Rel: October 24, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0105
_________________________

City of Birmingham

v.

Mark Pettway, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson

County, and the Jefferson County Commission

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court

(CV-24-900475)

LEWIS, Justice.
SC-2025-0105

The City of Birmingham ("the City") appeals from a judgment on

the pleadings entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") in

favor of Mark Pettway, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson

County. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural History

On February 2, 2024, the City filed a complaint for a declaratory

judgment against Pettway, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson

County. The complaint states that Pettway is

"required by Ala. Code (1975) § 14-6-1, 14-6-5, § 12-11-

3, § 12-12-32, § 12-14-1, and other Alabama laws and Rules of
Court, to accept into custody at the Jefferson County Jail
individuals arrested by Birmingham Police officers within the
police jurisdiction of the City for both on-sight violations of
state law and those arrested for misdemeanor offenses under
state law."

The complaint includes the following assertions of fact:

"5. In October of 2023 various individuals were

arrested by Birmingham Police Officers for on-sight
violations[] of State law, including misdemeanor and felony
offenses, within the police jurisdiction of the City.

"6. Many of the misdemeanor arrestees were

transported following their arrest to the Jefferson County Jail
…. Pursuant to Ala. Code (1975) § 14-6-1 Sheriff Pettway,
being the duly elected Sheriff of Jefferson County, has 'legal
custody and charge' of the Jefferson County Jail and 'all
prisoners committed thereto.'

2
SC-2025-0105

"7. Upon arrival at the Jefferson County Jail,

Birmingham Police Officers were informed that Sheriff
Pettway had a standing policy that Jefferson County Jail
personnel were not authorized to accept individuals who had
been arrested without a warrant issued by a Jefferson County
Magistrate.

"8. Randall L. Woodfin, Mayor of the City, and Scott

Thurmond, Chief of the Birmingham Police Department,
contacted Sheriff Pettway shortly thereafter and held a
conference call to discuss said policy. During the conference
call, Sheriff Pettway confirmed that it was his policy to refuse
to accept into his custody at the Jefferson County Jail
prisoners transported thereto as the result of a warrantless
arrest, even in those instances when the offense was
committed in the presence of Birmingham Police Officers.
Sheriff Pettway also refused to accept into his custody at the
Jefferson County Jail prisoners arrested by Birmingham
Police Officers within the police jurisdiction of the City for
misdemeanor offenses under state law.

"9. These conversations continued into November and

December of 2023, at which time Sheriff Pettway relented,
changing his position and acknowledging that he was
required to receive into custody at the Jefferson County Jail
those individuals committed for on-sight violations of state
law. As a result, on December 19, 2023, the City and Sheriff
Pettway executed a Memorandum of Understanding ('MOU')
outlining the expectations of each party, the responsibilities
of each party, and the process by which prisoners would be
committed to the Jefferson County Jail (attached hereto as
Exhibit A). The December 19th MOU was to become effective
as of January 1, 2024. Pursuant to the MOU, on January 1,
2024, the City began transporting on-sight arrestees to the

3
SC-2025-0105

Jefferson County Jail and Sheriff Pettway properly accepted

them as County inmates.

"10. This process continued unabated until

approximately January 10, 2024, at which time Chief
Thurmond was contacted by Sheriff Pettway and told that he
must cease accepting arrestees transported by the City to the
Jefferson County Jail. The reason provided was that the
Jefferson County Sheriff's Office was, and apparently had
been for some time, entering warrants brought by the
Birmingham Police Department under the Sheriff's Office
Originating Agency Identifier ('ORI'), contrary to state and
federal rules and regulations. An ORI is required by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for, inter alia, government
agencies to enter records into the National Crime Information
Center ('NCIC') and access Criminal Justice Information
('CJI'). Adherence to this and other requirements is required
and overseen by [the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency
('ALEA')].

"11. The parties complied with ALEA's mandate,

ceasing the transportation of arrestees to the Jefferson
County Jail. The parties also learned at that time that to
ameliorate the situation, they simply needed to complete and
sign ALEA Form 072, a one-page document titled 'NCIC
Holder Of The Record Agreement.' The City immediately
communicated its willingness to sign Form 072 and forward
it to ALEA once fully executed and waited on a response from
Sheriff Pettway. As of the filing of this Complaint, three (3)
weeks after receiving ALEA Form 072, Sheriff Pettway has
not responded and has refused to sign ALEA Form 072.

"12. Sheriff Pettway must 'receive into his custody all

persons who have been arrested and lawfully committed into
his charge ...' Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 88-00348. Pursuant to

4
SC-2025-0105

Ala. Code (1975) § 12-14-1, the Jefferson County District

Court has jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses under state
law committed within the police jurisdiction of the City.
Venue is proper in the county where a violation of state law
occurs. Ala. Code (1975) § 15-2-2. Furthermore, under state
law, '[a]ny jailer or other officer who willfully refuses to
receive into his custody any person lawfully committed
thereto on any criminal charge or conviction must, on
conviction, be fined not more than $500.00.' Ala. Code (1975)
§ 14-6-5. At this time, Sheriff Pettway's failure to respond to
and sign ALEA Form 072 is indicative of a willful refusal to
accept individuals at the Jefferson County Jail whom he is
required by state law to receive."

(Footnote and emphasis omitted.) The City requested the following relief:

"a). That this Honorable Court declare and define the

legal responsibilities of the parties when individuals arrested
by Birmingham Police Officers within the police jurisdiction
of the City for both on-sight violations of state law and those
arrested for misdemeanor offenses under state law are
transferred to the custody of Sheriff Pettway at the Jefferson
County Jail.

"b). That this Honorable Court declare that individuals

arrested by Birmingham Police Officers within the police
jurisdiction of the City for both on-sight violations of state law
and those arrested for misdemeanor offenses under state law
are lawfully committed into his charge.

"c). That this Honorable Court declare that Sheriff

Pettway must immediately sign ALEA Form 072 and meet
any other requirements of ALEA and or other state agencies
relating to the acceptance of arrestees by him into the
Jefferson County Jail.

5
SC-2025-0105

"d). That this Honorable Court grant such other relief to

which the City of Birmingham is entitled."

Pettway filed an answer to the complaint on March 11, 2024. The

Jefferson County Commission ("the JCC") filed a motion to intervene on

March 13, 2024. The JCC asserted that it held "a sufficient, financial

interest to support intervention under Rule 24(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]

because it is generally responsible for paying for the feeding, clothing,

and housing of the inmates housed at the Jefferson County Jails." After

a hearing, the trial court granted the JCC's motion on May 16, 2024.

On May 17, 2024, Pettway filed a motion for a judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. See Pontius v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562 (Ala. 2005) ("[A] defense of

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, although

typically raised pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] can be raised

after an answer has been filed by moving for a judgment on the

pleadings."). In his motion, Pettway argued that the City's complaint

was moot; that it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted

because, he said, it sought an advisory opinion from the trial court; that

the law upon which the City relied did not support its requested relief;

and that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.

6
SC-2025-0105

The JCC filed an answer to the City's complaint and a counterclaim

against the City on June 14, 2024. The JCC's counterclaim sought a

declaratory judgment

"determining and declaring that the City's improper policy of

charging persons arrested by City of Birmingham police
officers for misdemeanor offenses committed inside the police
jurisdiction of Birmingham with 'State law' violations, as
opposed to identical 'municipal code' violations, in an effort to
shift both the custody of such arrestees to the Jefferson
County Jails, and the cost of housing such arrestees to the
[JCC], and by extension, the taxpayers of Jefferson County, is
a sham, is contrary to law, and is due to be prohibited."

The City filed a response in opposition to Pettway's motion for a

judgment on the pleadings. Pettway filed a reply brief in support of his

motion. The City thereafter filed a reply to the JCC's counterclaim.

On September 30, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment on the

pleadings, dismissing the City's complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, specifically stating that the complaint failed to present a

justiciable controversy because the action was moot and constituted a

request for an advisory opinion. The trial court also dismissed the JCC's

counterclaim. On October 25, 2024, the City filed a motion to alter,

amend, or vacate the judgment on the pleadings; that motion was denied

by operation of law on January 23, 2025. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.

7
SC-2025-0105

The City filed its notice of appeal on February 7, 2025. The JCC did not

appeal.

Standard of Review

" When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made by a

party, 'the trial court reviews the pleadings filed in the case
and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of material
fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the
party entitled to a judgment according to the law.' B.K.W.
Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala.
1992). See also Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840 (Ala.
2000). A judgment on the pleadings is subject to a de novo
review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997). A court reviewing a judgment on the pleadings accepts
the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 1255-
56."

Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 82 (Ala.

2000).

Discussion

On appeal, the City first argues that the trial court erred in

dismissing the City's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As

noted previously, the trial court held that the complaint failed to present

a justiciable controversy because the action was moot and constituted a

request for an advisory opinion.

8
SC-2025-0105

With respect to the mootness inquiry, the trial court held that the

Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the City and Pettway

was the sole basis for the City's claim that Pettway was obligated to

accept the City's arrestees into the county jail and that, because the MOU

terminated on April 12, 2024, the City's action was moot. However, it is

clear from the allegations in the City's complaint that the City asserted

that Pettway is obligated to accept the City's arrestees and to execute any

necessary forms required to allow him to accept those arrestees (i.e.,

ALEA Form 072) not by virtue of the MOU, but pursuant to state law.

The complaint states: "Pettway's failure to respond to and sign ALEA

Form 072 is indicative of a willful refusal to accept individuals at the

Jefferson County Jail whom he is required by state law to receive."

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the City's request for a declaratory

judgment hinges on allegations that Pettway has violated Alabama

statutes; the complaint does not seek merely to enforce the since-

terminated MOU. The complaint highlights the existence of the MOU

(and incorporates it into the complaint) to provide context for the City's

claims, but the MOU is not the underlying basis of the City's assertion

that Pettway is required to accept its arrestees. At the hearing on the

9
SC-2025-0105

motion for a judgment on the pleadings, counsel for the City confirmed

the nature of its allegations on this point. Therefore, the termination of

the MOU does not render the City's action moot.

Turning to the trial court's finding that the complaint seeks an

advisory opinion, we note that the trial court's stated basis for that

finding was that the claim for a declaratory judgment was based on the

MOU and was, therefore, moot. Because, as we determined above, the

complaint is not based on the MOU, the trial court's reasoning on this

point fails.

Pettway asserts an additional argument in support of the trial

court's finding that the complaint seeks an advisory opinion, specifically,

that the City's complaint lacks specific factual allegations showing that,

after the termination of the MOU, "the City or [the Birmingham Police

Department] ever tried to take any arrestees charged with a state law

violation to the Jefferson County Jail and were refused" by Pettway.

Pettway relies on Ex parte Marshall, 323 So. 3d 1188 (Ala. 2020) (holding

that a declaratory-judgment action was unripe and sought an advisory

opinion because it lacked factual context and forced the trial court to

make assumptions or predictions), and Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So.

10
SC-2025-0105

3d 89, 94 (Ala. 2011) ("In the instant action, there exists only an

anticipated controversy; there has been no damage or injury to the

parties, nor have any legal rights been thwarted or affected. Thus, the

City's action seeks only advice -- not the resolution of a yet realized

controversy.").

This Court has stated that

"one of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to

render practical help in ending a controversy that has yet to
reach the stage where legal relief is immediately available
and to enable parties between whom an actual controversy
exists or those between whom litigation is inevitable to have
the issues speedily determined when a speedy determination
would prevent unnecessary injury caused by the delay of
ordinary judicial proceedings. Ex parte State ex rel. Lawson,
241 Ala. 304, 307, 2 So. 2d 765, 767 (1941). Stated another
way, declaratory-judgment actions are designed to set
controversies to rest before they lead to repudiation of
obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs.
Id. See also Berman v. Wreck-A-Pair Bldg. Co., 234 Ala. 293,
175 So. 269, 274 (1937). A declaratory-judgment action
requires only that there be a bona fide justiciable controversy.
Creola Land Dev., Inc. [v. Bentbrooke Hous., L.L.C.], 828 So.
2d [285,] 288 [(Ala. 2002)] (citing Gulf South Conference v.
Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala.1979)).

" 'A controversy is justiciable where present "legal rights

are thwarted or affected [so as] to warrant proceedings under
the Declaratory Judgment statutes." ' Creola Land Dev., Inc.,
828 So. 2d at 288 (quoting Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275
Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662 (1963)). We have recognized

11
SC-2025-0105

that a justiciable controversy is one that is ' " definite and

concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties in adverse
legal interest, and it must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a
[judgment]." ' MacKenzie v. First Alabama Bank, 598 So. 2d
1367, 1370 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Copeland v. Jefferson County,
284 Ala. 558, 561, 226 So. 2d 385, 387 (1969)).

"A declaratory-judgment action will not lie for an

anticipatory claim. Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So. 2d at 288
(citing City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., 738 So. 2d
903, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)). However, we have also held
that a party should not be forced to wait until the event giving
rise to the claim occurs before a court may determine the
party's rights and obligations. Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So.
2d at 288 (citing City of Dothan, supra; Morton v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 486 So. 2d 1263, 1269 (Ala. 1986)).

Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d 220, 224 (Ala.

2003). In Harper, this Court determined that a declaratory-judgment

action presented a justiciable controversy because, considering the

factual background of that case, litigation between the plaintiff and the

defendant on the question presented in the declaratory-judgment action

was "inevitable." Id. at 225.

In the trial court, the City argued in response to Pettway's mootness

argument that, "as … Pettway has, and continues to, refused to accept

arrestees charged with misdemeanor violations of State law into his

custody at the Jail, the dispute between him and the City is doomed to

12
SC-2025-0105

repeat itself." The City argues again in its reply brief before this Court

that "Pettway was and is refusing to accept certain [Birmingham Police

Department ('BPD')] arrestees into the county jail. Pettway continues to

deny that certain … BPD[] arrestees may be housed in the county jail,

and, therefore, there is a justiciable controversy existing between the

parties." The City's reply brief, p. 11. We agree with the City. As was

the case in Harper, here, the City is not merely seeking an advisory

opinion. See Harper, 873 So. 2d at 225. From the factual background of

this case, as discussed below, it appears that litigation was inevitable

between these parties concerning the issues raised in the complaint.

According to the City's complaint, 1 in October 2023, the City

arrested various individuals for on-sight violations of state law. The City

transported "many" of the individuals that had been arrested for

misdemeanor offenses to the county jail. At that time, the City learned

that Pettway had a "standing policy" against accepting any of the City's

arrestees without a valid state-law warrant issued by a magistrate (i.e.

1"A court reviewing a judgment on the pleadings accepts the facts

stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party." Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson,
776 So. 2d 81, 82 (Ala. 2000).

13
SC-2025-0105

on-sight arrestees). The complaint states: "Pettway also refused to accept

into his custody at the Jefferson County Jail prisoners arrested by

Birmingham Police Officers within the police jurisdiction of the City for

misdemeanor offenses under state law." (Emphasis added.)

In December 2023, the complaint states, Pettway "relented, …

acknowledging that he was required to receive into custody at the

Jefferson County Jail those individuals committed for on-sight violations

of state law," and the City and Pettway entered into the MOU reflecting

that understanding. The MOU required Pettway to accept into the

county jail those arrestees

"(i) who the City has arrested with probable [cause] and
taken into custody for misdemeanors upon which the City's
Police Department is the arresting agency and who are
awaiting hearing or trial of any such alleged violations (the
'Misdemeanor Offenders'), (ii) awaiting arraignment and/or a
warrant from a magistrate or otherwise lawfully detained
pursuant to the legal authority vested in the City subject to a
forty-eight (48) [hour] hold at the [Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office] Jails ('Felony Hold Offenders')."

The MOU further stated that

"Misdemeanor Offenders (to the extent they cannot

bond out) and Felony Hold Offenders shall be segregated from
other inmates and housed in their own block of the Jails
during the forty-eight (48) hour hold until the time that the
City provides [Jefferson County Sheriff's Office] with all
necessary paperwork and/or warrants, as set forth in detail

14
SC-2025-0105

herein, at which time, these Inmates shall be segregated by

gender and shall be housed in accordance with [Jefferson
County Sheriff's Office's] housing classification."

Finally, the MOU specified:

"The City shall be responsible for obtaining all

necessary warrants and related paperwork thereto regarding
the City's Inmates within forty-eight (48) hours of the initial
transport of the City's Inmates to the Jefferson County Jails.
[The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office] shall not be
responsible for holding the City's Inmates longer than forty-
eight (48) hours if the City fails to obtain all necessary
paperwork and/or warrants within this forty-eight (48) hour
timeframe."

The City and Pettway followed the terms of the MOU from its effective

date on January 1, 2024, through January 10, 2024, at which time

Pettway contacted the Chief of the Birmingham Police Department ("the

BPD") and told him that Pettway "must cease accepting arrestees

transported by the City to the Jefferson County Jail." The City then

learned that Pettway was refusing to accept any more of the City's

arrestees because the county's practice up until that point had been to

enter the warrants brought by the City into the National Crime

Information Center database using the county's "Originating Agency

Identifier" and to the access Criminal Justice Information database with

that identifier, but that practice was unlawful. The City also learned

15
SC-2025-0105

that, to cure the unlawfulness, the parties were merely required to

complete ALEA Form 072 (an "NCIC Holder of the Record Agreement").

Although the City offered to execute ALEA Form 072, Pettway refused to

sign the form. The MOU terminated according to its terms soon after the

City filed its complaint.

Although the complaint does not specifically allege an instance

since January 10, 2024, in which the City attempted to transport an

arrestee to the county jail and was refused by Pettway, the complaint

presents a justiciable controversy as to whether Pettway is required to

accept the City's arrestees without a warrant because, according to the

factual background laid out in the complaint, litigation between these

parties on this issue was inevitable by the time the complaint was filed.

See Harper, 873 So. 2d at 224 ("A declaratory-judgment action requires

only that there be a bona fide justiciable controversy."). Specifically, we

must take as true the allegations in the complaint that Pettway had a

"standing policy" of refusing the City's arrestees without a warrant; that

the City and Pettway entered into the MOU to create a new policy

allowing the City to transport its on-sight arrestees to the county jail and

to leave them there while the BPD officer obtained a warrant; that, after

16
SC-2025-0105

10 days of following the MOU, Pettway telephoned the Chief of the BPD

informing him that he could not lawfully enter the City's warrants and

thus could not accept the City's arrestees any longer; and that Pettway

has failed to take the necessary step to make his acceptance of the City's

arrestees lawful (i.e., executing ALEA Form 072). This factual

background evidences Pettway's ongoing refusal to accept the City's

arrestees without a warrant and the inevitability of litigation on this

point.

The complaint further asserts that Pettway is required by law to

accept arrestees from the City for on-sight violations and misdemeanor

violations of state law. The complaint accuses Pettway of refusing "to

accept individuals at the Jefferson County Jail whom he is required by

state law to receive." The complaint also asserts that Pettway's refusal

to sign ALEA Form 072 is unlawful because execution of that form is

necessary to allow him to lawfully accept the arrestees that he is required

by state law to accept. The complaint therefore sets forth a justiciable

controversy, namely, whether Pettway is required to accept into the

county jail the City's arrestees when they are taken in for on-sight

violations and misdemeanor violations of state law.

17
SC-2025-0105

We note, however, that Pettway conceded at the hearing on the

motion for a judgment on the pleadings that he must accept any arrestee

from the City once a valid state-law warrant has been obtained for that

arrestee, without regard to whether the arrestee's offense was a

misdemeanor or a felony. Therefore, no controversy presently exists as

to the City's allegation that Pettway refuses to accept all City arrestees

taken in for misdemeanor offenses under state law; Pettway has

acknowledged his obligation to accept such arrestees, as long as a

warrant has been issued. Therefore, the only question in dispute is

whether Pettway is required to accept arrestees from the City before a

warrant has been obtained (i.e., on-sight arrestees).

We further note that Alabama law requires that a warrant be

obtained within 48 hours of an on-sight arrest and mandates the release

of the arrestee if a warrant is not obtained within that period. 2 Therefore,

the dispute in this case is quite narrow. Even if the City loses this

2See State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 965-66 (Ala. 1994) ("If the arrest
is made without a warrant, Rule 4.3(a), [Ala.] R. Crim. P., requires that
the arrested person be released unless a probable cause hearing is held
within 48 hours."); Rule 3.1(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. ("[U]pon a finding of
probable cause made pursuant to Rule 2.4, [Ala. R. Crim. P.,] the judge
or magistrate shall immediately cause to be issued an arrest warrant or
a summons ….").

18
SC-2025-0105

declaratory-judgment action, it would be required to house the

individuals it arrests for violations of state law (whom it wishes to

transport to the county jail) for a very short amount of time (just until

the arresting BPD officer obtains a warrant).

In light of the background the complaint provides, this controversy

is not merely an " 'anticipated controversy,' for which '[d]eclaratory

judgment proceedings will not lie.' Creola Land Dev.[, Inc. v. Bentbrooke

Hous., L.L.C., 828 So. 2d [285,] 288 [(Ala. 2002)]." Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay

Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 46 (Ala. 2003). Considering the context provided,

this case is distinguishable from Ex parte Marshall, 323 So. 3d 1188, and

Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89. Based on the foregoing, we

conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the City's complaint for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on a finding of a lack of justiciability.

Although we conclude that the trial court's reasoning for entering

the judgment on the pleadings was erroneous, we must also consider

whether the judgment on the pleadings ought to be affirmed based on the

alternative argument offered by Pettway, specifically, that he was

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the City's

19
SC-2025-0105

complaint. 3 See Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d

1059, 1082 (Ala. 2004) (noting that this Court " 'may affirm a trial court's

judgment on "any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless

of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the

trial court ." ' " (citations omitted)). In light of the analysis below, we

conclude that Pettway and the JCC are entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law on the merits of the City's complaint.

We do not find any law requiring Pettway to accept the City's

arrestees without a warrant issued by a magistrate. We also do not find

any law stating that arrestees taken in by the City for violations of state

law cannot be held in the City jail until a warrant is issued. The City's

complaint relies on § 12-11-3, § 12-12-32, § 12-14-1, § 14-6-1, and § 14-6-

5, Ala. Code 1975, but it appears that the controversy implicates only §§

3Pettway also argued in his motion for a judgment on the pleadings

that he was entitled to sovereign immunity from this action pursuant to
Article 1, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022. Notably, on appeal, Pettway argues that
he is entitled to immunity only "to the extent the City is seeking any
monetary relief." Pettway's brief, p. 33. Moreover, in Parker v. Amerson,
519 So. 2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987), this Court held that an exception to
sovereign immunity arises when an action seeks "construction of a
statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if [the official named as a
defendant] is a necessary party for the construction of the statute."
Therefore, Pettway is not entitled to sovereign immunity from this
action.

20
SC-2025-0105

12-12-32 and 12-14-1.4 Sections 12-12-32 and 12-14-1 concern the

jurisdiction of the municipal, district, and circuit courts and differentiate

between violations of a municipal code, misdemeanor violations of state

law, and felony offenses. The parties argue that §§ 12-12-32 and 12-14-1

dictate which party bears responsibility for the City's arrestees.

On appeal, the City argues with respect to § 12-12-32 that

"the county district courts have jurisdiction over all

misdemeanor prosecutions except those prosecuted by a
municipality. The City does still charge, prosecute, and accept
into its jail those who violate its own ordinances, fail to appear
in municipal court, violate probation in municipal court, etc.
However, individuals arrested by BPD officers for violations
of state law misdemeanors fall within the jurisdiction of the
district court and should be housed in the county jail pending
criminal proceedings."

The City's brief, p. 42. The City further argues that Rule 2.2, Ala. R.

Crim. P., "makes it clear that violations constituting misdemeanor

4At the hearing on Pettway's motion, counsel for the City told the
trial court that § 12-11-3 was mistakenly cited in the complaint. Section
14-6-1 simply provides, in pertinent part: "The sheriff has the legal
custody and charge of the jail in his or her county and all prisoners
committed thereto, except in cases otherwise provided by law" and may
appoint a jailer "for whose acts he or she is civilly responsible." Section
14-6-5 provides: "Any jailer or other officer who willfully refuses to
receive into his custody any person lawfully committed thereto on any
criminal charge or conviction must, on conviction, be fined not more than
$500."

21
SC-2025-0105

violations of state law, as distinguished from municipal ordinances, are

to be heard in the county's district court. … Therefore, the county jail is

the appropriate place to house those arrested by BPD officers for

violations of state-law misdemeanors." Id., p. 41. Rule 2.2(b), addressing

misdemeanors and ordinance violations, is based on § 12-12-32. See

Committee Comments to Rule 2.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., as Amended to

Conform to Rule as Amended Effective August 1, 2007.

In its complaint, the City asserted that, "[p]ursuant to Ala. Code

(1975) § 12-14-1, the Jefferson County District Court has jurisdiction over

misdemeanor offenses under state law committed within the police

jurisdiction of the City. Venue is proper in the county where a violation

of state law occurs. Ala. Code (1975) § 15-2-2." On appeal, the City argues

that § 12-14-1 "contains no direction providing for a preference that a

municipality take jurisdiction any time there is concurrent jurisdiction."

The City's brief, p. 44.

In his motion for a judgment on the pleadings, Pettway argued that

§ 12-12-32 "confirms that the City has jurisdiction over the BPD arrestees

and inmates under [its] municipal ordinances." He cited Rule 2.2, Ala.

R. Crim. P., and § 11-1-1 of the Birmingham Municipal Code to argue

22
SC-2025-0105

that "Pettway could not have violated [§ 12-12-32] because the City has

stripped the jurisdiction of these misdemeanor offenses from Jefferson

County." See § 11-1-1, Birmingham Mun. Code ("It shall be unlawful for

any person to violate within the city or within the police jurisdiction

thereof any law of the state, now or hereafter enacted, the violation of

which is a misdemeanor or violation under the state law."). Pettway

argues that, "in the City's police jurisdiction, violations of state law

misdemeanors are violations of city ordinance that must be tried in

municipal court." Pettway's brief, pp. 22-23. Finally, in his motion for a

judgment on the pleadings, Pettway asserted that § 12-14-1

"does not grant the City the option to pick and choose which
ordinances will be applied under state law or the City's
ordinances, but requires the City to effectuate arrests and
prosecute the misdemeanor arrests within the City's
jurisdiction. The law requires the City to be the custodian of
their arrestees and inmates absent a valid state-law warrant
placing the inmates within the custody of Sheriff Pettway."

In response to the motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the City

argued that

"the fatal flaw of [Pettway's] motion [wa]s that it ignore[d] the

application of concurrent jurisdiction. Inherent in the
concurrent jurisdiction of the courts is statutory authority
that authorizes the City to charge offenses that fall within the
overlapping jurisdiction under State law. Once an arrestee is
charged under State law, the sheriff is obligated, as a matter

23
SC-2025-0105

of law, to accept that arrestee into his care. Ala. Op. Atty. Gen.
No. 88-00348. See also, Ala. Code §§ 12-12-32, 12-14-1, 14-6-
1, 14-6-5[] (1975)."

The City argues that "not all violations of state law are encompassed

within the City's Municipal Code as a separate ordinance. Violations of

state law are often best prosecuted through the county courts, and

individuals arrested for such violations should be accepted into or housed

in the county jail." The City's brief, p. 44.

Finally, Alabama Attorney General Opinion No. 1988-348, which

was cited in the City's complaint, states: "A sheriff is required to receive

into his custody all persons who have been arrested and committed into

his charge, including those who may be sick or injured." Although the

City relied on this opinion below, the City did not cite any law to suggest

that, once the City transports an arrestee to the county jail, that arrestee

is "committed into [Pettway's] charge." Additionally, the above-quoted

portion of the attorney general's opinion was written in response to the

following question: "Is a sheriff required to accept a person under arrest

into the county jail if that person is sick or injured?" Therefore, the

opinion did not concern a sheriff's responsibility to accept arrestees from

a municipality.

24
SC-2025-0105

From our reading of the above-cited statutes, rules, and opinions, it

appears that, when a violation of the Birmingham Municipal Code

constitutes a misdemeanor offense under state law, the municipal court

has jurisdiction to prosecute that offense; however, only the district and

circuit courts have jurisdiction to prosecute a felony offense. 5 However,

this fact does not support either sides' position. It also does not

necessarily establish that Pettway is responsible for all arrestees taken

in for committing a felony offense and that the City is responsible for

those that have committed misdemeanors. Neither side has cited any

law suggesting that the responsibility for an arrestee lies with the

5See § 12-12-32 (giving jurisdiction to municipal courts over

misdemeanor prosecutions when the municipality has adopted the
misdemeanor as a violation of the municipal code, and giving only district
and circuit courts jurisdiction over prosecutions of felony offenses); Rule
2.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. ("All felony charges … shall be prosecuted in
circuit court …."); and Rule 2.2(b) ("All misdemeanor offenses … shall be
prosecuted originally in district court or, where adopted as municipal
ordinance violations, municipal court."). This interpretation aligns with
§ 12-14-1(c), which gives the municipal court concurrent jurisdiction with
the district court over "all acts constituting violations of state law
committed within the police jurisdiction of the municipality which may
be prosecuted as breaches of municipal ordinances." Also, § 12-11-30(b),
Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[t]he circuit court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of all felony prosecutions …." The City may have
intended to cite § 12-11-30 instead of § 12-11-3 in its complaint. See,
infra, note 4.

25
SC-2025-0105

authority that has jurisdiction over the arrestee's prosecution, and we

have not found any such law. Instead, from the Birmingham Municipal

Code and the attorney general's opinions cited by the parties, it appears

that the responsibility for an arrestee lies with the authority presiding

over the arresting officer.

First, Alabama Attorney General Opinion No. 2002-248, which was

cited below by the JCC and Pettway and was discussed at the final

hearing, states:

"Although the Sheriff has an obligation to house prisoners

convicted of a felony, he or she may deny the use of his or her
jail to municipal prisoners. The decision of whether to accept
municipal prisoners, other than those he or she is required to
house by state law, lies solely within the discretion of the
sheriff, unless there is a current agreement between the
sheriff, the county, and the city for the sheriff to accept
municipal prisoners. …

"….

"Both the county commission and the sheriff should be

parties to any contract with a municipality to house municipal
prisoners in the county jail."

Alabama Attorney General Opinion No. 1998-78, cited by the JCC below,

describes a "municipal prisoner" as a prisoner "charged with a violation

of a municipal ordinance." Those opinions, although not binding

authority, indicate that there is no requirement that Pettway accept the

26
SC-2025-0105

City's arrestees taken in for violations of the municipal code. The parties

agree that the City is responsible for such "municipal prisoners." 6

Under § 8-4-5 of the Birmingham Municipal Code, it is clear that

all of the City's arrestees taken in for violations of the municipal code

(including those violations of state law that have been adopted as

violations of the municipal code) must be brought to the city jail. Section

8-4-5(a) states, in pertinent part:

"When any person is arrested, with or without a

warrant, for a violation of any provisions of this Code or other
city ordinance, the officer making the arrest shall forthwith
bring the person before a municipal court judge or deliver him
or her to the city warden, who shall detain him or her in
custody until he or she can be brought before a municipal
court judge to be dealt with according to law …."

More specifically, § 9-2-7 of the Birmingham Municipal Code states

that "[t]he designated facility of the city for the care, custody and control

of all persons arrested, detained or sentenced for violations of the

6Although Alabama Attorney General Opinion No. 2002-248 states

that "the Sheriff has an obligation to house prisoners convicted of a
felony," it does not state that a sheriff is obligated to accept municipal
arrestees that have committed a felony, or even those that have been
charged with a felony. (Emphasis added.) Although the opinion includes
the qualifier "other than those he or she is required to house by state
law," the opinion does not cite any state law requiring a sheriff to house
a "municipal prisoner."

27
SC-2025-0105

ordinances of the city and/or laws of the state is the Birmingham City

Jail." (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to § 9-2-7, all of the arrestees the City

takes in, whether for violations of state law or of its municipal code, may

be appropriately housed in the City jail.

We note that, as Pettway asserted in support of his motion for a

judgment on the pleadings, there are at least three circumstances set

forth in the Alabama Code in which a sheriff might accept into the county

jail arrestees from the City: by agreement, when the municipal jail is

overcrowded, or upon the closing of the municipal jail. Because such

scenarios are specifically set forth in the law, it is logical to presume that

a sheriff is not ordinarily required to accept arrestees from the City.

As stated above, the dispute in this case is quite narrow. Although

it is convenient and efficient for a municipality to have an arrangement

with the sheriff for the housing of state-law violators during the interim

period between the arrest and the issuance of a warrant, there does not

appear to be any requirement in the law that a sheriff participate in such

an agreement. The City concedes that the MOU was not required by law.

The City's brief, p. 27 ("[T]he MOU was one possible method of

documenting Pettway's statutory obligation to accept into the county jail

28
SC-2025-0105

BPD arrestees who have violated state laws."). Notably, the JCC

asserted in its answer that, with this action, the City seeks to force the

county to house the City's arrestees -- to circumvent the processes, which

are set forth in the law, of making consensual arrangements with the

county.

The City is also not entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that

Pettway must execute ALEA Form 072. The City has made clear that it

does not seek a judgment declaring that Pettway is required to execute

ALEA Form 072 or to participate in a MOU; rather, it seeks a judgment

declaring that the law requires him to complete those steps because he is

statutorily responsible for arrestees taken in for violations of state law.

We do not find a basis for such a judgment in the law. Pettway may have

been required to execute ALEA Form 072 during the life of the MOU in

order to lawfully carry out its terms; however, that question is now moot

since the MOU has terminated. Moreover, although Pettway has said

that he would accept arrestees from the City with a warrant, and it

appears that he cannot lawfully accept those arrestees without executing

ALEA Form 072, the City has not alleged that it would suffer any harm

or punishment if Pettway unlawfully accepted its arrestees in violation

29
SC-2025-0105

of the ALEA mandate (i.e., without signing the form) and continued to

enter the City's warrants into the system using the county's "Originating

Agency Identifier." The City has alleged that that would be unlawful,

but not that the City would be harmed or punished in any way, if that

continued to occur. Therefore, Pettway is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law on any claim that he was required by law to execute ALEA

Form 072.

As the trial court wrote:

"Judgment on the pleadings is proper when no issues of

material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law based on the substance of the
pleadings and any judicially noticed facts. B.K.W. Enters.,
Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala. 1992)."

Here, the complaint failed as a matter of law on its merits. Therefore, a

judgment on the pleadings was appropriate.7

7In its judgment on the pleadings, the trial court dismissed, with
prejudice, the City's complaint. The trial court improperly dismissed the
City's complaint with prejudice because it dismissed for lack of a
justiciable controversy and it is well settled that "[a] dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the
merits." Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 564
(Ala. 2005); see Ex parte Capstone Dev. Corp., 779 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 2000)
(holding that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is treated
as a dismissal without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to reinstitute the
action); Stringfellow v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 439 (Ala.
1999) (holding that insured's unripe fraud action should properly have

30
SC-2025-0105

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

AFFIRMED.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Cook, and McCool, JJ.,

concur.

Shaw and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.

been dismissed without prejudice in order to allow the insured to bring

the action when it presented a justiciable controversy). However,
because we ultimately conclude that the judgment on the pleadings was
warranted on the merits, the trial court's dismissal of the complaint with
prejudice was a harmless error.

31