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Political violence and democracy in Spain

Basque nationalism undermined by ETA

On 12 January a fourth Basque local councillor was murdered by ETA. After hundreds of killings, ETA now seems to be targeting members of the People’s Party, which is part of the Madrid government, as well as waging a campaign of violence against the governing party in the Basque Autonomous Community. Barbara Loyer explains the meaning of this, giving a rare insight into the little-known origins of Basque nationalism.

by Barbara Loyer 

On 1 December 1997 the Supreme Court in Madrid sentenced 23 leaders of the Basque separatist party, Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity), to seven years’ imprisonment. They had been convicted of using part of their election campaign television time to show a video made by ETA. In the broadcast Herri Batasuna said it was giving airtime to those who offered a real alternative for peace and democracy and a way out of the present political conflict and violence.

The video had shown three hooded, armed men calling for recognition of the Basque homeland, meaning the right to self-determination and territorial unity (including Navarre and the French Basque country). They demanded that "the Basque people" be allowed to "freely determine its future" and offered a cease-fire in exchange for an unconditional amnesty for all ETA members held in Spanish prisons and the departure of "Spanish armed forces" from the Basque country.

The next day the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), a Christian Democratic organisation which has a majority in the parliament of the Basque Autonomous Community and holds power in the Basque government, issued a statement condemning the prison sentences while making its opposition to Herri Batasuna quite clear. "The PNV has no reason to support Herri Batasuna, and even less to support its leaders. We get nothing but insults and threats from them and their political associates. What is more, the citizens of the Basque country are fed up with the arrogance and aggressive posturing of Herri Batasuna that accompanies the murder, kidnapping and extortion perpetrated by ETA and the urban guerrillas. Neither the PNV nor the great majority of the Basque people will support the call for a general strike on 15 December or any other action involving the use of force. It is high time for Herri Batasuna to break the link between political activity and the use of pressure, force and intimidation."

On 6 and 7 December several PNV offices were firebombed by ETA militants. On the evening of 12 December, a People’s Party town councillor in Renteria was shot dead by ETA. And on 9 January another town councillor was assassinated, this time in Zarautz.

Tens of thousands of people protested against these crimes. And all the nationalist and non-nationalist political parties in the Basque country, except Herri Batasuna, were represented on the demonstrations against terrorism. Meanwhile, Itziar Aizpurua, a member of Herri Batasuna, boldly declared that "a people that struggles is sure of victory (1)."

So who exactly is struggling? And against whom? While Spain is confronted with other nationalist movements, especially in Catalonia and Galicia, the Basque nationalist movement is the most complex, for three reasons. First, Basque nationalist ideology is separatist and calls the existence of Spain into question. Second, the basic tenets of that ideology, which concern the limits of Basque national territory and the definition of the national community, are highly controversial and strongly disputed by part of the Basque population itself. Last, nationalist activists are deeply divided on the issue of armed struggle, and several members of the PNV have been assassinated by ETA terrorists.

Basque nationalists base their convictions on a particular reading of the history of their region. In their view, the Basque country is absolutely distinct from Spain in terms of both language and history. They claim that the Basques were self-governing up to and even beyond 1200, when their territory was annexed by Castille, and have continuously fought to preserve their own forms of government. Seen in this way, the Basque nationalist movement is a struggle for the retrieval of lost sovereignty. Basque nationalists refer to their nation as Euskadi, or Euskal Herria, an entity made up of seven "historic territories". Spain contains the three provinces of the Basque country proper (Biscay, Guipuzcoa and Alava) as well as the province of Navarre, which has the status of an autonomous community and its own government. The provinces of Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule are in the French Department of the Pyrénées Atlantiques.

The reality of Euskadi is more complicated. A good part of the population living in the "historic territories" does not want to be included in the Basque nation. That is the case of most of the Basques living in France and, above all, the people of Navarre. But Basque nationalists are convinced, on linguistic and anthropological grounds, that Navarre is the heartland of their nation. The Bascons of Navarre are claimed as the ancestors of the Basque people, as the mountainous north of Navarre is still partly Basque-speaking. And the eleventh-century kingdom of Navarre is the only entity to have exercised political authority over all the territories to which the Basques now lay claim.

The great majority of Navarrese, however, consider their region to be quite distinct from the Basque country. The Union of the People of Navarre (UPN), founded in 1977 to oppose Basque nationalism, has become the largest political party in the region, winning 36.8 % of the vote in the 1996 elections.

The stubborn determination to unite the "historic territories" in one nation may seem rather strange in view of the strength of resistance to it. (Even within the Basque country, the province of Alava does not support the nationalist cause). However, the sense of belonging to a single nation was strengthened by the existence of a form of social organisation and similar institutions in the various "historic territories". These institutions, and the laws which they were responsible for applying, are a basic constituent of Basque nationalist ideology.

The fueros are the customs of the ancien régime applied by the local assemblies which the kings of Castille had to swear to observe in order to secure the allegiance of the Basque provinces. In Biscay, the ceremony of the royal oath took place in the city of Guernica beneath an oak tree that became the symbol of Basque independence. A person advocating reinstatement of the fueros is called a "fuerist", and the corresponding ideological movement is known as "fuerism". The fueros embodied the customs of each of the provinces, including Navarre. They granted the Basques of Guipuzcoa and Biscay special rights, in particular certain privileges in principle confined to the nobility. The reference to the nobility as "universal" strengthens the belief that the Basque people had developed a unique tradition of democracy in which all men were equal under the law. The two Carlist wars in 1833-39 and 1874-76 resulted in the abolition of the fueros, and a political movement gradually emerged to demand their reinstatement. Initially, this demand was not incompatible with inclusion of the Basque country in Spain, but after a few years it took on a separatist connotation.

Sabino Arana (1865-1903) was the founder of Basque nationalist doctrine and of the PNV, a party which has propounded Basque nationalism since its creation in 1898. His main idea was to distinguish radically between the "Basque and Latin races" and to argue for the political independence of the former. In 1897 Arana called for the establishment of a union of Basques "for the salvation of the common fatherland and the race itself (2)". He coined a new term, "Euskadi", to denote a Basque nation comprising territories in which history had taken rather different courses. Breaking with the vocabulary of the ancien régime, Arana spoke of a "war of conquest" against Euskadi, of "Basque laws" rather than fueros, and of "independence". Spain was depicted for the first time as a "foreign power" from which it was necessary to be separated. Separation was understood by his followers as a basic condition of progress for the Basque people, which was finally daring to assert its difference.

This ideology took shape against the background of the rapid industrialisation of Biscay, the main centre of the Spanish steel industry, which gave rise to a wave of immigration from other regions of the Iberian peninsula. Arana referred to this as "an invasion by Spanish socialists and atheists". At the outset, Basque nationalism was thus a racist, extreme-Catholic, separatist doctrine that postulated the existence of an ethnic community distinct from the Spanish and French and portrayed the Basque problem as a conflict between nations.

The synthesis between fuerism and separatism is the core of Basque nationalist doctrine. Xabier Arzalluz, PNV representative at the Madrid Cortes in 1978 and currently the party’s chairman, informed the deputies of the Constituent Assembly that the Basque country had reclaimed "its historic rights, the memory of which has never been lost. This has nothing to do with the ups and downs of the economy. It reflects an awareness of identity and history that is deeply felt by a large part of the population (3)". Many Spaniards have difficulty in understanding this obstinate determination to recover a status held under the ancien régime. For them, fueros are simply old local customs with no special significance. But for Basque nationalists the terminology is important. Use of the term fueros means that the powers conferred by the granting of autonomy in 1979 are rights that pre-date the 1978 Constitution.

For the PNV, Article I of the Additional Provisions of the Constitution, which "protects and respects the historic rights of the territories with fueros", constitutes recognition of the "extra-constitutional" status of the fueros system (4). Claiming continuity between ancient times and the modern era enables Basque nationalists to portray the history of their country as proceeding independently of events specific to Spain itself. In this way they are able to distance themselves from any concern with the future of the Spanish nation. While the leaders of the PNV do not call on their followers to secede, Basque nationalists recognise no duty to Spain. At the beginning of the 1936-39 civil war, the President of the Spanish Republic, Manuel Azaña, wrote the following words in his diary: "Once Bilbao has fallen, the Basque nationalists are likely to lay down their arms or even go over to the enemy. They are fighting neither for the Republic nor for Spain, which they detest, but for their own autonomy and semi-independence  (5)". Following the swift fall of Bilbao in June 1937, the PNV did indeed negotiate surrender terms with Franco, who had been able to count on strong support from the Navarrese and Basque Carlists since 1936.

The right to self-determination was claimed with varying degrees of aggressiveness by all the Basque nationalist parties when the 1978 Constitution was being drafted. The PNV agreed to vote against its incorporation in the Constitution in exchange for Article I of the Additional Provisions, referred to above. It is therefore understandable that it should be regarded as a major threat by advocates of a united Spain. But those fears have not led to a head-on clash between the Basque people and their "Spanish oppressors". The conflict over the demand for self-determination is between Basques.

The fact that Euskadi is not a simple territorial entity is not in itself an obstacle to the existence of a Basque nation. More important is the fact that the concept of a Basque national community is of relatively recent origin and has never corresponded to reality. Right up to the twentieth century each of the "historic territories" was concerned to defend its own autonomy against its neighbours. And the Basque national flag, the ikurriña, which some people imagine goes back to the Middle Ages, was invented by Sabino Arana at the beginning of this century, on the model of the Union Jack. During the two Carlist wars, the middle classes of Bilbao and San Sebastian supported the liberal monarchy, which was basically striving to achieve greater unification and modernisation of Spain at the expense of the structures and privileges of the ancien régime.

Both cities were besieged by the extreme-Catholic Basque Carlists and eventually freed by the Liberals, whose victory in both wars resulted in the abolition of the fueros. From the outset, the barons of the Basque economy, especially the most powerful of them, resisted the new ideas. And throughout his long dictatorship (1936-75), Franco found valuable allies in the Basque industrial and banking oligarchy.

The refusal of part of the local society to subscribe to the idea of a Basque nation is as deeply rooted in history as nationalist ideology, and the most radical critique of that ideology has come from former adherents and their offspring. At the turn of the century Miguel de Unamuno, who was born in Bilbao in 1864, forged his identity as a writer and philosopher from his rejection of the Basque nationalism of his early youth. Many of today’s anti-nationalist Basque intellectuals come from nationalist families. Some of them actively collaborated with ETA under the Franco regime, before debunking the beliefs of their youth in works of great detail and scholarship.

Basques can be divided into three national communities: those who call themselves Spaniards, those who think of themselves as French, and those who consider themselves only Basques. Two of the last four People’s Party councillors targeted in the latest wave of assassinations had Basque names.

Nationalists are also faced with the difficult problem of integrating immigrants from other parts of Spain and those of their children who have not espoused the Basque cause. The assimilation of such people is currently a subject of heated debate inside and outside the nationalist movement.

From 1979 to 1991 the combined vote for the Basque nationalist parties always exceeded 50 % of the poll in the Basque Autonomous Community. In recent years, however, the nationalists have not had an automatic majority. In 1993 a total of 685,674 votes in the Autonomous Community went to non-nationalist parties: the Spanish Socialist Labour Party, Euskadi Ezkerra, the People’s Party, the United Left and Alava Unity. The combined vote for the Basque Nationalist Party, Herri Batasuna, Eusko Alkartasuna and Euskal Eskerra was 578,908, and there were over 500,000 abstentions. If Navarre is included, the result is even more striking: the non-nationalist parties won over 900,000 votes in 1993, compared with only 625,000 for the nationalists. And in 1996 the proportions were similar.

ETA is continuing to undermine the nationalist bloc by strengthening the ranks of its opponents. Since the beginning of its assassination campaign against the People’s Party, membership of that party has grown. In 1990 the People’s Party won six seats in the Autonomous Parliament. In 1994 it won 11 seats out of 75, as many as Herri Batasuna. Since Herri Batasuna refuses to sit in the Parliament, the Basque nationalists are faced with the possibility that a coalition could elect a non-nationalist speaker at the next regional elections in October 1998.

The main Basque problem is now ETA itself, and the organised violence of its zealots, who have combined to form a National Liberation Movement (MLNV). Murder, death threats, car burning, gutted shops and physical assault have become the daily routine of politics. Since 1988 all local parties except Herri Batasuna have adhered to a pact giving the erzaintza (the police force of the Autonomous Community) a free hand against ETA activists. Public protest at the kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco reached unprecedented proportions. In Bilbao, a city of 900,000 people, the press estimated at 500,000 the numbers who demonstrated to demand that his life be spared (6). By contrast, the relatively calm reaction to the recent imprisonment of Herri Batasuna leaders by the Supreme Court in Madrid, which would have been unthinkable a few years ago, shows the extent of public disillusionment with that party.

Nevertheless, despite a steady drop in its influence, Herri Batasuna still obtains around 12 % of the vote and represents the 500 jailed members of the armed organisation. Only the militants of the MLNV itself, acting within the separatist movement, can marginalise the proponents of continued political assassination. For this to be possible, other nationalists must provide them with convincing arguments. Significantly, the ELA, a nationalist trade union opposed to armed violence, is now seeking a rapprochement with the LAB, a nationalist trade union sympathetic to ETA, in order to find a way out of the present tragic deadlock.

Barbara Loyer

Translated by Barry Smerin

* Lecturer at the University of Paris VIII, member of the editorial board of Hérodote (Paris), author of Géopolitique du Pays Basque - nations et nationalismes en Espagne, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1997.

(1Le Monde, 7-8 December 1997.

(2Sabino Arana Sabirdiar-Batza, Obras Completas, Bayonne-Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 1356.

(3Constitutional Debates, Vol. I, Spanish National Assembly, p. 1760.

(4 El Amejoramiento en el Parlamento, 2 vol., Parlamento de Navarra, Pampelune, 1983, Vol.I, p. 171.

(5Quoted in Manuel Gonzalez Portilla, La Guerra Civil en el Pais Vasco, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1988, p. 37.

(6See Ignacio Ramonet, "Pays basque", Le Monde diplomatique, August 1997.


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