INSIDE THE
VULCAN BODY. IT HAS NO DETRIMENTAL PHYSICAL EFFECTS ON THE SAFETY FUZE
(THE GRIP IS MUCH LESS THAN THAT EXERTED DURING CRIMPING)
PREPARING FOR FIRING
FITTING DETONATING CORD BOOSTERS (DCBs)

UNSCREW THE DETONATOR HOLDER. PUSH OUT THE 2 REMOVABLE SEGMENTS

INSERT THE PLASTIC HEAD OF THE DCB SCREW THE DCB-FITTED DETONATOR
INTO THE RECTANGULAR CAVITY IN THE HOLDING SCREW INTO THE CHARGED
DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW CREATED BY VULCAN BODY
PUSHING OUT THE REMOVABLE SEGMENTS.
CLOSE THE DETONATOR HOLDING SCREW

DEPLOYMENT WITH DCBs

‘RING MAIN’ USING DCBs

CONNECTED WITH DET CORD
‘SMALL JET’, THE ‘VULCAN’ PREDECESSOR
FITTING DET CORD INTO THE DCB DEPLOYED AGAINST UK 155mm ARTY SHELLS

DCBs OFFER THE MOST ASSURED MEANS OF SIMULTANEOUS INITIATION OF

EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, RESULTING IN SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER SIMULTANEITY THAN
ELECTRIC DETONATORS IN A RING MAIN. *
WHERE SEVERAL VULCAN ARE TO BE INITIATED SIMULTANEOUSLY AT SEPARATE
TARGETS, DCBs ARE PREFERRED. SETTING UP IS ALSO MUCH QUICKER
** WHERE MORE THAN ONE VULCAN IS TO BE FIRED OR WHERE ONE IS TO BE FIRED
IN CONCERT WITH, SAY, A LINEAR CUTTING CHARGE AT THE SAME TARGET, USE
ONLY DCBs.
PREPARING FOR FIRING
FITTING LEGS (BIPODS/TRIPODS)
PREPARATION OF LEGS

BEND THE LEGS TO AN ANGLE OF ~90° WITH

THE BEND ~40mm FROM ONE END
INSERT THE BENT LEGS INTO THE OPEN-
ENDED LEG HOLDING SOCKETS LOCATED IN
THE SCREW-CONSOLIDATOR RING.

HIS MAY REQUIRE SOME TURNING TO URGE THE LEG

FAR ENOUGH INTO THE SOCKET.
THE LEG MUST BE URGED WELL INTO THE SOCKET TO
ASSURE SECURITY

EXAMPLES OF STAND CONFIGURATIONS

‘STAND-OVER’ TRIPOD ‘STAND-OFF’ TRIPOD DUG-IN, STAND-OFF BIPOD

SELF-SUPPORTING BIPOD ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION SO SIMPLE THAT

SELF-SUPPORTING BIPOD EVEN A CAT CAN DO IT
NOTE: EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT
CROSSING THE LEGS UNDER THE VULCAN
BODY ENSURES STABILITY BETTER. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IF THE LEGS
ARE LOOSE IN THE SOCKETS

THE SYSTEM OFFERS FLEXIBILITY IN SELECTING STANDS. USER

EXPERIMENTATION SHOULD DETERMINE THE MOST APPROPRIATE
CONFIGURATIONS AND METHODS FOR PREPARATION
THE SYSTEM MAY BE LAID DIRECTLY ON THE GROUND OR OR FIRING
PLATFORMS SUCH AS SANDBAGS AND PILES OF EARTH BUT THIS PREVENTS
ACCURATE ADJUSTMENT OF STAND-OFF AND ANGLE OF INCIDENCE.
GUIDANCE NOTES FOR EOD APPLICATIONS
• GENERAL. THE ‘VULCAN’ CHARGE CONTAINER SYSTEM IS A MODULAR, VARIABLE
CONFIGURATION SYSTEM THAT ALLOWS THE USER TO SELECT THE EXPLOSIVE LOAD,
SHAPED CHARGE LINER [PROJECTILE] AND CERTAIN ANCILLARIES THAT PROVIDE
SPECIAL EFFECTS. IT PROVIDES THE ‘VULCAN’ BODY AS ITS CORE ELEMENT. THE
EXPLOSIVE LOAD, PROJECTILE AND ANY ADD-ON ANCILLARY MODULES ARE SELECTED
ACCORDING TO THE DESIRED EFFECT ON THE TARGET. TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND
ADVICE NOTES ARE SET OUT BELOW. THESE ARE COMPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF
PICTURES DESCRIBING THE VARIOUS TECHNIQUES.

• DEFLAGRATION
• GENERAL. LOW ORDER, ‘DEFLAGRATION’ EFFECTS ARE PROVIDED BY SELECTING
THE MAGNESIUM CONE. THE PROJECTILE IS PENETRATIVE BUT ITS LOW DENSITY
MAKES IT LESS LIKELY THAN, SAY, COPPER CONES TO CAUSE SHOCK-INDUCED
DETONATION (UNLESS AIMED DIRECTLY AT SENSITIVE BOOSTERS). IT IS INCENDIARY
AND IGNITES THE EXPLOSIVE FILL. THE RESULTING GAS PRESSURE CAUSES THE CASE
OF THE STORE TO FAIL. THIS EVENT IS QUITE VIOLENT, AS WOULD BURSTING
RESULTING FROM VERY RAPID HYDRAULIC PRESSURISATION. FOR LARGER STORES
(e.g. 1000lb), THE MAJORITY OF THE EXPLOSIVE FILL IS OFTEN EJECTED IN A SINGLE,
SOLID LUMP. FOR SMALLER STORES, SUCH AS MORTARS AND 105mm ARTILLERY
SHELLS, THE VIOLENCE OF THE EVENT PROJECTS FRAGMENTS FAR ENOUGH TO
CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF DETONATION. OBSERVATION OF A DETONATION VERSUS A
DEFLAGRATION (e.g. PRSENCE OR ABSENCE BLACK [TNT] SMOKE) , OR COMPARISON OF
THE EFFECTS ON THE GROUND, DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS IS NOT SO.
• STAND-OFF AND ANGLE OF ATTACK. THE PENETRATION VERSUS EXPLOSIVE LOAD
AND STAND-OFF HAVE NOT BEEN QUANTIFIED FULLY. FOR DEFLAGRATION
APPLICATIONS, THE STAND-OFF FROM THE TARGET SHOULD BE ~50mm. THIS IS THE
OPTIMUM DISTANCE FROM THE LEADING EDGE OF THE BODY FOR JET FORMATION.
CLEARLY, THE ACTUAL STAND-OFF OF THE CONE APEX FROM THE TARGET INCREASES
AS EXPLOSIVE LOAD REDUCES (e.g. THE ACTUAL STAND-OFF OF THE CONE APEX WITH A
30g LOAD PLACED AT 50mm FROM THE TARGET IS ~80mm). THE ANGLE OF ATTACK
SHOULD ALWAYS BE 90°. WHERE A SMALL CASE ENTRY HOLE EXISTS IN THE TARGET,
THE MAGNESIUM PROJECTILE MAY BE USED IN COMBINATION WITH THE FOCUSING
NOZZLE [INSERTED] TO ASSURE ACCURACY AND EFFECTIVENESS.
• EXPERIMENTALLY-DERIVED LOADS FOR DEFLAGRATION. THE OPTIMUM LEVEL OF
PERFORMANCE WITH GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF A LOW ORDER EVENT IS ACHIEVED
WITH THE MINIMUM NECESSARY EXPLOSIVE LOAD. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN
DETERMINED EXPERIMENTALLY AS BEING EFFECTIVE:
• UK 1000lb: 40g LOAD at 50mm (‘SOFT’ AND CRACK-RESISTANT FILLS (e.g. AS IN THE UK
1,000lb Mk 13) MAY REQUIRE A FULL LOAD).
• UK 105mm ARTY: 30g LOAD at 50mm (ASSUME 155mm 35-40g?)
• UK 81mm MOR: 30g at 50mm
• NOTE: TNT FILLED TARGETS. MOST LOW-ORDER TECHNIQUES ENCOUNTER
DIFFICULTY IGNITING TNT. PRINCIPALLY, AS IT IS OXYGEN DEFICIENT BUT POSSIBLY
ALSO AS IT HAS A LOW MELTING POINT, SO MAY QUENCH SOURCES OF IGNITION THAT
REQUIRE OXYGEN FROM THE AIR. EXPERIENCE MAY SHOW THAT A 2-STAGE ATTACK
MAY BE REQUIRED FOR TNT-FILLED STORES (1.CASE ENTRY: 2.IGNITION)
• DISRUPTION [INCLUDING CASE ENTRY] AND DE-ARMING.
• GENERAL. ‘DISRUPTION’ EFFECTS ARE PROVIDED BY A VARIETY OF PROJECTILES.
THESE INCLUDE THE POLYETHYLENE CONE (WITH WATER); THE COPPER EFP;
ALUMINIUM EFP AND THE COPPER CONE. THE PROJECTILE IS SELECTED ACCORDING
TO THE TARGET AND THE DESIRED EFFECT.
• POLYETHYLENE CONE
• GENERAL. THE POLYETHYLENE CONE IS USED WITH WATER TO CREATE A
COMPOUND WATER/POLYETHYLENE PROJECTILE. THIS IS PENETRATIVE BUT OF LOW
DENSITY AND IS INERT. THIS PROJECTILE IS MOST UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO AN
ENERGETIC EVENT DIRECTLY, UNLESS AIMED DELIBERATELY AT SENSITIVE
COMPONENTS SUCH AS DETONATORS AND BOOSTERS.
• DIRECT ATTACK. DIRECT ATTACK WITH THE WATER/POLYETHYLENE PROJECTILE
MAY BE USED FOR A VARIETY OF EFFECTS:
• CASE PENETRATION (FOR SUBSEQUENT EXPLOITATION)
• DISRUPTION (PHYSICAL BREAK-UP) OF SMALL DEVICES, e.g. SUB-MUNITIONS
• HYDRAULIC PRESSURISATION LEADING TO FUZE EJECTION. IN THIS MODE, FIRING
THE PROJECTILE INTO CERTAIN [PROBABLY SMALL] MUNITIONS LEADS TO SHORT-TERM
PRESSURISATION RESULTING IN FUZE EJECTION. THIS HAS BEEN TESTED TO DATE
SUCCESSFULLY ON UK 81mm MORTAR ROUNDS (2 SIMULTANEOUS SHOTS, 30g LOAD).
THE TECHNIQUE IS VIABLE BUT FURTHER EXPERIMENTATION IS REQUIRED TO
DETERMINE THE WIDER APPLICABILITY (i.e. EXPLOSIVE LOADS AND NUMBERS OF
SIMULTANEOUS SHOTS REQUIRED. N.B. USE DCBs FOR MULTIPLE SHOTS)
• FOCUSED ATTACK - USING NOZZLE. THE COMPOUND WATER/POLYETHYLENE
PROJECTILE MAY BE FOCUSED BY FITTING THE PROJECTILE FOCUSING NOZZLE. THIS
CONCENTRATES THE PROJECTILE TO GIVE IT A VERY NARROW CROSS-SECTION.
WHERE A SLIGHTLY BROADER CROSS SECTION IS REQUIRED, THE CONE MAY BE
SHORTENED BY CUTTING OFF THE END AT THE PRE-MARKED POINT. APPLICATIONS OF
THE POLYETHYLENE CONE WITH NOZZLE ARE:
• CASE PENETRATION (FOR SUBSEQUENT EXPLOITATION) GIVING A VERY SMALL
DIAMETER, CLEAN ENTRY HOLE.
• DISRUPTION (PHYSICAL BREAK-UP) OF SMALL STORES, e.g. SUB-MUNITIONS
• DISRUPTION OF SPECIFIC COMPONENTS (PARTICULARLY IN IEDs)
• COPPER [AND ALUMINIUM] EFPs
• GENERAL. THE EFPs ARE INERT PROJECTILES THAT ARE PENETRATIVE AT CLOSE
RANGE AND AT GREATER STAND-OFF THAN IS POSSIBLE WITH JET-FORMING CONES (e.g.
AT ~1m). THESE PROJECTILES POSSESS CONSIDERABLE KINETIC ENERGY, SO THEY
ARE MORE LIKELY THAN THE LESS DENSE PROJECTILES TO LEAD TO SHOCK-INDUCED
REACTIONS, INCLUDING DETONATION.
• DIRECT ATTACK. DIRECT ATTACK WITH THE EFPs IS USED FOR:
• CASE PENETRATION (FOR SUBSEQUENT EXPLOITATION) (NOTE DETONATION RISK)
• DISRUPTION (PHYSICAL BREAK-UP) OF STORES
• DESTRUCTION OF HARDWARE (e.g. WEAPONS; COMPONENTS; FUZE DE-ARMING)
• FOCUSED ATTACK - USING NOZZLE. FOR THE ABOVE EFFECTS, USE OF THE
FOCUSING NOZZLE CONCENTRATES THE EFP OVER A SMALLER AREA, GIVING AN
AIMABLE PENETRATIVE, SOLID PROJECTILE.
• FOCUSED ATTACK - USING TREPANNING ATTACHMENT. BY REVERSING THE
DIRECTION OF THE EFP IN THE VULCAN BODY AND FITTING THE TREPANNING
ATTACHMENT, AN ANNULAR (‘RING’ OR ‘PIE CUTTER’) PROJECTILE IS FORMED. THIS IS
USED PRINCIPALLY FOR CASE ENTRY. THE PENETRATOR CREATES A BROAD DIAMETER
(~30mm), CLEAN ENTRY HOLE. THE ATTACHMENT MUST BE IN CONTACT WITH THE
TARGET TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE. (THE ATTACHMENT IS FITTED WITH ‘VELCRO’.
MAGNETS, ALSO FITTED WITH ‘VELCRO’ ARE PROVIDED TO ASSIST ADHESION ON IRON
SURFACES (WHERE THIS IS PERMITTED)).
• COPPER [JET FORMING] CONE
• GENERAL. THE COPPER CONE IS USED AS A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PENETRATOR (THE
PERFORMANCE OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVE LOADS AND STAND-OFFs HAS NOT BEEN
QUANTIFIED. PENETRATION OF >75mm STEEL HAS BEEN ACHIEVED). THE COPPER
CONE IS MORE LIKELY THAN THE MAGNESIUM CONE TO INITIATE SHOCK-INDUCED
EVENTS AND SHOULD NOT BE USED TO EFFECT DEFLAGRATION). SUITABLE LIKELY
APPLICATIONS ARE:
• DESTRUCTION OF HARDWARE (e.g. WEAPONS; COMPONENTS; FUZE DE-ARMING)
• DISRUPTION (NOTE DETONATION RISK)
• CASE ENTRY (FOR SUBSEQUENT EXPLOITATION) (NOTE DETONATION RISK)

THE ‘VULCAN’ SYSTEM IS VERSATILE AND FLEXIBLE. AT PRESENT, A CERTAIN

AMOUNT OF USER EXPERIMENTATION AND TESTING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE
POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS, RSPs AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS.
THIS REQUIRES HIGH A STANDARD OF DATA GATHERING AND INFORMED
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS.
DEPLOYMENT - APPLICABILITY
LARGE AIR-DROPPED BOMBS - DEFLAGRATION

US 650 LB BOMB (LAOS) SET UP FOR ATTACK BY SMALL JET (VULCAN RESULT
PRECURSOR). MAGNESIUM CONE - NOTE NOZZLE FITTED, AS
CHARGE IS BEING FIRED INTO A PREVIOUSLY-MADE ENTRY HOLE IN
THE BOMB CASE. (NOTE DE-ARMER SLUG STUCK IN NOSE FUZE!)

VULCAN SET UP TO ATTACK UK 1,000lb MK 10 RESULT

BOMB FIRING MAGNESIUM CONE (40G PE4)

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION - DEFLAGRATION

UK 155 MM ARTILLERY SHELLS SET UP FOR ATTACK BY SMALL JET (VULCAN PRECURSOR).
MAGNESIUM CONE. FITTED WITH DCB TO ALLOW ‘DCB RING MAIN’ TO FIRE CHARGES CONCURRENTLY.

RESULTS
UK 105MM SHELL SET UP FOR ATTACK BY RESULT: BASE FRAGMENT TYPICAL OF
VULCAN. MAGNESIUM CONE (30G PE4) THOSE RESULTING FROM ATTACK
AND DEFLAGRATION BY VULCAN

UK 81 MM MORTAR BOMB SET UP FOR ATTACK RESULT: TYPICAL FRAGMENTS FROM

BY VULCAN. MAGNESIUM CONE. 30G PE4. DEFLAGRATION OF UK 81 MM MORTAR
BOMBS.

UK 81 MM PARA ILLUM MORTAR BOMB SET UP RESULT

FOR ATTACK BY SMALL JET (VULCAN
PRECURSOR). MAGNESIUM CONE.
MORTAR AMMUNITION - OTHER EFFECTS

UK 81 MM MORTAR BOMB SET UP FOR RESULT. NOTE FUZE ADAPTER RING

SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK BY 2 X VULCAN FIRING AND FUZE EJECTED WITH NO REACTION
COMPOUND WATER/POLYETHYLENE CONE, 35g PE OF THE EXPLOSIVE FILL

ALTERNATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
SHOWING THE
EXPLOSIVE FILL

BOMBLETS - DISRUPTION/MECHANICAL BREAK-UP

UK BL-755 SET UP FOR ATTACK BY SMALL JET RESULT

(VULCAN PRECURSOR). WATER/POLYETHYLENE CONE.

UK BL-755 SET UP FOR ATTACK BY SMALL RESULT

JET (VULCAN PRECURSOR).
(NOTE EFFECT OF EVENTS ON NOZZLE)
WATER/POLYETHYLENE CONE:
FOCUSING NOZZLE FITTED.
[NAVAL] MUNITIONS - CASE ENTRY

UK MK 44 TORPEDO EXPLODER, INERT RESULT. CASE ENTRY HOLES

SET UP FOR ATTACK BY SMALL JET CONSISTENTLY 10MM DIAMETER
(VULCAN PRECURSOR). MAGNESIUM
CONE. 20g PE4. NOZZLE FITTED

IEDD APPLICATIONS

SMALL JET (VULCAN PRECURSOR) FIRING TYPICAL RESULT

A WATER/POLYETHYLENE CONE
(TRUNCATED NOZZLE FITTED) AGAINST A
REPRESENTATIVE PIPE BOMB

SMALL JET (VULCAN PRECURSOR) CLOSE UP OF INTERNAL IED POST-FIRING. SUCCESSFUL

FIRING A WATER/POLYETHYLENE CONFIGURATION OF COMPLEX IED. DISRUPTION. WITNESS CIRCUIT
CONE (NOZZLE FITTED) AGAINST INCORPORATES FAST-ACTING DID NOT FUNCTION
A COMPLEX IED CIRCUIT. EXPLOSIVES LIVE BUT
WITNESS CIRCUIT INDICATES
FUNCTION EXTERNALLY
LOW ORDER TECHNIQUES (LOT) PROFORMA
To be completed on every occasion a low order technique is used. For Op FINGAL, VULCAN LOT Reports
are to be aggregated for submission to Mobility IPT to support the Short Range, Low Order Techniques project

GENERAL DETAILS
Date Location

Author
Number: Rank: Name: Unit:
WEAPON UXO DETAILS
Weapon Type: Name:
UXO Fuzed Summary Description:
*Nose/Top *Tail/Bottom *Transverse/Side
Yes No Yes No Yes No Unknown
Name: Name: Name:
Fuze Condition * Delete as necessary
*Nose/Top *Tail/Bottom *Transverse/Side
Armed Unarmed Armed Unarmed Armed Unarmed Unknown
Boosters Fitted * Delete as necessary
*Nose/Top *Tail/Bottom *Transverse/Side
Yes No Yes No Yes No Unknown
Main Fill
Explosive Non Explosive Type if Known:
Yes No Yes No Unknown
[VULCAN] PROCEDURE
Mg Cone Polyethylene Cone Cu Cone Explosive Load g
Cu EFP Al EFP
Nozzle (Full) Nozzle (Cut Down) Trepanning Kit Stand-off mm
Experimental RSP
Remarks: Include placement, point of aim and attack angle, rationale behind experimental RSP if this is the case, etc.

* Delete as necessary
RESULTS
If unable to determine results A1 – E then use the Alternative Reaction codes on reverse.
No Chemical Reaction Burn
A1 Case Not Penetrated B1 Burn Not Sustained
A2 Case Penetrated B2 Burn sustained to Burnout
A3 Mechanical Break-up B3 Burn to Deflagration
B4 Burn to Detonation
Deflagration Violent Deflagration
C1 Deflagration not sustained < 15% of fill consumed D1 Violent Deflagration
C2 Deflagration 15 – 50% of fill consumed D2 Transition to Detonation
C3 Deflagration >50% of fill consumed
Detonation
E Detonation
ALTERNATIVE REACTION CODES.
Cat A No Reaction
Cat B From the EOD operators perspective, reaction less that expected, the weapon partially open but a major portion of
fill remains
Cat C From EOD operators perspective, reaction ideal, weapon open, remnants in the vicinity of original weapon
location, no fill remaining.
Cat D Reaction more violent that desired, fragments up to several hundred metres. Majority of fill consumed during
deflagration.
OPERATORS OVERALL ASSESSMENT/REMARKS
Include alternative reaction codes if used layout of charges, thickness, condition, material of munition case, success or
failure (High Order) of procedure. Take Before and After Photos.

Note:- Operators are to attach diagrams and photographs/media where possible. Digital Photos on CD
as part of Post Op Report are required.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

SEVEN KEY POINTS

1. TAIL UNIT DESIGN (INCLUDING BALLISTIC OR RETARDED OPTIONS).

2. METHOD OF SUSPENSION (DISTANCE BETWEEN AND SHAPE).
3. BASIC SHAPE.

ASSOCIATED
EOD CWR HAZARDS
SHAPE TIMINGS FUZE LOC REMARKS
CLASSIFICATION %
OLDER WPNS
POINTED NOSE,
OLDER WPNS
TAPERS FROM
NOSE
SHOULDER TO GENERAL
TAIL
BASE PLATE PRE-IMPACT BOMBARDMENT
BLAST, FRAG,
GP (TEAR DROPPED IMPACT 33-60 MIGHT EMPLOY
MODERN EARTHSHOCK
SHAPED). POST IMPACT MULTI - FUZING
WPNS NOSE
MODERN WPNS
TAIL
PARALLEL SIDED.
TRANSVERSE

COMMONLY
PRE IMPACT EARLY MODELS CAN
CYLINDRICAL
(Impact with stand HAVE MUILPILE NOSE
SHAPED WITH NOSE
HC off acting as low tech 75-80 BLAST FUZES / CENTRAL
FLAT NOSE TAIL
effective pre BOOSTER FULL LENGTH /
(BOILER SHAPED)
impact). THIN CASE
VARIOUS SHAPES
OBIVOUS FRAG
PRE IMPACT NOSE ANTI PERSONNEL / SOFT
FRAG RIBS OR SMOOTH 20 FRAG
IMPACT TAIL SKINNED TARGETS
SKINNED

LONG AND
SLENDER HEAVY ARMOURERED
AP POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 10-20 FRAG
(PENCIL SHAPED) TARGETS

SOLID POINTED
NOSE
LIGHTLY ARMOURERED
SAP (TEAR DROP POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 20-30 FRAG
TARGETS
SHAPED)

FLAT NOSED
PARALLEL SIDED
OR TAPERS BLAST = Land UNDERWATER TARGETS
AS POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 60-75
FROM SHOULDER BPE = Sea THIN CASED
TO BASE

SOLID POINTED
NOSE
REINFORCED CONCRETE
DP PARALLEL SIDES POST IMPACT TAIL ONLY 50 EARTHQUAKE
TARGETS
(VERY BIG)

4. COLOURS / MARKINGS.
5. DIMENSIONS.
6. FUZING LOCATIONS ON WEAPON.
7. FUZING SHAPE (POSSIBLE INDICATION OF ROLE OF BOMB).
OTHER AIR DROPPED WEAPONS

ASSCOIATED
EOD SHAPE FUZE LOC CHARACTERISTICS HAZARDS REMARKS
TIMINGS
CLASSIFICATION
VARIOUS
SMALL
TUBULAR OR
MULTI ITEMS
COMBUSTABLE SPHERICAL. NOSE ENTIRE ITEM FIRE
IMPACT MAGNESIUM ALLOY
INCENDIARY MAYBE SILVERY TAIL BURNS /POSIBLE HE
THERMITE FILL
GREY IN
COLOUR

FLAMMABLE LIQUID FILLS

MULTIPLE COMBUSTILE
FIRE -
NON BOMB TYPE OR INCEDIARIES
NOSE CONTENTS ONLY LARGE
COMBUSTABLE AIRCRAFT FUEL IMPACT THERMITE BALLS CARTS
INTERNAL BURN SPREAD
INCENDIARY TANK TYPE POSS HE IGNITER CHARGE
AREA
FUZE ALWAYS ACTING TYPE

LEAVES AIRCRAFT DEPENDENT FUZE WILL BE AIRBURST

AIMABLE NOSE TO FUNCTION. ON CONTENTS MAYBE
BOMB SHAPED PRE IMPACT
CONTAINERS SADDLE PORTION MUNITIONS EXPLOSIVE OR NON
CARRIED EXPLOSIVE
REMAINS
VARIOUS
ATTACHED TO DEPENDENT SAME TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE
LARGE
NON AIMABLE OPERATED AIRCRAFT WHEN ON STORE AS CARRIED BY
TOO UNSTABLE N/A
CONTAINERS BY AIRCREW PAYLOAD MUNITIONS AIMABLE CONTAINER BUT IN
FOR FREE
DISPENSED CARRIED LARGER QUANTITIES
FLIGHT
ROLE COLOURS AS MAIN
VARIOUS SMOKE
PYROTECHIC NOSE FUNCTIONS ON THE COLOURING
TUBULAR WITH IMPACT FLAME
MARKERS INTERNAL SURFACE HAZARD BANDS
FLAT NOSE
LIGHT
PRODUCING
VARIOUS
NOSE CAN BE ROLE AND HAZARD
PYROTECHIC NORMALLY FUNCTIONS IN THE
PRE IMPACT TAIL MILLIONS OF INDICATORS TAKE THE
SIGNALS LARGER THAN AIR
INTERNAL CANDLE FORM OF COLOUR BANDS
PYRO MARKERS
POWER

ADAPTED FULL EACH USER HAS

BOMB SHAPED
SIZE WEAPONS. PREFERRED SHAPE TO
FULL SIZE BUT
NOSE SMALLER SIZE SMOKE DUPLICATE OWN USER
PRACTICE NORMALLY
IMPACT TAIL EITHER LOW OR FLASH BOMBS
BOMBS MUCH SMALLER
INTERNAL HIGH EXPLOSVE FRAG SHAPE TO MATCH
THAN NORMAL
CONTENTS BALLISTIC OR RETARDED
HE BOMBS
ROLE OF BOMB
WARHEAD HE.
FIRED INDIVIDUALLY OR
SOLID FUEL (LOW NON EX
ROCKET MULTIPLES
ROCKETS IMPACT NOSE EXPLOSIVE). CHEM.
SHAPED LAUNCH FROM RACKS OR
FINS SHAPED
NORMALLY PODS
VENTURI CHARGE
SUBMUNITION TYPES

METHOD
OF
EOD
SHAPE FUNCTIONING FUZE LOC CHARACTERISTICS HAZARDS REMARKS
CLASSIFICATIONS
VARIOUS
ONE PART
CONSTRUCTION. NOSE DESIGNED TO
SUBMUNITION FRAG FOOT PRINT DEPENDENT ON
POSSIBLE FRAG IMPACT TAIL FUNCTION ON
ANTI-PERSONNEL BLAST DELIVERLY METHOD
SCORING ON INTERNAL IMPACT
BODY

VARIOUS
MULTI PART
SHAPED
CONSTRUCTION DESIGNED TO STABILIZED IN FLIGHT
SUBMUNITION NOSE CHARGE
REQUIRES IMPACT FUNCTION ON (FOR ANGLE OF ATTACK)
ANTI-VEHICLE TAIL BLAST FRAG
STAND OFF IMPACT
INCENDIARY
CAPABILITY

ROCKET ASSISTED
SUBMUNITION CRATERING LIKELY TO BE FOUND AROUND
SIMILAR TO IMPACT SINGLE MAIN
RUNWAY NOSE EFFECTS VEHICLE / AIRCRAFT
LARGE ROCKET (SHORT CHARGE
CRATERING INTERNAL CAMOUFLET OPERATING SURFACES
IN APPEARANCE DELAY) PARACHUTE MAY
(ASSISTED) HEAVE
BE PRESENT

CRATERING
SUBMUNITION FREE FALL
IMPACT EFFECTS LIKELY TO BE FOUND AROUND
RUNWAY TUBULAR IN TWIN CHARGES
(SHORT INTERNAL CAMOUFLET VEHICLE / AIRCRAFT
CRATERING SHAPE PARACHUTE MAY
DELAY) HEAVE OPERATING SURFACES
(NON-ASSISTED) BE PRESENT

VARIOUS TYPES
SUBMUNITION
GENERALLY ONE IMPACT / ANTI LARGE DELIVERY NUMBERS
AREA DENIAL INTERNAL SMALL IN NATURE BLAST
PART DISTURBANCE PAINTED TO SUIT THEATRE
VICTIM OP
CONSTRUCTION

VARIOUS TYPES,
BLAST FRAG
SUBMUNITION IDENTICAL TO MODIFIED DESIGN
IMPACT / SHAPE SPORADIC / RANDOM
AREA DENIAL STANDARD VARIOUS OF KNOWN
TIMED DELAY CHARGE EXPLOSIONS
MODIFIED AP & AV MUNITIONS
INCEND
SUB MUNITIONS

ANTI
VARIOU, BLAST FRAG
SUBMUNITION DISTURBANCE
KEY FEATURE: MULTIPLE TARGET SHAPE
AREA DENIAL ANTI INTERNAL VERY HIGH THREAT
SELF RIGHTING WARHEAD CHARGE
SMART COUNTERMINE CONSIDER P.A.T.
LEGS INCENDARY
TIMED DELAY INFLUENCE PRECAUTIONS
Guided Weapons Categorisation Table

AAM ASM SAM SSM

Short Range Long Range Tactical Strategic Hand Held Short Range Long Range Anti-Armour Tactical Strategic
Dimensions L. 2m-3.5m L. 3m-7m L. 2m+ L. 5m+ L. 1m-1.5m L. 1.25m-3m L. 3m+ L. 0.8m-1.8m L. 2m+ L. 5m+
D. 120-150mm D. 150-400mm D. 200mm+ D. 500mm+ D. 70-120mm D. 120-250mm D. 300mm+ D. 100-250mm D. 200mm+ D. 450mm+
Guidance IR homing Radar homing IR, laser or Homing and/or IR homing, IR homing or Radar homing Wire Homing and/or Homing and/or
radar homing, pre-set beam rider or radio or radio command, pre-set pre-set
radio or TV radio command command possibly other
command command command or
homing
Control Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust
gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases,
movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable
control control control control control control control control control control
surfaces, may surfaces surfaces surfaces (may surfaces surfaces. surfaces (may surfaces surfaces (may surfaces (may
have rollerons have liquid have liquid have liquid have liquid
fuel) fuel) fuel) fuel)
Warhead Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Blast/frag, Nuclear, Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Shaped charge Blast/frag, Nuclear,
frag or frag or SAP, shaped chemical or frag or blast frag, frag or or tandem SAP, shaped chemical or
expanding rod expanding rod charge, large HE blast expanding rod expanding rod shaped charge charge, large HE blast
tandem or multiple penetration,
shaped charge shaped charge sub-munitions
Fuzing Side-looking Side-looking Forward- Forward- Side-looking Side-looking Side-looking Contact Forward- Forward-
proximity, proximity, looking looking proximity, proximity, proximity, looking looking
contact and contact and proximity and proximity and contact and contact and contact and proximity and proximity and
self-destruct self-destruct contact contact self-destruct self-destruct self-destruct contact contact
Propulsion Solid fuel Solid fuel (may Solid fuel (may Air-breathing Solid fuel, in- Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing Solid fuel with Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing
have in-line have in-line engine or liquid line booster line or engine, solid or in-line booster line or engine or
booster) booster) fuel (may have jettisonable liquid fuel jettisonable rocket motor,
solid fuel in- external rocket motor, external in-line or
line booster) booster in-line or booster jettisonable
jettisonable external
external booster
booster