Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability

Michael T. Klare

An Arms Control Association Report February 2023

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military
Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability
An Arms Control Association Report

February 2023

Michael T. Klare
Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military
Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability i
About the Author
Michael T. Klare is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association, where he focuses on the impacts
of emerging technologies on nuclear stability and arms control. From 1985 to 2018, Dr. Klare served as the Five
College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, a joint appointment at Amherst, Hampshire, Mount
Holyoke, and Smith Colleges and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of 15 books,
including, most recently All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank his colleagues at the Arms Control Association, especially Executive Director
Kimball and Senior Policy Analyst Shannon Bugos, for their assistance in making this report possible. Kimball
conceived of the “Arms Control Tomorrow” series in Arms Control Today which resulted in the original versions
of the chapters in this report and later their compilation in a single document; he also read the text and made
multiple suggestions for its improvement. Bugos provided the author with invaluable guidance on recent
developments in the field and made many beneficial improvements to the final text; she also contributed the
tables of U.S., Russian, and Chinese hypersonic weapons on pages 35–36 and the Glossary of Terms on p. 63. ACA
nuclear policy intern Heather Foye also assisted by copy editing the text. The author would like to extend special
thanks to Allen Harris, production editor, for his skilled and creative work in design and layout of the report.

The author would also like to acknowledge the European Leadership Network and the Samuel Rubin Foundation
for their support of the Arms Control Tomorrow research project.

Cover Photo
Cyberwarfare specialists serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard
engage in weekend training at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Md., June 3, 2017.
(Photo: J.M. Eddins Jr./U.S. Air Force.)
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute
DoD endorsement.

© Arms Control Association, February 2023

ii An Arms Control Association Report

  TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Preface

3 Executive Summary

8 Chapter 1: The Challenges of Emerging Technologies

18 Chapter 2: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War

30 Chapter 3: An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons and the

Changing Calculus of Battle

40 Chapter 4: Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New

Pathways to Escalation

48 Chapter 5: ‘Skynet’ Revisited: The Dangerous Allure of Nuclear

Command Automation

56 Chapter 6: A Framework Strategy for Reducing the Escalatory

Dangers of Emerging Technologies

63 Glossary of Terms

64 Endnotes

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability iii
iv An Arms Control Association Report
Preface

I
n commencing work on this document, I attended rest of the 756-page report focuses on proposals for
the Kalaris Intelligence Conference at Georgetown achieving this status—many of which have since been
University in September 2019. Among the featured incorporated into legislation or Pentagon directives.
speakers at the conference, which focused on the But once one reads deep into the report, they will find
military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), misgivings of the sort expressed by General Shanahan.
was Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, then-director of the “While the Commission believes that properly
Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). designed, tested, and utilized AI-enabled and
After expounding for 30 minutes on the benefits of autonomous weapon systems will bring substantial
utilizing AI for military purposes, Shanahan opened military and even humanitarian benefit,” the report
the floor for questions. Quickly raising my hand, states, “the unchecked global use of such systems
I inquired, “I understand your enthusiasm about potentially risks unintended conflict escalation and
exploiting the benefits of AI, but do you have any crisis instability.” In recognition of this danger, the
doubts about employing AI in computerized nuclear report devoted four pages to a few modest steps for
command-and-control systems?” reducing the risk of such dangers, but buried them in
“You will find no stronger proponent of the a long list of recommendations for accelerating the
integration of AI capabilities writ large into the weaponization of AI.
Department of Defense,” he responded, “but there is We at the Arms Control Association believe that
one area where I pause, and it has to do with nuclear appeals for the military utilization of emerging
command and control.” Given the immaturity of technologies and assessments of their destabilizing
technology today, “We have to be very careful. [You and escalatory dangers require a better balance. While
need to] give us a lot of time to test and evaluate.” not denying that certain advanced technologies
This dichotomy between the impulse to weaponize may provide potential military benefits, this primer
AI as rapidly as possible and the deep anxiety about the aims to balance the scales by way of a thorough and
risks in doing so runs throughout the official discourse rigorous appraisal of the likely downsides of such
on what are called “emerging technologies”—which, utilization. In particular, it focuses on the threats to
in addition to artificial intelligence, include robotics, “strategic stability” posed by the military use of these
autonomy, cyber, and hypersonics. The military technologies—that is, the risk that their use will result
utilization of these technologies, as claimed by their in the accidental, unintended, or premature use of
proponents, will provide U.S. military forces with a nuclear weapons in a great-power crisis.
significant advantage in future wars against other well- By publishing this report, we aim to better
armed major powers. At the same time, analysts within inform policymakers, journalists, educators, and
and outside the defense establishment have warned members of the public about the race to weaponize
about potentially catastrophic consequences arising emerging technologies and the dangers inherent in
from their indiscriminate use. doing so. While the media and the U.S. Congress
The same dichotomy arises, for example, in the have devoted much attention to the purported
Final Report of the National Security Commission benefits of exploiting cutting-edge technologies for
on Artificial Intelligence, submitted to Congress military use, far less has been said about the risks
and the White House in February 2021. “Our armed involved. Hopefully, this primer will help overcome
forces’ competitive military-technical advantage this imbalance by illuminating the many dangers
could be lost within the next decade if they do not inherent in the unconstrained exploitation of
accelerate the adoption of AI across their missions,” these technologies.
the report warns in its opening pages. To ensure this The primer is organized into six chapters, each
does not occur, the armed forces must “achieve a based on an article that originally appeared in ACA’s
state of military AI readiness by 2025.” Much of the flagship journal, Arms Control Today (ACT).

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 1
Chapter 1, “The Challenges of Emerging prompt it to launch its own nuclear weapons. This
Technologies,” introduces the concept of “emerging chapter is based on an article that first appeared in
technologies” and summarizes the debate over their the November 2019 issue of ACT.
utilization for military purposes and their impact Chapter 5, “‘Skynet’ Revisited: The Dangerous
on strategic stability. It highlights the centrality of Allure of Nuclear Command Automation,” considers
artificial intelligence in many of these advances, the implications of automating combat decision-
particularly the development of autonomous or making systems. While such systems—such as
“unmanned” weapons systems. Chapter 1 also the Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command-and-
provides a brief overview of the four technologies Control (JADC2) enterprise—could theoretically
given close examination in this report: autonomous help battlefield commanders cope with the deluge of
weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyberweapons, incoming information they are often confronted with,
and automated battlefield decision-making systems. they might also usurp the role of humans in combat
This chapter is based on an article that first appeared decision-making, leading to accidental or inadvertent
in the December 2018 issue of ACT. escalation. This chapter is based on an article that first
Chapter 2, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and appeared in the April 2020 issue of ACT.
the Laws of War,” focuses on lethal autonomous Finally, Chapter 6, “A Framework Strategy for
weapons systems. Devices of this sort combine Reducing the Escalatory Dangers of Emerging
combat platforms of varying sorts—planes, tanks, Technologies,” summarizes the analyses articulated
ships, and so on—with AI software enabling them to in the first five chapters and provides an overarching
survey their surroundings, identify possible enemy strategy for curtailing the indiscriminate weaponization
targets, and, under certain predetermined conditions, of emerging technologies. While no single approach
independently decide to attack those targets. This can adequately meet a challenge of this magnitude,
chapter identifies the types of unmanned weapons a constellation of targeted measures—ranging
now being developed and deployed by the major from awareness-raising to unilateral actions,
powers and discusses the moral and ethical objections Tracks 2 and 1.5 diplomacy, strategic stability
about their use, as well as their potential conflict with talks, confidence-building measures, and formal
the laws of war. This chapter is based on an article agreements—could, in time, slow the pace of
that first appeared in the March 2019 issue of ACT. weaponization and bolster strategic stability. This
Chapter 3, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic chapter is based on an article that first appeared in
Weapons and the Changing Calculus of Battle,” the December 2020 issue of ACT.
examines hypersonic weapons, or projectiles that fly As General Shanahan indicated in 2019, the
at more than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5). initiation of nuclear combat represents the
Projectiles of this sort appeal to military officials given “ultimate human decision.” During the Cold War,
their speed and maneuverability, but also pose a threat to the world’s top leaders came face-to-face with the
strategic stability by endangering key defensive assets of risk of Armageddon, prompting significant arms
nuclear-armed states, possibly leading to the premature control efforts to reduce that risk. Today, however,
use of nuclear weapons. This chapter is based on an developments in geopolitics and technology are again
article that first appeared in the June 2019 issue of ACT. increasing the danger of nuclear weapons use. We
Chapter 4, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? hope that this primer will help readers understand the
Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” looks at technological aspects of this danger and spur them to
cyberspace and the dangers arising from the offensive advocate for reasonable limitations on the military use
use of cyberweapons in a great-power conflict. As of destabilizing technologies.
the chapter suggests, a cyberattack on an adversary’s
nuclear command, control, and communications —Michael T. Klare
systems during such a crisis might lead the target state Senior Visiting Fellow, Arms Control Association,
to believe it faces an imminent nuclear attack and so February 2023

2 An Arms Control Association Report

Executive Summary

I
ncreasingly in recent years, the major powers variety of unilateral and multilateral measures, have
have sought to exploit advanced technologies— also advanced in recent years.
artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, cyber, and
hypersonics, among others—for military purposes, AI and Autonomous Weapons Systems
with potentially far-ranging, dangerous consequences. Among the most prominent applications of emerging
Similar to what occurred when chemical and nuclear technologies to military use is the widespread
technologies were first applied to warfare, many introduction of autonomous weapons systems—
analysts believe that the military utilization of AI and devices that combine AI software with combat
other such “emerging technologies” will revolutionize platforms of various sorts (ships, tanks, planes, and
warfare, making obsolete the weapons and the so on) to identify, track, and attack enemy targets
strategies of the past. In accordance with this outlook, on their own. Typically, these systems incorporate
the U.S. Department of Defense is allocating ever- software that determines the parameters of their
increasing sums to research on these technologies and operation, such as the geographical space within
their application to military use, as are the militaries which they can function and the types of target they
of the other major powers. may engage, and under what circumstances.
But even as the U.S. military and those of other At present, each branch of the U.S. military, and the
countries accelerate the exploitation of new forces of the other major powers, are developing—
technologies for military use, many analysts have and in some cases fielding—several families of
cautioned against proceeding with such haste autonomous combat systems, including unmanned
until more is known about the inadvertent and aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles
hazardous consequences of doing so. Analysts worry, (UGVs), unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and
for example, that AI-enabled systems may fail in unmanned undersea vessels (UUVs).
unpredictable ways, causing unintended human The U.S. Navy, for example, intends to employ a
slaughter or uncontrolled escalation. fleet of USVs and UUVs to conduct reconnaissance
Of particular concern to arms control analysts is operations in contested areas and, if war breaks out,
the potential impact of emerging technologies on launch antiship and land-attack missiles against
“strategic stability,” or a condition in which nuclear- enemy targets. The U.S. Air Force has embraced a
armed states eschew the first use of nuclear weapons “loyal wingman” approach, whereby armed UAVs
in a crisis. The introduction of weapons employing will help defend manned aircraft when flying in
AI and other emerging technologies could endanger contested airspace by attacking enemy fighters. The
strategic stability by blurring the distinction between U.S. Army seeks to reduce the dangers to its frontline
conventional and nuclear attack, leading to the troops by developing a family of robotic combat
premature use of nuclear weapons. systems, including, eventually, a robotic tank. Russian
Animated by such concerns, arms control advocates and Chinese forces are developing and deploying
and citizen activists in many countries have sought unmanned systems with similar characteristics.
to slow the weaponization of AI and other emerging The development and the deployment of lethal
technologies or to impose limits of various sorts on autonomous weapons systems like these raise
their battlefield employment. For example, state significant moral and legal challenges. To begin
parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional with, such devices are being empowered to employ
Weapons (CCW) have considered proposals to ban lethal force against enemy targets, including human
the development and the deployment of lethal beings, without significant human oversight—moves
autonomous weapons systems—or “killer robots,” that run counter to the widely-shared moral and
as they are termed by critics. Other approaches to religious principle that only humans can take the
the regulation of emerging technologies, including a life of another human. Critics also contend that the

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 3
A Chinese WZ-8 hypersonic reconnaissance drone is on display at the 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace
Exhibition (Airshow China 2021) on September 28, 2021 in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province of China. (Photo by Chen Wen/China
News Service via Getty Images)

weapons will never be able to abide by the laws of war Union have also proposed a non-binding code of
and international humanitarian law, as spelled out conduct covering LAWS deployment, requiring
in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the continuous human supervision of their use in combat.
Geneva Convention and 1949. These statutes require
that warring parties distinguish between combatants Hypersonic Weapons
and non-combatants when conducting military Hypersonic weapons are usually defined as missiles
operations and employ only as much force as required than can travel at more than five times the speed
to achieve a specific military objective. Proponents of sound (Mach 5) and fly at lower altitudes than
of autonomous weapons claim that the systems will, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which
in time, prove capable of making such distinctions also fly at hypersonic speeds. At present, the United
in the heat of battle, but opponents insist that only States, China, Russia, and several other countries are
humans possess this ability, and so all such devices engaged in the development and fielding of two types
should be banned. of hypersonic weapons (both of which may carry
In recognition of these dangers, a concerted effort either nuclear or conventional warheads): hypersonic
has been undertaken under the aegis of the CCW glide vehicles (HGVs), unpowered projectiles that
to adopt an additional protocol prohibiting the “glide” along the Earth’s outer atmosphere after being
deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems. released from a booster rocket; and hypersonic cruise
As the CCW operates by consensus and state parties missiles (HCMs), which are powered by high-speed
have opposed such a measure, proponents of a ban air-breathing engines, called “scramjets.”
are exploring other strategies for their prohibition, Weapons of these types possess several capabilities
such as an international treaty under UN General that make them attractive to military officials. Due
Assembly auspices. Some members of the European to their high speed and superior maneuverability,

4 An Arms Control Association Report

hypersonic missiles can be used early in a conflict
to attack high-value enemy assets, such as air-
defense radars, missile batteries, and command-and- With the proliferation
control (C2) facilities. Since hypersonic missiles fly
closer to the Earth than ICBMs and possess greater
of cyberweapons
maneuverability, they may be capable of evading anti- creating new and severe
missile systems designed to work against other types
of offensive weapons. threats to strategic
All three major powers have explored similar types
of hypersonic missiles, but their strategic calculations
stability, policymakers
in doing so appear to vary: The United States bear responsibility for
currently seeks such weapons for use in a regional,
non-nuclear conflict, whereas China and Russia appear developing strategies to
to be emphasizing their use in nuclear as well as
conventional applications.
prevent accidental and
The U.S. Air Force has undertaken the development unintended escalation.
of two such missiles for use in a regional context: the
Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), slated
to be the first U.S. hypersonic weapon to enter service, for great-power competition, given the domain’s
and the hypersonic attack cruise missile (HACM). vulnerability to a wide variety of malicious and
Concurrently, the U.S. Army and Navy have been aggressive activities. These range from cyberespionage,
working jointly on a common hypersonic boost-glide or the theft of military secrets and technological
vehicle for use by both services, along with booster data, to offensive actions intended to disable an
rockets to carry the HGV into the atmosphere. Russia enemy’s command, control, and communications
has deployed the nuclear-armed Avangard HGV on (C3) systems, thereby degrading its ability to wage
a number of its SS-19 Stiletto ICBMs, while China war successfully. Such operations might also be aimed
has tested the Dongfeng-17 (DF-17), a medium-range at an adversary’s nuclear C3 (NC3) systems; in such a
ballistic missile fitted with a dual-capable (nuclear or scenario, one side or the other—fearing that a nuclear
conventional) HGV warhead. exchange is imminent—could attempt to minimize
While most of these weapons programs remain its exposure to attack by disabling its adversary’s
in the development or early deployment stage, NC3 systems.
their presence has already sparked concerns among Analysts warn that any cyberattack on an
policymakers and arms control advocates regarding adversary’s NC3 systems in the midst of a major
their potential impact on strategic stability. Analysts crisis or conventional conflict could prove highly
worry, for example, that the use of hypersonic destabilizing. Upon detecting interference in its
weapons early in a conventional engagement critical command systems, the target state might
to subdue an adversary’s critical assets could be well conclude that an adversary had launched a
interpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first-strike, and pre-emptive nuclear strike against it, and so might
so prompt the target state to launch its own nuclear launch its own nuclear weapons rather than risk their
munitions if unsure of its attacker’s intentions. loss to the other side.
At present, there is no established venue in which The widespread integration of conventional with
officials of China, Russia, and the United States nuclear C3 compounds these dangers. For reasons
can meet to discuss formal limits on hypersonic of economy and convenience, the major powers
weapons. The U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue have chosen to rely on the same early-warning and
could serve as a possible forum for direct talks communications links to serve both their nuclear
between government officials on these topics. While and conventional forces—a phenomenon described
Washington paused the dialogue following Russia’s by James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for
invasion of Ukraine, the two sides should return to International Peace as “entanglement.” In the event
the table as soon as circumstances allow. A U.S.-China of a great-power conflict, one side or the other might
strategic dialogue, if and when established, could employ cyberweapons to disable the conventional
address similar concerns. C3 systems of its adversary in the opening stages of a
nonnuclear assault, but its opponent—possibly fearing
Cyberattack and Nuclear C3 that its nuclear systems are the intended target—
The cyberspace domain—while immensely valuable might launch its nuclear weapons prematurely.
for a multitude of public, private, and commercial The utilization of cyberspace for military purposes
functions—has also proven to be an attractive arena poses significant challenges for arms control. Existing

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 5
means of inspection and verification cannot currently JADC2 is envisioned as a constellation of computers
detect cyberweapons, whose very existence is often working together to collect sensor data from myriad
hard to prove. With the proliferation of cyberweapons platforms, organize the data into digestible chunks,
creating new and severe threats to strategic stability, and provide commanders with a menu of possible
policymakers bear responsibility for developing combat options. While JADC2 is initially intended for
strategies to prevent accidental and unintended conventional operations, the program will eventually
escalation. Some of the most effective, stabilizing connect to the nation’s NC3 systems.
measures, analysts agree, would be U.S.-Russian and The increased automation of battlefield decision-
U.S.-Chinese bilateral agreements to abstain from making, especially given the likely integration of
cyberattacks on each other’s NC3 systems. nuclear and conventional C3 systems, gives rise to
numerous concerns. Many of these technologies are
Automated Battlefield Decision-Making still in their infancy and prone to often unanticipated
With the introduction of new hypersonic weapons malfunctions. Skilled professionals can also fool, or
and other highly capable conventional weapons, the “spoof,” AI-enabled systems, causing unintended
pace of warfare will likely increase and, as a result, and possibly dangerous outcomes. Furthermore, no
exacerbate the pressure on battle commanders to make matter how much is spent on cybersecurity, computer
rapid combat decisions. In response, the militaries systems will always remain vulnerable to hacking by
of the major powers plan to rely increasingly on AI- sophisticated adversaries.
enabled battlefield decision-making systems to aid Given these risks, Chinese, Russian, and U.S.
human commanders in processing vast amounts of policymakers should be leery of accelerating the
data on enemy movements and identifying possible automation of their C3 systems. Ideally, government
combat responses. officials and technical experts of the three countries
Within the U.S. military, the principal mechanism should meet—presumably in a format akin to the
for undertaking the development of automated systems U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue—to consider
of this sort is the Joint All-Domain Command and limitations on the use of any automated decision-
Control (JADC2) program. Overseen by the Air Force making devices with ties to nuclear command systems.
under its Advanced Battlefield Management System, Until meetings of this sort become feasible, experts

An unmanned Boeing MQ-25 T1 Stingray test aircraft, left, refuels a manned F/A-18 Super Hornet, June 4, 2021, near
MidAmerica Airport in Mascoutah, Illinois. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Boeing)

6 An Arms Control Association Report

from these countries should meet in neutral venues among scientists, engineers, and arms control
to identify the dangers inherent in reliance on such experts from the major powers to identify
systems and explore various measures for their control. the risks posed by emerging technologies and
possible strategies for their control. “Track 2
A Framework Strategy for Reducing the diplomacy” of this sort can be expanded at
Escalatory Dangers of Emerging Technologies some point to include governmental experts
Military leaders of the major powers aim to exploit the (“Track 1.5 diplomacy”).
perceived benefits of emerging technologies as rapidly • Unilateral and Joint Initiatives: Steps taken by
as possible, in the belief that doing so will give them the major powers on their own or among
a combat advantage in future great-power conflicts. groups of like-minded states to reduce the
However, this drive to exploit emerging technologies risks associated with emerging technologies
for military use has accelerated at a much faster pace in the absence of formal arms control
than efforts to assess the dangers they pose and to agreements to this end.
establish limits on their use. It is essential, then, to • Strategic Stability Talks: Discussions among
slow the pace of weaponizing these technologies, to senior officials of China, Russia, and the
carefully weigh the risks in doing so, and to adopt United States on the risks to strategic
meaningful restraints on their military use. stability posed by the weaponization of
Given the variety and the complexity of the certain emerging technologies and on joint
technologies involved in this endeavor, no single measures to diminish these risks. These
overarching treaty or agreement will likely be able to can be accompanied by confidence-building
institute restraints on all of the technologies involved. measures (CBMs), intended to build trust
Thus, leaders of the relevant countries should focus in implementing and verifying formal
on adopting a framework strategy, aimed at advancing agreements in this area.
an array of measures which, however specific their • Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements: Once
intended outcome, all contribute to the larger goal the leaders of the major powers come to
of preventing unintended escalation and enhancing appreciate the escalatory risks posed by the
strategic stability. weaponization of emerging technologies,
In devising and implementing such measures, it may be possible for them to reach accord
policymakers can proceed in a step-by-step fashion, on bilateral and multilateral arrangements
from more informal, non-binding measures to intended to minimize these risks.
increasingly specific, binding agreements. The
following proposed action steps are derived from the The failure to adopt such measures will allow
toolbox developed by arms control advocates over for the application of cutting-edge technologies to
many years of practice and experimentation. military systems at an ever-increasing tempo, greatly
magnifying the risks to world security. A more
• Awareness-Building: Efforts to educate thorough understanding of the distinctive threats
policymakers and the general public about to strategic stability posed by certain destabilizing
the risks posed by the unregulated military technologies and the imposition of restraints on their
use of emerging technologies. military use would go a long way toward reducing the
• Track 2 and Track 1.5 Diplomacy: Discussions risks of Armageddon.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 7
Chapter 1:
The Challenges of Emerging Technologies

I
n seemingly every other generation, humans Mark A. Milley affirmed in 2021 that “the country
develop new technologies that alter the nature that masters those technologies, combines them
of warfare and pose fresh challenges for those with their doctrine, develops their leadership to take
seeking to reduce the frequency, destructiveness, and maximum advantage of them, is likely going to have
sheer misery of violent conflict. During World War significant—perhaps even decisive—advantage at the
I, advances in chemical processing were utilized to beginning of the next war.”2
develop poisonous gases for battlefield use, causing In accordance with this outlook, the U.S.
massive casualties; after the war, horrified citizenries Department of Defense is allocating ever-increasing
pressed their leaders to sign the Geneva Protocol sums to research on the underlying science of key
of 1925, which prohibits the use of asphyxiating, emerging technologies and to their application for
poisonous, and other lethal gases in war. Thirty years military use. Priorities for the department include
later, World War II witnessed the tragic application artificial intelligence, autonomous (or “unmanned”)
of nuclear technology to warfare, again resulting weaponry, hypersonic missiles, automated battlefield
in massive human death and suffering; this, too, decision-making systems, and cyberweapons. In its
inspired vigorous international efforts to ban or budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2023, for example,
restrict the use of such munitions. the department sought $3.0 billion for unmanned air
Today, a whole new array of technologies—artificial and sea vehicles, $4.7 billion for hypersonic weapons,
intelligence (AI), robotics, cyber, and hypersonics, $11.1 billion for cybersecurity operations, and $1.1
among others—is being applied to military use, billion for “core AI” research.3
with potentially far-ranging consequences. As was But even as the Department of Defense—and the
the case when chemical and nuclear technologies militaries of the other major powers—rush ahead
were first applied to warfare, many analysts believe with the weaponization of advanced technologies,
that the military utilization of AI and other such many analysts and policymakers have cautioned
“emerging” technologies will revolutionize warfare, against moving with such haste until more is known
making obsolete the weapons and strategies of the about how the various military capabilities stemming
past. “AI will transform all aspects of military affairs,” from these technologies may lead to unintended and
the National Security Commission on Artificial hazardous outcomes. Non-military devices governed
Intelligence (NSCAI) affirmed in its Final Report of by AI, such as self-driving cars and facial-recognition
March 2021. “The sources of battlefield advantage will systems, have been known to fail in dangerous and
shift from traditional factors like force size and levels unpredictable ways; should similar failures occur
of armaments to factors like superior data collection among AI-empowered weaponry during wartime, the
and assimilation, connectivity, computing power, outcomes could include the unintended slaughter of
algorithms, and system security.”1 civilians or the outbreak of nuclear war. As suggested
This prospect has provoked widespread interest by Eric Schmidt, the former chief executive officer of
and excitement among military officials in the Google, “even those powers creating or wielding an
United States and the other major powers. On AI-designed or AI-operated weapon may not know
one hand, senior officers are keen to exploit the exactly how powerful it is, or what it will do in a
purported capabilities of the new technologies for given situation.”4
battlefield advantage; on the other, they fear similar Animated by such concerns, policymakers, arms
strides by rival powers, potentially putting them at control advocates, and citizen activists in many
a disadvantage. In a characteristic expression of this countries have sought to slow the weaponization
outlook, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General of AI and other emerging technologies, or to

8 An Arms Control Association Report

More than 800 service members and civilians took part in Cyber Shield 18, an Army National Guard training exercise at Camp
Atterbury, Indiana from May 6–18, 2018. (Photo: Staff Sgt. Jeremiah Runser/U.S. Army Cyber Command)

institute rules of use or limits of various sorts on technologies will play an ever-increasing role in
their battlefield employment. State parties to the U.S. military strategy. Exploiting these technologies
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for military use, he declared at a regional security
(CCW), for example, have considered measures to conference in Singapore, “holds out the promise of
limit or prohibit the development and deployment progress across a range of emerging tech areas that
of autonomous weapons systems—or “killer robots,” can bolster our deterrence, from AI to hypersonics.”5
as they are termed by critics. The United Nations As during World Wars I and II, the major powers are
has pursued the adoption of limits on the military rushing ahead with the weaponization of advanced
use of cyberweapons, while the U.S. and Russia have technologies before they have fully considered—let
discussed the possibility of addressing, potentially alone attempted to mitigate—the consequences of
through arms control, the destabilizing impacts of doing so, including the risk of significant civilian
hypersonic weapons in future iterations of their casualties and the accidental or inadvertent escalation
“strategic security dialogue.” of conflict. Given these perils, it is essential that
Such efforts are being hampered, however, by policymakers, educators, and the general public
the desire of senior military officials in the United become more familiar with the new technologies and
States, Russia, China, and several other countries to the implications of their future use.
rapidly exploit the potential battlefield applications
of emerging technologies. Indeed, Russia is reported Emerging Technologies and
to have made widespread use of hypersonic missiles Strategic Stability
and cyberweapons during its February 2022 invasion What constitutes an “emerging technology”? While
of Ukraine (though to arguably limited effect), and there is no formal definition of such a category,
the U.S. and its allies supplied Ukraine with a variety the Congressional Research Services (CRS) of the
of sophisticated attack and reconnaissance drones. As Library of Congress has described a number of
the war in Ukraine was raging, moreover, Secretary scientific and technical fields that might fall under
of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III affirmed that emerging this heading, including AI, lethal autonomous

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 9
weapons, hypersonics, and quantum computing. autonomous weaponry on the future battlefield is
These technologies stand out, it explained, because bound to increase the pace and complexity of combat
they “could have a disruptive impact on U.S. national operations, undermining humans’ control over the
security in the years to come” (emphasis added).6 fighting by forcing them to rely increasingly on
Running through this and other assessments of machines for help in battlefield management, data-
the field is the notion that AI and other emerging processing, and decision-making, with potentially
technologies will have a “disruptive” impact catastrophic consequences. “Greater reliance on
on all existing aspects of military planning and automated capabilities, combined with the intense
organization, and on the conduct of war itself. “To decision-making time pressures that attend operations
compete, deter, and if necessary fight and win” on conducted at machine speeds, could lead to rapid and
future battlefields, the National Security Commission even unintended escalation,” Eric Schmidt warned in
on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) suggested in 2021, a 2022 essay.11
America’s military will require “wholesale adjustments In this report, we use “emerging technologies”
to operational concepts, technologies, organizational as shorthand for a range of scientific and technical
structures, and how we integrate allies and partners developments that, if applied to military use, are
into operations.”7 likely to have a transformative impact on the future of
Emerging technologies are also viewed as warfare in ways that are unpredictable and potentially
“disruptive” because they potentially endanger hazardous. We focus in particular on four such fields:
strategic stability, a vital aspect of the existing nuclear AI-enabled autonomous weapons, hypersonic missiles,
order. Although there is no accepted formal definition cyberweapons, and automated command-and-control
of strategic stability, it is usually said to denote a systems. These four were chosen for intensive study
condition in which nuclear-armed states have no because they entail a potential threat to strategic
incentive to strike first in a crisis. As suggested by stability and human control, and because they are the
Prof. Christopher F. Chyba of Princeton University, closest to being employed in actual combat. Particular
strategic stability implies that even when engaged attention is also paid to the pivotal role of artificial
in non-nuclear combat, nuclear-armed adversaries intelligence, as it figures prominently in the design,
will eschew the first use of nuclear weapons because development, and use of all the others.
they understand that any such strike will lead to
devastating nuclear retaliation.8 Artificial Intelligence
Although never entirely free from risk, strategic What is artificial intelligence, and why does it play
stability is thought to face new and unprecedented such a significant role in our investigation? Although
hazards from the introduction of weapons employing there is no accepted common definition for artificial
certain emerging technologies, such as AI, cyber, intelligence, it is usually said to encompass the
and hypersonics. Such weapons, it is feared, could software systems used to invest machines with an
blur the distinction between conventional and ability to monitor their surroundings—whether
nuclear attack, leading a nuclear-armed state to in the material world or cyberspace—and to take
misinterpret an enemy’s non-nuclear operations as independent action in response to various stimuli.
the prelude to a nuclear attack and so launch its own Congress, in authorizing increased Pentagon research
atomic munitions for fear of losing them entirely. A in this field, defined AI as “an artificial system
hypersonic missile strike on a nation’s key command- designed to act rationally, including an intelligent
and-control (C2) centers, for example, might be software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals
perceived as the initial move in a nuclear attack and using perception, planning, reasoning, learning,
so prompt an escalatory response; a cyberattack on communicating, decision-making, and acting.12
such C2 systems could produce comparable fears and Crucial to the application of AI to military use is
cause a similar escalatory outcome.9 “There is a dark the development of ever-more capable algorithms—
side to the new technologies,” said Heiko Maas, then computer programs that have been “trained” through
Germany’s minister for foreign affairs, at a November exposure to vast troves of data to identify various
2020 conference on the topic. “Their military use in external patterns and select particular responses
future conflict could threaten strategic stability and to them based on a menu of possible options. As
lead to devastating consequences.”10 explained by the CRS, this approach to AI, called
And it is not only strategic stability that is said machine learning, “involves statistical algorithms
to be threatened by the introduction of emerging that replicate human cognitive tasks by deriving their
technologies: many analysts also worry about own procedures through analysis of large training
the progressive loss of human control over the data sets.”13
weapons use and the conduct of war itself. The Algorithms can be developed to manage a wide
expanded employment of AI, cyber, hypersonics, and variety of devices and processes, including both

10 An Arms Control Association Report

physical objects like tanks and planes, as well as help militaries prepare, sense and understand, decide,
purely digital systems, such as cyberweapons and and execute faster and more efficiently,” the NSCAI
automated communications networks. In this sense, affirmed in its 2021 report. “In the future, warfare will
AI is viewed as an “omni-use” technology, applicable pit algorithm against algorithm.”14
to a wide spectrum of potential military functions. In consonance with this assessment, senior
These run the gamut from relatively mundane Pentagon officials insist that mastering AI and
tasks like logistical and maintenance oversight applying it to a wide variety of military functions
to such combat-related functions as surveillance, will prove essential as the United States faces ever-
intelligence analysis, target identification, and more capable adversaries in the years ahead. “AI
autonomous drone strikes. Algorithms have also been holds tremendous promise to improve the ability and
developed to permit “swarming,” or the use of drone function of nearly all systems and operations,” The
ships or planes in self-directed ensembles, able to Department of Defense noted in its budget request for
communicate and coordinate their movements with FY 2023. “Tomorrow’s AI must further accelerate these
one another. capabilities, while . . . discovering new applications
Many analysts believe that AI will revolutionize through scientific discovery and expediting the
warfare by allowing military commanders to Department’s modernization efforts.”15
supplement or, in some cases, replace their human- But while the U.S. military and those of many
crewed weapons with a wide variety of unmanned other countries have pursued the application of
systems. As warfare among the major powers grows artificial intelligence to combat functions with great
increasingly fast-paced, moreover, battle commanders enthusiasm, many analysts have expressed concern
are likely to place ever-greater reliance on AI-enabled about the many dangers of doing so. Even after
machines to monitor enemy actions, evaluate the extensive training, advanced algorithms have been
trove of information that is collected, and initiate known to make significant errors in identifying
appropriate countermeasures. “AI applications will objects (or people), and scientists still do not know

A Chinese Yilong II (Wing-Loong II) reconnaissance-strike drone demonstrates on the opening day of the 13th China International
Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition (Airshow China 2021) on September 28, 2021 in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province of China.
(Photo by VCG via Getty Images)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 11
how these systems arrive at their decisions. Like ultimate responsibility for the actions of such systems
other cyber-dependent systems, moreover, AI-enabled (by inserting limiting conditions into the weapons’
machines are vulnerable to hacking and sabotage.16 software), many critics find such claims insufficient
Despite these concerns, the U.S. Department of and argue that they be banned altogether.19
Defense and the militaries of other major powers Even putting aside the moral objections to such
are proceeding aggressively to employ artificial devices, many critics also contend that they will not
intelligence in a wide variety of military systems. Its be able to abide by the laws of war and international
growing importance will be evident in many of the humanitarian law, as spelled out in the Hague
technologies discussed below, but especially in the Conventions (1899 and 1907) and Geneva Convention
development of autonomous weapons systems. (1949). As will be explained further in Chapter 2, these
“conventions,” or treaties, require signatory states
Autonomous Weapons Systems to distinguish between civilians and combatants on
Autonomous weapons systems combine AI software the battlefield and, to the greatest degree possible,
and combat platforms of various sorts—tanks, planes, avoid unnecessary injury to the former. Critics of
ships, and so on—to identify, track, and attack enemy autonomous weapons avow that they will never be able
assets on their own. As defined by the U.S. Defense to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants
Department, such a device is “a weapons system on a chaotic urban battlefield, and so have joined in
that, once activated, can select and engage targets calls for their prohibition.20
without further intervention by a human operator.”17 Given the magnitude of these concerns, the
Typically, weapons of this sort are only enabled to development of autonomous weapons systems has
conduct these activities within certain parameters attracted more attention from policymakers and
programed into the software, such as the geographical arms control advocates than most of the emerging
space within which they can operate or the types of technologies. As will be discussed in Chapter 2,
targets they can engage.18 the signatories to the Convention on Certain
At present, the U.S. military, and those of the Conventional Weapons have convened several
other major powers, are developing—and in some expert groups to consider possible limitations on the
cases fielding—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), production and deployment of such systems, and
unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned several dozen states—along with representatives of
underwater vessels (UUVs), and unmanned ground civil society—have called for an international ban on
vehicles (UGVs). In its budget request for FY 2023, for their use.
example, the U.S. Department of Defense requested
$2 billion for the development and procurement of a Hypersonic Weapons
carrier-based UAV, the MQ-25A Stingray, along with Hypersonic weapons are usually defined as missiles
$400 million for development work on prototype than can travel at more than five times the speed of
USVs and UUVs plus an additional $116 million for sound (Mach 5). Most traditional ballistic missiles,
the development of UGVs. including all intercontinental ballistic missiles
Russia and China are also known to be developing (ICBMs), fly at hypersonic speeds, whereas most
and deploying autonomous systems of these types. traditional cruise missiles fly at subsonic (less
Russia, for example, has developed a family of robotic than Mach 1) or supersonic speeds (Mach 1 to
tanks, including the Uran-6 and Uran-9, some of 5). In practice, and for the purpose of this report,
which reportedly saw service in Syria and Ukraine. “hypersonic weapons” will refer to missiles that fly at
China, for its part, has developed a family of combat lower altitudes than ICBMs and greater altitudes than
UAVs, and deployed some in flights across the median traditional cruise missiles.21
line in the Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan. At present, the United States, China, and Russia
The development and deployment of fully (along with a number of other countries) are engaged
autonomous weapons systems like these raise in the development and fielding of two types of
significant moral and legal challenges for the countries hypersonic weapons, both of which can be armed
involved and the international community. In essence, with either nuclear or conventional warheads:
such weapons are being empowered to employ lethal hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), or unpowered
force against enemy targets, potentially including projectiles that “glide” along the Earth’s outer
human beings, without substantial human oversight— atmosphere after being released from a booster rocket,
moves that run counter to the widely-shared moral and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs), or missiles
and religious principle that only humans can take the powered by high-speed air-breathing engines, called
life of another human, and only under certain highly “scramjets.”22
constrained circumstances. Although proponents of Weapons of these types possess several capabilities
autonomous weapons contend that humans do bear that make them attractive to defense planners. Because

12 An Arms Control Association Report

of their high speed and superior maneuverability, hypersonic weapons, some Chinese analysts have
hypersonic missiles can be used early in a conflict to suggested that the Chinese leadership shares Putin’s
attack critical enemy assets, such as air-defense radars, concerns about the need to overcome future U.S.
missile batteries, and command-and-control (C2) missile defenses when conducting a retaliatory second
facilities; they can also be used to strike mobile assets, strike. But whereas Russian and Chinese leaders tend
such road-mobile missiles and ships in port. Because to stress the role of hypersonic weapons in strategic
they fly closer to the Earth than ICBMs and are highly nuclear encounters, U.S. officials have tended to
maneuverable, such missiles may be able to evade emphasize their utility in a regional, non-nuclear
anti-missile systems designed to work against other context, saying they are needed to overcome Chinese
offensive weapons.23 and Russian threats to U.S. combat forces.24
As will be further discussed in Chapter 3, the major Spurred by these, and related considerations, the
powers are being motivated by several factors to three major nuclear-armed powers have all invested
acquire weapons of these types. President Vladimir in the development of multiple types of hypersonic
Putin, for example, has claimed that Russia must weapons and, in some cases, have begun to deploy
install hypersonic glide vehicles on some of its ICBMs them. Russia, for example, has deployed the Avangard
to ensure Moscow’s capacity to execute a second-strike HGV on a number of its SS19 Stiletto ICBMs and is
retaliatory attack in the event of a U.S. nuclear strike, expected to install additional numbers on the Sarmat
even in the face of enhanced U.S. ballistic missile extra-heavy ICBM when it becomes operational in late
defenses. Although Chinese officials have not been as 2022. Russia has also fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a
forthright in explaining their motives for acquiring maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile, reportedly

A missile carrying a common hypersonic glide body launches from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii on March 19, 2020.
(Photo by U.S. Department of Defense)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 13
firing some on targets in western Ukraine.25 China has Griffin, the former undersecretary of defense for
tested a number of hypersonic weapons, including the research and engineering, has stated that the United
Dongfeng-17 (DF-17), a road-mobile medium-range States needs to develop such weapons in order “to
ballistic missile fitted with a “dual-capable” (either allow us to match what our adversaries are doing.”30
nuclear or conventional) HGV warhead.26 This sort of thinking, analysts fear, could spur an arms
The United States has developed and is testing a race in hypersonics, long before the consequences of
variety of conventionally-armed hypersonic weapons, their widespread deployment are fully understood.
with each of the military services seeking to acquire Given the potential risks posed by the deployment
some for their own specific military purposes. The of hypersonic weapons, many arms control advocates
Air Force, stressing the potential use of hypersonic believe that such munitions need to be regulated in
weapons in attacking “time-sensitive” targets some fashion, as have other major weapons systems.
such as mobile ballistic missiles, has pursued the There is considerable debate and uncertainty, however,
development of two such munitions: the AGM-183 as to how this might be accomplished. Hypersonic
Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), warheads fitted on the ICBMs of the U.S. and Russia,
which is slated to be the first U.S. hypersonic weapon such as Avangard, are limited by the New Strategic
to enter service, and the hypersonic attack cruise Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in
missile (HACM). The Army and Navy, citing the February 2026. However, none of the other hypersonic
threat to their conventional forces posed by growing missiles now in development by the major powers
numbers of Chinese and Russian medium-range are covered by this, or other treaties, and it is unclear
ballistic missiles, are working jointly on a common how they might be brought under some form of
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle for use by both services international control. Various strategies to achieve this
along with booster rockets to carry the HGV into outcome have been proposed by experts in the field,
the outer atmosphere. These initiatives include the and these will be given close attention in Chapter 3.
Navy-funded Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)
program and the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Cyberattack and Nuclear C3
Weapon (LRHW). To sustain all these programs, the Cyberspace, or the global web of information streams
Department of Defense requested $4.7 billion for linked to the internet, is a remarkable product of
hypersonic research in FY 2023, a 24% increase over human engineering that permits complex interactions
the FY 2022 request of $3.8 billion.27 among peoples, companies, organizations, and
Although most of these weapons programs governments. But while an extraordinary tool for
are still in the development or early deployment many purposes, the internet is also vulnerable to
stage, they have already raised concerns among attack by hostile intruders—whether to spread
policymakers and arms control advocates regarding misinformation, disrupt vital infrastructure, or steal
their potential impact on escalatory dynamics and valuable data. Most of those malicious activities are
strategic stability. Analysts worry, for example, that conducted by individuals or groups of individuals
the use of hypersonic weapons early in a conventional seeking to enrich themselves or sway public opinion,
engagement to subdue an adversary’s critical assets but the governments of certain countries, including
could be interpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first- China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the
strike, prompting the target state to keep its nuclear United States, have also engaged in such endeavors
arms on a high-alert status and to launch them for their own strategic purposes.31
quickly if unsure of its attacker’s intentions.28 Cyberspace has proven to be an attractive arena
Many analysts are also troubled by the fact that for great-power competition because it encompasses
the major powers are rushing to acquire these new so many important functions yet is vulnerable to
hypersonic missiles without having a clear concept a wide variety of malicious and hostile actions. At
of how they will be used in battle but simply out of one end of the spectrum of possible operations is
concern that their rivals may deploy such weapons cyberespionage, intended to penetrate an adversary’s
ahead of them. Indeed, the commander of the Joint military and scientific data systems and steal valuable
Global Strike Operations Center, Maj. Gen. Mark data about military dispositions, combat plans, and
Weatherington, disclosed in 2020 that the Air Force weapons designs. China, for example, has been
had yet to settle on a combat role for the various accused of stealing extensive technological data
hypersonic weapons it was developing. Among the from U.S. universities and defense contractors in this
questions that remained unresolved, he noted, were: fashion.32 Hostile actors may also seek to secretly
“How are we going to employ hypersonic weapons? plant malicious software (“malware”) in the operating
What do they bring to the battlefield? What are systems of critical infrastructure, such as energy and
our considerations for planning and executing and financial networks, for activation at some future
integrating them in a fight?”29 Meanwhile, Michael point—say at the onset of a conflict, or to precipitate

14 An Arms Control Association Report

Russian President Vladimir Putin (5L) visits the national defence control centre to oversee the test launch of the Avangard
hypersonic missile, Moscow, December 26, 2018. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu told President Vladimir Putin on
December 27, 2019 that the country’s first Avangard hypersonic missiles have been put into service, an official statement said.
(Photo by Mikhail Klimentyev/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)

a political crisis of some sort. Russia is said to have opposing side—its air, ground, and sea units, and
mounted attacks of this sort against Ukraine prior to the C3 networks connecting them to radar stations,
and following its February 2022 invasion.33 missile batteries, and the like. The side best able to
Cyberoperations are also expected to play a conduct (and defend against) such activities, it is
major role in any active conflict between the major widely believed, will possess a distinct advantage in
powers. Like so many other complex activities, future conflicts, as it will be able to fight with a better
military operations are heavily reliant on digitalized grasp of battlefield dynamics.
communications and the internet, and these electronic Many analysts worry, however, that such
operations are vulnerable to hacking and sabotage. operations might also be aimed at an adversary’s
Hence, when a conflict breaks out, the militaries of the strategic nuclear C3 (NC3), so as to impair its
major powers are expected to employ their cybertools functioning in the event of a major-power war. In
in efforts to discern enemy moves and intentions, such a scenario, one side or the other—fearing that
plant false and confusing information, and disable a nuclear exchange is imminent—might choose to
radar, communications, and weapons delivery systems. minimize the danger it can expect (and/or enhance
To enable military-related cyberoperations its own nuclear assault) by disabling its adversary’s
of this sort, the “cyberwarriors” of the major NC3 systems. Attacks of this sort could, in theory,
powers are believed to devote enormous effort to be undertaken without necessarily disclosing their
planting malware in the command, control, and source or, indeed, the fact that they have occurred at
communications (C3) systems of their adversaries. all. Given the potential appeal of such measures, it
For the most part, such operations are intended to is widely assumed that all of the major powers have
degrade the conventional fighting capabilities of the pursued such options.34

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 15
First Lt. Paul Lee, the 321st Missile Squadron missile combat crew commander, performs a simulated key turn of the
Minuteman III weapon system during a Simulated Electronic Launch-Minuteman test inside the launch control center at a
missile alert facility in the 90th Missile Wing’s missile complex, Neb., April 11, 2017. During a SELM, the missileers in the LCC
are responsible for sending commands to the Minuteman III ICBMs in the launch facility. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt.
Christopher Ruano)

While it is easy to grasp the appeal of such conclude it faces a nuclear rather than conventional
endeavors, analysts warn that a cyberattack on an attack, and respond accordingly. This danger, like
adversary’s NC3 systems in the midst of a major that arising from a deliberate attack on an adversary’s
crisis or conventional conflict could prove highly nuclear C3, has led to calls for the adoption of
destabilizing. Upon detecting interference in its international restrictions on the use of cyberweapons
critical command systems, the target state might against NC3 systems.36
well conclude that it was facing a pre-emptive As is true of artificial intelligence and autonomy, the
nuclear strike by its adversary and so launch its own utilization of cyberspace for military purposes poses
nuclear weapons, rather than risk their loss to the tough new challenges for arms control. Cyberweapons
other side. Even if the attacker was not seeking to cannot be detected or tallied by existing means of
provoke a nuclear exchange but was simply probing inspection and verification, and their very existence
its adversary’s weapons dispositions, the utilization is often hard to prove. Nor do the major powers have
of such tools might be sufficient to provoke a nuclear any incentive to discuss what constitutes some of
response by the target state.35 their most secret undertakings. But the proliferation
Even if not aimed intentionally at nuclear C3, a of cyberweapons is creating new and severe threats
cyberattack on an adversary’s command-and-control to strategic stability, so it will be incumbent upon
systems could prove destabilizing in cases where policymakers and arms control advocates to explore
a state’s nuclear and conventional C3 facilities are methods for devising and adopting controls on their
“co-located” or “entangled,” as is often the case. An future use.
attacker may seek merely to impair an adversary’s
conventional C3 systems for tactical battlefield gains, The Evolving Arms Control Agenda
but inadvertently disrupts NC3 systems employing Even from this brief outline, it should be evident that
the same digital networks—causing the target state to the weaponization of emerging technologies poses new

16 An Arms Control Association Report

and significant threats to strategic stability. In each area could, in future sessions, devise bilateral restrictions
covered—artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons on especially destabilizing cyberweapons.
systems, hypersonic missiles, and cyberweapons— At the same time, experts agree, it will be necessary
we see indications that the use of such systems in a to devise new or novel types of control measures.
major-power conflict could result in uncertainty about These might include unilateral steps taken by the
an attacker’s intentions and so trigger accidental or major powers to reduce their own contribution
inadvertent nuclear escalation. At the same time, we to global risk. For example, the National Security
observed that existing arms control and regulatory Commission on Artificial Intelligence, in its Final
measures do not easily apply to the new technologies, Report, called on the U.S. government to issue
given their distinctive features. Therefore, those a public statement affirming that “decisions to
existing measures will require modification in some authorize nuclear weapons employment must
fashion, or new types of controls must be devised to only be made by humans, not by an AI-enabled or
regulate the development, deployment, and use of autonomous system.”37 Unilateral steps of this
these new technological capabilities. sort have also been proposed for the cyber field,
On the whole, experts in the field are highly involving commitments to refrain from attacks on
skeptical about the likelihood of the major powers an adversary’s NC3 systems.38
negotiating and signing new arms control agreements These are only some of the strategies being
of the sort once contrived between the United States considered to control the development, deployment,
and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. However, they and battlefield use of emerging technologies. In the
suggest that whatever existing measures remain in chapters below, we will explore these options more
place be extended wherever possible to incorporate closely and examine others that have been proposed
emerging technologies. For example, in negotiating an for this role. But it should be apparent that despite
extension of the New START Treaty beyond February the unique challenges posed by these technologies,
2026, the U.S. and Russia might agree to incorporate policymakers and arms control advocates are not
hypersonic weapons (or some types of them) in wanting for ideas on how these challenges might be
their slate of weapons to be curtailed. Similarly, the overcome. In Chapter 6, we summarize these ideas
“Strategic Stability Dialogue” held on several past in a “framework strategy” for reducing the escalatory
occasions between top U.S. and Russian officials dangers of emerging technologies.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 17
Chapter 2:
Autonomous Weapons Systems and the
Laws of War

E
nvisioning a time when the U.S. combat fleet former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper in October
will be composed by as many “unmanned” 2020, unmanned vessels “will add significant
warships as traditional, crewed vessels, the offensive and defensive capabilities to the fleet at an
Navy in April 2021 conducted its first ever maritime affordable cost in terms both of sailors and dollars.”40
exercise comprised almost entirely of unmanned Adding to the appeal of this approach, future
surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned undersea unmanned vessels will be equipped with advanced
vehicles (UUVs, or drone submarines). Known as the sensors and computer systems enabling them to scour
Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 2021 (UIBP- large areas of the ocean on their own, collect data on
21), the exercise was conducted in waters off San enemy ship positions, and relay this information to
Diego and included participation by two prototype manned warships for possible missile strikes—or, in
medium-displacement USVs, Sea Hunter and Sea Hawk some scenarios, conduct independent attacks using
and the experimental Triton UUV, along with several their own onboard missile systems. “Unmanned
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). platforms play a vital role in our future fleet,” the Chief
Equipped with advanced sensors and computing of Naval Operations, Adm. Michael Gilday, affirmed in
gear, the autonomous air and naval systems were 2021. “They will expand our intelligence, surveillance,
set loose to locate simulated enemy warships and and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to our
relay this information to manned warships for live missile magazines, and provide additional means to
missile strikes on the mock targets. “This integrated keep our distributed force provisioned.”41
battle problem provides an operational approach to At this point, the Navy has yet to deploy a purpose-
integrating and adapting unmanned technology with built unmanned combat vessel or perfected the
our manned fleet,” said the exercise’s commander, algorithms needed to enable USVs and UUVs to
Rear Adm. James Aiken.39 operate on the high seas autonomously. However,
The development of unmanned surface and as demonstrated by UIBP-21, they have developed
undersea warships and their integration into the several prototypes of a medium-displacement-
Navy’s combat fleets has become a major Pentagon unmanned surface vessel, represented by the Sea
objective as U.S. defense planners seek to counter Hunter and Sea Hawk, and undertaken elaborate
growing Chinese and Russian naval capabilities maneuvers to test and refine the necessary software.
in a timely and affordable fashion. Ordinarily, the The aim of UIBP-21, Aiken indicated, “is to evaluate
preferred U.S. response to such a threat would be the these unmanned systems and how they can actually
construction of additional manned vessels—aircraft team with manned systems.”42
carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and so on. But large Based on this and other such exercises, the Navy
ships of this sort have become exceedingly expensive plans to gradually integrate purpose-built USVs and
and, at the same time, have become increasingly UUVs into its combat fleet in the coming years.
vulnerable to adversary anti-ship missiles. In response As of late 2021, it had awarded contracts for the
to this predicament, Navy strategists have developed construction of one deployable (i.e., combat-ready)
the strategy of “Distributed Maritime Operations,” medium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV) plus two
under which fewer numbers of large, crewed prototype (or test) MUSVs, four prototype large USVs
vessels will be accompanied by scores of less-costly (LUSVs), and five deployable Extra-Large Unmanned
unmanned ships—whose loss, in some future battle, Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). The first purpose-built
would not cause as much pain and dismay as would MUSV and XLUUV are expected to join the fleet by
the loss of major crewed vessels. As suggested by 2024 and, if Congress approves, serial production of

18 An Arms Control Association Report

Medium displacement unmanned surface vessel Sea Hunter sails in formation during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) on July 28,
2022. (U.S. Navy photo)

all three types of unmanned vessels will commence The top priority for the U.S. Air Force, for example,
after that. By 2035, the Navy predicts, as much as is the development of a “loyal wingman”—an
one-third of its combat fleet will be composed of unmanned aerial vehicle that can accompany crewed
unmanned vessels of these types.43 aircraft on missions in contested airspace over enemy
Initially, these uncrewed ships will engage in territory and conduct vital missions that would place
what might be termed combat-support missions: a piloted aircraft at high risk. Such missions might
tracking and surveillance of enemy vessels, mine and include, for example, intercepting enemy fighter
countermine operations, electronic warfare, and so planes or attacking heavily defended anti-aircraft radar
on. As the military gains experience in autonomous stations; they could also be used to strike high-value,
operations, however, they will be empowered to heavily-defended targets such as missile batteries
conduct offensive attack missions, as well. In its and command centers located deep within enemy
Unmanned Campaign Framework, the Navy describes territory.45 To advance this concept, the Air Force is
the LUSV as an “adjunct magazine,” or floating testing a prototype “drone wingman,” the XQ-58
combat vessel capable of autonomously launching Valkyrie, and a sophisticated software system called
numerous ballistic missiles at enemy ships and land “Skyborg” to control such aircraft when operating on
targets.44 their own.
The Navy is not alone among U.S. armed services Skyborg—or, more formally, the Skyborg
in seeking to increase its reliance on autonomous Autonomous Control System (ACS)—is still in
weapons systems in future operations, and the United development, but the Air Force has already conducted
States is not the only major power championing the tests in which it has assumed the role of a human
development of unmanned systems for military use. pilot in actual flight operations. On April 29, 2021,
The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army are also engaged the Skyborg ACS took control of an uncrewed military
in such endeavors, as are the militaries of China, aircraft, the Kratos Unmanned Tactical Aerial Platform
Russia, and other technologically advanced powers. (UTAP-22), for the first time. On this occasion, and
All of these actors are developing—and in some cases during a second test held on June 24, 2021, the ACS
fielding—unmanned combat systems intended to conducted basic flight maneuvers on its own (albeit
satisfy their distinctive strategic requirements. while being supervised by human controllers on the

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 19
ground). Eventually, Skyborg is intended to control Su-57, on combat missions over enemy territory. Said
multiple drone aircraft simultaneously and allow to possess stealth characteristics, the Okhotnik has
them to operate in “swarms,” coordinating their been flown on test flights with the Su-57 and was
actions with one another with minimum oversight by expected to enter service in 2022. The Russians have
human pilots.46 also developed an array of surveillance and target-
Drawing on this experience, the Air Force plans acquisition drones, some of which were employed
to award contracts for the design and production during the fighting in Syria and Ukraine. And, just as
of a “loyal wingman” type UAV beginning in fiscal the U.S. Army seeks to reduce the risks to its military
year 2024. As envisioned by Air Force officials, the personnel by fielding robotic combat vehicles, Russia’s
proposed drone would be designed to accompany F-35 ground forces plan to place greater reliance on such
and future manned aircraft on high-risk missions over systems in the future. Some of its prototype RCVs,
enemy-controlled territory. “The expectation is that including the Uran-6 and Uran-9, also saw service in
these aircraft can be designed to be less survivable and Syria and Ukraine.51
less capable [than manned aircraft], but still bring an China, too, has been developing such systems. It
awful lot to the fight in a mixture that the enemy has has deployed a number of large and medium UAVs
a very hard time sorting out and dealing with,” said with branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall in September 2022.47 including the BZK-005 and BZK-007 reconnaissance
A similar philosophy is guiding the U.S. Army’s drones and the GJ-1 and GJ-2 armed UAVs—some of
approach to the development of autonomous ground which reportedly have been flown on missions across
combat systems. Anticipating a future battlefield in the median line in the Taiwan Strait between China
which individual soldiers and human-crewed gun and Taiwan. In October 2019, at a parade marking
systems will prove increasingly vulnerable to enemy the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s
fire, the Army seeks to create a family of Robotic Republic, the PLA displayed mockups of two advanced
Combat Vehicles (RCVs) that can engage enemy forces UAVs, the GZ-11 “Sharp Sword” stealth combat drone
“out on the edge,” allowing their human overseers to and the WZ-8 hypersonic reconnaissance drone.
remain protected from the heaviest fighting.48 The Chinese also used that occasion to display an
At present, the Army is testing two potential RCV unmanned undersea vessel, the HSU-001.52
types: the RCV-Light, an unmanned scout vehicle For advocates of such systems, whether in the
for identifying enemy positions in contested areas; American, Chinese, or Russian militaries or those of
and the RCV-Medium, an unmanned gun platform other countries, the development and deployment
designed to engage enemy strongpoints and lightly- of autonomous weapons systems offer undeniable
armored vehicles. It also envisions a third type, the advantages in combat. Cheaper to build and maintain
RCV-Heavy, essentially an unmanned tank. Prototypes than crewed systems and able to operate 24 hours
of the first two types were field tested in 2021, with a day without tiring, robotic warriors supposedly
modified M-113 Bradley armored personnel carriers would help reduce friendly casualties while enabling
standing in for the proposed RCV-Heavy in simulated high-risk operations in contested areas. As suggested
combat operations.49 The Army is also proceeding by the U.S. Navy in its 2021 Unmanned Campaign
with the development of what it calls the Optionally Framework, “Autonomous systems provide additional
Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), a proposed warfighting capability and capacity to augment our
successor to the M-113 that would be capable of traditional combatant force, allowing the option to
unmanned operations in high-risk combat zones. take on greater operational risk while maintaining
Initial production of the OMFV is scheduled for 2027.50 a tactical and strategic advantage.” When equipped
For the Department of Defense, the development with advanced sensors and AI, autonomous weapons
and deployment of autonomous weapons systems can also be trained to operate in coordinated swarms,
like these is viewed as a critical objective if the or “wolfpacks,” overwhelming enemy defenders and
United States is to retain military superiority over its affording a speedy victory.
principal rivals while avoiding excessive risk to its Although the rapid deployment of such systems
combat personnel and also keeping weapons costs appears highly desirable to many military officials,
under control. Similar considerations have propelled their development has generated considerable alarm
the autonomous weapons programs of other major among diplomats, human rights campaigners, arms
powers, especially Russia and China. control advocates, and others who fear that deploying
Like the United States, Russia is pursuing the fully autonomous weapons in battle would severely
concept of a “loyal wingman” for its manned combat reduce human oversight of combat operations,
planes. It has developed an advanced UAV, the S-70 possibly resulting in violations of international law,
Okhotnik (“Hunter”) strike drone, intended to and could weaken barriers that restrain escalation
accompany its most capable fighter, the Sukhoi from conventional to nuclear war. For example, it

20 An Arms Control Association Report

Major U.S. Autonomous Weapons Systems
Weapon System Type Intended Use Status

Medium-altitude, long-
MQ-1B endurance drone intended for Entered service in 1995; widely employed for
Predator / battlefield surveillance and combat missions in in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
UAV
MQ-1C Gray strike missions; MQ-1B is USAF elsewhere. $140 million sought in FY 2021 for
Eagle version, MQ-1C is US Army procurement of 11 MQ-1Cs for US Army
version

MQ-4C is the USN version of

MQ-4C Triton $465 million requested for MQ-4C R&D in
the USAF RQ-4 Global Hawk
/ RQ-4 Global UAV FY 2021–23 plus $1.5 billion for procurement
and is intended for wide-area
Hawk of 6 MQ-4s
maritime surveillance

Provides wide-area surveillance

MQ-8B Fire and target acquisition for USN
UAV In service with the USN
Scout Littoral Combat ships and other
vessels

Entered service in 2007; widely used for combat

Remotely-piloted long-
missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. $1.4
MQ-9 Reaper UAV endurance surveillance and
billion requested in FY 2021–23 for 23 MQ-9s for the
attack drone
USAF and USMC

USN carrier-based aerial USN plans to purchase 72 MQ-25As for $13 billion;
MQ-25A
UAV refueling and surveillance first operational MQ-25A expected to join fleet in
Stingray
drone FY 2025

Remotely-piloted stealth drone Operated by the 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing,

RQ-170 Sentinel UAV intended for secretive ISR based at Creech AFB, Nev.; reportedly employed
operations over Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
Optionally A replacement for the M-113
Five companies awarded a total of $300 million
Manned Bradley Fighting Vehicle
UGV in July 2021 to develop prototypes for testing in
Fighting Vehicle intended for crewed or
FY 2023
(OMFV) unmanned operation
Robotic
Combat Vehicle Lightly-armed unmanned $116 million sought for RCV R&D in FY 2023.
UGV
Light scout vehicle Up to five companies expected to be chosen for
(RCV-Light) competitive testing of RVC-L candidates in FY 2024
Robotic Unmanned combat vehicle with one selected for prototype development in FY
Combat Vehicle designed to engage enemy 2026. Development of a more powerful UGV, the
UGV RCV-Heavy, is expected to follow.
Medium strongpoints and armored
(RCV-Medium) vehicles
Envisioned as a low-cost,
Medium Two MUSV prototype vessels, Sea Hunter and Sea
high-endurance maritime
Unmanned Hawk, engaged in simulated combat exercises in
USV surveillance ship with an
Surface Vessel 2021. $743.1 million sought for MUSV/LUSV R&D in
estimated displacement of
(MUSV) FY 2021–23
around 500 tons

Envisioned as a reconfigurable
combat vessel of approximately Two LUSV prototype vessels, Nomad and Ranger,
Large
1,000–2,000 tons displacement have been deployed and two additional LUSV
Unmanned
USV designed to carry various prototypes were scheduled for delivery in FY 2022.
Surface Vehicle
modular payloads, including $743.1 million sought for MUSV/LUSV R&D in
(LUSV)
anti-ship and land-attack FY 2021–23
missiles

Intended for use in ASW and Boeing awarded contract in 2019 for initial work
Orca Extra-
antiship operations; to be on 5 XLUUVs. $328 million requested in FY 2022
Large UUV UUV
launched from piers or for Orca program, with first XLUUV scheduled for
(XLUUV)
manned vessels delivery in late 2022

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 21
Major Chinese Autonomous Weapons Systems
Weapon System Type Intended Use Status

High-altitude, long-endurance First displayed in 2006. In service with all branches

BZK-005 UAV reconnaissance drone capable of PLA. Reportedly deployed by PLAAF in missions
of launching bombs or missiles across median line of Taiwan Strait in 2022

High-altitude, long-endurance
BZK-007 UAV In service with PLA Army, PLAN
reconnaissance drone

Medium-range reconnaissance
UAV; considered the Chinese
BZK-008 UAV In service with PLA Army
equivalent of the U.S. RQ-4
Global Hawk

Medium altitude, long

endurance UAV intended
Reportedly deployed by PLAAF in missions across
CH-4 UAV for ISR and strike missions;
median line of Taiwan Strait in 2022
considered an equivalent of
U.S. MQ-9 Reaper

High-altitude, long endurance

EA-3 Xianglong UAV First introduced in 2006; in service with PLAAF
UAV intended for ISR missions

Medium altitude, long-

endurance UAV intended
GJ-1 Wing
UAV for ISR and strike missions; First displayed in 2010; in service with PLAAF
Loong
considered an equivalent of the
U.S. MQ-1 Predator
Medium altitude, long-
endurance UAV intended
GJ-2 Wing
UAV for ISR and strike missions; First displayed in 2015; in service with PLAAF
Loong II
considered an equivalent of the
U.S. MQ-9 Reaper
Long-endurance stealth UAV
GJ-11 Sharp intended for ISR and attack First displayed at China’s National Day parade,
UAV
Sword missions; reportedly a clone of Beijing, Oct. 1, 2019.
the U.S. RQ-170

High-altitude, long-endurance
Reportedly deployed by PLAAF in missions across
TB-001 UAV UAV intended for ISR and
median line of Taiwan Strait in 2022
strike missions

High-altitude, long-endurance
UAV intended for wide-area In service with PLAAF since 2018. Reportedly
WZ-7 Soaring
UAV surveillance; considered a deployed by PLAAF in missions across median line
Dragon
Chinese equivalent of the U.S. of Taiwan Strait in 2022
MQ-4.
Hypersonic surveillance drone
intended for launching by a First displayed at China’s National Day parade,
WZ-8 UAV
“mother ship” aircraft at a high Beijing, Oct. 1, 2019.
altitude

Small tracked UGV intended for

infantry-support missions; rear Reportedly deployed by PLA Army in 2021 in Tibet
Sharp Claw II UGV
storage area can accommodate and along Indo-Chinese border
a mini-UGV, Sharp Claw I

Drone submarine intended for

long-range ISR patrols; its flat First displayed at China’s National Day parade,
HSU-b 001 UUV nose suggests it houses a large
sonar for detecting underwater Beijing, Oct. 1, 2019.
targets

22 An Arms Control Association Report

Major Russian Autonomous Weapons Systems
Weapon System Type Intended Use Status

Licensed-produced Russian
version of Israeli Searcher UAV; Reportedly used to attack Ukrainian weapons
Forpost-R UAV
intended for reconnaissance systems in 2022
and strike missions
Family of medium-range, long-
endurance UAVs intended First flown in 2016. Reportedly used in for attacks
Kronstadt Orion UAV
for surveillance and strike on Ukrainian ground vehicles in 2022
missions
Armed stealth UAV intended
Sukhoi S-70 as a “wingman drone” to First flown in 2019; reportedly test-fired guided
UAV
Okhotnik-B accompany the Su-75 fighter missiles in 2022
jet in contested airspace

Medium-range UAV used for

Reportedly used in Ukraine in 2022 to select targets
Orlan-10 UAV reconnaissance and target
for artillery strikes
acquisition

Improved version of Orlan-10 Reportedly used in Ukraine in 2022 to select targets

Orlan-30 UAV
with greater range for artillery strikes

Medium-range UAV used for

In production since 1994. Reportedly used in
Tu-243 Reis-D UAV reconnaissance and target
Ukraine in 2022 to select targets for artillery strikes
acquisition
Robotic combat vehicle
intended for infantry-support Reportedly saw wide use in Syria and used in
Uran-6 UGV
operations, especially mine Ukraine for mine clearance
clearance.
Robotic combat vehicle
intended for offensive
Uran-9 UGV Entered service in 2019. Reportedly used in Syria.
operations alongside tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles

Abbreviations:
ASW = anti-submarine warfare UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle
FY = fiscal year UGV = unmanned ground vehicle
ISR = intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance USAF = U.S. Air Force
PLA = People’s Liberation Army USN = U.S. Navy
PLAAF = People’s Liberation Army Air Force USV = unmanned surface vessel
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy UUV = unmanned subsea vessel
R&D = research & development

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 23
Few weapons in active service presently exhibit all of
these characteristics. Some militaries employ close-in
Autonomy is a matter of degree, naval defense weapons such as the U.S. Phalanx gun
system, which can fire autonomously when a ship is
with machines being granted under attack by enemy planes or missiles. However,
the Phalanx cannot independently search for and
ever-increasing capacity to strike enemy assets on its own, and human operators
assess their surroundings and are always present to assume control if needed. Many
aerial drones are able to attack human-selected ground
decide what to strike and when. targets, such as tanks or armed combatants, but cannot
hover over an area to identify and attack potential
threats on their own. Increasingly, however, UAVs are
seems reasonable to ask whether the Army’s proposed being endowed with such capabilities, as shown by
RCV, if deployed in a crowded urban area, would be Israel’s Harpy airborne anti-radiation drone, which can
able to distinguish between enemy combatants and loiter for several hours over a pre-determined area to
civilian residents, as required by international law? search for and destroy enemy radars.55
Likewise, could a wolfpack of sub hunters, hot on Autonomy, then, is a matter of degree, with
the trail of an enemy submarine carrying nuclear- machines being granted ever-increasing capacity to
armed ballistic missiles, provoke the captain of that assess their surroundings and decide what to strike
vessel to launch its weapons to avoid losing them to a and when. As described by the Congressional Research
presumptive U.S. pre-emptive strike? Service, autonomy is “the level of independence
These and other such questions have sparked a that humans grant a system to execute a given
far-ranging inquiry into the legality, morality, and task…. [It] refers to a spectrum of automation in which
wisdom of deploying fully autonomous weapons independent decisionmaking can be tailored for a
systems. In October 2022, for example, a group of 70 specific mission, level of risk, and degree of human-
nations, including the United States, delivered a joint machine teaming.”56 Put differently, autonomy refers
statement to the UN General Assembly raising such to the degree to which humans are taken “out of the
concerns and calling for unilateral and multilateral loop” of decision-making, and AI-enabled systems
steps to address them. “The introduction of new are invested with responsibility for critical battlefield
technological applications, such as those related to decisions.57
autonomy in weapon systems…raise serious concerns This emphasis on the “spectrum of automation”
from humanitarian, legal, security, technological is important because, for the most part, nations
and ethical perspectives,” the statement reads. “We have yet to deploy fully autonomous weapon
therefore see an urgent need for the international systems on the battlefield. Under prevailing U.S.
community to…address these risks and challenges by policy, as enshrined in a November 2012 Defense
adopting appropriate rules and measures.”53 Department directive, “autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapons systems shall be designed
Ever-Increasing Degrees of Autonomy to allow commanders and operators to exercise
Autonomous weapons are lethal devices that have appropriate levels of human judgment over the use
been empowered by their human creators to survey of force.”58 In their official statements, U.S. military
their surroundings, identify potential enemy targets, leaders regularly assert that this dictum continues to
and, under certain conditions, independently choose govern Pentagon policy on autonomous weapons.
to attack those targets on the basis of sophisticated Yet this country, like others, is developing and testing
algorithms incorporated into their operating systems. weapons that would allow for ever-diminishing
Such devices require the integration of several core degrees of human control over their future use.
elements: a mobile combat platform, such as a drone This is evident, for example, in the U.S. Navy’s
ship, aircraft, or ground vehicle; sensors of various approach to autonomous weapons systems. The first
types to scrutinize the platform’s surroundings; generation of USVs, it has been noted, will contain
processing systems to classify objects discovered by modest accommodations for a small detachment
the sensors; and algorithms directing the platform to of personnel to oversee operations that AI systems
initiate attack when an allowable target is detected are not yet deemed capable of performing, such
within a certain prescribed area. The U.S. Department as refueling at sea. But the Defense Advanced
of Defense describes an autonomous weapons system Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing a
as a “weapons system that, once activated, can select future unmanned warship called NOMARS, for “no
and engage targets without further intervention by a mariners,” that will have no crew space at all and will
human operator.”54 be designed to operate entirely autonomously.59

24 An Arms Control Association Report

The U.S. Army is testing the Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport vehicle, designed to unburden infantry personnel from
carrying supplies. Future versions may feature more autonomy and front-line capabilities. (Image: U.S. Army)

The Air Force and Army, as we have seen, are These institutional considerations, however, are not
proceeding along similar lines, initially fielding the only drivers for developing autonomous weapons
unmanned planes and guns that will operate under systems. Senior officers in China, Russia, and the U.S.
the oversight of human commanders while at the are fully aware of the technological ambitions of their
same time developing AI systems like Skyborg competitors and are determined to prevail in what
that will enable those systems to operate with might be called an “autonomy race,” wherein all of
ever-increasing degrees of autonomy. A similar the major powers are rushing the development and
evolutionary process is evident in the development deployment of ever-more sophisticated autonomous
and deployment of unmanned weapons by Russia, weapons lest their adversaries deploy such devices
China, and other nations. first, and so gain a presumptive battlefield advantage.
Pentagon officials regularly speak of China’s and
An Arms Race in Autonomy? Russia’s gains in robotic weapons when asking
In developing and deploying these weapons systems, Congress for increased funding for their own such
the United States and other countries appear to be projects, often intimating (without providing any
motivated largely by the aspirations of their own evidence) that the U.S. lags behind those countries
military forces, which see various compelling reasons in the autonomy field.60 By the same token, what
for acquiring robotic weapons. For the U.S. Navy, it is known of Chinese and Russian autonomous
is evident that cost and vulnerability calculations are weaponry suggests a drive to duplicate the strides
leading the drive to acquire unmanned surface and achieved by the United States in this area: many
subsea vessels. Naval analysts believe that it might be Chinese UAVs, for example, appear to be variants or
possible to acquire dozens of USVs for the price of just imitations of U.S. models.61
one manned destroyer, while simultaneously reducing Arms racing behavior is a perennial concern for the
the threat to human crews. The ground forces of both great powers, because efforts by competing states to
the U.S. and Russia are proceeding along similar lines, gain a technological advantage over their rivals (or
seeking to substitute unmanned combat systems for to avoid falling behind them) often lead to excessive
human-crewed ones in future high-intensity battles. and destabilizing arms buildups. A race in autonomy

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 25
poses a particular danger because the consequences Although data on the reliability of fully
of investing machines with increased intelligence and autonomous weapons under wartime conditions is
decision-making capacity are largely unknown and relatively scarce (given that few such systems have
could prove catastrophic. In their haste to match the yet been deployed), extensive laboratory testing of AI
presumed progress of likely adversaries, states might image-classification algorithms has shown that such
field robotic weapons with considerable autonomy systems can easily be fooled by slight deviations from
well before their abilities and limitations have been standardized representations. In one experiment, for
fully determined, resulting in unintended fatalities or example, a turtle was repeatedly identified as a rifle.
uncontrolled escalation.62 Algorithms of this sort are also vulnerable to trickery,
Supposedly, these risks will be minimized by or “spoofing,” as well as hacking by adversaries.66
maintaining some degree of human control over These dangers are becoming ever more severe as
all such machines, but the race to field increasingly autonomous weapons systems are accorded ever-
capable robotic weapons could result in ever- greater authority to make decisions on the use of
diminishing human oversight. Analysts at the CRS lethal force in battle. Although U.S. authorities insist
foresaw this in a 2018 assessment of the Army’s plans that human operators will always be involved when
for robotic combat vehicles. “Despite [the Defense life-and-death decisions are made by armed robots,
Department’s] insistence that a ‘man in the loop’ the trajectory of technology is leading to an ever-
capability will always be part of [RCV] systems,” they diminishing human role in that capacity, heading
wrote, “it is possible if not likely, that the U.S. military eventually to a time when humans are uninvolved
could feel compelled to develop…fully autonomous entirely. This could occur as a deliberate decision,
weapon systems in response to comparable enemy such as when a drone is set free to attack targets
ground systems or other advanced threat systems that fitting a specified appearance (“adult male armed
make any sort of ‘man in the loop’ role impractical.63 with gun”), or as a situational matter, as when drones
are empowered to fire at their discretion if they lose
Assessing the Risks contact with human controllers. It might be argued
Given the likelihood that China, Russia, the U.S., and that a human operator is somehow involved, simply
other nations will deploy increasingly autonomous by launching the drones on such missions, but no
robotic weapons in the years ahead, policymakers human is ordering the specific lethal attack.
must identify and weigh the potential risks of such This erosion in the degree of human control is
deployments. These include not only the potential especially concerning when we consider the escalatory
for accident and malfunctioning, as would be the potential of advanced autonomous weapons. As
case with any new weapons that are unleashed on the noted above, the U.S. Navy and Air Force are testing
battlefield, but also a wide array of moral, ethical, and unmanned ships and planes that will be equipped with
legal concerns arising from the diminishing role of advanced sensors and missile systems, allowing them
humans in making life-and-death decisions. to strike high-value targets, including command-and-
The potential dangers associated with the deployment control facilities located deep within enemy territory.
of AI-empowered robotic weapons begin with the fact Should USVs and UAVs of this type lose contact with
that much of the technology involved is new and their human controllers and their AI systems determine
untested under the conditions of actual combat, where that circumstances require the launch of their weapons,
unpredictable outcomes are the norm. For example, it they could provoke a major enemy retort resulting in
is one thing to test AI-equipped self-driving cars under an unintended escalatory spiral.
controlled roadway conditions with constant human Packs of such weapons, operating in self-coordinated
oversight; it is another to let such vehicles loose on “swarms,” might also be used to track down enemy
busy highways. Recent accidents involving Tesla’s ballistic-missile submarines and mobile ICBMs,
“Autopilot” self-driving feature suggest that even after eliminating the presumed invulnerability of such
years of testing and refinement, such devices can fail weapons and making a nuclear first strike appear
when encountering unfamiliar objects or conditions.64 more viable to states possessing such capabilities.
Consider, then, if that inherently flawed self-driving Simply by suggesting the potential for such an assault,
vehicle is covered with armor, equipped with a gun, the development or fielding of such capabilities could
and released on a modern battlefield as a robotic prompt the nuclear powers to place their atomic
combat vehicle. Most experts agree that algorithms weapons on a high level of alert, thereby making an
can never anticipate all the hazards and mutations accidental or inadvertent nuclear war far more likely.67
of combat, no matter how well “trained” the
algorithms governing a given weapon’s actions may Maintaining Ethical and Legal Norms
be. In war, accidents and mishaps—some potentially The trend towards diminishing human control over
catastrophic—are almost inevitable.65 autonomous weapons poses obvious challenges

26 An Arms Control Association Report

because virtually all human ethical and religious a life, and questions arise over the legitimacy of that
systems view the taking of a human life, whether in action? Who is accountable for any crimes deemed to
warfare or not, as a supremely moral act requiring have occurred, and how can a chain of responsibility
some valid justification. Humans, however imperfect, be determined?
are expected to abide by this principle, and most These questions arise with particular significance
societies punish those who fail to do so. Faced with regarding two key aspects of international law: the
the horrors of ever-more destructive warfare, human requirement for distinction and proportionality in the
societies have, over time, sought to limit the conduct use of force against enemy troops interspersed with
of belligerents in wartime and to prevent cruel and civilian populations. Distinction requires warring
excessive violence. parties to discriminate between armed combatants
Beginning with the Hague Convention of 1899 and civilians during the course of combat and to spare
and in subsequent agreements forged in Geneva the latter from harm to the greatest extent possible.
after World War I, international jurists have devised Proportionality requires attacking forces to apply no
a range of rules—understood, collectively, as the more force than is needed to achieve the intended
laws of war—proscribing certain behaviors in armed military objective, while sparing civilian personnel
conflict, such as the use of poisonous gas. Following and property from unnecessary collateral damage.68
World War II and revelations of the Holocaust, These principles pose a particular challenge to
diplomats adopted additional protocols to the Hague fully autonomous weapons because they require
and Geneva conventions intended to better define a capacity to make fine distinctions in the heat of
the obligations of belligerents in protecting civilians battle. It may be relatively easy, in a large tank-on-
from the ravages of war—measures generally known tank battle, for such systems to distinguish military
as international humanitarian law. So long as humans from civilian vehicles; in many recent conflicts,
remain in control of weapons, they can, in theory, be however, enemy combatants have installed guns
held accountable under those laws for any violations and rocket launchers on ordinary pickup trucks and
committed when using those devices. But what covered them with tarpaulins, making them almost
happens when a machine makes the decision to take indistinguishable from civilian vehicles. Perhaps

Jody Williams (left), a Nobel Peace Laureate, and Noel Sharkey, the chair of the International Committee for Robot Arms
Control, called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in Parliament Square in London on April 23, 2013. The ‘Campaign
to Stop Killer Robots’ is calling for a pre-emptive ban on lethal robot weapons that could attack targets without human
intervention. (Photo by Oli Scarff/Getty Images)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 27
a hardened veteran could spot the difference, but
an intelligent robot? Unlikely. Similarly, how does
one gauge proportionality when attempting to
attack enemy snipers ensconced in civilian-occupied
tenement buildings? For robots, this could prove an
insurmountable challenge.
Advocates and critics of autonomous weaponry
disagree over whether such systems can be equipped
with algorithms sufficiently adept to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate targets in
order to satisfy the laws of war. While champions
of robotic weaponry insist that such precision is
within technological reach, many human rights
advocates argue otherwise. “Humans possess the
unique capacity to identify with other human beings
and are thus equipped to understand the nuances
of unforeseen behavior in ways that machines,
which must be programmed in advance, simply
cannot,” analysts from Human Rights Watch and the Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill (center), chair of the
International Human Rights Clinic of Harvard Law Governmental Group of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
School wrote in 2016.69 Weapons Systems, speaks at a press conference in Geneva
Critics of fully automated weapons systems also August 27, 2018. The group was established by state parties
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to
argue that it is fundamentally immoral to endow evaluate the risks of autonomous weapons systems and
machines with the capacity to make decisions of to develop regulatory strategies. (Photo: Violaine Martin/
life and death on their own. This outlook holds that United Nations)
international law and common standards of ethical
practice ordain that only humans possess the moral
capacity to justify taking another human’s life, and Weapons (CCW) to consider the adoption of a legally
that machines must never be endowed with that binding prohibition of the deployment and use of
power. Proponents of this approach point to the fully autonomous weapons. The CCW, a 1980 treaty
Martens clause of the Hague Convention of 1899 restricting or prohibiting the use of particular types
(also inscribed in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva of weapons that are deemed to cause unnecessary
Conventions), stating that even when not covered by suffering in war or to harm civilians indiscriminately,
other laws and treaties, human populations “remain allows for the adoption of additional protocols
under the protection and authority of the principles addressing specific weapons not envisioned in
of international law derived from established the original treaty—as occurred in 1995, with the
custom, from the principles of humanity, and from adoption of a ban on blinding laser weapons, and
the dictates of human conscience.” Opponents of in 1996, with a measure restricting the use of mines,
fully autonomous weapons systems claim that such booby traps, and other such devices.71 Citing these
devices, by removing humans from life-and-death examples, several dozen states, along with civil society
decisions, are inherently contradicting “principles of groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots,
humanity” and “dictates of human conscience,” and have called for negotiating an additional protocol
so should be banned.70 banning autonomous combat systems.72
Proponents of such a measure say that it is the only
Strategies for Control way to avoid inevitable violations of international
Since it first became evident that strides in AI would humanitarian law. Opponents of a ban argue that
permit the deployment of increasingly autonomous autonomous weapons systems can be made intelligent
weapons systems and that the major powers are enough to overcome concerns regarding international
seeking to exploit those breakthroughs for military humanitarian law, so no barriers should be placed
advantage, analysts in the arms control and human on their continued development. In line with CCW
rights communities, joined by sympathetic diplomats practice, state parties to the CCW have convened a
and others, have sought to devise strategies for group of governmental experts to consider these and
regulating the development and battlefield use of other perspectives on autonomous weapons and their
such systems, or for banning them entirely. regulation. These meetings have generated a wide
A major part of that effort has involved efforts by spectrum of possible control measures, ranging from a
parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional total ban to assorted voluntary restrictions. However,

28 An Arms Control Association Report

as deliberations under the CCW are governed by by states of unilateral measures limiting the use of
consensus, a handful of states with advanced robotic autonomous weapons by their own military forces, and,
projects—notably Russia and the United States—have in the process, setting an example for other countries to
blocked consideration of a legally-binding protocol. follow. The National Security Commission on Artificial
Given that signatory states of the CCW are unlikely Intelligence, in its Final Report, specified a range of such
to reach consensus on the adoption of a protocol measures, including a requirement for rigorous testing
banning fully autonomous weapons, some states— of prototype robotic weapons under simulated combat
urged on by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and conditions to detect any flaws in their software before
other civil-society groups—are exploring alternative being deployed on the battlefield.75
routes to such a prohibition. One such path being The U.S. military, and those of other nations, are
considered is a drive to persuade members of the UN also being pressured by elements of civil society,
General Assembly (where measures are adopted by including figures in the tech industry, to adopt
majority vote, not consensus) to adopt a ban of this ethical principles for the use of AI and autonomy
sort akin to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of in combat systems. Reflecting its awareness of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).73 these concerns, in February 2020 the Department
Another approach, advanced by representatives of Defense adopted a set of “ethical principles
of France and Germany at the CCW expert group’s for artificial intelligence” to govern its use by the
meetings, would be the adoption by key states of military services. These include a requirement that
a political declaration affirming the principle of AI-empowered systems “be subject to testing and
human control over weapons of war, accompanied assurance . . . across their entire life-cycles” and
by a nonbinding code of conduct. Such a measure, that they possess “the ability to detect and avoid
possibly in the form of a UN General Assembly unintended consequences.”76
resolution, would require human responsibility over The construction and adoption of these and other
fully autonomous weapons at all times to ensure such control measures will become ever more essential
compliance with the laws of war and international as the major powers accelerate the acquisition of
humanitarian law. The code would establish unmanned combat systems and these devices are
accountability for states committing any misdeeds accorded ever greater autonomy. Without such
with autonomous weapons systems in battle and controls, human commanders will experience ever-
require that these weapons retain human oversight to diminishing control over the conduct of battlefield
disable the device if it malfunctions.74 operations, potentially resulting in unintended
Yet another approach, favored by the United States human slaughter and accidental or inadvertent
and several other countries, would be the adoption nuclear escalation.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 29
Chapter 3:
An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons
and the Changing Calculus of Battle

S
peed. Since nations first went to war, speed Both Russia and China have developed hypersonic
has been a key factor in combat, particularly warheads for some of their ICBMs with the evident
at the very onset of battle. The rapid intention of overcoming the defense systems being
concentration and employment of force can help installed by the United States to intercept and destroy
a belligerent overpower an opponent and avoid a incoming enemy missiles. Hypersonic warheads,
costly war of attrition—an approach that underlaid capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional
Germany’s blitzkrieg (lightning war) strategy during payloads (and so termed “dual-use”), are also being
World War II and America’s “shock and awe” fitted on missiles intended for use in a regional
campaign against Iraq in 2003. context, say, in a battle erupting in Europe or the area
Speed is also a significant factor in the nuclear around Taiwan. With the time between launch and
attack and deterrence equation. Following the arrival on target dwindling to ten minutes or less, the
advent in the 1950s of intercontinental ballistic introduction of these weapons will introduce new and
missiles (ICBMs), which reduced to mere minutes potent threats to global stability.77
the time between a launch decision and catastrophic Hypersonic weapons are said by proponents to be
destruction on the other side of the planet, nuclear- especially useful at the onset of battle, when they can
armed states have labored to deploy early-warning be used to attack an opponent’s high-value, heavily
and command-and-control systems capable of defended assets, such as air-defense radars, fighter
detecting a missile launch and initiating a retaliatory bases, and command-and-control (C2) facilities. The
strike before their own missiles could be destroyed. incapacitation of those facilities at an early stage in
Preventing the accidental or inadvertent onset of the conflict could help smooth the way for follow-on
nuclear war thus requires enough time for decision- attacks by regular air, sea, and ground forces. Yet, as
makers to ascertain the accuracy of reported missile the same facilities are often tied into a nuclear-armed
launches and choose appropriate responses. This is an country’s strategic warning and C2 systems, attacks
imperative reinforced by several Cold War incidents against them could be interpreted by the target state
in which launch detection systems provided false as the prelude to a nuclear first strike, and so trigger
indications of such action, but human operators the early use of its own atomic weapons.
intervened to prevent unintended retaliation. The rapid development of hypersonic weapons and
Today, speed will alter the calculus of combat the escalatory dangers they present obviously raise a
and deterrence even further with the widespread number of significant issues for arms control. Under
deployment of hypersonic weapons—maneuverable the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of
projectiles that fly at more than five times the speed 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and later Russia)
of sound (Mach 5 and higher). China, Russia, and the agreed to eliminate all nuclear and conventional
United States are now testing and deploying several ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range
types of hypersonic weapons to enhance their strategic of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers—a span that
nuclear deterrence capabilities and acquire additional encompasses most of the hypersonic weapons now
conventional strike options. (ICBM reentry vehicles in development. However, that accord was nullified
also travel at those superfast speeds, but the hypersonic in 2019 when the United States withdrew from the
glide vehicles now in development are far more treaty and Russia soon followed suit. Thus, except for
maneuverable, making their tracking and interception any hypersonic warheads affixed upon ICBMs covered
exceedingly difficult.) under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New

30 An Arms Control Association Report

The X-51A, shown as an artist’s concept, is an experimental, scramjet-powered hypersonic aircraft that achieved speeds of
over Mach 5 in a 2013 test. (Graphic: U.S. Air Force)

START) between the U.S. and Russia, which will reentry vehicles on ICBMs. Yet it was only at the
remain in effect until 2026, weapons of this type are onset of the 21st century that the major powers began
not subject to any arms control agreements. exploring the application of these technologies to
Both U.S. and Russian officials have spoken of their a wide variety of missile types. As this process has
interest in discussing possible limitations on new advanced, these states have largely focused on two
military technologies with strategic effects, possibly types of weapons: hypersonic boost-glide vehicles
including hypersonic weapons, in any future talks on (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs).79
a successor to New START, but no specific proposals Hypersonic glide vehicles employ a booster rocket
along these lines have yet been advanced. The Biden to carry the glide vehicle (and its encased warhead)
administration has also expressed its desire to discuss into the outer atmosphere. Once reaching that
such limits with Chinese officials, but Beijing has yet height, between 40 and 100 miles above the earth’s
to agree to such talks. Accordingly, at present there surface, the glide vehicle separates from the booster
are no formal restraints on the deployment or use and, propelled solely by its kinetic momentum and
of hypersonic weapons, despite the escalatory risks kept aloft by its aerodynamic shape, skims along
they pose.78 the atmosphere’s outer boundary for considerable
The rush to develop and deploy hypersonic distances. Although unpowered, the vehicle can
weapons without fully considering their potential maneuver in flight, using satellite guidance to strike
impacts or devising meaningful controls on their use its intended target with high precision.
is yet another aspect of the speed associated with The U.S. Department of Defense, as part of its
these munitions. Given the escalatory dangers of prompt global-strike program, initially considered
deploying hypersonic weapons, it is essential that launching conventionally-armed hypersonic glide
they receive closer attention from policymakers, arms vehicles from repurposed Minuteman ICBMs
control analysts, and the general public. and placing similar warheads on a small number
of intercontinental Trident submarine-launched
Hypersonic Developments ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Later, under pressure from
During the Cold War, the United States and the Congress, the Pentagon largely abandoned that
Soviet Union conducted extensive research on the approach, largely out of concern that such systems
technologies associated with hypersonic weapons, could be confused for the nuclear-armed versions of
including the notion of mounting maneuverable those missiles and unintentionally trigger a nuclear

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 31
response. More recently, the Pentagon has pursued weapons simultaneously: the Precision Strike Missile
medium-range systems employing assorted rockets (PrSM), with an intended range of 300 to 500 miles,
to boost the glide vehicle into space. Russia and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), with
China, however, are continuing to test and deploy a range of 1,725 miles or more, and the Mid-Range
ICBM-launched hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Capability (MRC), falling somewhere in between.
Russian Avangard and Chinese DF-17. Not to be outdone, the Navy, under its Conventional
Hypersonic glide vehicles are believed by their Prompt Strike (CPS) program, is developing a
proponents to offer several advantages over existing booster rocket that could be fired from submarines
ballistic missiles, whether ICBMs or shorter-range or surface ships and launch the hypersonic glide
types. By definition, ballistic missiles fly on a parabolic vehicle it is developing jointly with the Army, which
course, rising far into space before reaching their plans to install it on its LRHW system. The Defense
peak altitude and then descending toward Earth Department asked for $3.8 billion for development
on a primarily predetermined trajectory. Once such work on these and related projects in its fiscal year
projectiles are detected by a country’s early-warning 2022 budget request and $4.7 billion in fiscal year
radars, during the extra-atmospheric portion of their 2023, with far larger amounts expected in future
flight, it is possible to determine their intended target budgets as serial production of these weapons begins.81
and, where missile defense technology (with its In addition to their work on HGVs intended for
limited current success rate) permits, to intercept and long-range strike missions, such as the Avangard and
destroy them with ballistic missile interceptors. DF-17, Russia and China have also been developing
HGVs, by contrast, coast along the atmosphere’s hypersonic weapons for battlefield use, similar to the
outer edge, below the range of early warning radars U.S. ARRW and PrSM. These include, for example,
scanning for a ballistic trajectory, and so are harder Russia’s Tsirkon (or Zircon), a sea-launched HCM with
to detect while in flight. HGVs are also assumed to an estimated range of 300-700 miles, and its Kinzhal
be highly maneuverable, and so can more easily (“Dagger”), an air-launched HGV with a range of 1,200
elude enemy missile interceptors. Some analysts have miles. China is believed to be developing similar types,
argued, however, that HGVs will surrender some of but little information on these is available.82
their velocity during their atmospheric flight due to For the most part, work on hypersonic weapons is
drag from the surrounding air and so will be more focused on their use as offensive systems—whether
susceptible to point defenses when nearing their for theater battlefield use or to attack an enemy’s
intended target.80 cities and industrial zones as part of a retaliatory
Hypersonic cruise missiles, unlike glide vehicles, fly nuclear strike. However, the U.S. Department of
within the atmosphere and can be launched by ships Defense has also awarded $61 million for preliminary
or planes, or from land-based systems. To attain Mach design work on a defensive hypersonic missile, the
5 and above, they employ advanced, air-breathing jet Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), intended for use in
engines called scramjets, for supersonic combustion attacking an enemy’s hypersonic glide vehicles while
ramjets. Because the missiles must carry their fuel, in the midcourse, unpowered stage of their flight. In
they possess less range than glide vehicles and so conjunction with the GPI (which is expected to be
must be launched from sites closer to their target. mounted on surface ships), the Pentagon plans to
The U.S. Air Force is pursuing an air-launched HCM, deploy a new family of satellites in low-Earth orbit to
the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), and detect and track enemy glide vehicles.83
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is
also conducting research on such systems. In January Strategic Rationales
2023, Russia deployed the Tsirkon HCM, which can be All three major powers have explored similar
launched from ships and submarines. applications of hypersonic technologies, but their
China, Russia, and the United States are all strategic calculations in doing so appear to vary, with
working on variants of these weapons types and the United States primarily seeking weapons for use in
the necessary supporting technologies. In the U.S., a regional, non-nuclear conflict, and both China and
each of the military services has pursued its own Russia emphasizing the use of hypersonic weapons
hypersonics development effort or collaborated in for nuclear, as well as conventional applications.
joint projects with one of the other services. The Whatever the case, leaders of all three countries
Air Force, along with its hypersonic cruise missile believe that hypersonic weapons provide significant—
program, is developing a hypersonic projectile called even “game-changing”—advantages in speed and
the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), maneuverability as well as perceived invulnerability to
scheduled to be the first U.S. hypersonic missile to existing defensive systems.
enter active service, in fiscal year 2023. The Army is The United States first considered development
proceeding with development of several hypersonic of hypersonic weapons so as to be able to attack an

32 An Arms Control Association Report

U.S. warships and air bases in the western Pacific.
A U.S. preemptive strike on such capabilities using
hypersonic weapons at the onset of a conflict could
help safeguard key U.S. assets and pave the way for
subsequent attacks by main force units.
“Our potential adversaries have created the A2/
AD environment,” explained Lt. Gen. Neil Thurgood,
director of the Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical
Technologies Office, in a February 2020 interview. “In
order to move forces into that, you’ve got to create
lines of penetration. Hypersonics is a strategic weapon
that does that.”85
When discussing the potential combat uses of
hypersonic weapons, U.S. military officials typically
speak of their utility in conventional warfare—to
overcome enemy A2/AD capabilities and otherwise
degrade enemy defenses. However, some analysts have
suggested that they could also be used to attack an
enemy’s mobile missiles (some assumed to be dual-
capable) and other highly sensitive targets, such as
The X-60A is a test vehicle intended to develop U.S. satellite communications systems and underground
hypersonic missile technology. (Graphic: Generation Orbit) command centers. Even if the intent in such cases is to
ensure success in a conventional conflict, a hypersonic
missile barrage directed against such systems might
be interpreted as the prelude to a nuclear attack, and
enemy’s high-value targets, including C2 systems trigger the early use of nuclear weapons.86
and mobile missile batteries, without using nuclear Russia and China seem to have pursued a somewhat
warheads or relying on forward-based forces. This different path in their development of hypersonic
was the premise of the original conventional prompt weapons. Ever since the U.S. withdrew from the
global-strike mission (not to be confused with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002,
Navy’s CPS program), first announced by the Bush Chinese and Russian leaders have worried that a
administration in 2003. Over time, however, the future U.S. first strike on their strategic nuclear forces
Pentagon’s pursuit of hypersonic weaponry has might leave few of their ICBMs operational, and
focused more on conventionally-armed, intermediate- that, once launched, their remaining missiles could
range weapons that might be used in a regional be intercepted by U.S. anti-missile batteries, thereby
context to degrade an enemy’s defenses at the onset eliminating their second-strike retaliatory capability.
of battle, thereby easing the way for follow-on air, sea, By equipping their ICBMs with maneuverable
and ground forces. Despite this shift, speed of attack hypersonic re-entry vehicles, however, they evidently
has remained a consistent aim of the Pentagon’s hope that their surviving missiles will be able to evade
hypersonic endeavors. As noted by the Congressional any conceivable U.S. defenses, thus preserving their
Research Service in a January 2019 review of these deterrent capability.
efforts, “Analysts have identified a number of “After the United States withdrew from the Anti-
potential targets that the United States might need Ballistic Missile Treaty,” Russian Foreign Minister
to strike promptly,” such as an enemy’s C2 facilities Sergey Lavrov said as recently as May 2022, “we
as well as “air defense or anti-satellite weapons that had no choice but to work on hypersonic weapons
could disrupt the U.S. ability to sustain an attack.”84 because we knew perfectly well that the U.S. missile
Such a capacity would be particularly useful, U.S. defense system would not be aimed at North Korea
strategists believe, in any future engagement with and Iran but against Russia and then China. We
Russian forces in Europe or Chinese forces in the needed weapons that were guaranteed to overpower
Asia-Pacific region, such as in the South China Sea missile defenses.”87
or the area around Taiwan. Russia, it is claimed, has This, it appears, was the motive for development
deployed a powerful array of defensive weapons— of Russia’s nuclear-armed Avangard HGV: with its
collectively, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems— speed and maneuverability, Avangard is designed to
on its western borders, facing the NATO countries. evade any existing or future U.S. anti-missile systems,
Likewise, China is said to have deployed numerous thereby ensuring the integrity of Russia’s strategic
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at deterrent. “I will speak about the newest systems of

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 33
Russian strategic weapons that we are creating in weapons, but it is unclear if those munitions are
response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United truly as capable as is claimed. The much-ballyhooed
States of America from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Chinese HGV test of August 2021, for example,
Treaty,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in is said to have missed its intended target by 24
March 2018 when describing Avangard and several miles, whereas a recent U.S. hypersonic vehicle test
other new weapons systems. These new weapons, he (admittedly following a shorter trajectory) missed its
declared, are intended to “neutralize the threats posed target by a mere six inches.94 Furthermore, with each
by the deployment of the U.S. global missile defense of these countries driven by their specific goals, the
system.”88 Similar reasoning appears to underlie United States likely enjoys significant technological
China’s August 2021 test of a hypersonic glide vehicle advantages in the hypersonic weapons types it seeks
that reportedly circled the globe before striking its for its own arsenal. It would be misleading, therefore,
intended target.89 to claim that the United States has fallen behind in a
Although Russia and China appear to have placed hypersonic arms race.
their primary emphasis on the development of Whatever the case may be in this regard, the arms
hypersonic vehicles for emplacement on ICBMs racing behavior described by Secretary Kendall has
to evade U.S. anti-missile defenses, they have also resulted, in some cases, in the rushed development
pursued such weapons for theater use, presumably of new hypersonic missiles before their strategic
to target key enemy assets—warships, air bases, functions have been fully thought through. “The
logistical hubs, and communications facilities—in the target set that we would want to address, and why
event of a conflict arising in Europe or the western hypersonics are the most cost-effective weapons
Pacific. Russia’s Kinzhal, for example, is thought to be for the U.S., I think it’s still, to me, somewhat of a
intended for attacks on land- and ship-based missile question mark,” Kendall remarked in September
defense systems, while Tsirkon is believed to be 2021. “I haven’t seen all the analysis that’s been done
designed to target carrier battle groups and key land- to justify the current program.”95 This observation
based assets, such as C2 facilities.90 During the war in appears to be vindicated by the U.S. military’s current
Ukraine, Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal missiles at drive to field at least eight new hypersonic weapons by
Ukrainian arms depots and port facilities.91 the mid-2020s, not including defensive weapons; even
a cursory examination of these programs (see Table 2),
Arms Racing Behavior suggests a lot of overlap and indeterminate purpose.
Each of these countries initiated its pursuit of The risk of arms racing behavior is being further
hypersonic weapons for unique strategic purposes, exacerbated by the U.S. decision to develop new
but all seem to have accelerated their efforts partly hypersonic missiles specifically for defense against an
to overtake progress made by their rivals—behavior adversary’s offensive hypersonic weapons. At present,
that has all the earmarks of a classic arms race. In three military contractors—Raytheon, Lockheed
the United States, at least, hypersonic advances by Martin, and Northrop Grumman—are competing to
China and Russia are often cited by military officials develop a prototype design for such a weapon, with
to generate alarm among policymakers and garner the winner expected to begin producing combat-
support for comparable endeavors on the U.S. side. ready models later in the decade. No doubt these
“China’s hypersonic weapons development efforts will induce Russian and Chinese military
outpaces ours … we’re falling behind,” Admiral Harry officials to consider obtaining both additional
Harris, then commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific offensive hypersonic capabilities as well as their own
Command and later ambassador to South Korea, told hypersonic defensive systems, triggering a typical
Congress in 2018. “We need to continue to pursue “action-reaction” cycle in which advances in offensive
that and in a most aggressive way to ensure that we weaponry on one side prompts increased defensive
have the capabilities to both defend against China’s investments on the other, leading to countervailing
hypersonic weapons and to develop our own offensive advances in offensive weaponry, and so on, in an
hypersonic weapons,” he added.92 More recently, U.S. endless escalatory spiral.
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told Reuters that Nevertheless, the presumed need to ensure a U.S.
the U.S. and China are competing to develop the technological lead in hypersonic weaponry has been
most capable hypersonic weapons. “There is an arms underscored by the nation’s top defense contractors,
race, not necessarily for increased numbers, but for many of which expect to benefit from higher spending
increased quality,” he declared. “It’s an arms race that in this area. “From a pure business perspective,
has been going on for quite some time.”93 there is a significant opportunity in the hypersonic
Whether China or Russia has overtaken the United domain,” said former Raytheon Vice President
States in hypersonic weaponry is a matter of debate. Thomas Bussing at a December 2018 meeting of
Both assert they are ready to deploy hypersonic military contractors. Indeed, the hypersonic weapons

34 An Arms Control Association Report

U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs
conventional, Range
Lead nuclear, Description Speed (in Schedule
dual-capable kilometers)

AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle, using
Air Mach flight testing through
conventional Tactical Boost Glide technology and with a tungsten 1,600
Force 6.5–8 FY 2023
fragmentation warhead (which is limited to soft targets)

Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)

new start program in FY
Air a hypersonic cruise missile, using air-breathing Mach
conventional unknown* 2022; complete test and
Force technology 5+* development in FY 2027

Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW, also called Dark Eagle)

the common hypersonic glide body paired with
the Navy’s booster system on mobile ground Mach prototype deployment
Army conventional 2,775
platforms; at least the first battery will feature a 5+* in FY 2023
tungsten fragmentation warhead

Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)

the common hypersonic glide body paired initial operating
with a submarine-launched booster system capability on Zumwult-
on Zumwult-class destroyers and Virginia- Mach class destroyers in
Navy conventional unknown*
class submarines; this system may feature 5+* FY 2025 and on Virginia-
the tungsten fragmentation warhead or an class submarines in
alternative warhead FY 2028

Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO), also called Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment II (OASuW-2)
an air-launched, long-range hypersonic weapon Mach new start in FY 2023;
Navy conventional system likely to be compatible with F/A-18 unknown*
5+* deployment in FY 2028
fighter jet

Tactical Boost Glide (TBG)

a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle; capabilities Mach complete third test

DARPA conventional tactical
planned for Air Force and Navy 7+ flight in FY 2023

Operation Fires (OpFires)

program completed in
Mach FY 2022; capabilities
DARPA conventional a ground-launched system with TBG technology 1,600
5+* to be developed for
services

MoHAWC, previously Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC)

an air-launched hypersonic cruise missile that new start in FY 2023;
could be compatible with a variety of launch Mach begin integration and
DARPA conventional unknown*
platforms; capabilities planned for the Air Force; 5+* ground testing in FY
successor program to HAWC 2023

*no estimate or information publicly available

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 35
Russian Hypersonic Weapons Programs
conventional,
Range
Program nuclear, Description Speed Schedule
(in kilometers)
dual-capable

nuclear, a hypersonic boost-glide

Avangard
possibly vehicle launched from an Mach 20+ 6,000 deployed in 2019
(Project 4202)
conventional ICBM (SS-19 or Sarmat)

a hypersonic air-launched,
short-range ballistic reportedly entered
Kinzhal missile; compatible with trial deployment in
dual-capable Mach 10 2,000
("Dagger") the MiG-31K interceptor jet 2017 and became
and the Tu-22M3 strategic operational in 2018
bomber
conventional,
though may a hypersonic cruise missile
3M22 Tsirkon
possibly able to be launched from Mach 5–8 500–1,000 deployed in 2023
(or Zircon)
become nuclear ship or sea
capable

Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Programs

conventional,
Range
Program nuclear, Description Speed Schedule
(in kilometers)
dual-capable
a hypersonic glide some reports
Dongfeng-17 dual-capable vehicle on a road-mobile, indicate a
Mach 5–10 1,800–2,500
(DF-17) most likely medium-range ballistic deployment in
missile 2020
a hypersonic vehicle some reports
Xing Kong-2 prototype; also described indicate a
nuclear Mach 6 unknown*
(Starry Sky-2) as a hypersonic waverider deployment in
vehicle 2025

*no estimate or information publicly available

market could be worth “many billions of dollars,” Claiming that a major adversary might try to hide or
said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst who works move critical assets at the outbreak of a crisis to protect
with Lockheed Martin and other big firms. “We’re them from U.S. air and missile strikes, the Pentagon
talking about an entirely new class of weapons and the presumed that its prompt global-strike program—once
operating concepts to go with it.”96 equipped with hypersonic missiles—would enable U.S.
forces to attack those targets with minimal warning.
Escalation Risks and ‘Entanglement’ “Systems that operate at hypersonic speeds…offer the
Many weapons can be employed for offensive potential for military operations from longer ranges
and defensive purposes, but hypersonic weapons, with shorter response times and enhanced effectiveness
especially those designed for use in a regional context, compared to current military systems,” DARPA has
are primarily intended to be used offensively—to indicated.97 Most of the hypersonic weapons being
destroy high-value, heavily-defended enemy assets, developed by the U.S. military, including the Air Force’s
such as radar stations, missile batteries, and C2 ARRW and the Army’s PrSM, are intended for strikes
facilities. This raises two major concerns: the risk of against key enemy assets at an early stage of conflict,
rapid escalation from a minor crisis to a full-blown when speed confers a significant advantage. Certain
war and the unintended escalation from conventional Russian weapons, such as the Kinzhal, also seem
to nuclear warfare. intended for this purpose.
That hypersonic weapons are being designed for Some analysts fear that the mere possession of such
offensive use at an early stage in a conflict has been weapons might induce leaders to escalate a military
evident in U.S. strategic policy from the beginning. clash at the very outbreak of a crisis, believing that

36 An Arms Control Association Report

their early use will confer a significant advantage in involving the deployment of multiple hypersonic
whatever conflict might ensue, thereby reducing the weapons, as a defender will never be certain that an
chances for keeping the fighting limited. It is easy enemy’s assault is entirely non-nuclear. With as little as
to imagine, for example, how a clash between U.S. five minutes to assess an attack—the time it would take
and Chinese naval vessels in the South China Sea, a hypersonic glide vehicle to traverse 2,000 miles—a
accompanied by signs of an air and naval mobilization defender would be understandably hard pressed to
on either or both sides, might prompt one or another avoid worst-case assumptions.100
to launch a barrage of hypersonic weapons at all those Equally worrisome is the danger of “target
ships and planes, hoping thereby to minimize their ambiguity”: the possibility that a hypersonic attack,
utility in any full-scale engagement that might follow. even if conducted with missiles known to be armed
This might make sense from a military perspective, but solely with conventional warheads, would endanger
would undoubtedly prompt a fierce counterreaction the early-warning and C2 systems a defender uses for
from the injured side and restrict efforts to halt the both its nuclear and conventional forces, leading it
fighting at a lower level of violence. to fear the onset of a nuclear attack. This is especially
A similar scenario could easily emerge in Europe, dangerous in light of what James Acton, a security
where U.S./NATO forces face Russian forces along analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International
a potential conflict perimeter stretching from the Peace (CEIP), calls the “entanglement” problem. As
Arctic in the north to the Black Sea in the south. he explains, the nuclear and conventional command-
Should an armed encounter erupt at any spot along and-control systems of the major powers are widely
this perimeter, say in the Baltic states or the Black assumed to be interconnected, or “entangled,”
Sea, either or both sides might be tempted to launch making it difficult to clearly distinguish one from
hypersonic missiles at their adversary’s key combat another. Therefore, any attack on C2 facilities at the
assets, so as to ensure success in a full-blown encounter. onset of crisis, however intended, could be interpreted
Indeed, President Putin has warned of such scenarios, by the defender as a prelude to a nuclear rather than
saying that any U.S. deployment of offensive missiles a conventional attack, and so prompt the defender
in Ukraine would prompt Russia to deploy hypersonic to launch its own nuclear weapons before they are
weapons aimed at U.S. and NATO installations. “We destroyed by an anticipated barrage of enemy bombs
would have to create a similar threat for those who are and missiles.101
threatening us,” he said in November 2021. “And we The risk of target ambiguity arises with even greater
can do that already now,” he added.98 severity in the case of attacks by conventionally-
The introduction of hypersonic weapons also raises armed hypersonic missiles on the dual-use mobile
concerns over the escalation from conventional missiles of an adversary. Russia and China have
to nuclear warfare. The United States has focused fielded dual-use missiles that pose a significant threat
primarily on the development of hypersonic weapons to key U.S. assets in Europe and Asia, respectively.
carrying conventional warheads, but there is no As their mobility makes them difficult to track once
fundamental reason why they could not be armed fighting has commenced, they could be selected for
with nuclear weapons in the future. Furthermore, attack with hypersonic weapons in the very first hours
both Russia and China appear to be developing of a major U.S. clash with those countries. However,
hypersonic weapons with a dual-use capability: as some of these mobile assets are also viewed by their
Russia’s Kinzhal is assumed to be dual-use and its owners as nuclear retaliatory systems, a U.S. assault on
Tsirkon, though initially conventional, may possess them could be interpreted by the target state as part
that capability in the future; China’s DF-17 is also of a disarming first strike and so trigger its own use of
thought to be dual-capable. atomic munitions.
This leads to what is called “warhead ambiguity”: All this points to yet another concern related to
the risk that a defending nation, aware of an enemy’s the impact of emerging technologies on the future
hypersonic launch and having scant time to assess the battlefield: the risk that nuclear-armed nations,
warhead type, will assume the worst and launch its fearing scenarios of just this sort, will entrust
own nuclear weapons before they can be destroyed by more and more of their critical decision-making to
the incoming warheads. Concern over this risk has led machines, fearing that humans will not be able to
the U.S. Congress to bar funding for the development process the vast amounts of information pouring in
of ICBM-launched hypersonic glide vehicles, thereby from various sources and make reasoned judgments
helping to propel the Pentagon’s shift away from such under such enormous time pressures. With hypersonic
systems and toward the development of medium-range weapons in the arsenals of the major powers, military
weapons more suitable for use in a regional context.99 leaders may conclude that sophisticated AI systems
Nevertheless, warhead ambiguity will remain a feature should be empowered to determine the nature of
of any future conflict among nuclear-armed states future missile attacks and select the appropriate

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 37
Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman meets with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov at the start of the
U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva, Switzerland on July 28, 2021. (U.S. Mission Geneva Photo)

response, possibly involving highly escalatory a common understanding of the risks inherent in a
actions—a danger we address at length in Chapter 5. hypersonic arms race and to develop mutually acceptable
restraints. Until formal inter-governmental talks of this
Inserting Speed Bumps sort can be convened, informal conversations on these
Given the risks posed by hypersonic weapons— topics should be conducted among scientists, arms
especially when their deployment is paired with other control analysts, and retired military and diplomatic
technological developments—it is essential that we personnel—an approach known as “Track 1.5
consider measures for minimizing the dangers they Diplomacy.” Without broaching classified information,
pose to escalation control and strategic stability. these experts could assess the dangers posed by the
Such efforts are especially urgent now, as the major unrestrained deployment of hypersonic weapons and
powers rush ahead with the development and initial share ideas for mitigating these risks.
fielding of many such systems even though they remain A possible forum for direct talks between
largely unproven and the strategic rationale for their government officials on these topics is the bilateral
deployment has yet to be fully demonstrated. In contrast U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue. At a
to the speed with which this is occurring, policymakers September 2021 meeting in Geneva to discuss
need to provide additional time in which to assess the dialogue’s future functioning, senior U.S. and
the potential utility and escalatory risk of hypersonic Russian officials agreed to establish a “working
missiles as well as any alternative, already-existing group on capabilities and actions with strategic
capabilities that could fill a similar set of missions. effects,” and it has been expected that this group
At present, there are no bilateral or multilateral fora will examine the potentially destabilizing impacts
in which officials of the U.S., Russia, and China can of hypersonic weapons, among other emerging
meet to discuss formal limits on hypersonic weapons. technologies.102 While the dialogue was paused
Although each of these states can and should take following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
unilateral steps to slow their deployment of such the two sides may eventually return to the table as
systems, joint discussions will be essential to develop New START’s expiration in February 2026 nears with

38 An Arms Control Association Report

no replacement agreement in sight. A U.S.-China involved see a military advantage in deploying new
strategic dialogue, if and when established, would hypersonic systems quickly. Nevertheless, when and
hopefully address similar concerns. if officials of China, Russia, and the U.S. are prepared
If leaders of the major powers are prepared to to discuss such constraints, there are a number of
discuss constraints on developing and deploying ways they could proceed. One approach would be
hypersonic weapons, they could adopt a number of an outright ban on certain types of weapons—for
approaches. One way to start would be to impose an example, ground-launched missiles with specific
international moratorium on flight tests of hypersonic range limits, as in the INF Treaty. Such a ban would
weapons, as suggested by some arms control experts. reduce the risk of attacks on each country’s critical
Because the technology for most hypersonic weapons assets at the onset of an engagement, preventing rapid
is still largely unproven, a test moratorium would escalation of the fighting. Another approach, in the
allow time for policymakers to devise multilateral style of New START, would be to limit the number of
controls on such systems.103 Assuming that a ban of deployed weapons below a certain threshold, which
this sort is unachievable at this time, the parties to would eliminate fears of a disarming first strike.104
such discussions could agree on various confidence- Admittedly, such negotiations appear distant,
building measures (CBMs) designed to reduce the so Congress should intervene and impose its own
escalatory dangers of hypersonic deployments or speed bumps on the race to deploy hypersonic
narrow their application. Such measures could include weapons. Before approving all the funds sought by
information-sharing on the range and capabilities the Pentagon for hypersonic weaponry, lawmakers
of proposed weapons and protocols intended to should ask: What are these munitions needed for?
differentiate conventionally-armed hypersonic Do they pose an unnecessary risk of escalation? Are
weapons from nuclear-armed ones, so as to reduce the there better alternatives? By raising these questions,
risk of warhead ambiguity and unintended escalation. Congress would also call into question the utility of
The adoption of more formal, restrictive measures similar moves by other countries, thereby facilitating
will no doubt prove more difficult, as all the countries multiparty talks on hypersonic missile deployments.

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Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 39
Chapter 4:
Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes?
Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation

W
hen the Obama administration issued its communications systems in the 2018 NPR on three
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2010, grounds: a reliable NC3 system was absolutely essential
laying out the nation’s nuclear weapons to the effective functioning of the nation’s nuclear
policies, it identified only two permissible uses for deterrence capability; the nation’s NC3 networks were
nuclear munitions by the United States: to deter becoming increasingly vulnerable to newly-developed
their employment by another nuclear power, and cyberweapons; and third, any attempt to disable these
to blunt “a massive conventional attack” by a well- networks by such means constituted an assault on the
armed adversary. The 2010 NPR also envisioned a U.S. nuclear deterrent itself.
time when only the first of those uses remained, “The emergence of offensive cyber warfare capabilities
leaving “deterrence of nuclear attack on the United has created new challenges and potential vulnerabilities
States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of for the NC3 system,” the 2018 nuclear policy stated.
U.S. nuclear weapons.”105 However, when the Trump “Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort
administration released its own Nuclear Posture to design and use cyber weapons against networked
Review in 2018, the pendulum had swung in the systems,” including nuclear command, control, and
opposite direction, with nuclear weapons being communications. In light of these threats, it avowed,
accorded more potential uses, not less. These included the U.S. must take action to bolster the safety of its NC3
the revival of a Cold War precept, the deployment systems against hostile assault, both by increasing its
of so-called “low-yield” nuclear munitions to deter ability to withstand attack and by raising the costs for
and, if necessary, retaliate against the use of similar future NC3 attackers.107 Not mentioned—at least not in
weapons by a potential adversary. The 2018 Trump the unclassified text of the NPR—were extensive U.S.
policy also incorporated an entirely new justification efforts to employ cybertools to infiltrate and potentially
for the unilateral use of nuclear weapons by the incapacitate the NC3 systems of likely adversaries,
United States: to counter an enemy cyberattack including Russia, China, and North Korea.108
on the nation’s nuclear command, control, and When first promulgated in 2018, the claim that a
communications (NC3) systems. cyberattack on American NC3 capabilities constitutes
Speaking in particular of possible Russian cyberattacks sufficient grounds to launch a nuclear attack was
on America’s NC3 networks (but employing language seen by many observers as a dangerous shift in policy,
that would also apply to China or another future greatly increasing the risk of accidental or inadvertent
adversary), the 2018 NPR states, “To correct any Russian nuclear escalation in a crisis. “The entire broadening
misperceptions of advantage and credibly deter Russian of the landscape for nuclear deterrence is a very
nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks—which could fundamental step in the wrong direction,” said former
now include attacks against U.S. NC3—the President Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. “I think the idea of
must have a range of limited and graduated options, nuclear deterrence of cyberattacks, broadly, certainly
including a variety of delivery systems and explosive does not make any sense.”109 Nevertheless, this policy
yields.”106 Or, in plain English, an attack by Russia on was retained throughout the Trump presidency.
American NC3 systems would be sufficient to justify a Despite this shift in declaratory policy, the link
U.S. nuclear response. between cyber operations, nuclear command and
The Pentagon justified the perceived need to control systems, and nuclear escalation has been
threaten the use of nuclear weapons in response to an firmly established in the thinking of military planners
attack on the nation’s nuclear command, control, and in the United States and other nuclear-armed

40 An Arms Control Association Report

A U.S. F-22 fighter shadows a Russian Tu-95 bomber on May 20, 2019 in international airspace near Alaska. Aircraft and missile
detection systems rely heavily on electronic communications, making them potential targets for cyberwarfare.
(Photo: NORAD)

states. Most officials now assume that any conflict tasks, their vulnerabilities to cyberattack will grow—
erupting between the major powers will be preceded as will the temptation to devise new cyberweapons
or accompanied by cyberattacks on adversary NC3 aimed at their adversaries’ vital systems. In this
networks and that each is constantly probing the NC3 environment, it is essential to assess the impact of
defenses of the others in search of vulnerabilities that cyberattack developments on strategic stability and
might be exploited in future such attacks. “We are in to consider the enactment of new measures to bolster
a very, very contested domain in cyber,” Chairman of stability and reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley told
the Aspen Security Forum in November 2021. “Every The Cyber-Nuclear Connection
day our nation is literally being hacked.”110 The risks to strategic stability arise from the fact
The development and deployment of both that the NC3 systems of the United States and other
defensive and offensive cybertools have thus become nuclear-armed states are heavily dependent on
a significant feature of military relations among the computers and other digital processors for virtually
major powers, raising entirely new sorts of threats every aspect of their operation and because those
to strategic stability. Analysts worry, for example, systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattack.
that efforts by one major power to infiltrate the Every nuclear force is composed, most basically,
NC3 systems of another for information-gathering of nuclear explosive devices, the delivery systems
purposes can be interpreted, in a time of crisis, as the (planes and missiles) needed to transport these devices
prelude to a disarming “counterforce” strike aimed to their intended targets, early-warning radars and
at the target state’s nuclear deterrent, conceivably other systems used to detect enemy attacks, and
prompting the early or inadvertent use of nuclear the presidents and prime ministers empowered to
weapons. Furthermore, as the nuclear command, initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all,
control, and communications systems of the major however, is the NC3 system—an extended network of
powers are often interwoven with their non-nuclear communications and data-processing systems, all of
C3 systems, a cyberattack on the latter network them reliant on cyberspace. Warning systems, whether
could be misinterpreted as an assault on the former, ground- or space-based, must constantly watch for and
producing a similar outcome.111 analyze possible enemy missile launches; information
As governments and military forces come to rely on on actual threats must rapidly be communicated
computers for an ever-expanding of array of critical to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 41
responses and communicate their chosen outcomes have been working for years to probe for weaknesses
to air and missile launch facilities, which in turn must in these systems and have devised a vast array of
provide target data to delivery systems.112 cyberweapons, including tools for breaking into an
Because an effective, reliable NC3 infrastructure adversary’s computer networks (sometimes described
is essential to the maintenance of a nuclear-armed as “delivery systems”) as well as malicious software
state’s deterrent capability, it is not surprising that (“malware,” also called a “payload”) to permit the
rival nuclear powers view these systems as a promising extraction of vital secrets and/or the disabling of
vector of attack. During peacetime, cyber intrusion critical infrastructure.115
allows for one antagonist to probe for details about Military officials in the United States and,
the nuclear plans, deployments, and capabilities presumably, the other nuclear powers, have
of its rivals (i.e., cyber espionage); during wartime, made enormous efforts over time to enhance the
preemptive cyberstrikes on an enemy’s NC3 could invulnerability of their NC3 systems to cyberattacks
theoretically impair its ability to carry out attack of these sorts. At the same time, however, they have
missions ordered by senior officials. also increased the scale and sophistication of their
“The lure of cyberspace seems almost irresistible,” NC3 systems, adding ever more computers and
a team of researchers assembled by the Carnegie communications gear to these networks—and so
Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) observed increasing the number of possible entry points for
in 2021. “Cyber tools are less expensive to acquire and cyber intrusion. As noted by Herbert Lin, a senior
operate than conventional weapons. They offer huge research scholar at Stanford University, “Greater
potential geographic coverage, economies of scale, system complexity means a larger attack surface (i.e.,
and force-projection capabilities.” Moreover, “cyber more places where flaws can be found), which an
operations are typically highly secretive. This avoids adversary can exploit (i.e., vulnerabilities).”116
the scrutiny associated with other types of operations Although activity in cyberspace is much more
and presents options for plausible deniability.”113 difficult to detect and track than conventional
The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over military operations, enough information has
adversaries takes many forms and is not always become public to indicate that the major nuclear
aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused powers, notably China, Russia, and the United
of engaging in widespread cyberespionage to steal States—along with such secondary powers as Iran
technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and and North Korea—have established extensive
military advantages. Russia has been accused of cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in offensive
exploiting cyberspace to interfere in the 2016 and cyber operations on a regular basis, often aimed at
2020 U.S. presidential elections. Criminal groups, critical military, financial, and energy infrastructure.
including some thought to be allied with state In the buildup to the war in Ukraine, for example, the
actors—including in Russia and North Korea— Biden administration revealed that it had removed
have used cyberspace to extort money from banks, widespread malware from U.S. computer networks
municipalities, and individuals.114 Attacks of these thought to have been planted by Russian intelligence
sorts occupy most of the time and attention of the agencies in an attempt to hobble critical infrastructure
civilian and military cybersecurity organizations once fighting commenced.117
charged with thwarting such attacks. Yet, for those “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we
who worry about strategic stability and the risks of are in constant contact with adversaries,” said General
nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on Paul M. Nakasone, director of the National Security
NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern. Agency (NSA) and commander of the U.S. Cyber
This concern stems from the fact that, despite Command (Cybercom), in February 2019 testimony
the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 before the Senate Armed Services. “We see near-peer
systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies competitors [i.e., China and Russia] conducting
so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be sustained campaigns below the level of armed
made one hundred percent invulnerable to attack. conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic
This is so because such systems employ many advantage.”118
devices and operating systems of various origins and While eager to speak of adversarial threats to
vintages—most incorporating numerous software U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably, but not
updates and “patches” over time—offering multiple surprisingly, reluctant to say much about U.S.
vectors for attack. Electronic components can also offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged,
be modified by hostile actors during production, however, that Cybercom took action to disrupt
transit, or insertion, and the software involved can possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm
be tampered with or corrupted in some fashion. The elections. “We created a persistent presence in
experienced “cyberwarriors” of every major power cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted

42 An Arms Control Association Report

tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified including the United States, is believed to have crafted
in 2019. According to press accounts, this included a cyberweapons aimed at critical NC3 components
cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research of their adversaries and to have implanted malware
Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have in enemy systems for potential use in some future
been deeply involved in generating disruptive confrontation.
propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.119
Other press investigations have disclosed two Pathways to Escalation
other offensive operations undertaken by the United Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers
States. One, called “Olympic Games,” was intended are constantly being probed for weaknesses and
to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium- are probably infested with malware designed to be
enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges activated in a crisis, what does this tell us about the
used in that process by infecting them with the so- risks of escalation from a “nonkinetic” battle—that
called Stuxnet virus. Another, described as a “left of is, one fought with cyberweapons—to a kinetic
launch” operation to distinguish it from attempts to one, using conventional weapons at first and then,
intercept a missile after it had been fired, reportedly conceivably, nuclear ones? None of this can be
involved cyberattacks designed to cause malfunctions predicted in advance, but analysts who have studied
in North Korean missile tests.120 Although not aimed the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous
at either of America’s principal nuclear adversaries, new pathways for escalation. In fact, several such
those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and scenarios have been identified.122
capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear The first and possibly most dangerous path
infrastructure of other states. to escalation would arise from the early use of
Efforts by strategic rivals of the United States cyberweapons in a great-power crisis to paralyze the
to infiltrate and eventually degrade U.S. nuclear vital command, control, and communications (C3)
infrastructure are far less documented but thought to capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve
be no less prevalent. Russia, for example, is believed both nuclear and conventional forces. Given the
to have planted malware in the U.S. electrical utility heavy reliance placed by senior officers on reliable
grid, possibly with the intent of cutting off the flow and extensive C3 systems to track enemy actions
of electricity to critical NC3 facilities in the event and oversee countermoves by their own forces, the
of a major crisis.121 Indeed, every major power, incapacitation of these networks through cyberattacks

U.S. servicemen conduct a defensive cyberoperations exercise at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on March 8, 2019.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Renae Pittman)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 43
at the very onset of battle would, presumably, convey
an enormous advantage to the attacking side. In
What makes the insertion
the “fog of war” that would naturally ensue from of latent malware in an
cyberattacks of this sort, the recipient of such an
assault might anticipate more punishing follow-up adversary’s NC3 systems so
kinetic attacks, possibly including a preemptive strike
on its nuclear deterrent capabilities. Fearing the
dangerous is that it may not
possible loss of those capabilities, the nation under even need to be activated to
assault might place its nuclear weapons on high
alert and, in the worst case, launch them in response increase the risk of nuclear
to ambiguous signs of attack. This might occur, for
example, in a confrontation between NATO and
escalation.
Russian forces in eastern Europe or between U.S. and
Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region. links to serve both their nuclear and conventional
Speaking, for example, of a possible confrontation forces—a phenomenon described by James Acton
in Europe, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine of CEIP as “entanglement.” In the event of a
of the Center for a New American Security wrote that great-power conflict, one side or the other might
“both sides would have overwhelming incentives employ its cyberweapons to confuse or disable its
to go early with offensive cyber and counter-space adversary’s conventional C3 in the opening stages of
capabilities to negate the other side’s military a nonnuclear assault; but the recipient of such attacks,
capabilities or advantages.” If those early attacks not knowing whether it is conventional or nuclear
succeeded, “it could result in [a] huge military and systems that are the intended targets, might fear it
coercive advantage for the attacker.” This scenario is the latter and so prepare for immediate nuclear
might induce the recipient of such attacks to back operations, again risking early weapons use.125
down, affording its rival a major victory at very low Yet another pathway to escalation might arise from
cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes
the attacks on its critical C3 infrastructure as the against vital national infrastructure, rather than on
prelude to a full-scale attack aimed at neutralizing its military targets. All major powers, along with Iran
nuclear capabilities, and so choose to strike first. “It is and North Korea, have developed and deployed
worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy
“how even a very limited attack or incident could set major elements of an adversary’s key economic
both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”123 systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and
What makes the insertion of latent malware in an transportation networks. Russia, for example, is
adversary’s NC3 systems so dangerous is that it may believed to have infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and
not even need to be activated to increase the risk of it is widely assumed that the United States has done
nuclear escalation: simply by their presence, they the same in Russia.126
could sow doubts in the minds of adversary leaders The danger here is that economic attacks of
regarding the reliability of their NC3 systems. “The this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension
introduction of a flaw or malicious code into nuclear and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-
weapons through the supply chain that compromises for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of
the effectiveness of those weapons could lead to a an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing
lack of confidence in the nuclear deterrent,” thereby widespread harm and eventually leading one side or
undermining strategic stability, Page O. Stoutland the other to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military
and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in a 2018 paper for targets, possibly initiating a spiral of escalation ending
the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Without confidence in in nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack
the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks
a nuclear-armed state might misinterpret confusing on Russian energy and financial systems, causing
signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the widespread disorder in both countries and generating
worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some
lose them to an enemy’s first strike.124 point, Miller and Fontaine argue, such attacks “could
Compounding these dangers, in the view of many lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”127
analysts, is the widespread integration of nuclear These are by no means the only pathways to
C3 with conventional command, control, and escalation resulting from the offensive use of
communications systems. For reasons of convenience cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties,
and economy, the major powers have chosen to rely such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to
on the same early-warning and communications provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning

44 An Arms Control Association Report

systems to generate false readings (“spoofing”) of In embracing this strategy, Nakasone and other
missile launches. Nevertheless, these examples provide senior officials insist that their intention is defensive:
a clear indication of the severity of the threat. As to protect U.S. cyberspace against attack and deter
states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons future assaults on U.S. networks by letting opponents
become ever more potent, the dangers of unintended know their own systems will be crippled if they
or accidental escalation can only grow more severe. persist in malicious behavior. “For any nation that’s
taking cyber activity against the United States,”
‘Defending Forward’ said then national security advisor John Bolton
Under these circumstances, one would think the when announcing the adoption of NSPM-13, “they
major powers would seek to place restrictions on the should expect we will respond offensively as well as
use of offensive cyberweapons, especially those aimed defensively.”130 Any potential adversary following
at critical NC3 systems. This approach, however, is these developments will almost certainly interpret
not being pursued by the United States or the other “defending forward” as preparation for offensive strikes
major powers. in the event of a crisis, which would invite them to
Under the Obama administration, the Department step up their own defensive and offensive moves.
of Defense was empowered to conduct offensive Much less is known about the strategic cyberwar
cyberstrikes on foreign states and entities in response policies of other powers, but they likely parallel those
to like attacks on the United States, although any of the United States. China, for example, has long
such moves required high-level review by the White been known to employ cyberspace to spy on U.S.
House (and were rarely approved). This approach was military technological capabilities and steal what
embedded in Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20) they can for use in developing their own weapons
of October 2012, which states that any cyberattack systems. Russia has been even more aggressive in its
that might result in “significant consequences,” use of cyberspace, employing cyberweapons to cripple
such as loss of life or adverse foreign policy impacts, Ukraine’s electrical grid in 2015 and to influence the
required “specific presidential approval.” 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections. That Moscow has also
Officials in the Trump administration found this sought to infiltrate the U.S. electrical grid suggests that
requirement unduly restrictive and so persuaded the it, too, intends to “defend forward,” by preparing for
president to rescind PPD-20 and replace it with a more possible cyberattacks on U.S. command, control, and
permissive measure. The resulting document, National communications capabilities, including NC3 facilities.
Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NSPM-13), Although largely occurring in secret, what can
was approved in September 2018, but never made aptly be called “an arms race in cyberspace” is clearly
public. From what is known of NSPM-13, senior underway. All of the major nuclear-armed powers are
military commanders, such as Nakasone, were granted devising ever more powerful offensive and defensive
preapproval to undertake offensive strikes against cyberweapons for use both in peacetime and in the
foreign entities under certain specified conditions event of war. Each is seeking to enhance its defenses
without further White House clearance. In accordance against adversary attack; however, just as is the case
with the new policy, military planners were authorized in ballistic missile offense and defense, it is easier and
to prepare for offensive cyberattacks by seeking cheaper to devise offensive cybertools than defensive
vulnerabilities in adversarial computer networks ones. In the event of a crisis, then, there will be a
and by implanting malware in those weak spots for strong temptation to employ the new technologies
potential utilization when and if a retaliatory strike was early in the encounter, when they might be used
initiated. President Biden reportedly has left NSPM-13 to maximum effect—possibly setting in motion an
in place, but added a requirement that large-scale cyber escalatory process resulting in nuclear weapons use.
operations be brought to the National Security Council
(NSC) for review and possible adjustment.128 Arms Control in Cyberspace
As translated into formal military doctrine, this Given the various ways in which conflict in cyberspace
approach is described as “defending forward,” or could result in nuclear weapons use, steps must be
seeking out the originators of cyberattacks aimed taken to minimize the risk of escalation migrating
at this country and neutralizing them through from one domain to the other. It is undeniable,
counterstrikes and the insertion of malware for future however, that devising agreements to curb malicious
activation. As explained by the Cyber Command’s and escalatory behavior in cyberspace will prove
vision statement, “Defending forward as close as no easy task. Computer software cannot readily be
possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our classified and tallied the way bombers and missiles
reach to expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their can, and states do not agree on definitions of offensive
intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close and defensive cyberweapons—let alone on measures
to their origins.”129 to control them. Nevertheless, some efforts have

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 45
been made to develop rules and protocols to restrain much to gain from dialogues among them on the
the destabilizing use of cybertechnologies, and these cyber threats to strategic stability and strategies
provide a framework for further consideration. for mitigating them. Such talks, modeled on the
The starting point for all of these initiatives is a bilateral U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue,
recognition that cyberattacks on an adversary’s NC3 could include both diplomats and specialists with
networks—however appealing as a substitute for or knowledge of cyber and NC3 systems. A dialogue
an adjunct to kinetic attacks—pose significant risks of this sort “could make it easier to clarify to each
of accidental or inadvertent escalation that could other the types of restraint that would be most
prove catastrophic for all parties concerned. As noted important for strategic stability,” analysts at CEIP
by analysts from the U.S. and China assembled by suggested in 2021. “It could cover how each side
CEIP, these two countries “objectively share common views cyber operations, including what would be
interest” in avoiding a cyber-initiated escalatory seen as escalatory and how each might try to signal
cycle. Once acknowledging this fundamental precept, willingness to de-escalate or pursue off-ramps.” Such
the two sides “could define certain types of cyber a dialogue, they add, “could help prevent inadvertent
operations as mutually off limits and then identify escalation in crises or conflict.”135
ways to bolster each other’s confidence that such limits An added benefit of such conversations is that they
are being respected.”131 could help establish lines of communication between
Of all the measures that would most enhance the top cyber officials of rival states, allowing one
stability in this respect, experts agree, would be side or the other to inquire about suspicious activity
bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Russia and in its key systems and/or provide reassurance that a
the U.S. and China to abstain from cyberattacks on each disruptive attack is not under way. Participants could
other’s NC3 systems. Such measures, the CEIP analysts also use these sessions to devise confidence-building
suggested, could include commitments to forgo cyber measures (CBMs) for their governments to undertake.
espionage in each other’s core NC3 networks, the Initiatives of this sort are intended to inculcate a degree
planting of disruptive malware in those networks for of trust among potential adversaries and thereby pave
future use, and offensive cyberstrikes during a crisis. the way for more consequential, binding agreements.
As part of these initiatives, they noted, the parties could In the cyber realm, CBMs might include, for
agree to separate or “dis-entangle” their conventional example, information-sharing on measures being
and nuclear C3 systems, so as to prevent cyber taken by each side to prevent third-party cyberattacks
operations in the one area from spilling over into the on their NC3 networks, such as attacks by rogue actors
other. Together, such steps “could enhance stability seeking to trigger a crisis by spoofing a cyberstrikes
and reduce the risk of miscalculation.”132 by one of the nuclear powers. Other CBMs could
While acknowledging that measures of this sort include the installation of hotlines connecting each
could significantly reduce the risk of inadvertent side’s top cyber officials, so as to allow for reliable
escalation, most analysts contend that it will prove communications even during a crisis.
exceedingly difficult to negotiate such an agreement, Many analysts, believing that bilateral measures
given the high level of distrust between the major of this sort will be difficult to achieve in the short
powers, the high degree of secrecy involved, and the term, say that the major nuclear powers should be
enduring appeal of cyber operations. Verifying such encouraged to undertake unilateral steps to promote
an agreement is assumed to represent another major strategic stability. These could include moves to
hurdle, as the nuclear powers are highly reluctant to better protect vital computer networks against hostile
share information about their NC3 capabilities—let intrusion and to ensure high-level oversight over all
alone their vulnerabilities.133 Nevertheless, some offensive cyber operations. “States can and should
analysts insist that an agreement of this sort, while act unilaterally to mitigate the risks [of inadvertent
not verifiable in the traditional sense, could be made escalation],” Acton affirmed in Daedalus.136
enforceable through a form of mutual deterrence. “Any Mindful that offensive cyber operations could
state that considered launching a cyber operation in be initiated by junior officers lacking a full
violation of the agreement would have to reckon with understanding of the possible escalatory consequences
the possibility that the target (which would presumably of such moves, Acton and others have called for
be scanning its networks continuously) would detect requirements that all such decisions be subjected
the intrusion and respond in kind,” Acton wrote in the to rigorous scrutiny and be made at appropriately
Spring 2020 issue of Daedalus.134 high levels of executive oversight. The nuclear
Assuming that a formal, binding commitment powers, Acton wrote, “should put in place rigorous
to avoid attacks on each other’s NC3 systems is internal processes—if they do not already exist—to
not something the major nuclear powers are likely ensure that, in deciding whether to proceed with a
to agree to in the immediate future, there is still potentially escalatory cyber operation, the strategic

46 An Arms Control Association Report

risks are fully considered and weighed against the report, issued in 2015, went further, articulating a set
potential intelligence and military benefits.” Such of norms to govern behavior in this sphere. Foremost
decisions, moreover, “should rest with the senior among these was the precept that states “should
officials who would be responsible for managing the not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity
real-world consequences of escalation.”137 contrary to its obligations under international law
Another area where unilateral action would be that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or
extremely valuable, analysts agree, would be in otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical
securing greater separation between conventional and infrastructure” of another country.141 These principles
nuclear C3 systems. As noted earlier, the fact that these were incorporated into UNGA Resolution 70/237 and
systems are often “entangled” means that a cyberattack approved by member states on December 23, 2015,
on conventional networks could spill over into nuclear thus providing an initial framework for responsible
ones (or appear to be doing so), thereby triggering state behavior in cyberspace.142
unintended nuclear escalation. To reduce this risk, the Since the adoption of Resolution 70/237, the
nuclear powers should take action to separate the two General Assembly has continued to pursue the
systems as much as possible. “Entanglement between development of norms for responsible state behavior
conventional and nuclear systems means that attacks on in cyberspace. Pursuant to Resolution 73/27 of
the former could affect or be perceived to be intended December 5, 2018, it established an “Open-Ended
to affect the latter,” Herbert Lin wrote in 2021.138 Working Group,” composed of representatives of
In addition to advocating these bilateral and member states, to consider the adoption of additional
unilateral initiatives, various governmental and non- norms in the field and to devise confidence-
governmental actors have called for the adoption building measures aimed at promoting international
of international norms in cyberspace, to prevent cooperation in the implementation of such measures.
undesirable military outcomes as well as other This group has been meeting regularly and, following
disruptive actions, such as ransomware attacks and the adoption of another UNGA resolution in
human rights abuses. Normative measures like these December 2020, will continue its work for another
would not be binding on nation-states, but might five-year period, commencing in 2022.
influence their decision-making and discourage Developing effective restraints on the disruptive
malign and destructive activities. use of cybertools is likely to prove a long and arduous
In an effort to facilitate the adoption of such norms, process. Analysts worry, moreover, that the speed
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established a group of technological advance in this realm is exceeding
of governmental experts in 2011 to assess the dangers the pace of progress in the political and diplomatic
in cyberspace and to consider “possible cooperative realm. Nevertheless, political leaders have come to
measures to address them, including norms, rules, grasp the dangers arising from the uncontrolled use
or principles of responsible behavior of States.”139 of cyberweapons and have begun looking at possible
In its first report, released in 2013, the expert group pathways toward sensible control, many of which
affirmed that “International law, and in particular have been described above. Given the enormous risks
the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable” in of miscalculation in cyberspace, it is essential that
cyberspace, or what it called the information and leaders accelerate their efforts to assess these dangers
communications technology (ICT) sphere.140 A second and take effective action to minimize them.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 47
Chapter 5:
‘Skynet’ Revisited: The Dangerous Allure of
Nuclear Command Automation

T
he Pentagon’s budget request for fiscal year under attack by U.S. nuclear forces. When the U.S.
2022 included $15.4 billion for modernization leadership fails to halt such an attack by a rogue
of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Air Force general, the doomsday scenario is set in
representing a mere down-payment on the estimated motion. In the 1983 blockbuster “WarGames,” a
$1.7 trillion that will be spent on this massive teenage hacker inadvertently ignites a nuclear crisis
endeavor over the next 30 years. Most of this largess when he hacks into the (fictional) War Operation
will be used to replace existing nuclear delivery Plan Response (WOPR) supercomputer and prompts
systems—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the machine to initiate what it believes is a game,
missile-firing submarines, and long-range bombers— resulting in the actual launch of U.S. nuclear
with new, more capable systems. But a surprisingly weapons. Yet another vision of computers run amok
large share of the FY 2022 request, nearly $3 billion, was portrayed a year later in “The Terminator,” in
was sought for the modernization of the nation’s which a superintelligent computer known as Skynet
nuclear command, control, and communications again controls U.S. nuclear weapons and elects to
(NC3) infrastructure—the electronic systems that eliminate all humans by igniting a catastrophic
inform national leaders of a possible enemy attack nuclear war.
and enable the president to order the launch of To be sure, none of the plans for NC3 automation
America’s own nuclear weapons.143 now being considered by the Department of Defense
Just as existing delivery systems are being replaced resemble anything quite like the WOPR or Skynet.
with a new ICBM (the Sentinel), a new missile However, these plans do involve developing essential
submarine (the Columbia-class), and a new strategic building blocks for a highly automated command and
bomber (the B-21 Raider), the Department of Defense control system that will progressively diminish the
expects to spend tens of billions of dollars over role of humans in making critical decisions over the
the coming decades to replace the existing NC3 use of nuclear weapons. Humans may be accorded
infrastructure with a far more advanced and capable the final authority to launch nuclear bombers and
system, called “NC3 Next.” This evolving system of missiles as this process unfolds, but assessments of
computers and communications links will be designed enemy moves and the winnowing down of possible
to speed information-sharing and to protect against U.S. responses will largely be conducted by machines
increasingly severe cyberattacks.144 As part of this relying on artificial intelligence.
drive, Pentagon planners also seek to accelerate the The total overhaul of America’s NC3 infrastructure
automation of these systems—a goal that has certain was first proposed during the Trump administration,
attractions in terms of increased speed and accuracy, in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report of February
but one that raises troubling questions about the 2018. The existing NC3 system, the report stated, “is a
role of machines in determining humanity’s fate in a legacy of the Cold War, last comprehensively updated
future nuclear showdown. almost three decades ago.” Although many of its
Science fiction filmmakers have long envisioned individual components—early-warning satellites and
the possibility of machines acquiring the capacity radars, communications satellites and ground stations,
to launch nuclear weapons on their own. The 1964 missile launch facilities, and national command
movie “Dr. Strangelove” presupposes that the Soviet centers—had been modernized over time, much of the
Union has installed a “doomsday machine” primed interconnecting hardware and software has become
to detonate automatically should the country come obsolete, the report stated. The growing effectiveness

48 An Arms Control Association Report

In the 1983 film “WarGames,” a computer placed in charge of U.S. nuclear weapons begins a simulation that nearly leads to
the launch of U.S. missiles. While no U.S. Defense Department plans resemble anything quite like that scenario, they do seek
to develop essential building blocks for a highly automated command and control system that will progressively diminish the
role of humans in making critical decisions over the use of nuclear weapons. (Photo: Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

of cyberattacks, moreover, was said to pose an ever- enemy intentions and devise a menu of possible
increasing threat to the safety and reliability of critical countermoves from which combat commanders
systems. To ensure that the president enjoyed timely can choose—are still in their infancy. Nevertheless,
warning of enemy attacks and was able to order virtually every aspect of the NC3 upgrade is expected
appropriate responses—even under conditions of to benefit from advances in AI and machine learning.
intense nuclear assault and cyberattack—the entire
system would have to be rebuilt.145 The Allure of Automation
Given these highly demanding requirements, the The quest to further automate key elements of
2018 NPR report called for overhauling the existing America’s NC3 architecture is being driven largely
NC3 system and replacing many of its component parts by an altered perception of the global threat
with more modern, capable upgrades. Key objectives, it environment. Although the existing framework was
stated, would include strengthened protection against always intended to provide decisionmakers with
cyber and space-based threats, enhanced tactical warning prompt warning of enemy nuclear attack and to
and attack assessment, and utilization of sophisticated operate even under conditions of nuclear war, the
decision-support technology. These undertakings are operational challenges faced by that system have
ambitious and costly, and so will constitute a major grown more severe in recent years. Most notably,
component of the overall nuclear modernization effort the decision-making system is threatened by the
going forward. In January 2019, the Congressional ever-increasing destructive capacity of conventional
Budget Office projected that the cost of modernizing weapons and the growing sophistication of
the entire NC3 system over the ensuing decade would cyberattacks—and, as a result of those two, the
total $77 billion.146 growing speed of combat.
The 2018 NPR did identify increased automation The existing NC3 architecture was designed in
as a specific objective of this overhaul. That is so, in the previous century to detect enemy ICBM and
part, because automation is already built into many of bomber launches and provide decision-makers with
the systems incorporated in the existing NC3 system enough time—as much as 30 minutes in the case
and will remain integral to their replacements. At the of ICBM attacks—to assess the accuracy of launch
same time, many proposed systems, such as decision- warnings and still ponder appropriate responses.
support technology—algorithms designed to assess These systems did not always work as intended—the

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 49
history of the Cold War is replete with false warnings
of enemy attacks—but the cushion of time prevented
a major catastrophe.147 Moreover, the reasonably
The decision-making system
clear distinction between conventional and nuclear is threatened by the ever-
weapons enabled military analysts to avoid confusing
non-nuclear assaults with potentially nuclear ones. increasing destructive capacity
With the introduction of increasingly capable
conventional weapons, however, the distinction
of conventional weapons and
between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is being the growing sophistication of
blurred. Many of the new conventionally-armed (but
potentially nuclear-capable) ballistic missiles now cyberattacks—and, as a result
being developed by the major powers are capable of
hypersonic speed (more than five times the speed of
of those two, the growing
sound) and of flying more than 500 kilometers (the speed of combat.
limit imposed by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty) and are intended for attacks on
high-value enemy targets, such as air defense radars National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
and command-and-control facilities. With flight affirmed in its Final Report, speaking both of nuclear
durations of as little as five minutes, defensive early and conventional combat. “Currently, this process
warning and C3 systems have precious little time generally involves passing data in a serial fashion from
to determine whether incoming missiles are armed a sensor, through a series of humans, to a platform that
with nuclear or conventional missiles and to select can shoot at the target. AI will help automate some
and then carry out an appropriate response, possibly of the intermediate stages of the decision process.” As
including the early use of nuclear weapons. (See AI matures, moreover, it will propel “more advanced
Chapter 3, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed.’”) processes that would operate more akin to a web,
Cybercombat occurs at an even faster speed, fusing multiple sensors and platforms to manage
potentially depriving nuclear commanders of critical complex data flows and transmitting actionable
information and communication links in a time of information to human operators and machines across
crisis, thereby precipitating unintended or inadvertent all [combat] domains.”149
escalation. In the highly contested environment Automation could be even more useful, advocates
envisioned by the 2018 NPR report, decision-makers argue, by helping commanders—up to and including
may be faced with an overload of inconclusive the president—select nuclear and non-nuclear
information and have mere minutes in which to responses to confirmed indications of an enemy
grasp the essential reality—and thence to decide attack. With little time to act, human decision-makers
on humanity’s fate. (See Chapter 4, “Cyber Battles, could receive a menu of possible countermoves
Nuclear Outcomes?”) devised by algorithms. “As the complexity of AI
Under these circumstances, some analysts insist, systems matures,” the Congressional Research Service
increased NC3 automation will prove essential. noted in 2020, “AI algorithms may also be capable of
Increased reliance on AI, these analysts argue, providing commanders with a menu of viable courses
can help with two of the existing system’s most of action based on real-time analysis of the battle-
acute challenges: information overload and time space, potentially improving the quality and speed of
compression. With ever more sensors (satellite wartime decision-making.”150
monitors, ground radars, surveillance aircraft) Some analysts have gone even further, suggesting
feeding intelligence into battle management systems, that in conditions of extreme time compression,
commanders are being inundated with information the machines could be empowered to select the
on enemy actions, preventing prompt and considered optimal response and initiate the attack themselves.
decision-making. At the same time, the widespread “Attack-time compression has placed America’s senior
deployment of hypersonic missiles and advanced leadership in a situation where the existing NC3
cyberweaponry is compressing the time in which system may not act rapidly enough,” Adam Lowther
such decisions must be made. Artificial intelligence and Curtis McGiffin wrote in a 2019 commentary for
could help overcome these challenges, it is claimed, War on the Rocks, a security-oriented website. “Thus,
by sifting through the incoming data at lightning it may be necessary to develop a system based on [AI],
speed and identifying any enemy moves requiring an with predetermined response decisions, that detects,
immediate military response.148 decides, and directs strategic forces with such speed
“AI will make the process of finding and hitting that the attack-time compression challenge does not
targets of military value faster and more efficient,” the place the United States in an impossible position.”151

50 An Arms Control Association Report

That commentary provoked widespread alarm General Mark A. Milley on March 31, 2021, and
about the possible loss of human control over Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III gave it his
decisions of nuclear use. Even some military officials consent shortly thereafter. In consonance with these
expressed concern over such proposals. “You will find moves, Austin also approved the initial strategic plan
no stronger proponent of integration of AI capabilities for the JADC2, ensuring that it would receive high-
writ large into the Department of Defense,” said level attention.155
Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, then director of the Joint Major responsibility for developing the necessary
Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), at a September software for the JADC2 enterprise has been delegated
2019 conference at Georgetown University. “But to the Air Force through its Advanced Battlefield
there is one area where I pause, and it has to do with Management System (ABMS). As described by the
nuclear command and control.” Referring to Lowther Congressional Research Service, “ABMS proposes
and McGiffin’s assertion in War on the Rocks that an using cloud environments and new communications
automated U.S. nuclear launch ability is needed, he methods to allow Air Force and Space Force systems
said, “I read that. And my immediate answer is, ‘No. to share data seamlessly using artificial intelligence to
We do not.’”152 enable faster decision-making.”156 To collect data from
Shanahan indicated that his organization was the ABMS and integrate it into their respective combat
moving to integrate AI technologies into a wide array systems, the Army established Project Convergence
of non-nuclear capabilities, including command- and the Navy initiated Project Overmatch. Both
and-control functions. Indeed, JAIC and other involve extensive tests of ABMS software and assorted
military components are moving swiftly to develop air, sea, and ground weapons.157
automated C2 systems and to ready them for use by Spending information on JADC2, ABMS, and
regular combat forces. Initially, these systems will be Projects Convergence and Overmatch is relatively
employed by conventional forces, but the Pentagon scant, as these programs do not, for the most part,
fully intends to merge them over time with their appear in Department of Defense budget documents
nuclear counterparts. and many aspects of them are classified. According to
the CRS, the Air Force requested $204 million for its
All-Domain Command and Control ABMS project in FY 2022 while the Army requested
The Pentagon’s principle mechanism for undertaking $107 million for Project Convergence; the Navy
this vast enterprise is called the Joint All-Domain sought additional funds for its Project Overmatch, but
Command and Control (JADC2) program. As now these sums were kept secret.158 The Pentagon’s budget
envisioned, the JADC2 enterprise will incorporate a request FY 2023 provided no further information on
multitude of computers working together to collect
sensor data from myriad platforms, organize the data
into digestible bits, and provide commanders with
a menu of possible combat options. As explained
by the Department of Defense, “JADC2 provides a
coherent approach for shaping future Joint Force
C2 capabilities and is intended to produce the
warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act
at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and
with partners, to deliver information advantage at the
speed of relevance.”153
The JADC2 program is said to be a core element
of the Pentagon’s emerging strategy for U.S. victory
in the fast-paced wars of the future. Called the
Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) or All-Domain
Operations, the new strategy assumes seamless
coordination among all elements of the U.S. military.
General John E. Hyten, former vice chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that the strategy
combines “space, cyber, deterrent [i.e., nuclear forces],
Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, director of the Joint
transportation, electromagnetic spectrum operations, Artificial Intelligence Center, appears at a September 2019
missile defense—all of these global capabilities conference at Georgetown University. He spoke of the need
together … to compete with a global competitor for improving artificial intelligence in the U.S. military, but
cautioned, “there is one area where I pause, and it has to do
and at all levels of conflict.”154 The JWC strategy was with nuclear command and control.”
approved by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Photo: Georgetown University)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 51
ABMS or JADC2 spending, but indicated that ABMS March 2022 by Hyten’s successor as commander of
“contributes to the Joint All-Domain Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Chas Richard.
Control (JADC2) concept, which will allow current “I am very familiar with what JADC2 is doing in
and future platforms/sensors to instantly share conventional command and control. And in fact, was
critical operational data across the DoD enterprise very pleased that a subset of what JADC2 is doing
in the future contested high-end warfighting is for nuclear command and control,” he told the
environment.”159 Senate Armed Services Committee. “The two systems
In moving forward on all this, the Pentagon’s have to be overlapped to a great extent so that we can
initial emphasis has been on “data fusion,” or the have integration.”163
compression of multiple sensor inputs into concise Stripped of jargon and acronyms, what Hyten and
summaries that can be rapidly communicated to and Richard are saying is that the automated systems now
understood by commanders in the field. Over time, being assembled for the conventional C2 enterprise
however, the JADC2 project is expected to incorporate will provide a substructure for the nation’s nuclear
AI-enabled decision-support systems, or algorithms command-and-control system, or be incorporated into
intended to narrow down possible responses to enemy the system, or both. It is possible, then, that in some
moves and advise those commanders on the optimal future crisis, data on conventional operations being
choice. As noted by the Congressional Research overseen by the JADC2 system will automatically be
Service, “JADC2 intends to enable commanders fed into NC3 intelligence-gathering systems—possibly
to make better decisions by collecting data from altering their assessment of the nuclear threat and
numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial leading to a heightened level of alert—along with
intelligence algorithms to identify targets, then a greater risk of inadvertent or precipitous nuclear
recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic weapons use.
and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to
engage the target.”160 Parallel Developments Elsewhere
Pentagon officials insist that human commanders While the United States is proceeding with plans
will always have the final say in decisions regarding the to modernize and automate its nuclear command-
lethal use of force. Read through the statements of top and-control system, other nuclear-armed nations,
officials, however, and it appears as if humans will play especially China and Russia, are also moving in this
an ever-diminishing role in the future “kill chain.” direction. It is conceivable, then, that a time could
During a September 2020 test of the ABMS system, for come when machines on all sides will dictate the
example, AI-powered processors interpreted incoming dynamics of a future nuclear crisis and possibly
sensor data on enemy threats, selected optimal determine the onset and prosecution of a nuclear war.
responses, and directed a tracked howitzer to fire at a Russia’s pursuit of NC3 automation began during
mock enemy cruise missile. “That’s an example of us the Soviet era, when senior leaders, fearing a
demonstrating something that could not be done the “decapitating” attack on the Soviet leadership as
human-to-human way,” said Will Roper, the project’s part of a preemptive U.S. first strike, ordered the
chief acquisition officer. “Machine-to-machine, it’s development of a “dead hand” system intended
easy; human-to-human, impossible.”161 to launch Soviet missiles even in the absence of
This all matters because the Defense Department instructions to do so from Moscow. If the system,
has indicated that the JADC2 system, while intended known as Perimeter, were to detect a nuclear
primarily for use by non-nuclear forces, will explosion on Soviet territory and receive no signals
eventually be integrated with the nuclear command, from Moscow—implying a nuclear detonation there—
control, and communications network now being it was programmed to inform nuclear launch officers
overhauled. In a 2020 interview, General Hyten was who, in turn, were authorized to initiate retaliatory
asked if the emerging JADC2 architecture was going strikes without further instruction.164 According to
to inform development of the remodeled NC3. He Russian media accounts, the Perimeter system is still
responded, “Yes. The answer is yes.” Hyten, who in operation and employs some form of AI.165
had also served as commander of the U.S. Strategic As in the United States, modernization of the
Command, added that some NC3 elements will have country’s NC3 system appears to constitute a high
to be separated from the JADC2 system “because priority for Russia’s top officials and, like similar
of the unique nature of the nuclear business.” efforts in this country, is thought to involve increased
Nevertheless, “NC3 will operate in significant reliance on AI and automation. In 2014, Russia’s
elements of JADC2,” and, as a result, “NC3 has to military inaugurated the National Defense Control
inform JADC2 and JADC2 has to inform NC3.”162 Center (NDCC) in Moscow, a centralized command
The intertwined nature of JADC2 and nuclear post for assessing global threats and initiating
command-and-control was given added emphasis in whatever military action is deemed necessary, whether

52 An Arms Control Association Report

nuclear or non-nuclear. Like the Pentagon’s JADC2 ICBM arsenal, commenced automation of the
system, the NDCC is designed to collect information country’s nuclear command system in the late 1990s
on enemy moves from multiple sources and provide and has been upgrading its capabilities ever since. By
senior officers with guidance on possible responses.166 the early 2000s, Cunningham indicated, the Second
The Russians are also reported to be constructing Artillery was using an automated command-and-
an alternative nuclear command post in a secret control system for its missile units, one that was
underground facility. At a November 2020 meeting supposedly capable of “transmitting commands,
in Sochi with top government officials, President fusing intelligence, and monitoring launches in real-
Putin spoke of the need to maintain safe, reliable, time.” Cunningham noted, however, that China’s
and fast-acting C3 and NC3 systems. “It is absolutely capabilities in this regard generally lag behind those
clear that the combat capability of the nuclear triad of the United States and that modernization of its
and the capability of the army and navy on the NC3 systems remains a major state priority.168
whole to adequately and quickly respond to potential In the 2021 edition of its annual report on Military
military challenges directly depend on the stability, and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
effectiveness, and reliability of these systems under any of China, the U.S. Department of Defense reported
circumstances,” Putin told the gathering. Numerous that the Chinese leadership has adopted a goal of
improvements have been and are continuing to be completing the “intelligentization” of the PLA—or
made in the nation’s C3 and NC3 systems, he affirmed, the systemic integration of AI and cloud computing
with a particular emphasis on “information support, into all military operations—by 2027 at the latest.
monitoring, and situation analysis.” Suggesting a A key goal of this effort, the Pentagon indicated,
heavy reliance on computers and AI, he noted that “all will be the modernization of the PLA’s nuclear
command posts can receive comprehensive updates and conventional command-and-control systems.
in real-time and use them to assess the situation and According to the report, “PLA strategists have stated
make substantiated decisions.”167 new technologies will increase the speed and tempo
China is also investing in AI-enabled data fusion of future warfare, and that operationalization of AI
and decision-support systems, although less is known will be necessary to improve the speed and quality
about its efforts in this area. According a 2019 report of information processing by reducing battlefield
by Fiona Cunningham of Stanford University, the uncertainty and providing decision making
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF, previously the PLA Second advantage over potential adversaries.”169
Artillery Force), which operates China’s land-based
The Perils of Heedless Automation
There are many reasons to be wary of increasing
the automation of nuclear command and control,
especially when it comes to computer-assisted
decision-making. Many of these technologies are
still in their infancy and prone to malfunctions that
cannot easily be anticipated. Algorithms that have
developed through machine learning—a technique
whereby computers are fed vast amounts of raw
data and are “trained” to detect certain patterns—
can become very good at certain tasks, such as
facial recognition, but often contain built-in biases
conveyed through the training data. These systems
also are prone to unexplainable malfunctions and can
be fooled, or “spoofed,” by skilled professionals. No
matter how much is spent on cybersecurity, moreover,
NC3 systems will always be vulnerable to hacking by
sophisticated adversaries.170
AI-enabled systems also lack an ability to assess
intent or context. We might ask, for example, whether
a sudden enemy troop redeployment indicates
an imminent enemy attack or merely the normal
Soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army march during a rotation of forces? Human analysts can use their sense
parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of of the current political moment to help shape their
the People’s Republic of China in 1949, at Tiananmen Square assessment a situation like this, but machines lack
on October 1, 2019 in Beijing, China. (Photo by Andrea
Verdelli/Getty Images) that ability, and may assume the worst.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 53
This aspect of human judgment arose in a famous attack is an inherently challenging problem because
Cold War incident. In September 1983, at a time of there is zero actual data of what would constitute
heightened tensions between the superpowers, a reliable indicators of an imminent preemptive
Soviet nuclear watch officer, Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, nuclear attack.”172
received an electronic warning of a U.S. missile attack An equal danger is what analysts call “automation
on Soviet territory. Unsure of the accuracy of the bias,” or the tendency for stressed-out decision-makers
warning, he waited before informing his superiors to trust the information and advice supplied by
of the strike and eventually told them he believed it advanced computers rather than their own considered
was a computer error—as proved to be the case—thus judgment. For example, an American president,
averting a possible nuclear exchange. Machines are when informed of sensor data indicating an enemy
not capable of such doubts or hesitations.171 nuclear attack and while under pressure to make
Another problem is the lack of real world data an immediate decision, might choose to accept the
for use in training NC3 algorithms. Other than the computer’s advice to initiate a retaliatory strike rather
two atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of than consider possible alternatives, such as with
World War II, there has never been an actual nuclear Petrov’s courageous decision to pause and investigate
war and therefore no genuine combat examples for further. But with decision-making systems expected
use in devising reality-based attack responses. War to gain ever more analytical capacity over the coming
games and simulations can be substituted for this decades, “it is likely that humans making command
purpose, but none of these can accurately predict decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on
how leaders will actually behave in a future nuclear a par with or better than those of human advisers,”
showdown. Accordingly, decision-support programs a 2018 RAND Corporation study noted. “This
devised by these algorithms can never be fully trusted. potentially unjustified trust presents new risks that
“Automated decision-support systems … are only as must be considered.”173
good as the data they rely on,” analysts at the Center Compounding all these risks is the likelihood that
for a New American Security (CNAS) wrote in 2019. China, Russia, and the U.S. will all install automated
“Building an automated decision-support tool to NC3 systems without informing each other of the
provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear nature and status of these systems. Under these
circumstances, it is possible to imagine a “flash
war,” roughly akin to a “flash crash” on Wall Street
(that is, a stock market crash that is triggered by
the interaction of competing corporate investment
algorithms). In such a scenario, warns Paul Scharre of
CNAS, the data assessment systems of each country
could misinterpret signs of adversary moves and
conclude that an attack is imminent, leading other
computers to order preparatory moves for a retaliatory
strike, thereby prompting similar moves on the other
side and triggering an escalatory cycle ending in
nuclear catastrophe.174

Limiting the Dangers

Given these multiple risks, U.S. policymakers and
their Chinese and Russian counterparts should be very
leery of accelerating NC3 automation. Indeed, General
Shanahan acknowledged as much, noting in 2019 that
nuclear weapons use “is the ultimate human decision
that needs to be made” and warning that “we have
to be very careful” when automating NC3, especially
given “the immaturity of technology today.”175
This cautionary outlook also appears to have
informed the National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence when submitting its final
Former Soviet Colonel Stanislav Petrov sits at home in report in 2021. “While the Commission believes
2004 in Moscow. Petrov helped avert a possible U.S.-Soviet that properly designed, tested, and utilized AI-
nuclear exchange in 1983, when he doubted the validity
of an electronic warning that a U.S. missile attack was enabled and autonomous weapon systems will bring
underway. (Photo: Scott Peterson/Getty Images) substantial military and even humanitarian benefit,”

54 An Arms Control Association Report

it avowed, “the unchecked global use of such systems would prevent the automated escalation of conflict
potentially risks unintended conflict escalation and in specific scenarios without human intervention,”
crisis instability.” Acknowledging the immaturity of especially in scenarios that might result in nuclear
the technology and its potential for malfunction, the weapons employment. Lastly, in the hope that
report went on to say, “Unintended escalations may such talks will lead, in time, to the negotiation of
occur for numerous reasons, including when systems formal measures to reduce such risks, the report
fail to perform as intended, because of challenging and recommended intensive research on tools and
untested complexities of interaction between AI-enabled strategies for the verification of future agreements.177
and autonomous weapon systems on the battlefield, Aside from the NSCAI’s commissioners, the dangers
and, more generally, as the result of machines or unleashed by excessive reliance on automated nuclear
humans misperceiving signals or actions.”176 command systems has been addressed by a number
To reduce these risks, the Commission of other analysts. Referring to the stock market “flash
recommended several precautionary steps. First, crash” of May 6, 2010, when the Dow Jones Index
it called on U.S. leaders to “make a clear, public lost ten percent of its value in a matter of minutes,
statement that decisions to authorize nuclear weapons Paul Scharre noted that stock markets around the
employment must only be made by humans, not by world have since inserted “circuit breakers” into
an AI-enabled or autonomous system.” This would, securities trading, automatically halting trading when
it claimed, demonstrate a U.S. commitment to the prices shift rapidly by more than a certain percent.
responsible use of AI and enable American leaders The same, he said, must be done in the case of
to seek similar commitments from the leaders of automated military systems, to ensure that machines
Russia and China. Recognizing that formal treaties do not initiate extreme measures—such as the use of
or agreements to limit the deployment of AI-enabled nuclear weapons—without obtaining authenticated
NC3 systems are unlikely to be negotiated in the human approval.178
short-term, it recommended that U.S. and Russian Given all the uncertainties involved in the
leaders discuss the escalatory dangers of excessive automation of nuclear command systems and the
reliance on automated NC3 systems as part of their catastrophic consequences of miscalculation, it is
ongoing Strategic Stability Dialogue, as well as the imperative that the major powers take unilateral steps
initiation of a similar dialogue with China. to ensure that humans exercise ultimate control over
As these discussions proceed, the Commission nuclear-launch systems and, in dialogues of the sort
noted, participants could agree “to integrate proposed by the NSCAI, consider common measures
‘automated escalation tripwires’ into systems that to prevent unintended escalation.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 55
Chapter 6:
A Framework Strategy for Reducing the
Escalatory Dangers of Emerging Technologies

A
s has been demonstrated in the preceding five a group of governmental experts considering such
chapters, the introduction of new weapons restraints in March 2019.179 But the group, assembled
systems employing artificial intelligence and under the auspices of the Convention on Certain
other emerging technologies is dramatically altering Conventional Weapons (CCW), was unable to agree
the nature of warfare and posing significant risks on such a prohibition, and the development and
to strategic stability. The growing utilization of AI- deployment of autonomous combat systems have
enabled autonomous weapons, we learned, threatens continued apace.
to diminish human control over battlefield dynamics Efforts to control weapons employing other
and increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent disruptive technologies, such as cyber and hypersonics,
escalation; the imminent deployment of hypersonic have also witnessed little progress. Before the outbreak
missiles will accelerate the pace of combat, reducing of fighting in Ukraine, officials from Russia and the
the potential for prudent and well-informed crisis U.S. had announced plans to assess the disruptive
management. Strategic stability is also imperiled, impact of these technologies as part of the Strategic
as we have seen, by the development of offensive Stability Dialogue they had undertaken. At the second
cyberweapons and a growing reliance on automated such meeting, held in Geneva on Sept. 30, 2021,
battlefield decision-making. the two sides agreed to establish a “Working Group
These developments are troubling enough. But on Capabilities and Actions With Strategic Effects,”
the drive to develop and deploy weapons systems which, presumably, would consider the threats to
employing these technologies is also proceeding at strategic stability posed by emerging and disruptive
a much faster pace than efforts to assess the dangers technologies.180 However, President Biden suspended
they pose and to establish limits on their use. Military these talks after Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24,
leaders of the major military powers, especially those 2022; both sides have since indicated a willingness to
in China, Russia, and the U.S., are keen to exploit the resume the dialogue, but no plans had been made to
perceived benefits of these technologies as rapidly as do so as of February 2023.
possible, so as to obtain a combat advantage in any The war in Ukraine has further complicated efforts
wars that might erupt between them. In many cases, to control the military utilization of emerging
these efforts have acquired an arms-racing character, technologies by encouraging the belligerents to
as officials in one country point to supposed progress employ whatever weapons are viewed as providing a
in another to justify their own accelerated utilization battlefield advantage. Both sides, for example, made
of the new technologies. widespread use of reconnaissance drones to locate
Although many world leaders have warned of the enemy positions for attack by planes and artillery, and
dangers posed by the weaponization of emerging in some cases have employed armed drones, such as
technologies and called for the adoption of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 (used by the Ukrainians)
international restraints on such efforts, little progress and the Iranian Shahed-136 (used by the Russians), to
has been made to accomplish this. “Machines with directly engage enemy targets. The Russians also fired
the power and discretion to take lives without human Kinzhal hypersonic missiles at logistical facilities in
involvement are politically unacceptable, morally western Ukraine, and are believed to have conducted
repugnant and should be prohibited by international multiple cyberattacks on Ukrainian government and
law,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres told military networks. All this will no doubt increase

56 An Arms Control Association Report

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein speaks to the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber Conference in
September 2019. As great-power competition in cyberwarfare pushes the technology forward, there are risks that potential
escalatory consequences are being ignored. (Photo: Wayne Clark/U.S. Air Force)

the likelihood of other belligerents employing these end” warfare, or all-out combat against the modern,
technologies in future conflicts while complicating the well-equipped forces of their adversaries—combat
task of adopting international constraints on their use. that is expected to employ every advance in military
Despite these impediments to progress in this technology.
field, it is essential to consider possible strategies “We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s
for regulating the military utilization of emerging conflicts with yesterday’s thinking, weapons, or
and disruptive technologies. At this point, their equipment,” former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis
application to combat has been relatively limited, so told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April
the potential battlefield impact of these technologies 2018, when describing this new outlook. To prevail
has not been fully demonstrated. As they become in future wars, “[we must invest] in technological
more widely deployed, however, the threats they pose innovation to increase lethality, including research
to human control of escalation dynamics and strategic into advanced autonomous systems, artificial
stability will become ever more acute. This is the ideal intelligence, and hypersonics.”181
moment, then, to devise and begin to implement A very similar outlook regarding the strategic
measures designed to curtail this dangerous process. environment is embedded in Chinese and Russian
military doctrine. In language strikingly similar to
The Eroding Nuclear “Firebreak” that of the Pentagon’s new strategy, but in mirror
In constructing such measures, it is essential to image, China’s July 2019 white paper on national
remind ourselves of the geopolitical and military defense warned of increasing U.S. investment in
contexts in which emerging technologies are being advanced military capabilities and indicated that
exploited for combat use. After years in which if Chinese forces are to prevail in any future U.S.-
international terrorism was widely viewed as the China conflict, “greater efforts have to be invested
greatest threat to international peace and stability, in military modernization.”182 Russian doctrine
the major nuclear powers now perceive themselves to places equal emphasis on the utilization of emerging
be engaged in a competitive struggle for geopolitical technologies to ensure success on the battlefield.183
advantage, with every possibility that this struggle The military doctrine of all three countries
could result in war between them. Under these emphasizes the acquisition of advanced conventional
circumstances, all three countries are enhancing weapons—tanks, missiles, planes, and bombs—
their capacity for what the Pentagon calls “high designed for fast-paced, firepower-intensive

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 57
offensives at the very onset of battle. At the same
time, all three are engaged in costly upgrades to their
nuclear delivery systems, in most cases involving the
replacement of older ICBMs, bombers, and missile- The military policies and
carrying nuclear submarines with newer, more
capable versions. More worrisome still, all three are doctrines of the major powers
developing “low-yield” warheads for use in so-called are combining with advances in
“nonstrategic” scenarios, for example, to defeat an
overpowering conventional assault by an adversary. certain disruptive technologies
The acquisition of new nuclear munitions for use
in such scenarios was an explicit goal of the Nuclear to erode the nuclear firebreak
Posture Review adopted by the Trump administration and undermine strategic
in February 2018, and is believed to figure in Russian
military doctrine.184 Indeed, Russian President Vladimir stability.
Putin implicitly threatened to conduct such strikes
in the event that Russian-claimed regions in Ukraine
came under attack by Western-armed Ukrainian
forces.185 China is less transparent about its nuclear conclude that such strikes constituted the prelude
weapons policies, but is known to have developed to a nuclear attack, and so decide to launch its own
nuclear warheads for its medium- and intermediate- nuclear munitions before they could be destroyed by
range ballistic missiles intended for use against U.S. its adversary’s incoming weapons.188
and allied forces in the Asia-Pacific region.186 For example, a potential belligerent might choose
These developments are occurring, moreover, at to deploy its AI-enabled air and naval autonomous
a time when many of the barriers to the nuclear weapons in self-directed “swarms” to find and destroy
weapons use erected during the Cold War era have key enemy assets, including its command, control,
been abandoned, such as the Intermediate-Range communications, and intelligence (C3I) facilities.
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, or are at risk To an adversary, such attacks could be interpreted
of being terminated, as is true of the New Strategic as the prelude to a nuclear first strike, prompting
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires it to launch its nuclear weapons before they can
in 2026. Those barriers were largely intended to be destroyed by incoming weapons. The launch of
prevent a conventional war from escalating across multiple hypersonic missiles early in a conflict to
the “firebreak” separating non-nuclear from nuclear destroy key enemy assets like those described above
combat; the wider the firebreak, it was assumed, the might also cause the target state to fear that a nuclear
lesser the risk that a conventional conflict involving strike is imminent, again causing the premature
the major powers would trigger the use of atomic launch of its nuclear weapons. A cyberattack on an
weapons. As those barriers disappear, the firebreak is enemy’s C31 systems, especially those with nuclear
shrinking and the risk of escalation is growing. command-and-control functions, could produce a
In today’s fiercely competitive strategic similar outcome.
environment, moreover, analysts fear that the In response to these dangers, the major powers
firebreak is being further eroded by the introduction are coming to rely ever more heavily on AI-enabled
of increasingly capable non-nuclear weapons, machines to filter sensor data on enemy movements,
including systems employing emerging technologies decipher their intentions, and select optimal
of the sort described in earlier chapters.187 While none battlefield responses. This increases the danger that
of the major powers is likely to initiate a nuclear humans will cede key combat decision-making tasks
exchange with one of its principal adversaries— to machines that lack a capacity to gauge political
knowing the resulting destruction to its own and diplomatic contexts in their calculations and are
homeland would be catastrophic—all have adopted vulnerable to hacking, spoofing, and other failures,
military doctrines that emphasize non-nuclear possibly leading them to initiate extreme military
attacks on their adversary’s critical military assets responses to ambiguous signals and thereby cause
(radars, missile batteries, command centers, and so inadvertent nuclear escalation.
on) at the very onset of a conflict. In most cases,
these assets are intended primarily for conventional Enhancing Strategic Stability
operations, but some may also house nuclear-related Clearly, the military policies and doctrines of the
facilities, a situation described by James Acton of CEIP major powers are combining with advances in certain
as “entanglement.” If these dual-use or co-located disruptive technologies to erode the nuclear firebreak
facilities came under assault, the target state might and undermine strategic stability. Accordingly, efforts

58 An Arms Control Association Report

to regulate these technologies should prioritize to the greatest degree possible—we propose the
measures intended to buttress stability and widen the following constituent elements of a framework
firebreak. Given the variety and complexity of the strategy to restrain and regulate the utilization
technologies involved, no single overarching treaty or of emerging technologies for military use. These
agreement is likely to achieve this goal. Rather, what initiatives are derived from the toolbox developed by
is needed is a framework strategy, aimed at advancing arms control advocates over many years of practice
an array of measures which, however specific their and experimentation, as well as the contributions of
intended outcome, all contribute to the larger goal of other experts in the field.189
enhanced stability. In many cases, the measures described below are
As noted earlier, the greatest dangers to be already being applied to particular weapons systems,
overcome are those with the potential to spark in ways described in the earlier chapters of this
an accidental or unintended escalatory spiral. primer. Our intent here, however, is to bring them
Accordingly, when devising measures to enhance together in a more coordinated fashion, with the
strategic stability, the goal should be to reduce the overarching goal of reducing the risk to strategic
likelihood of such spirals by eliminating certain stability. In light of the current political atmosphere,
types of weapons or enabling systems, or imposing we begin with more achievable initiatives and proceed
limitations on their numbers and use. Buffers and step-by-step to more sweeping, legally-binding
other escalation-prevention measures can also be measures requiring political accommodation.
adopted, such as the “dis-entanglement” of nuclear
and non-nuclear C3I systems. And even when Awareness-Building: Before significant progress can
the international environment precludes formal be made in adopting formal measures to regulate
agreements along these lines, states can engage in the weaponization of emerging technologies, greater
unilateral actions or join with others in undertaking effort will be needed to educate policymakers
confidence-building measures aimed at developing and the general public about the risks posed by
a common understanding of the risks posed by the the unregulated use of these technologies. While
new technologies. advocates of applying the new technologies for
Recognizing the difficulty of achieving major military use have been vociferous in extoling the
breakthroughs in the current international advantages of doing so, there has been far less effort
environment—yet determined to achieve progress to address the dangers posed by such weaponization.

A Russian MiG-31 aircraft carries a Kinzhal hypersonic over Moscow’s Victory Day parade in 2018. High-speed weapons like
this, capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, risk escalating conflicts as decision makers have little time to
assess an ambiguous threat. (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 59
A critical first step, therefore, must be to identify these dangers posed by the weaponization of emerging
dangers and make their presence more widely known technologies. In the absence of such official discourse,
to government officials and the general public. it is imperative that scientists, engineers, and arms
In the field of autonomous weapons systems, control experts from these countries meet in neutral
valuable work of this nature has been performed by settings to assess the additive risks to strategic stability
the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (“the Campaign”) posed by the weaponization of these technologies
and its affiliated groups, including Human Rights and to devise practical measures for their regulation
Watch and the International Committee for and control. Building on the experience of the
Robot Arms Control. The Campaign has focused Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
in particular on the threats to international in assembling experts from many nations, such
humanitarian law posed by the deployment of meetings—often described as “Track 2” diplomacy (as
autonomous weapons, employing a combination distinct from official discussions, or “Track 1”)—could
of public protest and skillful lobbying to raise evaluate measures for curtailing or regulating the
awareness of these dangers within the diplomatic application of disruptive technologies to military use.
community. Although it has not been successful It should be possible, for example, for prominent
in its drive to persuade signatory states of the experts from China, Russia, the U.S., and other
CCW to adopt a legally binding prohibition on interested countries, to meet on an informal basis
autonomous weapons—largely due to Russian and to discuss possible limits on the deployment of
U.S. opposition—the Campaign has helped forge a hypersonic missiles or on methods for reducing
coalition of states prepared to consider adoption of a cyber threats to nuclear command-and-control
treaty to this effect at the UN General Assembly.190 systems. In fact, Pugwash convened such a session
Valuable as these efforts have been, they have on hypersonic weapons, in Geneva in December
addressed only one aspect of the larger problem, the 2019. This meeting reportedly brought together
threat to civilians arising from the deployment of several dozen participants from different countries,
autonomous weapons in chaotic situations where including scientists, academics, and experts from
such devices—once unleashed from human control— the NGO and think-tank communities. According to
may prove unable to distinguish between combatants Pugwash, “participants discussed technical aspects,
and non-combatants. A more comprehensive factors driving the development, roles and purposes
approach, encompassing the full range of emerging of hypersonic weapons, as well as risks associated
and disruptive weapons, has been adopted by the with their deployment and use.”192 The organization
German Foreign Ministry in organizing a series of has also sponsored several such workshops on
conferences on “Capturing Technology, Rethinking “cyber security and warfare,” the most recent held
Arms Control.” Each of these events, held in 2019, in January 2020.193
2020, and 2021, assessed the dangers posed by a This model can be employed by other organizations
full range of emerging technologies—including AI, to convene similar encounters between experts
autonomy, cyber, and hypersonics—and considered from the major powers to assess mutual dangers and
various approaches to their control. consider various control options. Ideally, these Track
The German effort, spearheaded by former German 2, or nongovernmental consultations, can be followed
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, has contributed to a by “Track 1.5” engagements, in which former
growing awareness of these dangers among members government officials and others with government
of the European Union. At the conclusion of the 2020 ties also participate, helping to ensure that any
conference, the foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, proposals developed at such gatherings will be given
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden issued consideration at higher levels.
a joint proclamation expressing their concern over the
“mounting risks for international peace and stability Unilateral and Joint Initiatives: Given the current
created by the potential misuse of new technologies.”191 state of international affairs, it will prove difficult for
More such gatherings, involving a wider spectrum of the U.S. and Russia or the U.S. and China—or all three
nations, would help increase awareness of these dangers. meeting together—to agree on formal measures for
In the United States, Congress should be encouraged to the control of especially destabilizing technologies. It
hold hearings on the destabilizing impacts of certain should, however, be possible for these states to adopt
emerging technologies. unilateral measures in the hope that they will induce
parallel steps by their adversaries and eventually lead
Track 2 and Track 1.5 Diplomacy: At present, to binding bilateral and multilateral agreements.
government officials from China, Russia, and the Noting that the rapid and unregulated utilization
United States are barely speaking to one another of artificial intelligence for military purposes could
about strategic nuclear matters, let alone about the lead to violations of international humanitarian

60 An Arms Control Association Report

law (IHL) and other unintended consequences, In addition to unilateral measures of these sorts,
the National Security Commission on Artificial various groups of states could agree on joint measures
Intelligence affirmed in 2021 that countries should to reduce escalatory risks. These might include, for
take unilateral steps aimed at “reducing risks example, the adoption of common codes of conduct
associated with AI-enabled and autonomous weapons and transparency requirements. Measures of these sorts
systems and encourage safety and compliance with aimed at autonomous weapons were advocated by 70
IHL.” Such efforts, it added, “should and must be nations, including the United States, in a statement
led by the United States.” Among such initiatives, delivered to the UN General Assembly on October 21,
the Commission called for the adoption of ethical 2022. Warning of the dangers posed by the unregulated
guidelines on AI’s coupled with strict protocols deployment of autonomous weapons systems, the
governing the design, development, testing, and statement called on the international community
deployment of AI-enabled weapons.194 to “address these risks and challenges by adopting
Independently of the NSCAI, the Department of appropriate rules and measures, such as principles,
Defense has been developing its own guidelines for good practices, limitations and constraints.”199
regulating the military use of artificial intelligence.
This process commenced in February 2020, with the Strategic Stability Talks: Before governments can
adoption of six “ethical principles” for the use of undertake the arduous process of negotiating formal
artificial intelligence by the department. In addition arrangements to curb the weaponization of emerging
to measures aimed at ensuring the safe and reliable technologies, senior officials must become more
use of AI-enabled systems, the DoD guidelines require familiar with the nature of these technologies and
that such systems “fulfill their intended functions the significant risks they pose; even more essential,
while possessing the ability to detect and avoid officials on all sides must come to understand how
unintended consequences.”195 their adversaries view these risks. The best way to
Although welcomed by many in the scientific and do this, many experts agree, is to convene a series of
technical community, the DoD’s “ethical principles” “strategic stability talks,” composed of government
did not incorporate procedures for their department- officials, military officers, and technical experts from
wide implementation, prompting calls for the opposing sides, who can build on the work begun
promulgation of such measures. The Pentagon finally under Tracks 2 and 1.5 diplomacy by identifying the
addressed this need in June 2022 with the release of risks posed by destabilizing technologies and devising
its “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and methods for minimizing them.
Implementation Pathway” report. This document, Some preliminary efforts of this sort have occurred
however, merely reiterated the principles incorporated under the auspices of the Strategic Stability Dialogue
into the original guidelines and attached a blueprint (SSD) conducted by U.S. and Russian officials in
for further action by DoD agencies.196 Clearly, then, recent years, albeit without achieving any concrete
far more work remains to be done in this area. results.200 As noted earlier, the two sides agreed in
Proposals have also been made for the adoption of September 2021 to establish a “Working Group on
unilateral measures in the cyberspace realm, aimed Capabilities and Actions With Strategic Effects,”
at preventing inadvertent attacks on a potential though this group has yet to meet—following the
adversary’s nuclear C3I systems and protecting one’s Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the
own systems from such attack. For example, James Biden administration understandably paused the
Acton has called on governments to adopt a “risk- dialogue. However, at the appropriate time, the two
averse” cyber policy, under which they insert barriers sides should resume these talks to hammer out a new
against unintended attacks of this sort.197 Acton has arms control agreement to follow the New START
also advocated the unilateral “disentanglement” of Treaty, which expires in 2026, as well as to launch
nuclear and nonnuclear C3 systems, to reduce the a serious conversation on strategies for minimizing
risk that an attack on the latter will be construed as the risks posed by the weaponization of emerging
an attack on the former, and so trigger an unintended technologies.
nuclear exchange. It is equally important that experts and officials of
Similar measures can be devised to reduce the risks the U.S. and China, or the U.S., China, and Russia,
posed by other disruptive technologies. For example, commence a similar dialogue. Although both Beijing
states possessing hypersonic missiles could introduce and Washington have warned of the dangers posed
some means to signal to potential adversaries that by each other’s utilization of advanced technologies
their weapons—even if capable of carrying nuclear for military use, especially cyber, autonomy, and
warheads—are loaded solely with conventional ones, hypersonics, they have never agreed to discussions
thus reducing the risk of “warhead ambiguity” and on mitigating these threats. Highlighting this lack of
the premature launch of nuclear weapons.198 communication and warning of the risks involved,

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 61
the NSCAI recommended in its Final Report that Similarly, some members the Group of
Washington work to establish a “U.S.-China SSD Governmental Experts established under the auspices
that includes the relevant military, diplomatic, and of the CCW have proposed that states commit to
security officials from both sides.”201 a code of conduct governing the military use of
Once talks of this sort commence, whether between artificial intelligence, incorporating many of the
the U.S. and Russia or the U.S. and China, the two principles contained in the Defense Department’s
parties could undertake confidence-building measures roster of ethical principles for AI use. In particular,
intended to build trust and develop a common such a code would require that humans retain
understanding of the problems involved. These ultimate control over all instruments of war,
could range from something as simple as devising including autonomous weapons systems and
a common dictionary of terms to low-level tests computer-assisted combat decision-support devices. It
of possible verification measures. Such efforts will might also incorporate requirements for the rigorous
prove especially important in the area of emerging testing of AI-enabled systems to reduce the risk of
and disruptive technologies, as these involve accidental or unintended outcomes.204
complex technical matters that can be difficult for If the major powers are prepared to discuss binding
experts, let alone policymakers to grasp. Overcoming restrictions on the military use of destabilizing
these impediments, and constructing a common technologies, certain priorities take precedence.
understanding of the problem, will be essential for The first would be an agreement or agreements
any forward progress in this area.202 prohibiting attacks on the nuclear C3I systems of
another state by cyberspace means or via missile
Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements: Once the strikes, especially hypersonic strikes. Another top
leaders of the major powers come to appreciate priority would be measures aimed at preventing
the escalatory risks posed by the weaponization swarm attacks by autonomous weapons on another
of emerging technologies, it may be possible for state’s missile submarines, mobile ICBMs, and other
them to reach accord on bilateral and multilateral second-strike retaliatory systems. Strict limitations
arrangements intended to minimize these risks. Such should be imposed on the use of automated decision-
accords could begin with nonbinding agreements support systems with the capacity to inform or
of various sorts and, as trust grows, be followed by initiate major battlefield decisions, including a
binding treaties and arrangements. requirement that humans exercise ultimate control
As an example of a useful first step, the leaders of the over such devices.
major nuclear powers could jointly pledge to eschew
cyberattacks against each other’s nuclear C3I systems. Without the adoption of measures such as these,
This need not take the form of a binding treaty, but cutting-edge technologies will be converted into
could be incorporated into a joint statement by leaders military systems at an ever-increasing tempo, and the
of the countries involved. While such an agreement dangers to world security will grow apace. A more
“would not be verifiable in the traditional sense,” thorough understanding of the distinctive threats to
Acton suggests, it would be “enforceable” in that each strategic stability posed by these technologies and the
state would possess the ability to detect and retaliate imposition of restraints on their military use would go
against such an intrusion.203 a long way toward reducing the risks of Armageddon.

62 An Arms Control Association Report

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Arms control: Arms control is a form of mutual Hypersonic cruise missile (HCM): HCMs are
agreement(s) or commitment(s) through which states powered by high-speed engines, called scramjets,
might reduce nuclear risks. The benefits of arms during flight and are intended to fly at both greater
control include avoiding an action-reaction arms race; speed and greater altitudes than traditional cruise
reducing incentives to preemptively strike adversary missiles.
military forces, including nuclear forces; lowering the
chances of inadvertent escalation; and saving money. Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV): HGVs are
launched by a rocket before gliding to a target, fly
Artificial intelligence (AI): Artificial intelligence at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles, and feature
can be understood as “computerized systems that significant maneuverability
work and react in ways commonly thought to require
intelligence, such as solving complex problems in Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs): LAWs
real-world situations,” according to the Congressional are weapons systems that can, once activated,
Research Service. AI is an enabling technology that independently select and engage targets without
can be highly tailored to specific applications or tasks. the need for further manual human intervention.
These weapons can be thought of as an application
Asymmetric arms control: Agreement(s) or of artificial intelligence, in that LAWs can be enabled
commitment(s) in which states make non-like-for-like to assess the situational context on a battlefield
exchanges. and determine the counterattack according to the
processed information.
Counterspace capabilities: Outer space is a domain
(similar to air, land, and sea) that is now generally Offensive cyber operations: Cyberspace is a global
considered a warfighting domain, including by the domain within the information environment that
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. can encompass the internet, telecommunications
Department of Defense. Counterspace capabilities networks, computer systems, and embedded
can be understood to refer to systems that can disrupt processors and controllers. Military offensive
operations or have a destructive effect in outer space. operations in cyberspace are intended to project
These include: kinetic physical (e.g. direct ascent anti- power by the application of force in and through this
satellite [ASAT] systems), non-kinetic physical (e.g. domain and can create effects that are intended to
lasers), electronic (e.g. jamming or spoofing), and support operations across the physical domains and
cyber capabilities. cyberspace. Defensive cyber operations, in contrast,
are activities meant to defend cyberspace.
Destination ambiguity: Destination ambiguity
occurs when a state could mistakenly believe that an Strategic stability: Strategic stability is the
incoming weapon is heading for its territory. convergence of arms race stability and crisis stability.

Drones: Drones are known as unmanned underwater Arms race stability: Arms race stability is defined as
vehicles (UUVs), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), a condition in which two adversaries do not have an
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), remotely piloted incentive to build up their strategic nuclear forces.
aircraft (RPA). A drone is a vehicle that does not have
a pilot, crew, or passengers on board, and the vehicle’s Crisis stability: Crisis stability is defined as a
systems are usually controlled from a ground station condition in which nuclear powers are deterred from
or are given a pre-programmed mission. There are launching a nuclear first strike against one another.
two broad categories: drones for surveillance and
reconnaissance missions and drones for combat Target ambiguity: Target ambiguity occurs when a
missions (to include providing close air support to state could mistakenly believe that its nuclear forces
troops on the ground and conducting strikes on were under attack when its conventional forces
specific targets). Drones can also be thought of as a were really the target. This situation could occur in
visual application of artificial intelligence. particular if a state’s nuclear and conventional assets
were “entangled” due to dual-use command-and-
Hypersonic missile: A hypersonic missile travels control systems.
at least five times the speed of sound (Mach 5).
Generally, hypersonic missiles fly at lower altitudes Warhead ambiguity: Warhead ambiguity occurs
than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and when a state could mistakenly believe that a
at greater altitudes than traditional cruise missiles conventional
and are largely intended for regional rather than
intercontinental use.

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 63
ENDNOTES
1. National Security Commission on Artificial Security (NSCAI), 23. See Bugos and Rief, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons, pp. 4–7.
Final Report, 2021, p. 22, https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/ 24. Ibid, pp. 8–14.
uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. 25. Holly Ellyatt, “Russia says it fired hypersonic missiles in Ukraine,”
2. As quoted in Caitlin M. Kenney, “The Next War’s ‘Butcher’s Bill’ Will CNBC, March 22, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/22/
Match WWII’s—Unless the US Adapts, Milley Says,” Defense One, July hypersonic-missiles-why-would-russia-use-the-kinzhal-in-ukraine.html
15, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/07/next-wars- 26. CRS, Hypersonic Weapons, pp. 16–19.
butchers-bill-will-match-wwiisunless-us-adapts-milley-says/183804/. 27. Ibid, pp. 4–14. See also Bugos and Rief, Understanding
3. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Budget Overview: Hypersonic Weapons, pp. 8–11.
DoD Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, pp. 2–4, 2–5, 2–10, 28. UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A
4–6, 4–7, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control, February 2019,
defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-
4. Eric Schmidt, “AI, Great Power Competition & National Security,” weapons-a-challengeand-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
Daedalus, vol. 151, no. 2 (Spring 2022), p. 293. 29. As cited in Theresa Hitchens, “ARRW to Mayhem to the Future of
5. DoD, “Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Secretary of Defense Hypersonic Operations,” Breaking Defense, August 31, 2020, https://
Lloyd J. Austin III (As Delivered),” June 11, 2022, https://www. breakingdefense.com/2020/08/arrw-to-mayhem-to-the-future-of-
defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3059852/remarks-at-the- hypersonic-operations/.
shangri-la-dialogue-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-a/. 30. As cited in Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, “Pentagon Tests
6. Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Defense Primer: Emerging Hypersonic Glide Body,” Arms Control Today, April 2020, https://
Technologies,” updated December 21, 2021, p. 1, https://crsreports. www.armscontrol. org/act/2020-04/news/pentagon-tests-hypersonic-
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11105. glide-body.
7. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 78. 31. See David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in
8. Christopher F. Chyba, “New Technologies & Strategic Stability,” the Cyber Age (New York: Crown, 2018).
Daedalus, vol. 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 150–70. 32. Ibid, pp. 100–23.
9. Ibid, pp. 150–70. See also Vincent Boulanin, et al, Artificial 33. See Kate Conger, “Ukraine Says It Thwarted a Sophisticated
Intelligence, Strategic Stability, and Nuclear Risk (Stockholm: Stockholm Russian Cyberattack on Its Power Grid,” The New York Times, April
International Peace Research Institute, 2020). 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/12/us/politics/ukraine-
10. German Federal Foreign Office, Capturing Technology, Rethinking russian-cyberattack.html.
Arms Control: Conference Reader, November 5–6, 2020, p. 4. 34. For background, see Herbert Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons
11. Schmidt, “AI, Great Power Competition & National Security,” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), pp. 32–34, 44–79.
p. 294. 35. For discussion, see Andrew Futter, “The Dangers of Using
12. Public Law 115-232, John S. McCain National Defense Cyberattacks to Counter Nuclear Threats,” Arms Control Today, July/
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Title II, Section 238. For more August 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-07/features/
on AI definitions, see CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, dangers-using-cyberattacks-counter-nuclear-threats.
Report R45178, updated November 10, 2020, pp. 1–4, https:// 36. See James M. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,”
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45178/10. Daedalus, vol. 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 141–46.
13. CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, p. 2. 37. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 98.
14. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 22. 38. Action, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,” pp. 143–44.
15. DoD, DoD Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, p. 4-7. 39. As cited in Richard Burgess, “Navy’s Unmanned Integrated Battle
16. For background, see CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Problem 21 to Culminate in Missile Shoot,” Seapower, April 20, 2021,
Security, pp. 30–34. https://seapowermagazine.org/navys-unmanned-integrated-battle-
17. DoD, Department of Defense Directive no. 3000.09, “Autonomy problem-21-to-culminate-in-missile-shoot/.
in Weapon Systems,” November 21, 2012, http://www.esd.whs.mil/ 40. As quoted in Jon Harper, “Esper Calls for 500-Ship Navy to
Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. Counter China,” National Defense, Oct. 6, 2020, https://www.
18. For extensive background on such systems, see Paul Scharre, nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/10/6/esper-calls-for-500-
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: ship-navy-to-counter-china.
W.W. Norton, 2018). 41. U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, “CNO NAVPLAN, January
19. For background, see CRS, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: 2021,” p. 6, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002562551/-1/-
Issues for Congress, Report R44466, April 14, 2016, https://crsreports. 1/1/CNO%20NAVPLAN%202021%20-%20FINAL.PDF.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44466/4. 42. As cited in Burgess, “Navy’s Unmanned Integrated Battle
20. For a thorough explication of this position, see Human Rights Watch Problem 21.”
(HRW) and International Human Rights Clinic, Making the Case: The 43. CRS, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Dangers of Killer Robots and the Need for a Preemptive Ban, December 2016, Background and Issues for Congress, Updated March 25, 2021, Report
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/arms1216_web.pdf. R45757, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45757/34.
21.Definition adopted from Shannon Bugos and Kingston Rief, See also Justin Katz, “CNO lays out future fleet he wants: 500 ships,
Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure And the Risks, 12 carriers, 150 unmanned vessels,” Breaking Defense, Feb. 18, 2022,
Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C., 2021, p. 2, https:// https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/cno-lays-out-future-fleet-he-
www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/Reports/ACA_Report_ wants-500-ships-12-carriers-150-unmanned-vessels/.
HypersonicWeapons_2021.pdf 44. U.S. Navy, Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign
22. See CRS, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, Framework, March 16, 2021, p. 15, https://www.navy.mil/Portals/1/
Report R45811, updated Dec. 13, 2022, pp. 2-4, https://sgp.fas.org/ Strategic/20210315%20Unmanned%20Campaign_Final_LowRes.pdf.
crs/weapons/R45811.pdf 45. For background, see Stephen Losey, “How autonomous wingmen

64 An Arms Control Association Report

will help fighter pilots in the next war,” DefenseNews, Feb. 15, 2022, 63. CRS, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems, p. 39.
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/02/13/how-autonomous- 64. See, for example, Cade Matz and Neal E. Boudette, “Inside
wingmen-will-help-fighter-pilots-in-the-next-war/. Tesla as Elon Musk Pushed an Unflinching Vision for Self-Driving
46. Theresa Hitchens, “Skyborg AI Flies Second Drone; Demos Cars,” The New York Times, Dec. 6, 2021, https://www.nytimes.
‘Portability,’” Breaking Defense, June 30, 2021, https://breakingdefense. com/2021/12/06/technology/tesla-autopilot-elon-musk.html.
com/2021/06/skyborg-ai-flies-second-drone-demos-portability/. 65. See Scharre, Army of None, pp. 189–95.
47. As cited in Valerie Insinna, “Coming soon: A U.S. competition for 66. Anish Athalye et al., “Fooling Neural Networks in the Physical
sixth-gen drone wingman could begin in FY24,” Breaking Defense, World With 3D Adversarial Objects,” LabSix, October 31, 2017,
Sept. 7, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/coming-soon-a- https://www.labsix.org/physical-objects-that-fool-neural-nets/. See
us-competition-for-sixth-gen-drone-wingman-could-begin-in-fy24/. also CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, pp. 29–34.
48. See U.S. Army, Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, March 67. For discussion, see Chyba, “New Technologies & Strategic
2017, p. 3, https://mronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ Stability,” pp. 150–70.
RAS_Strategy.pdf. 68. For background on these principles, see Scharre, Army of None, pp.
49. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Meet the Army’s Future Family of Robot 257–61. See also CRS, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, pp. 18–25.
Tanks: RCV,” Breaking Defense, Nov. 9, 2020, https://breakingdefense. 69. HRW, Making the Case, p. 5.
com/2020/11/meet-the-armys-future-family-of-robot-tanks-rcv/. See 70. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “ICRC Position
also CRS, “The Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) Program,” In on Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Geneva, May 12, 2021, p.
Focus, July 14, 2021, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2021-07-14_ 8, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-
IF11876_9568af60be380a1f3db5a25cba402e5eb5321bc3.pdf. weapon-systems.
50. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Weapons Systems 71. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
Annual Assessment, June 2022, pp. 151–152, https://www.gao.gov/ of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
assets/gao-22-105230.pdf. Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, usually
51. See Patrick Tucker, “Russia is Working to Pair Combat Jets and referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Drones, Too,” Defense One, Feb. 17, 2021, https://www.defenseone. or CCW, is also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention.
com/technology/2021/02/russia-working-pair-combat-jets-and-drones- UN, Office of Disarmament Affairs, “The Convention on Certain
too/172109/; Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Armed Forces Expand UAV Conventional Weapons,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-
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program/moscow-forming-first-robotic-military-units/. nytimes.com/2021/12/17/world/robot-drone-ban.html.
52. Rick Joe, “China’s Growing High-End Military Drone Force,” 73. Isabelle Jones, “Historic opportunity to regulate killer robots fails
The Diplomat, Nov. 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/ as a handful of states block the majority,” Stop Killer Robots, Dec. 17,
chinas-growing-high-end-military-drone-force/; H. I. Sutton, 2021, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/historic-opportunity-to-
“China’s Navy Reveals a Large Underwater Robot Which Can Be a regulate-killer-robots-fails-as-a-handful-of-states-block-the-majority/.
Game Changer,” Forbes, Oct. 1, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 74. See Group of Governmental Experts Related to Emerging
hisutton/2019/10/01/china-reveals-new-robot-underwater-vehicle- Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons
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54. DoD, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems. 75. NSCAI, Final Report, pp. 92–95.
55. For background on Phalanx and Harpy systems, see Scharre, Army 76. DoD, “DoD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,”
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Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 65
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84. CRS, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic 103. Mark Gubrud, Rajaram Nagappa, and Tong Zhao, “Test Ban
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87. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister Sergey 106. DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, p. 31, https://media.
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88. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” 108. For background on U.S. cyberattacks aimed at North Korea, see
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90. Jill Hruby, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems: An 110. As cited in Brad D. Williams, “Nakasone: Cold War-style
Open-Source Technical Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November deterrence ‘does not comport to cyberspace,’” Breaking Defense. Nov.
13, 2019, pp. 20, 24, https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/russias- 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/nakasone-cold-war-
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91. Ellyatt, “Russia says it fired hypersonic missiles in Ukraine.” 111. For an assessment of these and other cyber-related risks of
92. As quoted in “‘Falling Behind’: U.S. Admiral Warns of China escalation, see Ariel E. Levite, et al., China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3
Dominance in Hypersonic Missile Race,” South China Morning Stability, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2021,
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article/2133583/falling-behind-us-admiral-warns-china-dominance- 112. For a thorough description of the U.S. nuclear weapons
hypersonic. enterprise and its constituent NC3 systems, see Lin, Cyber Threats
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with China -Air Force secretary,” Reuters, Nov. 30, 2021, https://www. 113. Levite, et al., China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability, p. 15.
reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-hypersonic-weapon-arms- 114. For a comprehensive assessment of the cyber threat, see Sanger,
race-with-china-air-force-secretary-2021-11-30/. The Perfect Weapon. On Russian involvement in so-called “ransomware”
94. On China’s HGV, see Kaplan, “What Should Really Alarm Us attacks, see, for example, David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Biden
About China’s New ‘Hypersonic’ Missile Test.” On the U.S. HGV Warns Putin to Act Against Ransomware Groups, or U.S. Will Strike
test, see Jen Judson, “U.S.-Developed Hypersonic Missile Hit within Back,” The New York Times, July 9, 2021, https://www.nytimes.
6 Inches of Target, Says Army Secretary,” Defense News, October com/2021/07/09/us/politics/biden-putin-ransomware-russia.html.
13, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ 115. For a thorough assessment of these vulnerabilities, see Lin,
ausa/2020/10/13/us-developed-hypersonic-missile-hit-within-six- Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 38–104. See also Beyza Unal
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95. As quoted in Shannon Bugos, “Congress Shouldn’t Rubber-Stamp Chatham House, January 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
Hypersonic Weapons,” Breaking Defense, Sept. 29, 2021, https:// default/files/publications/research/2018-01-11-cybersecurity-nuclear-
breakingdefense.com/2021/09/congress-shouldnt-rubber-stamp- weapons-unal-lewis-final.pdf.
hypersonic-weapons/. 116. Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, p. 91.
96. As quoted in Aaron Gregg, “Military-Industrial Complex 117. Kate Conger and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Says It Secretly Removed
Finds a Growth Market in Hypersonic Weaponry,” Washington Malware Worldwide, Pre-empting Russian Cyberattacks,” The New
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business/2018/12/21/military-industrial-complex-finds-growth- politics/us-russia-malware-cyberattacks.html.
market-hypersonic-weaponry/. 118. Statement of General Paul M. Nakasone before the Senate
97. Peter Erbland, “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG),” Defense Advanced Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2019, https://www.armed-
Research Projects Agency, n.d., https://www.darpa.mil/program/ services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nakasone_02-14-19.pdf.
tactical-boost-glide. 119. Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Command Operation Took Down
98. Andrew Roth, “Russia will act if NATO countries cross Ukraine Russian Troll Farm for Midterm Elections,” The New York Times,
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theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/30/russia-will-act-if-nato-countries- us-cyber-command-russia.html.
cross-ukraine-red-lines-putin-says. 120. For background on these operations, see Sanger, The Perfect
99. CRS, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Weapon, pp. 7–36 and 276–283.
Missiles, pp. 2–3, 23–27. 121. David E. Sanger, “Russian Hackers Appear to Shift Focus to U.S.
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101. Ibid., pp. 126–129. com/2018/07/27/us/politics/russian-hackers-electric-grid-elections-.html.
102. Shannon Bugos, “U.S., Russia Establish Strategic Stability Groups,” 122. For a summary of such scenarios, see Page O. Stoutland and

66 An Arms Control Association Report

Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age: 144. CRS, “In Focus: Nuclear Command, Control, and
Report of the Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group,” Nuclear Threat Communications (NC3) Modernization,” Dec. 8, 2020, https://sgp.
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Cyber_report_finalsmall.pdf. 145. DoD, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, pp. 56–58.
123. James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine, “A New Era in U.S.- 146. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear
Russian Strategic Stability,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Forces, 2019 to 2028, January 2019, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/system/
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Security, September 2017, p. 18, https://www.cnas.org/publications/ 147. For an account of nuclear control accidents during the Cold
reports/a-new-era-in-u-s-russian-strategic-stability. War, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents,
124. Stoutland and Pitts-Kiefer, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
Age,” p. 12. 148. CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, pp. 9–13.
125. See James M. Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement: How 149. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 80
the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risk 150. CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, p. 13.
of Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, vol. 43, no. 1 151. Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin, “America Needs a ‘Dead
(Summer 2018), pp. 56–99. Hand,’” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2019, https://warontherocks.
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June 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/europe/ Command and Control: JAIC’s Shanahan,” Breaking Defense,
russia-us-cyberwar-grid.html. September 25, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/no-ai-for-
127. Miller Jr. and Fontaine, “New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic nuclear-command-control-jaics-shanahan/.
Stability,” p. 19. 153. DoD, “Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control
128. See Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “The Pentagon Has Prepared a (JADC2) Strategy,” March 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Cyberattack Against Russia,” Daily Beast, November 2, 2018, https:// Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-
www.thedailybeast.com/the-pentagon-has-prepared-a-cyber-attack- DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.
against-russia. On the Biden administration’s retention of NSPM-13, 154. As quoted in Colin Clark, “Gen. Hyten On The New American
see David Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, and Nicole Perlroth, “Preparing for Way of War: All-Domain Operations,” Breaking Defense, Feb. 18,
Retaliation Against Russia, U.S. Confronts Hacking by China,” The New 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/gen-hyten-on-the-new-
York Times, March 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/07/us/ american-way-of-war-all-domain-operations/.
politics/microsoft-solarwinds-hack-russia-china.html. 155. Theresa Hitchens, “SecDef OKs Joint Warfighting Concept; Joint
129. U.S. Cyber Command, “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Requirements Due Soon,” Breaking Defense, June 16, 2021, https://
Superiority: Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command,” p. 4, breakingdefense.com/2021/06/secdef-oks-joint-warfighting-construct-
https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20 joint-requirements-due-soon/. See also DoD, “Summary of the Joint
Vision%20April%202018.pdf. All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy.”
130. As quoted in Fryer-Biggs, “Pentagon Has Prepared a Cyberattack 156. CRS, “In Focus: Advanced Battlefield Management System,”
Against Russia.” Sept. 27, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11866.pdf.
131. Levite, et al., China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability, p. 14. 157. On Project Convergence, see CRS, “In Focus: The Army’s
132. Ibid, pp. 32–33. Inadvertest Project Convergence,” Sept. 27, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/
133. See Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, p. 130. weapons/IF11654.pdf. On Overmatch, see Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Navy
134. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,” p. 145. Dedicates More Resources To Secretive Project Overmatch,” National
135. Levite, et al., China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability, p. 40. Defense, Aug. 10, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
136. Acton, “Cyber Warfare and Inadvertent Escalation,” p. 143. articles/2021/8/10/navy-dedicates-more-resources-to-secretive-project-
137. Ibid, pp. 143–44. See also Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear overmatch.
Weapons, pp. 123–31, 143–46. 158. CRS, “In Focus: Joint All-Domain Command and Control
138. Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, p. 128. (JADC2),” Updated Jan. 21, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/
139. UN General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution 66/24, Developments IF11493.pdf.
in the field of information and telecommunications in the context 159. DoD, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 3–16.
of international security, December 2, 2011, https://undocs.org/A/ 160. Ibid.
RES/66/24. 161. As quoted in Theresa Hitchens, “Picking 1st ABMS Capabilities
140. UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in a Top Issue at Air Force Corona,” Breaking Defense, Sept. 23, 2020,
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/picking-1st-abms-capabilities-a-
International Security: Note by the Secretary-General,” A/68/98, June top-issue-at-air-force-corona/.
24, 2013, https://undocs.org/A/68/98. 162. As quoted in Colin Clark, “Nuclear C3 Goes All Domain: Gen.
141. UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in Hyten,” Breaking Defense, February 20, 2020, https://breakingdefense.
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of com/2020/02/nuclear-c3-goes-all-domain-gen-hyten/.
International Security: Note by the Secretary-General,” A/70/174, July 163. As quoted in Aaron Mehta, “Why nuclear command and control
22, 2015, https://undocs.org/en/A/70/174. can’t be separated from JADC2,” Breaking Defense, March 8, 2022,
142. UNGA, General Assembly Resolution A/70/237, December https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/why-nuclear-command-and-
23, 2015, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ control-cant-be-separated-from-jadc2/.
N15/457/57/PDF/N1545757.pdf. 164. Michael C. Horowitz, Paul Scharre, and Alexander Velez-Green,
143. DoD, Defense Budget Overview, DoD Fiscal Year 2022 Budget “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and
Request, chap. 2, pp. 12–14, https://comptroller.defense.gov/ Artificial Intelligence,” December 2019, pp. 12–13, https://arxiv.org/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_ ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf.
Overview_Book.pdf. 165. As noted in Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, “How Might

Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military

Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability 67
Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?” RAND 185. See David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Russia’s Small
Corp., 2018, p. 10, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ Nuclear Arms: A Risky Option for Putin and Ukraine Alike,” The New
perspectives/PE200/PE296/RAND_PE296.pdf. York Times, Oct. 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/us/
166. See Tyler Rogoway, “Look Inside Putin’s Massive New Military politics/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons.html.
Command and Control Center,” Jalopnik, November 19, 2015, 186. See Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/look-inside-putins-massive-new- 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 76, no. 6 (2020), pp. 443–57.
military-command-and-con-1743399678. 187. See Steven E. Miller, “A Nuclear World Transformed: The Rise of
167. As quoted in Joseph Trevithick, “Putin Reveals Existence Of New Multilateral Disorder,” Daedalus, vol. 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 17–36.
Nuclear Command Bunker,” The Warzone, Nov. 11, 2020, https:// 188. See Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement.”
www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37569/putin-reveals-existence-of- 189. For a review of the arms control “toolbox” and other proposals
new-nuclear-command-bunker-and-says-its-almost-complete. for controlling destabilizing technologies, see Jon Brook Wolfsthal,
168. Fiona Cunningham, “Nuclear Command, Control, and “Why Arms Control?” Daedalus, vol. 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020), pp.
Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China,” 101–15. See also Giacomo Persi Paoli, Kerstin Vignard, David Danks,
Nautilus Institute, July 18, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/ and Paul Meyer, Modernizing Arms Control: Exploring Responses to
napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-and- the Use of AI in Military Decision-Making (Geneva, Switzerland: UN
communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. Institute for Disarmament Research, 2020).
169. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 190. Jones, “Historic opportunity to regulate killer robots fails.”
Republic of China 2021, Annual Report to Congress, p. 89, https://media. 191. “Minister’s Declaration at the Occasion of the Conference
defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. ‘Capturing Technology, Rethinking Arms Control,’” November 6,
170. See CRS, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, pp. 29–34. 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-
171. On the Petrov incident, see Scharre, Army of None, pp. 1–2. rethinking-arms-control/2413346.
172. Horowitz, Scharre, and Velez-Green, “Stable Nuclear Future?” 192. Pugwash, “Geneva Workshop on Hypersonic Weapons,”
p. 17. Geneva, Dec. 15, 2019, https://pugwash.org/2019/12/15/geneva-
173. Geist and Lohn, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the workshop-on-hypersonic-weapons/.
Risk of Nuclear War?” p. 18. 193. Pugwash, “Geneva workshop on Cyber Security and Warfare,”
174. Scharre, Army of None, pp. 199–230. March 2, 2020, https://pugwash.org/2020/03/02/geneva-workshop-
175. Freedberg Jr., “No AI for Nuclear Command and Control: JAIC’s on-cyber-security-and-warfare-2/.
Shanahan.” 194. NSCAI, Final Report, pp. 97–100.
176. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 97. 195. DoD, “DoD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence.”
177. Ibid, pp. 97–103. 196. DoD, Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
178. Scharre, Army of None, pp. 199–210. Pathway, June 2022, https://www.ai.mil/docs/RAI_Strategy_and_
179. “Autonomous weapons that kill must be banned, insists Implementation_Pathway_6-21-22.pdf.
UN chief,” UN News, March 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/ 197. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,” pp. 143–44.
story/2019/03/1035381. 198. See Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 116–17.
180. Shannon Bugos, “U.S., Russia Establish Strategic Stability Groups.” 199. Joint Statement on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, First
181. Written Statement of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Senate Committee, Oct. 21, 2022.
Armed Services Committee, April 26, 2018, https://www.armed- 200. Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, “No Progress Toward Extending
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mattis_04-26-18.pdf. New START,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2020, pp. 31–32.
182. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 201. NSCAI, Final Report, p. 99.
China, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” July 2019, http:// 202. See, for example, Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134–38. See also
english.www.gov.cn/atts/stream/files/5d3943eec6d0a15c923d2036. Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, and Casey Mahoney, “The
183. See Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Military Scientists and Future Future of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: A Role for
Warfare,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 5, 2019, https://jamestown.org/ Confidence-Building Measures? Orbis, Fall 2020, pp. 527–43.
program/russias-military-scientists-and-future-warfare/. 203. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,” p. 145.
184. DoD, Nuclear Posture Review 2018. On Russian nuclear doctrine, 204. See, for example, Vincent Boulanin, Kolja Brockmann, and Luke
see Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker, “Russia’s Nuclear Richards, Responsible Artificial Intelligence Research and Innovation for
Weapons in a Multipolar World,” Daedalus, vol. 149, no. 2 (Spring International Peace and Security (Stockholm: Stockholm International
2020), pp, 37–55. Peace Research Institute, 2020).

68 An Arms Control Association Report

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan
membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for
effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine,
Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policymakers, the press and the interested public with
authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and
agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds
on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a
broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.
Increasingly in recent years, advanced military powers have begun to incorporate and
rely on new kinds or new applications of advanced technologies in their arsenals, such
as artificial intelligence, robotics, cyber, and hypersonics, among others.

The weaponization of these technologies may potentially carry far-ranging,

dangerous consequences that expand into the nuclear realm by running up the
escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear
attack. Arms control, therefore, emerges as a tool to slow the pace of weaponizing
these technologies and to adopt meaningful restraints on their use.

This report examines four particular new kinds or new applications of technologies—
autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyberattacks, and automated
battlefield decision-making—and proposes a framework strategy aimed at advancing
an array of measures that all contribute to the larger goal of preventing unintended
escalation and enhancing strategic stability.

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