The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-22-2

Commandant Features
8 Train to Outthink, Outmaneuver, Outfight Enemy
BG THOMAS M. FELTEY 1LT Hyun J. Chang
Editor in Chief 19 Competitive Visualization: The Reconnaissance and Security Formation and
LISA ALLEY

What it Brings to Multi-Domain Operations
MAJ Chris D. Thornton
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army 25 Forgotten Fundamentals in Reconnaissance and Security
Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Kark- CPT Jordan Woodburn and CPT Christopher Kiriscioglu
er Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. 29 Be a Better Mentor
LTC Allen Trujillo
Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR represents the
professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily re- 32 The Cube Division: A New Template for Armored Warfare?
flect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Michael MCabe
or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or super- 35 The U.S. Army Should Establish a Robotics Branch
sede any information presented in other official Army publications. John Dudas
Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government
property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR editorial of-
fices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the author’s intel-
lectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work it-
self — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public do-
main upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec-
essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet
publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for
clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate
changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content re-
mains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copy-
righted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work
is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should
be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however,
ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in-
stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special
arrangement.
As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional de- Departments
velopment of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR focuses on materials 1 Contacts
for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire 2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch
ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers;
5 Gunner’s Seat
weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series en-
listed Soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored 7 Letters to the Editor
and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 39 From the Screen: The Screen In-Depth by 1LT Caleb B. Welch
19-series officers and CMF 19-series enlisted Soldiers; and informa- 42 What’s Your Next Move? solution by LTC Ben Ferguson
tion concerning the training, logistics, history and leadership of ar- 44 Book Reviews
mor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and be-
46 Featured Unit: 635th Armor Regiment
low, to include threat units at those levels.
Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Official distribution is made as one copy for each armored brigade
headquarters; armored cavalry regiment headquarters; armor bat-
talion headquarters; armored cavalry squadron headquarters; re-
connaissance squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop,
armor company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S.
Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and
Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di-
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the
personnel for such organizations may request two copies by send-
ing a request to the editor in chief.
Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indi-
cated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to
ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR,
McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort
Benning, GA 31905.

2208902
Spring 2022, Vol. CXXXVIV, No. 2
Armor School Points of Contact
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as email at-
tachments to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@army.
mil. For all submissions, please include a complete mailing
ARMOR Editorial Office
ad­d ress and daytime phone number.
Editor in Chief
SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: We ordinarily do not print articles Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503
that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, Email: [email protected] DSN 835
other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article
to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Writer-Editor
Gary A. Jones (706) 545-8701
GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional photo Email: [email protected] DSN 835
prints or electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300
dpi PNG or JPG format. (Please do not send photos embedded Covers, Art Support, Tanks of the World Feature
in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use Power­Point for illustra- Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754
tions, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shad- Email: [email protected] DSN 835
ing. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or
photo submissions, contact the Editor in Chief.
UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery U.S. Army Armor School
problems or changes of unit address, email usarmy.benning.tra-
[email protected]; phone DSN 835-2698 or Commandant (ATZK-DF)
com­mercial (706) 545-2698. Requests to be added to the of- BG Thomas M. Feltey (706) 545-2029
ficial dis­t ribution list should be in the form of a letter or email Email: [email protected] DSN 835
to the Editor in Chief.
Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF)
EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor School, COL Sean W. Barnes (706) 545-2029
ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W141A, 1 Email: [email protected] DSN 835
Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.
Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of CSM Levares J. Jackson Sr. (706) 545-3815
Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit Email: [email protected] DSN 835
is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright
is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the 194 th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/re- COL Jason H. Rosenstrauch (706) 626-5969
printing permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in Email: [email protected] DSN 620
Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite 316 th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ)
W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. COL Peter C. Glass (706) 626-8670
ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine Web­ Email: [email protected] DSN 620
site at www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626-TANK (8265)/DSN 620: The Ar- George DeSario (706) 545-1352
mor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with Email: [email protected] DSN 835
questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and Army Capability Manager-Armored (CDID TCM-BCT-MC)
equipment of the armor force. Brigade Combat Team and Reconnaissance 706.626.2444
COL Jason T. Kidder DSN 835
Email: [email protected]
Army Capability Manager-Security Force (ATZB-CIG)
Assistance Brigade 706.545.5054
LTC Melvin S. Jackson DSN 835
Email: [email protected]
CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG Thomas M. Feltey
Chief of Armor/Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

Armor Standardization
and Training Strategy
2030
“True intuitive expertise is learned requirements created inconsistencies Training and Standardization Pro-
from prolonged experience with good with our overall approach to lethality gram.
feedback on mistakes.” -Daniel Kahne- and expertise.
man Other near-term efforts include build-
The Armor Standardization and Train- ing and implementing a tank- and
Readiness and expertise remain foun- ing Strategy 2030 focuses on a sys- Bradley-commander certification test
dational to our lethality as a branch. tematic approach that codifies the for all tank and Bradley commanders.
However, the real question that must necessary structures and enforcement In early March 2022, 316th Cavalry Bri-
be asked is, “In what way must we fo- mechanisms that are needed to stan- gade provided a draft of the tank-com-
cus our expertise and readiness?” dardize training and leader develop- mander certification test, and the bri-
ment within the branch. Our strategic gade is currently working on a draft
It is true that over the past 20 years,
framework links standardization Bradley-commander certification test
the atrophy of large-scale combat
across training requirements and lead- for review.
skills led to a decline in lethality. After
the III Corps Lethality Study, the con- er development to build expertise in
Both of these certifications will focus
sensus among leaders to rectify the mounted warfare. As part of the initial
on written and physical demonstration
problem was a focus on improving our concept development, we categorized
of knowledge on each respective plat-
approach to gunneries. While improv- the big ideas into near, mid- and far
form. We see the incorporation of
ing the Integrated Weapons Training objectives (illustrated in Figure 1) as
these tests as a requirement for all
Strategy (IWTS) was a significant step we move toward 2030. Future work
tank and Bradley commanders at the
in the right direction, Armor units across the Maneuver Center of Excel-
completion of professional military ed-
across the force still fail in platform lence over the spring, summer and fall
ucation (PME) and before assuming
proficiency as demonstrated through of this year will incorporate working
duties at their units. We see the ad-
an inability to meet basic gunnery, groups to build detailed plans that
ministrators of these tests as battal-
training and maintenance standards. codify our objectives, with the end-
ion- and company-level MGs, who will
state being the implementation of a
After feedback and observation from use them as part of an assessment to
pilot program.
across the force, the root of the prob- advise battalion commanders on the
lem comes from a lack of uniform ad- To start with, the U.S. Army Armor readiness of their leaders.
herence to existing standards, systems School is working with the Directorate Other near-term objectives to increase
and processes. While we have quality, of Training and Doctrine and 316th Cav- expertise involve increasing one-sta-
proven standards, they are not univer- alry Brigade to develop overarching tion unit training (OSUT) tank/Bradley
sally followed for a number of reasons. policies and manuals that will guide maintenance training and requiring all
To name a few, fluctuating operation- enforcement of standards. These OSUT graduates to be licensed drivers.
al-tempo requirements, inadequate products will range from adjustments
master-gunner (MG) manning and an to the IWTS to the development of a Finally, we placed several recent Ma-
increased latitude afforded to com- training circular (TC) similar to that of neuver Captain’s Career Course gradu-
manders to determine training TC 3-04.11, Commander’s Aviation ate captains in the MG course. Over

2 Spring 2022
Figure 1. The “big ideas” – future goals categorized based on near/mid/far objectives for future planning efforts.

the next year, they will help us identi- (Figure 2).​At its core, the RL progres- collective effort across the Army to
fy and integrate key course compo- sion model is the foundational struc- achieve. For example, expanding ex-
nents to address knowledge gaps with ture for implementing the big ideas pertise for 10-level tasks, or possibly
our company-grade PME. Their mis- from Figure 1. creating a 15-level for armored crew-
sion is advisory only; they will receive men, would require cooperation
no badges. However, these officers We are currently exploring ways to ag- with Ordnance Corps.​ The creation of
will provide feedback to help us in- gregate individual qualifications based a branch-wide command maintenance
crease the knowledge requirements of on RLs to build crew qualification, al- standard which will include the stan-
our students on their platforms. lowing for greater battalion-com- dardization of the following:
mander flexibility in certifying crews
• Global Command Support System-
Based on their recommendations, we and reducing the number of sustain-
Army (GCSS-Army) proficiencies by
will look to revise our PME to deliver ment gunneries required to keep for-
duty position;
graduates who possess 1) a greater mations qualified. This does two
understanding of MG roles and re- things. The first is to better link PME • GCSS-Army data tracked and
sponsibilities at echelon; 2) an in- requirements to expertise and knowl- reported at unit level; and
creased knowledge of key technical as- edge needed upon arriving at a unit. • Metrics for maintenance efficiencies.
pects of vehicle systems; and 3) an ex- Secondly, it will create a system across
panded understanding of weapon and the branch whereby an individual who Currently GCSS-Army is a data-driven
turret maintenance. By distributing conducts permanent-change-of-sta- system where trends at echelon are
this knowledge across the force, we tion from one post to another can ex- not tracked universally. We want to
will build the foundations needed for pect the same requirements, stan- look beyond operational-readiness
expertise. dards and standard operating proce- rates driven by the Status of Resourc-
dures for qualification and certifica- es and Training Systems to create a
As part of the readiness-level (RL) pro- tion. Doing so, we will better manage system that better understands issues
gression model, we look to increase talent, provide training stability at our platforms have. For example, cre-
the role of the battalion MG to be- echelon and create a unified system ating systems to track common non-
come the standardization instruc- for knowledge and expertise. mission-capable faults, lead times for
tor and officer that links RL programs replacement and issues with vendor
to standardized unit training plans Looking long-term, as we implement provided parts allows us to keep the
from individual to platoon tasks initial changes, we will need a greater force informed as well as provide

3 Spring 2022
Figure 2. Leader-development model comparison, potential Armor model. RLs are a way to track individual and collec-
tive crew readiness based on specific criteria, with progression levels based on rank and position. This approach is
similar to how Aviation Branch standardizes and tracks readiness. The final product will be incorporated into a digital-
records system for Soldiers that will span their entire career.

better feedback across the Army en- instructors across U.S. Army Forces can get us there, and I am counting on
terprise as to the functional needs of Command and U.S. Army Training and you to help make it a reality.
our platforms. Doctrine Command positions.
Forge the Thunderbolt!
As we link training to leader develop- Looking ahead, our working groups
ment, we want to identify talent and will continue to refine requirements
grow expertise. This will begin with over the coming months. Our goal is Acronym Quick-Scan
growing the next bench of noncom- to conduct an RL progression pilot (de-
missioned officers (NCOs) through use picted in Figure 2) by the first quarter AGTS – Advanced Gunnery Training
of Excellence in Armor (EIA) in of Fiscal Year 2023. I welcome your System
OSUT and a tank commander/Bradley feedback and ideas as we continue to BATS – Bradley Advanced Training
commander certification exam for the develop our strategy, as well as receiv- System
BOLC – Basic Officer Leader’s
most qualified graduates. ​We are cur- ing the results of the pilot with select
Course
rently working with the Combined brigades in the future. EIA – Excellence in Armor
Arms Center to implement a Digital GCSS-Army – Global Command
Career Record Book that links to exist- The ideas presented here represent a
Support System-Army
ing Army systems of record, where in- large shift from how we have previ- GLFX – gate to live-fire
dividuals can track their certifications; ously operated over the last 20 years. GST – gunnery-skills test
gunnery scores; written annual exam However, as large-scale combat oper- IWTS – Integrated Weapons
scores; platform-activity category ations continue in Ukraine with signif- Training Strategy
(PAC) based on current duty position; icant changes in great-power compe- MG – master gunner
tition in the 21st Century, it is impera- NCO – noncommissioned officer
and future requirements necessary for OSUT – one-station unit training
them to advance in RL categories. tive more than ever that we as a PAC – platform activity category
branch seek ways to improve our PME – professional military
Ultimately, this system will allow us to knowledge and expertise of our plat- education
better assess and distribute talent forms. I believe The Armor Standard- RL – readiness level
across the branch while also allowing ization and Training Strategy 2030 TC – training circular
us to balance quality of Soldiers and

4 Spring 2022
GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Levares J. Jackson Sr.

Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School

Thunderbolt 7 Tools for the

Kit Bag: Competence, Trust
and Communication
“Trust is equal parts character and leaders reassurance that in the event ply the art and science of trust.
competence. ... You can look at any there is an inability to communicate,
Part of this understanding must in-
leadership failure, and it’s always a you will understand how to apply ex-
clude teaching mechanisms that build
failure of one or the other.” -Stephen perience and doctrine to continue and
prudence and sound judgment to en-
M.R. Covey, The Speed of Trust: The accomplish the mission. Vital to our
courage critical thinking and prevent
One Thing that Changes Everything mission as noncommissioned officers
the usage of the preverbal “easy but-
(NCOs), the NCO creed states, “I will
As Armor and Cavalry team members, ton.” NCOs who fully understand the
exercise initiative by taking appropri-
we use the three developmental do- “art and science” of inherent trust are
ate action in the absence of orders.”
mains of leadership – institutional, op- valuable to our ability to continue to
The leader must know you will create
erational and self-development – to grow future leaders within the Armor
a trusting environment among your-
enhance education, training and expe- force. Trust is developed and main-
self, senior leaders and subordinates
rience. For the purpose of this article, tained by leaders who contribute to
based on your competence and edu-
I want to focus on institutional leader- the well-being of Soldiers, their mili-
cation.
ship and how it applies to the opera- tary expertise and to the Army.
tional and self-development aspects. Competence is our watchword. Com-
Trust has a direct relationship on the
petence is the ability to accomplish
In the institutional domain, we focus time and resources required to accom-
tasks in a timely manner with success-
on the foundations of learning and ex- plish the mission. We as leaders must
ful results. It is the embodiment of re-
perience through professional military develop and grow that trust within our
liability to your Soldiers and senior
education (PME) and functional cours- Soldiers so that we maintain our posi-
leaders. We must always strive to up-
es. Through these courses, you grow tive relationship with the American
hold and increase our level of compe-
your military-occupational-specialty people who rely on us to ethically, ef-
tence. Competence is the foundation-
knowledge, applying additional special fectively and efficiently serve the na-
al requirement that enables trust.
skillsets provided in course material to tion.
When combined with an upright char-
better yourself and your formations. acter, your competence enables orga- Communication is another critical
The knowledge imparted to you from nizations to build mutual trust and component of foundational leadership
doctrine while attending these cours- communication to accomplish mis- that enables trust. Communication
es exemplifies the refined lessons- sions with superior results. contributes to trust by keeping others
learned from battle-tested leaders informed, establishing expectations,
over the past 247-year history of our Effective organizational influence re-
providing feedback and developing
Army. However, it is up to you to apply quires the application of competence
commitment. Lack of communication
them. and sound judgment of its leaders to
creates chaos throughout organiza-
build the trust needed for lethal orga-
tions and reduces productivity to com-
Institutional leaders use military doc- nizations. Trust is the key to unit and
pliance rather than commitment.
trine to establish a baseline of knowl- leader success, but remember, blind
edge across all Army leaders. The trust is detrimental. True development Poor communication fails to allow sub-
foundations of doctrine and our PME of NCOs in the institutional domain ordinates time to provide much need-
teaching gives commanders and must ensure they understand and ap- e d b o tto m - u p ref i n e m e nt . A

5 Spring 2022
continued lack of refinement contin- one tool is greater than the other, but profession as the best there is through
ues to foster an organizational distrust when used together, their combined your actions as competent leaders
because it prevents the communica- effect is vital to mission success. who can be trusted.1
tion necessary to complete the mis-
sion. This chaos becomes evident in Competence, trust and communica- Notes
safety failures, discipline incidents and tion are three of the most common af- 1
Army Doctrinal Publication 6-22, Army
training shortcomings. ter-action review comments either af- Leadership and the Profession, July
ter an operation or in a command-cli- 2019, referenced throughout for institu-
Units that fully understand and oper- mate survey. The foundations are built tional, organizational and self-develop-
ate within mission command demon- institutionally, but as lifelong learners, ment discussion.
strate mastery of competence, trust we must constantly strive to earn our
and communication. These types of subordinates’ and leaders’ trust while
organizational leaders understand
Acronym Quick-Scan
providing that inherent trust to our
how the tools we have in our “leader- subordinates in our organizational ac- NCO – noncommissioned officer
ship kit bag” are paramount to accom- tions and self-development. PME – professional military
plishment of our mission and the wel- education
fare of our Soldiers. Remember, no Always communicate the Army

6 Spring 2022
LETTERS
Dear Editor, penetrating cones’ components and Dear Editor,
After seeing what upgrades have been cramming the projectile with explo- At Tillet, Belgium, the Germans staged
given to the Abrams M1A2 Systems En- sives would do it. Then replace the a brilliant defense against the U.S.
hancement Package Version 2 that I fuse from air/ground to impact/delay, 761st Tank Battalion, aided by angry,
have been on since 2016 and to the with the fuse set from the factory on low-hanging clouds and subzero tem-
new Advanced Multipurpose (AMP) impact. peratures. Mobility was limited to the
round that might potentially be issued roads only. On the hilltops above Tillet,
Why an HE round? Because as I read the enemy positioned forward observ-
in a time of war, I am under the im-
many accounts from World War II, I ers. On reverse slopes sprawled well-
pression that the overall design and ca-
saw that all sides expended, on aver- concealed artillery units that had the
pability of how good the M1 can be is
age, significantly more HE rounds than roads zeroed in. It was a bloodbath for
being ruined by good-idea fairies.
armor-piercing (AP) rounds. And when the combatants, especially for the ex-
When I first arrived at my battalion, we in heavy tank-on-tank combat during posed infantry, as German and Ameri-
had the flex mount for the tank com- World War II, HE was still expended can tanks battled it out.
mander (TC)’s .50-caliber weapon. A more than AP. Having an analog system
few years ago, we had the flex mount is generally more reliable and simple Finally, on the evening of Jan. 9, the
replaced with Common Remote-Oper- to understand/maintain. Especially for Germans could no longer continue
ated Weapon Station (CROWS) 3 (“lo main-gun rounds. their resistance and withdrew, with el-
pro CROWS”). The “lo pro CROWS” has ements of 761st Tank Battalion and 87th
become an absolute waste of money Another improvement for the Gunner’s Infantry Division in pursuit. Together
to have on the tank. Why? Because it’s Primary Sight/ Thermal Imaging Sys- they set up barricades along the
another electronic thing that breaks or tem would be to have the turret/hull Marche-Bastogne Road and choked off
stops working, and the .50-cal solenoid position shown in the optic rather than the vital supply artery to German op-
loses timing. To keep it working re- just on the Gunner’s Control Display erations in the Bulge.
quires extra time to ensure that it will Panel. It would be something similar to
how it is in the Commander’s Indepen- More than three-quarters of a century
work properly – vs. the flex mount,
dent Thermal Viewer (CITV). The only have passed since the blood-stained
which was simple and easy.
difference is that it wouldn’t show ground in and around Tillet shuddered
Also, the “lo pro CROWS” blocks the where the CITV is looking. with the shock of battle. But how dif-
TC’s forward vision when he is either SGT BEN SCHNEIDER ferent today is! Belgium has been lib-
in nametape defilade or when he has Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Ar- erated. The pounding of hostile guns
his hatch in “open protective” mode. mored Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat no longer echoes through the valleys.
And it turns the TC into a gunner when Team, 1st Armored Division
he is trying to use it vs. having his head We dedicated this plaque (Figure 1) in
out of the hatch to correctly survey the honor of 761st Tank Battalion Oct. 31,
battlefield. The best thing for the tank Dear Editor, 2021.
is to get rid of the costly and problem- I read with great interest articles relat- JOE WILSON JR.
atic CROWS and replace it with the flex ed to armored cavalry in both the Fall Son of Tech5 Joe Wilson Sr., Company
mount (Commander’s Weapon Sta- 2021 and Winter 2022 issues of AR- B, 761st Tank Battalion
tion). MOR. The two-part article, “Armor Op-
erations in the Battle of Hue: Readying
The AMP round, in concept, is great. Armor for Future Urban Operations,”
The biggest issue I foresee with it is by LTC (Retired) Lee Kichen is excep-
that the Ammunition Data Link that in- tional in detailing the need for ar-
terfaces with the round may break. mored reconnaissance and security in
When that happens, with my under- urban areas. LTC Cole Pinhiero’s “Res-
standing of the round, it basically turns urrecting the 3rd Armored Cavalry Reg-
it into a glorified high-explosive (HE) iment” and MAJ Greg Marsh’s “Task
anti-tank (AT) round, which defeats the Force-Management Approach for the
purpose of developing this new round. Division Cavalry Squadron,” both in the
The AMP round’s capabilities are fan- Fall 2021 issue, were well-written and
tastic; the issue is that it relies on elec- convincing. I commend all three of
tronic components that will break at these authors for their professional-
the worst time. ism, dedicated research and insightful
A better alternative is to take the mul- articles.
tipurpose AT round and turn it into an COLONEL (RETIRED) DAVID TEEPLES
HE round. How to accomplish this? By 43rd Chief of Armor
my understanding, removing all the Honorary Colonel, 3rd Cavalry Regiment Figure 1.

7 Spring 2022
Train to Outthink, Outmaneuver
and Outfight Enemy
by 1LT Hyun J. Chang proximates the disorder of combat.”4 Rifle Focus brought together military
units of the United States, Romania
The enemy the United States is likely Free-play training isn’t just a concept
and Croatia to train with the Polish
to face in future conflicts will be quite that resides in books, and it isn’t new.
Territorial Defense Force, testing them
different from those we’ve engaged in In 1941, in preparation for World War
all as a combined force. The U.S. con-
recent decades. Future enemies will II, the U.S. Army conducted the Loui-
tingent was comprised of units from
likely: siana Maneuvers, FoF exercises that
3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry, 81st Stryk-
• Be a near-peer who possesses involved about 400,000 Soldiers over
er Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) –
capabilities similar to or better than 3,400 square miles. And some of the
called the Dark Rifles – Battery B, 2nd
ours; officers present later became very in-
Battalion, 146 th Field Artillery Regi-
fluential generals such as Omar Brad-
• Want to win as bad as we do, with ment; and Troop A, 1st Squadron, 82nd
ley, Mark Clark, Dwight Eisenhower,
an untethered opposing, hostile and Cavalry Regiment. (Table 1.)
Walter Krueger, Samuel Anderson, Les-
independent will;
ley McNair, Joseph Stilwell and George Why the name “Focus?” Broyles and
• Learn and adapt to how we fight; Patton.5 his staff focused on training BG-P’s
• Need to be “hunted” through mission-essential tasks (METs): expe-
This article aims to demonstrate how
reconnaissance; and ditionary-deployment operations such
effective free-play training is, based on
• Will not be easy to predict. as alert/marshal/deploy (A/M/D), area
an actual free-play FoF exercise called
security and defense, and attack. Spe-
But do we currently train to fight and Rifle Focus, conducted Oct. 4-18,
cial focus was placed on interoperabil-
win against such an enemy? No. In- 2021, by a Stryker infantry-battalion
ity, or the units’ ability to integrate
stead, in most of our training, we fight task force (TF). From the planning
and operate in a North Atlantic Treaty
an opposing force (OPFOR), a roleplay- phase of the exercise, it was blatantly
Organization (NATO) environment
er who is often scripted and told to act obvious how the concept of a free-
alongside allies.6
a certain way to enable the training play exercise was now foreign to the
unit (TU) to achieve a training objec- U.S. Army. When planners sought sup- Each of the three rifle companies
tive. Our missions are usually terrain port for the exercise, it was met with formed a company team, and they
focused – to seize key terrain – with an higher-institutional reluctance and fought one another in a competitive
enemy that is either on the objective skepticism. environment. Company teams includ-
or inbound. ed all elements of BG-P, including mo-
Despite the lack of external support,
bile-gun-system (MGS) and anti-tank
But terrain doesn’t move or think. Is the TF commander, LTC Craig A. Bro-
guided missile (ATGM) Strykers, a
there a better way to train? Yes. By yles, enabled the TF staff to plan, pre-
field-artillery platoon, Romanian Ge-
conducting a free-play force-on-force pare and facilitate a true free-play FoF
pard short-range air-defense platoon,
(FoF) exercise where each side is pre- exercise, one in which the company
Croatian multiple-rocket launchers,
cisely the enemy described above. It teams entered an arena to fight one
U.S. combat engineers and Polish com-
is the superior way to train and how another in a competitive environment.
bat engineers. Our allies were eager to
we should train every time. It trains a What was the result? CPT Trey A. Bot-
be a part of this competitive FoF exer-
unit to “outthink, outmaneuver and ten, a company commander who par-
cise.
outfight the enemy” instead of “pur- ticipated in the exercise, said it “was
suing perfection in method rather the most effective training I’ve ever The 15 days of exercise consisted of
than obtaining decisive results.”1, 2 experienced.” three five-day rotations, where the
first two days of each rotation was re-
What was Rifle Focus? ception, staging, onward-movement
Free-play training Rifle Focus was a FoF multinational and integration (RSOI), and later three
not new maneuver exercise conducted in Po- days “in the box.” Each company team
Using a free-play exercise isn’t a novel land at the Bemowo Piskie Training was in the box for all three rotations,
concept. William Lind describes in his Area (BPTA). As the capstone training two as a TU and one as an observer/
book, 4th Generation Warfare Hand- event for Battle Group Poland (BG-P), coach/trainer (O/C/T) team. (Figure 1.)
book, that free-play is the “best train- it exercised support capabilities as Each three-day rotation “in the box”
ing” and that it “must constitute the well as command and control. Boyles, consisted of three battle periods (BPs):
bulk of the curriculum” for officers in commander of both BG-P and the U.S.
preparation for war. 3 He also wrote TF Dark Rifles from the Washington • A/M/D and receipt of the mission;
that “most training should be [FoF] Army National Guard (WAARNG), over- • Meeting engagement; and
free-play because only free-play ap- saw the entire training exercise. • Defend/attack to destroy.

8 Spring 2022
Figure 1. 15-day exercise schedule.

In the first BP, each company team re- the mission, the second BP began. (FRAGO) to either defend in sector to
ceived an alert from the BG-P head- Each team began the troop-leading destroy the enemy or to attack to de-
quarters to deploy into the tactical-as- procedures (TLP) process and execut- stroy the enemy.
sembly area, upload its ammunition ed its mission to destroy the other
and establish a defensive posture. team. Once the meeting engagement Since there was no Blue Force or op-
Then it received its order to destroy was over, the last BP began when both posing force (OPFOR) in the exercise,
the enemy. Once each team received teams received a fragmentary order each team was assigned as either Gold

9 Spring 2022
Figure 2. TF Dark Rifles training planning guidance.

or Black Team. All the vehicles were O/C/Ts were to adjudicate casualties you learn the most when you teach
marked with gold or black flags on and effects during the exercise. others, and to teach, you must know
their antennas, and Soldiers wore a In the end, exercising the adjudication what you’re talking about (TIME mag-
gold or black armband to distinguish process was valuable training on its azine, “The Protégé Effect” by Annie
the different teams. own. To adjudicate accurately, each Murphy Paul).7, 8, 9, 10
Each team’s leadership from squad O/C/T needed to understand the ef- Competition drives excellence.11 Rifle
leader and above had an O/C/T as- fect of each weapons system, includ- Focus was designed to bring out the
signed. Only six humvees were used ing all indirect-fire (IDF) assets, and competitiveness in every company
for each O/C/T team, and all O/C/Ts how cover, distance, and an element’s commander and Soldier. Months prior,
for squad leaders rode inside the posture affects the damage done to it. we announced that at the end of the
Strykers of the squad they coached to 15-day capstone exercise, there could
minimize artificiality and limit the Rifle Focus based
be only one winner. They were to con-
number of O/C/T vehicles trailing the on 4 ideas duct training to accomplish the mis-
TUs. (Figures 2 and 3.) Rifle Focus was based on four ideas sion of Rifle Focus: to find and destroy
from the following books and article: the opponent. This allowed subordi-
Training without MILES (1) competition drives excellence (Top nate units to prioritize training to dis-
Rifle Focus was conducted without the Dog by Po Bronson and Ashley Merry- cover their own ways to outthink, out-
use of multiple integrated laser-en- man); (2) champions are built by con- maneuver and outfight the enemy.12
gagement systems (MILES). However, sistently training at the threshold of Each commander assessed and trained
given the heavy vegetation on the ter- failure (The Talent Code by Daniel the real needs of their element in-
rain where BG-P was training to fight, Coyle); (3) only free-play training stead of checking the boxes on a
MILES lasers simply wouldn’t be effec- brings in the central element of war: checklist of things to do.
tive. Instead, BG-P developed exten- free creative will of the opponent
sive exercise standing operating pro- (Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, Table 2 is one company’s training plan
cedures (EXSOPs) that outlined how edited by Richard D. Hooker); and (4) to prepare for Rifle Focus.

10 Spring 2022
Figure 3. Rifle Focus task-organization.

During training meetings, command-

ers briefed their training plan to pre-
pare their units to be more efficient at
fighting the opponent. The entire TF,
including sustainers and staff, were in-
tent on meeting the objectives of the
capstone training event, either to fight
to destroy the enemy or to enable
company teams to do so. The focus
was on “obtaining decisive results,”
not “perfection in method.”13
The competitive environment not only
created effective training plans but
created excitement and motivation
among the formations. CPT Brandon
G. Legg, commander of the field-artil-
lery battery, said that at the end of
each rotation, his Soldiers were “dis-
cussing how the battle went, often
leading to discussions about how one
platoon or gun was faster than the
others and how many times one pla-
toon was able to take out the other
platoon.”

11 Spring 2022
typically would be completed by the
engineer platoon leader/platoon ser-
geant to support the maneuver com-
mander or coordinated by the TF en-
gineer.
Placing these tasks on the engineer
squad leader challenged this leader to
perform at a higher level of responsi-
bility, and the maneuver commander
in turn gained experience in how com-
bat support can shape his scheme of
maneuver. Through multiple repeti-
tions of employing FASCAM over the
course of the exercise, each echelon
of leaders gained a better understand-
ing of the planning and coordination
necessary for enabler authorizations
Results, not process the first time in their careers, compa- from higher headquarters.
Rifle Focus incentivized results, not ny commanders were fighting a real
peer-threat with the same capabilities Lastly, more mental stress was im-
the process. The winner of the 15-day posed on the commanders by constant
exercise was determined based on as theirs, free-thinking and with an un-
tethered opposing will. No one knew pressure to provide reports to paint an
who was most efficient at destroying accurate picture of the battlefield to
the enemy. The scoring system was de- where the enemy would be or where
the battle would occur. Each team had the TF commander. By design, each
veloped to incentivize destroying the team wasn’t the main effort in their
high-payoff targets that will cripple to “hunt” (outthink) the other team
using reconnaissance. battalion’s mission. That meant if they
the enemy, rather than just killing wanted to request battalion assets,
more troops/vehicles. Secondly, more stress was added by such as unmanned aerial systems
Table 3 is the scoring matrix. Once per- giving company commanders troops (UASs) from the Polish unit that volun-
sonnel/vehicle were killed, the regen- and equipment in an amount they’d teered to join the exercise, or con-
eration process began, where person- never commanded before, increasing structive close air support from the
nel killed or vehicles destroyed had to “the number of decisions [they] must Joint terminal attack controllers, each
conduct movement to the personnel make.”16 Each company team included commander had to articulate to the TF
holding areas and wait four hours un- its own MGS and ATGM Strykers, a commander through accurate reports
til released back to the exercise. field-artillery platoon, Romanian Ge- why he should grant them more assets
pard short-range air defense, Croatian to support the battalion mission.
During Rifle Focus, it didn’t matter if multiple-rocket launchers, a U.S. long-
company teams completed all the cor- range surveillance team, U.S. combat Operating 2 battalions
rect steps and processes. The only engineers and Polish combat engi- with 1 staff
thing that mattered was if they could neers, totaling about 40 vehicles and The idea of training at the threshold of
accomplish the mission to find and de- 200 Soldiers. Each commander had to failure was equally true for the staff.
stroy the enemy. The company com- fully exercise mission command and To make the exercise work, every staff
manders and platoon leaders weren’t decide how to do it on his own – what section had to solve for “yes” with a
restrained to and graded on a check- extra responsibilities to entrust to the great attitude, usually resorting to a
list such as all the correct elements of executive officer, first sergeant, fire- new and creative idea that hadn’t
the TLP process. Instead, as soon as support officer and other subordinate been tried before. The exercise was
the commanders received the battal- leaders, and how autonomous to planned using the Joint exercise life-
ion order, they were free to immedi- make their attachments. cycle (JELC), and staff officers were
ately begin reconnaissance (or not; taught and coached by the TF com-
the choice was theirs) and develop That meant attachment leaders had to
mander about the process.
and issue an order as extensive or recommend to company commanders
bare as they felt would optimize their how best to use their capabilities and During the planning and preparation
chance of winning combat. areas of expertise. An example of this processes, staff created two battalion
was how to properly employ the re- orders and two Road to War / warning
Training at threshold of failure.14 Rifle mote anti-armor mine/area-denial ar- order (WARNO) / operations order
Focus was designed to train the com- tillery munition family of scatterable (OPORD) / FRAGO briefs. Staff also
panies at the threshold of failure by minefields (FASCAM). The U.S. com- task-organized to be able to battle-
creating a training environment they’d bat-engineer squad leader attached to track and support two teams. Some-
never experienced before.15 First, all each company was required to use the times a single person had to wear two
missions during the exercise were 17-line scatterable-minefield request hats, such as to be the S-2, S-4 or S-6
based on destroying the enemy. For for proper FASCAM authorization. This for both Gold and Black teams.

12 Spring 2022
After rigorous assessment by appoint- They engineered the Joint Battle Com- When one TU’s communication plan
ed safety officers, an exercise map was mand-Platform (JBC-P) system so each was acquired by the other team, S-6
created with battalion checkpoints team could not see the other teams’ had to quickly create another one (al-
and phase lines, then the S-2 created locations on their JBC-P. The tactical- though the exercise director rewarded
a world for company teams to fight in. operations center (TOC) and tactical a TU’s capture of intel by awarding
To eliminate as much artificiality as command post (TAC) had to monitor points and allowing the capturing unit
possible, all boundaries and restricted and receive reports from both teams to exploit the other side’s communica-
areas had to make sense – labeled as with one set of battalion equipment. tion card for several hours). Overall,
the area of operations (AO) for adja- To make this happen, the S-6 shop in- the unpredictable nature of the free-
cent units, enemy minefields, etc. strumentally used parts from the com- play FoF exercise created abundant
mand-post (CP) platform vehicles to opportunities for the staff to solve
Due to the safety measures and coor-
establish two CP systems. They sup- problems under pressure.
dination in place, the 15-day exercise
ported both TUs with one retransmis-
was conducted without any serious in- Fighting a free-thinking enemy.17 Ev-
sion (retrans) team, and they created
juries or accidents. There were real-
two communication plans. ery effort was made to make this a
life vehicle-recovery situations, but true free-play exercise. Other than
they all added to the training value by
Despite all planning and preparation, safety measures in place to ensure the
providing opportunities to use recov-
once the exercise commenced, S-6 had exercise could be executed safely, ev-
ery assets/personnel and by placing
to adapt to unanticipated changes erything was in play. Companies were
stress on the command teams in coor-
such as thick vegetation in the AO, given their constraints and restraints
dinating recovery during combat.
forcing retrans to collapse inward to during the orders brief, and then they
Facilitating the exercise required cre- support the vastly limited range of were allowed to use their creativity to
ativity, especially from the S-6 section. very-high-frequency communications. find and destroy the enemy.

Figure 4. Rifle Focus JELC timeline.

13 Spring 2022
Executing a true free-play exercise had become better at outthinking, outma- squad and platoon levels and facilitat-
many unique characteristics, one be- neuvering and outfighting the enemy. ed AARs at the company-team level.
ing TUs’ experiencing the difficulty of As the exercise unfolded, each compa- During each AAR, the focus was on
finding an intelligent, moving enemy ny team learned to be better at incor- identifying what we’re good at, what
that was trying to avoid detection in a porating fire and maneuver, using re- we need to train at each echelon,
massive, heavily forested training connaissance to find the enemy, then what it meant for our way forward and
area. Since there was no OPFOR who using IDF assets to attack the enemy’s how we should drive our future train-
was alerted of the approaching TU, critical vulnerabilities. Company teams ing based on our self-evaluation. Lead-
sometimes TUs circled each other or drastically increased their emphasis ers were focused on how to change
fought a ghost enemy they assessed to on finding the enemy. They fully used the outcome – how to be better at
be at a certain area – which would be infantry to conduct reconnaissance outthinking, outmaneuvering and out-
realistic when fighting a real enemy. In missions, and they called for fire. Dur- fighting the enemy. The focus was on
such cases, the exercise director ing the exercise, more than 150 fire making ourselves better as an organi-
played a role in keeping the momen- missions processed, and this also fully zation, not the exercise.
tum going. exercised the logistics assets by creat-
“Rifle Focus was different from other
ing the need for logistics packages and
As an example, once TUs spent enough exercises simply because we had the
caches.
time being pressed by the TAC to de- opportunity to be creative,” said Bot-
termine the enemy’s location and in- Company teams learned the impor- ten, commander of Bear Company, the
tent, the TF commander would occa- tance of operating dismounted and of winning team of Rifle Focus 2021. “It
sionally inject enablers. The enablers conducting anti-armor ambushes. Dis- was the first time in my military career
provided intelligence to the TU with mounted ambushes abounded in later when I was not limited to a lane, a sce-
better reports of an assessed enemy’s rotations and were the primary way nario, or left and right limits. I had the
commander’s intent. Or, sometimes, direct-fire kills were achieved. In one opportunity to employ different forms
the TF commander shifted the main of the rotations, a platoon sergeant of maneuver at different periods of
effort to a TU and set a no-later-than from Cobra Company, SFC Schuyler D. the battle, exploit when able, retro-
time to attack across a phase line, Sampsonjackson, led his platoon dis- grade when required and was only lim-
forcing a decision in combat. mounted through thick vegetation, ited by my imagination and combat
found the enemy commander’s Stryk- power. It was a tremendous opportu-
Teachers learn the most.18 Lastly, Rifle er, destroyed it using AT-4 and Javelin nity to test my strengths and limitation
Focus was based on the idea that you fire, and then called for fire to mask in task-organization of enablers, and I
learn the most when you teach oth- his exfiltration out of the area – out- had the opportunity to think critically
ers. 19 Rotations were intentionally thinking, outmaneuvering and out- how my opponent would fight, then
built to give every company an oppor- fighting the enemy. find a way to beat him.
tunity to become the O/C/T. All lead-
ers knew they had to train and coach Rifle Focus demonstrated how a free- “This was the most effective training I
by the rules, so leaders at all levels in- play FoF exercise is a superior way to have ever experienced, and I am grate-
tently studied the EXSOP. And to ev- train. Every company team experi- ful my company had the opportunity
eryone’s surprise, the idea that O/C/ enced growth from its first rotation to to be a part of it,” continued Botten.
Ts are hated proved untrue, as all O/C/ the next. They weren’t afraid to learn “We gained a better understanding of
Ts did their best to coach and facilitate from each other, taking what worked terrain sense; how to separate the
the exercise, and the TUs cooperated, and immediately implementing it to mundane from the important; how to
each knowing their turn to trade plac- improve how they operated. One ex- build a common operating picture
es was coming. Since everyone knew ample was how one company team re- through reporting and mission-com-
they had to be O/C/Ts at some point, duced its time to A/M/D from almost mand systems; and how to fight an op-
leaders showed respect and profes- four hours to 52 minutes in just two ponent that wanted to win just as
sionalism toward their peer O/C/Ts. days. That required meticulously fine- much as we did. We also had the op-
tuning how its Soldiers drew weapons portunity to employ decentralized
The effectiveness of O/C/T teams was from the arms room, completed com- methods to achieve my intent due to
made possible by the three-day O/C/T munications check and moved 40-plus limitations of operational timelines
academy, conducted with full partici- vehicles and 200-plus Soldiers out of and changes of the battle period. This
pation of all team leaders and above. the motorpool. That illustrated how forced me to move away from the tra-
All leaders were of the same under- our formation was capable of figuring ditional TLP process and get back to
standing that “there may be a lot of things out to win the race and outma- [Field Manual] 3-0 tactics in finding
friction points, but we’re going to fig- neuver the enemy. the enemy, identifying the opponent’s
ure it out.” It was required of all peer intent, developing and executing a
O/C/Ts to be fair and impartial profes- The true value of Rifle Focus was the course of action – as opposed to going
sionals. opportunity to genuinely assess our into the fight with a well-refined, well-
units. Each rotation reflected the ef- rehearsed plan.
Results fective nature of our past training. Af-
Rifle Focus accomplished precisely the ter each rotation, each unit had inter- “As a commanding officer, I was the
training objectives of the exercise: to nal after-action reviews (AARs) at training audience and was tested in

14 Spring 2022
test our tactics and find the best pos-
sible way to work together and
achieve victory on the battlefield,”
said Croatian Army 2LT Luka Pavičić.
“It was the last exercise for us here in
Poland and I enjoyed it a lot,” com-
mented Romanian Army 1LT Bogdan
Toma. “In the exercise I learned about
U.S. capabilities, Croatian capabilities.
It was great. I hope that we will have
this kind of exercise more.”

Conclusion
Contrary to all doubts, once the exer-
cise commenced, the entire BG-P be-
gan operating like a single unit, engag-
ing and using every part of the ma-
chine. It required flexibility at all ech-
elons, from the rifleman to staff, and
all the way to the TF commander.
Figure 5. SPC Michael Schwader, a Soldier assigned to 3rd Battalion, 161st In-
fantry Regiment, pulls security during Rifle Focus with a M240B machinegun Leaders at all levels learned to adapt
Oct. 16, 2021, at BPTA, Poland. Different companies competed against eacat and figured it out to keep going and
other as part of Rifle Focus, Battle Group Poland’s two-week-long capstone accomplish the mission.
maneuver exercise. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Jameson Harris) Rifle Focus created precisely what Lind
described as the ideal training to pro-
every capability – training at the I heard a senior leader say to his com-
duce adaptive leaders, placing leaders
threshold of failure,” Botten said. “The pany, for example. What I learned
in “difficult, unexpected situations,
competitive atmosphere encouraged from Rifle Focus is we have developed
then [requiring] them to make deci-
us to take the training seriously and comfort and a natural tendency to at-
sions and take action under pres-
give every ounce of effort at every tack and seize terrain objectives, but
sure.”20 Above all, it created and en-
echelon to win. I did everything I could the skills and techniques to find and
graved in future leaders a mental
to determine the opponent’s course of destroy an enemy formation are dif-
model of what effective training
action, develop a plan to beat him and ferent,” Broyles said. “I and my forma-
should look like: a free-play FoF exer-
then impose a creative will against tion had lost the art of a movement-
cise. Once you experience it, you
him. It was awesome.” to-contact, then maneuvering to de-
won’t want to go back to situational-
stroy an enemy rather than seizing ter-
Free-play FoF training to this scale training exercise (STX) lanes. Everyone
rain. Post-Rifle Focus, we revamped
wasn’t something soldiers from other should train like this.
our entire training plans to consoli-
nations were used to, especially since
date and build on our lessons-learned. 1LT Hyun Jun Chang is a plans officer
they were training with other nations.
The outcome was better than I had with 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry, 81st
Even when some soldiers had multina-
ever imagined. Competition drives ex- SBCT, Kent, WA. His previous assign-
tional training, it was usually limited
cellence. ments include executive officer, Com-
to experience of other nations’ weap-
pany C, 3-161 Infantry, 81 st SBCT,
on systems. “Rifle Focus was also all about inte- Bremerton, WA; and platoon leader,
“Rifle Focus was all about how compe- grating/cooperating with our NATO al- Company C, 3-161 Infantry, 81st SBCT.
tition drives excellence,” summarized lies,” said Broyles. “We are never go- 1LT Chang’s military schools include
Broyles. “Soldiers knowing they are ing to fight alone, and enemies exploit Tactical Information Operations Plan-
competing against their peers rather seams, gaps and joints. Therefore it is ner Course and Infantry Basic Officer
than an assigned OPFOR intensified imperative we seal up those gaps cre- Leader’s Course. He has a bachelor’s
their preparation and execution. They ated when two different armies oper- of arts degree in English literature
really experienced what fighting a ate side by side. We practiced this from the University of Washington. 1LT
near-peer adversary would look like. over and over by fully integrating our Chang was the lead planner for Rifle
The intent was combining competition forces with allies and practicing taking Focus, a multinational free-play FoF
with external peer observers in a free- advantage of their capabilities we did exercise conducted in Poland during TF
play exercise that created as close to not have. In the end, our leaders un- Dark Rifles’ deployment as NATO En-
a real combat environment as possi- derstood the value of our NATO allies hanced Forward Presence Poland.
ble. The outcome was deep experien- we and have consider multinational
tial learning of lessons our Soldiers solutions in all we do.” Notes
would never forget.
1
Army Techniques Publication (ATP)
“Rifle Focus was a great opportunity 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad,
“’You really do win by reconnaissance,’ to work with our allies in [the] field to Headquarters Department of the Army:

15 Spring 2022
Acronym Quick-Scan
AAR – after-action report FPW – final planning work group RF – Rifle Focus
A/M/D – alert/marshal/deploy FRAGO – fragmentary order RSOI – reception, staging, onward
AO – area of operations HICON – higher control movement and integration
ASLT – assault IDF – indirect fire RXL – rehearsal
ATGM – anti-tank guided missile IPC – initial planning conference SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
ATP – Army techniques publication IPW – initial planning workgroup team
BPTA – Bemowo Piskie Training JBC-P – joint battle-command SF – Special Forces
Area platform STX – situational-training exercise
BG-P – Battle Group Poland JELC – Joint exercise lifecycle TAC – tactical command post
BP – battle period LoE – line of effort TEWT – tactical exercise without
CP – command post MET – mission-essential task troops or training exercise without
CPX – command-post exercise MGS – Mobile Gun System troops
DFCM – direct-fire control measure MILES – multiple integrated laser- TF – task force
EA – engagement area engagement systems TLP – troop-leading procedures
EXCON – exercise control MPW – mid-planning workgroup TOC – tactical-operations center
EXSOP – exercise standard NATO – North Atlantic Treaty TU – training unit
operating procedures Organization UAS – unmanned aerial system
FASCAM – family of scatterable O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer WAARNG – Washington Army
mines OPFOR – opposing force National Guard
FoF – force-on-force OPORD – operations order WARNO – warning order
FPC – final planning conference OPT – operational planning team WG – working group

Washington, DC, Aug. 23, 2016. 7

Po Bronson and Ashley Merryman, Top 11
Bronson and Merryman.
2
Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Dog: The Science of Winning and Losing, 12
ATP 3-21.8.
Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland New York, New York: Grand Central Pub- 13
Leonhard.
Battle, New York, New York: Presidio lishing, 2014.
14
Coyle.
Press, 1994. 8
Daniel Coyle, The Talent Code: Great-
ness Isn’t Born. It’s Grown, New York, 15
Ibid.
3
W.S. Lind and U.S. Marine Corps LTC
G.A. Thiele, 4th Generation Warfare New York: Random House Business, 16
Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Op-
Handbook, Castalia House, 2015. 2020. erations Process, Headquarters Depart-
4
Ibid.
9
Richard D. Hooker, editor, Maneuver ment of the Army: Washington, DC: July
Warfare: An Anthology, New York, New 31, 2019.
5
“Louisiana Maneuvers,” Wikipedia; re-
York: Presidio Press, 1993. 17
Hooker.
trieved Oct. 30, 2021, https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
10
Annie Murphy Paul, “The Protégé Ef- 18
Paul.
php?title=Louisiana_ fect,” TIME, Nov. 30, 2011, https://ideas. 19
Ibid.
Maneuvers&oldid=1042011463. time.com/2011/11/30/the-protege-ef-
fect/.
20
Lind and Thiele.
6
LTC Craig A. Broyles, “Dark Rifle 6 Train-
ing Guidance,” 2021.

Figure 6. SGT Sig Johnson, a Soldier

assigned to 3rd Battalion, 161st Infan-
try Regiment, aims an inert M3 Carl
Gustav anti-tank rocket Oct. 16,
2021, at a designated target during
Rifle Focus at BPTA, Poland. (U.S.
Army photo by SPC Jameson Harris)

16 Spring 2022
Figure 9. U.S. Army military vehicles with 3rd Battalion,
161st Infantry Regiment, take defensive positions during
Rifle Focus at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, Oct.
6, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Osvaldo Fuentes)

Figure 7. U.S. Army National Guard SSG Vireak Sok, with

3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry Regiment, leads a Soldier
through a forest during Rifle Focus at Poland’s Bemowo
Piskie Training Area Oct. 8, 2021. Rifle Focus is a force-on-
force U.S.-led training exercise that involves allies from
Battle Group Poland, supporting two U.S. infantry compa-
nies. This exercise measures command-and-control and Figure 10. Croatia Land Forces Privat Ivan Kudric from
maneuver tactics to support the NATO alliance. (U.S. Army Storm Battery takes fire elements on a Multiple Rocket
photo by SPC Osvaldo Fuentes) Launcher System sighting device during Rifle Focus.

Figure 8, left. U.S. Army Soldiers

from 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry
Regiment, prepare a .50-caliber M2
machinegun on a Stryker during Ri-
fle Focus at Bemowo Piskie Training
Area, Poland, Oct. 6, 2021. (U.S.
Army photo by SPC Osvaldo Fuentes)

17 Spring 2022
Figure 11. Croatia Land Forces soldiers from Storm Battery
respond to a simulated alert to deploy during Rifle Focus
at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, Oct. 6, 2021. (U.S.
Army photo by SPC Osvaldo Fuentes) Figure 13. SGT James Wright, a combat engineer assigned
to 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry Regiment, teaches Polish
Territorial Defense Force soldiers how to use soft demo
explosively formed projectiles during Rifle Focus Oct. 16,
2021 in Bemowo Piskie Training Area. This demonstration
Figure 12, below. Romanian Land Forces soldiers from the was one of many opportunities NATO allies had to work
Sky Guardians receive a call for fire during Rifle Focus at together and learn from each other during Rifle Focus, en-
Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, Oct. 8, 2021. (U.S. hancing interoperability. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Jameson
Army photo by SPC Osvaldo Fuentes) Harris)

18 Spring 2022
Competitive Visualization:
The Reconnaissance and Security
Formation and What It Brings to
Multi-Domain Operations
by MAJ Chris D. Thornton air- and electromagnetic-spectrum ground commanders at echelon in
(EMS) domains. An R&S formation can support of offensive operations in
Our enemies will be harder to find
protect a flank; conduct detailed re- LSCO and their relevance to forces
than they generally have been for the
connaissance of critical terrain such as equipped with air- and space-based
Joint force conducting multi-domain
wet-gap-crossing sites; or deliver tar- ISR. Whether penetrating the disrup-
operations (MDO). Wide-area aerial
gets concurrently with satisfying the tion zone of an enemy’s deliberate de-
intelligence, surveillance and recon-
commander’s priority information re- fense or conducting detailed recon-
naissance (ISR) will be affected by an-
quirements (PIRs). naissance for a gap crossing, there is a
ti-access and area denial systems at
continued need for an all-weather
least part of the time, and unmanned The Army need not look too far into
sensor and the Army to fight for the
aerial systems (UAS) may be shot the past to see what a formation with
information needed to identify targets
down or impacted by cyber and elec- a dedicated R&S mission can deliver in
and visualize enemy activity.
tromagnetic activities (CEMA). large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
During Operation Desert Storm, 2nd Ar- Describing R&S toolkit
The space domain will also be contest-
mored Cavalry Regiment, screening
ed. It is critical to friendly communica- The current version of Field Manual
forward of VII Corps, destroyed a divi-
tions, the use of precision munitions (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Secu-
sion of Iraqi army combat power while
and space-based sensors. rity Operations (in revision), describes
answering information requirements
considerations for the required capa-
Given this inevitable reality, cavalry and shaping the corps fight1 at the Bat-
bilities of a task-organized R&S forma-
will continue to be a key tool for com- tle of 73 Easting.2 The 3rd Squadron, 7th
tion. The guidance remains largely val-
petitive visualization for commanders. Cavalry Regiment, played an equally
id 4 but deliberately lacks specificity
critical role in 2003, fighting for infor-
Formations dedicated to reconnais- because the formations are tailored to
mation for 3 rd Infantry Division and
sance and security (R&S) – and cavalry the supported echelon and mission.
eliminating lead-echelon threats dur-
at the division and corps echelons in Task-organizations should be tailored
ing the division’s advance toward
particular – remain relevant despite to fit specific mission variables.5 Con-
Baghdad.3
increasingly sophisticated air- and siderations of command and support
space-based sensors. Their impor- The preceding two examples illustrate relationships are also critical when
tance will only increase as the U.S. the continued ability of cavalry forma- posturing R&S formations for success
Army is increasingly challenged in the tions to develop the situation for in LSCO.

19 Spring 2022
Potential task-organizations for divi- without being bogged down by the re- Unfortunately, initial assessments are
sion-cavalry squadrons have been de- quirement to plan for, maintain and sometimes based on months- or years-
vised with due attention to the consid- employ these sensors. Understanding old information, or the initial collec-
erations discussed in FM 3-98 and where artillery and sensor enablers tion has a limited level of detail. This
have had differing levels of success. are on the battlefield will become in- capability is valuable to a division pre-
Different divisions have described how creasingly important in the future as paring for a gap crossing.12 However,
they equipped and employed division- batteries become able to deliver not including them is sometimes omitted
cavalry squadrons during warfighter just munitions but also sensors into in exercise environments.
exercises. Field artillery and attack avi- the enemy disruption and battle zone.
A final capability to consider is com-
ation have been critical capabilities for
Attack aviation is another key consid- munications for the R&S formation,
these formations.6
eration for a cavalry formation requir- which must operate far forward to be
While these enablers have often sup- ing specialized expertise to use effec- effective in LSCO and MDO. Corps and
ported division-cavalry squadrons, tively. Currently a troop from a heavy divisions must be able to communi-
considerations of support relation- attack reconnaissance squadron (H- cate using frequency modulation; lon-
ships and incorporation of these into ARS) in direct support10 provides capa- ger-range radios such as high frequen-
the phasing construct are also critical- bilities to the division cavalry that in- cy and ultra-high frequency (UHF); or
ly important. This is particularly true creases its agility in reconnaissance UHF satellite-communications-based
when the staff of the R&S formation is missions and its ability to rapidly iden- systems, including Joint Battle Com-
a squadron supporting a division, tify high-payoff targets (HPTs). It mand-Platform.13 Also, supporting UAS
which is less robust and lacks some of comes with a planning burden that is must be prepared to act as a voice-
the specialists that a brigade tasked to likely best alleviated through special- communications relay, including Gray
provide R&S to a corps would have or- ists assigned to the division cavalry’s Eagle – whether or not it operates in
ganically. staff to serve as planners, liaisons, or support of the cavalry squadron, de-
both. pending on terrain impacts to commu-
A challenge that division-cavalry nications and platform location.
squadrons have consistently faced is The H-ARS troop facilitates aggressive Planners must also consider how to
employing all their capabilities effec- squadron reconnaissance by allowing push intelligence information they re-
tively. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 continuous coverage of one platoon of ceive via the Tactical Intelligence
warfighter exercises, many division- AH-64 Apaches and RQ-7B Shadow Ground Station (TGS) or the Tactical
cavalry squadrons provided with indi- UAS to detect enemy systems out to Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TI-
rect-fire and air-defense assets as at- the fire-support coordination line. Un-
tachments or under operational con- TAN) to its R&S formation. However,
like larger UAS such as Gray Eagle, the the right place for TGS (and TITAN) is
trol (OPCON) often struggled to em- Shadow is agile enough to displace
ploy them effectively, as they lacked not with the division cavalry or corps
frequently and keep up with the R&S formation because of the signa-
adequate specialists required on staff.7 squadron. It also allows for a manned/ ture they present. Cavalry formations
This may be partially alleviated with unmanned teaming capability that in- are not manned to conduct processing
the assignment of one or more air de- creases the survivability of aviation as- exploitation and dissemination of that
fenders and a liaison from the coun- sets against an enemy equipped with data.
terfire headquarters. 8 However, as man-portable and SHORAD air-de-
with any liaison exchange, the losing fense systems. The H-ARS’ capabilities Ultimately, R&S formations must be
unit pays a price. also facilitate intelligence and target equipped and supported to provide
handover, not only within the squad- the capabilities required of the mis-
Key capabilities to consider for a divi- sion. They also needs specialists to
sion or corps R&S formation are ron but also in support of division dy-
namic targeting and PIR collection. augment lean staff to employ them.
ground-based radar systems such as An appropriate task-organization can
the AN/TPQ-53 weapon-locating radar facilitate requirements without inflict-
and the AN/TPQ-64 Sentinel.9 These During warfighter exercises, cavalry
squadrons are frequently tasked to ing on commanders a burdensome
systems not only enable effective span of control beyond what their
counterfire against enemy long-range conduct detailed area reconnaissance
of potential gap crossing sites. Task- staff can support.
artillery, but they facilitate the protec-
tion of cavalry formations by cueing organizations with up to three engi-
neer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) Visualizing collection,
friendly short-range air defenses (SHO-
RAD) and friendly firing batteries that from the brigade engineer battalion to replicating experience
are conducting indirect cannon and the squadron in a TACON or direct- Enemy sensors, whether or not they
rocket fires against targets identified support relationship could complete are backed by artificial intelligence,
by R&S formations’ sensors. many tasks supporting the crossing, are likely to detect signatures from
especially if ERTs have trained with the high-flying UAS visible to long-range
By having these sensors in a support squadron before combat. 11 ERTs can radar, voice communications between
rather than in an OPCON or tactical- validate assessments of roads and command nodes14 and active emitters
control (TACON) role, the division cav- bridges, the status of banks and soil such as jammers. Understanding our
alry benefits from the capability composition. detection capabilities and our

20 Spring 2022
enemies’ capabilities is key to success- While these tools can contribute to an requirements, which seemed to hap-
ful R&S tasks in MDO. Visualizing sig- effective information-collection plan, pen when ICM was not developed or
natures across domains is the founda- they neither represent the totality of disseminated.19
tion of effective surveillance and re- the plan nor convey the relationship
An understanding of observable signa-
connaissance, which requires experi- between the sensors available and the
tures based on a whole-of-staff effort
ence. PIR and targets. Planning require-
and an understanding of the enemy’s
ments tools created during the IPB
It’s significantly harder to model an capabilities and limitations is the foun-
process exist in a symbiotic relation-
enemy armor regiment conducting a dation of the collection plan and an ef-
ship with the event template. If the
movement-to-contact if you’ve never fective deception plan. Intelligence
collection plan is developed in a vacu-
seen at least a battalion conducting a representatives with this understand-
um, or not updated as assessments
combined-arms live-fire exercise. ing of the enemy must be present at
are updated, it will consistently fall far
However, we’ve seen junior analysts working groups that consider decep-
short of expectations.
who are staffing our intelligence sec- tion and CEMA employment for these
tions model armor regiments despite Ensuring whole-of-staff input into col- plans to be effective. Successfully
considerable doctrine-based15 preach- lection-plan components such as the fighting for information requires un-
ing about leveraging the breadth of collection-management tools, part of derstanding what to look for and how
the staff’s knowledge during mission “reverse warfighting-function IPB” to look.
analysis by conducting “reverse intel- during the mission-analysis process,
Intelligence sections should produce
ligence preparation of the battlefield makes it more likely the list of indica-
an ICM that considers how, when and
(IPB).”16 tors to confirm or deny PIR is com-
where to identify PIRs and HPTs and
plete. For example, an engineer staff
disseminate it to subordinates and col-
It doesn’t end there. Finding armor can help the intelligence staff under-
lectors (such as division-cavalry squad-
regiments generally requires integrat- stand enemy-obstacles compositions
rons) as part of the orders process.
ing often poorly understood intelli- in their emplacement process so the
They should also brief key changes and
gence capabilities such as electronic- intelligence staff can incorporate this
expected target and intelligence
intelligence measures and signatures into the ICM, making the section more
handovers at the collection-manage-
intelligence, delivering these to the likely to recognize the construction of
ment working group to ensure shared
analyst via a complex intelligence ar- that obstacle when it happens.
understanding. A good plan is of little
chitecture and interpreting the ob- Ideally this also includes leveraging use if not disseminated.
served indicators correctly. In addition functional and multifunctional bri-
to stepping into the boots of that en- gades’ expertise. A division collection Benefits of ‘chief of
emy commander, that same analyst in manager may or may not understand reconnaissance’
the S-2 or G-2 may have to understand survivability moves within a position Transitions between plans, future op-
the terrain, enemy systems, electro- area for artillery or where the enemy erations and current operations are
magnetic spectrum, airspace, network is likely to place radar systems. How- not a challenge confined to the intel-
routers and virtual machines to build ever, division-artillery staff planners ligence warfighting function or warf-
the doctrinal product used to depict will probably have a good idea and will ighter exercises. Divisions have taken
current and anticipated enemy activ- have considered it during their mis- many approaches to ease these tran-
ity in time and space. sion analysis process. sitions, including appointing an offi-
cer20 as the chief of reconnaissance for
Thankfully there are tools to leverage Considering observables for key sys-
the division or corps, a practice prov-
the staff’s experience and communi- tems on high-payoff target lists (HPTL)
en to be successful with brigade com-
cate that experience down to the low- and inclusion of these in the ICM was
est level, provided they are used and bat teams.21 The position can free col-
a recommended best practice18 that is
disseminated. The staff must leverage lection management and dissemina-
now in doctrine. The change makes
these tools during mission analysis to tion or fusion sections of the need to
sense. Although PIRs will change dur-
improve collection plans and targeting manage the current fight while plan-
ing an operation, a division will still
and deception plans. Army Techniques ning the next one.22
tend to have a HPTL that prioritizes
Publication (ATP) 2-01, Collection enemy long-range artillery, air defense Similarly, at the corps echelon, the ap-
Management (recently revised), rec- and radars because of its responsibili- pointment of an experienced officer23
ommends “collection management ties in shaping enemy forces in sup- can increase the agility of collection
tools” for effective information-collec- port of its subordinate brigades and on the current operations and integra-
tion planning, including the informa- the criticality of these enablers. Warf- tion cell (COIC) floor with an experi-
tion-collection synch matrix (ICSM), ighter-exercise observations had enced person making sound recom-
the information-collection matrix shown that even when well-developed mendations on dynamic retasking of
(ICM) and the information-collection ICSMs and PIRs were disseminated to organic assets. Force-design updates
overlay. These tools are often omitted, the division-cavalry squadron, the to provide dedicated division-cavalry
incomplete, used incorrectly or not staff sometimes did not understand squadrons to divisions, if implement-
disseminated beyond the intelligence the association between PIRs, indica- ed, may result in wider adoption of
section.17 tors and specific information the chief-of-reconnaissance role.

21 Spring 2022
A chief of reconnaissance at echelon using them, this is understandable. Signature management with sensor
can also help integrate the collection The reasons are not made entirely programs must be a key consideration
plan and the decision-support matrix clear through exercise performance 24 in how systems are employed across
by assisting the chief of operations but seem to be tied to insufficient the board. Command-and-control sys-
with interpretation of the reporting training of non-cavalry formations in tems that rely heavily upon the Upper
coming into the COIC. However, the in- planning and executing R&S tasks. Tactical Internet and sensors that re-
dividual needs a clear understanding Reasons also include lack of intelli- quire continuous connection to a sat-
of the division’s priorities and target- gence sections’ ability to visualize the ellite will be vulnerable and must be
ing plan, and comprehension of how enemy in time and space25 and there- mitigated with an effective signature-
to interpret intelligence information fore the ability to tie observables to management and command-post dis-
and reports. With the right experi- PIRs. The solution is linked to an un- placement plan.
ence, the G-2 operations section, derstanding of friendly capabilities
armed with collection-management and a shared understanding of what The Army’s 11th Armored Cavalry Reg-
tools, could fulfill this role. the staff believes a particular intelli- iment, the opposing force at the Na-
gence requirement means. tional Training Center, is experiment-
The potential advantages of a dedicat- ing with multi-domain signature man-
ed chief of reconnaissance to help as- Ultimately, whether or not task-orga- agement and is integrating multiple
sist in dynamic adjustments to the col- nized R&S formations’ key leaders and sensor types and non-lethal effects
lection plan and rapidly interpret the collection managers understand the into operations. While cover and con-
intelligence picture are evident. Still, cavalry “mindset” – for success in cealment increase survivability, tac-
that individual must have the right mix MDO, where ISR assets in the air and tics, techniques and procedures must
of skill and experience to be able to vi- space cannot be assured – Army divi- also consider a force’s EMS footprint.
sualize and interpret the reporting. sions and corps must have several op- It’s important to remember that the
Cavalry-squadron commanders typi- tions so they are able to fight for infor- enemy is actively searching for them,
cally have the right mix of talents but mation.26 a lesson better learned in training
might find it challenging to divide his than in combat!
or her time between the chief-of-re- Considerations for
connaissance role and command of MDO R&S operations Increasingly, training audiences at our
the squadron. The Army is already considering what combat-training centers (CTCs) are
the next generation of reconnaissance working not only to integrate lethal
However, no matter who fills the role, and nonlethal effects but to manage
the individual should be selected and vehicles and ground-based sensors
will look like. The Next-Generation their EMS footprint, too.28 Division G-6
integrated into the role early to ensure sections can produce products on or-
the new arrangement is well re- Combat Vehicle family of programs
currently in development provide for ganic systems such as the systems-
hearsed before being executed be- planning engineering and evaluation
cause it affects the targeting process “optionally manned” vehicles with
long-range thermal and other sensors device29 that allow a division to “see
and how the battle is fought on the itself” in terms of its command post’s
COIC floor. equipped with artificial intelligence,27
increasing the flexibility and standoff EMS footprint. Ultimately, divisions
Ultimately the intelligence and opera- covered by the cavalry squadron. can and should experiment with dif-
tions staffs retain their responsibilities ferent options for mission command
Optionally manned fighting vehicles against peer threats.
whether or not there is a chief of re-
with longer-range sensors potentially
con. Producing sufficiently detailed
increase the physical distance be- In addition to courses about using ex-
PIR enables commanders’ decisions
tween platforms, known as dispersion, quisite theater and national ISR to an-
and targeting priorities. Even when
and therefore frontage covered by the swer the commander’s PIRs and iden-
backed by effective collection-man-
cavalry squadron equipped with the tify targets, collection managers who
agement tools, it is not easy. The chal-
capability. Future cavalry forces re- don’t understand organic sensors
lenges are compounded by the need
quire the ability to tip and cue net- must learn to use them to be effective.
for clearly understood roles and re-
worked sensors by voice and digital Spending a CTC rotation shadowing or-
sponsibilities at echelon. Neverthe-
means and to generate targets for can- ganic assets such as radar platoons,
less, they are the most critical ele-
non and rocket batteries and Joint low-level voice-intercept teams and
ments when successfully integrating
fires and effects. However, that tipping cavalry troops may be a greater ben-
cavalry into the deliberate and dynam-
and cueing of sensors must keep in efit to a would-be collection manager
ic targeting process at the division and
mind the necessity of all forces, par- than merely shadowing a division col-
corps echelons. Without them, forma-
ticularly cavalry forces, to conduct sig- lection manager at the warfighter ex-
tions will continue to struggle to fight
nature management across multiple ercise.30 Collection managers, particu-
for information.
domains. Camouflage might evade op- larly for armor and cavalry divisions,
In execution, results at the division tical detection, but more sophisticated may also benefit from the Cavalry
and corps have been mixed. Given the sensors are generally not fooled. A Leader’s Course 31 to understand re-
loss of dedicated R&S formations at concealed vehicle may be visible to connaissance and counter-reconnais-
key echelons and lack of practice thermal sensors. sance tasks.

22 Spring 2022
Cavalry’s importance at the division manned and unmanned aircraft; mobility Key Observations; retrieved from
echelon to enable MDO is increasingly and countermobility assets; indirect-fires https://call2.army.mil/docs/
being refined, driving doctrine, orga- systems; ground-based intelligence col- doc18085/18085.pdf.
nization, training, materiel, leadership lection teams; protection; sustainment; 19
Mission Command Training in Large-
and mission command. FM 3-98, Recon- Scale Combat Operations, FY21 Key Ob-
and education, personnel, facilities
naissance and Security Operations, July servations.
and policy changes to the force as con- 2015, describes these in detail.
cepts and capabilities are reassessed 20
The division-artillery squadron com-
5
FM 3-98. mander or expeditionary military-intelli-
and adjusted for Waypoint 2028-9.32, 33
Ultimately the Army must recognize
6
Center for Army Lessons Learned gence battalion (e-MIBn) commander
cavalry for what it is: a necessary com- (CALL), Mission Command Training in have been used in this role by divisions in
Large-Scale Combat Operations, FY19 an exercise environment.
ponent of competitive visualization.
Key Observations; retrieved from 21
CPT John F. Palmer, “The Squadron
MAJ Chris Thornton is an intelligence https://call2.army.mil/docs/ Commander as Chief of Reconnaissance,”
observer/coach/trainer for Operations doc18018/20-15.pdf. ARMOR, July–September 2016.
Group Bravo of the Mission Command 7
CALL, Mission Command Training in 22
MAJ Paul E. Roberts, “Reconnaissance
Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Large-Scale Combat Operations, FY21 beyond the Coordinated Fire Line,” Mili-
KS, who has coached brigade and divi- Key Observations; retrieved from tary Review, July-August 2018; retrieved
sion staffs at six warfighter exercises. https://call2.army.mil/toc. from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/
Some of his previous duty positions in- aspx?document=18124. Portals/7/military-review/Archives/Eng-
clude collection manager, 1st Cavalry
8
For the division, frequently the division lish/JA-18/Roberts-Division-Warfighter.
Division, Fort Hood, TX; executive offi- artillery; for the corps, frequently the pdf.
cer for Task Force Observe, Detect, field-artillery brigade, but exceptions ex- 23
While the leader chosen varies, at the
ist. warfighter exercise, the expeditionary
Identify and Neutralize, or TF ODIN, in
Afghanistan; and three operational
9
CALL, Mission Command Training in military-intelligence brigade commander
deployments on the E-8C Joint Surveil- Large-Scale Combat Operations, FY20 and a corps R&S formation commander
Key Observations; retrieved from have been demonstrated in the role at
lance Target Attack Radar System
https://call2.army.mil/toc. the corps echelon.
(JSTARS) supporting Operations Endur- aspx?document=18085.
ing Freedom, Inherent Resolve and
24
Key leaders in the G-2 Operations sec-
10
OPCON or TACON may be more appro- tion or E-MIBn augmentees could also
Resolute Support/Freedom’s Sentinel,
priate, and like the task-organization, the fulfill this role.
serving as deputy mission-crew com- command relationship is mission- and sit-
mander instructor and deputy mission-
25
The warfighter exercise is a simplified
uation-dependent.
crew commander. MAJ Thornton’s mil- simulation that does not realistically
11
ATP 3-34.81, Engineer Reconnaissance, model most domains, and certain things
itary schooling includes Command and March 1, 2016. are adjudicated by exercise controllers
General Staff College, Collection Man- 12
Note that ERTs can also provide an ini- and adjusted via “white card.” This, cou-
agement Course, Joint Planning pled with communications that are large-
tial assessment of a site for suitability as
Course, Joint Firepower Course, basic ly not disrupted or denied during the ex-
an airfield. If used for this purpose, aug-
and advanced survival evasion resis- mentation from the combat-aviation bri- ercise, potentially makes a chief of recon
tance and escape training, JSTARS gade or even the Joint force may be ad- on the COIC floor appear to be of greater
Deputy Mission-Crew Commander’s visable depending on the site’s intended value than it is.
Course and Mechanized-Infantry Lead- purpose in the division’s plan. 26
Fox.
er’s Course. He has a bachelor of arts 13
CALL, Preparing for Large-Scale Com- 27
COL Rich Creed and MAJ Nathan Jen-
in English from Rutgers University and bat Operations, Publication 21-06, Janu- nings, “Winning the Deep Fight: Why We
a master of arts in international rela- ary 2021. Should Return to Echeloned Reconnais-
tions from Webster University. sance and Security,” Modern War Insti-
14
Including unrealistic use of “always-on”
transmitters such as those used to deliv- tute, March 3, 2019; retrieved from
Notes er the Upper Tactical Internet. https://mwi.usma.edu/winning-deep-
1
MAJ Amos C. Fox, “The State of the Cav- fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-
alry: An Analysis of the U.S. Army’s Re- 15
ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of security/.
connaissance and Security Capability,” the Battlefield, Jan. 6, 2021. 28
Kris Osborn, “Army brings AI-Combat
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Insti- 16
COL Thomas Feltey and CPT Lance Rae, Speed to Tank Warfare,” Security Televi-
tute of Land Warfare, Landpower Essay “Military Deception and Reverse Intelli- sion Network, Sept. 13, 2021; retrieved
No. 16-1, June 2016; retrieved from gence Preparation of the Battlefield: How from https://warriormaven.com/cyber/
https://www.ausa.org/publications/ Staff Integration Creates Advantages for army-brings-ai-combat-speed-to-tank-
state-cavalry-analysis-us-armys-recon- the Brigade Combat Team Commander,” warfare.
naissance-and-security-capability. ARMOR, Fall 2018.
2
Stephen Borque, Jayhawk! The VII
29
Joseph Trevithick, “This Is What Ground
17
CALL, Mission Command Training in Forces Look Like to an Electronic-Warfare
Corps in the Persian Gulf War, U.S. Army Large-Scale Combat Operations, FY21 System and Why It’s a Big Deal,” The
Center for Military History; retrieved Key Observations; retrieved from Drive, May 11, 2020; retrieved from
from https://history.army.mil/html/ https://call2.army.mil/docs/ https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
books/070/70-73-1/index.html. doc18124/18124.pdf. zone/33401/this-is-what-ground-forces-
3
Fox. 18
CALL, Mission Command Training in look-like-to-an-electronic-warfare-sys-
4
The capabilities are ground maneuver; Large-Scale Combat Operations, FY20 tem-and-why-its-a-big-deal.

23 Spring 2022
30
Refer to ATP 6-02.70, Techniques for
Spectrum-Management Operations, for Acronym Quick-Scan
the role of the Systems Planning, Engi-
neering and Evaluation Device and simi- ATP – Army techniques publication ISR – intelligence, surveillance and
lar tools in spectrum management. CALL – Center for Army Lessons reconnaissance
Learned JSTARS – Joint Surveillance Target
31
This is the current culminating event
CEMA – cyber and electromagnetic Attack Radar System
for the Army Intelligence Development activities LPD – leader professional
Program-Intelligence Surveillance Recon- COIC – current operations and development
naissance program, designed to prepare integration cell LSCO – large-scale combat
future division and corps collection man- CTC – combat-training center operations
agers to conduct LSCO. There is signifi- E-MIBn – expeditionary military- MDO – multi-domain operations
cantly more flexibility in the program intelligence battalion OPCON – operational control
than years ago, but seeing the sensors in EMS – electromagnetic spectrum PIR – priority information
a field environment may be of more ERT – engineer reconnaissance requirements
training value than a virtual/constructive team R&S – reconnaissance and security
environment. FM – field manual SHORAD – short-range air defense
32
Fox’s “State of the Cavalry” discusses FY – fiscal year TACON – tactical control
this course on Pages 3-4 of his paper, and H-ARS – heavy attack TGS – Tactical Intelligence Ground
reconnaissance squadron System
it expresses concern that there are not
HPT – high-payoff target TITAN – Tactical Intelligence
enough slots for officers in cavalry squad-
HPTL – high-payoff target list Targeting Access Node
rons; widespread attendance by division ICM – information-collection matrix TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training
collection managers, however, would po- ICSM – information-collection synch and Doctrine Command
tentially exacerbate this issue. matrix UAS – unmanned aerial system
33
Danae Johnson, “TRADOC LPD to Dis- IPB – intelligence preparation of the UHF – ultra-high frequency
cuss Readiness through Waypoint 2028,” battlefield
October 2021; retrieved from https://
www.army.mil/article/251507/tradoc_
lpd_to_discuss_readiness_through_way-
point_2028.

24 Spring 2022
Forgotten Fundamentals in
Reconnaissance and Security
by CPT Christopher E. Kiriscioglu brigade’s main effort. When the fun- subordinate units. Few, however, will
and CPT Jordan L. Woodburn damentals of R&S are neglected, the focus on lateral communication issues
squadron becomes an inhibiting liabil- inherent in coordination with adjacent
Executing mission tasks that are built
ity rather than a dominating enabler. units.
from mere running estimates, fighting
for information to inform higher head- From multiple rotations at the Joint This is paramount for a cavalry organi-
quarters and shaping an enemy with Multinational Readiness Center zation due to the nature of reconnais-
few “knowns,” cavalry squadrons rou- (JMRC), the message is clear: cavalry sance handovers (RHO) during for-
tinely lean on the reconnaissance and organizations are forgetting the funda- ward-passage-of-lines and rearward-
security (R&S) fundamentals while op- mentals. passage-of-lines. The RHO consists of
erating in austere environments. a battle handover (BHO), or transition
Through the ability to fight for infor- Adjacent unit of area-of-operations responsibility, as
mation and answer intelligence re- well as an intelligence handover, tran-
quirements, cavalry organizations en-
coordination
Orient on the protected force, funda- sition of targets and collected informa-
able freedom of maneuver and deci- tion requirements. Squadrons must be
sion-making for commanders at ech- mental of security, Field Manual (FM)
3-98. (Illustrated on back cover.) Com- able to facilitate the transition of intel-
elon. ligence, targets and terrain knowledge
munication issues will always be at the
heart of every unit after-action review, to the protected force during RHO to
However, trends indicate many cavalry
but most will be focused on communi- set conditions for the follow-on force
formations are falling short in their
cation up to the higher headquarters, to accomplish its mission.
ability to shape the fight, retain com-
bat power and set conditions for the or communication down to The largest obstacle inhibiting

Figure 1. Abrams tank crews from 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, pull security Feb. 2, 2020, during Combined Re-
solve XIII at JMRC, Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by Army National Guard SGT Fiona Berndt)

25 Spring 2022
effective RHO is failure to plan and re- information requirements the cavalry as deliberate. Emplacing obstacles di-
hearse with adjacent units. During squadron needs to provide. These re- rectly correlates to providing in-
planning, units fail to exchange mutu- ports should not only flow to the bri- creased reaction time and maneuver
ally supporting operations graphics or gade but also to the customer battal- space for the protected force, espe-
mission intent prior to execution. This ion immediately to the cavalry squad- cially during a guard.
inevitably leads to miscommunication, ron’s rear. This is the true definition of
lost engagement opportunities and enabling timely decision-making. Enduring operations
preventable combat loss. To mitigate in R&S
degraded adjacent unit coordination, Displacing the Retain freedom of maneuver, funda-
squadrons must include representa- squadron mental of reconnaissance, FM 3-98,
tives of all units involved in RHO at the Retain freedom of maneuver, funda- and provide early and accurate warn-
combined-arms rehearsal (CAR). mental of reconnaissance, FM 3-98, ing, fundamental of security, FM 3-98.
and provide reaction time and ma- While not the perfect solution for en-
In the defense, the RHO must be re-
neuver space, fundamental of securi- abling security operations, the use of
hearsed at respective squadron/bat-
ty, FM 3-98. With special consider- engagement-area development in the
talion CARs, even to troop level if pos-
ation to the defense, cavalry squad- screen undeniably enables success for
sible. All observers and leaders in the
rons rarely define what it means to the cavalry squadron.
cavalry (down to the platoon-leader
level) should know what platoon or el- reach their displacement criteria. By using all the steps in the process
ement is behind them, along with When the trigger is met to displace, (including the commonly neglected re-
their future task and purpose. Cavalry troops and squadrons have rarely pre- hearsal, which should include adjacent
troops must have mutually supporting pared to displace in contact or under units, a verification of the RHO plan
graphic-control measures, at mini- pressure. and the displacement plan), the cav-
mum, and target-reference points Ideally, displacement must consist of alry can ensure it is prepared to an-
along key avenues of approach (AoA) pre-planned (and rehearsed) subse- swer intelligence requirements, fight
to rapidly pass a target and facilitate quent battle positions that are sup- for reconnaissance if necessary and
its subsequent destruction. ported by indirect fires to enable the retain combat power. Any deadspace
cavalry squadron to transition while should be mitigated by the use of dis-
Simply reporting to brigade is not mounted OPs in depth, which should
enough to enable a timely target ac- maintaining combat power. Units must
also be deliberate, not hesitant, in ini- be employed by platoon leaders and
quisition or transition. Special consid- troop commanders after careful anal-
erations must also be established to tiating their displacement. It exists for
a reason and ultimately allows the cav- ysis of the sector sketch.
account for the surface-danger zones
of defending and screening units. The alry to properly transition while main- Furthermore, establishing a narrative
probability of fratricide directly corre- taining the ability to continue to fight of how to interact with the enemy,
lates to the level of dissemination and for the brigade. codified as engagement criteria within
coordination of direct-fire-control commander’s reconnaissance/security
Triggers to initiate displacement must
measures among adjacent units. guidance, will allow the squadron to
be clear and easily understood to the
Squadrons must take ownership of co- impose deliberate lethality as well as
lowest level. Hesitation at the transi-
ordinating shared understanding along preserve combat power. Too often,
tion will lead to unnecessary combat
unit boundaries, especially during dis- squadron staffs relegate engagement
losses.
placement operations. criteria into the rudimentary box
Part of maintaining freedom of ma- checks, “engage enemy infantry fight-
In the offense, successful cavalry neuver also relies on the squadron’s ing vehicles but not tanks,” rather than
squadrons not only seek to answer pri- ability to deny freedom of maneuver guiding the echeloned engagement of
ority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to the enemy. Since aggressive direct- weapon systems to balance lethality
for the brigade, but they also identify fire engagements are likely to compro- with economy-of-force (for Phase II,
how their scheme of maneuver ties mise observation posts (OPs) and in- use 155mm to destroy enemy OPs un-
into the overall concept of operations. crease unwanted decisive engage- detected; use 120mm mortar fire to
For example, if the cavalry squadron is ment, obstacles become the squad- disrupt or displace enemy mounted
conducting a zone reconnaissance ron’s primary means of disrupting en- recon; use vehicle-mounted anti-tank
leading to an objective, discussions emy force maneuver. systems to initiate direct-fire contact
between the squadron and the follow- with section-sized or below Boyevaya
on assaulting battalion should occur, Effective obstacle emplacement con-
Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashi-
focused on what the battalion com- tinues to be the most neglected com-
na; employ .50-caliber weapons for
mander will need to know to enable ponent for cavalry organizations con-
squad-sized dismounts, etc.).
the attack. ducting a security-mission task, almost
to the point of non-existence. Al- To retain combat power, the cavalry
Battalion PIRs, route trafficability, ob- though the squadron’s obstacles will squadron must tailor its engagement
stacles, enemy composition and dispo- not be as robust as obstacles that are criteria appropriately to avoid becom-
sition, suitable AoA and any other along the support brigade’s main de- ing decisively engaged. Engagement
specified information are all likely fensive belt, they still need to be just criteria must be definitive and

26 Spring 2022
eliminate the guesswork for the scout failing to answer PIRs within the lat- from troop-collection assets that feed
on the ground. Otherwise, reconnais- est-time-information-is-of-value into an unfocused brigade collection
sance units will become unnecessarily (LTIOV), reconnaissance organizations plan. It’s not just information that the
compromised and unable to continue routinely neglect their critical role in squadron must collect, it’s the devel-
intelligence-collection efforts due to information collection. opment of that information through
OPs meeting disengagement or troop- analysis and feedback to the brigade
displacement criteria. To influence the collection plan, that will lead to answering PIR.
squadron staff must integrate with
Feeding brigade info- their higher headquarters during intel- Cavalry organizations transition infor-
collection plan ligence preparation of the battlefield mation into intelligence to drive bri-
Ensure continuous reconnaissance, or risk degrading the full development gade operations. Information itself is
fundamental of reconnaissance, FM3- of a focused reconnaissance objective worthless unless it contributes to in-
98; orient on reconnaissance objec- and supporting PIRs. Nesting with bri- telligence, and intelligence is useless
tives, fundamental of reconnaissance, gade during the earliest steps of the unless it contributes to an assessment.
FM 3-98; report all information rap- military decision-making process will With supporting intelligence, assess-
idly and accurately, fundamental of enable the squadron staff to synchro- ments are what allow the brigade S-2,
reconnaissance, FM 3-98; and per- nize across all warfighting functions and ultimately the brigade command-
form continuous reconnaissance, fun- with its higher headquarters and en- er, to visualize the operational envi-
damental of security, FM 3-98. sure that the ground-reconnaissance ronment and make advantageous de-
elements understands their role in an- cisions within it. The lower in echelon
Cavalry formations continue to strug- swering PIRs. that assessments can be made, the
gle with leveraging R&S operations to timelier and more accurate they will
enhance the brigade’s information- Inversely, failure to synchronize with portray the true events of enemy forc-
collection plan. Whether it’s from col- higher headquarters will contribute to es on the battlefield.
lecting on irrelevant PIR that do not a domino effect of ambiguous recon-
enable the brigade commander to naissance objects, confusing informa- Furthermore, troop commanders who
make an advantageous decision, or tion requirements and wasted effort are empowered to make decisions will

Figure 2. Scouts assigned to 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, conduct intelligence collection during troop dismount
reconnaissance training for a platoon external evaluation at Hohenfels, Germany, Jan. 26, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by
SGT Julian Padua)

27 Spring 2022
decrease the amount of time it takes night, squadrons must embrace all the
to answer a PIR within LTIOV and, in R&S fundamentals. Acronym Quick-Scan
turn, allow the brigade commander to
exert control over the enemy’s deci- CPT Christopher Kiriscioglu is a cavalry ABCT – armored brigade combat
sion-making cycle. To provide assess- and reconnaissance observer/coach/ team
ments, commanders at echelon must trainer (OC/T) with the Grizzly Team at AoA – avenue of approach
CAB – combined-arms battalion
be able to comprehend and differenti- JMRC, Hohenfels, Germany. Previous CAR – combined-arms rehearsal
ate between the multitudes of possi- assignments include squadron intelli- CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course
ble enemy courses of action, which gence officer, 1st Squadron, 71st Caval- FM – field manual
only occurs when the squadron staff is ry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, JMRC – Joint Multinational
fully nested and integrated with bri- Fort Drum, NY; assistant brigade intel- Readiness Center
gade planning cycles. ligence officer, 10th Division Artillery, LTIOV – latest-time-information-is-
10 th Mountain Division, Fort Drum; of-value
O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
All-weather, day or night battalion intelligence officer, 1st Bat- OP – observation post
Cavalry squadrons provide the most talion, 10th Attack Reconnaissance Bat- PIR – priority intelligence
reliable set of eyes and ears for their talion, 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, requirement
higher headquarters to employ. 10 th Mountain Division, Fort Drum; R&S – reconnaissance and security
Charged to dominate the operational fire-support officer, 3rd Battalion, 69th RHO – reconnaissance handover
environment, they must ensure shared Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade
understanding of both enemy and ter- Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Divi-
rain, and do so by adhering to a set of sion, Fort Stewart, GA; and fire-direc- Division, Fort Stewart, GA; command-
universal fundamentals – fundamen- tion officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Ar- er, Company D, 1 st CAB, 64 th Armor
tals that, if ignored, prevent ground- tillery Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Divi-
reconnaissance elements from achiev- Division, Fort Stewart. His military sion, Fort Stewart; Long-Range Surveil-
ing the reconnaissance objective and schooling includes the Military Intelli- lance Detachment leader, Company C,
subsequently keep the brigade from gence Captain’s Career Course, Caval- 3rd Battalion, 38th Cavalry Regiment,
realizing its decisive operation. ry Leader’s Course (CLC), Joint Fires 201st Military Intelligence Brigade, Fort
Observer Course and Geospatial-Intel- Lewis, WA; and cavalry-platoon lead-
Cavalry formations must be prepared ligence Officer’s Course. He holds a er, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 38th Cav-
to provide early warning and detec- bachelor’s of music in cello perfor- alry Regiment, 201 st Military Intelli-
tion, generate assessments from col- mance from the University of Michi- gence Brigade, Fort Lewis. His military
lected information requirements and gan. schooling includes Maneuver Captain’s
destroy select enemy targets to enable Career Course, CLC, Army Reconnais-
reaction time and maneuver space for CPT Jordan Woodburn is a cavalry and sance Course, Ranger School, Airborne
the protected force. Cavalry squadrons reconnaissance O/C/T with the Grizzly School, Air-Assault School and Path-
can’t accomplish this task if they are Team at JMRC. Previous assignments finder course. He holds a bachelor’s of
compromised, destroyed or fixed by include commander, Company B, 3 rd science degree in political science from
enemy reconnaissance. To live up to Combined-Arms Battalion (CAB), 67th The Citadel, Charleston, SC.
the status of being all-weather, day or Armor Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry

28 Spring 2022
Be a Better Mentor
by LTC Allen Trujillo What is mentorship? accepted belief that “while true men-
The Army Profession and Leadership torship entails a commitment by both
To succeed on today’s modern battle-
Policy (Army Regulation (AR) 600-100) the mentor and the mentored, the se-
field, the Army must continue to re-
defines mentoring as “the voluntary lection of a mentor is determined by
cruit, employ and retain the very best
developmental relationship that exists the Soldier; it cannot be based on po-
Soldiers. In addition, the Army must
between a person of greater experi- sition, rank or military occupational
continue to improve its diversity, eq-
ence and a person of lesser experience specialty.”5
uity and inclusion efforts to make sure
that the right person, with the right characterized by mutual trust and re- Joseph Kopser also supports this posi-
knowledge, skills and behaviors takes spect. Mentoring extends beyond the tion in Mentoring in the Army: Not Ev-
the right job at the right time.1 scope of chain-of-command relation- erybody Gets It, where he states that
ship and occurs when a mentor pro- mentees must “work to maintain the
Army senior leaders play a critical role vides the mentee advice and counsel. relationship as it progresses. Mentors
in these initiatives and processes Assessment, feedback and guidance will distinguish themselves from ac-
through their mentorship of Soldiers.2 are critical within the mentoring rela- quaintances as time passes. It is your
As the Army modernizes a wide range tionship and must be valued by the responsibility [as the mentee] to main-
of talent-management processes, mentee for growth and development tain the relationship.”6
there is an excellent opportunity for to occur.”4
senior leaders to improve the way Therefore if successful mentorship oc-
As a result, AR 600-100 implies that
they mentor officers, noncommis- curs when mentees maintain a rela-
mentees are ultimately responsible for
sioned officers (NCOs) and Depart- tionship with mentors they choose, se-
establishing and maintaining a rela-
ment of the Army civilians.3 To mod- nior leaders can improve their role in
tionship with their mentor.
ernize our mentorship processes, se- this process by deliberately making
nior leaders must deliberately make This implied responsibility is further themselves available to a wider audi-
themselves available to become men- explored in the article, Mentorship: ence than just those assigned to their
tors for high-performing subordinates Understanding a Leader’s Investment, immediate organization. It is the duty
across the Army. where the author argues a commonly of the mentor to make themselves

29 Spring 2022
available, and it is the responsibility of high-performing subordinates to se- engagement is a potential mentor-
the mentee to establish and maintain lect the best possible mentor for their mentee relationship.
the relationship. personal and professional goals. Se-
Virtual leader engagements or news-
nior leaders must advocate for these
How are mentors letters. Another option for senior
individuals to their higher headquar-
leaders to engage high-performing
chosen? ters as well as to other senior leaders
subordinates is through virtual leader
Generally speaking, mentees choose in similar organizations.
engagements or newsletters. Similar
mentors they “know, trust and feel Although the Assignment Interactive to direct engagements, senior leaders
genuine loyalty toward.”7 More specif- Module 2.0 move cycles are the most send high performers emails or phone
ically, mentees choose mentors they logical place for senior leaders to ad- calls and invite them to participate in
have worked for or seen in a profes- vocate for high performers, they a virtual leader engagement or peri-
sional setting. Unless there is a delib- should not be the only time high-per- odic newsletter. These virtual leader
erate process in place, mentees rarely forming subordinates are being dis- engagements and newsletters can cov-
select mentors outside of this limited cussed. Senior leaders should always er any relevant topic in the profession.
scope because they don’t even know be looking for opportunities to give
anyone else is even a possibility. their high-performing subordinates ac- However, the main goal of the interac-
Therefore improving the pool of men- cess to other potential mentors across tion between senior leaders and high-
tors a mentee has to select from will the Army. performing subordinates should be
improve the likelihood a high-perform- that the senior leader is making them-
ing subordinate can find the right Identify high performers across the selves available as a potential mentor.
mentor. Army. Once senior leaders clearly un- The initial goal of virtual leader en-
derstand the high performers in their gagements or newsletters is to provide
If we are serious as a profession about organization, they must deliberately an avenue for high performers to
identifying, promoting and retaining seek out high performers across the make direct contact with senior lead-
the most talented people, senior lead- Army. Although this seems like an im- ers; the long-term goal is for senior
ers must make a conscious, deliberate possible task, branch managers at Hu- leaders and high performers to get to
effort to engage with and make them- man Resources Command (HRC) regu- know each other and develop a poten-
selves available to high-performing larly compile this type of information tial mentor-mentee relationship.
subordinates across the Army. To build to give senior leaders an accurate as-
the “mutual trust and respect” 8 re- sessment of the Soldiers, NCOs and of- Official visits and/or in-person lead-
quired for the mentoring outlined in ficers across various organizations. er-professional-development (LPD)
AR 600-100, it is essential for senior seminars. Senior leaders should also
leaders to leverage formal and infor- Another method for senior leaders to consider using official visits or profes-
mal interactions to build the relation- identify top performers is to engage sional conferences as a venue to en-
ships required to truly get to know the peers and superiors across the Army. gage high-performing subordinates
high-performing Soldiers, NCOs and Once a senior leader determines a list across the Army. As senior leaders
officers in their respective fields. of high-performing subordinates, it is plan temporary-duty travel to conduct
essential to develop a plan on how to official business, they should allocate
How can senior formally or informally engage these a portion of their allocated time to vis-
leaders improve the top performers. it with high performers at the tempo-
way they mentor? Direct engagement. The easiest way rary-duty location.
Identify and advocate for high per- to engage a high-performing subordi- Similar to direct engagement, virtual
formers in your organization. The first nate is to make direct contact. Direct leader engagement or newsletters, of-
step senior leaders must do in the tal- engagement can be described as a ficial visits and LPD seminars should
ent-management process is clearly point-to-point email, a phone call or begin by notifying a high-performing
identify the top 5 percent to 10 per- an in-person meeting at a predeter- subordinate that a senior leader plans
cent of performers within their orga- mined location. In a direct engage- to visit them during their travels. If
nizations. During formal and informal ment, it is important for the senior this option is not feasible, senior lead-
interactions, it is incumbent on senior leader to clearly articulate to the high- ers could also directly invite high per-
leaders to understand the personal performing subordinate that this formers to an in-person LPD seminar
and professional goals of each high- meeting, phone call or email is the or social event during their visit.
performing subordinate as well as the first in a series of potential engage-
knowledge, skills and behaviors that ments aimed at building a profession- The initial goal of meeting during offi-
will potentially make them successful al relationship. cial visits or hosting an event is to pro-
in future jobs. vide the opportunity for high perform-
The high performer should also under- ers to make direct contact with senior
Senior leaders must understand their stand that the senior leader is making leaders. As previously mentioned, the
top performers will not always choose himself or herself available as a poten- long-term goal is a potential mentor-
to be their mentees; however, it is the tial mentor. The initial goal of a direct mentee relationship.
professional duty of senior leaders to engagement is to get to know each
create opportunities for other; the long-term goal of a direct Other options. There are many ways

30 Spring 2022
for senior leaders to reach high-per- we’re going after the best and bright-
forming subordinates. These options est … and we are going to do what it Acronym Quick-Scan
include, but are not limited to, all takes to keep them in the Army.”8
forms of social media and social-net- ABCT – armor brigade combat team
working sites. If senior leaders choose Senior leaders have the potential to AR – Army regulation
take action and improve the way they CSA – Chief of Staff of the Army
to use alternate methods to reach high HRC – Human Resources
performers, the most important thing mentor high-performing subordinates. Command
to remember is to make an initial con- With the advent of new technologies LPD – leader professional
nection as direct as possible. and the ease of communication across development
the globe, senior leaders must make a NCO – noncommissioned officer
What’s the next step? deliberate effort to identify high per- USMA – U.S. Military Academy
Role of the senior leader. Once a se- formers, make direct contact with
nior leader signals to a high performer them and clearly make themselves
that he or she is available as a poten- available as a potential mentor. USMA in systems engineering and a
tial mentor, senior leaders should master’s of science degree from the
make periodic contact to remind the Senior leaders must also advocate for University of Texas at Austin in opera-
potential mentee that they still have a high performers inside and outside of tions research/industrial engineering.
vested interest in their future develop- their direct organizations. High-per-
ment. In addition to maintaining peri- forming subordinates exist every-
where in the Army; it is up to senior Notes
odic contact, senior leaders should 1
Devon Suits; “Talent management will
also continue to advocate for their leaders to get to know as many of lead Army’s push to diverse leadership,
high performers to other senior lead- them as possible and then advocate says CSA”; Army News Service; March 15,
ers across the Army as well as to the for the best Soldiers for the right job, 2021; https://www.army.mil/arti-
branch managers at HRC. at the right time … even if they’re not cle/244233/talent_management_will_
a subordinate who has previously lead_armys_push_to_diverse_leader-
Role of the high-performing subordi- worked for them. ship_says_csa.
nate. If a Soldier is ever contacted by 2
Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda and Ar-
a battalion-level leader or above out- LTC Allen Trujillo is the Armor human-
chie Bates, “The Battalion Commander
side their chain of command, the Sol- resources manager in the Colonel’s Effect,” Parameters, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2021.
dier should do everything he or she Management Office at HRC, Fort Knox,
can to get to know the senior leader. KY. His previous assignments include
3
Thomas Brading; “Chief of staff: Most
Treat these formal or informal engage- serving as the executive officer to the signature systems to be fielded by 2023,
commanding general, 1st Cavalry Divi- people still No. 1 priority”; Army News
ments as an opportunity to grow per-
Service; Oct. 13, 2021; https://www.
sonally and professionally, and keep sion, Fort Hood, TX; brigade executive
army.mil/article/251126/chief_of_staff_
an eye out for the cues that encourage officer, 3 rd Armor Brigade Combat most_signature_systems_to_be_fielded_
direct communication. In the end, the Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort by_2023_people_still_no_1_priority.
Soldier is ultimately responsible for Hood; battalion executive officer, 3rd
Battalion, 8 th Cavalry Regiment, 1 st
4
AR 600-100, Army Profession and Lead-
maintaining the mentor-mentee rela-
ership Policy; Washington, DC: Depart-
tionship. Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; assistant
ment of the Army; April 2017.
professor and analyst, Department of
Conclusion Systems Engineering, U.S. Military
5
MSG Leslie Renken; “Mentorship: Un-
Since 1775, the U.S. Army has been Academy (USMA), West Point, NY; derstanding a Leader’s Investment”; One
successful due to the people who company commander, 4th Battalion, 6th Leader to Another Volume II; U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College;
comprise its formations. The Army’s Infantry Regiment, 4 th ABCT, 1 st Ar-
2015, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/
success can also be attributed to the mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; and pla- Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2017/De-
professional military education for its toon leader and executive officer, 2nd cember/Mentorship/.
officers and NCOs. As the Army mod- Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 4th ABCT, 1st Cav- 6
Joseph Kopser; “Mentoring in the Mili-
ernizes our talent-management pro- alry Division, Fort Bliss. LTC Trujillo’s
tary: Not Everybody Gets It”; Military Re-
cesses, it is essential for senior leaders military schools include the Armor Of- view, November-December 2002.
to update the way they mentor high- ficer Basic Course, Maneuver Captain’s
performing subordinates. As GEN Career Course and Command and Gen-
7
Ibid.
James C. McConville has previously eral Staff College. LTC Trujillo holds a
8
AR 600-100.
said, “We are in a war for talent, and bachelor’s of science degree from 9
Suits.

31 Spring 2022
The Cube Division:
A New Template for
Armored Warfare?
by Michael McCabe
In a war against a peer adversary such
as Russia or China, armored divisions
will play a central role. The purpose of
this article is to propose a new tem-
plate for armored divisions in high-in-
tensity mechanized warfare in the
plains or desert.1
This design, hereafter referred to as
the “cube division,” is built from a bi-
nary template with two armored bat-
talions forming a “binary regiment,”
two regiments forming a “square bri-
gade,” and two brigades forming a
cube division: 2x2x2, or two-cubed.
The use of the binary template offers
advantages compared to a three-bat-
talion “triangle” template that are
more advantageous to armored divi-
sions than to infantry divisions, and
this article will articulate how and
why.
Why the binary template?
The first question to be answered is:
why is the binary template better for
armored divisions than triangle tem-
plates? The answer is threefold: First,
it is inherently more agile. Second, it
puts more combat power at the bri-
gade level compared to a triangle tem-
plate, with four battalions per brigade
rather than three. Third, it allows a
higher ratio of support units without
making the division oversized and
bloated.

Agility Figure 1. Organization chart of “cube” division.

In an infantry brigade or division, the
need for mobility must be balanced
operational mobility to armor but speed and protection will become
with static staying power. This is a dif-
must dismount to fight. On foot, an in- more critical, and battles will become
ference in kind from armored divi-
fantryman is capable of seizing a build- more fluid.
sions, which are more lopsided in fa-
ing or manning a trench but is no-
vor of mobility. This is not to discount the importance
where near as tactically speedy or
On the open steppes of Eastern Eu- powerful as a main battle tank. In a of infantry in an armored battle but
rope or comparable desert terrain, featureless battlefield bereft of infan- merely to point out that they play a
mounted infantr y has similar try’s usual choices for cover, tanks’ supporting role to tanks, a reversal of

32 Spring 2022
the Army’s recent experiences in coun- capacity to inflict and sustain damage much larger support requirements
terinsurgency. Battalions designed for than its three-battalion counterpart. than mechanized infantry in sustained
conventional warfare against a peer In a future war involving armored di- combat, and thus copying infantry-
opponent will resemble reinforced visions, most tank battles will be support ratios is less than ideal. The
battalions, and this means the infan- fought at the brigade level; the cube cube division offers an improvement
try “reinforcing” the armored battal- division emphasizes this command lev- – first by reducing the total number of
ion will be organic and permanent, as el over the others. The square brigade combat battalions from nine to eight,
opposed to mixing pure infantry/pure has more combat battalions than a tri- and second, by increasing the number
armor battalions in a brigade and then angular template and can therefore of organic support units.
blending them temporarily on a case- deliver heavier knockout blows, but it
by-case basis. is divided into pairs for ease of man- The first improvement, reducing the
agement and command so as to not number of battalions, makes the divi-
With a binary template, a regimental sion smaller and therefore easier to
become unwieldy.
commander has two reinforced ma- transport and resupply. Since armored
neuver battalions. While two battal- Should any peer conflict go nuclear, divisions consume more supplies per
ions may seem weaker than three on square brigades and binary regiments capita than infantry divisions, smaller,
the surface, they are inherently more will furthermore be necessary for more nimble formations will consume
responsive to changes and can reliably power projection without offering less overall. Smaller two-battalion for-
beat the enemy to the punch. Getting juicy targets for tactical nukes. mations can recover more quickly than
inside the enemy’s observe-orient-de- three-battalion formations and sustain
cide-act loop will be crucial for ar- The four-battalion model is useful in
the tempo of operations above what
mored divisions, as they cannot adopt both concentrated and dispersed ac-
the enemy can sustain, granting a tac-
Maginot tactics like infantry can. tions. The American way of war is
tical advantage. Smaller armored divi-
predicated on the assumption that our
sions would also be easier to deploy
Coordination and synchronization of a forces must fight outnumbered and
strategically, and the ability to rapidly
multi-battalion formation is necessary win, especially when the enemy at-
introduce armor to hotspots is desir-
to prevent piecemeal actions, and the tempts to encircle us. To counter this,
able for readiness and deterrence.
fewer subunits one has to manage, the our military has traditionally relied on
better. Thus, a command level with slashing attacks throughout the ene- The second advantage is tied directly
more than one battalion, but still my’s strategic depths rather than en- into the binary regiments; their exis-
smaller than a brigade, will enable ju- circlements, and mechanized/tank tence in the chain of command allows
nior officers to seize fleeting opportu- warfare is no exception. An armored a third tier of command and support.
nities with minimal staff work, while brigade would be capable of attacking Three tiers of command creates new
brigade commanders can focus on and counterattacking in four locations slots for support but also allows mod-
larger actions requiring greater at once with reinforced battalion-sized ularity, mixing and matching.
amounts of staff work – all without ei- forces, or be able to use one regiment
ther commander or operation becom- to screen a wide area and/or both For instance, medical support might
ing overwhelmed. flanks while the second concentrates be better suited for a regiment; trans-
for an attack. port for the brigade; and chemical, ra-
The brigade and division also benefit diological, biological and nuclear units
from this binary template, and the Even when an armored brigade cannot for division level. Engineering could be
cube division uses it on all three lev- blunt an enemy’s thrust or destroy it, useful at more than one level, and so
els. This consistency throughout all such dispersed counterattacks can still on. Instead of a binary “brigade/divi-
levels of command will smooth the throw off the timing of the enemy’s at- sion” choice, it becomes an all-you-
path for officers rising through the tacks and buy time for any units in can-eat buffet. All three levels, how-
ranks, something which will be indis- danger of encirclement to escape the ever, would possess fuel-resupply
pensable should the officer corps suf- noose. Without the binary regiments, trucks and armed escorts, plus self-
fer heavy casualties in a slugfest. Us- a four-battalion brigade would be slow propelled artillery. These are crucial
ing an agile template at higher levels and lumbering compared to a three- because fuel consumption is a major
of command will also foster a culture battalion opponent, but with the regi- concern for armored warfare, resup-
of bold, aggressive action from all of- mental commands, this brigade be- ply will always be targeted, and towed
ficers, and this will preserve the spirit comes both larger and quicker than a artillery is as obsolete on a mecha-
of armored warfare and the armored three-battalion brigade designed for nized battlefield as black-powder muz-
division’s espirit de corps in an age semi-mobile, semi-static infantry war- zleloaders.
when the Army is largely dominated fare.
by infantry culture. Dispersed, mobile, armored artillery
Higher ratio of support will offset any quantitative artillery ad-
Greater brigade power Concurrent to smaller, more nimble vantages enjoyed by the Russians and
While a binary regiment has the tacti- and responsive multi-battalion forma- Chinese, and also provide a place for
cal-agility advantage over a three-bat- tions, the cube division emphasizes anti-weaponry (particularly against
talion regiment or brigade, the square combat support more than a triangle drones). By giving smaller units more
brigade is larger and has more division does. Armored divisions have organic support, the division can

33 Spring 2022
readily keep its widely dispersed regi- pose-built for dispersed action.
ments and brigades resupplied and Acronym Quick-Scan
supported at all times. These are not Yet the cube division still avoids the
only beneficial for sustained high-tem- pitfalls of the pentomic division, which CSS – combat service support
po combined-arms warfare but also emphasized dispersed strength too ex-
provide redundancy when the division cessively and thus could not function
have been reposted on RealClearDe-
sustains heavy losses. without tactical nukes. The cube divi-
fense. He holds a bachelor’s of arts de-
sion’s design is better suited to tanks
gree in biochemistry-molecular biolo-
Conclusion than infantry’s jack-of-all-trades ap-
gy from Carroll College.
While this essay has been fairly broad proach and is an original, modern de-
and brief in describing the cube divi- sign for the 21st Century.
sion, the principles are consistent: ar-
Notes
1
Infantry divisions would be best served
mored warfare is not the same as in- Michael McCabe is as a draftsman/de- by separating into light-heavy versions
fantry warfare, and armored divisions signer at Newport News Shipbuilding rather than a one-size-fits-all approach,
will benefit from stronger brigades, in the Hampton Roads area of Virgin- with heavy infantry working alongside
greater support and smaller overall ia. He has been published on Small tanks and in urban combat; however, this
size. Dispersal is critical in modern Wars Journal under the pen name Mi- is a whole essay unto itself and therefore
warfare, and the cube division is pur- chael Gladius, and some of his essays omitted.

34 Spring 2022
The U.S. Army Should Establish
a Robotics Branch
by John Dudas machinegun and one Javelin missile. positions are filled with qualified Sol-
The RCV-L is perhaps the strongest diers. The ASI qualification is earned
As part of the effort to modernize and
case for a robotics military-occupation after the Soldier completes more
to build the Army of 2030, air and
specialty (MOS) within a dedicated Ro- training for the specific duty assigned.
ground robotics systems will soon be
botics Branch.
fielded to Army brigade combat teams Applying an ASI system to fill robotics-
(BCTs). Common sense sharply indicates that operator positions is a band-aid at
only a highly trained Soldier should be best, especially in light of future quan-
According to The U.S. Army Small Un-
permitted to operate this combat sys- tities that are destined to maneuver
manned Aircraft Strategy published
tem and not someone with an addi- formations. The Army is still left with
in September 2020, there are five ro-
tional duty whose focus may be else- the dilemma of asking a Soldier to per-
botics systems designated for fielding
where. True, there are many examples form two complex functions on the
in the next two to three years.1 Includ-
where Soldiers can perform their pri- battlefield: their primary MOS and the
ed in these systems are four small un-
mary MOS and an additional duty – additional duty.
manned aircraft systems (SUAS) with
the anti-armor infantryman is one
the capability to perform small-unit in- Another option is to create new MOSs
such case. This Soldier is expected to
telligence, surveillance and reconnais- in a branch career-management field.
fight as a dismounted infantryman and
sance (ISR) missions, and one ground Since most air and ground robotic sys-
then transition into an anti-armor gun-
robotic vehicle designed for equip- tems will be fielded at the tactical lev-
ner when required.
ment transport. These capabilities are el, this highlights more MOSs within
managed by the Robotics Require- However, to ask a Soldier to operate the two primary maneuver branches:
ments Division within the Maneuver an air or ground robotics system – es- infantry and armor/cavalry.
Capabilities Development Integration pecially one with the complexity and
Creating more MOSs in these two
Directorate at Fort Benning, GA. lethality of the RCV-L, and expect the
branches would result in only a better
same Soldier to give the required con-
Another robotic system is also on band-aid. Though you have seemingly
centration, skill and vigilance while
board for fielding, albeit some years solved the problem of overloading the
performing their primary combat duty
down the road. The Robotic Combat Soldier with two jobs, a new problem
– is simply asking too much. Special-
Vehicle-Light (RCV-L) is under develop- is created with career development.
ization is needed.
ment as part of the portfolio of the How do armor Soldiers with RCV-L op-
Next-Generation Combat Vehicles Options erator MOSs compete with their
Cross-Functional Team (NGCV-CFT). 19D/19K cousins? Does he or she have
After the previously mentioned robot-
The NGCV-CFT is one of the six priori- the experience to lead a dismounted
ic systems are fielded, a practical
ties for Army modernization.2 reconnaissance team after operating
question is: Who is going to operate
a lethal robot for three years inside a
See Table 1 for a brief description of and maintain them? Right now, the an-
control vehicle?
each system. swer is that Soldiers from each eche-
lon where they are assigned will have Probably yes. Motivated Soldiers are
Challenges this task. For example, an infantry pla- very adaptable, and quality leaders
A quick study of Table 1 will tell the toon fielded with three Soldier-borne will always find a way. But the Army
reader that all these systems are des- sensors (SBSs), one short-range recon- should manage talent in a manner that
tined for fielding at the tactical level naissance (SRR) system and one small avoids putting a Soldier in that posi-
(brigade and below). Looking even multi-purpose equipment transport tion in the first place. Especially when
closer, one system stands out:-the (SMET) would require five Soldiers to it must be accepted that military ap-
RCV-L. The glaring difference in this operate these robotic systems in addi- plication of robotics technology is only
system as compared to the others is tion to their primary MOS duties. A going to advance in the future. And
that the RCV-L is a lethal ground ro- different approach must be consid- these advancements will find their
botic. The vehicle is forecasted to be ered. way in greater numbers to the maneu-
equipped with a Common Remotely ver formations. There will be a time
One option is to create an additional
Operated Weapons Station-Javelin when potentially half the combat ve-
skill identifier (ASI). The ASI denotes a
(CROWS-J) system, similar to the in- hicles in a mounted-maneuver forma-
coded position within an organization-
fantry carrier variant that is present in tion will be robotic.
al chart that ensures the proper man-
the Stryker BCT.3,4 Perhaps there will even be entire ro-
ning of a special duty within the unit.
The CROWS-J is a remote weapon sta- It can be considered a so-called forc- botic formations at different echelons
tion armed with a .50-caliber ma- ing function for organizational leaders
chinegun or MK 19 grenade (and the Army) to ensure these Continued on Page 35

35 Spring 2022
36 Spring 2022
Continued from Page 33 center. Until 2009, Fort Bliss served as Western Governors University.
the Air Defense Artillery School and
– robotic sections and platoons, robot- would have little difficulty ramping up Notes
for a dedicated training-support mis-
1
Robotics Requirements Division, Ma-
ic companies, perhaps even robotic
sion. Officers, warrants officers, non- neuver Capabilities Development Direc-
battalions – complete with air and torate; U.S. Army Small Unmanned Air-
ground systems. These formations commissioned officers and Soldiers
craft System Strategy; Fort Benning, GA:
may even have different roles within could all receive specialized robotic Army Futures Command; 2020.
the same organization, some being le- training at Fort Bliss, providing a pro- 2
Andrew Feickert; “The Army’s Robotic
thal and others providing combat-sup- fessional environment of robotics ex-
Combat Vehicle (RCV) Program”; Con-
port functions such as ISR, logistics perts for the Army.8 gressional Research Service; Dec. 14,
transport or resupply. The point is to Besides entry-level MOS training for 2021; https://crsreports.congress.gov/
not split the maneuver branches into operators, maintainers and leaders, product/pdf/IF/IF11876.
human combat systems, if you will, the RCoE would also provide advanced 3
Shephard News Team; “Javelin firings
and robotic systems. Again, specializa- education for all ranks and become showcase CROWS flexibility”; Jun. 25,
tion of skill in talent management is the repository of lessons-learned. In 2021; https://www.shephardmedia.
key. addition, the RCoE would have the re- com/news/landwarfareintl/javelin-fir-
ings-showcase-crows-flexibility/.
The best option for the Army is to cre- sponsibility of developing future roles
and concepts for robotic formations
4
Director, Operational Test and Evalua-
ate a Robotics Branch that can fill
and ensuring these concepts were tion; “Stryker Common Remotely Operat-
combat organizations with specially ed Weapon Station-Javelin (CROWS-J)”;
trained Soldiers. These Soldiers should nested across the doctrine, organiza-
Feb. 26, 2022; Fiscal Year 2018 Army Pro-
be backed and supported by a pur- tion, training, materiel, leadership de- grams; https://www.dote.osd.mil/Por-
poseful branch, filled with robotic ex- velopment, personnel, facilities and tals/97/pub/reports/FY2018/
perts with the mission to solely focus policies categories. army/2018strykercrowsj.
on their training, employment, profes- pdf?ver=2019-08-21-155808-197.
sional development, promotion and Conclusion 5
Richard Killblane; 70 Years of the Trans-
assignment. Only a dedicated Robot- As stated, the U.S. Army should estab- portation Corps; U.S. Army Transporta-
ics Branch can perform all those func- lish a Robotics Branch. As robotic tech- tion Corps; Feb. 26, 2022; https://trans-
tions. nology advances and finds its way into portation.army.mil/history/index.html.
maneuver formations, dedicated and 6
Office of the Chief of Armor; This is Ar-
Robotics Branch and skilled Soldiers must be properly mor, U.S. Army Armor School Pamphlet
trained and led to employ these sys- 360-2; Dec. 8, 2021; www.benning.army.
center of excellence tems. A Robotics Branch will directly
Building a new branch is not without mil/armor/ocoa/content/References%20
support this effort. and%20Guides/USAARMS%20Pam%20
precedent. The creation of a Robotics
360-2%20This%20is%20Armor.
Branch would be similar to the advent John Dudas served in the U.S. Army for pdf?8DEC2021.
of the Motor Transport Corps after in- 32 years and retired as an infantry 7
Bill Roche; “Army’s Cyber Branch Marks
tegration of mechanized vehicles into command sergeant major. Currently a its Fifth Anniversary”; Army Cyber Com-
the force, or even the Tank Corps, training developer (maneuver air and mand; Aug. 28, 2019; https://www.army.
which both began in 1918. 5,6 As re- ground robotic systems) in Systems mil/article/226345/armys_cyber_
cently as 2014, the Army started the Training Branch, Directorate of Train- branch_marks_its_fifth_anniversary.
Cyber Branch to engage threats in the ing and Development (DoTD), MCoE, 8
LaSonya Morales and Jason Stadel; “Air
cyber domain.7 Fort Benning, GA, previous assign- Defense Artillery School Graduates Final
ments have been capability developer Classes at Fort Bliss”; U.S. Army 16th Mo-
The new Robotics Branch should be
(thermal sights-sniper and crew- bile Public Affairs Detachment; Dec. 15,
classified as another member of the
served weapons), Soldier Require- 2009; https://www.army.mil/arti-
combat arms since most of its systems
ments Division, Maneuver Capabilities cle/31876/air_defense_artillery_school_
will find their home in maneuver for- graduates_final_classes_at_fort bliss.
Development and Integration Director-
mations (at BCT level and below). A
ate, Fort Benning; directorate sergeant
seemingly logical home for a Robotics
major, DoTD, MCoE; command ser-
Center of Excellence (RCoE) is at Fort
geant major, 3rd Battalion, 11th Infan-
Benning, which is also home to the
try (Officer Candidate School), Fort
Acronym Quick-Scan
Maneuver Center of Excellence
Benning; and sergeant major, G-3/5/7,
(MCoE). ASI – additional skill identifier
U.S. Army Africa, based at Caserma BCT – brigade combat team
However, a strong argument could be Ederle, Vicenza, Italy. His military CROWS-J – Common Remotely
made for Fort Bliss, TX. Fort Bliss and schooling included Sergeants Major Operated Weapons Station-Javelin
the adjoining White Sands Missile Course, Capability Developer Course DoTD – Directorate of Training and
Range has an enormous training area Development
and Ranger and Airborne schools. Du-
ISR – intelligence, surveillance and
with excellent live-fire ranges, along das holds a bachelor’s of science de- reconnaissance
with adequate air and ground maneu- gree in liberal studies from Excelsior MCoE – Maneuver Center of
ver space, that would fit the needs of College and a master’s of education Excellence
an air and ground robotics training degree in instructional design from

37 Spring 2022
Acronym Quick-Scan
MOS – military-occupation specialty RCoE – Robotics Center of SMET – small multi-purpose
NGCV-CFT – Next-Generation Excellence equipment transport
Combat Vehicles Cross-Functional RCV-L – Robotic Combat Vehicle- SRR – short-range reconnaissance
Team Light SUAS – small unmanned aircraft
SBS – Soldier-borne sensor system

38 Spring 2022
FROM THE SCREEN
The Screen In-Depth
by 1LT Caleb B. Welch
One of the first things I had to do as a
new platoon leader was participate in
a tactical-decision exercise that my
squadron commander was facilitating
to prepare platoon leaders for an up-
coming Joint Readiness Training Cen-
ter rotation. I was fresh out of the Ar-
mor Basic Officer Leader’s Course
(ABOLC) and the Scout Leader’s Course
(SLC) at Fort Benning, GA, and I was
looking forward to applying what I had
learned.
My troop commander brought in all
the platoon leaders and briefed an op-
erations order, all of which made
sense until he briefed the locations of
each platoon arrayed in a troop
screen. My troop commander ex-
plained that he wanted my platoon to
“screen in-depth” along a certain
route, but his graphics indicated he
wanted us arrayed in what I would
have described as a good ol’ fashioned
stationary screen.
At SLC I was taught that a screen in-
depth was a very specific way to con-
duct a screen. Therefore I was under
the impression that setting up a screen
in-depth meant emplacing observa-
tion points (OPs) to conduct a platoon
or troop internal reconnaissance
handover (RHO) and pass targets into
an engagement area to be destroyed. Figure 1. In-depth positioning of OPs. (Adapted from Figure 4-3, ATP 3-20.98,
I was honestly a little confused after Scout Platoon)
the brief, so I approached my com-
mander and asked him to clarify how has something to do with positioning screen in-depth just a regular screen?
he wanted me to orient my platoon in OPs at varying distances between the Thankfully my troop commander was
the screen. He clearly thought his new frontline trace and rear boundary of a good sport about the whole misun-
platoon leader was very dumb as he the platoon, but they rarely articulate derstanding and didn’t lose his pa-
tried in vain to explain the orientation their definition in similar language. tience with me. Eventually I opened
of a screen to the stupidest person he To make matters worse, Army Tech- up Scout Platoon in his office, and I
had ever met. niques Publication (ATP) 3-20.98, discovered that doctrine provided no
Despite being confident that my in- Scout Platoon, does not have a clear clear guidance one way or another.
structors at SLC had taught me the definition for a screen in-depth. The Both of us were able to see each oth-
doctrinally correct way to establish a result is that cavalry leaders often use er’s understanding of what constitut-
ed a screen in-depth reflected in the
screen in-depth, I quickly realized the the term “screen in-depth” so liberal-
language of ATP 3-20.98.
definition I learned was not shared by ly that the term no longer has any
all cavalry officers. Cavalry leaders can meaning. For example, if every screen The previous vignette illustrates the
generally agree that a screen in-depth is a screen in-depth, then isn’t a lack of unity among cavalry leaders on

39 Spring 2022
a characteristic incorporated into all
screens.
According to Scout Platoon, “Scout
platoons plan screens in-depth. Depth
prevents the threat from easily identi-
fying and penetrating the screen, pre-
vents gaps from occurring when [OPs]
displace, allows platoons to gain and
maintain enemy contact, and facili-
tates the destruction of enemy recon-
naissance elements without compro-
mising tasks” (Paragraph 4-23). Incor-
porating depth into a screen prevents
the enemy from easily pinpointing the
location of friendly screens, protects
screens from enemy indirect fires and
allows OPs to displace without com-
promising the integrity of the screen.
As a result, depth should be incorpo-
rated as a planning consideration into
all screens.

Figure 2. Alternate graphics to depict in-depth positioning of OPs. (Based on Scout Platoon Paragraphs 4-30 and
map created by the author) 4-31 under subhead “Depth” provide
an excellent discussion of the impor-
tance of depth and potential tech-
niques for platoon leaders to achieve
depth in their screens. “Scout platoon
leaders assign section boundaries that
allow multiple [OPs] to establish a
screen and create depth within a
screen [Figure 1]. Whenever possible,
[OPs] should be within supporting dis-
tance of each other to enhance secu-
rity through mutual support and to en-
able RHO between observation posts.”
While this information is helpful, it ul-
timately fails to describe in concrete
terms how to establish a screen in-
depth. The definition is supported by
graphics, which generally seem to
cause more confusion than clarity.
The most obvious issue with Figure 4-3
in ATP 3-20.98 is that leaders have a
hard time imagining implementing this
technique into their screen because of
the lack of graphic-control measures.
Figure 3. Alternate graphics to depict a stationary screen with depth. (Based If Figure 4-3 shows the enemy moving
on map created by the author) into an engagement area, the OPs
passing the target are in danger of
the definition of a screen in-depth and What doctrine says committing fratricide. The risks asso-
shows that a lack of specificity ulti- ciated with setting up a screen in this
mately leads to confusion. My goal is To its credit, ATP 3-20.98 dedicates an
entire paragraph to discussing depth, way are too high to be considered a
to provide a summary of platoon- and useful technique and a more concrete,
troop-level doctrine for the term and its importance when planning and
conducting security operations. Unfor- less theoretical example would be
“screen in-depth,” highlight discrepan- helpful.
cies and inadequacies in its definition, tunately, it also fails to clarify the dif-
and discuss possible alternatives that ference between incorporating depth The biggest shortcoming with Scout
would clarify its meaning. into a screen and planning a screen in- Platoon’s definition of a screen in-
depth. Ultimately depth is meant to be depth is that it fails to differentiate the

40 Spring 2022
difference between incorporating contact to another element without into an engagement area is often im-
depth into a screen and establishing a engaging or displacing by conducting practical and unnecessary when ar-
screen in-depth. The reader is left with a platoon internal RHO. A screen in- rayed in a stationary screen.
a vague idea of the importance of in- depth is normally achieved by arraying
corporating depth into the screen but OPs parallel to the enemy’s expected Conclusion
no real concrete idea of the variety of avenue of approach. This technique al- By providing a clear definition of a
techniques that can be used to achieve lows the scout platoon to set up en- screen in-depth and graphics that il-
depth within a screen. gagement areas with a greater chance lustrate its unique capabilities, cavalry
of achieving flank shots and facilitates leaders can provide platoon-level
Proposed definition passing targets through the assigned leadership another tool to assist in
Undoubtedly one of the strengths of element’s area of operations.” planning and executing security oper-
Scout Platoon, and ultimately any suc- ations. The unique mission of cavalry
cessful Army doctrine, is its flexibility. Most of the first sentence is taken di- organizations requires flexible and
Some cavalry leaders may argue that rectly from Scout Platoon, Paragraph clear doctrine that can be used as a
differentiating between depth as a 4-30. Most of the raw material needed framework to guide leaders as they
characteristic of all screens and a to define a screen in-depth can be plan missions.
screen in-depth as a technique will ul- found in the pages of this publication;
timately reduce this flexibility and po- it is a matter of separating the expla- 1LT Caleb Welch is the executive offi-
tentially restrict cavalry leaders from nations of the importance of depth cer of Troop B, 2nd Squadron, 107th Cav-
applying creative solutions to the from the descriptions of screens in- alry Regiment, 37 th Infantry Brigade
unique challenges presented by mis- depth. Combat Team, Ohio Army National
sion variables: mission, enemy, ter- Guard. He concurrently serves as the
More graphics will undoubtedly aid full-time Active Guard Reserve squad-
rain, troops available, time and civil readers as they attempt to picture the
considerations. ron training officer for 2-107 Cavalry.
concept of a screen in-depth as it 1LT Welch previously served as a pla-
In reality, providing a clear definition would appear on an operations over- toon leader in Troop B, 2-107 Cavalry.
for a screen in-depth will provide an- lay. It is important that two sets of His military schools include ABOLC,
other tool for scout-platoon leaders to graphics are used to distinguish a Air-Assault School, SLC, Pathfinder
consider when planning security mis- screen in-depth from a stationary Course and Maneuver Leader’s Main-
sions. A clear definition of a screen in- screen with depth incorporated. Fig- tenance Course. 1LT Welch has a bach-
depth will facilitate creative problem- ure 2 clearly illustrates that a screen elor’s of science degree in journalism
solving and provide another example in-depth is oriented parallel to the en- from Ohio University.
for leaders to consider when facing emy’s most likely avenue of approach,
the unique challenges presented by with the potential for OPs to pass a
Acronym Quick-Scan
the operational environment. target into an engagement area near
OPs 1 and 2.
Scout-platoon leaders would benefit ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer
from a potential definition for a screen Figure 3 is equally important in that it Leader’s Course
ATP – Army techniques publication
in-depth such as the following: “A demonstrates 1) the necessity of in- OP – observation post
screen in-depth is a technique used by corporating depth to best use the ter- RHO – reconnaissance handover
scout-platoon leaders that allows one rain available and avoid compromising SLC – Scout Leader’s Course
element of the screen to pass enemy OP locations; and 2) passing targets

41 Spring 2022
TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISE
by LTC Ben Ferguson advance guard of a mech-
anized-rifle division that
Following is the author’s solution to
is moving east toward
the tactical vignette published in AR-
the international airport.
MOR’s Fall 2021 edition. The best so-
The TF’s movement will
lutions from the field for that vignette
allow the rest of the bri-
can still be published in a subsequent
gade to maneuver and
issue of ARMOR.
destroy the regimental
“What’s Your Next Move?” serves as main body, with enough
the first in a new series of scenarios fo- combat power left to
cused on large-scale combat opera- block the remainder of
tions. ARMOR publishes tactical vi- the enemy division.
gnettes, or tactical- decision exercises,
to generate professional dialogue. Sce- Scenario follows in support; you have priority of
narios may seem vague and lack perti- While conducting resupply in Tactical fires, but your fire-support officer has
nent information to mimic the confu- Assembly Area Blast, intelligence, sur- limited contact with the lead firing bat-
sion of battle. veillance and reconnaissance reports tery.
large groups of enemy tracked vehicles
There are no “right” or “wrong” an- The terrain is mostly open, lightly for-
15 kilometers away from Command
swers to the scenarios posed in ested prairie with little undulation,
Post (CP) 1. The TF commander has di-
“What’s Your Next Move?” Use your with some higher terrain in the center
rected you via Joint Capabilities Re-
doctrinal knowledge and educated as- of the zone. As you approach the inter-
lease (JCR) to occupy Battle Position
sumptions to determine “What’s Your section at CP 6, the easternmost scout-
(BP) 1 and delay the enemy force until
Next Move?” platoon observation (OP) reports visu-
the rest of the battalion can arrive.
al contact with about 30 vehicles mov-
Situation Your team consists of two M1A2 tank ing east and starting to deploy in the
You are the commander of A Team platoons and one mechanized-infantry vicinity of CP 1, and movement of a
(tank heavy), Task Force (TF) 3-8. You platoon. Your company has tactical wheeled vehicle just north of CP 7. A
are the TF’s advance guard as it con- control of the battalion scout-platoon moment later, your other mounted
ducts a movement-to-contact. The TF’s section toward the forward-line-of- scout OP reports they have identified
mission is to fix and then destroy the own-troops and the mortar platoon what they assess are threat-vehicle

42 Fall 2021
sections north of Hill 560, moving east toward the south. Be prepared to cov- force-oriented or terrain-oriented) to
toward CP 3 and in the vicinity of CP 2. er supplemental avenue of approach prevent the possibility of bypass to the
from CP7 and move dismounted-infan- north.
What’s your next move? Decide what
try squads to block enemy dismounted
to do and issue your fragmentary order There is an inherent dilemma as to
avenues of approach.
(FRAGO) as if you were speaking on the whether we should attempt to occupy
radio or via JCR message. Following White, move east half of BP, oriented a static position or potentially accom-
your initial FRAGO, clearly define the north toward CP2 and CP3. Task: At- plish the mission farther north or
problem(s) as you see it/them. Submit tack-by-fire, orienting direct fire deep south to ensure the enemy cannot eas-
both your initial FRAGO and discussion on CP2. Purpose: To prevent the ene- ily bypass our position.
of the problem, assumptions and ratio- my from maneuvering to the north and
bypassing. Break. The company/team does not have the
nale for your solution to ARMOR, us-
time or the combat power to cover all
army.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-mag- Blue, move to southwest corner of BP, potential enemy avenues of approach.
[email protected], no later than 45 days oriented west to PL Ike. Task: Attack- By establishing a position vicinity the
after this edition is posted on-line. by-fire, orienting fires from CP4 to Tar- planned BP, we should be able to ac-
get Reference Point 1. Purpose: To pre- complish the mission of fixing the en-
Author’s proposed FRAGO vent the enemy from maneuvering emy battalion by destroying the lead-
“Guidons, this is Black 6, FRAGO fol- north. Break. ing two companies along PL Ike and
lows. Add three graphic-control mea-
Mortars, move to Mortar Firing Point forcing the enemy commander to de-
sures: Platoon (PL) Abe as a straight
1 south of road and PL Abe. Task: Dis- lay further action before he has time
line between CP7 and CP5; PL Ike as a
rupt the advance guard’s main body to develop the situation and maneuver
line between CP7 and CP3; and PL Cal
with high-explosive/smoke between PL against the company/team and our fol-
between CP1 and CP2.
Cal and PL Ike. Purpose: Disrupt the en- low-on TF.
Situation: The enemy scouts or mount- emy’s formations, giving us a direct- By moving the mechanized infantry to
ed patrols are moving on east-west av- fire advantage by forcing him to button higher ground, oriented northwest, the
enues of approach; they are deploying up and disperse. intent is to provide greater survivabil-
a battalion-sized element at CP1 and
Black Fires, move to a position vicinity ity and range for the mech infantry’s
moving generally east to engage the
CP5 to regain communications with the tube-launched, optically tracked, wide-
main body of the task force.
task force and call for fires to fix ene- guided missiles. Dismounted Javelin
Mission: We will attack-by-fire to fix my at PL Ike. You have priority of fires. and AT engagements will help block
the lead enemy battalion vicinity CP3 enemy identification of CP7 as a less-
to allow the TF to move to a position Scouts, continue to observe, destroy defended avenue of approach but
of advantage to destroy the enemy enemy scouts and engage mounted would clearly be of greatest concern.
targets to prevent enemy penetration Identification of enemy movement of
regiment.
of CP7 in the south or CP4 in the north. a company-sized element through CP7
Intent: The purpose of our mission is Identification of enemy committal of would require a difficult reallocation of
to fix the enemy force at CP3 to allow platoon or larger-sized elements to- tanks while under contact or a decision
the TF time to move to a position of ward CP7 is commander’s critical-infor- to retrograde to supplementary posi-
advantage and destroy the enemy reg- mation requirement. tions farther southeast.
iment. We will accomplish this by at-
Black 5, Regain contact with higher, re-
tacking by fire oriented north and west Don’t agree? Following your initial
port and determine how long until TF
to defeat the enemy battalion at CP3 FRAGO, clearly define the problem(s)
will arrive. Observe location and move-
and PL Ike. At endstate, the company/ as you see it/them, then submit both
ment of enemy east of PL Ike and assist
team will be arrayed in attack-by-fire your initial FRAGO and discussion of
in calling for and adjusting fires.
positions vicinity BP1 in a left echelon, the problem, assumptions and ratio-
anchored to the hill to the west and Black 7, move trains to a hide position nale for your solution to ARMOR, us-
oriented to the west and northwest; west of CP6; be prepared to execute army.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-mag-
the lead enemy battalion fixed vicinity medical evacuation. Acknowledge, [email protected] no later than 45 days
CP3; and the TF maneuvering to de- over.” after this edition is posted on-line.
stroy the enemy regiment.
Rationale
Tasks to subordinate units: Green Our mission was to find and fix the Acronym Quick-Scan
(mechanized infantry), move to the in- lead enemy battalion to enable the bri-
tervisibility line vicinity hill west of BP, gade, but we now we have to make AT – anti-tank
oriented toward PL Ike. Task: Attack- some assumptions on how long the BP – battle position
by-fire, orienting anti-tank (AT) fires to battalion will take to deploy. The dis-
CP – command post
CP1 and dismounted AT at CP7. Pur- FRAGO – fragmentary order
tance and the objective of the enemy JCR – Joint Capabilities Release
pose: To protect the company/team’s must be accounted for (i.e., is he OP – observation post
flank, denying enemy movement PL – platoon
TF – task force

43 Fall 2021
BOOK REVIEWS
The Equus expertise, having served in the Rhode- Campaign Series. Volume 2, the sub-
Men: Rhode- sian army as a paymaster to several ject of this review, covers the German
sia’s Mounted units, including the Grey’s. His re- attack within the city itself. Volume 1
Infantry: The search is exhaustive, and the writing covers the approach of the German
Grey’s Scouts, is detailed to an extreme. Unfortu- army to the city, and Volume 3 deals
1896-1980 by nately, his writing style is dense, with with the massive and decisive Russian
Alexandre Bin- little in the way of an appealing story- counterattack. A reader interested in
da; United line to the reader. the campaign will want to read all
Kingdom: He- three volumes. But this work can stand
What Equus Men lacks in a narrative
lion and Com- alone and be read and understood by
is more than made up for in period
pany; 2021; someone who has not read the others.
photographs and information, leaving
2 8 8 p a ge s ;
an overall impression of a unit year- Most readers of ARMOR will be famil-
$300 hardcover, $35.77 paperback.
book rather than historical work. iar with Osprey’s Campaign Series, of
Is there a role for horse-mounted cav- Readers searching for a “one-stop which literally hundreds have been
alry in modern warfare? The answer shop” on the Grey’s Scouts need look published. These always-concise
to that question may be found in the no further. works range from good to excellent
story of Rhodesia’s own cavalry force and focus on standard military history.
during the so-called Bush War of 1964- Rhodesia reintroduced horse cavalry Full of maps, photographs and excel-
1979. in a search for tactical solutions to an lent drawings, they narrate the course
increasingly untenable strategic prob- of their battles describing the plans
Written by Rhodesian-army-veteran lem set during the nation’s civil war.
author Alexandre Binda, Equus Men and maneuvers of both sides.
Petrol shortages, land mines and diffi-
opens with an account of the emer- cult terrain – combined with declining This work fol-
gency stand-up of an ad hoc paramili- external material and political support lows the stan-
tary cavalry unit during the Matabele for Rhodesia – required its military dard Cam-
Rebellion of 1896, in what would later leaders to look for novel approaches paign Series
become Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). to counterinsurgency. The idea of an format. It
This unit, dubbed Grey’s Scouts from army maintaining a ready, resourced starts out with
its founder Englishman George Grey, and trained cavalry force may seem an analysis of
served as part of the larger Bulawayo anachronistic in 21st Century military the origins of
Field Force throughout the 100-day
warfare, and certainly was not the an- the campaign,
conflict.
swer to Rhodesia’s existential chal- a brief biogra-
Both formations passed into African lenges. phy of the ma-
military history until Rhodesia recog- jor command-
nized the need for a cavalry branch as Binda presents a compelling case for
ers of both
a counterinsurgency tool. Despite the maintenance of a small mounted
sides and then an analysis of the con-
some resistance to the idea, the Rho- cavalry force as a reconnaissance or
tending armies. The book then nar-
desian army authorized a provisional counterinsurgency element to aug-
rates the battles and ends with a dis-
cavalry force drawing its lineage from ment modern military capabilities.
cussion what the battlefield looks like
the Grey’s. These cavalrymen played a That said, there is a danger of present-
today.
pivotal, albeit short-lived, role until ing tactical-level solutions as a silver-
Rhodesia collapsed in 1980. The unit bullet answer to operational or strate- Forczyk, one of today’s leading mili-
disbanded a final time as dictator Rob- gic level challenges – a lesson U.S. tary historians, has produced one of
ert Mugabe assumed power in the Army leaders seem to have largely for- Osprey’s best histories with this book.
newly renamed Zimbabwe. gotten in our own counterinsurgency His descriptions of the commanders
experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. involved are excellent, and his analy-
The text’s middle is a year-by-year LTC CHRISTOPHER J. HEATHERLY ses of the strengths and weaknesses
analysis of the reformed Grey’s in Rho-
of both sides’ armies and air forces are
desia, including combat-informed
interesting and informative. Most im-
changes to its organization, structure, Stalingrad 1942-1943 (2), The Fight
portantly, his battle narrative is clear
employment, personnel, equipment for the City by Robert Forczyk; Oxford,
and easy to follow. Readers often get
and tactics. Binda concludes the story United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing;
bogged down in military histories try-
with a series of appendices listing mil- 2021; 96 pages; $24 paperback, $9.99
ing to follow the movements of differ-
itary honors, the Grey’s fallen soldiers Kindle.
ent commanders and their formations
and even selections from the unit’s
Dr. Robert Forczyk has written three over unfamiliar terrain, but there is no
songbook.
volumes chronicling the Battle of Stal- problem with that here. Forczyk’s clear
Binda writes from a position of ingrad for Osprey’s long-running prose is supported by a host of

44 Spring 2022
excellent and detailed maps. One German historian specializing in this partisan strength and made the fight
comes away with a clear understand- period, discovered Heinrici’s private effectively a two-front war before the
ing of what happened and why. papers in an archive and edited a Ger- close of the first year. Partisan efforts
man edition similar to the now-avail- to interdict German resupply were a
As always in Osprey books, there are
able English translation. His expertise constant source of worry and frustra-
cut-outs in the text that examine por-
in this chapter in German history tion and contributed materially to the
tions of the battle in great detail, us-
makes his work especially relevant as deterioration of Wehrmacht combat
ing three-dimensional terrain depic-
a retelling of the opening year of the effectiveness.
tions. There are also careful drawings
war on the Russian front.
with annotations that describe uni- Heinrici observed a number of sharp
forms and equipment in detail. Heinrici records the relentless, ruth- contrasts to what his soldiers had ex-
less and often savage nature of Rus- perienced in operations in the West:
If you are interested in and want to
sian resistance and the German re- “seasons of mud” lasting for months
clearly understand the Battle of Stal-
sponse to it that characterized combat in Fall and Spring; subfreezing temper-
ingrad in a relatively short, but accu-
in his sector. He recounts no acts of atures for weeks on end, with lows
rate, work that is packed with detail,
mercy or chivalry – such as those that reaching -30F; a lack of potable water;
this is for you.
occasionally appear in the memoirs of near-universal poverty, and yet every
COL (RETIRED) WILLIAM R. BETSON
his colleague GEN Erhard Raus; Heinri- village had a new, well-equipped pub-
ci’s war was, lic school.
German General on the Eastern Front: for his sol-
the Letters and Diaries of Gotthard Poor planning, based on German un-
diers, one of
Heinrici, 1941-1942 by Johannes Hurt- derestimation of Russian morale and
no quarter
er; United Kingdom: Pen and Sword fighting ability, caused endless suffer-
asked or giv-
Books Ltd; 2021; 176 pages; $34.95 ing for Heinrici’s troops when the
en. Nonethe-
hardcover, $19.95 paperback. hoped-for quick victory failed to ma-
less, Heinrici
terialize. Like the fictional soldiers in
The Russo-Ukranian War, Europe’s first was not a Nazi
Cross of Iron, Heinrici’s men lived for
major conflict since 1945, makes the and did not
months on end in combat, outdoors,
private letters and diaries of a senior engage in
in all kinds of weather, without reli-
German commander, Generaloberst wanton de-
able resupply, hungry, cold, ill and
Gotthard Heinrici – who led combat struction.
bonded to each other in a misery that
operations over much of the same The savagery of the combat and the often produced heroic sacrifice, while
ground in World War II – relevant as a scenes of extreme suffering and utter the top brass in Berlin continued to
glimpse of what warfare in that region, ruin that greeted him everywhere, in live in comfort and believed in fairy-
especially in wintertime, entails. contrast to what he’d witnessed in tales of eventual victory. Stories of
Heinrici knew this region well, having World War I, led him to remark on sev- men with frostbite, sores and lice re-
fought over it as a young officer in eral occasions that nothing like what maining in the trenches or on the
World War I. Much of his 6½ years of he saw had happened in Europe since ground for hours during a sub-arctic
combat experience were spent on the the Thirty Years’ War. A particularly winter to hold the line against repeat-
terrain contested during the opening telling example of the intensity of the ed attacks by better-fed, -clothed and
stages of the present fighting in conflict is Heinrici’s relating how a -equipped foes are a regular feature of
Ukraine. His letters to his wife, private Russian partisan had, prior to execu- Heinrici’s letters.
in nature but intended to be preserved tion, made his own noose, exclaiming,
The takeaway for the reader is that cli-
as a historical record of what Heinrici “I die for Communism!” as his sen-
mate and geography will be critical
saw, offer an almost-daily recounting tence was carried out.
factors for any would-be combatant
of what the Wehrmacht encountered Partisan warfare was endemic and a planning operations in the realm of
once they passed the German frontier regular refrain in Heinrici’s writings. “General Winter.” Doing so will help
bound for the Eurasian heartland. Both civilians and Russian soldiers avoid the mistakes Heinrici’s superiors
These letters – excerpted to focus on caught behind the leading edge of the made in learning the lessons of com-
military matters – combined with di- German advance would operate inde- bat in Eurasia. Germany’s failure to
ary entries, offer a short, pungent re- pendently in the Wehrmacht’s rear, learn from history contributed to their
counting of the enemy and elements frequently equipped with military gear “Napoleonic retreat” from a Russia
that ultimately broke the fighting pow- abandoned in forests and swamps dur- they’d marched into expecting a quick
er of the Wehrmacht. ing the retreat. Airborne insertions be- and easy triumph.
Dr. Johannes Hurter, a distinguished hind the German front added to SFC (RETIRED) LLOYD A. CONWAY

45 Spring 2022
MOR REG
AR IM
H
635 T

EN
T

Yellow and green are the colors used for Armor. The increased maneuverability, penetrat-
ing force and firepower of the modern tank are symbolized by the fusils charged with
pheons or broadarrows alongside the destructive and awesome fury of a cyclone. The lat-
ter also refers to the sobriquet of Kansas as the “Cyclone State,” home area of the organi-
zation. The distinctive unit insignia was approved Oct. 5, 1977.
“Orient on the protected force” is a fundamental of security. (From the Maneuver Center of Excellence “Fundamentals
of Reconnaissance” poster series, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/fundamentals/SF-2.html. See the article “For-
gotten Fundamentals in Reconnaissance and Security“ by CPT Christopher E. Kiriscioglu and CPT Jordan L. Woodburn in-
side.

Headquarters, Department of the Army PB 17-22-2

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited PIN 212043-000