The hardest fighting in
Intramuros was the 129th�s effort to capture Ft. Santiago in the
northwest corner of the old walls.� They fought room to room, and then
through subterranean dungeons and tunnels, using flamethrowers, phosphorus
grenades, demolitions and bazookas.� In some cases, they poured
gasoline or oil through holes in the floor then ignited it to flush out the
die-in-place defenders.� The regiment did not secure the last of the
fort�s tunnels until 1200 on 25 February. [xxxviii]
During
the fighting in Intramuros, some Japanese troops attempted to exfiltrate
wearing U.S. uniforms and carrying M1 rifles.� Others showed a white
flag in the belfry of Del Monico church only to follow up with rifle fire.�
None of this helped them.� Only twenty-five Japanese surrendered in the
Intramuros fighting, all of them Formosans of t he Imperial Japanese Labor
Force.� At dawn on 26 February, seeing that the Intramuros stronghold
had fallen, Rear Admiral Iwabuchi and his staff committed suicide at their
headquarters in the Agriculture Building.
[xxxix]
Despite the loss of Intramuros, the
Japanese still held three strong positions, the Legislative, Finance and
Agriculture Buildings, which lay just southeast of the old fortress.�
Since Rear Adm. Iwabuchi had expected U.S. attacks to come from the south,
he had fortified these buildings more thoroughly than the more northerly
strongpoints.� It is probably also for this reason that Iwabuchi had
put his headquarters in the Agriculture Building.� The Legislative,
Finance and Agriculture Buildings were of reinforced concrete.�
Window-sited machine guns covered exterior approaches.� Sandbags and
barricades blocked all ground-level doors and windows.� Interiors were
also fortified as in other strongpoints.�
The U.S. artillery preparation
on the buildings began on 25 February.� However, the 1st Cavalry
Division, then deployed along the bay shore west of Intramuros, reported
shells falling on its positions.� These were 37th Infantry
Division rounds that had overshot the government buildings to fall on the 1st
Cavalry Division.� Major General Robert S. Beightler, commander of the
37th Infantry Division, immediately ordered a ceasefire at 1050
to resolve this problem by shifting troops out of the fire zone.� Fires
resumed at 1245. [xl]
On 26 February, the148th
Infantry Regiment assaulted the Legislative Building and secured it by 28
February.� The regiment�s troops were harassed by Japanese firing up
through holes in the floor and had to withdraw after their first assault to
allow more shelling of the still vigorously resisting defenders.� On 26
February, the 5th Cavalry Regiment assaulted the Agriculture
Building after an artillery preparation, but troops had to withdraw because
of withering Japanese covering fire from the nearby San Luis Terrace
Apartments.� The 5th Cavalry Regiment had to spend 27
February clearing out the apartments.� On 28 February, the regiment
returned to the Agriculture Building with a three-hour artillery
preparation.� Point-blank 155mm howitzer fires alternated with
point-blank tank and tank-destroyer fires, with all of these fires aimed no
higher than the first floor of the Agriculture Building so as to avoid
endangering friendly troops.� Much of the Agriculture Building thus
pancaked on its own first floor, and the 5th Cavalry Regiment
assaulted into what was left.� A flamethrower tank reduced a pillbox on
the southeast corner, and other tanks swarmed around the building to provide
point-blank 75mm fire.� The 5th Cavalry Regiment otherwise
used flamethrowers, bazookas and small arms.�
On 1 March, the 5th
Cavalry Regiment made a surrender appeal to Japanese survivors.� When
there was no response, the regiment employed demolitions and burning
gasoline and oil against remaining defenders.� An artillery preparation
was applied against the sole remaining Japanese position, the Finance
Building, on 28 February and 1 March.� A surrender appeal this time
garnered twenty-five Japanese responses.� After more artillery
preparation on 2 March, the 148th Infantry Regiment assaulted the
building.� They cleared the last of the Japanese defenders from the
elevator shaft on top of the building on the morning of 3 March.
[xli]
On the afternoon of 3 March
Lieutenant General Oscar W. Griswold, commander of 14th Corps,
reported to Gen. Krueger of 6th Army that all resistance had
ceased.� The struggle to capture Manila was over.
[xlii] The struggle to administer the battle-torn city, however,
was just beginning.�� U.S. military assets on the scene would play
a major part in reviving and running Manila for several weeks after the
battle.� The task of administering the city was complicated by the
enormous toll the battle had taken.� U.S. casualties in the battle were
1,010 killed in action (KIA) and 5,565 wounded in action (WIA), for a total
of 6,575. �Japanese counted dead were 16,665.� In addition, there were
an estimated 100,000 civilian casualties, of varying degrees of seriousness
and of diverse causes; most were probably generated by Japanese executions
and atrocities toward Philippine civilians, by friendly fire from American
artillery, and by mishap or exposure associated with dislocation.� Much
of Manila itself was in ruins.� The water system within the city needed
extensive repairs.� Sewage and garbage collection systems were not
functioning.� The electrical system was out.� Most streets were
ruined and public transportation no longer existed.� The major
government buildings, the Philippine General Hospital, and the University of
Philippines were destroyed, along with many residential districts.� The
port installations were severely damaged.� Besides all this, numerous
homeless civilians were milling about seeking food, shelter, and medical
care. [xliii]
U.S. forces in Manila were
immediately enlisted for occupation duty.� After the battle, the 37th
Infantry Division bivouacked� near Grace Park, in the northern suburbs.�
On 5 March, the division was removed from 14th Corps, placed
directly under 6th Army, and given the mission of providing
security for the city.� Troops from the division were distributed to
Filipino police stations, and so they had to deal with collaborators brought
in by civilians until the Counterintelligence Corps could investigate.�
Looting was a major problem for the division�s security troops.�
Large-scale looting was conducted during the battle by organized bands of
Filipinos who moved just behind the American advance.� The looters
placed a point man in the American front lines to identify where the spoils
were richest, allowing those behind to carry off the goods without delay.�
American security troops did not try to reverse the looting done during the
battle.� They stopped further looting when the battle was over,
however, by mounting guard and patrol duty throughout the city, 24 hours a
day. [xliv]
Security forces faced the
problem of the city being strewn with numerous mines, unexploded shells, and
booby traps.� Areas where fighting had been heaviest were roped off
from the public by military police until the 37th Infantry
Division�s engineer companies could clear them.� On 8 March, the track
was blown off a U.S. bulldozer on Dewey Boulevard.� There were
occasional casualties from mines throughout March.� The 117th
Engineer Battalion piled fifty tons of cleared mines and shells in Burnham
Green Park, where on 16 March these exploded from causes unknown.�
There were no casualties.� The 117th Engineers were also
busy repairing warehouses, plumbing and electrical facilities, and building
an airstrip and Red Cross recreation center. [xlv]
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