B E L F E R C E N T E R PA P E R
Time to Decide and Act
A Call for an Israeli Initiative
Dan Meridor
S E N I O R F E L LO W PA P E R
J A N UA R Y 2017
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
www.belfercenter.org
Design & Layout by Joshua Coe
Cover photo:
An Israeli settlement is seen in the top of a hill near the West Bank city of Ramallah, Thursday,
April 19, 2011. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Copyright 2017, President and Fellows of Harvard College
Printed in the United States of America
B E L F E R C E N T E R PA P E R
Time to Decide and Act
A Call for an Israeli Initiative
Dan Meridor
S E N I O R F E L LO W PA P E R
J A N UA R Y 2017
About the Author
Dan Meridor, who until recently was Israel’s deputy prime minister and
civilian head of intelligence, is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center.
Meridor has been a central player in Israeli politics for more than 30 years.
He served as a cabinet secretary from 1982-84 under Prime Ministers
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, and was first elected to the Knesset
for the Likud Party in 1984. He has held a series of prominent Cabinet
positions, including minister of justice in Shamir’s government from
1988-92. In 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed Meridor
as minister of finance.
Meridor and several other members of Likud and the Labor Party later
formed a new party called Israel in the Center. He was reelected to the
Knesset for the Center Party in 1999 and became chairman of the Knesset’s
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, one of a number of prominent
foreign affairs roles Meridor has held.
He later served as Knesset observer to the Council of Europe, and after
he lost his seat in the 2003 election he served as international chair of the
Jerusalem Foundation. He also was chairman of the committee that wrote
Israel’s defense doctrine, submitted in 2006.
Table of Contents
The Success Story of Israel......................................................1
The Unresolved Conflict ..........................................................2
Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)
and the Gaza Strip .....................................................................3
The Problem.................................................................................4
Two Options.................................................................................5
In the Absence of an Agreement .........................................6
The Proposed Initiative ...........................................................7
Israel After the Initiative ..........................................................8
Reflections on the Future........................................................8
Conclusion....................................................................................9
In this Sunday, Oct. 11, 2015 photo a
Palestinian woman walks by a Jewish
child as he lights candles where a
stabbing attack took place in Jerusalem’s
Old City. (AP Photo/Oded Balilty, File)
The Success Story of Israel
Israel is a remarkable success story.
Israel has developed a defense capability that defies a
dramatic asymmetry in resources, population and territory
with its neighbors and serves as an effective deterrent
against its enemies. It has successfully coped with all
military challenges and convinced some of its enemies to
accept its existence and even sign peace treaties with it.
Israel’s economy is steadily growing and has reached
a level of close to 40 thousand dollar GDP per capita. It is
globally recognized as a “Start-up Nation”. It has a low rate of
unemployment and enviable high-tech industries. It is a
member of the OECD. Recently, it found significant reser-
voirs of gas in the Mediterranean Sea.
Israel’s academic institutions produce high level graduates,
scholars and scientists. They thrive for excellence and the
numerous Nobel laureates from the small State of Israel
illustrate the high intellectual and scientific level of the
Israelis.
Israel’s population has grown significantly. Starting with
600,000 Jews in 1948, its population is now around 8.5
million— out of them 6.5 million Jews. It has successfully
absorbed into its society millions of Jews from all over the
world, including more than a million Jews from the former
Soviet Union within a few years after the latter collapsed.
From a historic perspective— within a short period of time,
the Jews ascended from the abyss of total helplessness that
led to the massacre of Jews in Europe to the climax of a
defensible and prosperous independent state in the Middle
East.
From a geopolitical perspective, Israel is a strong and viable
democracy in the midst of a very troubled region.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 1
The Unresolved Conflict
2
Immediately after the victory of 1967, the National Unity
Government offered the Golan Heights to Syria and the Sinai to
Egypt in return for peace. Both Syria and Egypt refused.
It took another ten years of stalemate and another war— the
Yom Kippur War in 1973— before Prime Minister Menachem
Begin led Israel into the historic breakthrough of Peace with
Egypt (1977-1979). In return for peace, Israel gave the Sinai
Peninsula back to Egypt. Begin and Sadat’s courageous
leadership changed the course of history.
In 1981, Israel applied sovereignty to the Golan Heights, giving
the inhabitants (who had been Syrian citizens) permanent Israeli
residency and offering them Israeli citizenship. In spite of this,
Israeli governments (Rabin, Barak and Netanyahu) continued to
offer territorial concessions for peace with Syria, but the
negotiations never bore fruit. Now, according to Israeli law
(though not necessarily by international law), the Golan Heights
are part of Israel. The 20,000 Druze inhabitants of the Golan
Heights enjoy full equality with all the other residents of Israel.
They have the right to become Israeli citizens and vote to the
Knesset. Some of them do that.
Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)
and the Gaza Strip
Unlike the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, Judea and
Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip are part of the Historic
Land of Israel (or Palestine). The Jews have a historic claim to
them. They have been a part of the British Mandate over
Palestine.
Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, lost it to Israel in 1967 and
gave up its claim in 1988. The Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt
in 1948 and ruled by it, although it was never annexed by Egypt.
Its inhabitants have never been accorded Egyptian citizenship.
Egypt lost the Gaza Strip to Israel in 1967.
Numbers are not certain, but probably over four million
Palestinians reside in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 3
It is clear to all inside Israel (hawks and doves alike) and to the
international community that the current situation in these
territories is temporary, and not a solution or a steady state.
That is why different Israeli governments have proposed various
solutions to the unresolved problem, including a territorial
compromise (the Alon plan), a functional compromise of
undefined sovereignty with autonomy and optional citizenship
(Begin’s Autonomy plan), the Camp David Framework for Peace,
and so forth.
No agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was reached
until the Oslo Accord was signed in 1993. Israel recognized the
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian People.
The agreement was partially implemented, but the negotiations
about the end of conflict were never concluded. Bold attempts
to end the conflict with the establishment of a Palestinian State
alongside Israel failed. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO,
rejected Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s proposal at Camp David in
2000 and Abu Mazen, President of the Palestinian National
Authority, did not accept Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal
in 2008.
In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, up-
rooting all the Israeli settlements there. In 2007, Hamas took
over the Gaza Strip, where it has ruled ever since. A physical
fortified border separates Gaza from Israel. Goods are crossing,
but people are not.
The Problem
In Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) live now around two
million Palestinians (estimates range between 1.8 and 2.8
million) and around 400,000 Jews. The territory has never been
annexed to Israel and its sovereignty is undefined. The Jews are
citizens of Israel. The Palestinians are not. The Jews live there as
if they are in Israel; they freely cross the lines between Israel and
the territory every day. The Palestinians there are not allowed to
cross into Israel without a revocable permit, which only a few
get. The Jews there vote— as if they live in Israel— in the
general elections for the Knesset, which legislates and forms the
government. The Palestinians cannot vote in the national
elections.
4
The Jews can come and go abroad at their will; Palestinians
need a special permit.
Clearly, this is not a normal situation. The anomaly, justified as it
may be as a temporary situation, needs to be resolved on a
permanent basis.
The Two Options
The resolution can basically be one of two options: One state
from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea or two states in
that territory. Tertium non datur. There is no third option.
The “one state solution” will inevitably be a bi-national state,
with a small majority for either the Jews or the Arabs. Given the
fear and hatred between the two parties, it is highly probable
that this “one state” will sink in terror and bloodshed. But even if
this state survives, it will be the tragic end of the Zionist vision
of a Jewish State. In order for a state to be Jewish and
democratic, it has to be comprised of a stable, significant Jew-
ish majority. This will certainly not be the case in a “one state”
solution.
Some people devise all sorts of mechanisms designed to keep
full Israeli control forever without granting full equality to the
Palestinians. Some misquote Begin’s autonomy plan, which
offered autonomy and open sovereignty. Begin, a true
democrat, specifically insisted that Arabs who live within the
autonomy should have an option to become Israeli citizens and
vote for the Knesset. Otherwise, he even indicated that it will
become an Apartheid regime, a “Rhodesia” as he said in the
Knesset. Since the vast majority of Israelis— including the
hawkish parties— do not want Palestinians to vote for the
Knesset, they are in fact rejecting Begin’s autonomy plan. In-
stead, they will have to choose between giving up part of the
land and giving up democracy.
Zionism was based on values of justice and democracy. It
demanded a Jewish majority in order to establish the Jewish
State. The main Zionist claim— a Jewish majority— is needed
only because everyone in the state— Jew and Arab— should
have a right to vote. If Arabs are prevented from becoming
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 5
citizens and voting, one does not need a majority, but one
ceases to be a democracy. This option is a distortion of Zion-
ism. It takes away Zionism’s most significant value: Justice.
A “two state solution”— The Jewish State of Israel and The
Arab State of Palestine— entails challenges and risks. These
have to be resolved. The risks have to be managed in a way
that does not put the security and well-being of Israel in
jeopardy. But these serious challenges and risks are not exis-
tential. A one state solution is not only an existential threat,
but a highly probable recipe for the destruction of the realized
Zionist dream: the success story of the state of Israel.
In the Absence of an Agreement
In order to resolve the conflict with a two state solution, an
agreement is necessary. The agreement should establish
peace and put an end to all claims between the parties. But so
far the attempts to reach an agreement with the Palestinians
have failed.
What should Israel do now? Remaining on the course of the
last 50 years may inevitably lead to a one state solution. The
continued settlement activity makes it more and more difficult
to separate the populations and to create a Palestinian State.
Are we not already in a de facto one state situation with nu-
merous noncontiguous enclaves of Palestinians (“A zones”)?
What will Israel do if the Palestinians accept the one state
reality and demand an equal right to vote? Shall we then offer
them isolated enclaves of autonomy with no voting rights,
while we enjoy full sovereignty? Did this work in any other
place on earth?
Staying the course which Israel has followed the last 50 years
entails an existential threat to Israel, because we will steadily
slide on a slippery slope into a one state reality. In the
meantime, Israel, which otherwise enjoys the support of
powerful friends, is losing the moral high ground and serious-
ly risking its international standing.
More and more, Israelis, whose democratic values and sense
of justice conflict with the reality of “occupation”, cannot live
with this cognitive dissonance.
6
Rather than changing the reality to adhere to their values, they
change their values to adhere with the reality.
What then should Israel do now to halt this internal and
external deterioration?
The Proposed Initiative
Here is a proposal for a new Israeli policy, which will change the
present course. It will disable the “one state solution” and
enhance a ”two state solution” and revive the credibility of
Israel’s declared policy of reaching a reasonable solution and
return clarity and justice to the Zionist cause.
• The Government of Israel states that its goal is an agreed
resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians by the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel and the end
of all claims.
• The Palestinian State shall be demilitarized and other secu-
rity measures should be taken to safeguard Israel’s security.
• The border between Israel and the Palestinian State will
be negotiated by the parties on the basis of mutually
agreed changes to the armistice lines of 1967. Israel will
insist that the border includes in Israel the main settlement
blocks, situated behind the “security fence” (hereinafter: “the
fence”). The rest of the territory is proposed for the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian State.
• Israeli settlement activity will be coherent with the border
Israel proposes. Consequently, from now on, Israel will re-
frain from any settlement activity east of the fence.
• Israel will not withdraw its defense forces as long as there is
no agreement preserving Israel’s security.
• The Government of Israel will offer the Jews who live out-
side the fence assistance to move voluntarily into Israel’s
future boundaries. Those who choose not to move will stay
there, protected by the IDF, until this issue is resolved in a
full peace agreement that ends the conflict.
• Israel will withdraw all its civilian functions for the Palestin-
ians in the area designed for the Palestinian State. It will do
so in coordination with the Palestinian Authority, or— in
case there is no cooperation— unilaterally. The withdrawal
of Israeli civilian functions will start immediately and will be
carried out gradually.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 7
All the steps mentioned above should be taken in
consultation with Jordan and other Arab States. These steps
can serve as tools for upgrading and exposing existing
relations and cooperation with Arab States and encouraging
those states to help persuade Palestinians to accept the
Israeli proposal.
Israel after the Initiative
This will create an entirely new reality. The emergence of a de
facto border line (even if not final and negotiable) will clearly
signal the two-state option and stop the slippery slide to a
one state reality. Israeli settlement activity will be coherent
and logical in the context of an Israeli proposal to end the
con-flict within reasonable boundaries, while safeguarding
Israel’s security. Most importantly, the Israeli policy will again
look reasonable and just to Israelis, Palestinians and others.
One will be able to defend it. If it regains broad international
(and internal) support, it may lead the other side to rethink
their position and force them to accept the reality of a two
state solution.
Reflections on the Future
If this new Israeli policy eventually leads to the establishment
of a Palestinian State as a peaceful neighbor to Israel, one
should reflect on additional steps, which make sense in the
long run even if they seem quite improbable now. One
should consider close links among the Palestinian State, Israel
and the Kingdom of Jordan. These links should begin with
agreements based on common security interests against
terror and other destabilizing forces. Security links must be
accompanied by closer economic cooperation: free trade
agreements, joint projects, common use of energy, roads and
railways and so forth.
The national and religious attachment of the Jews to their
historic homeland makes it very painful to partition the land.
One should assume parallel feelings on the Arab side.
Reconstructing the region with close bonds among Israel, Pal-
estine and Jordan may partially alleviate this painful and hard
process of accepting territorial compromises.
8
The Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign and
stable country, with strong strategic ties with Israel and a
unique link with the Palestinians. The common interest of
the three parties in security and stability in this very unstable
and violent region may add another reason for strengthening
these bonds. In addition, creating a bigger common market,
with complementary comparative advantages, will
significantly help the new Palestinian state build a stronger
economy with its neighbors. The Palestinian population,
living in the Palestinian State, Jordan and Israel can only
benefit from these bonds among the three states.
All these reasons point at the remarkable benefits that will
accrue to all concerned in establishing strong links among
Israel, Jordan and Palestine. This might gradually extend from
bilateral and trilateral economic agreements and security co-
operation all the way to confederation (or federation) while
all parties keep their national identity and interests.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Israel, the unique success story of the just cause
of Zionism, is on the wrong path regarding the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. We have to change this course and we have to
do it now.
There are risks involved in the initiative proposed here. These
risks should be weighed against the risk in not taking this
initiative, in continuing on the present course. The risks of
changing course can and should be resolved. The other risk,
of continuing the present policy, is existential.
It is for the Israeli leadership to take this decision. Time is of
the essence. The Israeli leadership has to take this initiative
now.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 9
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
www.belfercenter.org
Copyright 2017, President and Fellows of Harvard College
Printed in the United States of America
