THE ARMY AND HOMELAND SECURITY:

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Antulio J. Echevarria II

March 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-046-X

ii
FOREWORD

The topic of homeland security includes a broad array of

missions and mission areas ranging from national missile
defense to military assistance to civil authorities. Recently
the topic has attracted a great deal of attention due to the
public’s heightened awareness of the variety and nature of
emerging threats and of the United States’ vulnerabilities
to them.
This monograph, written by Lieutenant Colonel Antulio
J. Echevarria II, grew out of a tasking by the Army Staff to
investigate the Army’s role in homeland security from a
strategic, rather than a legal or procedural perspective. The
author achieves this perspective by placing homeland
security missions within the larger spectrum of operations.
In so doing, he exposes potential problem areas—missions
requiring more or different force structure than that
already available—for further action by the Army. He also
recommends that the Army consider alternative force-
sizing metrics that include, as a minimum, the “high-end”
homeland security identified in the study.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II is a lieutenant colonel in the

U.S. Army currently assigned as the Director of Strategic
Research at the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle
Barracks, PA. He graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor officer,
and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in
Germany and Continental United States; he has also served
as an assistant professor of European history at the U.S.
Military Academy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of
BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Center at
Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After Next
project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and as a
speechwriter for two U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff. He is a
graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff
College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in History from
Princeton University. He has published articles in a
number of scholarly and professional journals to include the
Journal of Military History, War in History, War & Society,
the Journal of Strategic Studies, Parameters, Joint Force
Quarterly, Military Review, and Airpower Journal. His
book, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the
Great War, was published by the University Press of Kansas
in March 2001.

iv
THE ARMY AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Throughout our nation’s history, the U.S. Army and its

sister Services have readily responded to the Constitutional
requirement “to insure domestic Tranquility and provide for
1
the common defence.” That requirement has obliged U.S.
forces to conduct a broad range of missions from the
suppression of sedition, as in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794,
to the reconquest of U.S. territories, as in the Second World
War. However, global economic changes, the rapid advance
of information technologies, and the increasing
proliferation of long-range missiles and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) recently have added new dimensions to
2
the requirement to protect the homeland. Accordingly,
political and military leaders have begun to voice concerns
about America’s growing vulnerability and what should be
3
done about it. It is both timely and appropriate, therefore,
for the U.S. Army to reexamine the issue of homeland
defense and to assess whether it possesses the necessary
resources to perform its homeland security (HLS) missions
while carrying out its other responsibilities under the
national security and national military strategies.
This monograph approaches homeland security as a
strategic issue, examining the Army’s capacity to
accomplish its HLS missions under the current force-sizing
metric and war planning requirement to fight two
simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) major theater wars
4
(MTWs). Little agreement exists over whether the Services
have sufficient forces to execute two MTWs even without
the additional—and still difficult to quantify—
5
requirements associated with HLS. Furthermore, despite
much debate about the future of U.S. national security
strategy and much rhetoric about the vulnerabilities of the
homeland, little of the work done to date on alternative
strategies actually addresses the requirement to protect the

1
6
homeland. To assist the Department of Defense (DoD) in
identifying requirements and assigning priorities for HLS,
the Army should establish a force-sizing metric for its HLS
missions, particularly its high-end missions (defined later).

Assumptions.

This monograph makes two fundamental assumptions.

First, the United States will remain engaged in the world
for the foreseeable future. As a result, its national security
strategy of “Engagement” and its national military strategy
of “Shape, Respond, Prepare Now” will remain unchanged
7
in principle, even if the terms and priorities are altered.
Second, if U.S. national culture and historical traditions
are any indication, Americans will demand a domestic
environment in which their homeland is secure, but civil
authority and liberties remain intact and security measures
8
are transparent. Accordingly, the U.S. military will
perform the bulk of its HLS missions as the supporting
rather than the lead federal agency and may have to comply
9
with fairly restrictive rules of engagement.

A New Threat Environment.

With the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of a

new technological revolution, the threat environment has
changed. A number of regional powers, states of concern,
and transnational groups already possess limited, if
asymmetric, means capable of challenging the interests of
10
the United States abroad and those of its allies.
Intelligence estimates indicate, for instance, that ballistic
missiles will continue to proliferate over the next few
decades. More than 25 countries currently possess ballistic
missiles, though only two, Russia and China, have
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of
reaching the United States. However, China’s missile
arsenal will probably increase significantly in the next
decade. Furthermore, as the report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the

2
Rumsfeld report) concluded, within 5 years North Korea
and Iran (and Iraq in 10 years) will have the capability to
target the United States with ICBMs armed with
11
conventional and unconventional warheads. Conceivably,
by 2010, any one of these states and a score of others could
issue a “stay at home or else” ultimatum to the U.S.
National Command Authority (NCA), thereby effectively
threatening the nation’s ability to protect its interests
12
overseas.
In addition, cruise missiles—which vary in type from
relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
million-dollar-per-copy Tomahawks—have proliferated
enormously in recent years. Approximately 19 nations
currently produce cruise missiles of some type, while more
than 75 countries possess them. Often referred to as the
“poor-man’s air force,” cruise missiles are much cheaper to
develop and easier to conceal than ballistic missiles. They
can also carry payloads similar to those of ballistic missiles,
but can deliver them with greater effectiveness because of
their ability to make multiple passes. Intelligence estimates
project a market of some 7,000 cruise missiles of the
land-attack type by 2010, not counting Chinese or American
13
purchases. These missiles can be concealed in and
launched from standard shipping containers. U.S. ports
typically handle 13,000,000 shipping containers annually,
but only a fraction of these are inspected. On any given day,
about 1,000 ships travel the Atlantic Ocean, making it
difficult to determine which vessel (or vessels) might
launch, or had launched, a cruise missile against a U.S.
14
target. To date, the major sea and air ports of the United
States lie virtually unprotected from an attack by land-or
sea-launched cruise missiles.
Furthermore, assessments conducted by the United
States Commission on National Security/21st Century
(Hart-Rudman Commission) and the National Commission
on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) point out that America
15
remains vulnerable to a large-scale terrorist attack. While
the total number of terrorist incidents in the United States

3
has declined from a high of 51 in 1982 to a low of 3 in 1996,
the overall lethality of terrorism worldwide has risen from
an average of 1,200 casualties during 1987-94 to more than
16
3,500 during 1995-97. Intelligence projections, such as
17
Global Trends 2015, suggest that this trend will continue.
What’s more, some political leaders have expressed concern
that large-scale domestic terrorism has already begun—as
evidenced by the Oklahoma City bombing—and that
extremist organizations like the Order and the Aryan
18
Resistance are planning more attacks. Domestic terrorism
thus poses at least as serious a threat to U.S. citizens as the
international brand, perhaps more.
Moreover, international and domestic terrorists appear
to have grown more radical in their aims and methods.
During the Cold War, international terrorists typically
executed limited attacks so as not to undermine external
political and financial support for their causes. Today,
however, a number of international and domestic terrorist
organizations seem motivated by revenge or apocalyptic
fears, and seem bent on inflicting as many casualties as
possible. Some international terrorists, such as Osama bin
Laden and his al-Quaida organization, have achieved a
considerable degree of fiscal and political independence and
are thus less concerned that mass-casualty attacks would
alienate their supporters. Hence, terrorist attacks in
general have expanded in scale, as evidenced by the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, which was expected to
yield some 60,000 casualties. Consequently, while the total
number of terrorist incidents worldwide has declined over
the years, intelligence estimates indicate that the overall
likelihood of a terrorist attack in the United States
19
involving a WMD has actually increased.
Additionally, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
have proliferated despite Congress’ Cooperative Threat
Reduction program with Russia, and the presence of such
arms control regimes as the Chemical Weapons Convention
20
(CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Russia’s inability to maintain accurate accountability of all

4
of its WMD remains a source of concern; and Iran, Iraq,
Libya, and North Korea, among others, continue to increase
their chemical and biological stockpiles despite, in some
cases, being signatories to one or both of these conventions.
A WMD attack, whether delivered overtly by missiles or
covertly by other means, could result not only in massive
casualties, disruption or degradation of information
infrastructures, contamination of public health systems
and foodstuffs, and degraded response capabilities, but also
in economic damage, loss of strategic world position,
social-psychological damage, and undesirable political
21
change.
Finally, one must consider the potential menace to U.S.
information systems posed by cyber attacks. The number of
documented computer intrusion events has increased from
22
1,334 in all of 1993 to 8,800 in the first 6 months of 2000.
The Computer Security Institute estimates that computer
crime in the United States doubled in 1999, causing nearly
23
$10B in financial losses. Because the sectors of the critical
infrastructure of the United States—information and
communications, vital human services, energy, physical
distribution networks (e.g., waterways, bridges), and
banking and finance—are becoming increasingly tied
together electronically, cyber attacks can have a
devastating effect on them as well. The Presidential
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection assessed
the vital human services and information and
communications sectors as highly vulnerable to computer
attack. The energy, physical distribution, and banking and
finance sectors were classified as either well-protected or
24
relatively resilient to an attack. Nonetheless, as the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified before
Congress in February 2000, the foreign cyber threat
continues to grow. More than one dozen countries, including
Russia and the People’s Republic of China, have developed
or are developing the means to launch strategic-level cyber
25
attacks.

5
Today’s threat environment reflects the influences of a
faster-paced and more interconnected world. In this
environment, the traditional notion that “a threat =
capabilities x intentions” remains valid, but requires more
emphasis on potential threats than previously. Few of those
states or nonstate actors that might wish to do the United
States harm currently possess the capability to do so. Yet,
even a slight increase in the rate of proliferation of
long-range missile technologies and WMD means that our
adversaries can acquire that capability sooner than we
expect, perhaps sooner than we can implement counter-
measures. In addition, computer “glitches” such as the Y2K
bug possess no intent at all, but can nonetheless undermine
national security when they become active. Accordingly,
policymakers must now focus as much on possibilities as on
probabilities, as much on vulnerabilities as on threats. Put
differently, an effective homeland defense might require
treating vulnerabilities as seriously as confirmed threats
26
under the traditional reckoning.

Definition of HLS and Mission Areas.

The U.S. Government needs to develop a comprehensive

definition of HLS to provide a uniform basis for coordinating
the efforts of all federal agencies and for deriving mission
areas, tasks, and responsibilities for each. Remarkably,
however, HLS has not yet been authoritatively defined,
either at the interagency level or by the defense
27
community. Part of the reason for this is the disagreement
over whether the definition should address only the
requirement to “deter and defend against foreign and
domestic threats” or whether it should encompass “all
hazards,” including natural and man-made disasters. Some
views, such as those offered by RAND Arroyo, favor the
former—a more circumscribed definition—because it
provides a clear distinction between “military activities”
28
and the “activities of civilian organizations.” They argue
that such distinctions will reduce damage to the military’s
image, which could suffer harm if it is perceived as doing

6
either too little or too much. Unfortunately, definitional
clarity will not necessarily preclude misperceptions of
whether the military has actually done too little or too much
in any particular HLS situation. Furthermore, a
circumscribed definition tends to make the problem fit the
tools available; and would thus not help expose potential
organizational or procedural weaknesses in the ways the
U.S. Government and the Joint community propose to
protect the homeland.
In the absence of an authoritative definition, the Army
has rightly developed and tentatively approved the
following “all-hazards” definition in its HLS: Strategic
Planning Guidance (Draft dated Jan. 8, 2001):
Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at
home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating the
effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting civil
authorities in crisis and consequence management; and
helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and
adequacy of critical national assets.

Such a definition avoids dividing national security into

“domestic” and “overseas” concerns and thereby helps
preserve unity of effort in the execution of the national
security and national military strategies. Second, it assists
in reducing the potentially disruptive impact of an incident
in which it is not clear whether hostile intent is involved by
enabling the creation of a single chain of command
appropriate for either situation. Finally, it facilitates the
establishment of priorities and the allocation of resources.
This definition supports the following missions or
mission areas described in the draft HLS Strategic
Planning Guidance:
• Land Defense. The Army objective under Land Defense
is to be prepared to participate as part of the joint force
executing plans for the defense of the United States and its
territories.

7
• Responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incidents.
The Army objective in responding to CBRNE incidents is to
organize, equip, and train units to timely, effectively and
efficiently support the Lead Federal Agency in its efforts to:
(1) reduce the vulnerabilities to CBRNE incidents; and (2)
manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents.
• National Missile Defense (NMD). In the near-to-mid
term the Army’s objective is to perform those actions
necessary to ensure the successful testing, deployment and
operation of a land-based NMD system. The purpose of the
NMD system as currently envisioned is to provide
protection against limited ballistic missile attacks targeted
at the United States. This protection will be achieved
through integration of the NMD system elements with
Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
(ITW/AA). The Army’s Operational Concept for NMD can be
found in TRADOC PAM 525-82.
• Combatting Terrorism. The Army objective under
Combatting Terrorism is to provide training, staffing and
equipment resources and services to support domestic
emergencies consistent with national security priorities,
Federal Response Plan criteria, and U.S. Code dealing with
employment of military forces within the United States.
• Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Protecting
and defending critical infrastructure, including information
and information systems. Army support will likely consist of
equipment and forces to prevent the loss of, or to assist in
restoring, telecommunications, electric power, gas and oil,
banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency
services, and government continuity. The Army objective
under CIP is to develop a capability to ensure the
availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of those
assets deemed critical to the United States.
• Information Operations (IO). The Army objective
under IO is to provide information operations in support of
HLS efforts. Information operations are defined as

8
defensive and offensive operations taken to affect adversary
information and information systems while defending one’s
own information and information systems. While there are
situations where a retaliatory IO offensive strike directed at
an external entity might be undertaken to stop an ongoing
attack, the general expectation is that HLS IO missions will
be defensive in nature.
• Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). The
Army objective under MACA is to provide essential support,
services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil
authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities.
MACA includes all of the actions that can be taken under
the disaster-related Military Support to Civil Authorities
(MSCA).
As this list reveals, the Army’s HLS missions span a
broad spectrum. In addition, they take place in parallel with
other activities reflected in the Army’s Spectrum of
Operations. As Figure 1 illustrates, the Army’s HLS
missions correspond to low- and high-end operations based
on their frequency and magnitude. For example,
Environmental Operations, which are often high in
frequency but low in magnitude, correspond with the left or
low-end of the spectrum. Last year’s fire-fighting activities
in the northwestern United States were significant events
for the soldiers involved, but those activities did not tax the
Army’s (or DoD’s) resources to the degree that a WMD
attack would have.
By contrast, operations at the right end of the spectrum
tend to occur less frequently, if at all, but demand more
resources, and often of a specific kind. The exception to this
rule is Domestic Relief, which can occur anywhere along the
spectrum depending upon the size of the incident. As a
general rule, then, those incidents with the lowest
probability of occurrence could result in the most severe
consequences and, accordingly, would require the greatest
amount of resources.

9
Figure 1.
It is doubtful that most low-end HLS missions would
prevent the Army from executing a two-MTW scenario.
However, it is almost certain that some high-end HLS
missions would. A WMD incident, for example, could
require sufficient resources to halt or interrupt the flow of
forces from the continental United States (CONUS) and
thereby seriously affect the commander-in-chiefs’ (CINCs)
war plans. Since defense officials currently assess the risk
to U.S. forces as “moderate” for the first MTW and “high” for
the second, any disruptions in the flow of forces would
compound an already acute strategic dilemma.
As a minimum, therefore, the Army should develop a
HLS force-sizing metric for its high-end missions,
specifically its WMD and NMD missions (and possibly
Domestic Relief, though it is not clear under what
circumstances it would cause the NCA to halt the flow of
forces overseas). Moreover, the process of developing such a
metric would help the Army (and the defense establishment
at large) to refine the full range of potential HLS missions,
develop planning factors, assess requirements, identify

10
areas of possible conflict between HLS and warfighting
missions, and determine how to develop a force to fit the
29
metric.

A Force-sizing Metric for HLS.

WMD. It is difficult to forecast with precision the number

and type of resources a WMD incident would require. The
variables involved are too numerous and diverse for
hard-and-fast rules. Planners at Joint Forces Command
Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) have nonetheless
used the best information available from the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to develop draft
“playbooks” that offer an estimate of the resources required
to respond to three possible high-end events: the detonation
of a 10KT nuclear device; a persistent chemical strike; or the
30
discharge of a high-yield explosive device.
By these estimates, the resources required to respond to
the detonation of a 10KT nuclear device include: four (light)
infantry battalions; five medical companies; three chemical
battalions; three engineer construction battalions; three
military police companies; four ground transportation
battalions; an aviation group; three direct support
maintenance battalions; and two general support
maintenance battalions. Resources required to respond to a
persistent chemical strike or to an incident involving the
detonation of high-yield explosives would amount to some
30 percent of those required for a 10KT nuclear event. While
these numbers might appear small, it is important to
remember that the loss of even a single medical, chemical,
or signal element can render larger units non-mission
capable for the prosecution of an MTW.
Naturally, a combination of incidents would require
more resources. However, that amount might not equal the
simple sum of resources required for each incident. A
combination of incidents could well produce a negative
synergy that would require more resources. Yet, it might

11
also result in a reduced resource demand overall depending
upon the timing and proximity of the events.
Since an infinite number of scenarios are possible, the
Army requires a force-sizing metric that balances resources
and requirements within acceptable risk parameters. The
Probability-Severity Matrix included as Figure 2 represents
one possible framework for such a force-sizing metric.
Cross-indexing the probability of an event with its
anticipated severity produces a Probability-Severity Index
(SI) that can also serve as a resource baseline. For instance,
an SI equal to one 10KT incident (the detonation of a
nuclear device the size of a 55 gallon drum) reflects
probability of occurrence that is greater than that of a 15KT
incident, but lower in severity.
The Army might, for example, consider establishing a
force-sizing metric capable of addressing an SI of 2x10KT
events, which would accommodate any number of scenarios
in which one or two nuclear devices are brought into the
United States covertly. A scenario involving three or more
devices suggests that the perpetrators have access to
considerable resources—not only weapons but also means of
transportation and concealment—and that they have
planned a well-coordinated assault. In such a case, the
United States would probably be engaged in a war for
national survival in which “all bets are off” and the National
Command Authority would likely direct all resources
against the perpetrators, assuming they could be identified.
In addition, a resource baseline capable of addressing
2x10KT events would enable the Army to respond to several
incidents, such as a 1x15KT or 1x22KT incident, or
approximately 3x1KT nuclear incidents, or three biological
31
or chemical attacks.
NMD. Ideally, NMD would include a robust,
multi-layered defensive system consisting of space, air, sea,
and land weapons capable of long-range—strategic—
defense as well as shorter-range—theater—defense.
Although it seems clear that the United States will erect

12
some form of NMD, support for it is far from unanimous, for
technical and political reasons.

Figure 2.

The technical argument, presented by such outspoken

critics as Dr. Theodore Postol, is that the technology does
not exist (and probably never will) to enable an interceptor
to distinguish a real missile from the chaff or decoys that
inevitably accompany it. However, experts at the U.S. Space
and Missile Defense Command have successfully refuted
this argument by showing that Postol’s claims pertained to
32
an obsolete version of interceptor technology.
The political argument for not building an NMD,
proffered most conspicuously by Russia and China, is that
implementation will cause an expensive and dangerous
arms race, or have an otherwise destabilizing influence
33
worldwide. However, this is a specious argument. An arms
race is essentially already underway as evidenced by the
proliferation of missile technology. An NMD, which is a

13
defensive system, not an offensive one, and presumably can
be extended to our friends and allies, serves as a necessary
counterweight to the dangers inherent in proliferation. In a
manner of speaking, it represents a “threat” primarily to
those states inclined to use their offensive missile
capabilities to threaten others. Rather than exerting a
destabilizing influence, in fact, NMD could contribute to
maintaining or restoring peace and stability by precluding a
“state of concern” from using its ballistic missiles to deter
the United States or its allies from intervening in a regional
crisis.
Another component of NMD is a shorter-range
antimissile system capable of defeating cruise missiles.
Such a system would also meet some requirements for force
protection as well as the defense of critical infrastructure.
The type and number of systems required would naturally
depend upon a careful analysis of such factors as mission,
enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). Excluding the
understandable desire to provide an anti-missile shield over
every major U.S. port or city, the defense of only critical
ports and airfields along the east, west, and Gulf coasts, and
the Great Lakes would still require a large number of
systems. For example, some 147 Nike-Ajax and Nike-
Hercules air-defense sites were constructed in the United
34
States during the Cold War.
To be sure, the Army’s force-sizing metric will also have
to include the other HLS mission areas. However, those
most likely to have an impact on the force structure
necessary for the U.S. military to execute 2MTWs are WMD
and NMD.

Developing a HLS Force.

Once the Army has developed a force-sizing metric for

HLS, it will need to examine the options available for filling
that metric. Two of the more popular options are described
below:

14
1. Add HLS as a “third MTW” to the current two-MTW
force-sizing metric and assign high-end missions to an
appropriate number of Army National Guard (ARNG)
divisions (along with full-time soldiers as necessary).
2. Convert the current two-MTW force-sizing metric into
one overseas MTW (or multiple smaller-scale contingencies)
and one within CONUS for HLS missions.
Option 1 has the advantage of maintaining a larger force
for deterring aggression or, if necessary, for defeating an
adversary quickly and decisively. It also retains more forces
for executing smaller-scale contingencies abroad—which
many strategists claim will characterize the strategic
environment for the foreseeable future—and reducing the
excessively high operational tempo for the Army overall. In
addition, it reduces the risk that unforeseen crises would
draw units away from transformation. Furthermore, the
stability that most ARNG units enjoy would enable their
personnel to become well-established in their communities
and develop critical working relationships with local law
enforcement, fire departments, paramedics, and other
emergency response organizations. (In many cases, ARNG
and Reserve personnel are also local “first-responders” and
that could pose a challenge unless planned for beforehand.)
Such relationships can aid communications efforts among
responding authorities and help reduce the inevitable fog
35
and friction that would attend a major incident.
However, reequipping an appropriate number of
full-time ARNG divisions for WMD response and missile
defense of the homeland will require substantial additional
funds. The Army would also have to de-conflict any
warfighting missions that might already have been
assigned to some of those units.
Option 2 comes in a variety of forms. Fundamentally, it
has much in common with any option—such as focusing on
smaller-scale contingencies—that calls for scaling back the
number of MTWs the U.S. armed forces must address, or
eliminating them altogether. Overall, this option has the

15
advantage of directing more resources toward HLS without
increasing the total amount of defense spending. It is
possible that this option would even allow for further
reductions in force structure, thereby freeing funds for
redirection to other federal agencies so as to increase border
security, drug interdiction activities, and critical
infrastructure protection.
However, it has significant disadvantages in that it
reduces U.S. influence overseas, as well as U.S. ability to
deter war or to fight more than one major conflict at a time.
This option would require changing U.S. strategy to
“win-hold-win” and thus would mean placing more
emphasis on (and ultimately more funding in) Halt-phase
operations to stop an aggressor’s advance in one theater
while a friendly counteroffensive takes place in another.
Yet, as the results of the Kosovo campaign indicate,
one-dimensional operations—which currently characterize
the Halt-phase concept—entail a high degree of risk and
tend to produce ambiguous results. In short, option 2 trades
36
flexibility in crisis response for better protection at home.
In sum, each option would cause defense planners and
strategists to address HLS and national security as a single,
integrated activity. Each would also place the desired
emphasis on HLS missions. However, only option 1 permits
the United States to address high-end HLS missions while
retaining its present capability to deter war and to fight and
win two conflicts simultaneously.
At the same time, this comparison illustrates that the
37
two-MTW force-sizing metric has outlived its usefulness.
The two-MTW metric fails to capture, for example, the
requirements for HLS, not to mention those associated with
other missions, such as peacetime engagement. The Army
should consider whether another metric would enable it to
quantify and communicate its force structure requirements
more accurately.
Clearly, HLS requirements must be imbedded in
whatever overall force-sizing metric is chosen. In any case,

16
the major conclusion of this monograph—that the Army
needs to develop a HLS force-sizing metric—remains valid
even if the overall two-MTW force-sizing metric is changed.

Recommendations.

In summary, this monograph recommends that the

Army do the following:
• Consider alternative force-sizing metrics that include
high-end HLS missions as a minimum;
• Advocate development of an NMD system to include
defense against cruise missiles;
• Continue to emphasize the importance of HLS in the
development of national security and national military
strategies.
Whether and to what extent the United States is
attacked in the future will depend a great deal upon how its
potential adversaries perceive the measures taken to
defend it. If prudent steps have been taken, fewer
opportunities will exist for harm, and the United States will
find itself in a better position to mitigate the effects of harm
should it occur.

ENDNOTES

1. For a summary of the Army’s contribution to the “common

defence,” see Gregory J. W. Urwin, “The Army of the Constitution: The
Historical Context,” in Max G. Manwaring (ed.), “. . . to insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence . . .” Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 27-62.

2. For the purposes of this monograph, WMD refers to chemical,

biological, nuclear, radiological, and high-yield explosives as well as
those generally referred to as weapons of mass effect (WME), such as
electro-magnetic pulse or computer viruses. The term “weapons of mass
destruction” is controversial. Mike Osterholm and John Schwartz,
Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming
Bio-terrorist Catastrophe (New York: Delacorte Press, 2000) point out
that the term conveys the sense that defense against such weapons is

17
primarily a military or police concern rather than one affecting all
citizens.

3. Phillip A. Odeen, et al., Transforming Defense: National Security

in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December
1997), was one of the first documents to raise homeland defense as a
strategic concern.

4. While recent indications are that the 2MTW force-sizing metric

will soon change, this monograph resulted from a tasking to investigate
homeland security within the context of 2MTWs. For indications that
the Joint community is considering abandoning the 2MTW metric, see
Elaine M. Grossman, “Military Makeover: Fight two wars at once?
That’s old thinking,” Boston Globe, January 7, 2001, p. D1.

5. Many analysts, in fact, maintain that not only does the U.S.
military lack the forces for a 2MTW scenario, but the force-sizing metric
itself is antiquated and does not reflect the full range of today’s strategic
requirements. See Steven Metz, ed., Revising the Two MTW Force
Shaping Paradigm, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
Forthcoming, 2001.

6. An example of such a discussion is Michael O’Hanlon,

“Rethinking Two War Strategies,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2000,
pp. 11-17, which proposes an additional 10 percent cut in U.S. armed
forces, but fails to mention homeland defense. Such omissions are due in
part to DoD’s position that it will play a supporting role in homeland
defense and its failure to define better the full range of HLS missions
and their potential overlap with warfighting missions—a deficiency
addressed in the recommendations of Michèle A. Flournoy,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, Washington, DC:
National Defense University, November 2000, p. 60. Nonetheless, a vast
amount of material on HLS issues does exist. See, for example, the
recent publications on homeland defense by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and the Journal of Homeland Defense
(www.homelanddefense.org).

7. Public pronouncements by key members of the new

administration suggest that the United States will remain engaged in
the world. See, for example, the speech of Dr. Condoleeza Rice, the Bush
administration’s National Security Advisor, at the Fletcher Conference,
November 15, 2000; and Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the National
Interest,” and Robert B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,”
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, 63-78, here 45 and
70, respectively.

18
8. In a speech to the National Academy of Sciences on January 22,
1998, President Clinton assured the public that those demands would
be met, declaring that even in the face of a growing bioterrorist threat,
the government would remain committed to upholding “privacy rights
and other constitutional protections, as well as the proprietary rights of
American businesses.”

9. Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the

Army,” Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 82-97, offers an
excellent summary of legal lessons learned from selected domestic
employments of the Army during the 1990s.

10. A useful summary of key aspects of the U.S. homeland and their
vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack is provided in Kenneth F.
McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the
Next QDR, McNair Paper No. 62, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, November 2000, pp. 60-64, Table 7. Global Trends 2015: A
Dialogue about the Future (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
globaltrends2015) states that asymmetric approaches will become the
“dominant characteristic” of most threats to the U.S. homeland.

11. Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al., The Report of the Commission to

Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Washington, DC,
July 15, 1998, pp. 8-9.

12. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile

Defense Requirements in 2010, Washington, DC: IFPA, April 1997, p.
6-9.

13. Cruise Missile Threats; and Emerging Cruise Missile

Capabilities, Center for Defense and International Security Studies,
http://www.cdiss.org/cmthreat.htm; Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threats, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC-1031-0985-98,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/tabled.htm. The Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle: How Great
a Defense Challenge? (Washington, DC: IFPA, November 2000), p. 3,
reports that 80,000 cruise missiles comprised of 75 different types are
deployed in 81 different countries.

14. http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/cruise4.htm.

15. The United States Commission on National Security/21st

Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security
and Promoting Freedom, April 15, 2000; and the Report of the National
Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism, The Terrorism Research Center, June 7, 2000.

19
Some critics maintain, however, that as dramatic as terrorist attacks
are, “to call them a serious threat to national security is scarcely
plausible.” John and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, May/June 1999, pp. 43-53. This view is
successfully rebutted by Patrick L. Moore, “Is Catastrophic Terrorism
Just Strategic ‘Peanuts?’” National Security Law Report, Vol. 22, No. 4,
July-August 2000, pp. 1, 5-6.

16. Terrorism in the United States 1996, Washington, DC: FBI,

http://www.ncvc.org/stats/dt.htm; and Anti-US Attacks, 1987-97,
Director of Central Intelligence, Counterterrorist Center,
http://www.cia/di/products/terrorism/attacks.gif; and Total
Casualties Worldwide, 1987-1997 (graph), http://www.cia/di/
products/terrorism/worldwide.gif.

17. Global Trends 2015, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

globaltrends2015.

18. Hon. John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” Strategic Review,
Fall 2000, pp. 11-15.

19. Global Trends 2015. Amy E. Smithson and Leslie Anne Levy,
Ataxia, Stimson Center Report No. 35, contend that terrorist use of BW
and CW will remain difficult. See also Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism by
Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Reassessment of the Threat,” in
Transnational Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military
Strategies, Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, November 2000, pp. 85-104. Hoffman essentially argues that
terrorists cannot overcome the difficulties of employing WMD, and so
will not use them. His argument is successfully defeated by Victor
Utgoff, “Bruce Hoffman’s View of Terrorism by Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Another Perspective,” pp. 133-136, in the same volume.
See also Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism, New York: Oxford, 1999.

20. Richard Latter, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Forging a

Response to a Twenty-first Century Threat,” Wilton Park Paper,
October 2000, points out that, while 139 states have signed the CWC
and 27 of 61 declared CW production facilities have been destroyed thus
far, concerns remain over clandestine programs and the absence of
Middle Eastern and North-east Asian states as signatories. Similarly,
the BWC is hampered by the absence of any arrangements to verify
compliance. On the need to bolster CW and BW arms control regimes,
see: Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Preventing the
Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapon Materials and
Know-How,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2000,
pp. 88-96, esp. 95; Marie I. Chevier, “Strengthening the International

20
Arms Control Regime,” in Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and
Defense, Raymond A. Zilinskas, ed., Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2000, pp.
149-176; and Laurie Garrett, “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism,” Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2001, pp. 76-89.

21. Much depends upon the social and historical context of the
attack. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the
Peloponnesian War, Robert B. Strassler, ed., (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1998); and Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, Jonathan
Usher, trans., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), provide
examples of how an epidemic can cause political and social chaos.
However, the great flu epidemic of 1918, devastating as it was, caused
no such disruption. Gina Kolata, Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza
Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus that Caused it (New York:
Touchstone, 2001). Henry W. Fischer III, Response to Disaster: Fact
Versus Fiction & Its Perpetuation, 2d ed., (New York: University Press of
America, 1998), indicates that chaos will be a typical organizational
response, but not for individuals, provided they are kept well-informed.

22. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination

Center, www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html.

23. Charles Piller, “Cyber-Crime Loss at Firms Doubles to $10

Billion,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2000; cited from F. G. Hoffman,
Homeland Defense: A Net Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Forthcoming 2001.

24. Robert T. Marsh, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s

Infrastructure, Washington, DC: President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection, October 1997, pp. 11-20, Appendix A.

25. Hoffman, Homeland Defense.

26. For supporting views on the need to change the traditional

definition of a threat, see Colonel Randall J. Larsen, U.S. Air Force
(Retired) and Ruth A. David, “Homeland Defense: Assumptions First,
Strategy Second,” Strategic Review, Fall 2000, pp. 4-10; and Phillip E.
Lacombe, “Daniel T. Kuehl’s View of DOD’s Role in Defending the
National Information Infrastructure: Another Perspective,” in
Transnational Threats, pp. 163-172.

27. Ashton B. Carter, “Keeping America’s Military Edge,” Foreign

Affairs (January/February 2001), pp. 90-105, esp. 94, in fact, lists
homeland defense as one of the “homeless missions” that are
accomplished in an “ad-hoc fashion by unwieldy combinations of

21
departments and agencies designed a half-century ago for a different
world.”

28. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, DRAFT, The Army Role in
Homeland Defense: Concepts, Issues and Options, RAND Arroyo Center,
October 1999, pp. vi-xvii.

29. See Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 60, for similar points
cast as recommendations.

30. Playbooks for other scenarios are under development, but have
not yet progressed to the draft stage.

31. The baseline of 2x10KT also accords roughly with a RAND draft
study, October 1999, that proposed planning guides of one 22KT nuclear
incident of 100,000 casualties, three chemical attacks of 5,000
casualties each, and three biological attacks of 10,000 casualties each.

32. Lieutenant General John Costello, Commander USASMDC,

briefing presented at the Annual U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command Conference, August 22, 2000. Dr. Postol was invited, but
declined to participate in the conference. See also The Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, National Missile Defense: Policy Issues and
Technical Capabilities, July 2000, Final Edition. Nonetheless, criticism
of developing an NMD continues; see “Missile Shield Illusions,” New
York Times, on the web, January 10, 2001.

33. There are also issues with the 1972 ABM Treaty that remain to
be resolved. R. James Woolsey, “The Way to Missile Defense: Dealing
with Russia and Ourselves,” National Security Law Report, Vol. 22, No.
3, May-June 2000, pp. 1-2, 5-6, provides a brief discussion of the
provisions of the ABM Treaty and suggests how it might be changed. He
also discusses a cheaper alternative that would employ satellites.

34. http://www.zianet.com/dpiland/ordnance/wspg.htm.

35. The advantages and disadvantages of using Army Reserve (and

by extension some ARNG forces) in a HLS role are discussed in Charles
L. Mercier Jr., “Terroists, WMD, and the US Army Reserve,”
Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 98-118.

36. On the limited efficacy of air operations in the Kosovo campaign,

see Admiral Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, New York: Farrar,
Straus, & Giroux, 2000, pp. 181-183. For a critique of the Halt-phase
concept, see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old
Skins . . . with Powerpoint, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
1998.

22
37. For a discussion of force-sizing alternatives, see Metz, Revising
the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm.

23
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author
Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Cover Artist
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